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Cosmopolitanism in a Global Perspective

by

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Many of you might remember former Prime Minister Theresa May's famous dictum during the Tory Party conference in October 2016: 'If you believe you are a citizen of the world, you're a citizen of nowhere.'[1] This is how she summarized an attack on those who, in her eyes, represented 'the wealth of London'. These people, she argued, did not respect 'the spirit of citizenship'. Rather, 'too many people in positions of power behave as though they have more in common with international elites than with the people down the road.' If we translate 'citizen of the world' as 'cosmopolitan' (or 'global citizen'), her statement can be seen as an outright attack on people moving freely between different regions and cultures.

I would like to take the occasion of the GHIL Annual Lecture as an invitation to reflect on a concept that has resurfaced in recent polemics in Germany, Britain, and beyond in the context of debates about the global economy, about immigration and identity, namely, that of 'cosmopolitanism' or, perhaps more precisely, that of people displaying cosmopolitan behaviour or leanings.[2] There are many different strands to the current debate, not all of which can be dealt with in this context. My main concern is to problematize the common perception that cosmopolitanism is a phenomenon of elites, and of mostly Western elites at that. In order to do this, I will seek not only to engage with current debates but also to trace the origins of present-day notions of cosmopolitanism. I will then attempt to link this to

[1] 'Theresa May's Conference Speech in Full', *Telegraph*, 5 Oct. 2016, online at <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/05/theresa-mays-conference-speech-in-full/>, accessed 9 Sept. 2019. Subscription required.
[2] The abstract noun implies a philosophical stance or even ideology which links it to a particular intellectual tradition, whereas this contribution explicitly intends to start from concrete phenomena in order to allow for a less culturally deterministic approach.

concepts, but also to practices, in non-Western societies in order to test to what extent cosmopolitan practices and concepts are an exclusively Western phenomenon. By relating the history of the concept in the West to non-Western perspectives, I aim, in a small way, to follow Dipesh Chakrabarty's call to provincialize Europe.

Cosmopolitanism and Cosmopolitans in Current Public Discourse

May's statement quoted above was widely taken as an attack on people with multiple identities, or who embraced a European or global vision of politics. The *Guardian* subsequently compared it to Alexander Gauland's diatribe of October 2018 against a globalized class living in English-speaking bubbles in big cities.[3] Gauland is the co-leader of the Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany), an originally mostly Eurosceptic right-wing party founded in 2013. Since its founding and subsequent rise in popularity, it has incorporated the Islamophobic rhetoric of the far-right nationalist movement PEGIDA, also known as Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident. This 'nativist' movement was founded in October 2014 against the background of an increase in the number of asylum seekers and political demonstrations by immigrants. These were perceived as a prelude to the importing of conflicts from the migrants' societies to Germany.[4] Although absent in the debates on the 'citizens of nowhere', refugees and migrant workers actually form the other large group with which not only Gauland, but also May, were (and

[3] Alexander Gauland, 'Warum muss es Populismus sein?', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 6 Oct. 2018, online at <www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ inland/ alexander-gauland-warum-muss-es-populismus-sein-15823206.html>, accessed 16 Sept. 2019; Jonathan Davis and Andy Hollis, 'Theresa May's Brexit Speech had Shades of Hitler', *Guardian*, 12 Oct. 2018, online at <www. theguardian.com/politics/2018/oct/12/theresa-mays-brexit-speech-had-shades-of-hitler>, accessed 9 Sept. 2019.
[4] For the background of PEGIDA and its characterization as 'nativist' see Fabian Virchow, 'PEGIDA: Understanding the Emergence and Essence of Nativist Protest in Dresden', *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 37/6 (2016), 541–55, online at <https://doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2016.1235026>, accessed 3 Jan. 2020. Subscription required.

are) concerned. Crucially, in the minds of May and Gauland, they are not considered in the specific context of 'citizens of the world', but rather as immigrants of a problematic nature, even though their practice of mobility links them strongly to the mobile elites. I will show, in this lecture, that this class-based separation is one linked to a particular trajectory in Western thought.

But let me return to Britain and Theresa May. For good measure, the *Guardian* added to her statement a very similar one by Adolf Hitler about people 'who feel at home everywhere'.[5] Ostensibly, May and Gauland were both criticizing a particular type of globalized elite. Gauland, however, went further by contrasting such elites with ordinary workers in precarious or badly paid jobs, concerned about their homeland ('Heimat'), who feel endangered by an influx of immigrants.[6] A recent prominent example of this kind of rhetoric was seen in US President Donald Trump's address to the UN General Assembly in September 2019. He exclaimed that 'The future does not belong to globalists. The future belongs to patriots.'[7]

Obviously, all of this leads us into the midst of current debates about immigration, immigrants, and the supposed dangers of multi-culturalism. To recapitulate, in Britain, the decision to allow Polish labour immediate access to the British market after Poland's accession to the EU sparked substantial angst and caused strong reactions against immigration. This immigration occurred initially in the EU context, but the large-scale immigration of mostly Syrian migrants into Europe from 2015 exacerbated such fears. In Germany, the de-industrialization of many parts of eastern Germany and the reloca-

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[5] Jonathan Davis and Andy Hollis, 'Theresa May's Brexit Speech had Shades of Hitler', *Guardian,* 12 Oct. 2018, online at <www.theguardian.com/politics/ 2018/oct/12/theresa-mays-brexit-speech-had-shades-of-hitler>, accessed 9 Sept. 2019.

[6] Matthias Koch, 'Globalisierung, Heimat und "Hitler light" ', *Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 11 Oct. 2018, online at <www.haz.de/Nachrichten/ Politik/Deutschland-Welt/Gaulands-Gastbeitrag-Globalisierung-Heimat-und-Hitler-light>, last viewed 16 Sept. 2019.

[7] 'Trump Accused of using Antisemitic Trope during UN Speech', *Independent*, 24 Sept. 2019, online at <www.independent.co.uk/news/ world/ americas/us-politics/trump-unga-un-speech-globalists-patriots-antisemitic-a9118581.html>, accessed 25 Sept. 2019.

tion of industry to regions with lower wages—initially in eastern Europe—gave rise to anxieties and xenophobic attacks in the 1990s. In the 2010s such fears were channelled into PEGIDA and crystallized after acts of sexual harassment during New Year celebrations in 2015 in Cologne (mostly perpetrated by North African immigrants rather than by Syrian refugees) led to an unprecedented polarization of opinions about migration.

'Citizens of the world', 'globalized class', 'vaterlandslose Gesellen'—we can see here that cosmopolites and cosmopolitanism are by no means universally positively connotated. This observation is certainly not restricted to the immediate present and the current wave of globalization, as the reference to Hitler already indicates. And scepticism about cosmopolitanism was not limited to the right wing of the political spectrum, but could also be found among adherents of such an avowedly internationalist ideology as socialism. Thus, in the Soviet Union, 'kozmopolitizm' became a strongly Antisemitic term opposed to socialist internationalism, at least in official parlance.[8] The supposedly negative cosmopolitan practices of Jews were contrasted with true patriotism.

Even among proponents of cosmopolitanism positively connotated, there is no real agreement on what the term means. According to Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen, it may be a middle ground 'between ethnocentric nationalism and particularistic multiculturalism', a 'vision of global democracy and world citizenship', or a chance for transnational links between social movements, 'non-communitarian, post-identity politics . . . to challenge conventional notions of belonging, identity and citizenship'. Finally, according to the same authors, it could be used as a description of socio-cultural processes and behaviours 'manifesting a capacity to engage cultural multiplicity'.[9]

Our current debates on cosmopolitanism are rooted in concerns about present-day waves of globalization, economic transformation,

[8] For the Soviet Union see Caroline Humphrey, 'Cosmopolitanism and *Kosmopolitizm* in the Political Life of Soviet Citizens', *Focaal*, 44 (2004), 138–52; and Konstantin Azadovskii and Boris Egorov, 'From Anti-Westernism to Anti-Semitism', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 4/1 (2002), 66–80.
[9] Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen, 'Introduction: Conceiving Cosmopolitanism', in eid. (eds.), *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, and Practice* (Oxford 2002), 1–22, at 1.

and large-scale migration. In this context, notions of global citizenship seem to be on the rise, according to surveys conducted for the BBC. This is the case notably in expanding economies with significant out-migration such as India, China, or Nigeria, whereas OECD countries which consider themselves at the receiving end of migration tend to emphasize national belonging.[10]

In recent Western debates on the contentious issue of migration, cosmopolitanism has been invoked as the basis for the treatment of migrants. This debate has furthermore become entangled with debates about global justice and the obligation, or lack thereof, not only to guarantee equal rights but also to grant access to these rights, for example, as regards immigration. David Miller and Carl Knight call this distinction one between 'weak' and 'strong' cosmopolitanism.[11] Jacques Derrida's treatise on hospitality outlines a somewhat different distinction, namely, that between a stranger who can be identified, and an 'other' who does not even have a name.[12] I will argue that unconditional 'strong' cosmopolitanism which would, for example, include Derrida's 'other', is a fairly recent phenomenon mostly found among political activists. It seems less relevant in the historical debates in Europe or in non-Western societies and will hence be largely neglected in the further discussion.

While this strand of the debate focuses on obligations towards other people, notably, those not related to us who come from outside the (local or national) community, another strand, exemplified by Kwame Appiah's treatise on cosmopolitanism emphasizes respect for differences (and potential interest in learning from them).[13] This

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[10] Globescan, 'Global Citizenship a Growing Sentiment among Citizens of Emerging Economies: Global Poll', *Globescan,* 27 Apr. 2016, online at <https://globescan.com/global-citizenship-a-growing-sentiment-among-citizens-of-emerging-economies-global-poll/>, accessed 20 Sept. 2019.

[11] Carl Knight, 'In Defence of Cosmopolitanism', *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory*, 58/129 (2011), 19–34, online at <www.jstor.org/stable/41802517>, accessed 16 Sept. 2019. To the titles by David Miller that he cites should be added *Strangers in our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration* (Cambridge, Mass., 2016).

[12] Jacques Derrida, *Of Hospitality*, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford, 2000).

[13] Kwame Anthony Appiah, *Der Kosmopolit: Philosophie des Weltbürgertums* (Bonn, 2007), 13.

strikes a chord with Ulrich Beck's argument that cosmopolitan tolerance involves actively 'opening oneself up to the world of the Other, perceiving difference as an enrichment'. Both Beck and Appiah would agree on a position based on 'regarding and treating the Other as fundamentally equal'.[14]

Appiah's treatise on cosmopolitanism combines an emphatic profession with multiple sentiments of belonging, tolerance of different value systems, and engagement with cultural differences, with a strong belief in the regulatory functions of nation states. This might imply limitations on the moral responsibility of individuals and, indeed, of states to save the entire world.[15] This falls short of positions arguing for an entirely integrated world society or, in current political terms, for completely open borders. Appiah regularly refers back to his own experiences of Ghanaian society, but also relies on authors of the Scottish Enlightenment and, more specifically, on Adam Smith, to bolster his argument. This is crucial in so far as the debates by both the Enlightenment authors and the Greek philosophers whom they quote invariably link cosmopolitanism with another concept, that of hospitality, to such an extent that the two become almost indistinguishable. This entanglement is echoed in contemporary texts such as Derrida's treatise on hospitality when he characterizes Kant's statements on hospitality in *Zum ewigen Frieden* (*Perpetual Peace*) as a 'cosmopolitan tradition'.[16] It seems particularly significant in our context that a philosopher with experience in West African practices and traditions as well as Western philosophy points to the particular discourses of the Enlightenment period as a useful starting point for present-day debates about cosmopolitanism. Hence, the next section will briefly explore these philosophical foundations before moving on to a number of non-Western traditions and the question of their relation to such Western understandings.

[14] Ulrich Beck, 'A New Cosmopolitanism is in the Air', *signandisght.com*, 20 Nov. 2007, online at <www.signandsight.com/features/1603.html>, accessed 18 Sept. 2019.

[15] On this see of Appiah, *Der Kosmopolit*, esp. ch. 10.

[16] Derrida, *Of Hospitality*, 27.

Enlightenment Understandings of Cosmopolitanism

In his *Theory of Moral Sentiment* (1759), Adam Smith, the author referenced by Kwame Appiah, distinguishes between an immediate, egotistic impulse based on self-interest and interpersonal links with relatives and friends, on the one hand, and a more abstract, weaker moral commitment towards humankind, on the other. While Smith, primarily interested in the foundations of the economy, sees egotism as a natural impulse, social behaviour based on self-control is something that children have to learn in 'regard to the sentiments of the real or supposed spectator of our conduct'.[17] He bases this argument on the community oriented Stoic tradition.[18]

While Adam Smith departs from rational self-interest, Immanuel Kant was interested in conditions of perpetual peace. His treatise *Zum Ewigen Frieden* (1795) is often quoted as one of the foundational texts of Western cosmopolitanism or 'Weltbürgertum'. Kant insists on the right to hospitality in order to pursue commercial interests in particular. This does not, however, entitle strangers to further rights in foreign countries, which are conceived as the cornerstones of world order.[19] Thus both Kant and Smith, two important historical proponents of cosmopolitanism, seem to have had a clear preference for positions that would nowadays fall into the category of 'weak' cosmopolitanism.

Kant was not the only one who insisted on hospitality as the basis and core of cosmopolitanism. Eighteen years before Kant's treatise, the landscape architect and author on moral philosophy, Christian Hirschfeld, had published a book entitled *Von der Gastfreundschaft*.[20]

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[17] Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 6th. edn. (1790; reprint São Paulo, 2005), 118–38, quotation at 127. On Smith see Lisa Hill, 'Adam Smith's Cosmopolitanism: The Expanding Circles of Commercial Strangership', *History of Political Thought*, 31/3 (2010), 449–73, esp. 455–60.

[18] Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 123.

[19] Immanuel Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden* (Erlangen, 1795), 3rd preliminary article, online at <www.sgipt.org/politpsy/vorbild/kant_zef.htm>, accessed 18 Sept. 2019.

[20] Christian Hirschfeld, *Von der Gastfreundschaft: Eine Apologie für die Menschheit* (Leipzig, 1777). Jürgen Osterhammel first drew my attention to this book.

In its opening passage, Hirschfeld praises hospitality as 'one of the most endearing virtues adorning human nature, which turns nations into siblings and ties continents together'.[21] Referring to Scottish philosopher Frances Hutcheson's *A System of Moral Philosophy* (1756), which Lessing had translated into German, Hirschfeld not only describes hospitality as an obligation of politeness vis-à-vis persons with whom one has no special connection, but argues that it was almost constitutive for entire nations.[22] He then describes how, in an age when neither proper transport infrastructure nor security was ensured, hospitality became a necessity for travellers. In his view, this virtue required a certain degree of civilization and material well-being. Hirschfeld explicitly dismisses the theory Henry Home, Lord Kames, put forward in his *Sketches of the History of Man* (1774). Kames posited a natural hatred of strangers of different origin that was most easily found among island nations which had most preserved their original character and were particularly inimical to strangers arriving on their shores.[23] Hirschfeld contradicts Kames's theory that this was a natural instinct, instead explaining his examples of violent encounters with foreigners in terms of the barbaric behaviour of European conquerors.[24]

For his most prominent examples of hospitality, Hirschfeld particularly celebrates the 'Orient', and notably Arabs, Persians, and Turks.[25] This leads us back to a consideration of practices and theoretical notions of hospitality found outside the West. As has been shown, these would have sufficed for readers in the late eighteenth century as proof of cosmopolitan practices. This is all the more important as there is probably more literature available on non-

[21] Hirschfeld, *Von der Gastfreundschaft*, 3.

[22] Ibid. 6–8.

[23] Hirschfeld here refers to the translation of Heinrich (Henry) Home (Kames)'s *Versuche über die Geschichte des Menschen,* Erster Theil, aus dem Engl. (1774), 19–20. I have been able to consult a revised edition (Vienna, 1790), 23–4, online at <mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb11273227-1>, accessed 3 Jan. 2020. The original version was entitled *Sketches of the History of Man,* 2 vols. (1774).

[24] Hirschfeld, *Von der Gastfreundschaft*, 60–70, 86.

[25] Ibid. 100–31.

Western practices than on historical and philosophical theorization outside the West.[26]

Non-Western Concepts and Practices of Hospitality

Engagement with strangers, notably travellers of all sorts, is a trait found in most societies. Let me give you a few examples. Writing about West Africa between 1000 and 1630, George Brooks has argued that 'the origins of landlord–stranger reciprocities are lost in antiquity, but their tenets are embedded in the fundaments of the societies of western Africa'. He details that 'travellers are provided with food and lodging, and their possessions are secured'.[27] Beyond real and fictional kinship, this is based on customary law and the belief in divine sanctions, and instilled in people from their childhood through their socialization, proverbs, and tales. Often, this is part of a wider web of mutual obligations, and relations with strangers form only one aspect.

Such seems to be the case with the Wolof concept of *terànga*. *Terànga* today is marketed as the kind of hospitality sought by tourists. A Google search of the term yields restaurants and hotels with the name, or advertisements which characterize Senegalese society as welcoming for tourism. However, the concept is much richer. It is central to how social relations are meant to be structured, with a complex set of behavioural rules, codes, and principles binding diverse people and groups.[28] In an analysis of this basic code, it has even been suggested that this system of mutual obligations creates a basis for something conceptualized elsewhere as public space by linking individuals and groups to each other and controlling their

[26] Probably the best survey of Muslim literature (with a strong comparative angle to the Christian tradition) is Mona Siddiqui, *Hospitality and Islam: Welcoming in God's Name* (New Haven, 2015).

[27] George E. Brooks, *Landlords and Strangers: Ecology, Society, and Trade in Western Africa, 1000–1630* (Boulder, Col., 1993), 38.

[28] Abdourahmane Seck, *La question musulmane au Sénégal: Essai d'anthropologie d'une nouvelle modernité* (Paris, 2010), 131 and n. 78; cf. Boubakar Ly, 'L'honneur dans les sociétés Ouolof et Toucouleur du Sénégal', *Présence Africaine*, NS 61 (1967), 32–67, at 60–1.

interactions through a set of moral rules, while preserving (for example, religious) plurality.[29]

In a study of illegal migrants from the Western Sahel, mostly speakers of Soninke in Angola, Paolo Gaibazzi has observed reference to a similar understanding of the world. In descriptions of their treatment by Angolan police combating illegal immigration, the migrants complained of a lack of 'humanity', a term encompassing a range of meanings such as solidarity, sociality, civility, and politeness, but also empathy, compassion, and pity. This was based on the local custom of strangers automatically being seen as potential guests 'in need of hospitality and care; tellingly, *stranger* and *guest* are the same word in Soninke'. Gaibazzi points out that hospitality actually sustained 'a wide array of mobilities, ranging from casual visits by relatives to large-scale migratory phenomena'.[30] This notwithstanding, exchange remained an important aspect: Gaibazzi mentions that one of his respondents had been offering meat to certain Angolan powerbrokers in order to initiate such a relationship. The importance of the gift and reciprocity, emphasized by Marcel Mauss, is the basis on which social relations with strangers are formed and a sense of community is created.[31]

In Muslim societies, it has become almost impossible to distinguish analytically between hospitality prescribed by religion, and possibly older traditions enabling translocal relationships, for example, among the Bedouin.[32] In its most basic form, which is often ascribed to the Bedouin, it comprises (often temporary) security, protection, and respect for strangers.[33]

In practice, Islamic and traditional notions intersected and formed locally specific but almost inseparable variants of hospitality. One particular variant are notions related to Muslim pilgrimage in the port city of Jeddah in present-day Saudi Arabia. They are interesting

[29] Seck, *La question musulmane au Sénégal*, 227–9.
[30] Paolo Gaibazzi, 'Politics of Inhumanity', *American Ethnologist*, 45/4 (2018), 470–81, at 472.
[31] Marcel Mauss, *The Gift* (first pub. 1950; London, 2002), esp. 18–23.
[32] On this issue see Andrew Shryock, 'The New Jordanian Hospitality: House, Host, and Guest in the Culture of Public Display', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 46 (2004), 35–62.
[33] Ibid. 36.

as they can help to illustrate to what extent local conditions shaped very specific variants of what hospitality can mean.

At least since early Muslim times, Jeddah has been a port city on the Red Sea coast. As such, it was a distinctly non-tribal society characterized by a population composed of local Arabs and immigrants from the Arabian Peninsula, the African shores of the Red Sea, and far beyond. Moreover, the composition of the population changed greatly over time in response to changing patterns of trade and politics.[34] As the main port of the Hijaz region and, crucially, of the holy city of Mecca, Jeddah regularly received pilgrims who arrived by sea in order to perform the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. The immigrant population, hailing overwhelmingly from other parts of the Muslim world, thus consisted partly of merchants, partly of immigrants in search of work, and partly of pilgrims who did not return to their countries of origin. While the population of Mecca was similarly varied in origin, the holy city was completely closed to non-Muslims because of its sacred character, while regulations were less strict with regard to Jeddah.

Although the Hijaz was, until 1918, part of the Ottoman Empire, the local brand of cosmopolitanism was distinctly different from what was celebrated as Ottoman cosmopolitanism in places such as Istanbul, Izmir, or Salonika. There, the multi-religious composition of the population gave rise to the characterization of these cities as cosmopolitan.[35] This had initially been based on a particular Islamic notion of the toleration of other 'people of the book', that is, adherents of a monotheistic religion. The transformation of toleration into equal citizenship in the course of the nineteenth century, when there was much European economic and political pressure, proved to be a painful process, which was accompanied by a number of violent eruptions.

In the Hijaz, people framed the presence of strangers as a sacred duty of hospitality for the 'guests of God', that is, the pilgrims heading to Mecca. This resonates to this day—the Saudi King bears the

[34] For more detail and references see my *A History of Jeddah: The Gate to Mecca in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Cambridge, 2020).
[35] For a discussion of Ottoman cosmopolitanism see my ' "Cosmopolitanism" or "Conviviality"? Some Conceptual Considerations Concerning the Late Ottoman Empire', *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 17/4 (2014), 375–91.

title of Guardian of the Two Holy Cities. The Kingdom considers the hosting and protection of pilgrims as a main duty and source of international legitimacy, and the pilgrimage season provides the occasion for very public displays of diplomacy.

While pilgrimage today is almost on an industrial scale, with three to four million pilgrims annually, until the mid twentieth century numbers varied from a few tens of thousands to an occasional peak of around 100,000. Even this was a significant annual influx for the city of Jeddah, given that it had only about 10,000 to 15,000 inhabitants for much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

This notwithstanding, the cosmopolitanism in which people from Jeddah take pride to this day is based on the hospitality of the pilgrimage. 'Service to the Guests of God' was not only a sacred duty involving eventual spiritual redemption; it was also, long before the current, politically fostered encouragement of religious and other tourism to Saudi Arabia, a major source of income for the city. While this does not form part of the discourse on hospitality, it is reflected in a host of proverbs such as *al-hajj haja* ('the pilgrimage is a necessity'), indicating both the religious duty of pilgrimage as well as the material need for it. This serves as a reminder of the connections between hospitality (or cosmopolitanism) and exchange, that is, trade and economic gain, mentioned in the theories of Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant. Pnina Werbner, writing on South Asian Sufi networks, also emphasizes the frequent creation of webs of mutual obligations as the result of hospitality.[36]

The specificity of the Jiddawi variant of cosmopolitanism, even by comparison with nearby Mecca, lies in the toleration of non-Muslims. In local imagination, this is accommodated in the image of Jeddah as the antechamber or *dihliz* of Mecca. In local architecture, the *dihliz* connotes an entrance corridor and its adjacent reception rooms, which were used to conduct business and receive visitors. Thus all

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[36] Pnina Werbner, 'Vernacular Cosmopolitanism as an Ethical Disposition: Sufi Networks, Hospitality, and Translocal Inclusivity', in L. Baskins (ed.), *Islamic Studies in the Twenty-First Century: Transformations and Continuities* (Amsterdam, 2016), 223–40, at 231–2; for Baku cf. Bruce Grant, 'Cosmopolitan Baku', *Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology*, 75/2, 123–47, at 134, online at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00141841003753222>, accessed 25 Sept. 2019. Subscription required.

sorts of people, including servants or outsiders, could enter the *dih-liz*. By contrast, the remainder of the house was mostly reserved for family members, reflecting a society with a strong emphasis on gender segregation. Thus, the *dihliz* also has a somewhat dubious image as a space in which strangers were present. From the perspective of Mecca as a holy city, this antechamber of Jeddah was polluted by the presence of non-Muslims. What we can observe here, then, are two different notions of cosmopolitanism in the same region. For Mecca, it is something that encompasses the entire Muslim world, excluding all non-Muslims. In Jeddah, cosmopolitanism encompasses the toleration of non-Muslims through the image of the entrance hall or *dihliz*.

Mechanisms of Integration

Despite the somewhat limited nature of the notions of hospitality mentioned above, it would seem that many societies espousing hospitality were also quite open to integrating strangers more closely, and thus to becoming what we would term today 'cosmopolitan societies'. A convenient way to achieve this could be marriage. To take Jeddah as an example once again: many promising new arrivals, often youngsters who trained in local businesses, were offered marriage into established local families. This helped to 'indigenize' them, a phenomenon also noted for West Africa. In the Muslim world, charitable endowments provide another example. These have been considered by Jonathan Miran in a study of the Eritrean town of Massawa as acts of citizenship which marked investment in local society and prestige by residents hailing from elsewhere and often maintaining links with multiple localities and societies.[37]

It is important, however, that we do not overstate such indigenization. Members of the Indian Ocean Hadhrami diaspora were not the only ones to establish marital relations in more than one port to lubricate their mercantile and scholarly networks. Thus they could

[37] Engin Isin, 'Ottoman Waqfs as Acts of Citizenship', in Pascale Ghazaleh (ed.), *Held in Trust: Waqf in the Islamic World* (Cairo, 2011), 209–26; Jonathan Miran, 'Endowing Property and Edifying Power in a Red Sea Port: Waqf, Arab Migrant Entrepreneurs, and Urban Authority in Massawa, 1860s–1880s', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 42/2 (2009), 151–78.

become members of a number of different localities. Similarly, rich merchants were able to endow properties in more than one place.[38] Marriage and endowment are just two particularly prominent forms of cosmopolitan sociability. Hence, such citizens of the world were, strictly speaking, not citizens of nowhere but, rather, citizens of a number of specific localities. Anthropologist Engseng Ho has coined the term 'local cosmopolitans' for these people.[39]

There is one further important aspect which is often overlooked, mainly because of the normally positive connotations of the term cosmopolitanism. Diversity and strangers living together was and is no easy task. While Kant may have dreamt of perpetual peace, cosmopolitan societies were by no means immune to eruptions of intercommunal violence. Rather, these were such a frequent phenomenon that violence has come to be considered a 'normal' part of contentious politics.[40] Analysing the pogroms against Jews in Odessa in the nineteenth century, Caroline Humphrey has argued that people can belong to a number of different communicative groups or publics. However, 'a person can be physically present in only one crowd', and pogroms were carried out by crowds in which people were drawn to one particular cause, often as a result of the circulation of rumours.[41] She argues convincingly that the cosmopolitan nature of a city is less a stable condition than a delicate balance, often based on 'transitory patterns of relations, expanding and subsiding', which can easily be disrupted by outbreaks of crowd violence.[42]

[38] Miran, 'Endowing Property and Edifying Power in a Red Sea Port'.
[39] Engseng Ho, *The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean* (Berkeley, 2006), 188–91.
[40] For a survey of recent literature, see Ulrike Freitag, Nelida Fuccaro, Claudia Ghrawi, and Fatemeh Masjedi, 'Introduction', in eaed. (eds.), *Urban Violence in the Middle East* (New York, 2015), 1–25, at 1–12.
[41] Caroline Humphrey, 'Odessa: Pogroms in a Cosmopolitan City', in ead. and Vera Skvirskaja (eds.), *Post-Cosmopolitan Cities: Explorations of Urban Coexistence* (New York, 2012), 17–64, quotation at 23.
[42] Ibid. 57.

The Ambivalence of the 'Stranger'

Urban violence thus directs attention to another aspect of hospitality, namely, the ambivalent meanings associated with the stranger. This can, to some extent, be shown etymologically. The Greek term *xenos* could denote both the stranger as someone seeking hospitality, and thus the guest, as well as the threatening stranger or enemy. It seems difficult to establish a clear sequence regarding semantic development, but the increasingly negative connotations seem to have prevailed.[43] In a similar manner, the Latin terms *hospes* and *hostis*, at least initially, reflected ambivalent meanings, until *hostis* increasingly acquired the meaning of the enemy, while *hospes* was reserved for the more positive connotations of the stranger.[44] The Arabic term *gharib* (somebody far from his home, not a relative) implies lack of familiarity and membership in a (tribal) community. The Ottoman plural of the Arabic word *ghuraba'* often connotes paupers (that is, people not supported by relatives). In Islamic thought, the term did not constitute a separate legal category, unlike the concept of the stranger in Antiquity or in Judaism.[45] It also seems to have been, at least in theory, a less problematic term in the Muslim context, with regard not only to other Muslims, but also to adherents of other religions.[46] Nevertheless, the above discussion of the *dihliz* illustrates that, in social practice, strangers—here seen as people not belonging to the household—did evoke some reservations.

[43] Brigitte Jostes, 'Was heißt hier fremd? Eine kleine semantische Studie', in Dirk Naguschewski and Jürgen Trabant (eds.), *Was heißt hier 'fremd'? Studien zu Sprache und Fremdheit* (Berlin, 1997), 11–76, online at <https://edoc.bbaw.de>, accessed 3 Jan. 2020.

[44] Rudolf Stichweh, 'Der Fremde: Zur Soziologie der Indifferenz', in Sylke Bartmann and Olivier Immer (eds.), *Das Vertraute und das Fremde: Differenzerfahrung und Fremdverstehen im Interkulturalitätsdiskurs* (Bielefeld, 2012), 79–95; for *hostis* see Jürgen von Ungern-Sternberg, 'Hostis', in *Der Neue Pauly* (Stuttgart 1998), v. cols. 747–8.

[45] Franz Rosenthal, 'The Stranger in Medieval Islam', *Arabica*, 44/1 (1997), 35–75.

[46] Siddiqui, *Hospitality and Islam*, 10–11. She does not provide a proper etymology.

The frequent ambivalence of terms for strangers also means that while hospitality is often considered a crucial or even sacred duty, the rights of guests in most historical contexts were limited and embedded in an equally binding set of obligations and rules. Again, Jeddah provides a good example and shows that while strangers were certainly not seen as anything akin to enemies, their often prolonged presence needed to be not only framed in a particular way (most prominently as 'guests of God'), but also mediated through specific practices. In the context of pilgrimage, a clear structure was provided through the system of pilgrims' guides. They received the visitors in the port, and organized accommodation, provisions, and onward travel to Mecca, where they were handed over to Meccan guides. Although they often stayed in houses rented out by locals to pilgrims, visitors would rarely move around unaccompanied by either their guides (and group) or their immediate hosts. Thus the potential 'threat' of the strangers to local society was mediated by local interlocutors. These often mastered the languages of the guests and thus provided the necessary cultural mediation. They would also have conveyed rules of behaviour and conviviality, that is, the tools for 'everyday cosmopolitanism'. For example, in the tightly controlled social space of the city, only the market areas were freely accessible to all, visitors and inhabitants alike. If strangers—and this even pertains to inhabitants of other quarters—ventured into the residential areas, this would alarm the informal guards of the quarters and lead to interrogation or unfriendly encounters. Interestingly, to this day, pilgrims are managed in groups according to their countries of origin and, at least until very recently, have little chance to roam freely in the city or beyond.

In other words, and irrespective of whether or not the Arabic term for stranger had the same connotations of threat as some of the European terms discussed above, it is not a recent phenomenon that cosmopolitanism operates in a hierarchical space of social control. This is probably more in line with the 'weak' cosmopolitanism discussed earlier than with the much further reaching, and very highly morally charged, claims of its 'strong' variant.

A Divergent Development from the late Eighteenth Century?

So far, it has been established that Western intellectuals theorizing cosmopolitanism base their arguments on philosophers and writers of the Enlightenment, and that these Enlightenment authors do not greatly distinguish between hospitality and cosmopolitanism. We have further seen that an author such as Appiah, who tries to bridge Western and African thought on the question of cosmopolitanism, also refers back to these very same writers. Why, then, does the close link between the two terms seem less intuitive today than in the past? Why has there been a need to defend the concept against elitism, for example, by pointing to lower class sociabilities in the taverns and brothels of port cities? Why have cosmopolitan practices even been situated in a distinctly colonial heritage?[47] And why, finally, does somebody like anthropologist Pnina Werbner suggest introducing a specifically 'vernacular' cosmopolitanism which, apparently, is somehow distinct from what would presumably be regarded as 'regular' cosmopolitanism? She diffidently asks whether Western ethical prescripts associated with the philosophical stances discussed above mean that people 'beyond the West . . . are incapable of being "truly" cosmopolitan in their own right'.[48] This concept of 'vernacular cosmopolitanism' responds to the call by a number of notable postcolonial scholars to decentralize a Eurocentric use of the concept. This Eurocentrism is seen as rooted in Western etymology but also, more pertinently, in the elitist connotations of the concept. 'Vernacular cosmopolitanism' has recently been adopted to 'encompass everyday cosmopolitanism as well as a cosmopolitanism from below', often also in non-Western contexts.[49]

[47] Sami Zubaida, 'Middle Eastern Experiences of Cosmopolitanism', in Vertovec and Cohen (eds.), *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism*, 32–41; Peter van der Veer, 'Colonial Cosmopolitanism', ibid. 165–79; for 'cosmopolitanism from below', see Will Hanley, 'Grieving Cosmopolitanism in Middle East Studies', *History Compass*, 6/5 (2008), 1346–67; and Asef Bayat, 'Cairo Cosmopolitan: Living Together through Communal Divide, Almost', in S. Mayaram (ed.), *The Other Global City* (New York, 2009), 179–231.

[48] Werbner, 'Vernacular Cosmopolitanism as an Ethical Disposition'.

[49] Sneja Gunew, *Post-Multicultural Writers as Neo-Cosmopolitan Mediators* (London, 2017), 7.

I would like to suggest that the answer to most of these questions can be found in the distinctly different development of 'the West' and 'the rest' from the late eighteenth century. Hirschfeld's response to Kames might just about capture the very moment when the hitherto quite comparable developments began to diverge dramatically. Engaging with Kames's argument about the natural disposition of humans to hate strangers, to which Kames himself had to add a number of exceptions, Hirschfeld argues that Kames's examples of hatred illustrate something quite different from what the author had intended.[50] Hirschfeld discusses the cruelty and barbaric behaviour of the European conquerors—the Spanish, Dutch, French, and British—to then argue:

> The cruelty of which the Barbarians are accused is very often a result of the examples set by the Europeans which they had witnessed, and of the tyrants the latter had imposed. . . . And the Barbarians who, at times, committed cruelty towards Europeans were almost always in a situation of defence, which rather excuses the transgression of boundaries and might even justify it. Once the necessity of defence ceased, and hope for peace approached, they strove to open their hearts to the softer movements of trust and friendship.[51]

Hirschfeld's observation provides a witness account for the very processes which led to the European assertion of civilizational superiority.[52] He writes at the very moment when the earlier equilibrium between Europe and Asia began to tilt in favour of the former and Europeans began to assert their dominance, something that had already occurred earlier in the Americas. Jürgen Osterhammel has described this transition with regard to the relationship between Europe and Asia. While Asia had been fascinatingly different but basically equal until the eighteenth century, this changed towards the

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[50] Hirschfeld, *Von der Gastfreundschaft*, 67.
[51] Ibid. 74–5; trans. from German by Ulrike Freitag.
[52] For further examples of Europeans with a more critical perspective on European comportment abroad see Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Entzauberung Asiens: Europa und die Asiatischen Reiche im 18. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1998), 82–4.

end of the eighteenth century, giving way to an approach which judged Asia by (supposedly universal) European criteria of rationality, efficiency, and justice, or by Christian values.[53] Asia, as well as other non-Western parts of the world, now became the object of civilizing missions, while Europe turned in on itself when defining itself, and when developing concepts with which to describe the world.[54]

I suggest that it is at this juncture when, in the European perception, a notion of 'cosmopolitanism' developed that went beyond the earlier close association with hospitality. This argument can be found implicitly in some of the literature on cosmopolitanism, for example, in the contributions by Sami Zubaida, who considers the context of European imperial dominance as 'the golden age of Middle Eastern cosmopolitanism'.[55] It lays a strong emphasis on the mobility practices of elites, which are often linked to an emphatic engagement with other cultures and thus go beyond the regulation of encounters between strangers through codes of hospitality and civility. In the words of van der Veer: 'the boundaries of traditional authority, of belonging to one's nationhood, ethnicity, and religion, have to be transcended if one wants to be cosmopolitan and feel allegiance only to a worldwide community of mankind.'[56] This resembles what Ulrich Beck calls a 'normative cosmopolitanism' searching for 'harmony across national and cultural frontiers'. These present-day definitions, which distinguish cosmopolitan globetrotters and expatriates, mostly of the upper classes, from immigrants (without ever investigating the latter's attitudes) seem to be a continuation of the earlier association of cosmopolitanism with a specific imperial elite.[57]

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[53] Ibid. 375–403.

[54] A similar argument is made by van der Veer, who suggests 'provincialising' the cosmopolitanism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by considering different figurations of nationalism and spirituality. Cf. van der Veer, 'Colonial Cosmopolitanism', 165–79.

[55] Zubaida, 'Middle Eastern Experiences of Cosmopolitanism', 37.

[56] van der Veer, 'Colonial Cosmopolitanism', 165–79.

[57] Ulrich Beck, 'Cosmopolitical Realism: On the Distinction between Cosmopolitanism in Philosophy and the Social Sciences', *Global Networks: A Journal of Transnational Affairs,* 4/2 (2004), 131–56, at 132.

Significantly, Beck distinguishes this normative approach from what he terms a 'descriptive–analytic approach' focusing on 'actually existing cosmopolitanisms'.[58] These latter encompass people's cosmopolitan practices without examining their normative approach, and are thus less class-specific. This is much more akin to a less normatively charged and potentially universalizing approach, and therefore to what I am trying to suggest in this lecture.

Even if a thorough investigation of the concept's history and hence verification of the above distinctions is beyond the scope of this contribution, it is worth noting that it underlies much of the postcolonial debate around the term. Again, this needs to be treated with caution, as some postcolonial assumptions, such as that aggressive expansionism is a specifically Western characteristic, are perhaps more influenced by current global concerns and the positionality of their authors than by a disinterested consideration of global history. To give one example, Argentinian semiotician and postcolonial theorist Walter Mignolo distinguishes three waves of Western cosmopolitan thought accompanied by different types of aggressive expansion. The first was associated with a universal Christian mission linked to the Portuguese and Spanish Empires; the second came in the garb of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism associated with the British, French, and German Empires; and a final, more recent variant of cosmopolitanism, is for him associated with human rights and linked to US domination (notably in Latin America, which is his main vantage point).[59] While this perspective certainly reflects important parts of the modern Latin American experience, it ignores the history of the expansion of non-Western empires from ancient Egypt to Muslim Empires or China, as well as an even greater number of more regional processes of domination and homogenization.[60] Consequently, one might debate Mignolo's chronology, ask about other

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[58] Ibid. 132.

[59] Walter Mignolo, 'The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis', *Public Culture*, 12/3 (2000), 721–48, at 722–5.

[60] A classic example of the latter is still Eugen Weber's *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870–1014* (Stanford, 1976). For a brief critical appraisal see Caroline Ford, '*Peasants into Frenchmen* Thirty Years After', *French Politics, Culture and Society*, 27/2 (2009), 84–93, esp. 88–90, online at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42843601>, accessed 27 Sept. 2019.

processes of imperial domination, and question the equation of cosmopolitanism and imperialism. Less debatable is the eventual domination or even universalization of a particular Western interpretation which was, at least in large part, conceived in the historical context of Western imperial and post-imperial expansion.

Regardless of the finer points, my argument is that the Western conceptual *Sonderweg* in the interpretation of cosmopolitanism became mainstream by virtue of the West's political domination and cultural hegemony. The main feature of this particularist development was the emergence of a concept separate from that of hospitality in that it overshadowed practices of mutual obligation and privileged Western practices and concepts based, among other things, on the Enlightenment philosophers cited above, at the expense of all others.[61] Furthermore, it is predicated on a definition of civility which is based on tolerance towards others. As this is hegemonically defined by Westerners, animosity towards them is of itself an indicator of a lack of openness towards others, and hence a lack of cosmopolitanism. In this, positions have not changed dramatically since Kames's times. This can be seen from Werbner's analysis and the question, quoted earlier, of whether people 'beyond the West' can be 'cosmopolitan in their own right'.[62] Furthermore, while it developed in an imperial context, in more recent years it adapted to the context of nation states. Homi Bhabha has described it as a

> kind of global cosmopolitanism, widely influential now, that configures the planet as a concentric world of national societies extending to global villages. It is a cosmopolitanism of relative prosperity and privilege founded on ideas of progress that are complicit with neo-liberal forms of governance, and free-market forces of competition.[63]

The philosophical debate about world citizenship (*Weltbürgertum*) as well as the political debates and polemics about whether 'citizens of

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[61] van der Veer, 'Colonial Cosmopolitanism'.

[62] Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, 223.

[63] Homi K. Bhabha, 'Looking Back, Moving Forward: Notes on Vernacular Cosmopolitanism', preface to id., *The Location of Culture* (Abingdon, 2004), pp. ix–xxv, at p. xiv.

the world' need to be loyal to one particular political entity, which underlay many of the quotations cited at the beginning of this lecture, is predicated on this system. In this context, notions and practices of hospitality and transregional movement developed in an age of polities and empires with porous borders come to be seen as antiquated, at best, and as a threat to national order through large-scale migrations, at worst.

Perspectives and Conclusions

What can we conclude from this attempt briefly to sketch where the much (ab)used term cosmopolitanism comes from and how it is employed in current debates? Or, to return to the initial question: what does such a broadening or decentring of notions of cosmopolitanism mean for our conceptual considerations? And could this have any consequences for our current political discourse?

The first point to note is banal: cosmopolitan practices occur in many different historical and geographical contexts, and thus cannot be reduced to an elitarian/elitist practice as is done by adherents of normative notions of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan practices developed because the need and desire to exchange goods meant that different people throughout history came into contact with each other, and such exchanges could only flourish if conventions for interaction developed. These were often based on the notion of hospitality, which has been conceptualized in different societies in a generally comparable way, although obviously with specific terms and underlying understandings. Some of these had fairly universalist aspirations, such as the imaginaries connected to solidarity between adherents of specific religions. The 'hospitality for the guests of God' is based on one such example.

Second, the Western notion of world citizenship (*Weltbürgertum*) was also built on this common basis. It was theorized, however, at a time when the West began to expand its empires and, later, when the ideal-typical concept of nation states as the pinnacle of political organization became the basis from which theories were formulated and developed. It is at this point that the former common conceptual basis was eroded.

Does this mean, third, that we should opt for new or different terminologies? Werbner's suggestion of adding 'vernacular' to the noun 'cosmopolitanism' does not, for one, strike me as particularly useful. Adding adjectives such as 'vernacular' to 'cosmopolitanism' actually enhances the very hierarchization against which Werbner tries to argue. This is the result of pitting cosmopolitanism, a noun free of adjectives and hence qualifications, against a 'vernacular', that is, a local or particularist variety of the concept. This latter might not even be theorized and is, in the debates, almost invariably non-Western in origin.[64] Rather than creating sub-categories under a normative noun, we should reconsider the meanings of the noun itself. This, I argue, does more to decentre a merely European version of the concept in the sense in which Chakrabarty has suggested, and thus potentially does more to create a more inclusive (and hence more global) concept.

This also strikes me as more useful than Mignolo's suggestion that we accept a plurality of understandings of what cosmopolitanism might mean. Otherwise, we might directly use Arabic, Indian, or Chinese terms because we will no longer know what is meant when a concept is evoked. In this vein, I would emphasize the core notion of hospitality as a fairly widespread (if not global) basis enabling the different visions of what cosmopolitanism could or should be to emerge and flourish. Such a return to the normative basis and acceptance of variations developing from it might help us to avoid the strong moral undercurrent of present debates, which seem to take one particular conceptual development as an absolute truth.

This alone does not solve the conundrum of how to interpret what is or is not meant by cosmopolitanism, and the underlying notion of hospitality. There will still be debates about what a cosmopolitan stance means, and what rights (or lack thereof) can be derived from an obligation of hospitality. These will be as much determined by political philosophies and positions as before, and this lecture certainly does not offer a solution. However, by struggling for the meaning of one concept, we at least recognize the common basis extant in much humanity, and thus forego some of the hubris associated with claims to the high ground of cosmopolitanism.

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[64] For calls to broaden the concept see Sheldon Pollock, Homi K. Bhabha, Carol Breckenridge, and Dipesh Chakrabarty, 'Cosmopolitanisms', *Public Culture*, 12 (2000), 577–89.

Fourth, such a notion of cosmopolitanism might enable us better to understand notions and expectations of some of those claiming hospitality in the West. As an example, let me return to some of the observations collected by anthropologist Gaibazzi from the Soninke-speaking West African migrants. In their comments on how they are treated as migrants in Angola, they accept that their cosmopolitan ventures are regulated by codes that clearly recognize their status as guests with all the limitations this implies (in other words, they expect a rather limited or 'weak' cosmopolitanism on the part of their hosts). In the extreme, they even argue that they accept the right of their host countries to deport them. What they do not accept, however, is dehumanizing treatment and a refusal to give them what they consider to be the (potentially only initial and temporary) right of guests.

Finally, a certain ambivalence about strangers does not automatically imply xenophobia, but seems to have deep historical roots in more than one region of the globe without having historically prevented the emergence of cosmopolitan practices. It is precisely such ambivalence which could be (and is) mobilized at certain historical junctures, when specific strangers are singled out and, in the worst case, become the target of popular mobilization.

The last two points in particular could have some lessons for those loading the term cosmopolitanism in the very high-pitched and morally charged debates about migrants and citizens of the world. They miss the very differentiation inherent in many of the historical theorizations, as well as practices, surrounding the history of hospitality, and of the cosmopolitan practices associated with human movement and encounters. While I would, in the final analysis, tend towards what Ulrich Beck terms a social science perspective on cosmopolitanism, that is, on the multitude of encounters between strangers and the practices associated with organizing these, I would also shy away from a normative overloading of the term.

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