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7 May  DR ANDREAS RÖDDER (Stuttgart/Munich)
Breakthrough in the Caucasus? German Reunification as a Problem for Contemporary History
Andreas Rödder is Privatdozent in Modern History at the University of Stuttgart and, during the academic year 2001/2, Fellow at the Historisches Kolleg in Munich. His most recent book, entitled Die radikale Herausforderung: Die politische Kultur der englischen Konservativen 1846–1868, will be published in the GHIL’s German series in the summer. At the moment he is writing a textbook on the history of the Federal Republic of Germany between 1969 and 1990.

21 May  PROFESSOR UTE FREVERT (Bielefeld)
Militarism Revisited—Conscription and Civil Society in Germany
Ute Frevert holds a chair of Modern History at the University of Bielefeld and is a leading expert on nineteenth and twentieth-century history. Among her many publications are Men of Honour: A Social and Cultural History of the Duel (1995), and Die kaserinierte Nation: Militärdienst und Zivilgesellschaft in Deutschland (2001).

28 May  PROFESSOR KARL SCHLÖGEL (Oxford/Frankfurt an der Oder)
Excavating Modernity—Cities in Eastern Central Europe in the Inter-War Period
Karl Schlögel is this year’s Visiting Professor at St Antony’s College, Oxford, and Professor of East European History at the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder). He has published extensively on many aspects of East European history, most recently, Berlin Ostbahnhof Europas – Russen und Deutsche in ihrem Jahrhundert (1998) and Promenade in Jalta und andere Städtebilder (2002).

(cont.)
Seminars

11 June  **DR RICHARD LOFTHOUSE (Oxford)**

**Max Beckmann’s Religion**
Richard Lofthouse is a Teaching Fellow in Modern History at Corpus Christi College, Oxford. He completed his Ph.D. at Yale University in 2000. At present he is preparing a book to be entitled *Modernist Art, Vitalist Energies: Dix, Spencer, Beckmann, Epstein*, c. 1900–1940.

Seminars are held at 5 p.m. in the Seminar Room of the GHIL. Tea is served from 4.30 p.m. in the Common Room, and wine is available after the seminars.
ARTICLE

‘ONE PEOPLE, ONE REICH, ONE GOD’
THE VÖLKISCHE WELTANSCHAUUNG AND MOVEMENT”

by Uwe Puschner

The völkisch movement is generally regarded as the ‘immediate precursor’ of National Socialism. It is usually seen as a phenomenon of the Weimar Republic, and is thus considered almost exclusively in the context of National Socialism. The first notion is wrong, and while there is much to support the second, both statements are only partially relevant. To cast an analytical glance at the literature reflecting a völkische Weltanschauung dating from the 1920s reveals that the Weimar perspective is far too limiting. The völkisch movement is not a ‘product of the post-war years’. Its origins lie in the period ‘twenty, thirty years before the [First] World War’. And we can answer questions about connections, continuities, and discontinuities with National Socialism—the most frequently asked question about the völkisch movement—only after we have addressed another question. What was the völkische Weltanschauung? And what was the völkisch movement itself?

The völkisch movement has hardly been researched to date, and even now we know almost nothing about it. This is because it presents itself to the observer as an impenetrable tangle of the most

* This article is based on a lecture given at the German Historical Institute London in March 2001. It draws on my Habilitationsschrift, which has now been published as Die völkische Bewegung im wilhelminischen Kaiserreich: Sprache – Rasse – Religion (Darmstadt, 2001). For this reason, footnotes are used only to indicate the source of quotations, and to refer to recent publications, mostly studies that have appeared in the last two years. I should like to thank Angela Davies of the GHIL for preparing the translation.
diverse organizations and currents. Moreover, scholars have not generally seen it as an independent movement to be distinguished from Nazism. So, what were the political goals and contents of the völkisch movement? What social groups did it involve? What political ‘successes’ did it have? What was its impact?

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The personal, institutional, and ideological links and inter-connections between the völkisch movement and Nazism are clear. Nazism appropriated the adjective ‘völkisch’. It used many elements of the völkische Weltanschauung, including its symbols such as the swastika. Yet relations between adherents of the völkisch movement and the Nazis were tense, and despite their ideological proximity and even occasional co-operation, the fundamental rivalry between them was unmistakable to contemporaries.

For adherents of the völkisch movement, National Socialism was ‘one member of the wider völkisch movement’. The Nazis, for their part, vehemently rejected this classification and insisted that, on the contrary, the National Socialist movement should be regarded as the ‘pioneer and thus the representative’ of völkisch ideas. After all, it claimed, it was ‘the work of the NSDAP’ that had first made völkisch a political slogan and an ideological battle cry. Let us take a closer look at what appears to be a quarrel between the chicken and the egg.

We will start with the Nazis. While rebuilding the Nazi Party from 1925 on, Hitler repeatedly treated the leaders of the völkisch movement with utter scorn. He rejected the diffuse ‘collective term völkisch’, as did the representatives of the völkisch movement themselves, whom he described as ‘fantasizing-naïve academics, professors, government officials, teachers, and legal officials’, and ‘unworldly wandering scholars’ enthusing about ‘the heroic days of the ancient Germanic tribes, prehistoric times, stone axes, spears and shields’. And he particularly warned against ‘so-called religious reformers on a Teutonic basis’. In 1934, finally, in a speech to cabinet


5 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, 2 vols (in one volume) (78th-84th edn.; Munich, 1933), pp. 514-16.


7 Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 397.
ministers, Hitler counted ‘the small group of völkisch ideologues who believe that the nation can only be happy if it destroys the experiences and results of two thousand years of history and sets out on new migrations wearing bearskins’ among the countless ‘enemies of the new regime’.8

Hitler, Goebbels, and Gregor Strasser regarded the older völkisch leaders from pre-war days as political rivals of National Socialism who had to be taken seriously because they refused to join the Nazi movement and had their own claim to leadership. Given the potential competition, the Nazi leaders adopted the tactic of flattering the old völkisch leaders as pioneers. Younger members of the völkisch movement, such as Darré, Himmler, and Rosenberg were already among Hitler’s faithful companions. To be sure, because of their visions of a greater Germanic Reich built on ‘peasants and a religious-Germanic basis’, Hitler dismissed them as ‘crackpot apostles of the beyond’.9

As far as the Völkische were concerned, we cannot speak of a uniform attitude toward National Socialism. Some were passionate supporters, while others, after an initial period of euphoria, cooled off and wanted to keep their distance. This tells us less about the difficult and differentiated relationship between the Nazis and the Völkische, than about a generational conflict within the völkisch movement itself. After the First World War the older generation was increasingly sidelined politically, which gave rise to complaints about the ‘new leaders’, ‘who never mention those who prepared the ground for them, and to whom they owe their ideas’.10

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These complaints indicate that there were quarrels and ruptures within the völkisch movement during the 1920s. These manifested themselves in a change of leadership and, something that has yet to be investigated, a paradigm shift. One striking change in the 1920s as compared to the pre-war period was an increased commitment to party politics and the parliamentary system among the Völkische, who now held seats in the Länder parliaments and in the Reichstag. Yet a strong faction in the völkisch movement continued to reject political parties as an organizational form for the dissemination of völkisch ideas, arguing that they were concerned not with 'party politics', but with 'educating the people towards a völkisch awareness'. The Völkische regarded political parties as less strategically significant, and the movement saw itself as an 'extraparliamentary power'. This was essentially connected with the history of the movement’s origins and helps to explain its later organizational disadvantages by comparison with an aggressive, hierarchically structured National Socialism.

The völkisch movement was an over-arching collecting point for, in particular, those who aspired to reform culture and lifestyles, for anti-ultramontanists, anti-Semites, eugenicists, and many more. The lowest common denominator was the shared political goal of a 'rebirth of the German Volkstum' defined in terms of race and religion. The ideological breadth of the movement as a whole was matched by the diversity of its organizational forms. These ranged from informal social groups and loosely organized societies which formed around journals to registered associations and sect-like orders and lodges. The eclecticism of the movement’s character had implications for the diffuse image of the völkisch movement. A large number of ambitious leaders who often fell out with each other meant that all attempts to create a völkisch umbrella organization failed, as did the cartels that were created in preparation for such an organization, and which did have some short-term successes.


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Aware of these weaknesses, the Völkische adopted a strategy of infiltrating all social classes and groups, long before the slogan ‘march through the institutions’ was coined. In terms of organizational history, this phase gave rise to völkisch segments within the reform movements already mentioned. The völkisch movement thus showed itself to be a ‘fellow traveller’. According to an insider’s estimate, on the eve of the First World War the hard core of the movement numbered no more that 10,000 predominantly male supporters, including many teachers, journalists, writers, professionals, clergy, and state officials. Despite this small number the movement managed, with its strategy of infiltration and the assistance of a large-scale propaganda machine using such techniques as popular lecture series, mass leafleting, and the mass dissemination of journals, to interest a wide section of the public in the völkisch ideology.

The term ‘völkische Bewegung’ first appeared in 1901, in an article in the journal Heimdall. Subtitled Zeitschrift für reines Deutschstum und Alldeutschstum, it was one of the two main organs of the völkisch movement. The other was Hammer, edited by Theodor Fritsch. Adolf Reinecke, editor of Heimdall, was one of the founding fathers of the völkisch movement. His intellectual origins lay in the language movement of the 1880s, to which Hermann von Pfister-Schwaighusen also belonged. He, in turn, gave the movement a name when he coined the word ‘völkisch’ as a synonym for ‘national’ in 1875. Reinecke and Pfister-Schwaighusen worked together in the Allgemeiner Deutscher Sprachverein, whose goal was to purify the German language. Both left this association of worthies in disgust early in the 1890s because neither its work in Germanizing the language nor its ideological basis were radical enough for their taste. In 1898 they created the Alldeutscher Sprach- und Schriftverein which, like Reinecke’s Heimdall, was closely connected with the Austrian Pan-German movement.

A second root of the völkisch movement, organized anti-Semitism, also went back to the 1880s. Theodot Fritsch came from the same origins. After the anti-Semitic parties had lost their voters in the 1890s and rowdy anti-Semitism had frightened off their clientele, Fritsch

13 Cf. ‘Völkische Mahnung’, Heimdall, 6 (1901), pp. 86 f.
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attempted to give anti-Semitism a new platform as part of a racially motivated ideology of Germanness.\textsuperscript{15} With the publication of Heimdall starting in 1902, Fritsch became one of the most influential leaders of the völkisch movement, a fact that is still largely unacknowledged today. Fritsch is generally known as the chief ideologue of anti-Semitism, but not of the völkische Weltanschauung. The undeniable links to organized anti-Semitism, the innumerable anti-Semitic articles in Hammer and other völkisch journals, the Aryan regulations in the völkisch organizations discriminated not only against Jews, and especially the völkisch chroniclers all contributed to the fact that in the Kaiserreich the völkisch movement and the völkisch ideology disappeared, as it were, behind anti-Semitism.

Anti-Semitism was undoubtedly an essential element in the völkische Weltanschauung, but it was neither the only one nor the most important. Völkisch anti-Semitism can be understood and explained only with, and in terms of, the völkisch racial ideology. Often, scholars researching anti-Semitism have completely overlooked these connections. Yet by focusing on racial anti-Semitism alone, the complexity of the völkisch racial ideology (and thus the dimensions of the völkische Weltanschauung) cannot be grasped.

The völkische Weltanschauung was fully formed before the First World War. The slogan ‘one people, one Reich, one God’, which was adopted by the Völkische among the Deutsch-Nationale Austrian students, can be seen as marking out the co-ordinates of the movement’s system.\textsuperscript{16} The slogan was so striking that it served the movement as a political goal. However, this slogan was short on content, rather describing a vision of the future which the movement hoped to achieve. The three concepts which make it up are based on a single


element, namely, racism. The völkisch racial ideology can be seen as a general key to the understanding of the völkisch ideology and movement.

The majority of the organizations which considered themselves part of the loosely defined völkisch movement therefore demanded that their members take the ‘blood oath’. According to the völkisch doctrine of salvation, race determined the fate of the individual as well as of the racially defined Volk. In the case of the Germans, this meant that ‘we are of holy German descent, of the blood from which will grow the salvation of the world. We go forth from the great homeland as Germans, and this is our task, to fulfil the destiny of our birth. ... Wake up, German Volk, your home is in danger ...! Rub the sleep out of your eyes, the deed wants doing! It is waiting for you! You are descended from God: set up your law in the world! The law of your blood! The law of your heart! The freedom and power of your God!’

According to völkisch views, this racial doctrine with religious trimmings could explain the past and the present as much as dictate the future. The Völkische assumed that ‘common blood and common history form a common state’ and that the community they aspired to had to be a racial state built on a racial basis. They therefore called for ‘a thorough German renewal ... in the service of our own race’. This gave rise to a comprehensive Racial Renewal Programme, whose aim was to create deutschvölkische people. These would typically be tall, long-headed, blond-haired, and blue-eyed.

Like all Völkische, the religious prophets of the movement also worked from the notion of ‘race and blood’. In calling for a German religion, or one that was arteigen (‘true to type’), they were in fact calling for a religion of race. Religion provided the justification for the movement’s apocalyptic doctrine of salvation, which was believed in fanatically. Moreover, it gave the Völkische a reason for their anti-egal-

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18 ‘Was ist deutschvölkisch?’, Thüringer Landes-Zeitung, 14 April 1914, no. 86.
19 Dietwalt [= Philipp Stauff], ‘Regierung und völkische Bewegung’, Bismarck-Bund: Monatsschrift des Deutschen Bismarck-Bundes, 10 (1912), pp. 115-18, quotation at p. 117.
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itarian, racist intellectual construct in the first place. In essence, this was that ‘the salvation of the world will come from German blood’.  

Völkisch racial ideology was based on the ideas of Gobineau and social Darwinism, and was influenced by contemporary eugenics. It postulated an almost irreversible process of ‘Aryan decline’. This degeneration of the Germans was partly their own fault and partly caused by foreign influences. It culminated, in völkisch ideology, in pessimistic visions of decline and imminent racial death. The völkisch ideology assumed that the Aryans were the highest of all the human races, and that among the Aryans, the Germanic or Nordic race was the most highly developed but also the most under threat. The uneasiness which the Völkische felt at the upheavals and changes of the modern age in the economy, in society, and culture led them back to a process of racial degeneration, which they explained as the consequence of racial miscegenation and the influence of foreign races. They saw this alleged process of degeneration as beginning in Antiquity when the Romans came over the Alps. These non-Germanic peoples, Roman civilization, and Christianity began to deprive ‘the Germanic tree of rising spring sap’, as they saw it.

The ‘anti-Romanism’ that accompanied both the German reception of Tacitus and the expression of Teutonic ideology since Humanism is at the bottom of this völkisch view. Anti-Romanism was a constituent element of the völkisch ideology, and especially of the völkisch-religious movement. As far as its prophets were concerned, the völkisch idea began to spread with the Reformation in Germany. Luther, therefore, features as a German-völkisch hero, whose achievement was to have freed ‘the Germanic world of Rome’s domination’. Arminius and the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest enjoyed the same veneration as Luther.

24 Ernst Wachler, Über die Zukunft des deutschen Glaubens: Ein philosophischer Versuch, Irminsul. Schriftenreihe für Junggermanische (eddische) Religion
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and the Reformation. To the present day, the Deutschgläubige use a calendar that begins with the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest (AD 9).

Anti-Romanism, anchored in religious and cultural sub-groups of the völkisch movement, found a firm place in the völkisch ideology of race in the form of anti-Catholicism. In a theory of conspiracy and encirclement, interpreted in a racist way, this ideology postulated a pact between Rome, the Romance nations, and the Slavs whose aim was ‘to put a big circle ... around the German Reich, starting from the Adriatic and going via Austria to Poland on the one side, and via Switzerland and Lorraine as far as Belgium on the other’. But this was not all. The anti-Slav feeling displayed here fed into a pernicious völkisch racial apocalyptic vision in which anti-Slavism merged with anti-Semitism and the Yellow Peril, heralding a battle of the races. This construct saw the Jewish and the Slavic people living in the German Reich as the vanguard of the threatening Yellow Peril.

These comments point to conclusions which the völkisch camp drew from the pessimistic evidence of racial degeneration, alienation, and inundation by foreign elements (Überfremdung). From the start, the Völkische were not prepared simply to stand by and watch the ‘twilight of the Aryan race’. Referring to the demands of life-style reformers and eugenicists, they drew up a Racial Renewal Programme touching on all areas of life. In 1913, the Deutschbund, one of the most influential organizations of the völkisch movement, summed all this up in its ‘racial working plan’. As far as the Deutschbund was concerned, ‘maintaining and cultivating the race’ was the ‘most urgent’ of all ‘völkisch tasks’. The ‘racial working plan’ encouraged more research on racial history, racial biology, and eugenics, and promoted a comprehensive educational campaign which aimed to disseminate the völkisch racial ideology among the German people and give it a firm popular grounding. Above all, however, it prescribed ‘practical measures’, including abstinence and support for the temperance movement, a vegetarian diet, and physical exercise in the form of sport, or at least regular doses of fresh air.

This term is attributed to Otto Ammon.
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The emphasis on nature and a natural lifestyle in the völkisch ideology was matched by a strong anti-urbanism. The city was regarded as the ‘graveyard of the race’.28 The völkisch argument against cities was that the unhealthy environmental and living conditions of the urban population made it incapable of maintaining itself. It therefore required a constant influx of people from the country, the ‘physiological store-room of racial strength’.29 This conviction, the racial ideological variant of conservative agro-romantic ideas, gave rise to a catalogue of measures designed to ‘maintain as large a rural population as possible, consisting of physically and mentally healthy people to serve as the source of the power of our Volk, and from which the urban population will repeatedly be supplemented’.30 The flight from the land was to be countered by internal colonization, by infrastructural measures as well as measures to protect nature and foster regional values and traditions, by policies favourable to agriculture, and finally, by land reform. The efforts of the Völkische were unmistakably directed towards creating an agrarian society and a state based on status groups (Ständestaat), they sang paens to the authenticity of life on the land and to the myth of the eternal peasant, and repeatedly called for people to leave the big cities and move to the country. Yet they did not aspire to create a purely agrarian state; nor did they aim for total re-agrarianization or the demolition of industrial complexes and big cities. Rather, they sought for solutions which compromised between the agrarian social basis of the völkische Weltanschauung and the industrial capitalist economic system in the sense of an ‘alternative modernity’ — as opposed to ‘an alternative to modernity’31. Although the medium-sized production sector of the economy was, in principle, favoured over large-scale enterprises and during the Wilhelmine period, see now Stefan Kuhn, ‘Der Deutschbund’ (MA thesis, Friedrich Meinecke Institute at the Free University of Berlin, 2001), and Ascan Gossler, ‘Friedrich Lange und die “völkische Bewegung” des Kaiserreichs’, Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, 83 (2001), pp. 377–411.


29 ‘Arbeitsplan des Deutschbundes’.

30 Ibid.

31 Uwe Justus Wenzel, ‘ “Konservative Revolution”: Ideengeschichtliche Reminiszenzen aus Anlaß einer neuen Studie [Rolf Peter Sieferle, Die Konserva-
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big industry, nobody, declared a völkisch spokesman, thought of reorganizing heavy industry into small-scale enterprises. None the less, in the interests of ‘racial improvement’, the Völkische tried to stem the further expansion of big industry and large cities.

As early as 1896 Theodor Fritsch, generally known as a perfidious anti-Semite and an ‘early planner of the Holocaust’, proposed the concept of the garden city as an alternative to urban industrial social developments, and as a synthesis between town and country. To Fritsch’s annoyance, these ideas entered the popular consciousness not through his own publications, but through those of a Briton. The founding of the Deutsche Gartenstadt-Gesellschaft and the garden city movement in 1902 looked to The Garden-City of Tomorrow by Ebenezer Howard, published in 1898. This book, like Fritsch’s publications, was based on notions of agrarian and lifestyle reform. The garden cities created in Germany were not built according to Fritsch’s plans, and their builders certainly did not subscribe to the völkisch dogma of common ownership of the land. None the less, they were very popular as places to live among the prominent members of the völkisch community. While the Völkische preached the benefits of living in the country, they themselves lived in garden cities because their clientele was urban.

Most members of the völkisch movement saw garden cities as ‘an important method of ensuring the health and welfare of the Germans’ in the struggle against ‘racial deterioration’. But the völkisch racial breeders had doubts as to whether the ‘new Mensch’ could be brought forth, and a ‘racial economy’ successfully be based on ‘garden cities, the cultivation of fruit and vegetables, and other small-scale means’.

The ‘racial working plan’ already mentioned above sums up, in a shocking and concise way, what a völkisch racial economy was, and

33 Ivo’s Deutschvölkischer Zeitweiser 1913, pp. 158 f.
how ‘population policy and breeding policy’ were to be conducted ‘according to the doctrines of looking after the race’: ‘The eradication of those of inferior worth is to be aimed for, while the industrious and noble sections of the population are to be encouraged to reproduce ..., and the already very dangerous decline in the rate of population increase is to be combated (by higher tax relief for families with more children, a military service exemption tax, a tax on unmarried men, laws protecting mothers and babies, bonuses for breast-feeding etc.).’ Further, contraception was rejected while ‘the establishment of a German foundation for the support of racially valuable progeny’ was demanded. Calls were made for partners to be selected ‘according to racial criteria’, and finally, ‘for mothers of large families to attain their proper position of respect and honour in public opinion’.35

For a small group of Völkische, these plans and ideas for reforming lifestyles did not go anywhere near far enough. The ultimate völkisch goal of ‘racial purity’ and the ideal of the tall, long-headed, long-faced, blond-haired, and blue-eyed völkisch person of the future, they believed, could hardly be realized by means of the measures described. They put their hopes on planned ‘selective breeding for Germanic racial purity’.36

The biologist Willibald Hentschel was the originator of this idea. In his programme, first published in 1904 as Mittgatt: Ein Weg zur Erneuerung der germanischen Rasse, Hentschel put forward a detailed plan for his utopia of racial breeding; indeed the völkisch racial mania for the ‘new man’ peaked in his project. Mittgatt was a code-name for ascetic rural co-operative settlements in which private property would be unknown, so-called human gardens where men and women, selected by experts, would live in a ratio of one man to ten women. Groups numbering one hundred men and one thousand women were to live in separate areas, even during temporarily concluded marriages. These were to end with the beginning of a pregnancy. After two or three years, women would be permitted to marry again. In line with völkisch principles, the education of the children was to emphasize the physical. Boys, in groups of a hundred, were to be brought up in Spartan simplicity whereas the girls were to be left

35 ‘Arbeitsplan des Deutschbundes’.
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in the care of their mothers. Only the boys and girls ‘selected to establish a new generation’ were to stay in Mittgart. All the rest, those of ‘inferior racial worth’ would have to ‘be released ... into the world when they reached the age of sixteen’; there, with the so-called Minus Variants (Minusvarianten) who were not considered suitable for the Mittgart project, they would form the urban population that was ‘condemned to die’. Hentschel’s plan was built on the assumption of rapid success. He counted on the existence of three hundred Mittgart settlements, which would send ‘an unbroken stream of one hundred thousand human children of superlative hereditary stock into the cultural areas ... who would effect an immediate transformation across the whole breadth of national experience’.37

Hentschel’s proposal produced a heated controversy in the ranks of the Völkische. The majority doubted that the project would be successful, in particular, the vague possibility of breeding humans with ‘long heads’ and true ‘Germanic qualities’.38 Even greater difficulties were caused by the so-called Mittgart marriage, which ran counter to the general morality not only of the Völkische, who saw ‘lifelong monogamy [as] the ideal form of human mating’ and ‘permanent marriage ... as the most suitable ... for the raising of children’.39 None of the compromise solutions put forward, such as the proposal to allow the Mittgart marriage only for a transitional period, found any more favour than did references to Tacitus and Germania, otherwise recognized as sacrosanct sources for the values and norms to which the Völkische were to aspire.

Apart from financial difficulties, the Mittgart marriage was the biggest obstacle to the acceptance of Hentschel’s plans, and despite several attempts, they remained unrealized before the First World War. To be sure, Mittgart and the völkisch settlement projects associated with it, such as Heimland, a settlement near Rheinsberg which existed from 1909 to just after the First World War, were firmly rejected by the female members of an otherwise male-dominated move-

38 Gerstenhauer, Rassenlehre, p. 49.
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ment. But there were exceptions, such as Margart Hunkel, who invoked the ‘German motherhood of God’ and founded the Deutsche Schwesternschaft in 1917. This, in turn, gave rise to Donnershag, a deutschgläubige outdoor settlement founded near Sontra in Upper Hesse in 1919, where it is alleged that Hentschel’s ideas on breeding were put into practice for a short time.

Although these extreme völkisch proposals for racial renewal failed either at the planning stage or were hindered by external conditions, it would be wrong to dismiss them as misguided, unrealistic ideas, for the prophets of the völkische Weltanschauung and their followers took them very seriously indeed. Their goal was for ‘a people with völkisch ideas to aspire to racial purity’, they actually wanted ‘to replace Adam ... with their own, Germanic Adam who contained all the glory of the human spirit within himself’, as Theodor Mommsen wrote derisively, misjudging the fanaticism of the movement.

Ultimately, the aim of the Völksche was to create ‘new’, racially pure human beings who, with others of their kind, that is, racially pure Germanic-Aryan individuals, would form the new Volk of the ‘one Reich’. This greater German Reich was to be predominantly agrarian and to have a constitution based on professional status groups. According to the slogan of the völkisch journal Heimdal, it was to stretch from Scandinavia to the Adriatic, from Boulogne to the Narwa, and from Besançon to the Black Sea. The Völksche used these ideas to justify their hate campaigns directed against the Slavs and Jews who lived in the German Reich, and to legitimize their demands for Lebensraum in the East, and their call for discriminatory measures against Jews and Slavs in the Reich. The measures they demanded ranged from deprivation of civil rights, expulsion, resettlement, and deportation, to extermination, which was already being openly discussed at the turn of the century.

Yet from the start, the Völksche were unanimously agreed that the ‘race question’ could not be allowed to be the only content of the völkisch...
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*kische Weltanschauung*. This is where their concern with religion comes in. Religion and religiosity were the driving forces behind all thought and action in the *völkisch* spirit. This did not indicate a renunciation of the racial dogma; rather, the idea of a religion which was inherent in and innate to the race was built upon it.

In the *völkische Weltanschauung*, action that was considered responsible in racial terms presupposed ethical-religious action dictated by race. The ‘loss of religion among the people’ was seen as a threat to the ‘existence of state and society’ and as significant evidence for the *völkisch* thesis of degeneration, racial deterioration, and ‘decline of the Aryan race’.43 By the same token, religion was regarded as guaranteeing a moral, *völkisch*, and thus also racial rebirth.

*Völkisch* religion was always orientated towards this world rather than the next. Thus it was a logical demand that ‘saving the soul’ had to start with ‘saving the body’ — which referred to the comprehensive programme of racial regeneration.44 There was agreement that ‘natural characteristics and qualities’ could only develop fully in a racially pure *Volk*.45 The path which the *Völkische* publicized and themselves trod towards a ‘German rebirth’ thus necessarily had to start from a specific ‘German religion’. The lack of a religion specific to their race was seen as the ‘greatest danger for the future of the Germanic people; that is its Achilles heel; whoever hits it there will bring it down’.46

One principle was common to the various concepts for a Germanic religion that were drawn up. This was expressed by a *völkisch* ideologue when he confessed that he wanted ‘real religion,


46 Houston Stewart Chamberlain, *Die Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, vol. 2 (5th edn.; Munich, 1904), quotation at p. 750.
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not just a Weltanschauung with religious elements'. According to völkisch views, ideology did not have a religious character. It was not seen as a substitute religion, a political religion. In my opinion this, in addition to the rejection of the status of a party and of a hierarchical party organization, is an important difference between the völkisch movement and National Socialism.

Christianity in its traditional form could not provide the religion specific to their race sought by the Völkische because it did not fulfil two fundamental demands of völkisch religiosity. In sharp contrast to Christian teaching, the völkisch notion of a religion specific to their race was decidedly not other-worldly. It was directed towards this world rather than the next, and towards race, which was the determinant of all being.

Up to this point there was agreement among the members of the völkisch movement. Where they differed was on what form this religion should take. The proposals put forward ranged from a Germanized Christianity to a total rejection of Christianity in favour of pagan religions. However, only a minority of adherents turned away from Christianity completely. Most clung to a Christian religion that had been Germanized to varying degrees, but like all völkisch religious concepts, was strongly anti-Semitic and, especially, anti-Catholic. Luther and the Reformation were significant. In the völkisch awareness, völkisch ideas had begun to spread through Germany since the Reformation. This is where the roots of the völkisch veneration of Luther, which came out of national Protestantism, lay. But in völkisch Christian thinking, Luther’s doctrine was ‘not the highest stage of knowledge’, and the Reformation was considered ‘half-finished’. In the general völkisch view, the work begun by Luther and Bismarck, that other German reformer, was awaiting completion in the establishment of the greater Germanic Reich described above.

The breeding ground of völkisch religion and, in particular, so-called Deutschchristentum, was unmistakably the combination of

nationalism and Protestantism during the Kaiserreich. The Deutschchristentum, however, saw 'the Protestant church as only a transitional stage towards a deutschvölkisch faith'. The völkisch ideologue Adolf Bartels coined the term 'Deutschchristentum' (German Christianity) in 1913, when he issued the slogan: 'More Deutschchristentum; less Jewish Christianity.' It is clear that Bartels's völkisch origins lay in anti-Semitism. Just as obvious is the key significance of anti-Semitism for the völkisch movement, the völkisch religious movement, and, in particular, for the deutschchristlich movement. In fact, the völkisch dogma of the inseparability of race and religion made anti-Semitism a necessary precondition. Christianity, however, God's 'new bond' with mankind, is based on God's first bond with his chosen people, the Israelites. Jesus Christ, the founder of the religion, was himself a Jew, and Luther the reformer was a Catholic monk.

This led the völkisch supporters of Christianity to conclude that 'in continuation of the first reformation and purification effected by Luther', Christianity now needed 'another, up-to-date purification in a free and Aryan spirit'. The precondition for the Germanization of Christianity was 'Entjudung' (getting rid of the Jews). 'From now on we can recognize only those parts of the Bible that to some extent agree with the Aryan and Germanic spirit', went the slogan. On the context see Barbara Stambolis, 'Religiöse Symbolik und Programmatik in der Nationalbewegung des 19. Jahrhunderts im Spannungsfeld konfessioneller Gegensätze', Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, 82 (2000), pp. 157–89, and now on the more differentiated relationship between Protestantism and anti-Semitism, Wolfgang E. Heinrichs, Das Judenbild im Protestantismus des Deutschen Kaiserreichs, Schriftenreihe des Vereins für Rheinische Kirchengeschichte, 145 (Cologne, 2000). In this context see also Justus H. Ulbricht, 'Klänge "deutschen Wesens": Feiern, Rituale und Lieder deutschreligiöser Gruppierungen', in Richard Faber (ed.), Sekularisierung und Reskralisierung: Zur Geschichte des Kirchenliedes und seiner Rezeption (Würzburg, 2001), pp. 129–44.


51 Bartels, Verfall, p. 38.


54 Ibid., p. 479.
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included neither the Old Testament, nor the epistles of St Paul in the New Testament.

At the hub of Deutschchristentum lay the doctrine of Christ. The Deutschchristen simply declared Christ to have been an Aryan. This made original Christianity an ‘Aryan religion’ which, according to their racial ideology was appropriate for the Germanic soul. All that had to be done was for Christianity to be restored to its original form and purified of foreign ‘influences’. The ‘German Christ’ — or rather, the völkisch idol — formed by this thinking was the model and likeness of the völkisch figure of light which it was the goal of all visions of racial renewal to create: a ‘Christ of life’, of this world rather than the next, a Christ of action, a stubborn, death-defyingly courageous and heroic fighter and leader who was ready to make sacrifices.55 This heroic so-called Christianity, which had been totally stripped of its true contents and filled with new ones, was held up as the historical religion of the Germans, the one appropriate to their nature, and the ‘German Christ’ was seen as the ‘one God’.

The völkisch pagans made entirely different choices. This large minority within the völkisch religious movement found any religious idea based on Christianity unacceptable in principle. Their main criticism of Deutschchristentum was that it was an Aryanized version of Christianity, and they strongly rejected the anti-Semitic motives of the deutschchristlich demagogues. The pagans believed that Deutschchristentum could not be the völkisch religion appropriate to the Germanic people because Christianity made no sense without Judaism. Ultimately, Christianity would always be a Jewish religion. The orthodox members of those segments of the völkisch religious movement who believed in the Germanic peoples thus saw Deutschchristentum as a striking contradiction to the principles of völkisch racial doctrine. They demanded a truly ‘German religion’ which

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should build on ‘what our fathers believed, looked at, and thought about, so that we can use it and cherish it’.56

For the völkisch pagans, Erinnerung (racial memory), the sub-conscious retention and liberation of traditional knowledge of the Germanic past, so far still buried, was the central construct. Taking recourse to it smoothed the way for the pagan Völkische to demand a ‘hereditary religion’ for the Germans. ‘After all, the belief appropriate for our people once existed in a wonderful form’, explained one of the leading pagans. ‘It is not dead, just buried; is it not possible to uncover the soil whence it sprang? Let us try to find a way into the world of our fairy-tales and myths, to the lost shrine of our Volk.’ Just as ‘spiritual rebirth’ presupposed becoming aware of and declaring a commitment to Germanic pre-history, German Heimat, and thus to völkisch uniqueness, the only ‘fountain of youth’ for religious renewal was ‘our own Volksstum’. In the view of the pagans, the ‘true belief of the Germans’, which was essentially a natural, that is, racial, religion, survived essentially in traditional customs and, in particular, in fairy-tales, sagas, and myths. Artists, and especially writers, in whose medium, the mother-tongue, the ‘ancient inheritance’ had largely been preserved, were therefore called upon ‘to sow the seeds of a new belief’ like ‘visionaries’.57

It would be precipitate to see this programme merely as a sort of religion of art or literature, a ‘religion of Germanisien’, as one deutsch-christlicher opponent of the pagans accused it of being.58 In fact, this proposed religion, which was undoubtedly fixated on national culture, covered up a racism which was fundamental to the völkische Weltanschauung and culminated in the ideology of the ‘master race’, as well as efforts to renew the religious cults of the ancient Germanic tribes.

One of the places in which pagan ideas were put into practice was the Harzer Bergtheater, an open-air theatre near Quedlinburg, which

56 Paul Hartig, Die völkische Weltsendung: Wege zum völkischen Werden (Bad Berka, 1924), p. 2.
57 Wachler, Zukunft, pp. 18 and 21.
was opened in 1903. Conceived as a temple to fire, its aim was ‘to radiate and express Aryan efforts in the spiritual life of the nation’. Before the First World War, this open-air theatre, which is still in use today, functioned as a pagan cult site, where groups who believed in a German religion would gather with their sympathizers.

In 1914 the Germanische Glaubens-Gemeinschaft and its associated Germanische Gemeinschaft of sympathizers were members of the church. In addition there were the Wodan-Gesellschaft, and the lodges Große Germanen and Nornen, the Deutsche Schäfferbund and the Wandervogel Völkischer Bund für Jugendwandern. Other participants were members of the occult Germanenorden, delegates from the Fahrrende Gesellen, a youth organization of the Deutschnationale Handlungshelfer-Verband, the Deutschbund, and the Deutschvölkischer Lehrer-Verband; and finally, a delegation from the Bund Deutscher Wanderer, including members of the Deutsche Vortrupp Bund, a life-style reforming youth group led by Friedrich Muck-Lamberty. Early in the 1920s, Muck-Lamberty caused a great stir when he travelled through Franconia and Thuringia with his Neue Schar, calling on young people to mobilize. Muck-Lamberty saw his destiny as ‘to beget the German Christ with a blonde girl’. This list of völkisch groups, or groups that were close to the völkisch movement, points up the völkisch strategy of advertising their ideas among young people and the youth movement in particular, and recruiting new members there, successfully as it appears. It also illustrates the confusing spectrum of völkisch religious communities.

The first völkisch religious community was the Aryosophical Ordo Novi Templi. Modelled on the Knights Templar, it was set up in 1900 by the former Cistercian monk and mystic of race, Jörg Lanz von Liebenfels (i.e. Adolf Lanz). Three years later the Deutschreligiöse Bund was established at the Hermann Memorial in the Teutoburg Forest. This organization can be seen as an early precursor of the organized form of the deutschchristlich movement, which came into being after the First World War with the founding of the Bund für deutsche Kirche in 1921. The pagans began to organize themselves in

60 Quoted from Ulrich Linse, Barfüßige Propheten: Erlöser der zwanziger Jahre (Berlin, 1983), p. 121.
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1910. The two most significant organizations were the Deutschgläubige Gemeinschaft and the Germanische Glaubens-Gemeinschaft, constituted in 1911 and 1912 respectively. They either still exist today, or have been reconstituted.

The foundation history and the early years of these two organizations was deeply marked by the claims to leadership of their founding fathers: Otto Sigfrid Reuter and Ludwig Fahrenkrog. Both believed that the defining features of 'German religion' were a 'common race' and a 'common religious will'. The aim of both was a unified 'community of blood and religion'; both therefore restricted membership to Aryans and called for freedom of the church. Fahrenkrog and Reuter believed that 'the Germanic race' harboured the divine within itself. 'German religion is the religion innate in German people', one of the deutschgläubige prophets declaimed. From this point of view, the claim to be the elect, a willingness to act and make sacrifices, and 'breeding the race up' constituted the essence of völkisch religion. This is the source of the fanaticism and aggressiveness of the Völkische, and of their view of themselves as the 'elect'.

The consequences of this sort of thinking are well known. They have given rise to three theses which underlie research on the völkische Weltanschauung and movement. First, the völkische Weltanschauung was completely formed before the First World War. The same applies to the völkisch movement. It also existed long before the First World War. Since the mid-1890s, in the Wilhelmine period, the Völkische had created the ideological breeding ground, the organizational prerequisites, and the propaganda instruments for National

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Socialism and modern right-wing extremism in the form of a network of institutions covering Germany, and aggressive and focused agitation.\textsuperscript{66} Secondly, the relevant concepts, motives, patterns of thought, and enemy images were shaped during this twenty-five years of \textit{völkisch} agitation before the First World War. The Nazis drew on this fund of \textit{völkisch} sympathizers and on their propaganda arsenal. While they regarded much as eccentric, diffuse, even as counter to their beliefs, they took over one thing in its entirety. This was, thirdly, the \textit{völkisch} racial ideology, comprised in the slogan ‘one people, one Reich, one God’, the constituent element of the \textit{völkische Weltanschauung}. All three \textit{völkisch} demands were destined to fail in the social and political reality of Germany after the First World War. Yet the Nazis made use of the \textit{völkisch} programme of ‘one God’, which was ready to be drawn upon in the minds of many people. The heroic German saviour figure, familiar from the \textit{völkisch} programme for earthly salvation, could be transformed into a charismatic \textit{Führer} figure. Thus ‘one people, one Reich, one God’ became ‘one People, one Reich, one \textit{Führer}'.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

A WAR OF WORDS? OLD AND NEW PERSPECTIVES
ON THE ENLIGHTENMENT

by Michael Schaich


PAMELA E. SELWYN, Everyday Life in the German Book Trade: Friedrich Nicolai as Bookseller and Publisher in the Age of Enlightenment, 1750-1810 (University Park, Pa.: Penn State University Press, 2000), 419 pp. ISBN 0 271 02011 3. £56.50


MAIKEN UMBACH, Federalism and the Enlightenment in Germany, 1740-1806 (Hambledon: The Hambledon Press, 2000), 232 pp. ISBN 1 85285 177 5. £38.00

Over the last two decades or so, the Enlightenment has had a bad press in intellectual circles on both sides of the Atlantic. With the advent of postmodernism the legacy of the Age of Reason was held responsible for such diverse phenomena as the authoritarian nature of the modern state, the suppression of emotions in bourgeois society, and the destruction of the natural environment. Such criticism was not without precursors. In 1947 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer had already pointed out the inherently retrogressive
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and destructive as well as the progressive elements of Enlightened thinking in their influential treatise *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Paradoxically, however, academic research on the historical period of the Enlightenment has not been hampered by the poor reputation of its subject in general discourse. Rather, modern criticism sometimes seems to have sparked off the study of the intellectual revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.¹ Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s book, for example, revived interest in the Age of Reason after the Second World War. Following a short flourish of studies in the inter-war period, most prominently Ernst Cassirer’s *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment* (1932), interest had declined sharply. The most important impetus for the investigation of the Enlightenment, however, was the student revolution of 1968. In its aftermath scholars all over the Western world started to trace the roots of the liberal political agenda set out by the students and their intellectual leaders in the writings of Enlightened thinkers. In consequence, from the 1970s, eighteenth-century studies became one of the growth industries within the humanities. Journals devoted to the analysis of all aspects of eighteenth-century life sprang up, national societies of dix-huitiémistes were founded and soon came together to form the International Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies, and numerous conferences are held, culminating every five years in a world congress on the Enlightenment with hundreds of sessions and thousands of participants from all areas of cultural studies.

The explosion of research activities over the last twenty to thirty years, defying any fashionable criticism, has also resulted, almost inevitably, in a re-evaluation of the traditional monolithic image of the Age of Reason. Thus the idea of a universal model of the Enlightenment was increasingly challenged by historians who put more emphasis on the national contexts in which the new movement gradually took shape.² Even more interestingly, the character of the Enlightenment as a primarily intellectual current has been ques-

¹ For a general account of Enlightenment research in Germany in the twentieth century see Winfried Müller, *Die Aufklärung*, pt. 2, Enzyklopädie deutscher Geschichte, 61 (forthcoming, Munich, 2002).
tioned by social historians, who highlight its more practical ambitions and generally utilitarian outlook. Far from being merely a war of words, the Enlightenment aimed at reform in many areas of eighteenth-century politics. Both approaches, intellectual history and social history, nowadays belong to the canon of approved methods and are widely employed in research on the Enlightenment, as the first two parts of this review article will demonstrate. In recent years, however, new studies which attempt to discover the visual language of the Enlightenment have taken up the ideas of cultural history. They reveal a totally new side of the old question of whether the Enlightenment was a war of words, and enable us to decipher hitherto hidden layers of meaning, as the third part of this review article suggests.

I

Traditionally, intellectual history has been the via regia for investigating the Enlightenment. One of the most prominent historians to have adopted this approach in the last few decades is Margaret C. Jacob, now professor of history at the University of California at Los Angeles. Twenty-one years ago, almost at the same time as postmodernists mounted their attack on the Enlightenment, she wrote a monograph, *The Radical Enlightenment* (1981), in which she championed the cause of an intellectually subversive and ultimately also politically revolutionary undercurrent within the Enlightenment movement, which in the long run shaped our modern, secular, and liberal Western society. Convincingly argued and well written, Jacob’s book placed the radical Enlightenment firmly on the agenda of eighteenth-century historians. Yet she succeeded not only in broadening the field, but also in modernizing the methodology of intellectual history. Identifying the Masonic lodges with their shield of secrecy as one of the hotbeds of radical thinking, she introduced an element of social analysis into the history of Enlightened ideas and concepts. It is therefore hardly surprising that to the present day Jacob’s work in this and subsequent volumes to a large degree defines perceptions of the eighteenth century in American and British universities.

This influence is certain to rise with the publication of her latest book, a ‘brief history’ of the Enlightenment. The slim volume is conceived primarily as a textbook for use in the classroom and therefore contains a good collection of key documents of the Age of Reason.
Apart from the anonymously published *Treatise of the Three Impostors* (1719), the reader will find substantial extracts from the writings of John Locke, Voltaire, Mary Wortley Montagu, Denis Diderot, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and Moses Mendelssohn. This list alone makes clear that in her introduction Jacob is mainly concerned with ideas and controversies. In her understanding, the Enlightenment grew out of ‘a war of words with the upholders of tradition, authority and the status quo’ (p. vii).

According to Jacob’s chronologically structured account, the origins of this development are to be found in the 1680s when liberal Protestants in England and the Dutch Republic used tracts and pamphlets in a struggle against religious intolerance and arbitrary rule as embodied by absolutist Catholic princes such as James II in England and Louis XIV in France. As the clergy were seen as the main butresses of the policies of these monarchs, the church, its privileges, and its dogmas soon became a second target of enraged pamphletists who drew upon a whole new set of ideas in these battles. One of the main points of reference, according to Jacob, was the work of John Locke whose treatises undermined belief in the divine right of kings and advocated government by Parliament. Further support came from the unfolding of modern science connected mainly with the name of Isaac Newton. New methods such as ‘experiment, trial and error, and the belief that mathematical regularity and laws ruled the universe’ (p. 15) cast doubt upon the basic assumptions of revealed religion. Finally, the theories of seventeenth-century thinkers such as Francis Bacon and René Descartes could be interpreted—often against the original intentions of their authors—in a way which questioned ecclesiastical authority and doctrinal belief. Taken together, the battles of international Protestantism against allegedly Catholic despotism and religious orthodoxy in the decades around 1700 forged a core group of Enlightened beliefs which evolved around anti-clericalism, the opposition to absolutism, and sometimes even the notion of a natural religion.

These early Enlightened ideas were disseminated in newly constituted public spaces like coffee-houses, salons, Masonic lodges, learned journals, or by the means of Grub Street. Rather surprisingly, however, given her record as a modernizer of intellectual history, Jacob goes into little detail. Only Freemasonry, her favourite subject, and the clandestine book trade are given a somewhat broader treat-
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ment. The lodges emerge, as in her previous books, as spheres whose secret nature allowed freedom of thought, religious toleration, and the practice of democratic procedures such as ‘constitutional government, elections, voting and public speech making’ (p. 35). The image of the ‘clandestine universe’ (p. 33), on the other hand, with its radical writers, publishers, and printers living under the constant threat of the censor, remains rather vague. Instead of describing living conditions in this vibrant underground world, Jacob confines herself to recounting the contents of some of the texts which were printed and distributed under these circumstances. She describes the anti-Catholic and anti-French feeling which still prevailed in the late seventeenth century only to be replaced, as time passed, by the openly heretical tendency manifested in the most famous of all these texts, the Treatise of the Three Impostors mentioned above, which denounced Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad as charlatans and the religions they founded as forgeries.

Although the Treatise contained ‘perhaps the most extreme set of words written in the eighteenth century’ (p. viii), the Enlightenment in general was, according to Jacob, not yet at its most radical. In the middle of the eighteenth century it entered a new stage in its development. The centre of gravity shifted from England and the Dutch republic to Paris, which rose to become the ‘capital of the Enlightenment’ (p. 50). Parallel to this geographical shift an even more progressive strand of thinking entered the intellectual arena: materialism became the latest fashion in Enlightened circles, as the jubilant reception of the writings of Julien La Mettrie, pornographic novels like Thérèse philosophe and Fanny Hill, and especially Denis Diderot’s multi-volume Encyclopédie amply demonstrate. The French philosophes ‘removed God and in his place inserted the blind forces of matter in motion’ (p. 51). At the same time Jean-Jacques Rousseau laid the ‘theoretical foundation for democracy’ (p. 57), as Jacob puts it, in his Du contrat social (1762).

All these impulses further radicalized the Enlightenment after 1775, now expanding into the realm of politics. An ‘international republican conversation’ (p. 59) advocating the republic, which Jacob seems to identify with democracy, as the best form of government, broke out. In a further attempt to democratize political life, the Enlightenment movement turned practical after 1780, when clubs and societies were founded to promote reform and improvement
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measures. In addition, a campaign to abolish slavery gained momentum all over Europe as a result of the debate about human rights. Finally the politicization of the Enlightenment was characterized by ‘democratic revolutions’ (p. 68 and passim) in America, Amsterdam, Brussels, and Paris which Jacob clearly links to the influence of Enlightened ideas, although she avoids an open confrontation with historians who deny such causalities. The aftermath of the French Revolution, however, also marks the end of Jacob’s narrative. Repressive measures introduced by governments all over Europe to contain revolutionary ideas and disillusionment about the violent turn of events in Paris ‘brought the Enlightenment to a close’ (p. 68).

On the whole, Jacob describes the Enlightenment as a progressive and increasingly radicalized force which rejected traditional notions of secular and ecclesiastical authority, and in doing so established ‘the values of tolerance, fair-mindedness and worldliness’ (p. viii), the foundations of our modern liberal and open-minded culture. This teleological perspective of course makes for compelling reading, which in turn will secure a wider audience, but it clearly fails to give a full picture. Leaving aside the fact that Jacob’s equation of ‘republic’ with ‘democracy’ takes no account of the much wider meanings of the term in early modern political discourse, her narrative relies mainly on the writings of the radicals. Moderate Enlightened positions, as represented, for example, by Montesquieu, Leibniz, and Christian Wolff, are largely absent from the text, and when they are briefly dealt with, she rebukes them as ‘timid’, as in the case of Immanuel Kant (p. 63). A further problem is the almost exclusive concentration on England, the Dutch Republic, and France—as if Italy or Germany, which is at least mentioned in passing, had no Enlightenment worthy of more extensive treatment. Closely connected with this West European bias is a last inadequacy of Jacob’s text, her complete neglect of any Catholic contribution to the development of the Enlightenment. Neither the impact of the ideas of Giordano Bruno or Galileo in the formative years of the Enlightenment, nor the later influence of Giambattista Vico or Cesare Beccaria in the pan-European debates is credited. Instead Jacob adheres to the old misconception of the Enlightenment as an exclusively Protestant affair. In the end, all these deficiencies leave the reader with a rather distorted image of the Enlightenment, providing a further example of a once critical approach which has turned into a new orthodoxy.
A far more convincing account of the initial stages of the Age of Reason is now to be found in Jonathan Israel’s *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750*. The sheer size of the volume, eight hundred pages as compared to Jacob’s seventy, and the narrower focus alone allow for a much more nuanced analysis. More importantly, however, Israel, a well-known expert on the Dutch Republic in the early modern period, structured his book as broadly as possible right from the start. Enviably polyglot and erudite, he set out to trace the development of the radical Enlightenment not only in England, the Dutch Republic, and France, but also in the Baltic, the Holy Roman Empire, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Based on a huge number of printed and unprinted sources, his account thus provides the reader with a truly European panorama of radical Enlightened thinking, which in parts even widens into a history of the Enlightenment as a whole. Within the limits of this article it is impossible to do justice to the multi-layered narrative and the scope of the study. But a brief outline of the main argument may at least indicate its importance.

Like Jacob, Israel dates the beginning of the Enlightenment to the 1680s. Yet the story he tells starts in the 1650s when the spread of Descartes’ philosophy triggered—to use Paul Hazard’s phrase—a crisis of the European mind, a kind of prelude to the Enlightenment proper. Until the middle of the seventeenth century, according to Israel, debates and controversies had taken place in a relatively stable framework. Intellectual war had raged between different confessional camps which all claimed a monopoly on God’s truth, but never questioned the principles of the Christian religion or of the divinely ordained social and political order itself. This all began to change with the advent of Cartesianism and its mechanistic world-view. The pillars of Christianity were shaken, but not yet overthrown. Cartesianism lacked the internal unity and strength to supplant the old modes of thinking. The last step was only taken by a new generation of radical writers after 1680. They pushed the bounds of reason further than ever before and for the first time rejected the central tenets of the Christian religion and, in consequence, the fundamental laws of the traditional political structure. The audaciousness of their ideas, as Israel states, made them the driving force behind the intellectual revolution of the late seventeenth century. They distanced themselves from a more moderate version of the Enlightenment which
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‘aspired to conquer ignorance and superstition, establish toleration, and revolutionize ideas, education, and attitudes by means of philosophy but in such a way as to preserve and safeguard what were judged essential elements of the older structures, effecting a viable synthesis of old and new, and of reason and faith’ (p. 11).

For Israel, the dawn of this radical Enlightenment is inextricably linked to the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza. In stark contrast to Jacob, who assigns him only a minor role on the fringes of the Enlightenment, Israel places Spinoza, the son of a Jewish merchant with no formal academic training and without an established position in the learned world, right at the centre of the Enlightenment project. Spinoza’s work, according to Israel, became the main source of inspiration for the radical wing of the movement. Not without reason does the dust-jacket depict an oversize image of his staring eyes looming above a series of small-scale portraits of other radical philosophers. This account of Spinoza’s influence reflects what more conservative contemporaries already knew when they characterized the writings of radical authors as ‘Spinosime’ or ‘Spinozisterey’. Between 1670 and 1750 Spinoza became the most feared and even hated representative of the Enlightenment, the arch-atheist, whose notoriety was almost proverbial.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Israel devotes a large part of his book to an explanation of Spinoza’s philosophy. In a painstaking textual analysis he reconstructs every aspect of Spinoza’s intellectual cosmos: the historically grounded Bible criticism, the revolutionary concept of substance and a God innate in nature, which could be employed to overturn any notion of divine providence or even the existence of God, the hitherto neglected contribution to the Scientific Revolution, and the attempts to draw up a theory of ‘democratic republicanism’ (p. 262). Spinoza’s greatest achievement, however, in laying the ground for a radical Enlightenment consisted in his ability to forge the doctrines of ancient and modern authorities into a coherent philosophical framework: ‘it is primarily the unity, cohesion, and compelling power of his system, ... which explains his centrality in the evolution of the whole Radical Enlightenment’ (p. 231).

Throughout these chapters Israel constantly endeavours to embed his elucidation of Spinoza’s philosophy in the historical and philosophical context in which it developed. In a brilliant subchapter he reconstructs Spinoza’s youth in the milieu of Amsterdam’s Jewish
community, from which he was later expelled because of his heretical convictions, and a circle of atheistic freethinkers who met in the same city during the 1650s and 1660s. Among the highlights of the book is also a captivatingly narrated publishing history of Spinoza’s main works, the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (1669–70) and the *Ethics* (1677–8). This is a prime example of the skill with which publishers and authors of clandestine literature circumvented censorship and disseminated their intellectual contraband. Attention is further given to some of Spinoza’s comrades-in-arms, for example, the ex-Jesuit Van den Emden and the brothers Koerbagh. They composed equally outrageous tracts which were usually anonymously published, but the brothers Koerbagh had the misfortune to be discovered and sentenced by a magistrate. Yet the exponents of Spinoza’s philosophy not only had to struggle with hostile authorities, but were also involved in the first, still rather small-scale learned controversies. On the other hand, Spinoziste philosophy started to gain adherents in England, Scandinavia, Germany, Italy, and France. Even before Spinoza’s death in 1677, therefore, a philosophical school had come into existence. Until the 1680s, however, Spinozism still relied on a relatively small and close-knit network of ardent admirers.

Only in the period between 1680 and 1720 did it mature into the full-blown radical current within the Enlightenment which is the theme of Israel’s book. This transformation was brought about by a series of sensational debates, which nowadays have been largely forgotten, even by experts on the Enlightenment. But in Spinoza’s time, they attracted the attention of intellectuals in the whole of Europe and forced his disciples to formulate a cohesive set of ideas and beliefs. These controversies either centred on individuals such as Pierre Bayle and Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, who were accused of atheism, or on certain topics, for example, the reality of miracles or supernatural beings like demons, spirits, sorcerers, and the devil. Since Spinozism honed its profile in constant dispute with more moderate positions in contemporary philosophy, Israel devotes part of his book to the mainstream of the Enlightenment, thus for a time broadening its scope into a comprehensive history of intellectual developments in early eighteenth-century Europe. He basically distinguishes four different camps which led the ‘counter-offensive’ (p. 445) against the radicals. First, there was liberal theology exemplified by such clergymen as the French Oratorian Richard Simon or the
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Swiss Protestant Jean Le Clerc, who went to great lengths to defend revelation, some if not all miracles, and a providential God on the grounds of reason. Second, Israel points to neo-Cartesianism, whose foundations, however, collapsed in the 1720s because of internal inconsistencies. Third, there was Newtonianism reinforced by Lockean ideas, which, contrary to an oft repeated misapprehension, entered the continental scene only from the 1730s onwards, and fourth, Leibnizian-Wolffianism with its prime aim of defending princely authority and strengthening the Christian churches via a reunion of the confessions. All four philosophical blocs tried to hold the middle ground in the intellectual arena between conservatives and radicals, and sought to combat any philosophical system deemed outrageous.

The momentum of the radical Enlightenment was, however, unstoppable, as Israel demonstrates in the last part of his book, in which he maps the spread of Spinoziste philosophy throughout Europe in the first half of the eighteenth century. Scrutinizing one national republic of letters after another, he acquaints us with the philosophers in the tradition of Spinoza’s doctrines. The list contains names such as John Toland, Matthew Tindal, and Ehrenfried Walther von Tschirnhaus, and ends with the French philosophes La Mettrie and Diderot. In their writings the radical Enlightenment reached its climax in terms of public acceptance and philosophical originality. What followed, according to Israel, was intellectually a pale copy. For him, the main phase of the Enlightenment ends around 1750.

Covering much of the same ground as Jacob’s books, Israel’s hefty volume surpasses them by far. He charts the landscape of the radical Enlightenment with a comprehensiveness which previously seemed impossible, all the more as he does not restrict himself to intellectual history but also includes the socio-cultural context. A number of chapters deal with the working of censorship in Europe around 1700 and the public spaces in which the new philosophy was fostered, the literary clubs, tea and coffee-houses, Masonic lodges, lexicons, learned journals, ‘universal’ libraries, and universities. Brilliant biographical vignettes of radical writers and descriptions of the literary underworld also bring the story to life. Even more important, however, is that Israel succeeds admirably in showing the absurdity of the bias towards England and France in Enlightenment research. He convincingly advocates a much broader view which explains the
intellectual transformation of the late seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries within a wider European framework. In comparison to
these assets the possible drawbacks count for little. Historians of phi-
losophy and science may correct some details in the appraisal of indi-
vidual philosophers. Israel might also have exaggerated the differ-
ences which separated intellectual developments before and after
1650. He might even have fallen into the same trap as Spinoza’s tra-
ditionalist enemies in the early eighteenth century, who discovered a
Spinoziste behind every more daring text, and thus might have over-
estimated the influence of Spinoza’s ideas on the radical Enlighten-
ment. Yet we will have to wait a long time before his book is
matched by another account of the intellectual turmoil in Europe
around 1700, and especially a book which is written with as much
verve and can be read with as much pleasure as Israel’s.

II

A completely different perspective on the Enlightenment from the
one put forward by Jacob and Israel, which emphasizes intellectual
history and provides a sweeping treatment of the whole of the
Enlightenment, is presented by studies which have appeared with
increasing frequency since the 1970s. They give priority to the utili-
tarian orientation of the Enlightenment, address questions of imple-
mentation and dissemination of ideas, and depend mainly on a
methodology derived from social history. In contrast to the books
mentioned above, scholars pursuing this strand of research concen-
trate on the moderate, practical-minded version of the Enlighten-
ment. Furthermore, their favourite period of investigation is the sec-
ond half of the eighteenth century, and for good reason. As both
Jacob and Israel point out, although with slightly differing peri-
odizations, in intellectual terms the Enlightenment had passed its
peak by the last decades of the century. In its later stages the prin-
cipal aim of the Enlightenment movement was to popularize and,
where possible, realize concepts which had been developed earlier.

3 This criticism was raised by Susan James in ‘Life in the Shadow of Spinoza’,
*Times Higher Educational Supplement*, 21–28 December 2001, p. 31. It also
resurfaces, albeit less explicitly, in Anthony Grafton’s review in the *Times
Literary Supplement*, 9 November 2001, pp. 3 f.
Assemblies, clubs, and societies, which served as channels for the dissemination of Enlightened ideas and agencies for practical reform, were among the main instruments for achieving these goals. The world of associations therefore early attracted the attention of social historians of the Enlightenment. Especially in Germany, the literature on the topic is vast and the tide of interest still rising. Monographs exploring the societies of a particular region appear almost by the year, conferences are held, and the whole field was recently subjected to a second comprehensive treatment in nearly ten years, in Wolfgang Hardtwig’s intriguing compendium, following Richard van Dülmen’s first attempt of 1986. In Britain, on the contrary, the study of societies has long been relatively neglected despite the prominent role which clubs played in the political and intellectual life of the nation. This shortcoming has now been remedied by the publication of a magisterial survey by Peter Clark, an eminent historian of urban Britain in the early modern period.

Drawing on his impressive knowledge of the scattered source material, Clark gives a comprehensive picture of British and, in some cases, colonial clubs and societies, their overall development, organizational structures, and membership patterns from the late sixteenth century to 1800. The emphasis, however, lies on the period from the late seventeenth century onwards. Although there were a few bell-


ringing and literary societies under the early Stuarts, and a first boom took place during the English Revolution, the breakthrough happened only after the Restoration of the British monarchy in 1660. Over the following decades London witnessed the emergence of numerous new societies, from literary, musical, and drinking clubs to religious, school alumni, and patronymic societies, which usually met at inns, ale-houses, or coffee-houses. This upsurge was generated by an influx of landowners who increasingly spent the season in the capital and sought diversion. The affluent genteeel and, in their wake, the professional elites created a demand for sociable activities which was met by the establishment of clubs and societies. Their rise was further facilitated by changes in the outward appearance of London. The widening and paving of streets, the demolition of old town walls and gates, the erection of new civic buildings in a representative style, the laying out of pleasure gardens, and the enlargement and embellishment of public drinking houses created a physical setting for the new forms of upper-class sociability, 'a new “social space”, a cultural quartier, ... which enabled the better-off classes to move easily from one venue, and one entertainment, to another' (p. 169). Ultimately, the cause of the societies was promoted by the expansion of the press, which provided publicity, and the commercial interest of publicans on whose premises societies met, booksellers whose pamphlets, books, and newspapers they bought, and other trades which cashed in on the new trend. The associational world in Britain was the result of a highly commercialized and consumer-orientated society.

In the early eighteenth century the same pattern recurred in towns all over Britain as the movement spread from London to the provinces and even to the colonies. The remainder of the century witnessed a steady, and in the last decades exponential, growth in the number as well as the range of societies. While older types disappeared, new forms mushroomed, among them sports clubs, more and more specialized learned associations and academies, philanthropic, charitable and religious societies, book clubs, artisan box and benefit societies, leisure-orientated associations such as clubs for angling, horse racing, or bird-fancying and, in the wake of the American and French Revolutions, debating and various political societies. The ‘most structured and successful of all upper- and middle-class associations’ (p. 273), however, were Masonic lodges, to
which Clark devotes a whole chapter. Yet the picture he draws bears no resemblance to Jacob’s description of Freemasonry as a radical, secret organization. In reality, Masonic lodges announced the time and place of their meetings in newspapers, published membership lists, met in taverns, and held lavish street processions, in which members appeared in full regalia with jewels and apron, often becoming the laughing-stock of passers-by. More scorned than feared, Freemasons were bound only to keep the rites and ceremonies of their lodges secret. Against this backdrop, the supposed radicalism of Freemasonry seems rather unlikely. Indeed, British lodges had no special affinity with radical religious groups, as Jacob claims, but were frequented by Dissenters, Anglicans, and Catholics alike whereas Jews, despite the general appearance of religious toleration, were sometimes excluded. Therefore, strictly deist or atheist lodges formed at best a tiny minority. The same moderation is discernible in politics. Whiggish affiliations were the closest lodges got to radicalism. After the French Revolution many Masons moved to the right and developed strong royalist leanings. Although Clark concedes that lodges could be training grounds for democratic practices such as balloting or office-holding, in general they did not differ greatly from the rest of the associational movement.

They were only one type within a huge spectrum of societies which attracted large numbers of people. It has been estimated that during the whole of the eighteenth century 25,000 different clubs and societies existed in the British Empire. In London alone, by 1750, 20,000 men met daily in associations. Half a century later every third English townsman belonged to at least one society on average. While these figures were never to be reached in the German-speaking world, the social composition of associations in Britain and the Old Reich was more or less the same. The upper and middle classes dominated, the former including gentry, doctors, lawyers, clergymen, and, to a lesser extent, merchants and bankers, the latter craftsmen, retailers, and artisans. The poor and the labouring classes were largely excluded. Striking similarities between German and British societies are also visible in their aims and ambitions. Externally, associations of all kinds had taken up the cause of practical improvement. They promoted and supported agrarian innovation, educational reform, moral correction, industrial advancement, scientific and medical progress, and the refinement of manners and taste.
Internally, they cultivated a culture of conversation. Often guided by manuals, the members aimed at witty and inspired discourse, and in their debates covered a wide range of topics from moral and aesthetic matters to questions of public improvement and the latest gossip.

If these two sides of daily life linked clubs and societies closely to the Enlightenment, a third aspect is more mundane. As Clark stresses repeatedly, conviviality was perhaps the main appeal of many associations. Eating, drinking, singing, and gambling in congenial company was an integral part of the associational experience, often resulting, however, in excesses. Heavy drinking, indecent songs, and swearing were common features of all societies, especially during the annual feasts, which almost always ended in drinking bouts. Only in the later parts of the century were such abuses curtailed under the impact of a culture of politeness and sensibility. Nevertheless, conviviality remained essential to associational life, although it is usually unduly neglected in German studies of the topic.

In fact, German scholars might learn a great deal from Clark’s book, especially from his broad analysis of the social factors behind the rise of the associations. While German scholars have long associated the increase in societies with the growth of the Enlightened Bildungsbürgertum (educated middle class) and its mainly intellectual concerns, Clark places the voluntary societies in the context of a prosperous and highly commercialized society characterized by the ‘Consumer Revolution’ (p. 144). In Clark’s account belonging to a society evolved into a form of conspicuous consumption. The demand for sociability and entertainment was at least as important as the Enlightened obsession with utilitarian measures or intellectual debate in explaining the success of clubs and societies. Although there are limits to how far models derived from a more modern British society can be applied to the German case, adopting a perspective similar to Clark’s could open up whole new avenues of research.

On the other hand, Clark’s book would have benefited from a closer look at conditions on the Continent. He repudiates any external influence on the development of British associations without recognizing that many of the seemingly autochthonic features, like social composition or range of activities, were common European property. A comparative perspective would also have allowed an even better understanding of the enormous dynamic behind the
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growth of British societies. Central to this argument is the difference between the shape of the continental state and its British counterpart. Whereas the absolutist state was by nature interventionist and tried to regulate a wide range of affairs, even at local level, the military-fiscal state in Britain withdrew from many areas of domestic policy which were left to voluntary initiatives on the ground. This self-restraint gave plenty of scope for the foundation of clubs and societies, while the establishment of associations in the Old Reich was hampered by the existence of elaborate, although not altogether efficient, government machinery. Taking more account of the European dimension of the issue would have made Clark’s book an even more convincing evaluation of the British associational world.

If clubs and societies represent one aspect of efforts to implement and disseminate Enlightened ideas, the literary market clearly represents another. As early as 1979 Robert Darnton explored the contribution made by printers and booksellers to the diffusion of the Enlightenment in his classic study of the publishing history of the Encyclopédie. Now Pamela Selwyn, one of his students, has written the story of Friedrich Nicolai, Germany’s most famous Enlightenment publisher. Selwyn’s narrative, like Darnton’s, is not primarily concerned with Enlightened concepts and writings, which in the case of Nicolai have already been fully analysed, but hinges on the link between Enlightenment and commerce. She addresses the question of how the Berlin publisher managed to sell the Enlightenment and become the prosperous citizen that he was. Marketing rather than intellectual strategies should therefore have been at the heart of her book. Unfortunately, however, Nicolai’s reputation as an exponent of Enlightened thinking seems to have got the better of Selwyn. In the end, to anticipate the main point of criticism, she does not take the commercial side of the book trade seriously enough and in many parts of her study still clings to the deliberately cultivated myth of the publisher as midwife to literature, subordinating his own financial interests to the Enlightened cause.

8 See esp. Horst Möller, Aufklärung in Preußen: Der Verleger, Publizist und Geschichtsschreiber Friedrich Nicolai (Berlin, 1974).
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Even so, the volume gives a reliable general account of Nicolai’s publishing activities. Drawing mainly on Nicolai’s vast correspondence, c. 15,000 letters by some 2,500 individuals, Selwyn elaborates on the various aspects of his career in the book trade. She describes the organization of his publishing company and his bookshop in one of the fashionable quarters of the Prussian capital, reconstructs his battles with pirate publishers and censors in the German states, analyses the relationship with his authors, and evaluates his editorship of the Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek, a highly influential and, over a long period, commercially extremely successful review journal modelled on the Monthly Review, but with a decidedly German focus. Edited and published by Nicolai from 1764 to 1805 with a short interruption in the 1790s, it established him as the foremost exponent of the German Enlightenment. His unwaveringly Enlightened stance was also clearly expressed in his publishing lists, which reflect the utilitarian orientation of the late Enlightenment. While at the beginning of Nicolai’s career literary figures such as Gotthold Ephraim Lessing and Moses Mendelssohn counted among his authors, the focus soon shifted to scholarly and informative works which promoted the improvement of agriculture, technology, education, and religion. Therefore areas like pedagogical reform, theology, science, mathematics, medicine, geography, and travel accounts dominated, whereas belles-lettres and philosophy were relegated to the margins. Pornographic books or clandestine literature, which played such a prominent role in Israel’s and Jacob’s studies, did not feature at all. In line with this more prosaic attitude was also his dislike of the luxurious editions published by some of his competitors. He was convinced that the German reading public preferred cheap to beautiful books. Accordingly his own products made no claim to any bibliophile standards. An affordable price was more important to him than good quality paper or a special font—not for commercial reasons, he alleged, but in order to disseminate Enlightened ideas more easily. Fortunately, Selwyn’s publishers decided to go the other way and have produced an elegantly printed volume on fine paper.

Among the best sections of the book are those that deal with the day-to-day running of a bookshop and publishing house at the end of the eighteenth century. They provide deep insights into the tiresome world of composers, printers, proof-readers, copy editors, and apprentices in the book trade. For example, Selwyn depicts in
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some detail how prospective authors approached Nicolai in order to sell their manuscripts, and she portrays the protracted negotiations about fees, print-run, paper quality, and fonts which followed. She also illustrates the process of compiling a lexicon, and sheds new light on the lucrative business of translations. Only the publisher seems to have profited from these, whereas the author of the original text received no payment and the freelance translator was remunerated as badly as is the practice today. Even more fascinating is the chapter on the publication of the Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek. At close range, the reader can watch the mechanics behind one of the most widely read journals of the German Enlightenment. Nicolai emerges as an editor with great managerial skills who directed a multitudinous team of reviewers, 439 over the years, by way of letters and printed circulars. He was assisted by a handful of close collaborators, the sub-editors, the majority of whom lived outside Prussia. They recommended reviewers, revised manuscripts, organized supplies of costly paper, oversaw the printing process which was carried out in small towns close to where they lived, and helped to organize the distribution of the periodical. Without the efforts of these men, who stayed in the background, neither the journal nor many a contribution to the heated controversies of the age would have seen the light of day. It is exactly this unglamorous side of the Enlightenment which comes to the fore in Selwyn’s book and makes it a worthwhile read.

The practical aspect of the Prussian Enlightenment embodied by Nicolai is also the subject of a volume of collected essays, edited by Eckhart Hellmuth, Immo Meenken, and Michael Trauth. This is a Festschrift dedicated to Günther Birtsch, a leading expert on Prussia in the eighteenth century. During a long academic career at the Max Planck Institute of History at Göttingen and later at the University of Trier, his research revolved around the triangle: ‘Prussianism, absolutism and Enlightenment’ (p. 16), as Hartmut Lehmann, the institute’s present director, puts it in an introductory appraisal of Birtsch’s œuvre. In a series of major research projects on the history of the Prussian Estates, fundamental rights, and especially the Prussian General Code of 1794, Birtsch investigated the ambivalent relationship between the Enlightened reform movement and the absolutist state, coining the term ‘reform absolutism’ to designate a collusion of interests in practical improvement.
Most of the contributions to the present volume, produced in the sumptuous style for which the publisher frommann-holzboog is rightly famous, take up one central aspect of the process Birtsch described. Apart from a few essays on the Jewish Enlightenment, the court of Frederick II, and regional identities within the Prussian territorial conglomerate, they all explore the world of the Enlightened Prussian bureaucracy. The reader, for instance, becomes acquainted with elite civil servants like Carl Gottlieb Suarez and Ernst Ferdinand Klein, both heavily involved in the drafting of the Prussian General Code and in the scheming of Enlightened circles in Berlin. Suarez drew up proposals for a reform of the conduct of criminal litigation, which failed, however, because they were too progressive and liberal, as Peter Krause makes clear. Klein, a close friend of Nicolai, became the prototype of the Enlightened bureaucrat, as Klaus Berndl points out in his biographical sketch. Klein regularly frequented clubs and societies, and taught for a while at Prussia’s main university at Halle, but devoted most of his life to indefatigable work in the public service. Even his last thoughts before his death were reportedly dedicated to the Prussian state. This allegiance to the state which, in the case of Klein and many other Prussian bureaucrats, stemmed from a sense of duty towards the common good of society typical of the utilitarian Enlightenment, was increasingly cast in legal terms during the rise of a body of professional officials in the decades around 1800, a process which is analysed in an essay by Diethelm Klippel. If a legal obligation of loyalty to the state for officials was, in a sense, the endpoint of this development, its origins might be found in the influence which Calvinism exerted on the Prussian lands from the late seventeenth century onwards, as can be learned from Thomas Ertman’s essay. This is primarily concerned with Otto Hintze’s explanation of Prussia’s rise from an insignificant small state to one of Europe’s great powers. Hintze, himself an exemplary representative of ‘asceticism and professional commitment’ (p. 40) within the Prussian civil service, in his later writings after the First World War explained the strength of the Prussian state as lying in the legacy of Calvinism, which fostered virtues like self-denial, an austere lifestyle, and dedication to Prussia’s cause, not only in monarchs but also in the state apparatus. According to Ertman, however, the validity of this theory still has to be demonstrated by further, preferably comparative, research. None the less, it becomes clear from these examples
that the intellectual stock of the Prussian bureaucracy, the views and convictions of one social group which upheld the Enlightenment, is the main point of departure for most of the articles in this book. Yet, while the essays mentioned above subscribe to established methods in studying the eighteenth century, other contributions on the same theme open up new paths.

III
Over the last two decades, parallel to and partially influenced by the spread of postmodernist concepts and ideas, new ways of writing the history of the Enlightenment have increasingly been tested. In the aftermath of the famous ‘linguistic turn’, scholars working on the eighteenth century have employed, for example, methods of discourse analysis or cultural history, to name trends only which are essential to the purpose of this article. Thus, two essays in the Festschrift for Günther Birtsch, written, significantly enough, by younger scholars, attempt to reconstruct interlocking patterns of argument referring mainly to Michel Foucault. Thomas Nutz discovers the beginnings of a modern theory of prisons in the administrative spirit of Prussian officials. In a work by the Geheimer Stats- und Justizminister Albrecht Heinrich von Arnim, dating from 1801–3, Nutz finds prefigured all the elements which distinguished the prison reform movement of the later nineteenth century from its philanthropic and humanist precursor during the Enlightenment: the combination of bureaucratic efficiency and specialized, scientifically acquired knowledge. Julia Schreiner pieces together the discourse about suicide in the eighteenth century from evidence scattered in numerous articles, tracts, and especially legal texts. Her essay deserves special attention since it also reveals the inherent limits of the German Enlightenment. Though suicides were penalized less and less during the eighteenth century, a trend which becomes visible in the ending of the practice of burying suicides dishonourably under the gallows, Prussian jurists continued to denounce them on moral grounds as obnoxious. Not even the potentially exculpating tendency to explain suicides in pathologic terms, which originated in medical debates and entered the legal discourse in the late eighteenth century, changed the general attitude of moral condemnation. The physical and mental derangement which, according to this new theory, accounted for suicides, was attributed to an immoral conduct of life.
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Consequently, the Prussian General Code which prohibited interment under gallows allowed only a quiet burial without ritual, and no full-blown Christian funeral. Still, some otherwise enlightened contemporaries took offence at the concessions and campaigned for a return to the old punitive practice. Yet at the same time two social groups were excluded completely from the process of decriminalization. Soldiers and pregnant women who took their own lives were still treated as murderers, a fact which has hitherto been overlooked in the relevant literature. All in all, these exceptions, objections, and ambivalences support Schreiner’s claim that the celebrated modernity of the German Enlightenment at least needs some qualification. Her essay clearly demonstrates how seemingly remote areas, dealt with in an innovative way, can be made fruitful for the general history of the Age of Reason.

The same is true of Eckhart Hellmuth’s contribution, which takes on board ideas of recent cultural studies and attempts an evaluation of visual material for the history of concepts and ideas. For this purpose he investigates a number of plans for a monument to Frederick the Great in the decade after the death of the Prussian king in 1786 when the memory of the deceased developed into a heroic cult. In the end, neither of the memorial projects, which culminated in two artistic competitions in 1791 and 1795–6, were realized. This failure notwithstanding, the designs reveal significant changes in the intellectual orientation of Prussian officials. Whereas the competition of 1791 produced artistically unsatisfactory or at best conventional ideas, mainly designs for equestrian statues, later plans, including the outcome of the second competition, were of a completely different nature. The majority of drawings are of architectural monuments, in general, temples, and they share three characteristics: enormous dimensions, a sacred aura, and, most importantly of all, a tendency towards depersonalization. Though the figure of Frederick the Great is still present in one way or another, the purpose of these monuments was clearly different from earlier proposals. Instead of rendering homage to the person of the king, the more abstract monuments, designed almost exclusively by members of the official Oberbau-
departement (Central Construction Department), were intended as ‘a shrine for the Prussian state’ (p. 299). Nowhere is this more obvious than in the plans of Friedrich Gilly, who designed a massive classical temple which he deliberately placed at the intersection of two roads
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connecting the centres of power in the Prussian state. Moreover, Gilly’s design was intended to evoke intense patriotic feelings. The simple sarcophagus of Frederick the Great, installed in a gloomy undercroft, should remind the visitor of the king’s self-sacrifice for his subjects and, by implication, of the idea of dying for the fatherland, so prominent in Prussian mythology since the Seven Years War. In the designs of Gilly and his colleagues we thus come across the same allegiance to the state which is the subject of other studies in this instructive volume. As Hellmuth aptly demonstrates, insights into the intellectual world of Prussian bureaucrats can be gained not only from written texts, but also from architectural drawings, read as a system of signs and symbols.

Decoding the visual language of the Enlightenment is also the main intention of Maiken Umbach’s book, somewhat cryptically entitled *Federalism and Enlightenment in Germany, 1740–1806*. Based on her Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, Umbach’s study focuses on the small German states whose participation in the Enlightenment is usually eclipsed by developments in the large or middle-sized territories. In particular, Umbach concentrates on the Enlightened politics of Leopold III, Friedrich Franz of Anhalt-Dessau, commonly known as Prince Franz. During his reign (1758–1817) Anhalt-Dessau, threatened politically by neighbouring Prussia and overshadowed culturally by its other neighbour, Saxe-Weimar, evolved into a model state of Enlightened reform. The three-pronged programme of agricultural improvement, based on the replacement of the old three-field system by a new clover-based crop rotation, the abolition of the traditional common and the introduction of enclosures, and, finally, the promotion of stable-feeding, became especially famous. Widely reported in Enlightened journals, these innovations were copied in different parts of the Old Reich. Scarcely less famous were the pedagogical reforms instigated by Johann Bernhard Basedow at the model school of the German Enlightenment, the Philantropin in Dessau. Completely geared towards educating useful members of society, the curriculum exclusively emphasized practical subjects, especially experimental sciences, and deliberately neglected humanist traditions like the teaching of ancient languages. Although the Philantropin had to be closed in the 1790s, its influence was felt in many German states, and Franz was elevated to the rank of a patron of the Enlightenment. In this connection it is significant to remember that
Franz drew the inspiration for his reforms mainly from the English example. During four lengthy visits to the British Isles he assiduously studied cultural, political, and economic practices there. His encounters with reformers among the aristocracy, such as the second Earl of Shelburne, proved decisive. They not only introduced Franz to the latest developments in education, agriculture, manufacturing, and industry, but also acquainted him with new trends in the lifestyle of the nobility. Particularly noteworthy were his visits to country houses like Chiswick, Painshill, Stourhead, and Stowe. In the course of these sojourns he became aware of the recent fashion for landscaped gardens, which ultimately resulted in the creation of the garden at Wörlitz, the first English garden in Germany.

More than a pleasant environment for walks and other pastimes, however, the garden at Wörlitz played a central role in Franz’s Enlightened reform programme. And this is the dimension which Umbach’s analysis revolves around. In contrast to other scholars of the German Enlightenment, she seeks the intellectual foundations of Franz’s reform projects not in theoretical treatises or public declarations, but in the iconography of the garden at Wörlitz. Far from being a fanciful undertaking, such an approach is, according to Umbach, a bare necessity. While rulers of bigger states and their ministers put their guiding ideas and principles in writing, princes of smaller states and their counsellors did not employ a conceptualized form of expression. Instead of composing programmatic texts they developed a visual language to convey their thoughts and convictions. Often these visualized utterances provide the only access to their minds. The neglect of such speech acts by research based exclusively on written records, she argues, leads scholars to make false assumptions about the extent of Enlightened activities in territories like Anhalt-Dessau. Furthermore, she suggests, disregarding all other kinds of communication produces a restricted picture of the Enlightenment. Many facets of Enlightened discourse could not yet be articulated other than in visual form: ‘Images pioneered new ways of thinking; they articulated agendas that were not yet adequately expressed in written language, and reinvented politics’ (p. 16). Deciphering the non-verbal code of the Enlightenment thus allows historians to discover hitherto hidden layers of meaning.

In Umbach’s case, the object of analysis is the horticultural iconography at Wörlitz. By looking at the design of the garden she investi-
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gates, for example, Franz’s self-representation as an Enlightened prince, which other scholars would have drawn on written material to elucidate. Umbach, by contrast, interprets a vista in the park opening up a view of a synagogue, a Gothic church, and an allegory of natural religion as an identification with religious toleration. The ‘onlooker would perceive all three religious symbols as united in a single ideal picture’ (p. 77). In addition, as Umbach shows, the park articulated a particular conception of history and progress. By integrating allusions to volcanoes into the design of the garden Franz indirectly took sides with one scientific group in a learned controversy about the geological origins of the earth, and by implication expressed their views on the creation and development of mankind. Other props, such as a copy of the iron bridge at Coalbrookdale, associated with the beginnings of industrialization, an ‘ornamented farm’ (p. 100) with green-houses and cultivated fruit and vegetables, and a display of memorabilia connected with James Cook’s South Sea expeditions celebrating the scientifically based use of nature for productive purposes, are read by Umbach as symbols of the utilitarian aspect of the Enlightenment. Finally, a cult of sentimentality underlies the whole garden. Influenced by the grounds in Painshill and Stourhead, funerary monuments commemorating friends and relatives of Franz’s or famous poets, and artificial lakes functioning as mirrors were intended to evoke sentiment. The passer-by was to be induced to indulge in introspection and experience deep emotions. ‘The landscape garden became the locus for a “sentimental journey”’ (p. 78). At the end of his pilgrimage through the park the visitor was meant to feel not only enlightened but also uplifted. In his creation Franz attempted to reconcile reason with sentiment. ‘The Wörlitz landscape provided a visual guide to improvement’ (p. 117), emotional as well as rational.

Delineating Franz’s philosophical beliefs and concepts, however, is only the first step in Umbach’s argument. Referring to Franz’s only great political achievement, the foundation of the German Fürstenbund, a federation of small and medium-sized states to safeguard their independence against the great powers, Austria and Prussia, around 1780, she also discovers in the ideas laid out in Anhalt-Dessau a new strand within the German Enlightenment, a small state Enlightenment which she brands ‘federal Enlightenment’. As Umbach states, this current differs greatly from the state-enforced
Enlightenment typical of the larger German territories with their vast bureaucracies. Whereas ‘enlightened absolutism’, best identified with the Prussia of Frederick the Great, pressed for reforms to centralize power in the state apparatus, ‘federal Enlightenment’ was indebted to the ideal of diversity, ‘decentralised government and political pluralism’ (p. ix). It displayed strong sympathy for the political structure of the Old Reich with its multitude of small political units. Federal Enlightenment, which, according to Umbach, was pioneered by Prince Franz, thus combined notions of improvement and reform with a defence of the political and legal order of the Empire.

Like his intellectual concerns, Franz’s political views found visual expression in the garden at Wörlitz, most visibly in the Gothic House which Umbach subjects to detailed scrutiny. Built in a style reminiscent of the English neo-Gothic of the time, but interspersed with attributes more common in Palladian buildings, the deliberately eclectic architecture worked at several levels. Its crenellations conjured up the world of medieval castles and knights. On the other hand, the Gothic pointed arch, supposedly derived from the archetype of the primitive bark hut, hinted at the Goths and, by implication, at a primitive past of unspoiled virtues and especially of ancient liberties. As in the case of the Temple of Liberty at Stowe, Gothic or Saxon liberties were thus invoked. While in England they were drawn upon to defend the ancient constitution against being overthrown by despotic politicians like Robert Walpole, in the political setting of the German Empire they must be understood as protecting old imperial rights against modern states like Prussia. At the same time, the regular architectural features, symbolizing ‘the more rational, institutional thinking of the Renaissance epoch’ (p. 153), can be read against the backdrop of the concurrent imperial reform discussion which reveals a comparable divide between representatives of an idealized medieval image of the Empire (for example, Justus Möser) and those who stressed the legal and rational institutions of the Old Reich, such as the Reichskammergericht (Imperial Chamber Court) established during the Renaissance (for example, Stephan Pütter). From such a perspective, the Gothic House symbolized the reconciliation of the rational and the irrational in the interests of imperial self-defence. More clear-cut than the exterior was the symbolic language of the interior where references to imperial history and the federal constitution multiplied. Numerous artefacts, like
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armour and portraits of (Protestant) defenders of the imperial constitution, or stained glass windows glorifying the Swiss Confederation as the embodiment of a federal ideal which alone was capable of protecting smaller states, varied the general theme.

All this is convincingly argued. The Gothic House can indeed be seen as a pronouncement of Franz’s political vision. Whether it can support the construction of a whole new strand of the German Enlightenment, however, is doubtful. The very dichotomy between a liberal, pluralistic Enlightenment with clear positive connotations and a coercive, even oppressive counterpart embodied in Prussia smacks of old Sonderweg theories and arouses suspicions. The fact that Franz stimulated reform in the spirit of the Enlightenment without rescripts, as Umbach repeatedly stresses, may separate Anhalt-Dessau from other, larger states, though it was not unknown even in Prussia. But the method of encouraging rather than decreeing reform, ‘government by precedent’ (p. 95), as Umbach calls it, might also be the result of a weak administration which lacked the means to introduce reforms more forcefully. Of greater importance, however, is the fact that Franz’s programme of improvements was no different in content from those of larger territories. Contrary to Umbach’s belief, an emphasis on ‘the useful aspects of enlightened politics’ cannot be counted as one of the ‘distinctive features’ (p. 56) of a federal Enlightenment inspired by the English example. All German states were united by a utilitarian approach, as the research of the last thirty to forty years has made abundantly clear. This misconception becomes obvious in those sections of Umbach’s book that deal with Basedow’s educational reforms. Far from being peculiar to small states, as she claims, his writings were influential in all the German territories. Although Basedow, like every prominent Enlightened reformer, had his critics, his admirers saw that many of his ideas were implemented. On the other hand, the question remains whether Umbach’s federal Enlightenment had any adherents in small states other than Anhalt-Dessau. Even among his closest collaborators Franz’s taste sometimes aroused resistance as his failed attempt to distribute prints of English paintings demonstrates. Is there, for example, any documentary evidence that the English Enlightenment had the same strong influence on other princes? Neighbouring Saxe-Weimar, the only other small state Umbach deals with at least in passing, provides a striking example to the contrary. As Umbach her-
self admits, the celebration of classical Antiquity in Weimar had little in common with the intellectual predilections in Franz’s principality.

A shared interest in conserving the political order of the Old Reich, which has long been recognized by scholars as *Reichspatriotismus* (imperial patriotism), could not and—at least as far as the princes of other small state were concerned—was not intended to overcome cultural differences. Yet it is exactly this amalgamation of political and intellectual concerns that constitutes the specific nature of Umbach’s form of Enlightenment. Until it can be shown that the same set of ideas was prevalent in a number of small states, it is premature to speak of a ‘German federal Enlightenment’ (p. 191).

Although the book does not prove Umbach’s case, it has much to offer. It (re)discovers the symbolic language of the Enlightenment and indicates what historians could gain from examining it. Umbach’s great strength is her ability to show that the late Enlightenment was more multi-faceted and complex than social historians have led us to believe. Although some of her arguments seem rather far-fetched and she at times jumps to conclusions, Umbach nevertheless succeeds in destroying the doctrinaire character usually associated with the last phase of the Age of Reason. Instead she unearths strands like sentimentality which, despite their irrational feel, were compatible with other aspects like improvement and practicality. The image of the late Enlightenment thus becomes more intricate, stressing the co-existence of different traditions in an almost postmodern way and relegating the old image of sterile and one-dimensional utilitarianism to the dustbin. This re-evaluation, however, is only made possible by investigating ‘the multi-layered visual language of the late Enlightenment’ (p. 144).

Umbach’s approach, however, runs into difficulties as soon as she claims that this visual language was exclusive to small states. In Prussia, for instance, Lenné’s early nineteenth-century garden programme can be read in similar ways, as becomes clear from her own account. The same applies to the English Garden in Munich, created in the 1790s. Furthermore, in the case of officials in Berlin, designs for a monument provided the medium for a discussion of the nature of the Prussian state, as we learned from Hellmuth’s essay. The visual code was therefore a universal language, which in principle could be applied by everyone and was suitable for different cultural and political purposes. The garden landscape of Wörlitz was only one of many

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eamples in which Enlightened princes, governments, or social groups employed a non-verbal language. Making us aware of this hitherto rather neglected side of the Enlightenment is one of the great assets of Umbach’s case study.

Historians of the eighteenth century, therefore, will have to learn how to decode the visual semiotics of the Enlightenment lest they should miss essential aspects of the eighteenth century’s intellectual agenda. The Enlightenment was a war not of words, but of thoughts which could be expressed in more than one way and in more than one language. Only a combination of methods from intellectual, social, and especially cultural history will allow us to draw a comprehensive and multi-faceted picture of the Enlightenment.

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BOOK REVIEWS


During the first half of the twentieth century, the Estate-based society of late medieval and early modern times fascinated historians from states with very different political systems. The International Historians’ Congress held in Warsaw in 1933, at which east-central and eastern Europe figured much more prominently than they had done at any previous congress, represented an important breakthrough for comparative research on the European Estates. On the initiative of the Belgian historians Emil Lousse and Henri Pirenne, the foundations were laid for the Commission Internationale pour l’Histoire des Assemblées d’Etats, which came into being three years later. To the present day, the commission provides the central institutional framework for this branch of research. The considerable achievements which the commission notched up in its early years demonstrated that ‘Histoire comparative’, proclaimed as a programme at the Paris Congress of 1900, could usefully be applied to the topic of the Estates and their assemblies. But why did the scholars of eastern central Europe in particular study the history of the Estates? Long before and long after 1918, the system of Estates provided a widely used platform on which to articulate social aspirations and to legitimize political actions, or, at times of crisis, to prop up national self-confidence. In more general terms, the Estates were interesting as the bearers of national traditions and reform attempts, they expressed the potential for resistance to all forms of monarchical-autocratic state integration, and they stood for an assumed continuity from the corporative representative assemblies of the past to the parliamentary-democratic constitutional forms of the present. To sum up, it was no coincidence that historians in all the states created after the First World War from the Baltic to the Adriatic had a heightened interest in the culture of liberty of eastern central Europe. There were clearly peak times for working on this topic, and they can be correlated with political history. To this extent, to study this topic also involved a contemporary historical and political dimension.
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The research sponsored by the Commission Internationale pour l’Histoire des Assemblées d’Etats built on, among other things, the work of Otto Hintze. A short time before, in 1930, he had published a highly regarded contribution to the typology of the constitutions of the Estates in the Western world, and he had included eastern central Europe— in his terminology, the ‘peripheral marginal lands’— in his universal doctrine of zones. Hintze’s constitutional and social history studies stimulated the study of the history of the early modern Estates in eastern central Europe in particular. Otto Hoetzsch should also be mentioned here, and later Hans Rothfels, who, during his years at Königsberg, developed a novel overall programme for looking at the regional structures of eastern central Europe. Rothfels saw the traditions of a state based on Estates (Ständestaat) as one of the main factors in unifying the region. And in the corporative element he re-discovered the German element in the colonized ‘East’. He explained the strength of liberal elements derived from the Estates in terms of a struggle between nations which he projected into the past. Thus the ‘pressure of foreign peoples’ in the colonized areas preserved the ideas of independence and self-administration’. Elsewhere, he saw the Danzig corporation functioning as a ‘national defence’.

Throughout, Rothfels’s work focuses narrowly on the Germans, and this perspective was later ideologically expanded and radicalized in national-political terms by Theodor Schieder. In his Deutscher Geist und ständische Freiheit im Weichsellande (his Habilitation thesis of 1940), whose arguments were presented more succinctly in ‘Landständische Verfassung, Volksstumspolitik und Volksbewußtsein’ (published in 1943 in the Brackmann Festschrift), Schieder explained the history of the eastern central European Estates entirely in the light of ‘east German national groups’. Schieder defended the constitution of the Estates against the tradition of ‘Borussian’, statist historiography because, he argued, in the various ‘German border areas’ it had helped to preserve the ethnic group (Vollstum). In contrast to internal German territories, in the east, from the Baltic countries to Transylvania, ‘German corporative forms of life’ had been defended with the autonomy of the Estates. This interpretation of the creation and preservation of corporate identity as an ‘achievement’ of ethnic history—a thoroughly national and thus anachronistic interpretation of the processes by which the Estates in eastern central Europe had
Royal Prussia, 1569–1772

been formed in the early modern period—limited the scope of Schieder’s approach to produce genuine insights from the start.

Schieder’s methodology, his epistemological goals, and his overall concept take us directly to the subject of the book under review here, Karin Friedrich’s monograph on the ‘other Prussia’, a topic which forces anyone working on it to deal constantly with diverse forms of constructing the past. Even in the second half of the twentieth century, German and Polish scholars working on the history of Prussia were still having difficulty in divorcing themselves from the older traditions of national history. Thus German authors still frequently see the union of Royal Prussia with the Polish crown (from 1466) and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (from 1569), in the tradition of the Borussian negative image of Poland, as a dark age which came to an end only with the divisions of Poland. Thus also the ‘subjugation of the German peoples’, which Schieder believed he saw in all the sources, did not end until 1772: the suppression of an identity assumed to be based on the German language and the Lutheran religion, untouched by historical change, and attributed mainly to the urban middle classes of Royal Prussia—whose inhabitants, ironically, had spoken of ‘Polish Prussia’ since the beginning of the eighteenth century. Conversely, Polish historiography tends to minimize national awareness in Royal Prussia, or to equate it ahistorically with Brandenburg-Prussian or even German separatism. Yet it must be asked—and this is the cardinal question—whether ‘Prussian’ really equalled ‘German’ before the first division of Poland?

This is precisely the point at which Karin Friedrich takes a new approach. Like Michael G. Müller in his recent work on Danzig, Elbing, and Thorn in the period of confessionalization, she takes the context of the whole state into account. She investigates, over a long period of time, the often underrated and frequently deliberately ignored positive points of contact between the Prussia’s national awareness and the Rzeczpospolita (Commonwealth), in particular, at the level of political ideas, the constitution, and the motives behind it. It does not need to be emphasized that this perspective, sympathetic but also marked by the present, and occasionally using the mirror-image of the arguments of the side it criticizes, is still only one perspective. This is a large topic, for German as well as for Polish historiography. And we are fortunate indeed that it has been taken up
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by a historian of eastern central Europe who is interested in theoretical debates as well as the history of historiography, and who has not only mastered her subject in the narrow sense, but is also extremely well versed in the modern research on identity and nationalism. The fact that Friedrich, lecturer in history at the School of Slavonic and European Languages, University College London, also writes well and fluently means that reading this ambitious book not only furthers our knowledge, but is also an intellectual pleasure.

One factor which contributes to this is the clear internal structure of the work. In comparable German studies, the table of contents alone would fill several pages, whereas in the book under review it lists eight chapters, plus an introduction in which Friedrich discusses some of the historiographical problems mentioned above, and a conclusion which, unfortunately, does not recapitulate the findings of the book as expected, but glances forward at conditions in the centralist Prussian monarchy in the nineteenth century. In eight steps, Friedrich explores the questions she poses at the beginning concerning the origins of and motives behind the strongly political orientation and active participation of the Royal Prussian aristocratic and bourgeois elites in the political system of the Commonwealth. In the foreground is the frequently researched historical constitutional connection between Royal Prussia and the Polish crown, which changed markedly as a result of the Union of Lublin (1569). Previously, the political Estates—the aristocratic senators, representatives of the three big central areas, the smaller towns, and noble representatives from the three palatinates (wayewid twn) of Pomerelia, Marienburg, and Culm—had been represented as a whole in the Polish senate or in the chamber of deputies. The Union of Lublin changed all this. Henceforth the Prussian noble Estates—and this also affected Danzig, Elbing, and Thorn—no longer had a permanent place in the new union’s structure of Reichstag and Landtag. They felt that they were being treated like the Estates of a province rather than of an autonomous Land. Despite these constitutional changes, and in spite of all the potential for conflict between the big Prussian towns, the king, and the republic, which went as far as a military exchange of blows, the author demonstrates, by drawing upon examples from contemporary political philosophy and historiography, that no alternative was conceived to the tie between the Land and the union: ‘Unlike most histories of German Hanseatic cities in the Empire,
Royal Prussian Particular-Historie never ignored the larger dimension of the wider commonwealth (p. 78). Also characteristic of this was the harsh dislike with which, after the Chmielnicki revolt of 1648, scholarly Prussian historians criticized the disloyalty of the Cossacks and their rejection of the Polish-Lithuanian state.

No less characteristic is the fact that the Prussian historiography of the early modern period (or the history of Prussia in general) has no examples of attempts to place the history of the large Prussian towns into a Hanseatic context, let alone into the political context of the empire. The strengthening of a feeling of belonging together in political and historical terms—an awareness of a Land identity interpreted by Friedrich as national awareness—was served in particular by the ius indigenatus (the rights and immunities connected with citizenship), which topped the hierarchy of the fundamental rights of Royal Prussia. In Friedrich’s opinion, this was where the essence of the identity of Royal Prussia lay, not in the ethnicity of its inhabitants, and she provides detailed evidence for her thesis from a large body of political and historical writings. Thus Friedrich extensively analyses Land histories as identity-creating elements, outlines the rise of histories of the origins of Royal Prussia, and explains why the Sarmatian origin myth in particular was so popular among a large number of influential historians and scholars. For example, Christoph Hartknoch, a professor of history who was born in Allstein, wrote in his Alt- und Neues Preußen, published in Danzig in 1648: ‘It is certain that Poles, Lithuanians and Prussians have venerated the same mother, Sarmatian Europe’ (p. 96). However, in the eighteenth century, when increasing centralization under the Saxon kings posed a real threat to its own claims to autonomy, Hartknoch’s Prussian myth was no longer enough. Now historical-legalistic arguments came to the fore. Their aim was to renegotiate the constitutional special status of Royal Prussia within the framework of the Commonwealth. Ultimately, this led to a radicalization of Prussian national awareness, and towards the end of the century, to a tangibly more positive approach to the past before the union with Poland.

In her book about the ‘other Prussia’, which is neither a purely legal and constitutional history nor just a history of ideas and history of historiography, Karin Friedrich touches on a large number of individual issues and debates. On the whole, this study makes an important contribution to our understanding of the difficult process
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of nation-building before the age of modern nationalism. There are not many comparable works on eastern central Europe, a region that is highly attractive to comparative historians who are interested in cultural transfer. It is an area in which linguistic-ethnic, legal, and cultural mixtures are as characteristic as the problems of national identity-creation, which are fraught with conflict. Karin Friedrich’s stimulating book makes two things clear: it underlines the necessity of continuing to subject to critical scrutiny older images of history and lines of tradition, in particular, in the regions central to German-Polish relations, and it demonstrates in an exemplary way the profit to be gained by posing old questions afresh and discussing them within a methodologically ambitious framework.

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Early modern researchers like to use the encyclopaedic work of Johann Heinrich Alsted as a treasure trove of seventeenth-century learning. Yet until now there has been no comprehensive monograph on the life and work of Alsted, professor of philosophy and theology at the reformed academy in Herborn. Specific aspects have been investigated, such as, for example, Alsted’s role as a teacher in the context of Gerhard Menk’s excellent study of the history of the Herborn academy.¹ Similarly, individual texts have been studied, in particular, the 1630 Encyclopaedia, ‘the most significant encyclopaedia of the Baroque period’,² and the Diatribe de mille annis apocalypticis, published in 1627 and translated into English in 1643, which is the most influential seventeenth-century millenarian text, along with the works of Thomas Brightman and Joseph Medes. Given the variety and number of Alsted’s works (more than sixty were published, and some are several thousand pages long), specialization is inevitable. Howard Hotson from the University of Aberdeen, undeterred by the amount of material, has attempted an overall assessment. The fruit of his protracted research in archives and libraries has now been presented in three books. In addition to the study under review here, an edition of sources and a study of Alsted’s millenarianism have been published,³ and a further book on Alsted’s encyclopaedia project has

³ Maria Rosa Antognazza and Howard Hotson, Alsted and Leibniz on God, the Magistrate and the Millennium (Wiesbaden, 1999); Howard Hotson, Paradise Postponed: Johann Heinrich Alsted and the Birth of Calvinist Millenarianism, Archives internationales d’histoire des idées, 172 (Dordrecht, 2000).
been announced. The last two monographs are deeper investigations of topics which are touched upon in the volume under review here, the centrepiece of Hotson’s research on Alsted.

Hotson sees this book as an intellectual biography. Alsted’s intellectual development is presented in five chapters: studies at the academy in Herborn, and at the universities of Marburg, Basle, and Heidelberg (‘Education: Three Varieties of Further Reform, 1584–1610’); the young Alsted’s philosophical programme (‘Panacea Philosophica: The Young Alsted’s Public Programme, 1610–20’); years of crisis (‘Crisis and Withdrawal: The Programme Undermined and Retracted, 1612–25’); Alsted’s occult interests (‘Occult Sympathies: The Private World of the Mature Alsted, 1614–38’); and Alsted’s millenarianism (‘Apocalyptic Changes: The Origin of Alsted’s Millenarianism, 1619–27’). These chapters do not follow a chronological scheme. Hotson is interested in analysing the intellectual centres and forces driving his protagonist, not in his conventional biography. This gives the account analytical stringency. The narrative is driven forward not by movement through the stations of Alsted’s life, but by the analysis of related problems and the questions to which they give rise. However, this approach does sacrifice clarity and transparency, and those who are not already familiar with Alsted’s biography will find only scattered information about it in this book.

Hotson presents Alsted as an exemplary figure of the ‘second Reformation’, in whom political structures, events, and interests, religious doctrines, convictions, and conflicts, scholarly curiosity, networks, and methods of working are reflected and concentrated. Alsted, a scholar from the small county of Nassau-Dillenburg, is emblematic for the reformed central European academic culture of the first half of the seventeenth century. Hotson focuses on the scholar less as a unique or significant individual than as part of a network of a variety of contexts which shape and orientate him. The author combines the approaches and methods of political history, church history, the history of ideas, and the history of science, and he succeeds admirably. The book is a strong argument for intellectual history that crosses the boundaries between present-day disciplines, and combines different methodologies and explanatory approaches.

4 Howard Hotson, Between Ramus and Comenius: Encyclopedic Learning and Further Reform in Central Europe, 1569–1630 (forthcoming).
This method sharpens our insight into the origins of texts and ideas. The section on Alsted’s millenarianism is a good example. Hotson demonstrates that Alsted became a millenarian only as the result of complicated interactions between scholarly interests and political experiences. Theological and philosophical (hermetic) reading reacted with political circumstances (the experience of war in the 1620s) to convince Alsted, who until then had expected the end of the world to be imminent, that a thousand-year reign of peace on earth would begin in 1694.

Alsted is particularly well-suited to being read as an exemplary figure: ‘Alsted is not the greatest theologian of the second reformation, its greatest philosopher, its most radical hermeticist, its leading polemicist, or its most successful ienicist; but he, more than anyone else, unites all the conflicting tendencies of the movement within himself’ (p. 228). His early programme of a ‘reformation of the individual, conceived as the restoration of the image of divine perfection to each of the human faculties through an encyclopedic education’ (p. 222), was based on his reading of heterogeneous texts and owes much to the fact that he came to grips with a number of very different philosophical traditions and directions: Petrus Ramus (Pierre de la Ramée), Bartholomäus Keckermann, and Giordano Bruno (whose Artificium perorandi Alsted edited), Lullism, hermeticism, and alchemy.

After 1612, Alsted’s ambitious pansophical programme was gradually scaled back. Its basic assumption of the perfectibility of mankind was directly opposed to the Calvinist doctrine that human reason was not the path to salvation. In 1618–9 the Synod of Dort (Dortrecht) enshrined the inadequacy of human reason as dogma. Alsted took part in the synod, along with Johann Biesterfeld of Siegen, as the representative of the Wetterau counts. On his return to Herborn, he was appointed professor of theology. According to Hotson, Alsted’s rise through the theology faculty was not the only reason for the disappearance of Lullism, hermeticism, and alchemy from his publications. He suggests that the debates and unrest precipitated by the publication of the Rosicrucian manifestos, and the outbreak of the Thirty Years War, which polarized the confessional parties, also played an important part. Alsted’s reform programme was predicated on harmony and the quiet power of persuasion, not on confrontation and polarization. Alsted was not a radical thinker; when the times became unfavourable for his ienicism, he retreated
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from it. Schmidt-Biggemann interprets Alsted’s abandonment of his occult interests as an ‘inner development’. Hotson challenges the idea of any such ‘intellectual reorientation’: ‘In fact, if we peer behind the facade of his published works and into the more personal domain of his correspondence, a private world will begin to emerge more thoroughly hermetic than even the most audacious writings of his youth’ (p. 143). Hotson argues that Alsted’s pansophical reform project disappears only from his publications. If we look at the ‘private’ Alsted, it is still there at the end of his life. Hotson supports his thesis by reference to scattered, mostly unpublished, sources. These make it possible to reconstruct an underground strata of reading, aspirations, and alchemical practices of which Alsted’s published writings make no mention.

Alsted himself seems to have experienced the opposition of ‘private’ hermeticism and ‘published’ Calvinist doctrine as a distressing tension. In any case, this is suggested by a letter, quoted by Hotson, concerning Alsted’s final hours in Transylvania, where he spent his last years teaching at the newly established Calvinist academy in Gyulaferhüvár (Alba Julia). On his deathbed, Alsted asked for his manuscripts to be placed sub anathenate and burned. His friends refused, ‘but he threw them in front of us and cut up some of them with great physical effort and (let it be written decently) threw them into the “shadow seat” ’ (p. 179). A beggar was charged with retrieving the manuscripts. Hotson interprets this passage as the dramatic closing chord of Alsted’s intellectual biography between hermetically inspired philosophy and theological orthodoxy, as ‘a final great act of symbolic renunciation’: ‘the dying Alsted finally realized that too much filth of the Lullists and kabbalists and alchemists which he had picked through had clung to his most ambitious unpublished works’ (p. 180). Although elegant, this interpretation is of doubtful soundness. In the early modern period, rhetoric was dominated by ‘political’ strategies as much as behaviour and action itself. Thus the context of the quoted passage suggests that the description of the deathbed scene was motivated more by the desire to present Alsted as a ‘perfectly orthodox and knowledgeable theologian’ (p. 179).

In interpreting the works, Hotson draws heavily on Alsted’s ego-documents and programmatic statements (in prefaces, dedications,

5 Schmidt-Biggemann, *Topica universalis*, pp. 101, 139.
and letters). By contrast, the internal structure of the works, Alsted’s method of argument, his use and disposition of an immense amount of material, and the scholarly methods which he deployed in constructing his massive apparatuses and accumulations of knowledge take a back seat. For example, in the analysis of Triumphus Bibliorum sacrorum seu encyclopaedia biblica of 1625, described as one of Alsted’s ‘most famous and significant works’ (p. 138), the reader discovers a great deal about what the work is not. But, apart from some general statements about the tradition of the genre and Alsted’s programmatic attitudes, the reader is left fairly unclear about what this work would have meant to a contemporary scholar. Yet given the mass of material which has to be mastered to attempt an overall view of Alsted’s life and work, such expectations are easy to express but hard to fulfil. Hotson has written a concise intellectual biography, in many respects exemplary, of a scholarly figure who is difficult to pin down. He has given Alsted a detailed profile. Based on Hotson’s scholarship, other researchers will be able to make better use of Alsted’s treasure trove than has been possible so far.

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It seems that not only books have a destiny, as Terentianus Maurus once said, but also areas of research. There has been a wealth of individual studies on the life and achievements of Joseph Görres. A critical edition of his works, begun in 1926 and interrupted during the Second World War, was resumed in 1958 only to be interrupted again by the early death of its editor, Heribert Raab. Work re-started in 1998, but no date has been set for its completion. Despite these unfavourable circumstances, interest in Görres has not been extinguished. Evidence of this is provided by the two-volume selected works, Ausgewählte Werke, edited by Wolfgang Frühwald and published in 1978, and Bernhard Wacker’s profound study, Revolution und Offenbarung: Das Spätwerk (1824–1848) von Joseph Görres—eine politische Theologie (Tübingen, 1988). However, there has not yet been a biographer capable of dealing with the complexities of this unclassifiable politician, journalist, and scholar with both passion and expert knowledge. Raab would have been ideally suited to this task, which should have rounded off his life’s work.

The biography under review here comes from the USA. It is based on a Ph.D. thesis supervised by Fritz Stern at Columbia University. Henry Kissinger provides a foreword in which he points to the relevance of the questions asked by Görres: ‘Where do the state’s responsibilities and powers end? What is the role of religion in politics?’ (p. xiv). This interest in the enormous and until recently under-appreciated role of religion in nineteenth-century German politics is what inspired the author to come to grips with Görres (p. xvii). In this large undertaking, Vanden Heuvel was able to draw on a broad base of diversified and scattered research on Görres. Vanden Heuvel has extended the source base through his own archival research which, however, allows him to round off what was already known rather than produce anything fundamentally new.

Vanden Heuvel’s strictly chronological approach combines individual sections of the life with particular intellectual problems addressed by his subject. This is especially appropriate in the case of Görres, as a change of scene (such as the move to Heidelberg in 1806, or that to Munich twenty years later) could indicate a shift in his
interests or signal that he was about to address new tasks, or take them up with renewed energy. Vanden Heuvel is clearly most interested in Görres’s public face. The private life receives so little attention that the reader sometimes wants to know more. For example, was Katharina Görres just a home-maker who followed her husband around of necessity, or was she an intellectual companion who accompanied him from inclination?

His concentration on the political in the widest sense also prevents Vanden Heuvel from adequately presenting some of the qualities and inclinations that typified Görres. ‘Görres was an ardent student of natural science, and his tendency to draw metaphors and analogies between the worlds of politics and physics or chemistry would be a trademark of his writing style for his entire life.’ This by no means insignificant sentence is, remarkably, found not in the main account, but in footnote 64 on p. 58, interpreting a passage of Görres which is quoted. If Görres, despite all the changes in his life, displayed invariants in his thinking, it would surely be important to explore such ‘trademarks’ systematically, as they might reveal not just commonplace expressions, but conditions governing his intellectual world. Nor is Görres’s peculiar rhetoric, which accounts for much of the fascination exerted by his work, discussed in detail anywhere. This underlying political approach means that different sections of the biography work better than others. One of the best is the account of Görres’s republican youth in Koblenz as a friend of revolution. This episode in the life has not been described so convincingly and precisely anywhere else (and this section draws most heavily on Vanden Heuvel’s archival researches). All the others, including the concluding chapter, ‘Confessional Politics’, which describes the last years of Görres’s life from the *Kölner Ereignis* (1837) on, also provide reliable and often detailed information.

By comparison with the political events, the analysis of Görres’s theoretical positions takes a back seat. While it is not lacking altogether, just as Schelling’s influence on Görres is discussed, it could be asked whether these issues deserve more space and attention, and whether the important works should have been probed more deeply. It is also characteristic of the line taken by Vanden Heuvel that the most important recent German work on Görres, Wacker’s attempt to understand Görres’s late work as political theology, is mentioned in passing (p. 345), but is not discussed as a possible approach to
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Görres. The line taken by Vanden Heuvel means that he presents Görres’s late pamphlet, *Athanasius*, as an appeal to the newly discovered political power of the masses, without mentioning Görres’s associated speculations on the philosophy of history. Vanden Heuvel also provides a conventional account of Görres’s Ultramontanism, unavoidable in connection with his late development, without acknowledging the serious criticism which Margaret L. Anderson had levelled at him as early as 1991 (*Journal of Modern History*, vol. 63, pp. 704 f.). Vanden Heuvel overlooks the fact that in *Deutschland und die Revolution*, Görres had seen Ultramontanism as a necessary complement, in terms of the sociology of organization, to the separation of the Church from the state which he advocated, without thereby himself already becoming a fully convinced Ultramontane. In such theological and philosophical respects, the author of this biography leaves his flanks exposed to criticism.

This brings us to the problem faced by every biographer of Görres: the immense mass of material which can hardly be dealt with satisfactorily from a literary point of view. Vanden Heuvel’s solution is to neglect what he considers less important. Thus he mentions the success of *Athanasius*, which sold quickly, but passes over not only the changes and additions in later editions but also the writings in which Görres, provoked by the response to *Athanasius*, replied to his critics. This lack of completeness is the price to be paid for a 400-page, readable book. In-depth studies of Görres’s entire œuvre would have filled several volumes. But there is another conceivable method which Vanden Heuvel chose not to use, namely, to uncover a consistent inner unity behind the immense variety and external changes. Vanden Heuvel’s book is, nevertheless, a considerable achievement. It will be the first port of call for anyone seeking information about Görres for the foreseeable future, thus providing the basis on which all future research will build.

Should another edition or a German translation be under consideration, a number of factual errors could be corrected on such an occasion. Examples are: Johann Michael Sailer was bishop not of Landshut (p. 230), but of Regensburg; ‘major’ Scharnhorst, who was Görres’s guest after the victory over Napoleon, cannot have been the famous army reformer suggested in note 53 on p. 229 because he was a general and was already dead at that time (as the footnote mentioned reveals); and the prince-bishop of Breslau, Baron von Diepen-
bock, is not exactly an example of the new type of ‘bourgeois bishops of the 1830s’ (p. 334) who were thrown up by secularization, for he possessed everything that, even before secularization, would have smoothed his path to a bishop’s throne via an aristocratic cathedral chapter.

It is, of course, not only the mass of material that poses problems for a biographer of Görres. Anyone who takes on such a task will always be inferior to his subject. For Görres, the ‘man who consists of men’,¹ was anything but straightforward as a person. If the art of biography consists of appropriating the intellectual and experiential world of one’s subject to such an extent that one sees it not only from outside, but understands it from inside without forfeiting the necessary critical distance, then a biographer of Görres must be capable of thinking and feeling as a Rhinelander, a philosopher, a political prophet, and, finally, a Catholic. This is hardly possible without losing one’s own identity. Vanden Heuvel’s biography is that of a scholar with political interests, and this is the source of both its strengths and weaknesses. But as a biographer who could empathetically follow all of Görres’s tracks does not exist, we cannot criticize an author for his particular point of view and the resulting perspective. Thus we have here one possible biography of Görres which does not exclude, but makes desirable, another possible one so that the picture we have of Görres can be as complete and balanced as possible. For this, the author deserves our thanks.


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*Fatherlands* is the fourth book in Cambridge University Press’s New Studies in European History series. Its distinguished editorial board and the four excellent titles that have appeared so far promise that it will be a great success which will make many stimulating contributions to early modern and modern European history. However, the series also comes with a serious drawback which requires a few introductory remarks. As in other recent Cambridge University Press series, such as Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare, editors and publisher permit only English text to appear. This should be reconsidered in future volumes. In a clear departure from once universal scholarly standards, foreign-language quotations no longer appear in the original language, not even in footnotes or endnotes. It is not clear why this is considered to be an advantage. The presence of one or the other, in this case German, word would hardly deter purchasers of specialized works directed at a very restricted audience by their price, if nothing else. Nor is it conceivable that production costs would skyrocket if a few footnotes were slightly longer than they are at present. The disadvantages are obvious and serious. The loss of the original style and turn of phrase may be considered a merely aesthetic problem, and therefore negligible. But quotations are evidence presented to support an argument, and translating the evidence automatically makes the argument more difficult to verify. Inevitably, readers will wonder what the original text was and whether this or that translation is really the best one possible—particularly when it comes to verse, as on p. 262 of the present book. It also makes it impossible for scholars operating in other languages to quote the evidence presented, because they can only guess at the original text. The banning of foreign text is symptomatic of an increasing self-imposed insularity of contemporary English-language scholarship, even that dealing with the histories of other countries. It is almost as if publishers assume that their books will be read only in English-speaking countries, and only by people who have no grasp of the languages of the places they are, after all, for the most part studying intensely. This attitude may be acceptable in textbooks,
which are primarily targeted at an English-only audience, but it is very strange indeed in scholarly works.

The publisher’s decision is all the more regrettable as few works deserve even a tinge of parochialism less than Abigail Green’s wide-ranging book on state-building in nineteenth-century Germany. She calls into question many key assumptions regarding the process of German nation-building in an elegant, persuasive, and eminently readable fashion by casting new light on the relationship between particularism and nationalism. She does this by examining the process of state-building in non-Prussian Germany between the revolution of 1848 and German unification, with particular emphasis on the three kingdoms of Hanover, Saxony, and Württemberg. These were very different in location as well as in economic development—Hanover remaining relatively rural and backward, Saxony industrializing most rapidly, Württemberg dominated by crafts. They also experienced very different political developments, with Hanover torn by a series of constitutional crises but relatively unaffected by the revolution of 1848, while Württemberg and Saxony were more stable constitutional states with a higher, but short-lived, revolutionary potential.

They were comparable, however, in their relative weight within the German Confederation. In this, these middle-sized states contrasted with the more important kingdom of Bavaria, whose nation-building attempts have been studied by Manfred Hanisch in Fürst und Vaterland: Legitimitätsstiftung in Bayern zwischen Revolution 1848 und deutscher Einheit (1991). Green asks how these states coped with the task of forming viable states with an at least semi-invented tradition in an age when German nationalism appeared more and more of a threat, and industrialization increased social tensions.

Because all states were centred around their monarchs, and a sense of tradition could most easily be centred on the monarchy, which was much older than the states in their present form, Green begins by introducing the kings themselves, carefully pointing out the importance, but also the limitations, of the differences in their talents, ages, and abilities. In an era when direct contact between a monarch and the populace was a major tool of political communication, it was crucial to have a presentable and popular king. The fact that Hanover’s Georg V was blind, or that King Karl of Württemberg did nothing to disguise his homosexual inclinations, were serious
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drawbacks. By contrast, politically reactionary views, such as those held by Georg V’s predecessor, Ernst August, were not as damaging if they were combined with a genial personality, as the unexpected symbiosis between Ernst August and the head of his March ministry, Johann Carl Bertram Stüve, demonstrated. Moreover, the unpopularity of individual monarchs could be outweighed by increasing the public presence of more widely admired members of the royal house.

Green then turns her attention to structural elements of statebuilding: state culture, press policies, primary education, economic development, and railway building. In all areas, she notes a fundamental ambivalence. Most developments tended to work in favour of both state integration and integration at a national level. For instance, states spent considerable sums of money on public or semi-public museums, historical monuments in honour of previous rulers, and associations for the study of the fatherland’s history and culture. The emphasis on the history of the states was in itself highly ambivalent because it increased awareness of the instability of Germany’s political frontiers and of how relatively recently these states had been created in their present form. This ambivalence becomes even more pronounced when it is taken into account that the same governments supported explicitly German monuments like the Hermannsdenkmal, a central association of history societies, allowed other state monuments such as Dresden’s Goldener Reiter to decay, and made gestures towards national unity by putting out black-red-gold flags during national celebrations by gymnasts or singers. However, state support for the fatherland-agenda was more focused. It was a part of civil servants’ duties, whereas national gestures often resulted from private initiatives being supported by the states.

The increasing number of newspapers and the abolition of censorship presented the opposition with new chances to occupy part of the public sphere. But it also allowed governments themselves to pursue a more active press policy by providing papers with news, or by operating newspapers outright, thus challenging nationalist visions of Germany’s future. However, even official newspapers distinguished between state news, German news, and foreign news. Elementary education was more closely regulated by the state after 1848, in a clear attempt to prevent subversive influences from taking root in pupils’ minds. Guidelines for the curriculum were laid down, and teachers’ salaries were increased. Nevertheless, the obligatory
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readers distributed in Württemberg, for instance, stressed the importance of the fatherland as well as of the German nation. Perhaps most surprisingly, Green argues convincingly that neither the Zollverein nor the expansion of the railway network worked in favour of national integration. The Zollverein did strengthen Prussia’s position in Germany, but this was by no means universally popular. The building of railways was undertaken by states within state borders, and one of their purposes was to link the peripheries of states with the centre. They opened up communications with Austria and non-German countries as well as within the territory of the later German Empire, and were therefore not factors for national integration. Moreover, railways made it far easier to travel within a state, and thus became part of states’ attempts to increase awareness of state culture. Railways made the monuments and museums erected in capitals accessible to a state’s population at reasonable fares, and allowed masses of visitors to reach events such as Württemberg’s Cannstatter Volksfest. State governments exploited the possibilities of the new means of communication to the full.

Having shown that states were at least semi-successful in popularizing loyalty to the fatherland, Green looks at how these states presented themselves. They emphasized cultural vitality and prosperity over military power and influence in foreign affairs, and related the existence of many states in Germany to the composition of the German nation of different tribes. In principle, it was not impossible for this to coincide with the acceptance of an over-arching German nation, the political unification of which was indeed occasionally advocated by government newspapers. In this respect, the three kingdoms examined by Green differ from Bavaria, which sought to limit use of the word ‘nation’ to the state-patriotic discourse. But political developments deepened the tension between the concepts of the ‘fatherland’ and ‘national’ unity in the three other kingdoms as well. The war of 1866 created a clear opposition between state patriotism and nationalism because the victory of the one had to result in the weakening, or, in the case of Hanover, destruction of the other. A final chapter examines the aftermath of 1871. Green points out that the roots of the German Empire in non-Prussian Germany remained rather shallow. Only 25 per cent of German men who had the franchise voted for parties in favour of national integration in the first national elections of 1871 (p. 299). The different franchises for nation-

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al and state parliaments allowed different political styles to persist at the national and the state level, where, for instance, the national liberals had a much stronger, and the social democrats a much weaker, position than in the Empire. Few monuments to Emperor Wilhelm I were erected outside Prussia, and the boundaries of formerly independent territories such as Hanover remained important in political terms. Finally, regionalism could easily be resurrected at times of crisis.

Like any seminal book, Abigail Green’s re-reading of the 1850s and 1860s in the context of a wider discussion of state-building and nation-formation in nineteenth-century Germany raises further questions. Because the structural developments she describes did not make national unification on the Bismarckian model a predictable and logical outcome, day-to-day politics and particularly the military sphere must take centre stage for the explanation of how and why unification came about. It would thus be interesting to know more about the military aspect of state-building, to examine how this ‘school of the nation’ worked. This could be relevant at the level both of the officer corps (which had to identify possible enemies inside and outside the German Confederation while being linked to other confederate states through training and federal fortresses) and of conscripted soldiers, who became part of another major state-building institution. A second remaining blank is the German Confederation itself. Recently, some doubts have been raised, by Jürgen Müller (notably in his introductions to volumes 3/1 and 3/2 of Quellen zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundes, published in 1996 and 1998 respectively) and others, about whether the Confederation was really the complete failure in the 1850s and 1860s as which it appeared in retrospect. Not only the rulers of individual states were able to surprise visiting gymnasts by putting German colours on prominent display, but the German Confederation’s forces ended up fighting with black-red-gold cockades in 1866 as well. This had little effect in the long run, and Green shows that the importance of the federal level was very limited in the states she studied most intensely. But this may have been different in the very small political entities. Regardless of the answers to these additional questions, Abigail Green has succeeded in moving the goalposts for any enquiry into the growth of nationalism and the persistence of particularism in Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century.
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The question this monumental history of Germany from the Middle Ages to the 1990s poses is: was there a German Sonderweg which distinguished Germans from other Western nations? Although most of Winkler’s detailed descriptions relate to the period after 1806, he argues that the Sonderweg question cannot be answered with reference to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries alone, but must be traced back to the Holy Roman Empire, the confessional divisions among the German people created by the Reformation, and the rivalry between Prussia and Austria which emerged in the eighteenth century. He claims, convincingly, that the revolutionary changes which affected Germany in the nineteenth century did create a constitutional nation-state similar to others in that era, but with a deficit in political freedom. Furthermore, German nationalism was influenced by a quasi-religious fervour connected with the enduring myth of the Reich, which gave the German intelligentsia the idea that their nation could claim a God-given mission to dominate Europe, or even mankind. He argues that this was a very un-Western viewpoint, and that its only parallel in Europe lay in the claim of the Russian Orthodox Church to be the heir of Byzantine Christendom.

So far as the ideology of the Reich is concerned, a major leitmotiv which runs throughout the first two thirds of the book is the way in which this concept proved enduringly seductive to the German mind and distracted German élites from the objective of creating a viable, stable nation-state. The Reich ideal was initially a religious one, rooted in the notion that the mission of the Germans was to prevent the reign of anti-Christ in Europe. The victory of Lutheranism in the Reformation encouraged a new version of this vision; Protestant zeal was turned towards the achievement of eternal grace whilst accepting secular authority without question on earth. Later on, in a more secular age, nationalism could be adopted by revolutionaries as a surrogate religion, with the ideal of the German Reich being adapted to the new circumstances. Winkler points to Fichte as an early pro-
ponent of the notion that the world would be saved by German domination and that God was an apparently secular deity to be invoked in support of German nationalism. Although Winkler does not regard the 1848 revolutions as a missed opportunity—the radical revolutionaries lacked mass support and their programmes would have led to anarchy and civil war on a horrendous scale—he does note that the apparent failure of liberal reformers at that time encouraged an acceptance of authoritarian attitudes amongst the educated sections of the population. The Prussian victories in 1866 and 1870-1 were hailed as defeats for Jacobinism and Ultramontanism at the hands of Lutheran Untertanentreue. From then on German nationalism progressively lost its connection with the concept of political emancipation, as the National Liberals, deliberately divided by Bismarck, supported repressive legislation against Roman Catholics and Social Democrats. In 1902 Theodor Mommsen commented bitterly that ‘Bismarck had broken the back of German Liberalism’.

For Winkler the foundation of the German Empire in 1871 did mean a shift in the direction of ‘Westernization’ or ‘normalization’—in itself a challenging juxtaposition of concepts. Bismarck’s revolution from above settled the question of unity in favour of the klein-deutsche solution. However, it did not solve the issue of freedom. The increasingly authoritarian nature of German nationalism militated against the development of internal emancipation. Winkler cites the remarkable discussion between the German theologian, Friedrich Strauß, and Ernst Renan over the issue of Alsace-Lorraine, an area which Strauß claimed was historically German and strategically necessary for the Reich. Renan answered him with reference to popular self-determination. Whatever the linguistic or ethnic background of the people in those provinces, they wanted to remain part of France. This was the difference between the French and the German approach: ‘Our policy is the policy of the rights of Nations, yours is the policy of races... The policy of dividing people into races, quite apart from the fact that it rests on a scientific fallacy... is bound to lead only to wars of destruction, to zoological wars. It would mean the end of that fruitful mixing which has led to what we call mankind.’ It would, of course, be wrong to suggest that the type of nationalism presented by Renan was entirely French, and that more rapacious attitudes were confined to Germans. The policy of many French leaders towards the Rhineland after 1918 illustrated that
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‘Western’ countries could ignore self-determination when it suited them. But the moral force of emancipatory nationalism was undoubtedly weaker in Germany than in some other countries during the fifty years after the founding of the Wilhelmine Empire.

When considering domestic policy Winkler comes down firmly against the notion that the Empire was evolving into a democratic parliamentary state before 1914. The concept of a ‘silent parliamentarization’ cannot be squared with the constellation in the Reichstag, in which most middle-class parties opposed or feared reform and the Social Democrats were refusing to coalesce with them. Wilhelm II himself, despite his initiative in dismissing Bismarck in 1890, was completely averse to liberal or parliamentary developments in the Reich. When he topped out the new Reichstag building in 1894 he privately sneered at it as the Reich monkey-house and refused to allow the motto ‘Dem deutschen Volke’ to be inscribed over it until 1916, by which time the foundations of his Empire were already beginning to crumble. Furthermore, amongst the conservative classes and the Bildungsbürgertum, racialist, militarist, and social Darwinist views were gaining ground before 1914. Such attitudes were to be found at the very top of the Reich’s hierarchy. Thus Wilhelm II was much impressed by the work of the woolly-minded British racist Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and when a Bavarian cavalry general circulated a memorandum demanding a programme of discriminatory measures designed to drive Jews out of Germany, the Prussian Crown Prince passed this on approvingly to Bethmann-Hollweg and the Kaiser. In 1911 the mood amongst Conservatives and other right-wing nationalists was warlike and often openly contemptuous of parliamentary procedures. Winkler rightly denies that this sort of movement was the result of ‘populist’ tendencies amongst the German masses. It was more the expression of a conservative nationalism appealing to the middle and lower middle class whose spokesmen continued to be deferential to Germany’s aristocratic élites. The anti-Semitic proto-fascist Heinrich Claß, head of the Pan-German League, exemplified this attitude. Winkler might perhaps have made more of the fact that many Germans in the years before the First World War seemed unimpressed by jingoist hysteria, as the Reichstag elections of 1912 demonstrated. Although much is often made of the enthusiasm with which the war was greeted in Germany’s capital cities when it broke out, there had been mass
demonstrations for peace at the end of July 1914, and the decisions which led to war were not taken by the elected representatives of the German people.

Winkler describes vividly the disastrous impact of the war on Germany’s political culture, exacerbating as it did social tensions and racial hatred, and dividing both working-class and middle-class Germans into hostile camps. Although the course of the war finally pushed a reluctant imperial government to grant concessions in the direction of parliamentary control over the Reich government and the reform of the lop-sided franchise in Prussia, events in October 1918 demonstrated that no serious will for change existed in military or court circles. It is difficult to see how, without the collapse of the Wilhelmine Empire as the result of the catastrophic war, there could have been a democratic revolution in Germany. As it was, this revolution was only made possible by the fact that the Social Democratic movement had split, and that the majority party was willing to collaborate with middle-class colleagues to create a genuinely parliamentary Republic. Winkler firmly rejects the older left-wing critique of Weimar, which reproved the Social Democrats for their failure to carry out root-and-branch socialization in an advanced industrial nation, the civil institutions of which had not collapsed to anything like the extent of those in Russia. The only result of such a revolution would have been chaos and civil war.

As one would expect from a distinguished historian of the German labour movement, Winkler has much that is interesting to say about the SPD in the Weimar Republic. He is perhaps overly critical of its leaders for not doing more to collaborate with moderate ‘bourgeois’ parties. One problem Weimar had was that the values which inform the Federal Republic today—commitment to a market economy and free trade, a belief in pragmatic compromise as a way to overcome sectional conflicts, scepticism in the face of utopian ideologies—were not at all powerful in Germany during the 1920s. For many rank-and-file SPD supporters ‘socialism’ was a more important objective than parliamentary democracy. This attitude was strengthened by the open fear and contempt for the ‘Sozis’ exhibited by their middle-class compatriots. SPD leaders also had to look over their shoulders at an increasingly popular and viciously disruptive German Communist Party. But they did what they could to defend the Republic, and in this respect it is noteworthy that relatively little
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is said in the Weimar chapter about the Reichsbanner, the Republican defence formation established mainly by Social Democrats. Its leader, Otto Hirsing, is not mentioned in the index.

Despite the fact that the Weimar Republic did create a genuinely ‘modern’ political system for the German nation-state, Winkler regards its constitution as fundamentally flawed. This was largely due to the widespread distrust of parliamentary democracy among the German middle class. The creation of a parallel source of power, in the shape of the popularly elected president, weakened parliamentary government and enabled the political parties in the Reichstag to evade responsibility. With the election of an Ersatzkaiser in the shape of Field Marshal Hindenburg in 1925 this anomaly was to prove fatal. Winkler stresses the part played by the East Elbian elite surrounding Hindenburg for the disastrous decision to appoint Hitler Chancellor. But he also points out that there were other, more deep-seated, causes of Hitler’s success. Quite apart from the appalling economic difficulties created by the world depression, Weimar was burdened with the widespread hostility of large sections of the propertyedy and educated classes, which regarded the Republic as the child of defeat and humiliation. Not only did they feel that the defeat should be reversed, but they believed that Germany had a great new opportunity to fulfill its destiny. With the Austro-Hungarian Empire dissolved and Russia isolated under the Bolsheviks, the way seemed open to recreate the mythical Reich of ancient tradition. The fact that the National Socialists were led by an Austrian who, despite his own contempt for Christianity, did not hesitate to invoke the Almighty when declaring his historic mission, strengthened the Nazi appeal to romantic yearnings for a God-given imperium in which the Germans would reign supreme. Winkler sees this vision as the bridge which Hitler was able to build to the conservative classes in Germany before 1933. Certainly the greater German Reich, for which he took the credit, was a widespread inspiration for the educated middle class. In 1920, for example, Hermann Oncken stated that the only aim left for Germans after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire was the ‘return to the greater German idea’. This idea could attract Lutherans, who saw it as the extension of nationalist German Protestantism over central Europe, and some Roman Catholics, who welcomed the chance to redress the confessional imbalance in Germany. Winkler makes it clear that Hitler, for all his rhetorical references to God, was con-
temptuous of the Christian ‘slave’ religion, which he saw as undermining the iron will of the Aryan race to exterminate its biological foes. There is little doubt that, had the Third Reich emerged victorious from the Second World War, the extirpation of Christianity throughout occupied Europe would have been one of its consequences.

Winkler relates this overblown fantasy of the Nazi Reich to the legacy of the Middle Ages. He suggests that the Germans never rid themselves of their medieval inheritance until Germany’s total defeat in 1945. It was this defeat which gave liberal conservatives and moderate social democrats the chance to create what he regards as the first really Western German state: a stable parliamentary democracy with a foreign policy committed to a Western global alliance and to the integration of Western Europe through co-operation rather than hegemony. This was, of course, the Federal Republic, a country habitually referred to by outsiders as West Germany, based as it was on the three Western occupation Zones after the war. Even the Soviet Zone of occupation, or German Democratic Republic, as it styled itself from 1949, was a severe break with the past. The politically conservative agricultural areas of Eastern Germany, which had acted as a drag on its westernization before 1933, were now no longer in Germany at all, but occupied by Poland or the Soviet Union. The founding myth of the GDR was that of anti-fascism and, although this was easily transmogrified into hostility towards ‘imperialist’ American capitalism, it was incompatible with the nostalgia for a mythical Reich of the sort which had haunted Germany since the Peace of Westphalia. Nevertheless, the GDR did present West Germans with a dilemma. The unity of Germany was an ideal which most Germans shared. It was a humane and decent ideal because it involved refusing to accept the fact that roughly a fifth of Germany’s population should be forced to bear the harshest consequences of a lost war, whilst the other four-fifths enjoyed security, freedom, and prosperity as part of the Western family of nations. Over time the issue of unification came to be focused on the people of the GDR. By the 1980s few West Germans were really determined to regain territory East of the Oder/Neisse frontier. As for notions of a Greater German Reich including Austria and the Sudetenland, they were restricted to the lunatic fringe of neo-Nazi politics.

For many West German intellectuals, though not the mass of the population, upon whose sturdy good sense the political structure of
the Federal Republic was based, the issue of German national consciousness was troublesome because it seemed that an incomplete Germany could not function as a proper ‘nation-state’. Some urged an intensification of historical recollection to instil national pride into German youth. Others preferred to see West Germany as the harbinger of a new ‘post-national’ era in which the nation-state would lose its importance. Ironically, this discussion was taking place at about the same time as Erich Honecker was trying to give the GDR a bogus national tradition of its own to create the illusion of an independent, socialist Germany. In the West the controversy was given a particularly bitter flavour by intense public discussions about the mass murder of European Jews during the Third Reich. These discussions caused some intellectuals to demand that the stigma of the Holocaust should be removed from the German past to create a ‘normal’ national consciousness, whereas others argued that Auschwitz must be seen as the defining moment in modern German history, leading them to the conclusion that a German nation-state was neither necessary nor desirable. Winkler, who played an important part in such controversies himself, has little time for those on the left who rejected German unification and wanted Germany to play the role of a missionary for post-nationalism, a posture which he regards as being almost as arrogant as that of Reich enthusiasts between the wars. Instead he argues that unification in 1990 established Germany for the first time as an entirely normal nation-state, at peace with itself and in harmony with its neighbours. It is a comforting conclusion, and one with which few who know Germany well will have much to disagree.

This is in all respects a remarkable work of scholarship. It is not possible within the space of a review to do justice to the rich variety of thought-provoking comments and original perspectives it contains. It is a book to be read and reread. Many of its judgments are controversial, and it is all the better for that. Perhaps towards the end of the second volume we are led a little too far into the thickets of that most arid of disputations, the German Historikerstreit of the 1980s, and thereafter rather too much attention is paid to the agonizing by left-wing intellectuals when faced with a unified German nation. But these are very minor quibbles. This is a magnum opus on a grand scale.
History of Germany from 1806 to Reunification


Research into the history of the Third Reich has grown exponentially over recent decades, and even specialized aspects of the field have received extensive scholarly attention. In the light of this, it is perhaps surprising that no detailed study of theatre under the Nazis has been written in English until now. Two volumes published in recent years cover only limited periods or special aspects. Glen Gadberry, in *Theatre in the Third Reich* (1995), concentrates on the pre-war years, and Günter Berghaus’s compilation, *Fascism and Theatre* (1996), contains only three articles on German theatre. The topic has also long been neglected in Germany, and it is only since the 1980s that the research situation has become considerably better. Studies by, among others, Ketelsen (1970), Fischli (1976), Drewniak (1983), Wardetzky (1983), and Dussel (1988) have established the subject as an important research topic. The recently published massive work *Theater im Dritten Reich*, edited by Henning Rischbieter (2001), illustrates that the topic is still very much on the agenda in Germany. One of the problems of the research so far has been either the tendency to assume that theatrical life in Germany survived largely untouched by the Nazis, or the supposition that every single theatre was completely supportive of the regime. Another problem has arisen from the various methodological approaches taken. Scholars like the Germanist Uwe-Karsten Ketelsen concentrate on the literary quality and special characteristics of the dramatic output more than on the question of a particular drama’s success. Historians such as Konrad Dussel, on the other hand, leave aesthetic questions aside and concentrate on how far individual theatres were drawn into the political system. As a result, important issues of performance and interpretation tend to be overlooked. Dussel’s approach, however, seems much more appropriate for dealing with one of the crucial aspects concerning not only theatre but cultural life in Nazi Germany in general: the discrepancy between high expectations and actual artistic output. Research concerned mainly with the politics of Nazi theatre and the measures taken, general theoretical positions, and favoured production formats (Drewniak, Wardetzky, and Rischbieter) finds it difficult to answer the question of whether these measures and official pro-
nouncements were put into practice, and to what extent the high expectations were fulfilled.

In his introductory chapter London presents popular misconceptions about theatre under the Nazis and stresses that we should neither condemn all plays performed nor assert ‘that the theatre remained untainted by Nazi propaganda’ (p. 3). Nationalistic and reactionary attitudes within the theatre world had a long tradition in Germany, going back to the turn of the century. Nationalist drama, for example, did not suddenly emerge in 1933. The year of the Nazi take-over, however, marks the starting point of an unprecedented repressive policy which concerned every aspect of theatrical life. Nazi policy, however, was far from consistent and rivalries between the Rosenberg circle and Goebbels, for example, are ample proof of the relative diversity. This also holds true for the question of censorship. Reichsdramaturg Schlösser relied heavily on self-censorship in acts of ‘vorausgezogenen Gehorsam’ (pre-emptive obedience), and improvisation was extensive. Concerning the immediate effects of censorship, however, London’s claim that by 1934 ‘one of the richest periods of modern German drama had virtually disappeared’ (p. 12) is not entirely correct. Although the number of plays in the repertoire was considerably reduced by comparison with the Weimar period, not all of these plays had been outstanding pieces. Throughout the Weimar years most provincial theatres presented a highly conservative programme, and many of these stages did not put on their first Brecht play until the 1960s. Plays affected by the cuts were mainly the highly successful comedies by Arnold/Bach, Blumenthal/Kadelburg, and Bernauer/Österreicher and the operettas by Kálmán, Abraham, and Fall. Apart from a few obvious cases, however, there were many inconsistencies regarding authors and works favoured or condemned. ‘Weimar’ was the common enemy but Nazi ideologists never reached agreement about the works with which they wanted to replace the pieces of this ‘degenerate’ era. It is interesting to note, however, that the introduction of new forms, like the ‘Thing’ plays or modern dance, had been stopped by 1935–6, and gave way to a restoration of established styles. Apart from the first season after the take-over, in which overtly propagandistic plays had an important share in the programmes, light entertainment dominated German stages throughout the period. Stressing continuing effects, London correctly points out that many characteristic features of theatre.

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under the Nazis were not limited to the time between 1933 and 1945.

The most important ‘new’ dramatic form to emerge after 1933, the ‘Thing’ plays, were long regarded as a genuine Nazi art form. William Niven, however, makes clear that ‘Thing’ plays owed as much to Catholic passion plays and open-air theatre as to more ‘suspicious’ art forms such as socialist workers’ theatre and Expressionist drama. In fact, ‘Thing’ plays were far from original. Apart from this, the most interesting question is why Goebbels had virtually put a stop to the much-heralded ‘Thing’ movement by the end of 1935. There were several reasons for the decision. Apart from technical and financial difficulties, the uncertainties of the weather and the challenge posed by political spectacles, which seemed far more theatrical, certainly figure prominently. But Niven overemphasizes the importance of the ‘Thing’ movement’s Weimar roots, which, he claims, ‘became a threat to the political system’ (p. 54). It is questionable whether audiences and officials alike perceived every performance of a ‘Thing’ play only as a vivid reminder of the ‘degenerate’ Weimar years. And even if some may have recognized close links to the workers’ theatre of the 1920s, this was almost certainly not the prime reason for the movement’s failure. Rather more important was the lack of popular support because of the plays’ poor quality and lack of theatricality. After a short period of public enthusiasm, the static displays of hundreds of extras, slow movement, declamatory speeches and lengthy plots, the presentation of ideas rather than characters, and the predictable outcome of the plays increasingly bored audiences and were major reasons for their ultimate failure. In any case, the end of the ‘Thing’ experiment made way for a restoration of the bourgeois theatre and its established theatrical forms.

Glen Gadberry in the following article presents a group of plays which profited from this move: history plays. A genre which had existed before 1933 became quite successful thereafter and accounted for the majority of ‘serious’ dramas written and performed during the Third Reich. The Nazis strongly endorsed the genre as the plays were seen as ‘a viable and memorable means to reassess the past’ (p. 97). Topics from medieval and Prussian times proved especially popular. Frederick the Great, Bismarck, and Henry IV were presented as heroic figures in remarkable struggles against evil forces in order to demonstrate the greatness of German history. Gadberry
Theatre under the Nazis

thoroughly examines different types of history plays and gives many examples. The ban on dealing with contemporary subjects on stage—as well as on the use of Nazi symbols or uniforms—meant that writers had to concentrate on other topics. For many playwrights, however, this move was probably convenient, as dealing with the immediate past posed many potential problems. These plays were more likely to be censored than works about a more remote past. Although it might not be correct to claim that these dramatists fled into the safety of the past, their behaviour does not automatically mean that they actively supported the Nazi ideology (as Gadberry argues on pp. 100–101) either. Gadberry is right, however, to say that most of the history plays reflect Nazi ideology in one way or another, and also that most of them lack real conflict and complex character studies, but appear rather simple and flat. We must bear in mind, however, that although these plays were highly promoted, they never played a decisive role in the repertoire.

Although opera was of particular concern to the Nazis, Eric Levi’s article shows that this area, too, was ‘beset with ambiguities and contradictions’ (p. 136). The fact that the notion of an ‘opera crisis’ persisted throughout the Third Reich suggests that an original form, a typical Nazi opera, was never found. Deficiencies in the musical quality of the works and rigid censorship account for this failure. Permission to stage the non-German operatic repertoire, for example, depended very much on the political situation at the time. Works by Scandinavian and Italian composers were endorsed, whereas Russian operas reached German stages only during the brief German–Soviet pact between 1939 and 1941. On the other hand, although Offenbach and Meyerbeer were banned, libretti by Jews or half-Jews were still accepted. During the first year of the Nazi regime in particular, control was far from total and quite a few outlawed pieces managed to slip through the net. Parallel to the search for an archetypal Nazi opera, musicologists tried to redraw the classical repertoire by ‘Aryanizing’ the libretti of Mozart’s operas, presenting Wagner as a ‘spiritual godfather’ (p. 141) of the Nazi regime, or reviving Lortzing as a composer of Volksoper. None of the contemporary composers secured unequivocal approval. Graener or Vollerthun, hailed as the heralds of a new era in the first two seasons after the seizure of power, quickly lost their influence. The same holds true for many of the younger composers, such as Egk, Orff, and Wagner-
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Régény, whose operas in some way corresponded to Nazi ideology but could also be interpreted as including critical remarks. Richard Strauss, the most prolific German composer alive at the time, was a special case. He lent his glamour to the Nazis and was accused of having been a willing accomplice of cultural politics. His works, however, do not support such a conclusion and even his most pro-Nazi work, Day of Freedom (Friedenstag, 1938), was ambiguous. While Hans Pfitzner, on the other hand, engaged actively in polemics and was seen by many as the Third Reich's prime musical exponent, he had stopped composing operas two years before the Nazis came to power. In a remarkable and perceptive conclusion Levi places his findings into a European context and points out that developments in Germany were not unique. Many opera houses in the Western democracies also rejected modernism and became increasingly conservative in their selection of repertoire.

The performance of non-German works was not confined to opera. On the contrary, the production of non-German drama was even endorsed by Nazi officials, as John London points out. But although the Nazis emphasized the importance of foreign drama it was a hypocritical claim as the share of non-German drama in the repertoire fell considerably after 1933. The choice of the 'right' plays became essential and placed Italian drama at the top of the agenda. Rather than artistic quality or originality, the political background of the dramatists became the important criterion. Pirandello, for example, was banned, but Mussolini's dramatic efforts were widely recognized. The classical Spanish theatre experienced a revival, although plays like Calderon's The Great Theatre of the World were adapted or re-translated in order to make them compatible with Nazi ideology. Apart from Italian and Spanish drama, the Greek classics and Scandinavian authors featured prominently, whereas French drama was avoided. British comedies played a significant role until the outbreak of the war, when all English drama was banned. Although attacked by the Rosenberg circle, Shaw remained in the repertoire until the end of the war, but productions of Shaw and Shakespeare required special permission from 1941. Goebbels conveniently classed Shaw as Irish, and, therefore, anti-English, in order to keep his popular plays in the repertoire. Shakespeare, on the other hand, had always been prominent in German repertoires. He was, after all, regarded as part of the German cultural heritage, and inter-
Interpretation as a Nordic-Germanic dramatist now. New translations helped, as did 'German' interpretations of Shakespeare's works. On the other hand, Shakespeare provided an opportunity for directors like Fehling to express cultural opposition, although the impact of such productions is difficult to assess, as London correctly remarks.

A special case of repressive Nazi culture politics was the establishment in April 1933 of the Jüdischer Kulturbund (Jewish Arts League), which became the only legitimate cultural outlet for Jewish artists. Rebecca Rovit presents the different stages in the short life of this theatre between 1933 and 1941, emphasizing repertoire and censorship. She shows that the process of granting permission to produce a certain play was often reduced to personal debate and careful collaboration between theatre director Kurt Singer and Staatskommissar Hans Hinkel or Reichsdramaturg Schlösser, who oversaw the enterprise. Censorship policy, however, was far from consistent, and the censors 'appeared to make up the rules for theatres as they went along' (p. 195). Control became tighter, however, after the 1935 Nuremberg laws and the 1938 pogrom, until in September 1941 the theatre was closed down completely. One of the difficulties the Jews faced was the question of identity. Most of them felt German, and they strove for a repertoire consisting of very much the same fare as was offered on other stages across Germany. The Nazi authorities, however, prohibited the performance of plays by German authors (Jews were not counted as German) and required a 'Jewish' programme. It is remarkable, though, that even with regard to this single theatre Nazi policy was inconsistent, as Schlösser did not want the Kulturbund to become too Jewish. This, he feared, might prove dangerous, as it would present Zionism in too positive or even too powerful a light. The Zionist minority within the Jewish community, however, supported the move towards a more characteristically 'Jewish' theatre, although this did not materialize until the last season of the Kulturbund. Apart from the Greek classics, Shakespeare, and modern classics such as Ibsen and Shaw, the repertoire increasingly consisted of light dramas and escapist comedies, which contrasted strikingly with the actual threats in real life outside the theatre. Rovit makes an interesting point when she argues that, despite the very nature of the theatre, it was a haven not only for those who found employment there, but also for repertoire officially banned from 'Aryanized' stages. Kulturbund audiences saw plays by
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Schnitzler, Zweig, Molnar, and Priestley, a fact, which ‘in an ironic twist of logic’ appears as ‘a breath of freedom’ (p. 207).

Another rather special theatrical enterprise is presented in an article about the German theatre in Lille by William Abbey and Katharina Havekamp. Theatre played an important part in Nazi Germany’s war campaign. Its main purpose was to provide German theatre for German audiences, but it was also a means of demonstrating cultural ‘superiority’ and the intention of staying permanently in the occupied territories. Most of the German theatres were established in places which the Nazis claimed to be ‘re’-incorporating into the Reich and in assimilated areas. Elsewhere theatres existed mainly for soldiers, or were designed ‘to win over the local (German) populations’ (p. 263). The main purpose of the Deutsches Theater in Lille was to entertain the forces gathered in a city of great military and economic importance. Ernst Ziegler became theatre director and, as in many other cases around Germany, he was an ardent supporter of the Nazi regime and an eager Hitler Youth leader rather than a talented Intendant. The prestige of Lille in Goebbels’s view can be seen from the high subsidies it was awarded—the staff alone totalled 430 when it opened in May 1941. The discrepancy between expectations and actual practice, however, also became obvious in Lille. The programmes contained some classics but mainly trivial entertainment and appear to have been very ordinary. The quality of the productions seems to have been similarly poor. It is interesting to note that many plays with small or all-female casts were produced, and that these productions in particular went on tour to Belgium and the rest of France. Expectations of ticket sales to the local community were high but never materialized as the locals remained extremely hostile. The authors point out that although the statistics may look impressive, the theatre failed to make any lasting impression on the cultural life of the city and that after its closure in August 1944 nothing remained of the German cultural presence. The Deutsches Theater in Lille was a special case, and the authors themselves admit that it was ‘distinct from any other theatre in Nazi-occupied Europe’ (p. 285). The question, therefore, arises as to why such a specialist study—interesting as it may be—was included in the volume. Instead, one could have wished for an essay on theatrical activity outside Berlin. The relative freedom enjoyed by Gründgens and Hilpert was something that provincial theatre directors in Dortmund
or Münster could only dream of. They were subject to much stronger influence from their local authorities.

Another limitation of the volume is that it does not deal convincingly with the question of the influence the audience had on the repertoire. In his introductory chapter London mentions the failure of contemporary Nazi drama, but his assertion that overtly propagandistic drama played only a marginal role ‘because direct allusions to the present were officially limited’ (p. 23) by decrees is only partly true. We must distinguish between the first season after the Nazi take-over (1933–4) and later ones. Propagandistic drama indeed played an important role during the first ‘national’ season. Audience reaction, however, was poor and attendance in many theatres declined. To reach the expected records in attendance figures Intendanten had to find alternatives to grave and stiff Nazi drama, which all too often was also of poor quality. The reason for the failure of the overtly propagandistic drama, therefore, seems to have been a lukewarm reception rather than political directives. Apart from these shortcomings, however, John London is successful in filling a gap and providing a balanced account of recent research to a broad, English-speaking readership. Although most of the contributors do not present ground-breaking new research, the volume can only be recommended.

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KLAUS LARRES with ELIZABETH MEEHAN (eds), Uneasy Allies: British–German Relations and European Integration since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), xvi + 344 pp. ISBN 0 19 829383 6. £50.00

The history of bilateral relationships in Western Europe after 1945 can only sensibly be written within the context of European institutionalization as a result of the integration process. Traditional ‘realist’ diplomatic accounts, which place exclusive emphasis on governments and ‘national’ interests and which largely see international relations as the outcome of power relationships dominated by security issues are totally inadequate for the analysis of post-war (West) European relations. Once inside European institutions from the European Coal and Steel Community to the current European Union, national governments have had to operate within an intricate web of governmental and transnational relationships and to acknowledge European responsibility for more and more policy areas which can still be discussed, but not regulated at a bilateral level. If this is the case even for the Franco–German relationship, which was particularly close and crucial for Western Europe and the integration process at many junctures in post-war European history, it is all the more true for the relationship between (West) Germany and Britain. After all, Britain was comparatively marginal to post-war Western Europe even after the first enlargement of the then European Communities in 1973 to include Britain, Ireland, and Denmark. The editors of this book, therefore, are right to place the bilateral relationship between (West) Germany and Britain in the wider context of European integration.

It could, of course, be said that if almost all relations in Europe are now of a multilateral character, and if European politics should be treated more and more like domestic politics, as many comparatists have increasingly argued in the theoretical debate about the integration process, the discussion of bilateral relationships with a strong contemporary focus, as in this book, is altogether superfluous. This would be too drastic a view, however, especially given that so few historians and political scientists have an adequate grasp of the integration process and its theoretical explanations which goes beyond the acknowledgement that the EU matters; or, in the case of contemporary historians, have the linguistic ability to access the varied
sources in many European archives. In any case, the editors are content to close a gap in the literature which they see in the lack of an interdisciplinary treatment by historians and social scientists of the bilateral relationship between the two countries in the European context. To fill this gap, they have divided the book into three sections. The first deals with the bilateral relations between Britain and West Germany as well as the GDR between the end of the Second World War and German unification in 1989–90. The four essays in the second section address the importance of institution-building and foreign and security policy for Britain and Germany during the 1990s. The third section, finally, concerns the economic and social questions of industrial modernization, economic policy-making, and social engineering at a time of increasing globalization. The latter, rather than the conventional security issues, have so far dominated the political agenda of the European Union and its member states. Thus a multinational framework of analysis seems especially appropriate.

The first essay, by Anne Deighton, gives a reliable overview of the relationship between Britain and West Germany until British accession to the European Communities. She argues, with some justification, that British and West German governments had different concepts of ‘power relations’ (p. 33). British attitudes to the West German governments were based ‘on control, dominance, and alliance diplomacy’, whereas West German European policy pursued ‘national interests’ by ‘sharing power’ inside European institutions (p. 34). Deighton implicitly acknowledges the influence of ‘soft’ factors like historical experience and national images for the policy-making process, and also the role of economic motives behind the integration project. Yet this is a highly traditional treatment of the diplomatic relations between two national governments, which is hardly integrated into the respective domestic political contexts. Deighton does not even acknowledge how problematic it is to speak of supposedly ‘German’ ‘national interests’ when the nation was in fact divided and Adenauer’s policy of Western integration highly contested in West German politics, at least until 1955–7. As she does not read German and therefore has no access to anything published in the German language, her chapter also illustrates the inadequacy of writing about bilateral relations from a unilateral perspective. Deighton suggests, for example, that Adenauer suddenly switched from an ‘Atlanticist’ to a ‘Gaullist’ perspective in the autumn of 1962 (p. 28), when West
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German foreign policy in fact always had to mediate between the USA and France, which often happened at the expense of Britain. When it comes to assessing Adenauer’s apparently inexplicable and supposedly sudden change of mind concerning British EEC membership in 1962, Deighton resorts to Harold Macmillan’s speculations in his autobiography about the motives of the German chancellor, whom he absolutely despised—perhaps not the best support for an insecure judgement. Unfortunately, the author also ignores alternative explanations of Britain’s German and European policy.

The second chapter, on the period from 1973 to 1989, shows a much better grasp of the domestic context for policy-making, not only in Britain, but also in Germany. In particular, Julie Smith and Geoffrey Edwards explain how the institutional tradition and political milieu of German federalism as well as the ideological openness towards supranational solutions of the Christian Democrats as the leading government party until 1969 continued to influence the European policy behaviour of the SPD-led governments in the 1970s. The authors deal with the essential episodes, especially the budget issue, which led to the characterization of Britain as an ‘awkward partner’ (Stephen George) inside the enlarged EC. This new partner appeared unwilling to enter into stable long-term relationships involving give and take in European negotiations, stubbornly following an inflexible agenda determined by domestic party politics and the fixations of a Prime Minister with dictatorial inclinations. Smith and Edwards rightly emphasize that the strong British support for the Internal Market Programme in the 1980s signifies that British European and German policy did have coherent aims and was in fact ‘constructive’. They also show, however, that Margaret Thatcher treated the EC Council like her Cabinet and, unlike the Foreign Office, did not grasp the need for long-term interest mediation and issue linkages in the Community. Unfortunately, this essay is also somewhat lop-sided in its more extensive treatment of Britain and Europe.

The third essay, by Klaus Larres, is a very detailed account of British policy towards the GDR. Its inclusion acknowledges the simple fact that there were two Germanies until 1990, and allows an account of British attitudes towards German unification and of the changing policy of the governments in London towards the Hallstein doctrine (named after the state secretary in the German Foreign Office and then President of the EEC Commission) that the Bonn gov-
ernment was the sole legitimate representation of Germany and that the Federal Republic would therefore break off its relations with any country which decided to establish diplomatic links with the regime in East Berlin. Larres shows how from the West German perspective British Prime Ministers from Churchill (1953) to Eden (1955) and Macmillan (1959) appeared to call this doctrine into question with their détente initiatives (although not necessarily German unification, which Churchill foresaw through its neutralization in the context of a de-militarized Central Europe). The author is inclined towards the gentle view that British governments basically continued to support German unification throughout the 1960s and always placed their relationship with Bonn before possibly closer links—even of a purely economic nature—with East Berlin. Others, like Rolf Steininger in his recent book on the Berlin crises of 1958 and 1961, have come to the conclusion that British governments adhered to reunification rhetoric, but never meant it seriously and in fact agreed (also before Thatcher) with the Italian Christian Democrat politician Giulio Andreotti, who once said that he loved Germany so much that he was only too happy that there were two of them. This historiographical debate will doubtless continue, but it is to be hoped that it will be less morally charged in the future than it has often been in the past. For now, Larres probably contributes most with his detailed account of British interest in increased trade with East Germany, and how this became linked to the foreign policy issue of non-recognition until the solution of 1973. The author also points out, however, that the economic crisis in the GDR, combined with the privileged intra-German economic relationship as a result of a separate clause in the EEC Treaty as well as generally more competitive West German exports, meant that hopes for greater trade proved illusive during the 1970s and 1980s.

In the fourth essay in this section, Lothar Kettenacker provides a nuanced account of Britain and German unification in 1989-90. It takes the West German perspective and policies into consideration, and is based on all published documents and available autobiographical accounts, including those by Jacques Attali, the close adviser to the French President François Mitterand. Kettenacker recapitulates the fundamental differences between, on the one hand, the constructive attitude of the Foreign Office and its head, Douglas Hurd, who was not opposed to unification and trusted the policy of the
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Kohl government and especially Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the long-serving West German foreign secretary, and Prime Minister Thatcher on the other. Thatcher’s thinking on Germany was totally dominated by historical experience, national prejudice, and the idea of fixed national characters which cannot change over time. At a meeting with the equally sceptical, but more prudent Mitterand in December 1989, Thatcher apparently pointed to Silesia and other formerly East German territories on a map she had brought along and insisted that ‘they’ll take all that and Czechoslovakia’, if the four Powers allowed German unification to happen (p. 112). Her collectivist ideas about ‘the German character’ only awaited confirmation by her famous Chequers meeting with leading historians. They are perhaps understandable up to a point, but the British Prime Minister’s intransigence only strengthened the German preference for close ties with Washington and Paris at a time of rapid political change in Europe, which was also to some extent undermining the extremely close Franco-German relationship. It is also true that British policy over unification did not really matter, so long as the USA and the Soviet Union could agree its terms with the Kohl government. This only served to show how Britain had to follow the USA and the Soviet Union in the post-war period, even over this crucial issue, despite its initial great power status after 1945 and its continuing shared formal legal responsibility for Berlin as a whole and unification.

Many of the other essays in this volume are equally interesting and deserve to be read by contemporary historians as well as political scientists, especially for their often more structured, systematic approach. Jim Buller and Charlie Jeffrey, for example, show in a clear comparative perspective how domestic political norms and institutions shape the European ‘engagement’ of political elites in Britain and Germany. The German federal constitutional tradition is highly rule-bound and consensual and therefore ideally suited for interaction with other governments and transnational actors inside the EU. It also explains why German policy-makers have traditionally had a pretty coherent approach to institutional reform in the EU along the lines of the German constitutional model. In contrast, British traditions, including high centralization and adversarial, party-centred politics, have made it much more difficult for British policy-makers to adapt to Community policy-making. The authors believe that the recent (partial) ‘Europeanization’ of the British constitution through
its decentralization and introduction of proportional representation in regional and European elections could facilitate the future task of British governments of enhancing their influence on the general direction of the integration process and particular polices. Historians will rightly caution against the rash assumption that a change in the rules will promptly lead to an equally fundamental change in political behaviour.

In his essay, Valur Ingimundarson explains the emergence of American hegemony in the 1990s by pointing to policy differences among European countries, including Britain and unified Germany. While this view has some validity for military relations, despite the partial rapprochement between France and Britain since the St Malo summit in 1998 and signs of a similar European reaction to the recent terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, Ingimundarson's vision is unfortunately limited to this particular policy area. In other respects, from the Kyoto protocol to the establishment of the international court of justice, the policies of European Union member states on issues other than trade have increasingly converged to an astonishing extent. This is, in fact, partly the result of aggressive foreign policy on the part of the US administration and Congress, especially after the election of President Bush in 2000. While the author could not possibly have taken these recent developments into account, they none the less serve to illustrate how misleading a one-sided treatment of military and security issues can be if more general conclusions are drawn from their analysis.

As part of the third section, Jeremy Leaman provides an 'old' Labour account of economic policy-making under the impact of globalization in Britain and Germany. This concludes by defending consensus policy-making using abstract and meaningless neo-Marxist vocabulary about an ongoing 'crisis of accumulation' and wild predictions about the guaranteed rise of structural unemployment (p. 221). The chapter is clearly written for a British audience and, understandably perhaps, reflects the author's utter personal depression in view of the Americanization of the British economic and social system, and the sheer arrogance of British policy-makers concerning the presumed superiority of the new 'British model' over a supposedly declining Germany. Unfortunately, Leaman raises none of the really interesting questions about the institutional competition between different socio-economic models at times of globalization, or the trans-
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fer of policy concepts from one country to another, such as between Blair’s ‘Third Way’ and the economic rhetoric (although by no means the actual policy-making) of the Schröder government in Germany. To some extent, Elizabeth Meehan compensates for this lack of analytical innovation with her essay on British and German policy towards the Social Chapter and social policy-making inside the European Union. She is more open-minded about the possible advantages and disadvantages of the Europeanization of one ‘model’ or the other, or, indeed, the emergence of an amalgamated new European socio-economic ‘third way’.

Overall, this is a very valuable book with many interesting contributions. It is successful in its important main aim of placing the bilateral relationship in the wider context of European integration. It also brings together contemporary historians and political scientists, which is very welcome in these days when most historians stop their work in accordance with the thirty year rule for the opening of government archives and most social scientists have an exclusive interest in theory without any historical grounding. Yet, no edited volume is without at least one major cause for criticism. This is practically guaranteed given the extreme difficulty of devising a coherent structure and getting authors to respond to a common set of questions. To my mind, this book still places much too much emphasis on governmental relations between the two countries at a time when transnational relations inside the European Union are not only almost always of a multilateral character, but also evolving very quickly at a sub-governmental level between societal actors, for example, in the form of party contacts, the emergence of European pressure groups, and academic expert networks. None of this is discussed in this book, but this is perhaps just as well, as it leaves colleagues some topics on which they can publish to avoid perishing in the next research assessment exercise.

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Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration 1945–63 (1999) and British Foreign Policy 1955–64: Contracting Options (2000, ed. with G. Staerck). He is presently working on studies of the transnational co-operation between European Christian Democrat parties in the twentieth century and the political culture of internationalization in the nineteenth century (world exhibitions).

‘Monasterium sine archivum est quasi castra sine firmamentum’ is an oft-quoted medieval catch-phrase. The KGB, abolished on 11 October 1991, was no monastery. But in a way its employees felt as if they were members of a brotherhood of a chosen few, serving the principles of Marxist–Leninist ideology for a country encircled by enemies. In reality it had become a machine of mistrust, striving for total control and caught in a process of deception and delusion, which often led to a deformation of human character, and brutality in the methods used against all forms of opposition. All its ideas, concepts, and actions are collected and reflected in its innermost body: the archive. It sounds incredible and even fantastic that there was a leak in this massive body of institutionalized suspicion for more than a dozen years—and that it was kept secret and undiscovered for another decade. Vasilii Mitrokhin defected to Britain in 1992. He brought with him numerous files of the utmost secrecy which led to something approaching an earthquake in circles of KGB agents. The FBI called it ‘the most complete and extensive intelligence ever received from any source’ (p. 1).

The ‘plot’ might have been written by an imaginative novelist: a sober and sometimes idealistic archivist within the system of the KGB recognizes that the ‘official’ version and the reality of the institution he works for and the society he lives in are two rather different and even contradictory parts of his life. Mitrokhin, who began his career in the foreign intelligence service in 1948, and was sent to several postings abroad after 1952, was influenced by the struggle of official Soviet politics with its dissidents and by the information he received during his foreign service and from Western broadcasts. Mitrokhin’s experiences and second thoughts culminated in the will to collect evidence about the multiple KGB actions all over the world. His ‘opportunity came in June 1972, when the First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate [FCD] left its overcrowded central Moscow offices in the KGB headquarters at the Lubyanka ... and moved to a new building south-east of Moscow at Yasenevo’ (p. 9). Mitrokhin was in charge of some of the most secret files: ‘For the next ten years, working from private offices both in the Lubyanka and at Yasenevo, Mitrokhin was alone responsible for checking and sealing the approx-
imately 300,000 files in the FCD archive prior to their transfer to the new headquarters. While supervising the checking of files, the compilation of inventories and the writing of index cards, Mitrokhin was able to inspect what files he wished in one or other of his offices. ‘Few KGB officers apart from Mitrokhin’, Andrew sums up the role of his collaborator, ‘have ever spent as much time reading, let alone noting, foreign intelligence files. Outside the FCD archives, only the most senior officers shared his unrestricted access, and none had the time to read more than a fraction of the material noted by him’ (p. 10).

The disillusioned archivist started to smuggle documents he had copied by hand, most of them top secret, which illustrated the day-to-day schizophrenia of ideology and reality. Mitrokhin hid the growing quantity of archival loot by packing it into a milk-churn, later into a clothes-boiler, tin trunks, and aluminium cases which he buried beneath his family dacha thirty-six kilometers outside Moscow. When he retired in 1984, Mitrokhin started to sort his notes and thought about a way to get his material (and himself) to the West for publication. In 1992 he was brought to London by the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). It seems no exaggeration to claim that ‘[n]o one who spied for the Soviet Union at any period between the October Revolution and the eve of the Gorbachev era can now be confident that his or her secrets are still secure’ (p. 1).

Christopher Andrew has composed from this mass of defector’s material an excellent book. It is not only readable, but also full of exciting information for any historian who is interested in international history from the Bolshevik Revolution to the Soviet system of the 1980s. Mitrokhin and Andrew met for the first time in 1995 when the KGB pensioner had already given his information to the SIS, by which time the SIS had been in possession of his material for more than three years. Security services and intelligence agencies from several countries, for example, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, had been brought into contact with the defector and used his information for their counter-intelligence activities. The time to publish the essence of his files had come. Andrew was a congenial collaborator to Mitrokhin since he had already published a history of the KGB with Oleg Gordievsky.\textsuperscript{1} This was also based on inside informa-

\textsuperscript{1} Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, \textit{KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev} (London, 1991).
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tion and documents, provided by Gordievsky, who had worked as a British agent from 1974 to 1985. It is interesting to see that during this period in the 1990s, when Mitrokhin collaborated with the SIS and Andrew, few leaks about the defector’s fate occurred until he and Andrew announced the publication of their book. It is no wonder that some of the spies who were caught after Mitrokhin revealed his knowledge must have felt like Rip van Winkle, awaking after decades of hiding and sleeping in apparent security.

Andrew shows that the ‘priorities of Soviet intelligence under Lenin, and still more under Stalin, continued to be shaped by greatly exaggerated beliefs in an unrelenting conspiracy by Western governments and their intelligence agencies’ (p. 40). He makes clear that the ‘Soviet propensity to conspiracy theory derived both from the nature of the one-party state and from its Marxist-Leninist ideology’ (p. 40), and he gives detailed information on hundreds of cases, not only based on Mitrokhin’s files, but drawn from his complex research on intelligence history as a whole. Andrew explains how a series of ‘semi official’ books on the history of the KGB, most of them collaborative works with former members of the KGB by authors from Britain or the USA, suffer from the weakness ‘that the choice of KGB documents on which they are based has been made not by them but by the SVR’ (Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki, the post-Soviet Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, p. 27).


Andrew also demonstrates that Germany rated as the second most important target after the USA. The East German Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) in many cases was even more successful than the KGB, and some agents did not realize that they were under the control of the KGB while they thought that they were working for the HVA. Their tasks were almost identical: ‘The chief priority of both KGB and HVA influence operations during the 1950s and 1960s was to discredit as many West German politicians as possible as neo-Nazis and “revenge-seekers”’ (p. 573). On the other hand, there were persistent rumours about connections between West German politicians and Soviet and East German intelligence, especially combined with prejudices against Willy Brandt’s policy. Several of these rumours could be cleared by Mitrokhin’s information. There was a file on Brandt, codenamed POLYARNIK, in the KGB archives. On 15 June 1996, the German weekly, Focus, accused Brandt of having been a spy for the Soviets during the Second World War while he was working in Scandanavia. Mitrokhin’s files proved that this was untrue, and that Brandt had kept in touch not only with Moscow’s Stockholm residency but also with members of the British and American intelligence corps. He gave information to all of them with the single motive to ‘hasten the defeat of Adolf Hitler’. When the KGB tried to blackmail Brandt in 1962 it failed (p. 23). Another prominent case was that of Herbert Wehner (codenamed KORNELIS), who was classified as a ‘confidential contact’. Wehner was obviously confident that he could not be blackmailed. He was valued so highly that, according to Markus Wolf, ‘Mielke alone edited the reports on conversations with Wehner for passing on to Honnecker’. Mitrokhin’s archive also suggests that there was ‘a KGB agent in the entourage of Egon Bahr’ (not Bahr himself), who has not, so far, been able to be identified (p. 594). Mitrokhin’s archive furthermore illustrates the nature of Cold War operations against Western countries and reveals the KGB’s influence on Western Communist parties. It also makes clear the extent of penetration and persecution of the Soviet churches and the KGB’s activities in Poland in connection with Karol Wojtyla’s rise as a moral authority against the Soviet system after his election as Pope John Paul II in October 1978. Anyone who

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might have had illusions about the paranoiac perceptions and totalitarian intentions of Stalin and his imitators in Communist-ruled countries should read the chapters on ‘special tasks’. They show that ‘assassination had been an integral part of Stalin’s foreign policy’ and that Communist leaders like Bulgarian Todor Zhivkov ordered murders all over Europe (pp. 506–8). In the 1960s Nikita Khrushchev benefited from ‘the KGB’s declining enthusiasm for assassination plots’. He was not shot but ‘only’ became an unperson for six years after his involuntary resignation until his death in 1970.

Andrew’s book contains a mass of detailed information, especially on European history since the Bolshevik Revolution, which is not only historically important but also makes fascinating reading. The combination of Mitrokhin’s files and Andrew’s research gives an insight into several of the most important power showdowns of the twentieth century, all of which derived from ideological confrontation. This book should be read by everyone who is interested in the international history of the twentieth century. Not only historians are now awaiting the second volume which will reveal the actions of ‘the KGB in the world’.

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JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, Another Country: German Intellectuals, Unification and National Identity (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000) ix + 310 pp. ISBN 0 300 08388 2. $27.50. £20.00

Intellectuals have traditionally taken a prominent place on every issue concerning German national identity. As a central event of German post-war history, German unification represented a special challenge for them. Müller’s study asks how German intellectuals reacted to unification, what positions they occupied in relation to the redefinition of national identity, and what impact this event had on their self-image as intellectuals. German unification marks not so much a break in as a culmination of the discourse on national identity. The different positions on nationality that had developed in post-war Germany were raised again. Some were reformulated, others were stubbornly defended in their old form, but by becoming a political priority they gained a new explosiveness.

The discourses around unification which Müller presents with a great deal of empirical detail demonstrates that in Germany national identity cannot be constructed without reference to the National Socialist past. In a word, anyone who wants to be taken seriously in this debate must disclose their own attitude to this chapter of German history. Paradoxically, this also applies to the conservative spectrum whose members ask for relations to the nation and history to be ‘normalized’, and plead for more ‘national self-confidence’. However, they must then acknowledge that there cannot be any ‘normality’ in Germany unless it includes this dark side of the country’s past and the national trauma resulting from it. In the right-wing and the left-wing camps, unification forced German intellectuals to take a position on the nation. In order to trace these discourses, Müller presents individual portraits of well-known writers and intellectuals such as Günter Grass, Jürgen Habermas, and Karl Heinz Bohrer. He complements these by analyses of intellectual camps, such as the left spectrum or the New Right. Unification represented a particular problem for every one of these camps. Was the division of Germany, as Günther Grass and many left-wing intellectuals argued, a just punishment for National Socialist barbarism, and thus did unification provide a final exculpation and therefore initiate a process of forgetting? Or did unification for the first time offer the chance to stand up for one’s own history as a whole nation? The literary critic Karl
Heinz Bohrer suggested that it was the ‘anti-nationalism’ of the left wing that, paradoxically, prevented a confrontation with one’s own history.

According to Müller’s analysis, the New Right ultimately failed because it was unable to bring the intellectual concepts of its founders, such as Carl Schmitt, up to date. It was incapable of making an innovative contribution to the national question, and remained fixated on its main opponent, the ’68 movement. For a long time the right wing gained political legitimation from presenting itself as the advocate of German unification in contrast to the left wing, which had made concessions to ‘the Communists’. After unification the Right was, ironically, confronted with the fact that there was nothing left for it to do. In spite of the apparent ‘victory over Communism’ the New Right, gaining ground for a short period after unification, has not succeeded in constituting a common neo-Conservative foundation myth. The left spectrum reacted with restraint and scepticism to unification, the coming down of the Berlin Wall, and the end of ‘actually existing socialism’, which meant the loss of a central utopian idea. The discussion starting now within the leftist camp on what, in fact, it means ‘to be left’ has, according to Müller, left to a vacuum which for a short time has given the Right a chance to present itself as an alternative. Simultaneously, left-wingers drew parallels with the Adenauer era. They feared that enthusiasm for the D-Mark in East and West Germany would lead to the renaissance of a petty-bourgeois economic miracle mentality which would throw the question of the past off the agenda. Finally, they feared that the political and intellectual heritage of the former GDR could cause a relapse into anti-democratic positions.

Whether German unification was related to an idea of nationality as an ethnic community of fate, whether attempts were made to aestheticize the nation in the romantic tradition, whether the concept of the ‘nation of culture’ was revitalized, or whether ‘constitutional patriotism’ was favoured, Müller argues that discourses around national identity all had two features in common. Firstly, the protagonists fell into sharply separated dichotomies and secondly, they strongly personalized the debate. One reason for the severity with which the respective parties faced each other is identified by Müller as the ‘culture of suspicion’ which originated in the experiences of the ‘sceptical generation’ and was later generalized by the ’68 gener-
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ation. The Left fundamentally suspected all kinds of conservatism, capitalism, and nationalism of harbouring fascism. The Right, in turn, accused the Left of advocating totalitarian policies because of their commitment to Communism, which was regarded as the secret blood brother of National Socialism. Interestingly, both accusations were couched in terms of the past.

Müller pays particular attention to biographical and age-group experiences. At the beginning he points out with some astonishment that on the German side the arguments and positions in the debate around unification hardly referred to their historical dimension. In short, what has been lacking so far is a deciphering of the genealogy of the discourses, a ‘tracing back’ of intellectual paths. If, like Müller, one gets involved in such a challenge, one quickly notes how much the various intellectual points of view are marked by generation-specific experiences. Such diachronic focuses, however, unfold their capacity only if the intrinsic dynamics of the discourses and their interdependent interrelations are also examined, as Müller does. Thus the dichotomies, the self-dynamics, and the mutual dependences of the discourses are demonstrated in a post-structural interpretation of the intrinsic dynamics of discourses. This does not mean, however, that Müller is seduced by a ‘metaphysics of the discourses’. For him, and this is the strong point of his book, discourses unfold with a relative autonomy whose structural-dynamic principle floats above the actors while determining their actions. However, there are also actors who are able to act clearly by themselves. Both factors in this complex interplay are brought into relation by Müller in a differentiated way. On the one hand there are significant actors, on the other there is the quasi-independence of the discourses, and both are imbedded in a historically evolutionary logic without straining the implied causality too much. It is true that with regard to the most recent past, there has been a lack of analyses of the German nationality discourse. However, it would have been desirable in some places for Müller to have illuminated the historical dimension of the positions he examines on the question of the nation even more deeply. Many of the topics Müller presents can be interpreted correctly only if the German nationality discourses of the Enlightenment, Romanticism, and those of the German Kaiserreich of 1871, are included.

In order to interpret the orthodoxies and heterodoxies of the intellectual arena, and to describe the structural and historical logic of the
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disputes occurring within it, Müller refers to Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory, in particular, to his thoughts on the field of cultural production. However, Müller does not get involved in a diversified and differentiated theoretical discussion. Rather, he is interested in interpreting the rich material that he presents in support of his theoretical premisses. Müller’s achievement here is considerable. His book gives an thrilling insight into recent German history, and also provides informative illustrative material on how, within a specific field, opinions in general are produced. In his introductory explanations of the logic of the intellectual field, Müller points out that it is a special German feature, not found within the Anglo-American space, that intellectuals have such a high public profile, achieved in particular by publishing in major newspapers. Yet to conclude that in Germany, intellectuals are the ‘influential opinion makers’ would be rash. German intellectuals undoubtedly have an exposed position in the process of constructing national identity. However, the role of ‘seismograph’ corresponds more accurately to the self-image of intellectuals than to reality. German intellectuals are inclined to intervene, somewhat belatedly, on issues that have already been settled. Concerning the reaction of the intellectuals to German unification, this diagnosis applies to a certain extent. In fact, one often had the impression that German intellectuals would have hesitated to settle the issues. Whether this behaviour can be generalized into a national feature is another question. Historical events such as German unification are always the hour of activists. Intellectuals feature as quiet initiators and as subsequent interpreters in such processes. That they seem to fade out a little during the events themselves is neither a specifically German feature, nor a reproach to intellectuals in general.

What characterizes the German intellectual landscape, according to Müller, is a fatal inclination towards ‘camp thinking’, that is, a tendency to collapse into a self-referential and perhaps also complacent discourse which ultimately focuses less on the actual subject of the debate than on forming distinct intellectual camps. The inclination of German intellectuals, whether on the Right or the Left, to intervene after the event, often with pedagogical intent, and their ‘excessive attention to positionality’, as Müller puts it, both point to a feature of the German nationality debate that he does not address directly, but that can be read between the lines. I refer here to the tension between the intellectuals and the people, or the Volk and the masses. Concern-
ing self-referential ‘camp thinking’, Müller perhaps wrongs German intellectuals. This sort of behaviour can be observed everywhere, and processes like these must be analysed separately. More justified is his point that the German intellectuals deeply distrust the German people. This is not, however, a specifically German feature. We need only think of French philosophers of the Enlightenment, such as Voltaire, and their disparaging opinion of the ‘common people’. Nevertheless, in Germany the Right and the Left perhaps approach each other closely here. Mutatis mutandis, both hold the latent, or, on the Right, sometimes explicit, opinion that the ‘nation’ needs strong guidance. The Right advocates that this should be achieved by the state and institutions, the Left by morality linked with pedagogy. Both tend towards pessimism in their deep scepticism about the strength of social self-regulation, and both, finally, stand firmly in the sometimes lamentable German tradition of constructing national identity from above, quasi in closed session, without including the ‘common people’—and sometimes even in opposition to them. Within the right-wing camp a negative anthropology is a basic theoretical assumption, but nor is the left-wing spectrum immune to such views. Intellectuals of the ‘sceptical generation’, such as Jürgen Habermas, subscribed to the values enshrined in the constitution. This faith in the constitution, which according to Müller was also conditioned by the experience of National Socialism, was anchored in a deep distrust of the people. One can only wonder what ‘constitutional patriotism’ should be. A ‘patriotism’ that by definition is critical of a majority of the population? A ‘patriotism’ that wants to be a teaching tool for the nation? One thing should, however, not be forgotten. Surveys of personal attitudes to National Socialism and Adolf Hitler as a statesman justify a certain scepticism about the democratic sense of the average German well into the 1960s.

Reading Müller’s book, one gains the impression that German writers and intellectuals possess a lineage going far beyond the period under investigation in this book. In this lineage, which began during the Enlightenment and Romanticism, they saw themselves as a new caste of priests, uncoupled from the real world and largely alien to the population, creating visions of nationality in which the superficial phenomena of the vulgar world had no place. Their constructions of national identity were exclusive, morally highly rigorous, and of a barely comprehensible aesthetic artificiality. Many of these
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corporate concepts of national identity emerged during the debate on German unification, after the ‘masses’ had pulled down the Berlin Wall. At the end of his book, Müller notes that ‘normally countries, it seems, do not debate their normality’ (p. 271). In this sense Germany is probably not a ‘normal country’. However, Müller also points out that it was precisely this capacity to debate their own political condition, including the past, the ability to be sceptical, and a readiness to protest, which allowed the Germans to build up a democratic culture after the war. In the disorder surrounding unification, this democratic culture proved itself to be stable, and the slide to the right, into a pretentious nationalism, that many intellectuals feared would take place, failed to materialize. According to Müller, this was to the credit of the intellectuals, even if they sometimes faced the ‘normal population’ more suspiciously than was necessary.

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The Federal Republic of Germany has been a country of immigration from the start, although this was officially denied until the change of government in 1998. Anyone who suggests something different has closed their eyes to reality, or is playing semantic games. Between 1954 and 2000, close to 31 million people migrated to the Federal Republic. Their specific legal status varied: they came as guest workers, refugees from the GDR, family members seeking reunion, asylum-seekers, ethnic Germans, workers on seasonal or short-term contracts, or students. Over the same period, 23 million people left the country again. On average, over the last forty years the population of the Federal Republic of Germany has grown by 200,000 per year as the result of population movements. Few other countries in the world can demonstrate a similar positive balance. The strategies which the political classes so long used to maintain the official description of the Federal Republic as a non-immigration country, despite this huge influx of people over decades, could provide the topic for a separate investigation. Even before the foundation of the two German states, 12 million people who had been expelled from their settlement areas in central and Eastern Europe entered Germany, and most of them moved to the Western occupation zones. Every fifth inhabitant of Bavaria, and every third inhabitant of Schleswig-Holstein at that time was a German refugee from war. In contrast to what some romanticizing accounts may suggest, the integration of the expellees into the Federal Republic’s post-war society was by no means conflict-free. On the whole, however, it was successful. One factor contributing to this was the redistribution of property between victims of war and expulsion, and those who had been able to preserve most or all of their property. The state spent more than DM 110 billion on compensating and integrating the expellees, who also benefited from the long-lasting economic upturn in the early years of the Federal Republic’s existence.

Barbara Marshall begins her investigation by looking back to those times in order to clarify the continuity and structural significance of in- and out-migration for the Federal Republic of Germany.
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The period of employing guest workers, which lasted until recruitment was stopped in 1973, was followed by family reunion programmes and the entry of large numbers of asylum seekers, which internationalized immigration. In the 1970s African and Asian refugees first went to Germany in large numbers. The Länder and the local authorities, which have responsibility for asylum policy in Germany, were soon competing to see who could implement the most restrictive policies—a competition that was not without racist undertones. It is a special strength of this book that it clearly explains the significance of the federal structure and the resulting multiplicity of levels at which decisions on asylum policy are made. The Interior Minister at the time and later Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, coined the word ‘Asylmüßbrauch’ (abuse of asylum), sparking off a continuing debate which sees asylum seekers not as individuals under threat, but as unwanted immigrants who represent an unconscionable burden for the government and the welfare services. Germany, however, is not alone in raising the stakes in this debate. ‘Fortress Europe’ is a project pursued jointly by Brussels, Berlin, and Paris.

The decline of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and German reunification in the 1990s gave immigration a further boost. The ending of travel restrictions in the Soviet Union meant that ethnic migration increased exponentially. In 1990, 397,000 ethnic Germans emigrated to Germany. The number of asylum seekers and refugees from civil war zones in former Yugoslavia rose in parallel. The various waves of immigration created an increasingly aggressive domestic political climate, which was exacerbated by party political campaigning, and for which Germany was not prepared. The attempted murders of asylum seekers and foreign families in Hoyerswerda, Rostock, Mölln, and Solingen showed a surprised public that there was a racist mob in Germany that was prepared to use violence. Groups of drunk skinheads—according to Marshall, 90 per cent are male and under 25 years old—roamed the streets shouting the Hitler salute. But there were also other images. In reaction to murder and hatred, hundreds of thousands of men and women went out on the street peacefully to demonstrate their solidarity with the victims. This was the other, the decent, Germany.

There are many factors explaining why a wave of excessive violence was generated in the eastern parts of a reunited Germany.
Many young people were left in a normative vacuum during the phase of democratization. The old ideals that had been inculcated at school were no longer valid, and after 40 years of socialist rule, they could not look back to the stabilizing traditions of a civil society. The ardently desired economic new start began with job losses and unemployment. At this difficult time, foreigners and asylum seekers became scapegoats who were held responsible for the social and economic malaise. Added to this was a psychological element. Through their displays of violence and racism, right-wing young people publicly violated the taboos of the anti-Nazi consensus in the Federal Republic of Germany. They found being right-wing ‘cool’ and provocative, and thus enjoyable. Indeed, most of these young people did not have a firmly established, radical right-wing view of the world.

In this tense situation in the early 1990s, German immigration policy changed as the result of a compromise between the ruling coalition of Christian parties and Liberals, and the Social Democratic opposition. The SPD signalled its willingness to support a change in the right of asylum guaranteed in Article 16 of the Basic Law. This ensured the two-thirds majority in the Bundestag that is required for any constitutional change in Germany. In return, the CDU/CSU were prepared to accept restrictions on the immigration of ethnic Germans and confirmed that they would consider a comprehensive review of immigration law. Marshall correctly points out that this was not a fair agreement which satisfied both political camps, as the SPD had to make more painful concessions than the two union parties. For many Social Democrats, the fundamental right to political asylum was a ‘symbol of Germany’s continuing commitment to atonement for the past and to humanitarian values in the treatment of the persecuted of the day’ (p. 18). It had been accepted in the constitution in response to the persecution of political opponents during the Nazi period. A revision of the Basic Law which watered down the right to asylum seemed to many to be a betrayal of the founding principles of the Federal Republic and of those Social Democrats, persecuted by the Nazis, who had found asylum abroad. The SPD none the less agreed because of the pressure applied by local politicians from its own ranks. Given the large numbers of refugees, these had been forced to turn sports halls and schools into temporary reception centres, which provoked bitter resistance on the part of the local people.
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The ‘Weltstadt’ (world city) is becoming a ‘Zeltstadt’ (tent city), went the cry in Munich, governed by the Social Democrats, when asylum seekers had to camp in the public parks because there was no other accommodation. Within the SPD, the realists, who were re-elected, won out over the idealists, who thought in historical terms. Future developments vindicated the realists. Changes in the asylum law led to a reduction in the number of refugees and allowed the German government to participate fully in the Schengen Agreement and in European harmonization of refugee policy.

At this point, Marshall underestimates how difficult it had been for the Conservative union parties to accept the restrictions on the immigration of ethnic Germans, which had also been agreed in the Asylum Compromise. The imposition of a quota first of 200,000, and then of only 100,000 per year put a stop to the ethnic Germans’ unhindered access to Germany. In the following years, language tests were introduced, and entitlement to financial benefits was severely restricted. Thus the Asylum Compromise not only sealed the end of Germany’s liberal asylum policy, but also signalled the end of a völkisch immigration policy. Conservatives, who wanted to defend the idea of an ethnically homogeneous nation against the challenges of a multicultural society, found this difficult to swallow. To be sure, the majority of the population no longer considers ethnic Germans from Kazakhstan and Russia as ‘real’ Germans. They are seen as immigrants, just like Turks, Iranians, and Pakistanis.

Changes in German citizenship law also demonstrate that the process of de-ethnicizing German policy is irreversible. Even under Helmut Kohl, it was made easier for young foreign residents and others with long periods of residency to obtain a German passport. Building on the work of Roger Brubaker, Marshall refers to the way in which the first German citizenship law of 1913, parts of which remained in force until the end of 1999, had come about. This law was based on the principle of ius sanguinis (citizenship based on descent) and prevented children born in Germany to foreign parents from growing up as German citizens. Thus one of the first reforms for which the red-green government aimed was the introduction of the principle of ius soli, which derived citizenship from place of birth. The Greens, in particular, saw the old law as a ‘legacy of Hitler’s emphasis on “German blood”’, and the requirement to integrate into German culture constituted in their eyes an attempt to “cleanse” the
individual [foreigner] of linguistic, cultural and ethnic attachments’ (p. 146).

Since 1 January 2000, the majority of children born to immigrants in Germany have acquired the right to a German passport at birth. For the first time in modern history, therefore, the children of foreigners are growing up as Germans, with all the rights and responsibilities this involves. Marshall neglects to point out that German citizenship regulations thus largely match those in countries with a ‘republican’ concept of nation, and in some respects, even go beyond them. In contrast to the USA, for example, no ‘civics test’ examining historical and political knowledge is required in Germany; nor does cultural assimilation have to be demonstrated, as in France. The increasing number of Turkish Muslims and Vietnamese Buddhists with guaranteed access to German citizenship shows that the conservation of ethno-cultural homogeneity, which never existed anyway, is no longer among the goals of German naturalization policy. Thus the implementation of the ius soli is one of several indications of how the Federal Republic’s policy is adapting to the practice of other Western democracies.

Most children acquire dual citizenship at birth, as the new law does not require them to renounce the citizenship of their parents. Only at the age of 18 do they have to choose between a German and a foreign passport. The CDU/CSU collected millions of signatures on a petition opposing the general acceptance of dual citizenship, which the red-green coalition had initially planned. The broad public support for this campaign eventually forced Schröder’s government to withdraw their plans.

Barbara Marshall has written a knowledgeable book about German immigration policy. Anyone who wants information about political developments from the reception of refugees from war zones to the discussion of the new immigration law can rely on her precise account. However, it makes for dry reading. The author could be criticized for sticking too closely to a description of what happened. One could have wished that she had had more courage to explore interpretations of the wealth of material she presents.

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CONFEREE REPORT

**Three Debates Revisited.** Symposium to mark the 25th Anniversary of the German Historical Institute London, held at the GHIL on 15–16 November 2001.

The modern state in Germany and Britain and explanatory models of state theory provided the unifying theme of the papers presented at the German Historical Institute’s 25th anniversary symposium, held at the GHIL’s premises in Bloomsbury Square. The individual sessions looked at the genesis of modern statehood c. 1600–1800, its conceptual reflection in modern state and social theory (Otto Hintze, Max Weber), and the validity of functionalist versus intentionalist explanatory models of the German fascist state and regime.

The symposium opened with three contributions discussing the main features of British and German state-building processes from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. In his introductory speech, Hartmut Lehmann (Göttingen) drew attention to the emergence of denominational churches and the growth of confessional awareness as intellectual adjuncts, and to some extent preconditions, of these processes. Ronald G. Asch (Osnabrück) outlined past and present historiographical paradigms of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century origins of state formation in the British Isles and the Holy Roman Empire. The rise of the modern state constituted one of the central themes of German historical scholarship for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, not least because German national experience of statehood was felt to be defective by European standards. However, the traumatic experience of the National Socialist state as the ultimate manifestation of the undemocratic *Machtaat* led to a reassessment of stereotypes of national state formation which had hitherto been uncritically accepted. Among the new developments in post-war German historiography was a positive reassessment of the Holy Roman Empire’s constitutional structure. From the 1960s onwards, historians began to investigate the social origins of Germany’s path to 1933. German re-unification revived the long-standing debate on the existence of a German *Sonderweg*, but the exponents of a ‘re-revised’ view of the Holy Roman Empire now stress
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those features of early modern state-building processes in Germany which are seen as conforming to a wider European pattern of state growth. While refraining from any definite pronouncement on the viability of the latter position, Asch sounded a note of caution. In particular, he drew attention to the arguably unique nature of the coalescence of interests which characterized the English case of joint state-building by the central powers and the local elites.

The latter theme was taken up by Jeremy Black (Exeter), whose paper implicitly tested the feasibility of John Brewer’s thesis of the rise of the unified fiscal-military state against more complex models of composite state-formation. In particular, Black demonstrated the extent to which British domestic and colonial state-building processes from 1688 to 1815 were shaped by mutual efforts to achieve and maintain a balance between the agents involved. Contrasting and comparing the British case with a wide range of European and non-European examples of state-formation, Black indicated the problems facing any attempt to adopt a schematic approach to British developments. Eckhart Hellmuth’s (Munich) concluding paper took a discussion of Otto Hintze’s theory of Prussian state formation and the British response to it as a starting point for a comparison of Anglo–German interpretations of national growth. John Brewer’s account of the rise of the British fiscal-military state is shown to have been inspired by Hintze’s Anglo–Prussian comparison. However, Brewer’s account of how Britain’s economic and military rise to world power status was sustained by a highly efficient fiscal and administrative bureaucracy conclusively refuted Hintze’s thesis of a ‘weak’ British state as compared with its bureaucratic-absolutist Prussian counterpart. Indicating some possible areas for further research into the origins and nature of the modern state, Hellmuth advocated taking a broader, less ‘Weberian’ view of states as ‘landscapes’ of long and uneven development. A closer analysis of hidden time structures might help explain the long-term fate of the ‘pioneers’ and ‘late-comers’ of modern state formation.

The second section of the conference, chaired by Wolfgang J. Mommsen (Düsseldorf), was devoted to the study of Max Weber. In the last paper, M. Rainer Lepsius (Heidelberg) speculated on the potential of a future paradigm of Weber’s value categories, while the other two presentations looked at Weber’s intellectual role from his death to his impact on present-day research. This section should be
seen against the background of a highly successful GHIL conference published as *Max Weber and his Contemporaries* (edited by Wolfgang J.
Mommse and Jürgen Osterhammel, 1987). Wolfgang Schwentker
(Düsseldorf) spoke on ‘Max Weber’s Influence on European Social
Sciences, 1920–45’, emphasizing the tension between Weber’s posi-
tion as an outsider in Weimar Germany and the overwhelming influ-
ence that was attributed to his writings and his sociological and
methodological ideas. Scholars such as Karl Mannheim saw the
establishment of the academic field of sociology as decisively influ-
enced by Weber, and Otto Hintze’s work on European constitutional
history was clearly shaped by Weber’s method of the ‘ideal types’.
Finally, the philosopher Karl Loewith compared Weber’s and Karl
Marx’s philosophies, interpreting them as the two most important
figures for the understanding of the modern world. Schwentker also
discussed Weber’s impact outside Germany, for example, through
the translations of his writings, particularly his *General Economic
History* and *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, and
through the scholarly adoption of his ideas in Western and Eastern
Europe and beyond. Weber was translated only selectively into the
major European languages, whereas Japanese scholars showed a
strong interest in almost the whole of Weber’s *œuvre*. While the
Italian reception concentrated on Weber’s political thinking and the
French were particularly interested in a critical exegesis of the
*Protestant Ethic*, the British response to Weber was hesitant.
Schwentker attributed this, among other things, to the British cultural
elites’ general resistance to German thought after the First World
War.

In his paper on the ‘Fashioning of the “Classic” Max Weber’, Dirk
Kaesler (Marburg) concentrated on German scholarship after 1945.
Kaesler saw Weber as a ‘sociological mastermind’ and, with Marx
and Durckheim, as a ‘classic’ of international sociology. According to
Kaesler, this development after the Second World War offered a
sharp contrast to the selective and weak impact and reception of
Weber’s work during his lifetime. After looking at the writings of
more than forty individual scholars, Kaezler proceeded to depict
Weber as an icon of modern sociology in both East and West. Kaezler
suggested that Marianne Weber and Johannes Winckelmann were
largely responsible for a hagiographic image of Weber, and Karl
Jaspers’ presentation of the man and his work was probably far too
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enthusiastic. Modern research, however, has ‘fashioned’ Weber through a continuing reflection on his major political concepts, philosophical models, and ideas of the state.

The third section of the conference, chaired by Gerhard Hirschfeld (Stuttgart), revisited another controversial debate between German and British historians. What it revealed was the contribution made by British scholars to the historiography of the ‘Third Reich’, in this case by Tim Mason who, with his highly provocative but none the less stimulating paper on ‘Intention and Explanation: A Current Controversy about the Interpretation of National Socialism’, threw an apple of discord into the Institute’s Cumberland Lodge conference of May 1979. In his paper ‘Functionalists versus Intentionalists: The Debate Twenty Years On’, Richard Bessel (York), a participant at that conference, drew a vivid picture of this controversy which reverberated among historians for some time. Mason’s unorthodox Marxist approach may have somewhat offended the more conservative German historians who stressed the moral responsibility of the individual perpetrators. Bessel’s argument was that the battle lines of this controversy have since become blurred, mainly for two reasons: the demise of Marxism as a dominant historical paradigm and the emphasis of recent research on the Holocaust, which cannot be explained without reference to Hitler. Historians of the period are nowadays both ‘intentionalist’ and ‘functionalist’. But at the root of this debate lies the moral responsibility of the historian, who is called upon to explain without falling into the trap of trivialization. In this sense, Bessel argued, the Cumberland Lodge debates are still relevant and meaningful to present-day approaches to the history of Nazi Germany, which will always provide a moral lesson.

The second speaker, Hans Mommsen (Bochum) spoke on ‘The Third Reich: Mechanics and Machinations’. He was also, by his own admission, ‘an active partisan of the debate’. Mommsen gave due credit to Mason’s terminology which from then on inspired the academic discourse on recent German history. He traced German historiography up to this point, the shift from research on the causes of Hitler’s rise to the mechanics of the by no means monolithic power structure of the regime, which explains why Tim Mason’s analysis had such far reaching repercussions. His generation, he argued, perceived the totalitarian model on the one side and the fixation on Hitler and his secret plans on the other as serious impediments to a
full explanation of society’s collaboration with the regime. The stu-
pendous Hitler cult was reversed into the opposite. The focus on
Hitler, who had betrayed the trust of the Germans, suggested that the
élites had somehow been misled and were therefore exonerated.
After 1945 everyone tended to diminish his own responsibility for
what had happened. It is in this context that Mommsen deliberately
coined the controversial phrase that Hitler was a ‘weak dictator’.
Hitler, he argued, functioned ‘primarily as a transmitter of public
prejudices and resentments’. Mommsen vehemently rejected the
notion that the functionalists conceal the moral responsibility of the
individual perpetrators. He appreciated the contribution by British
and American historians which was, for various reasons, less biased
than the self-conscious approach of their German colleagues.
Altogether Mommsen’s paper was once more an articulate defence of
the functionalist interpretation of the ‘Third Reich’ with the intention,
not unlike Bessel’s, of stressing the moral responsibility of the histo-
rian.

Finally, Ulrich Herbert (Freiburg) spoke on ‘The Nazi Regime at
its Most Radical’. He represents the younger generation of historians
who are no longer partisans of the debate that stretches back twenty
years. Their research on the executive elite of the Nazi regime and
their involvement in the worst atrocities has taught them that the dis-
tinction between functionalists and intentionalists does not get them
very far. They focus their research not so much on Hitler, but on his
entourage and the executioners on the spot. However, the latter were
not just Hitler’s willing henchmen but had ideas and ambitions of
their own, which explains why the governmental machine func-
tioned with such deadly efficiency. Herbert did not wish to defend
the intentionalists but he criticized their opponents for leaving the
perpetrators out of the picture when dealing with the criminal char-
acter of the regime. The historian cannot escape his moral responsi-
bility to name and shame those with their hands on the control pan-
els of power. In conclusion one must say that today there can be no
doubt that both camps in the debate were, in their different ways,
motivated by their concern to draw the right moral lesson from Nazi
horrors of the past.
NOTICEBOARD

Research Seminar

The GHIL regularly organizes a research seminar at which recipients of grants from the Institute, Fellows of the GHIL, and other scholars report on the progress of their work. Any postgraduate or postdoctoral researchers who are interested in the subjects are welcome to attend. As a general rule, the language of the papers and discussion is German.

The following papers will be given this term. Further meetings may also be arranged. Future dates will be announced on each occasion, and are available from the GHIL. For further information, contact Professor Lothar Kettenacker on 020 7404 5486. Please note that meetings begin promptly at 4 p.m.

14 May Jan Rüger
Öffentliche Marinefeiern in Großbritannien und Deutschland 1897–1914

25 June Inga Brandes
Armut und lokale Netzwerke der Fürsorge in ländlichen Gemeinden Westirlands und der Eifel/ des Hunsrücks (1880–1970)

2 July Reinhold Schulze-Tammena
Steuerhinterziehung und Steuerwiderstand in Preußen im 19. Jahrhundert

9 July Janina Wellmann

16 July Dr Stefan Ludwig Hoffmann
Berlins Unterwelt: Kriminalität und soziale Ordnungsvorstellungen in der deutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft 1945–61
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As a matter of interest to readers, we record the following papers which were given before the publication date of this Bulletin:

12 Feb. Anja Hill-Zenk
Eulenspiegel in England: Der englisch-kontinentale Buchhandel am Beispiel der Eulenspiegel-Rezeption

26 Feb. Dr Regina Pörtner
Grundbesitz und gesellschaftliche Modernisierung: Vergleichende Untersuchung zur Geschichte der britischen entails und der österreichischen Fideikommissse im Zeitalter der Aufklärung

5 Mar. Michèle Gordon
Jakobitismus in Nordengland: Frauen als ungenannte Helfer einer politischen Bewegung

19 Mar. Rainer Kosbi
Gedächtnis der Irischen Hungersnot

Scholarships awarded by the GHIL

Each year the GHIL awards a number of research scholarships to German postgraduate students and Habilitanden to enable them to carry out research in Britain, and to British postgraduates for research visits to Germany. The scholarships are generally awarded for a period of up to six months, depending on the requirements of the research project. British applicants will normally be expected to have completed one year’s postgraduate research, and be studying German history or Anglo-German relations. The scholarships are advertised in the Times Higher Educational Supplement and Die Zeit every September. Applications may be sent in at any time, but allocations
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are made for the following calendar year. Applications, which should include a CV, educational background, list of publications (where appropriate), and an outline of the project, together with a supervisor’s reference confirming the relevance of the proposed archival research, should be addressed to the Director, German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2 NJ.

During their stay in Britain, German scholars present their projects and the initial results of their research at the Institute’s Research Seminar, and British scholars do the same on their return from Germany (see above for the current programme).

For the year 2002 the following scholarships have been awarded for research on British history, German history, and Anglo-German relations.

Ph.D. Scholarships

Inga Brandes: Armut und lokale Netzwerke der Fürsorge in ländlichen Gemeinden Westirlands und der Eifel/des Hunsrück zwischen 1880 und 1970

Christopher Craun: Hrabanus Maurus

Lars Fischer: Imperial German Social Democracy, the Nation, and the Jews: Franz Mehring. A Case Study

Ulrich Fischer: Pontifex et Opifex: Studien zu Großbauten und Stadtgestaltung in den englischen Kathedralstädten der normannischen Zeit (1066–1135)

Michèle Gordon: Jakobitismus in Nordengland: Frauen als ungenannte Helfer einer politischen Bewegung


Alexander Hirt: Kulturelle Truppenbetreuung im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Ein deutsch-britischer Vergleich zu Organisation und Wahrnehmung des totalen Kriegs

Rainer Kosbi: Gedächtnis der Irischen Hungersnot

Simon Miller: The Social Milieu of German Resistance to Nazism, 1941–45


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Jan Rüger: The Naval Spectacle: Öffentliche Marinefeiern in Großbritannien und Deutschland, 1897-1914

Helen Shiner: Shifting Patterns in the Patronage of Architectural Sculpture in Germany between 1890 and 1933


Emma Winter: The Transformation of Taste in Germany and England, 1797-1858

Habilitation Scholarships

Dr Harald Fischer-Tiné: Low and Licentious Europeans: White Subalterns in Colonial India 1784–1914

Dr Stefan Ludwig Hoffmann: Berlins Unterwelt: Kriminalität und soziale Ordnungsvorstellungen in der deutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft 1945–61

Postgraduate Students’ Conference

The German Historical Institute London held its sixth postgraduate students’ conference on 10–11 January 2002. Its intention was to give postgraduate research students in the UK and Ireland working on German history an opportunity to present their work-in-progress, and to discuss it with other students working in the same field. The Institute also aimed to present itself as a research centre for German
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history in London, and to introduce postgraduates to the facilities it offers as well as to the Institute’s Research Fellows.

In selecting students to give a presentation, preference was given to those in their second or third year who had possibly already spent a period of research in Germany. Students in their first year were invited to attend as discussants. Twelve projects in all were introduced in plenary sessions held over two days. Sessions were devoted to the seventeenth century, the First World War, the inter-war period, the Third Reich, and the post-1945 period in both East and West Germany.

As well as discussing their subjects and methodologies, the participants exchanged information about practical difficulties such as language and transcription problems, how to locate sources, and finding one’s way around German archives. Many comments came from the floor, including information about language courses and intensive courses for the reading of German manuscripts, references to literature already published on the topic, and suggestions about additional sources. Information about institutions that give grants for research in Germany was also exchanged. The German Historical Institute can offer support here by facilitating contact with German archives and providing letters of introduction which may be necessary for students to gain access to archives or specific source collections. In certain cases it may help students to make contact with particular German universities and professors. The German Historical Institute also provides scholarships for research in Germany (see above).

The GHIL is planning to hold the next postgraduate students’ conference early in 2003. For further information, including how to apply, please contact the Secretary, German Historical Institute, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ.
Prize of the German Historical Institute London

The German Historical Institute London awards an annual prize of DM 6,000, known as the Prize of the German Historical Institute London, for an outstanding work of historical scholarship. The prize is sponsored by Veba Oil and Gas UK Limited, and was initiated in 1996 to mark the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the GHIL. In 2001 the prize was awarded to Ulrike Lindner for her thesis, entitled 'Politik—Gesundheitswesen—Patienten: Maßnahmen und Auswirkungen von Gesundheitspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Großbritannien, 1948–65', submitted to the University of Munich.

To be eligible a work must be:

1. a Ph.D. thesis written at a UK or German university and, as a rule, submitted to the university within the 12 months prior to the closing date
2. on a subject matter taken from the field of UK or German history or UK–German relations or comparative studies in the nineteenth or twentieth century
3. unpublished.

An entry which has been submitted to a UK university must be in English and on German history or UK–German relations or a comparative topic; an entry which has been submitted to a German university must be in German and on British history or UK–German relations or a comparative topic.

To apply, please send the following to reach the Director of the German Historical Institute, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ, by 1 September 2002:

1. the complete text
2. all relevant reports from the university to which it is being submitted
3. a declaration that, if a work in German is awarded the prize, the author is prepared to allow the work to be considered for publi-
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cation in the series Veröffentlichungen des Deutschen Historischen Instituts London, and that the work will not be published elsewhere until the judges have reached their final decision

4 the applicant’s current curriculum vitae.

The Prize will be presented on the occasion of the Institute’s Annual Lecture in November 2002. Future awards will be advertised in the Bulletin of the GHIL.

No member of the Committee of Judges and no employee or blood relative of an employee or ex-employee of the Sponsor or the Institute or any member of the Committee shall be eligible as a candidate for the Prize.

Staff News

The academic staff of the Institute changes from time to time, as most Research Fellows have fixed-term contracts of three to five years’ duration. During this time, along with their duties at the Institute, they work on a major project of their own choice, and as a result the Institute’s areas of special expertise also change. We take this opportunity to keep our readers regularly informed.

ANDREAS FAHRMEIR’s Fellowship at the German Historical Institute came to an end in December 2001. Shortly before that, the project he conducted at the Institute, entitled ‘Das Stadtbürgertum einer Finanzmetropole: Untersuchungen zur Corporation of the City of London und ihres Court of Aldermen, 1688–1900’, was accepted as a Habilitationsschrift by the Faculty of History of the J. W. Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main. He is now a consultant with McKinsey & Company Inc’s Frankfurt office.
SABINE FREITAG joined the GHIL as a Research Fellow in 1997. She studied history, philosophy, and German literature in Frankfurt/Main and Rome. Her main fields of interest are nineteenth and early twentieth-century German, British, and American history. She is co-editor of *British Envoy to Germany, 1816–1866*, vol. 1: 1816–1829 (2000). She is currently working on a history of criminal law, culture, and policy in England, 1880–1930. She is the author of *Friedrich Hecker: Biographie eines Republikaners* (1998), and has edited, with Andreas Fahrmeir, *Mord und andere Kleinigkeiten: Ungewöhnliche Kriminalfälle aus sechs Jahrhunderten* (2001).

DOMINIK GEPPERT, who joined the GHIL in 2000, studied history, philosophy, and law in Freiburg and Berlin, where he also worked as a research assistant for four years. His main fields of interest are British and German contemporary history, international history, and the history of the press. He is currently working on British-German press relations, 1890–1914. He is the author of *Störmannöver: Das 'Manifest der Opposition' und die Schließung des Spiegel-Büros in Ost-Berlin im Januar 1978* (1996) and *Konflikt statt Konsens: Die Entstehung des Thatcherismus aus dem Geist der Opposition 1975 bis 1979* (forthcoming, 2002).

LOTHAR KETTENACKER is Deputy Director of the Institute and apl Professor at the University of Frankfurt/Main. From 1973 he ran the London office of the Deutsch-Britischer Historikerkreis, which was later to develop into the GHIL. His Ph.D. (Frankfurt, 1986) was on Nazi occupation policies in Alsace (1940–44), and he also completed a B.Litt. at Oxford in 1971 on Lord Acton and Döllinger. He has written a major study of British post-war planning for Germany during the Second World War, as well as various articles on National Socialism and on British history in the 1930s and 1940s. He is currently working on a study of German unification for the Longmans series, *Turning Points in History*. His most recent publication is *Germany since 1945* (1997).

MARKUS MÖSSLANG, who came to the GHIL in 1999, studied modern and social history at the University of Munich. After completing his M.A. in 1995 he was a research assistant in the history department. His Ph.D. thesis on the integration of refugee scholars and
teachers in West German universities and schools (1945–61) will be published shortly. He is currently co-editing British Envoys to Germany, 1816–1866, vol. 2: 1830–1847.

REGINA PÖRTNER, who joined the GHIL in 1998, took an M.A. in history (medieval, modern, economic) and German at the University of Bochum. She was a visiting student at Trinity College, Oxford, in 1988–89, and took her D.Phil. (Oxford) as a Rhodes Scholar in 1998. She is the author of The Counter-Reformation in Central Europe: Styria 1580–1630 (2001) and has recently edited the latest issue of the Institute’s bibliography, Research on British History in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1998–2000 (2002). She is presently working on aspects of British legal and intellectual history in the eighteenth century.

MATTHIAS REISS joined the GHIL as a Research Fellow in 2002. He studied history, political science, and economics at the University of Hamburg, before changing to the University of Cincinnati (Ohio) in 1993, where he received his MA two years later. His main fields of interest are American, British, and German history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries up to the Second World War. His Ph.D. was published in 2002 as Die Schwarzen waren unsere Freunde: Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in der amerikanische Gesellschaft 1942–1946. He is currently working on a study of the image of the unemployed in England and Germany from the middle of the nineteenth century to the 1970s.

MICHAEL SCHAICh, who joined the GHIL in 1999, was a student of history and media studies at the University of Munich. After completing his M.A. he became a research assistant in the history department. His Ph.D. thesis on Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment in Bavaria was published last year as Staat und Öffentlichkeit im Kurfürstentum Bayern der SpätAufklärung. During his time at the Institute he is working on the relationship between monarchy and religion in seventeenth and eighteenth-century England.

BENEDIKT STUCHTEY joined the GHIL in 1995 after studying in Münster, Freiburg, and Trinity College Dublin. His main research interests are the history of historiography and of European imperialism. He is currently working on anti-colonialism in the twentieth cen-

**European Lieux de Mémoire**

The German Historical Institute London is currently planning a closed conference on European *Lieux de Mémoire*, to be held at Cumberland Lodge, Windsor Great Park, 5–7 July 2002. We intend to discuss Pierre Nora’s model *Lieux de Mémoire* and its possible transfer to a European context. In the first section of the conference we will debate the theoretical and methodological problems of existing national projects. The French, German, Italian, Dutch, and Austrian publications will be introduced by their respective editors. Of course, the British perspective will also be taken into account. Each presentation will be accompanied by a commentary. In the second section we plan to investigate European *Lieux de Mémoire* taking an example such as Rome. For further information, please contact the Secretary, GHIL, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ.
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**Continental Britons: Jewish Refugees from Nazi Europe**

An exhibition to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the Association of Jewish Refugees in Great Britain, Jewish Museum, Camden Town, 8 May–20 October 2002

This exhibition tells the story of the experiences and achievements of the German-speaking Jewish refugees who fled from Nazi persecution in Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia and found refuge in Britain. It takes place in the sixtieth anniversary year of the organization that has represented the refugees since its foundation in summer 1941, the Association of Jewish Refugees in Great Britain. The AJR is collaborating with the Jewish Museum and the Wiener Library in creating the exhibition.

Between 1933 and the outbreak of war in 1939, over 70,000 refugees from the Reich, the great majority of them Jewish, fled to Britain, of whom some 50,000 settled here permanently. They were the first of a swelling tide of immigrants to impinge on the largely homogeneous and monocultural society of Britain before and immediately after the Second World War, and their culture, their way of life, and—not least—their accents made a considerable impact, especially on the principal areas where they settled, such as north-west London. The extraordinary contribution that they made to British cultural, artistic, scientific, and intellectual life, as well as to the British economy and British society in general, is already well known: they changed the whole face of fields from psychoanalysis to photo-journalism and from art history to publishing.

The exhibition seeks principally to record the lives and varied experiences of ordinary Jewish refugees, starting with a brief retrospective view of Jewish life in Germany and Austria, and going on to their enforced emigration and their reception in Britain. The initial phase of settlement was interrupted by the outbreak of war, which for many sealed their separation from their homelands and, all too often, from the family and friends they had left behind. This was followed in summer 1940 by the mass internment of ‘enemy aliens’ by the British government. But the exhibition then documents the refugees’ strong record of war service, in the fighting forces, in essential war work, and in civil defence.

The exhibition goes on to depict the ways in which the refugees re-created their lives, both as individuals and as a group. It shows the
choices and dilemmas they faced, the loss of home and identity and the adjustment to a new life, the gradual process of integration and acceptance, and the establishment of new roots, both in the personal and the professional and social spheres. Refugee life in the post-war decades is reflected in everyday detail in the displays, as is its impact on the host society and culture. The exhibition closes with a section on the German-Jewish heritage today.

It will feature a reconstruction of one of the most famous refugee meeting places, the Cosmo Restaurant on Finchley Road, and an enlarged map of the Finchley Road with details of the many refugee locations situated in the area. There will also be filmed interviews with some of the ‘Continental Britons’, among the better known being Lord Moser, Lord Brainin, Andrew Sachs, and Judith Kerr. These will enable visitors to encounter the stories of individual refugees and to gain a sense of their identity today. Displays of books and works of art by refugees will convey something of the cultural riches that they created.

A substantial and wide-ranging programme of events, some held in conjunction with institutions like the Wiener Library, the London Jewish Cultural Centre, and the Refugee Council, has been arranged to accompany the exhibition. These also include a number of lectures covering many facets of refugee experience and achievement, two concerts at the Wigmore Hall, two book launches, and two one-day conferences.

For further information please contact the Jewish Museum, 129-131 Albert Street, London NW1 7NB, tel. 020 7284 1997.
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German History Society

The German History Society’s next AGM will take place on 7 December 2002 at the German Historical Institute London. For further information please contact: Dr Mark Hewitson, Dept. of German, University College London.


This edition of the GHIL’s bibliography is now available. For a free copy please write to the Secretary, GHIL, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2 NJ.

Bulletin Index, 1997–2001

This supplement to the existing Bulletin Index (1979–1996), is now available. It may be consulted online, via the Institute’s homepage (www.ghil.co.uk), and copies are available from the Institute. For a free copy, please write to the Secretary, GHIL, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2 NJ.
LIBRARY NEWS

Recent Acquisitions

This list contains a selection of recent publications in German and English, primarily on German history, acquired by the Library of the GHIL in the past year.

Aalders, Gerard, Geraubt! Die Enteignung jüdischen Besitzes im Zweiten Weltkrieg, trans. by Stefan Häring (Cologne: Dittrich, 2000)
Aas, Norbert, Verlegt, dann vergast, vergiftet, verhungert: Die Kranken der Heil- und Pflegeanstalt Bayreuth in der Zeit der Zwangssterilisation und ‘Euthanasie’ (Bayreuth: Bumerang-Verlag, 2000)
Albers-Schönberg, Heinz, Die Schweiz und die jüdischen Flüchtlinge, 1933–1945: Eine unabhängige Studie (Stäfa: Gut, 2000)
Allweier, Sabine, Canaille, Weiber, Amazonen: Frauenwirklichkeiten in Aufständen Südwestdeutschlands 1688 bis 1777, Kieler Studien zur Volkskunde und Kulturgeschichte, 1 (Münster: Waxmann, 2001)
Ammerich, Hans and Johannes Gut (eds), Zwischen ‘Staatsanstalt’ und Selbstbestimmung: Kirche und Staat in Südwestdeutschland vom Ausgang des Alten Reiches bis 1870, Oberrheinische Studien, 17 (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 2000)
Anderson, Jeffrey, German Unification and the Union of Europe: The Domestic Politics of Integration Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)
Anschütz, Janet and Irmtraud Heike, Feinde im eigenen Land: Zwangsarbeit in Hannover im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 2nd edn (Bielefeld: Verlag für Regionalgeschichte, 2000)
Library News


Asch, Ronald G. (ed.), *Der europäische Adel im Ancien Régime: Von der Krise der ständischen Monarchien bis zur Revolution (ca. 1600–1789)* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2001)


Bahl, Peter, *Der Hof des Großen Kurfürsten: Studien zur höheren Amtsträgerschaft Brandenburg-Preußens, Veröffentlichungen aus den Archiven Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Beihfg 8* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2001)


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Benninghaus, Christina (ed.), Region in Aufruhr: Hungerkrise und Teuerungsproteste in der preußischen Provinz Sachsen und in Anhalt 1846/47, Studien zur Landesgeschichte, 3 (Halle: Mitteldeutscher Verlag, 2000)

Benthien, Claudia, Anne Fleig, and Ingrid Kasten (eds), Emotionalität: Zur Geschichte der Gefühle, Literatur, Kultur, Geschlecht. Kleine Reihe, 16 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2000)


Benz, Wolfgang, Geschichte des Dritten Reiches (Munich: Beck, 2000)

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