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31 Oct.  **AXEL SCHILDT (Hamburg)**
*The Long Shadows of the Second World War: The Impact of Experiences and Memories of War on West German Society*

In cooperation with the Modern European History Research Centre, Oxford University

Axel Schildt was appointed Professor of Modern History at the University of Hamburg in 2002 and is Director of the university’s Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte. He is a leading expert on the history of the Federal Republic of Germany and on popular culture after the Second World War, and he has published extensively on this and other subjects. His most recent publications are a biography of Max Brauer (2002) and, with D. Siegfried, *European Cities, Youth and the Public Sphere in the Twentieth Century* (2005).

7 Nov.  **ADAM TOOZE (Cambridge)**
*Labour, Food, and Genocide: The Economics of the Third Reich*

Dr J. Adam Tooze is University Senior Lecturer in Modern European Economic History at Jesus College Cambridge. He is a renowned expert on the economic history of twentieth-century Germany, particularly the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, and was awarded the 2002 Philip Leverhulme Prize for Modern History. Among his numerous publications are *Statistics and the German State 1900–1945: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge* (2001), which won the H-Soz-Kult Historisches Buch Prize for 2002, and *Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (2006).

14 Nov.  **DAVID CLAY LARGE (Montana State University)**
*Hitler’s Games: Politics and Race in the 1936 Olympics*

Professor David Clay Large joined the Department of History and Philosophy at Montana State University in 1983. His main research areas are modern European and German
history. Among his most recent publications are a history of Berlin (2000) and And the World Closed Its Doors: One Family's Abandonment to the Holocaust (2003). His current work, Nazi Games: The Olympics of 1936, will be published in 2007.

28 Nov. SYLVIA PALETSCHEK (Freiburg / Oxford)
The Story of Lucie Lenz: Revolution, Espionage, and Adventure in 1848 and After
Sylvia Paletschek was appointed Professor of Modern and Contemporary History at the University of Freiburg in 2001. Her research interests encompass women’s and gender history, the social history of religion, the history of the 1848–9 revolution, and the history of higher education and science. Among her many publications are a history of the University of Tübingen during the German Empire and the Weimar Republic (2001) and Women’s Emancipation Movements in the Nineteenth Century: A European Perspective (2004). In 2006/7 she is Visiting Fellow of the Stifterverband at the European Studies Centre, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford.
THE 2006 ANNUAL LECTURE

Nationalism, Power and Modernity in Nineteenth-Century Germany

will be given by

PROFESSOR JOHN BREUILLY
London School of Economics

on Friday, 27 October 2006, at 5 p.m.
at the German Historical Institute.
ARTICLE

‘A VERY GERMAN REVOLUTION’?
THE POST-1918 SETTLEMENT RE-EVALUATED*

Conan Fischer

I A ‘Flawed Revolution’
Deeply controversial during the Weimar era itself, the German Revolution of 1918–20 has remained the object of heated scholarly dispute. That said, few if any historians have seen fit to challenge the basic image of failure that haunts Weimar’s birth agonies and wider history. This is hardly surprising given how quickly, how utterly, and with what appalling consequences the republican settlement unravelled.

Sebastian Haffner has been among the revolution’s most trenchant critics. His polemical work, which appeared in 1979, ranks among the more extreme abnegations of the post-First World War settlement, but the issues that exercised him have been highly pertinent to the wider discussion. Deliberate betrayal by Germany’s Social Democratic leaders was, in his view, the fundamental problem. They failed, he argues, to create the ‘proletarian democracy’ that the Social Democratic (not Communist) masses demanded, even seeking to ‘unleash the front-line army against the revolutionary workers’ in a misguided effort to maintain order. Related to this effort, alliances were forged both with the centrist bourgeois and religious parties and key elements of the old imperial order, who were at best fair-weather friends of democracy. For Haffner it was imperative that any revolution be pursued to its utmost potential, for only so could it perform its predestined liberating role. ‘It is’, he concluded, ‘the suffocated and repressed, the betrayed and disowned revolutions that

*This article is based on a lecture given at the GHIL on 21 Feb. 2006.


2 Ibid. p. 208.

3 Ibid. p. 209.
destroy the health of a people. Germany continues to suffer as a result of the betrayed [1918] revolution to this day.4

In this regard the dual nature of the revolution—in part a creature of Germany’s military, political, and economic leaders and in part a complex series of popular initiatives and uprisings—has nourished much of this debate. These two elements of the revolution—the ‘revolution from above’ and the ‘revolution from below’—coexisted very uneasily from the outset and by early 1919 had slid into direct, armed conflict with one another. Before turning to any reappraisal of these events, it might be helpful to review as briefly as possible some of the key events and orthodox interpretations of this German revolution.5

The so-called ‘revolution from above’ was based on growing cooperation between the Majority Social Democratic (MSPD), liberal, and Catholic parties in parliament, a rapprochement between trade union leaders and employers in the economy, and a readiness of elements within the old imperial order during October 1918 to sanction the transformation of Germany from a semi-absolutist to a parliamentary monarchical order. Leaving aside for now the motives of the democratizing elements of this revolution from above, it is generally understood that the army and monarchy sanctioned these changes

4 Ibid. p. 213.
reluctantly and under extreme pressure. By September the war was effectively lost and the United States had made plain that any cease-fire and subsequent peace negotiations would demand the establishment of a representative German government. Beyond that, as General Ludendorff was heard to remark, it would be preferable to saddle the democratic forces, whom he held responsible for Germany’s imminent defeat, with the unenviable task of securing both the international and domestic settlements.6

The revolution from below originated during the final days of the monarchy in circumstances that are equally well understood. Efforts during late October by navy chiefs to resume hostilities at sea, despite the government’s ongoing armistice negotiations, coupled with the decision by the Kaiser to leave Berlin and his newly-democratized parliament on 29 October and join his military chiefs at their HQ in Spa, suggested that a counter-revolution was in the offing. The sailors of the fleet mutinied; the unrest spread onshore to the main naval ports, and thereafter swept Germany, resulting in the establishment of local Councils in the towns and parts of the countryside.

Their formation was invaluable in finally persuading Wilhelm II that abdicate he must, and their very existence undoubtedly helped the country’s Social Democratic leaders to drive a relatively hard bargain with regard to the democratization of state governments, the extension of the franchise to include women, and, on 9 November, the formation of a provisional government of Majority and Independent Social Democrats to replace the disintegrating monarchist order. Thereafter, the Councils, which were dominated by the Majority Social Democrats, quickly made themselves useful in sustaining and legitimizing the task of local administration alongside the existing professional civil service. During December the MSPD-dominated General Congress of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils supported the MSPD-led government’s efforts to organize elections to a Constituent Assembly with a view to establishing a pluralistic republican parliamentary order with the least possible delay. Efforts by the radical

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minority either to delay these elections or to base an explicitly socialist republican constitution on the Council system were rejected, an outcome which the trade union leader, Ernst Däumig, regarded as a ‘death sentence’ on the revolution.7

From late December, however, relations between the parliamentary and popular forces deteriorated alarmingly. The popular revolutionaries generally had little interest in conventional politics, but the further splintering of the Social Democratic movement during December 1918 was nonetheless important. Having joined the Majority Socialists in forming the provisional government, the Independent Socialists (USPD) initially supported preparations for elections to a Constituent Assembly. However, the USPD had broken away from the majority party in 1917 as an anti-war faction and so contained a volatile mix of radicals and reformers, of labour leaders and party functionaries. The coalition with the MSPD was only agreed after a heated internal debate and some of the USPD’s more radical leaders baulked at this process, for it promised the bourgeois and religious parties a significant role in political life, including a potential veto over any thoroughgoing socialist agenda. The Independent Socialist Rudolf Hilferding reminded his party that both democracy and socialism were USPD objectives and argued that the revolution needed to prolong the life of the provisional government and so allow time to seize the commanding heights of the economy and society. This, he believed, would make any capitalist counter-offensive impossible.8

The USPD also contained a particularly radical faction known as the Spartakusbund. This group, led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, rejected on principle the very notion of a non-socialist parliamentary republic and now broke away from the USPD. Luxemburg and Liebknecht were ready to participate in any parliament faut de mieux,9 but stood in principle for some ill-defined form of pluralistic proletarian rule. Pursuing socialism through parliament was, Luxemburg argued, ‘a risible petty bourgeois illusion’, whilst civil war, if it came, would merely represent ‘the class struggle by anoth-

7 Ibid. p. 385.
8 Ibid. p. 381.
9 Arthur Rosenberg, Geschichte der Weimarer Republik (Frankfurt am Main, 1980), pp. 51-2.
er name’. Thereafter Spartakus took the lead in the formation of the Communist Party (KPD) at the turn of the year, which also rejected the very notion of a non-socialist political order.

For all that, the Weimar constitution was drafted during the spring of 1919 and, as the left had feared, represented a compromise between the erstwhile Bismarckian order and contemporary republican ambitions. Article 48, which allowed parliamentary government to offload its responsibilities on to the President when the going got tough, was among the more notorious provisions of this constitutional settlement, for it granted the authoritarianism of the Bismarckian state an afterlife in a republican setting.

Beyond constitutional matters, the Independents regarded the notorious deal struck on 10 November 1918 between Chancellor Friedrich Ebert and the army commander General Wilhelm Groener to expedite demobilization, but also to guarantee domestic order, with greater concern. Here the Independents stood closer to the Council movement, which demanded the dissolution of the Imperial Army and its replacement by a National Militia under popular republican control.1 This, of course, was not to be and in any case would have been rendered null and void by the disarmament provisions of the Versailles Treaty. More immediately, however, government leaders deployed the regular army in late December against insubordinate naval forces stationed in Berlin. The abject defeat of the regular forces unleashed a fateful succession of events, which can only be mentioned very briefly here. The USPD resigned from the government, the Independent Socialist Police Chief in Berlin was dismissed for siding with the insurgents, and thereafter a popular uprising flared up in the capital in early January 1919. Liebknecht and the Spartacists appended themselves to this rising, with the declared objectives of overthrowing the Majority Socialist government and blocking elections to the Constituent Assembly, due to be held on 19 January. A scratch force of Social Democratic volunteers, newly formed volunteer units (Freikorps) of a decidedly nationalist and anti-
parliamentarian bent, and regular army volunteers crushed the rising, and on 15 January officers from the Horse Guards Division seized and murdered Luxemburg and Liebknecht.

The use of Freikorps units did not stop there, rapidly spilling over into a nationwide campaign against ‘the left’, whose victims included an increasingly radicalized Council movement and also wildcat strikers in industry. These strikers formed Employees’ Councils which demanded concrete improvements in working conditions under a vaguely defined but syndicalist-style rubric of socialization, only to attract swingeing criticism from the official unions and the MSPD. Workplace hotheads, so the argument ran, prejudiced any orderly economic recovery and also compliance with the reparations and associated material demands placed on Germany by the Allies. It might be added that the leaders of the official unions were far from amused to see their authority in the workplace called into question by this nascent syndicalist movement.13

Meanwhile the Freikorps were also deployed to crush the so-called Munich Soviet during early April 1919 and to suppress the Ruhr workers’ rising in March 1920. Given that the Ruhr’s workers had risen in reaction to an abortive attempt by Freikorps and certain army units to topple the legitimate republican government—the so-called Kapp Putsch—this particular Freikorps operation has been regarded as especially controversial. In effect, it pitted the would-be shock troops of the counter-revolution against a bastion of popular revolutionary sentiment, much of which stood behind the legitimate government and the young republic at the end of the day.14

Historians have lined up to criticize the strategies of Germany’s

revolutionary leadership, of whom only a few can be mentioned in passing here. Reinhard Rürup argues that the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils offered the provisional government a programme of democratization of the army, administration, and economy which was both remarkably coherent and practical.\(^{15}\) In Wolfgang Mommsen’s estimation the MSPD proved itself too hidebound thereafter to engage with the factory-based social protest movement, with lasting polarization of the labour movement the result.\(^{16}\) There is a near consensus that the series of compromise agreements between republican and imperial interests contained the seeds of disaster, for the old guard was at best resigned to the revolutionary settlement, at worst hostile. From its bastions within the Reichswehr, heavy industry, agriculture, the judiciary, and civil service, so the argument runs, imperial society was well-placed to compromise the orderly functioning of the republic and, as the Great Depression struck, to plot its overthrow—and all of this before the National Socialists had really become a force to reckon with.

This returns us to the USPD’s doubts during December 1918, when influential voices urged the provisional government to consolidate the revolution without interference from an assembly or parliament which was highly unlikely to contain a socialist majority. It also evokes the case advanced by supporters of Council democracy, among whom Rürup is,\(^{17}\) and Francis Carsten was,\(^{18}\) especially eloquent, that the republicans would have done better to afford the Councils a formal, constitutional role in the process of government and thus underpin the revolution with mass popular support. Similarly, Carsten was certainly not alone in regarding as a fatal error the provisional government’s reliance on the imperial military and

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on volunteer forces, whose brittle cooperation with the state was only occasioned by their still greater hatred of an ill-organized and infant Communist movement. The assassination by far-right terrorists of the non-socialist government ministers Matthias Erzberger in August 1921 and Walther Rathenau in June 1922 for attempting to secure and comply with the post-war international and domestic order showed these elements in their true colours.

And with regard to peacemaking, as Peter Krüger has argued, reliance on the grandees of the imperial Foreign Office saddled the Republic with a foreign policy which failed to articulate any credible, pacific vision of Germany’s future place in the world.19 Far more energy, it has been observed, was expended in denying war guilt than in addressing adequately the very legitimate concerns of the Allied powers.20 Similarly, it has been claimed, the avoidance of reparations, even at the cost of undermining orderly economic life, periodically took precedence over genuine efforts to comply with a reparations schedule that Germany had agreed.21 Revanchist sentiment within the new Reichswehr—a successor to the Imperial Army in all but name—added to the desolate picture.

One could go on at length, but to do so here would only serve to reinforce what is already common knowledge. In summary, the revolution’s leaders allegedly failed to harness adequately a powerful popular movement that could have underpinned the new republic, instead relying on cooperation with the pre-war elite to secure order. They did so to ensure that the new domestic and international settlement accommodated as far as possible the complex and diverse range of interests that constituted German society. However, this

process of accommodation afforded the revolution’s enemies the opportunity to strike back at the Republic, and if the Nazis constituted the bastard offspring of the initial counter-revolutionary movement, they were no less its offspring for that.

So what of our original title and what of a case for the defence, if a case there is? One might begin by evoking the commonplace that much historical writing reflects the priorities and concerns of its own age. Advocacy of the Council movement coincided, more or less, with the events surrounding 1968 in Western Europe, and, to the East, the Prague Spring and the emergence of Solidarity in Poland. Solidarity certainly demonstrated the potential of a disciplined Factory Council movement, albeit here in alliance with the established Church. Similarly, the development of Ostpolitik and the beginnings of a thoroughgoing reckoning with Germany’s Nazi past seemed to contrast with the post-1918 denial of war guilt and an accompanying revisionist foreign policy.

Other historians have evoked the notion of a wider revolutionary (moral) imperative, either occidental or global, against which the 1918 German revolution might be judged.22 However, the example

22 Not surprisingly, this tendency was strongest among historians in the former East Germany. Thus Joachim Petzold (ed.), Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg, vol. iii (Berlin, 1970), pp. 590–1. For a general account of East German historiography: Andreas Dorpalen, German History in Marxist Perspective: The East German Approach (London, 1985), pp. 313–24. See also Rürup, ‘Demokratische Revolution’, p. 283. In Western work the notion usually appears in a more implicit and qualified form, among other places in more general narratives. Thus Mary Fulbrook writes that 1918 ‘amounted to little more than a political and constitutional revolution … but it—crucially—failed to effect radical changes in the socioeconomic structure of Germany, nor did it reform the key elites’. Mary Fulbrook, A Concise History of Germany (Cambridge, 1990), p. 158. Eberhard Kolb is similarly negative, writing of a ‘revolution that ran aground’ and concluding that: ‘To this day the revolution of 1918–19 does not rank among the events which, by common consent, represent major positive developments in German history.’ Eberhard Kolb, The Weimar Republic (London, 1988), p. 21. Rürup’s personal verdict can be found in ‘Revolution von 1918/19’, p. 15: ‘The Weimar Republic’s ethos (and that of its supporters) was not founded on the Revolution. Instead it rested on the containment of the latter.’ Others are more sympathetic. A. J. Nicholls, Weimar and the Rise of Hitler (Basingstoke, 2000), pp. 24–6, argues that the revolution achieved what it could within the bounds of possibility.
set by the French revolutionary experiences of the late eighteenth and
teneteenth centuries is highly ambivalent, given that either Bona-
partism or monarchy followed on the heels of all but the 1870 crisis,
which was in itself hardly a shining example of revolutionary
purism. The Marxist–Leninist tradition enjoyed some credibility as
long as Communism remained a global system of rule. However, the
Cambodian genocide, the ignominious collapse of the Eastern bloc
regimes in Europe, and the onward march of a market-oriented eco-
nomic order in China have relativized the achievements of the great
Communist revolutions and called into question the advisability of
socializing an economy on any terms. As the Chinese Representative
to Hong Kong was recently heard to remark in public: ‘capitalism is
the highest achievement of human civilization.’23 In a comparable if
less dramatic spirit, the Labour-controlled Edinburgh Council is about
to erect a statue of Adam Smith in the heart of the Scottish capital.24

It might therefore be claimed that post-First World War Germany
did not get the revolution that historians would have preferred; par-
ticularly those historians who, in the aftermath of Fritz Fischer, had
relatively little positive to say about Imperial Germany. Continuity
from the Empire into the Weimar Republic was clearly problematic
under such circumstances, with the disaster of the early 1930s and
thereafter the Third Reich merely serving to confirm this gloomy
prognosis. For more radical members of the profession, of course, the
baful continuities of German history extended through and beyond
Auschwitz and so into the Bonn Republic.

None of Germany’s more recent past, however, could have in-
formed the revolutionaries of 1918, and it is equally possible to detect
in the MSPD’s strategy a consistency and clear-sighted realism which
delivered pretty much what was intended from the outset. Rather
than any radical objective going by default, the total loss of the
monarchy formed the main exception, for few leading Social
Democrats had envisaged such an outcome. Furthermore, given that
the new Republic sought a consensus born of compromise, it might
be pertinent to reconsider the aims and expectations of the old order,
or more precisely of those elements that were accommodated by the

23 Ivor Tiefenbrun, ‘Prophet of Capitalism Deserves to beHonoured in his
24 Ibid.
post-war settlement. Was the compromise of 1918–20 truly unacceptable to the entire imperial establishment, and was it therefore merely exploiting the leeway granted to it by the revolutionaries in order to stage a counter-revolution at the first opportune moment?

II The SPD and the Revolution
By 1914 the Social Democratic movement had become particularly diverse in ideological terms, including more-or-less orthodox Marxists, but also elements who appeared increasingly keen to reach an accommodation with Wilhelmine society. The SPD contained many staunch advocates of a defensive patriotism, to which Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg took care to appeal when pinning the blame for the outbreak of the Great War on to Russian aggression. This patriotism, which lent credibility to the civil political truce or Bürgerfrieden of 1914, assumed that socialists shared certain vital interests with other members of their national society or, at the very least, that the nation could and did offer them certain benefits. Similarly, the Social Democrats had sufficient confidence in the bona fides of imperial society to anticipate that the latter would concede an element of constitutional reform in return for the labour movement’s participation in the war effort. The Majority Socialists applied a comparable analysis to the conduct of the war itself, concluding that: ‘In the event of a defeat of the state to which they belonged, the proletarians would necessarily suffer greatly . . . Consequently it was their supreme interest and must be the supreme aim of their representa-

tives to avoid this eventuality.’26 Trade union leaders agreed, arguing that: ‘The concept of thinking socialistically involved an awareness that it was not the private gain and advantage of the individual which guarantees victory, but rather the sacrifices of the individual to the common weal of the nation.’27 None of this, of course, precluded demands for democratization, or for an early, negotiated settlement. The latter found expression in the 1917 Reichstag peace resolution which, tellingly, was formulated and carried through in collaboration with the (bourgeois) Progressives and the (Catholic) Centre Party. In other words, the Social Democrats were already articulating policy in a manner which transcended both the social and religious/secular divides.

Beyond the threat of enemy invasion and defeat, the trials of total war also raised for the socialists the spectre of domestic upheaval and even civil war, which added urgency to their efforts to promote collaboration between the different classes. Such collaboration had become a practical reality for Germany’s labour leaders during the conflict, for their participation in the management of the war effort brought them an unprecedented degree of influence in public affairs. This was, of course, confirmed and strengthened by the subsequent revolution. Thus Theodor Leipart, who was to succeed Carl Legien as Convener of the majority unions (Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, ADGB) in 1921, served as Minister of Labour in Württemberg’s first post-war government, whilst the miners’ leader, Otto Hué, served both as a National Commissioner for the Ruhr Coalfield and simultaneously as a Councillor in the Prussian Trade Ministry. Such advances apart, events in the former Russian Empire provided ample warning, if it were needed, of the horrors of civil war, and although the popular revolutionary movement in Germany was not Bolshevik in character, nor had it been in Russia during early and mid-1917. Firebrands such as Karl Liebknecht and episodes such as the Munich Soviet did little to settle nerves, however much might have distinguished Germany’s radicals from Trotsky or Lenin. Nor

did the USPD’s leaders take the threat of civil war lightly. Although a critic of the MSPD’s revolutionary strategy, the Independent Socialist Karl Kautsky, with an eye to earlier European history and contemporary events in Russia, also regarded civil war as the ultimate social catastrophe. Domestic conflict, he observed, invariably ended in dictatorship rather than democracy. \(28\) Added to this was the clear danger, appreciated in Independent Socialist circles, that a lurch to either political extreme would trigger an Allied intervention and even a renewal of hostilities. \(29\)

However, the German Revolution owed its character to more than a fear of radical adventurism. As the revisionist theorist yet USPD member Eduard Bernstein observed in 1921, radical revolutions tended to occur in agrarian societies in which the state was far less developed, the population consequently far less dependent on the state, and therefore prone to see radical strategies as less destructive. Germany, in contrast, had already seen a high level of integration between the different elements of a sophisticated and functionally interdependent society, which made risk-taking far more problematic. Bernstein continued that the degree of, and potential for, further democratization within the institutions of Imperial Germany had been such that radicalism was not called for. \(30\) This might have appeared meaningless to many of the half-starved, exhausted workers in Germany’s post-war heavy industrial sector, but as Bernstein concluded, the revolution had to take a longer-term view. The settlement of November 1918 had built on the compromise settlement of 1871 by further democratizing German politics and society, whereas any socialist dictatorship would have violated this same democratic principle to which the SPD had always subscribed.

The January 1919 elections to the Constituent Assembly confirmed this diagnosis, for there was no socialist majority. If there was a consensus in the new Assembly, it centred upon the securing of a just peace and the establishment of a reforming, parliamentary democracy. The MSPD, left liberals (DDP), and Centre Party formed the parliamentary majority around which this programme could assume concrete form, with a degree of support from the USPD and the former National Liberals (DVP). This same republican alliance

\[28\] Winkler, *Weg nach Westen*, vol. i. p. 357.

\[29\] Ibid. p. 379.

\[30\] Ibid. p. 380.
was to achieve a string of notable successes in Prussia under the leadership of Minister President Otto Braun and Interior Minister Carl Severing, both Social Democrats. Regional and local government in Prussia saw many monarchist officials replaced by republicans (a process aided by the ravages of the post-war influenza pandemic), the police force reformed, illicit military and paramilitary activities suppressed, and all manner of right-wing extremists pursued with increasing conviction.

The undeniable traumas of Weimar’s early years owed more to utterly desolate material conditions than to any developed critique of this revolutionary settlement. The failure of the revolution’s principled critics on the left, in the KPD, to harness or even initiate much of the resulting popular insurgency or to displace the SPD or the ADGB (of which more later) as the pre-eminent and durable representatives of labour was testimony enough to this. As for the USPD, despite a creditable performance in the 1920 Reichstag elections, its own ideological incoherence prevented it from articulating a credible radical counter-strategy and soon enough it was to break up with its members either returning to the majority party, joining the Communists, or leaving politics altogether.

III The Civil Service and the Revolution
The nub of the problem would, therefore, appear to rest on whether the non-socialist parties and the institutions of the former Empire would or could meet the labour movement half way and thus secure this compromise settlement. Historians have, of course, tended to respond negatively to this question and in so doing to draw on a far wider historiography than that of the German Revolution. It would be ill-advised to presume that generations of historians have quite simply got it wrong, and that Germany’s elite greeted the revolution with relief and unbridled enthusiasm. The dubious partisanship of the judiciary, which proved itself remarkably indulgent when sentencing right-wing radicals for politically-motivated offences, and also the racialist or revanchist sentiments that infested Germany’s universities during the Weimar era constituted unmistakable storm warnings for the future.

However, whether the continuities from Empire into Republic should be regarded entirely negatively is another matter. As already noted, the Centre and the Progressive Parties had already joined with
the MSPD within the imperial Reichstag in 1917 to articulate peace proposals, and the same religious and bourgeois parties were offered and accepted a subordinate role in the provisional revolutionary government of November 1918. The former National Liberals, now repackaged as the German People’s Party (DVP), also proved capable of playing a positive and constructive role under Gustav Stresemann’s leadership in Weimar’s domestic and foreign policy, although as Jonathan Wright reminds us, its deeper loyalty to the Weimar coalition remained equivocal.

Some decades ago David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley proposed that Imperial Germany was a more dynamic entity than was commonly allowed, and others have since argued similarly. If the Empire could, indeed, accommodate a degree of change, then might not the people and institutions that drove that change have done the same in a republican setting, without necessarily subscribing to republicanism itself? Would then the passage of time not have created a functional loyalty to the new order, such as developed within France’s Catholic and monarchist circles towards the Third Republic? Here across the Vosges, after all, a coalition of moderate republicans and monarchists, led by the veteran Orléanist Adolphe Thiers, had crushed the Paris Commune and with it the Parisian National Guard in 1871, after which the aged monarchist served as the first elected President of the Republic. With time, moderate republicanism prevailed and soon enough monarchists and conservative Catholics found access to much of the public service barred, although the army officer corps remained open to them. This was not the end of the matter, for the young republic was faced by a number of political and moral traumas, such as the rise of Boulangism and, most notably, the Dreyfus Affair, before the (bourgeois) republican ethos became relatively secure.

33 E.g. the recent collection of essays in Eley and Retallack (eds.), *Wilhelmianism and its Legacies*.
Similar examples of functional loyalty were to be found within the German civil service after 1918. The Kapp Putsch, Hagen Schulze reminds us, foundered primarily on the resistance of senior civil servants in the national and Prussian governments, rather than through the general strike that had been called by the legal government and the trade unions. Even the Armed Forces Ministry, staffed in part by serving officers, witnessed ‘resistance Prussian style’ as officials carried on with routine business, but ignored instructions from the Kapp regime. When seen in this light, General von Seeckt’s alleged response to the Putsch, that ‘Reichswehr does not fire on Reichswehr’, might have stemmed from a wish to maintain the integrity of the army and so (in his view) the state, rather than representing an expression of support for the putschists as such. William Mulligan’s recent study of the Reichswehr under Groener’s successor, General Walther Reinhardt, reaches comparable conclusions which extend beyond the exceptional circumstances of the Kapp Putsch. Reinhardt, Mulligan demonstrates, was very much the military professional, fixated on the likely character of a future war, but not a principled opponent of Weimar. On the contrary, opportunities for cooperation and reform were very much in evidence. A comparable attitude prevailed during the wider post-revolutionary period within the senior echelons of the Foreign Office. In common with any diplomatic service, Germany’s ambassadors and Foreign Office mandarins sought to promote their country’s external interests, but it was not lost on them that accommodation, even rapprochement, with Berlin’s wartime enemies offered opportunities that confrontation and defiance denied. The Ambassador to London, Friedrich Stämer (not of the old school as it happens) was fiercely critical of the Cuno government’s diplomatic inertia during the 1923 Ruhr Crisis, warning Berlin that far more was needed to transform latent British sympathy into active mediation. Thereafter the

36 Ibid. p. 215.
Secretary of State Ago von Maltzan, and Carl von Schubert, who handled West European affairs, were closely involved in the formulation of a more conciliatory foreign policy during Gustav Stresemann’s tenure as Chancellor and Foreign Minister. They were even ahead of the politicians when it came to mending fences with France during late 1923 and early 1924. It was von Maltzan, in conjunction with the French Ambassador, Pierre de Margerie, who struggled to contrive a means of opening a constructive dialogue between Stresemann and Raymond Poincaré, and it was Carl von Schubert who met with French notables from the political and economic world during early October in an effort to understand fully French concerns and objectives. Thereafter he urged his political masters to try to see things from Poincaré’s point of view, rather than simply playing to the German public gallery:

Germany has issued a pretty crude proclamation, which certainly declares that passive resistance has been abandoned, but leaves not a shred of doubt that this climb down is the product of financial crisis . . . What can we expect from M. Poincaré beyond his waiting to see what happens next? Can we really expect him now to accept us with open arms?

Weeks later the Chargé d’Affaires in Paris, Leopold von Hoesch, proposed to Berlin a ‘deeper interlinking of [French and German] interests’ as a solution to the crisis in Franco-German relations, rather than any revisionist policy, which would have amounted to little more than vacuous defiance.

Similarly, von Maltzan (better known in connection with the 1922 Rapallo Treaty) was acutely aware of the damage inflicted on Ger-

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many’s interests by the antics of the radical right. He deplored the Munich putsch and, more particularly, the fiasco of the ensuing trial of Hitler and his collaborators. ‘A trial in name only’, as he wrote, it ‘could only end with a verdict which amounts to a catastrophe for the cause of justice. Not only should the acquittal of Ludendorff be regarded as misconceived, but also the light sentences imposed on the remaining accused. The granting of periods of probation is particularly disturbing, for this amounts to a bonus for high treason.’42 This is not to claim that the ‘Bonner Preuße’ von Maltzan and his senior colleagues were born-again republicans, for they were not. However, von Maltzan’s personal distaste for the radical right was unmistakable and accompanied by vehement assertions of Foreign Office loyalty to the new political order.43 Far more divided the gentlemen at the Wilhelmstraße from the Republic’s ultra rightist enemies than from the Republic itself and, as seen, a similar balance of loyalties had been evident during the Kapp Putsch within the civil service at large.

IV Big Business, the Trade Unions, and the Revolution
Leaving the public service, the economy, and, in particular, big business has come in for extended criticism. Heavy industry is widely held to have harboured political goals both in domestic and foreign policy, with disarmament and reparations tending to blur the distinction between the domestic and international arenas. Predatory in its foreign initiatives and reactionary at home, the heavy industry of the Ruhr in particular was also regarded in post-war Paris as the very embodiment of a reactionary and revisionist Germany, with the

43 Thus AP, vol. vii, no. 176, Der Staatssekretär des Auswärtigen Amts Freiherr von Maltzan an den Chefredakteur des Vorwärts Stampfer, 3 Apr. 1923, p. 432: ‘You will be persuaded by your own appreciation of the circumstances, that today any Corps student who is engaged in the public service does his duty exactly like every other citizen and offers unconditional sympathy for the reorganization and future development of his fatherland.’ For a fuller discussion of the surrounding issues see Conan Fischer, ‘Continuity and Change in Post-Wilhelmine Germany: From the 1918 Revolution to the Ruhr Crisis’, in Eley and Retallack (eds.), Wilhelminism and its Legacies, pp. 202–4.

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changes wrought by the revolution skin deep at best, and entirely fraudulent at worst. Historians have tended to agree, dismissing the Stinnes-Legien Agreement as an opportunistic attempt by big business to concede just enough to prevent events taking a more radical course, but sufficiently little to permit a counter-revolutionary offensive at the earliest opportunity.\footnote{E.g. Volker Berghahn, Modern Germany: Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 68–9.} Within this context the new republican government has been especially strongly criticized for failing to socialize the mining concerns and thus deprive the private sector of a key power base.

When it came to the international settlement, and particularly reparations, comparable bad faith is invoked, to the point where Stephen Schuker has written of ‘American reparations to Germany’, as capital inflows from the United States outweighed German payments into the reparations account.\footnote{Schuker, ‘American Reparations to Germany’.} Recently, however, Gerald Feldman has argued that in the immediate post-war era at least, historians such as Stephen Schuker and Sally Marks inhabit ‘a creditor’s utopia where nations are constantly paying their bills and doing so on time’. However, Feldman continues, the political and socio-economic realities of post-revolutionary Germany made total compliance with the reparations regime problematic in the extreme.\footnote{Gerald D. Feldman, ‘The Reparations Debate’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 16 (2005), pp. 487–98, at 488.} Things quickly reached the point, he observes elsewhere, where the authorities were left struggling to manage a domestic distributional conflict, ‘whose major function, no matter who won, appeared to be serving the well-being of Germany’s enemies’.\footnote{Id., The Great Disorder: Politics, Economics and Society in the German Inflation, 1914–1924 (New York, 1997), p. 428.} Recently it has been noted that for every 100 gold marks credited to the reparations account, Germany was expected to come up with a clearing payment of 74 gold marks—a massive capital outflow that was not credited to the reparations tally as such and hitherto ignored in the ensuing historical debate.\footnote{Conan Fischer, ‘The Human Price of Reparations’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 16 (2005), pp. 499–514, at 503.} In addition, deductions were made from the reparations account to cover the significant costs of the Allied occupation of
western Germany and also to cover in part the costs of food imports in a sort of ‘food for coal’ programme which, again, was not credited to the reparations tally itself.49

But to return to domestic affairs, heavy industrial and labour leaders were locked in discussions well before the fall of the monarchy, as each lost confidence in the imperial authorities’ ability either to prosecute the war effort or to manage the domestic economy. The events of October and November 1918 certainly lent these discussions a new urgency, which culminated on 15 November in an agreement between the employers, led by the prominent industrialist Hugo Stinnes, and the ADGB’s Convener, Carl Legien, through which each recognized the other’s rights and privileges on a parity basis. The trade unions respected the property rights and ensuing privileges of private shareholders as well as the authority of company managers, whilst the employers conceded the trade unions’ sole rights to represent labour at workplace and national levels, including collective pay bargaining, conceded an eight-hour six-day week, and agreed to provide for enhanced workplace consultation. And looking beyond their immediate interests, both sides resolved to collaborate in securing an orderly demobilization and normalization of the battered German economy, a role they fulfilled in conjunction with the civil service. As with their allies in the SPD, incremental gain and the broadest possible agreement across society, rather than any catastrophist vision of class warfare, typified the trade unions’ strategy and behaviour, whilst the industrialists, in Gerald Feldman’s words ‘were, in effect, abandoning their long-standing alliance with the Junkers and the authoritarian state for an alliance with organized labor’.50

The Stinnes–Legien Agreement was lent institutional form in the Central Standing Committee of Employers’ and Employees’ Federations (Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft, ZAG), which brought capital and labour together in a common forum, and in 1920 such collaboration was granted a tentative official legitimation in the form of the National Economic Council. The latter never fulfilled the expectations of the trade unions, but the 1920 Factory Council Act (Betriebsrätegesetz) and the 1921 Company Board Act appeared to promise

more. These, too, may not have satisfied workplace radicals, and cer-
tainly their primary purpose was to facilitate communication
between management and workforce and thus raise economic effi-
ciency. Furthermore, management was prone to skirt around the pro-
visions of these acts when it suited. However, the majority unions
did regard the acts as a codification of the Stinnes–Legien accord and
anticipated that these consultative bodies might in due course serve
to promote a degree of economic democracy.\footnote{Benno König, ‘Interessenvertretung am Arbeitsplatz: Betriebsrätepraxis in
der Metallindustrie 1920–1933’, in Klaus Tenfelde (ed.), \textit{Arbeiter im 20. Jahr-
hundert} (Stuttgart, 1991), pp. 66–90, at 74.} Certainly they affor-
ded a more practical route in this direction than anything syndicalism
had on offer, and, beyond all of this, they served organized labour as
an ethical and political identification with key elements of the No-
vember Revolution and the Republic that it had created.

From the employers’ point of view the Factory Council and Com-
pany Boards Acts, and also the eight-hour day, were certainly con-
troversial. However, quite apart from the fact that there was no con-
sensus among leading industrialists over whether they could, or even
should, reverse these agreements, Werner Plumpe, among others,
has demonstrated that as often as not heavy industry’s bark was
much worse than its bite,\footnote{Werner Plumpe, ‘Die Betriebsräte in der Weimarer Republik: Eine Skizze
du ihrer Verbreitung, Zusammensetzung und Akzeptanz’, in Werner Plumpe
and Christian Kleinschmidt (eds.), \textit{Unternehmen zwischen Markt und Macht: Aspekte
deutscher Unternehmensgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert} (Essen, 1992), pp. 42–60, at 52. For a fuller discussion see Werner Plumpe, \textit{Betriebliche Mitbestim-
mung in der Weimarer Republik: Fallstudien zum Ruhrbergbau und zur Chemischen
Industrie} (Munich, 1999).} and as Wolfram Fischer once warned us,
historians have often been more prone to record the bark from a safe
distance than investigate the bite issue too closely – or words to that
effect.\footnote{‘Historians often make the mistake of rating the written word too highly,
while neglecting to grapple with concrete actions.’ Wolfram Fischer,
‘Wirtschaftliche Rahmenbedingungen des Ruhrkonflikts’, in Klaus Schwabe

Furthermore, we should remind ourselves that the Factory
Council Act was not the outcome of a struggle between pro- and anti-
republican forces, but instead an outgrowth of legislation introduced
in Wilhelmine Germany shortly before the First World War. Optional workers’ committees and compulsory committees in the Prussian mining industry had marked a state-sponsored attempt to improve industrial relations, even if pre-war employers tended not to take them too seriously. These committees were, however, beefed up during the war and thereafter offered the Republic a template for post-war legislation. Imperial Germany also provided the personnel with the expertise to carry out further reform, for the Works Council and Company Board Bills were not the work of trade unionists or Social Democrats, but of the same civil servants at the National Labour Ministry—versed in a long-standing tradition of statist reform—who had formulated the Wilhelmine legislation. Yet again the essential character of the German Revolution, a compact between democratizing forces and the pre-war establishment, is very evident.

By the end of 1923 the revolutionary labour accords had been severely compromised and with the 1928 Ruhr lockout were effectively a dead letter. However, it need not have been so. Plumpe demonstrates that at individual plant level managers in many parts of the economy developed a constructive, even positive, relationship with the Factory Councils. As a senior trade union official in the Rhenish metallurgical industry observed:

> The entrepreneurs have come to terms quickly with the establishment of the Works’ Councils. Here one has to distinguish clearly between the pragmatic attitude of the factory owner or manager—that is, the actual employer—to the Works’ Council and the principled stance of the employers’ federations or the business press. One cannot simply equate the typical, often of necessity dogmatic utterances and views of the latter with the views of employers, and especially individual factory managers themselves. The attitude of factory managers, of the real workplace politicians, is usually flexible and down to earth.

Plumpe distinguishes between the metallurgical and more especially the chemical industry on the one hand, and a reactionary coal-min-

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54 Plumpe, *Betriebliche Mitbestimmung*, pp. 37–8, 44, 50, and n. 50.
55 Quoted from Plumpe, ‘Die Betriebsräte’, p. 52.
ing industry on the other. However, it can be shown that even among the most politically recidivist enterprises, such as Emil Kirdorf’s Gelsenkirchener Mining Company, this same dichotomy between rhetoric and day-to-day management practice existed. For individual mine managers the Works’ Councils provided a legitimate and far more calculable vehicle for management-workforce relations than any alternatives on offer. This compact in the mining industry only disintegrated after the collapse in September 1923 of passive resistance against the Franco-Belgian seizure of the Ruhr district, when the very viability of German-controlled private sector mining operations in the Ruhr hung in the balance. Even then many pithead managers reacted furiously against the politically explosive, unilateral attempt by their employers to scrap the eight-hour day, remonstrating that a legally negotiated settlement with the trade unions would easily have been reached.\textsuperscript{56} In other words, had the specific crisis of 1923 not occurred, even the coal-mining industry would have witnessed the functional acceptance and thus emergent loyalty to the new order with the passage of time.

Looked at from the ordinary workers’ point of view, research by Karin Hartewig, among others, has concluded that the Ruhr’s miners identified far more positively with the Republic in the wake of the revolution than its critics presume,\textsuperscript{57} and certainly events in the Ruhr during 1923 point in the same direction. Miners compared the substance of their revolutionary settlement with the vacuousness of French libertarian sentiment (as they saw it) which belied the draconian persecution of trade unionists by the Bloc National government, particularly in the mining industry.\textsuperscript{58} The suppression of the German trade unions in the Saarland and the condemnation of labour activism in the Moselle (the former Lothringen) as a ‘German’ disease,\textsuperscript{59} also served to reinforce the Ruhr labour force’s determination to resist the Franco-Belgian incursion and so defend their revo-

\textsuperscript{58} Fischer, \textit{Ruhr Crisis}, pp. 72–8.
olution and the international peace settlement of which (à la Woodrow Wilson) it formed a part.\textsuperscript{60}

Finally, when it comes to industry and foreign policy, Gerald Feldman has stressed the politically pragmatic and internationalist character of the pre-1914 Hugo Stinnes,\textsuperscript{61} whilst Richard Hamilton, among others, has recorded the exasperation in some business circles over the outbreak of war and their own government’s role in this.\textsuperscript{62} That said, annexationist sentiment was widespread among industrialists during the war itself, before intermittent efforts were made after 1918 to create some form of Franco–German industrial union. This was intended in part to take on the growing economic might of the USA, in part to replace the highly politicized and unwieldy reparations regime with a more sustainable commercially predicated indemnity agreement. But it should be remembered that the negotiators on either side of the Rhine had been business partners and often friends, on either side of the Vosges, before 1914.

All in all, the attitudes adopted by individual entrepreneurs and by heavy industry collectively during the period between 1900 and 1923 present a picture of bewildering inconsistency and complexity. It certainly does violence to this fragmented and differentiated picture if one follows George Hallgarten,\textsuperscript{63} or Willibald Gutsche,\textsuperscript{64} to portray pre-war heavy industry’s record as imperialistic and pred-


Fischer, Ruhr Crisis, pp. 72–8.\textsuperscript{60}


Thus George Hallgarten, Deutsche Industrie und Politik von Bismarck bis heute (Hamburg, 1974).\textsuperscript{63}

Willibald Gutsche, Der gewollte Krieg: Der deutsche Imperialismus und der 1. Weltkrieg (Cologne, 1984); see also id., Fritz Klein, and Joachim Petzold, Der Erste Weltkrieg: Ursachen und Verlauf. Herrschende Politik und Antikriegsbewegung in Deutschland (Cologne, 1985).\textsuperscript{64}
tory. The Ruhr’s magnates, perhaps of necessity, pursued sensitive and differentiated strategies as they bought into French iron ore concessions and other ventures. Their investments were frequently funded by French merchant banks, were often structured as French-chaired subsidiaries with a majority of French nationals on the board, or on other occasions consisted of complex joint ventures with French companies. All of this was reciprocated by a degree of French investment in Germany. Limited space prevents our going into detail here, but contemporary responses to this process are instructive. August Thyssen expressed the hope that Franco–German economic collaboration would serve as the ‘foundation stone of a lasting accord and contribute to the improvement of relations between our two countries’, whilst in 1912 his son, Fritz, similarly hoped that Franco–German economic integration would render war between the two countries obsolete. Certainly the French government of the day judged Thyssen’s ventures to be of private and commercial significance only, and on this level relations between the two neighbour- ing countries were increasingly warm in the immediate pre-war period. The German trade attaché in Paris reported in 1911, the year of the second Moroccan crisis, that French and German companies ‘are delighted at the success of their cooperative ventures’, whilst the French nationalist author Louis Bruneau concluded: ‘One must grant each activity . . . its due and so recognize with complete justice that M. Thyssen’s are truly prodigious.’ A press campaign did flare up against German economic influence in France around the time of the second Moroccan crisis, but was dismissed by the Comité des Forges de France as the ‘impact of an exaggerated nationalism’. In any case, as the French journalist Auguste Pawlowski concluded: ‘We

68 Wilsberg, Terrible ami, p. 236.
69 Quoted ibid. p. 272.
70 Quoted ibid. p. 223.
71 Raymond Poidevin, ‘Le nationalisme économique et financier dans les
have interests in German mines. The Germans have the same in French mines. What could be fairer? 72 Nothing, it would seem, prompting Walther Rathenau to urge Bethmann-Hollweg shortly after the outbreak of war to secure a speedy and conciliatory settlement with France, for ‘the occupation and the transfer of property in France would ... be more trouble than they were worth’. 73

Thus the September 1914 Memorandum was not the only game in town and when the fighting was over, and Germany had lost, had had a revolution, and signed a peace settlement, a desire by industrialists to return to normalcy, to re-establish something of what had gone before explains the otherwise odd maintenance of relations between French and German heavy industry during the early 1920s and through the 1923 Ruhr Crisis itself. 74 All of this, it should be noted, accorded with the more pacific dimensions of Germany’s official, post-revolutionary foreign policy.

V A Very German Revolution

None of the above serves to make light of the enormous challenges that the German Revolution sought, but in part failed, to address. It is almost too easy to find reasons for the eventual failure and collapse of Weimar. However, it is also too simplistic to dismiss the revolution as a charade or a feeble compromise and in this regard many accounts, no doubt with an eye to the National Socialist future, become over-deterministic or indulge in various forms of wish fulfilment. In fact, the revolution reflected pretty accurately the reformist potential already present in Wilhelmine society and, beyond that, the more radical ambitions of the democratizing forces in that society. Given the circumstances of defeat, the immediate imposition of indemnities on the provisional Republic, and the enormous energies expended in accommodating the occupation regime in the west of the country (which receive barely a mention in many accounts of the period), the revolution was in many regards a remarkable achievement—more
thoroughgoing and, as noted earlier, no bloodier than the tentative and agonizing birth of the French Third Republic a generation before.

As in 1870s France, the new political leadership in post-1918 Germany crushed any intimations of insurgency with considerable brutality. The revolution from below and the Council movement were certainly authentic reflections of popular sentiment rooted in the pre-war labour movement, but in essence their prominence following Germany’s military collapse was a product of the outrage, anguish, and grinding misery of that particular moment. They undoubtedly lent force at a critical juncture during November to the Social Democratic and Trade Union participants in the ‘revolution from above’, but at no stage did the revolution from below contain any comprehensive strategic vision upon which a domestic political settlement and an international settlement and reparations regime acceptable to the Allies could have been built. 1918 was, indeed, a very German revolution, but then, on the whole, countries do tend to get the revolutions they have earned. On those terms Germany’s revolutionary settlement was sufficiently practical yet visionary to offer the country a viable future, for it represented a readiness on each side to accommodate the other, and thus was a triumph of moderation over utopian extremism in all its forms.

In spite of this, Weimar failed, but in 1920 the reasons for this lay as much in the future as in Germany’s historical legacy, and international forces would play as great a part in this disaster as domestic factors. The Third Reich was heir to this failure and, in turn, has imposed an exceptionally heavy moral burden on contemporary Germany. However, this should not obscure the more positive legacies of Weimar and its antecedents, for these enduring continuities have contributed much of worth to present-day Germany and Europe.

CONAN FISCHER is Professor of European History at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. His principal research interests have included political radicalism and paramilitary politics in interwar Germany, National Socialism, German Communism, the domestic and foreign policy of Weimar Germany, and the history of Europe from 1900 to 1945. His most recent publications include The Rise of the Nazis (2nd edn., 2002) and The Ruhr Crisis, 1923–1924 (2003).
Over the past three decades, suicide studies have gradually emerged as a vivacious and independent field of historical research. The subject naturally inclines to an interdisciplinary approach, inherently combining classic sociological categories with methods from religious and legal studies and cultural anthropology. As thematic history, suicide research is also conducive to comparative analyses, transcending both ethnic stereotypes and geographical borders, while serial analyses reveal chronological patterns that test traditional periodization. Apart from micro-historic psychological profiles of individuals emerging from an extremely desperate and personal act, public perceptions of self-destruction proffer important clues regarding prevailing morality, social norms, cultural values, and the material quality of life in any given age. Upon closer examination, suicide research also divulges a demonstrably political dimension. Those familiar with the events of 9/11, current conflicts in the Middle East, or naval warfare in the Pacific during the Second World War (kamikazes influenced Harry S. Truman’s decision to cancel a planned invasion of Japan and employ the atomic bomb) will be aware of its potential impact on conflict resolution, though perhaps the self-

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1 This review of the field is intended to provide neither a comprehensive overview, limited as it is largely to early modern Germany, nor a complete bibliography of secondary works on the early modern period. For the latter, there is a dedicated website at:
http://www.nuim.ie/academic/history/suicidebibliography/
This site, originally set up by Jeffrey Merrick and managed until 2004 by Jeffrey Watt, is a highly useful tool though, admittedly, badly in need of an update by its current editor.
immolation of Buddhist monks in protest against the Vietnam War exemplifies other, more subtle variants of political self-sacrifice.

Simple and universal definitions of self-destructive acts as either suicide, martyrdom, or valueless expressions of enlightened free-thinking break down within particular historical contexts, begging a sensitivity to historical contingency and justifying in-depth research on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, the morally laden expression ‘suicide’ first appeared in the eighteenth century. What is more, upon closer analysis, the ostensibly conventional fluctuations in suicide rates usually attributed to universal social factors across the globe are starting to offer up their past, as it rapidly becomes apparent that we ignore historical legacies at our peril. Therein lies another potential merit of historical suicide studies: historians of suicide actually possess constructive empirical data, both qualitative and quantitative, to assist sociologists, psychiatrists, and providers of pastoral care in understanding current manifestations of the phenomenon. For example, recent psychiatric studies of China have reached the perplexing conclusion that this society—now in the grip of rapid industrialization and urbanization—exhibits an unusually high reported rate of suicide among rural women. These findings undermine two longstanding sociological ‘laws’, namely, that men kill themselves more often than women (while women evidence higher rates of parasuicide, that is, attempted suicide) and that rates are higher in urban areas. In fact, however, anyone familiar with the history of suicide in China realizes that such counter-intuitive statistics make better sense when highlighted against the backdrop of traditions since the Han dynasty, with honourable female suicides extolled in literature and exonerated in law for centuries.

In Europe, legal historians had long considered pre-modern prohibitions against and punishments for suicide as a judicial curio. Social historians gained greater awareness of the topic after a short article by renowned French historian Jean-Claude Schmitt appeared in the *Annales* in 1976.³ His brief class analysis of suicide in the Middle Ages ultimately served as the cornerstone for a grand study by his compatriot, Georges Minois, whose *History of Suicide: Voluntary Death in Western Culture* trumpets the current primacy of early modern cultural historians in the field of suicide studies.⁴ In the tradition of French *histoire totale* (for example, Philippe Ariès’s studies of death and childhood),⁵ Minois’s comprehensive study reconfirms a penchant among some to define ‘Western culture’ in terms of France and England and it also awards precedence to class analysis, perhaps explaining the red dust jacket? However, there is also a strong English tradition of empiricism in suicide studies. One of the first real milestones in the historical study of suicide appeared in 1990 as a comprehensive analysis of early modern England by Michael MacDonald and Terence Murphy.⁶ Ten years in the making, their *Sleepless Souls* represents a massive serial analysis of the records of Star Chamber, coroners’ reports, and periodical literature. Two other seminal studies (by Olive Anderson and Victor Bailey) document the Victorian era,⁷ but surely the most significant recent contribution is Alexander Murray’s monumental *Suicide in the Middle Ages*.⁸ Intended as a three-volume work, two impressive tomes are already in circulation. Murray takes a more pan-European approach inclusive of

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England, France, Germany, and Italy, and has set a new standard against which all future monographs must be measured.

Over the past twenty years, curiously and largely unnoticed, the largest single body of scholarship in suicide studies has focused geographically on the German-speaking lands and chronologically on early modern central Europe. Of course, there were significant if sporadic signs of prior interest. Primary among them were the Herculean labours of the Augsburg church historian and target of Nazi persecution, Hans Rost. At the end of his life Rost willed a suicide collection of over 1,000 works (one of the largest in the world) to the Staats- und Stadtbibliothek in Augsburg. By 1927 he had already compiled a comprehensive bibliography of some 3,700 historical and sociological sources. A large part of his suicide catalogue became available to the wider community in 2005, when 1,098 works from the years 1578 to 1945 appeared on 1,625 microfiches released by the Harald Fischer Verlag.

Another landmark in German historical suicide studies came in 1953, when Jürgen Dieselhorst published an unusually rich microhistorical reconstruction of punishments for suicide in imperial Nuremberg. Motivated by an interest in legal and criminal history, he unearthed a wealth of serial judicial records, appending a detailed database of nearly 150 cases—all admirably constructed years before the advent of the P[ersonal] C[omputer] era. In a subsequent reassessment, H. C. Erik Midelfort located only one case that escaped Dieselhorst’s detection, a tribute to the meticulous foundations of his original research. Even today, Dieselhorst’s initial findings on juridical procedure, public perceptions, and popular rituals remain an essential guideline and a starting point for scholars of suicide working on early modern Germany.

12 As part of an unpublished paper, some of the results appear in published form below, n. 16.
Given the decentralized nature of the Holy Roman Empire, it is hardly surprising that all subsequent studies have been regional or local in nature. The trick has remained to couch them in orthodox historiographical debate to ensure their relevance to a wider audience. Here historical suicide studies have delivered impressive results and proven themselves worthy of note by the wider community of scholars. Certainly I have tracked these developments with interest over the last decade while collating research for a comparative study of suicide in the Empire from 1495 to 1806. And, after visiting dozens of archives in Germany as well as Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, eastern France, Holland, Hungary, northern Italy, and Poland, one can surmise sufficient cause for a proliferation of interest in central Europe.

Suicide, though seldom categorized as a crime de jure in the Empire after the promulgation of the Carolina in 1532, was in fact treated harshly, with official and unofficial sanctions invoked by churches, the state, and in popular culture. This meant, of course, that the states and churches of the Empire produced scattered but extensive documentation arising from legal—and at times illegal—actions taken against the bodies of suicides, their survivors, and their estates. During the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, German archivists catalogued the folkloric with romantic vigour, later influenced by Burckhardtian cultural trends amid acclaim for Durkheim’s Le Suicide. As many archives introduced indexing by topic, they earmarked suicide documentation for preservation as a matter of special cultural importance. Other documents were removed outright from their original provenance to separate files created especially for records on suicide. My personal experience of archival visits suggests that this has led more than one archivist to express considerable concern over their predecessor’s morbidity. Nevertheless, through their cataloguing efforts, remarkable finds still await rediscovery by a local or regional historian. Archival richness coupled with strong regional literary and judicial traditions help to explain the preponderance of early modern central Europe in the present historiography. Were it not for the possibilities, one might even despair of ever comprehensively exploring all the available case histories.

13 Émile Durkheim, Le Suicide: Étude de sociologie (Paris, 1897).
This has also been the case with another peculiarity of early modern German history: the predominance of witch-hunting in the Empire. Of the 50,000 or more people legally executed as witches in early modern Europe, over half suffered their fate in Central Europe. Surprisingly, patterns of witch-hunting and associated popular beliefs in the role of Satan in human affairs display some striking similarities to historical patterns and beliefs surrounding self-killing. Theoretically, the rise of cultural anthropology as an ancillary to historical research, especially in the early modern period, was a necessary precondition to the expansion of both areas of study. As anthropological interests and the new cultural history (however one chooses to define it) spread at German universities, these eventually turned to historical suicide studies. In this area, recent research has focused on ritual dishonour, burial desecration, weather-related superstitions, and popular revolts. Literary critical and discourse models are also being applied with greater frequency. As a direct result of novel theoretical impetus, a number of conference sessions and dedicated conferences have recently been held, edited collections have appeared, and several important monographs have originated as doctoral theses.

Like their Anglo-American and French counterparts, German social and cultural historians of suicide initially concentrated their efforts on their own perennial area of interest in early modern historiography: religion. The earliest monograph, Markus Schär’s *Seelennöte der Untertanen*, actually predates the more famous work of MacDonald and Murphy on England by five years. Through a serial analysis of the archival records of suicides in Zurich from 1500 to 1800, Schär concluded that the austere Zwinglian atmosphere of the town lay at the roots of a pervasive melancholy and mounting suicidal tendencies. His argument echoes the sentiments of nineteenth-century German sociologists who, like Durkheim, were convinced on theological grounds that Protestants kill themselves more often than Catholics (once the so-called ‘first law’ of sociology). Of course, this theory sat very well with champions of the Weberian ethic, who viewed high suicide rates as a perverse yet sure badge of self-disci-

pline, moral repression, sexual sublimation, and urban modernity among Protestants in the nineteenth century.

Here, however, subsequent historical suicide studies reveal a danger inherent in nineteenth-century presumptions projected on to the conundrum of religious beliefs and practices in the Reformation era. Schär’s argument of a confessionally driven psychological divide evident in early modern suicide remains highly controversial. In 2001 Jeffrey Watt produced an equally controversial refutation of austere religious practice as a root cause of suicide based upon his heavily statistical analysis of even thicker documentation from nearby Geneva from roughly the same period (1536 to 1798). In *Choosing Death*, Watt claims the contrary. He identifies secularization and the attack on Reformed religious taboos by *philosophes* (not least among them the émigré Rousseau) during the latter half of the eighteenth century as preconditions for an unprecedented torrent of modern suicides.

As both Watt and Schär present evidence of rising rates of suicide since the sixteenth century, the glaring variance is not statistical, but rather to be sought in a qualitative interpretation of religious practices and secularization. Here one should bear in mind that Zwingli was not Calvin. The broader picture of nuanced confessional influence is further complicated by the insertion of evangelical Lutherans and Catholics. Work by H. C. Erik Midelfort and myself certainly identifies a stronger perception of suicidal despair among and toward evangelical Lutherans than any other confession. Lutheran authors surely dominated in the sixteenth-century literature on sui-

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suicide and consolation. Contemporaries sometimes blamed this penchant for ruminations of suicide on a lack of institutional channels for the relief of guilt through rituals like penance. This may be regarded as qualitative evidence for Protestant individualization, that is, Evangelicals found themselves alone before God. However, there is just as much evidence to indicate that Luther encouraged his followers not to despair of their sins, but to seek salvation through faith, grace, and scripture, offering them a message of hope. In this regard the Reformed Churches are far closer to Catholics, who dedicated little press to the subject. Ultimately, however, and despite the Lutheran literary flourish, rough statistical data for the period as yet offers no conclusive proof that suicide was more prevalent among any particular religious confession in early modern Europe, Catholic or Protestant, nineteenth-century retrospection notwithstanding. Even if there were, one must doubt whether the clear dogmatic lines dividing nineteenth-century Christian sects can easily be projected on to the often confused state of individual religious identity in the sixteenth century.

For while contemporaries superficially explained— and condemned— self-disembodiment (Selbstentleibung) in religious terms, the sources document many other underlying material, political, psychological, and social factors influencing perceptions. The results of the third conference of the Internationale Arbeitsrunde zur Geschichte der Seelenheilkunde (a mixed group of historians and psychiatrists), held in 1992 in Wiblingen, evidenced strong literary-critical and psychiatric explanations. Another example of an interdisciplinary approach to the subject is the volume of essays edited by Gabriela Signori in 1994. Largely concentrating on late medieval and early modern central Europe, this was the first collection to introduce the subject as a coherent field in German historiography and, as such, heavily influenced a coming generation of scholars in the field. Here stress factors of everyday life (Signori), subsistence crises (Lederer), and local conflicts (Michael Frank) were also identified as defining forces in perceptions of self-killing.

17 Gunther Wahl and Wolfram Schmitt (eds.), Suizid (Reichenbach, 1998); note the excellent article by Werner Blesch (pp. 63–85).
18 Gabriela Signori (ed.), Trauer, Verzweiflung und Anfechtung (Tübingen, 1994).
The onset of the new millennium witnessed significant growth in the field, as the number of conferences, conference sessions, and publications devoted to the history of early modern suicide increased rapidly. Among them, two conference sessions occurred at international venues: the 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences in Oslo 2000 (including a memorable performance by Alexander Murphy) and the 2001 annual conference of the American Historical Association in Boston (hosted by the Conference Group for Central European History, chaired by Michael MacDonald and commented by H. C. Erik Midelfort). However, two dedicated conferences convened specifically to discuss historical suicide research have had even more lasting implications, as both resulted in edited volumes.

In 2001 the German Historical Institute in Washington hosted a conference on suicide in early modern Europe, and the proceedings were subsequently edited by Jeffrey Watt. Set out chronologically, the conference volume’s broad themes trace the origins of ‘modern’ suicide in an early modern society undergoing secularization, medicalization, and other modernizing trends. Ten chapters treat the subject across the Continent, from Holland to Switzerland and Spain to Hungary, while the addition of a non-conference chapter by Arne Jansson on suicidal murder (killing another in order to receive the death penalty) in Stockholm facilitated the inclusion of Scandinavia as well. The volume contains pieces on early modern Germany by Craig Koslofsky (Saxony) and Vera Lind (Northern Germany), material from Watt on Geneva, and a comparative analysis of Hungary’s association with the Habsburgs (Lederer). Nine of the chapter-length studies are bounded geographically, either by region or, most often, the confines of an early modern metropolis.

Suicide in global perspective was the subject of another conference held in 2002 and hosted by the Erfurt branch of the Max Planck Institute for History. Published as Sterben von eigener Hand, it represents the first comprehensive cultural examination of suicide in Europe, America, and Asia through the ages. More than any other pub-

lication, this volume demonstrates how a thematic approach can create common ground and enable historians constructively to bridge geographical and chronological boundaries separating them from colleagues in other historical fields and non-historical disciplines. While early modern Germany is represented solely in a piece by Andreas Bähr analysing the complexities of self-killing in Lessing’s *Emilia Galotti*, two essays cover suicide in modern Germany under National Socialism (Christian Goeschel) and the SED (Udo Grashoff).

At roughly the same time, two meaty monographs marked the completion of important dissertations on suicide in early modern Germany: *Selbstmord in der Frühen Neuzeit* by Vera Lind and *Der Richter im Ich* by Andreas Bähr, both appearing in the series ‘Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte’. Lind’s work consists of two parts, the first narrating the historical discourse on suicide in the West from classical antiquity to the eighteenth century, the second applying a social anthropological model to extract cultural meanings from a detailed analysis of her 303 North German case studies, overwhelmingly drawn from the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Whether or not the overall theoretical argument of a nexus between discourse and *Lebenswelt* is entirely satisfying, her narrative summary and explication of the history of ideas about suicide from Augustine to Luther and the *Carolina* is succinct and most valuable. The suggestion that lenient popular attitudes toward self-murder were the primary impetus behind a reform of practice from below remains controversial.

The study by Bähr, on the other hand, deliberately disregards sociological tools in favour of a far softer, literary-critical approach to ‘self-killing’ (as opposed to ‘suicide’, a differentiation which the author adamantly maintains throughout the work). This is a sophisticated approach, requiring him to search for nuanced shades of value extracted from contemporary literature and — most impressively — in the self-witnessing of his *dramatis personae* themselves, examined in the form of letters, diaries, and suicide notes posthumously explaining their actions. By juxtaposing formal published literature

with informal unpublished writings, Bähr displays both sensitivity to qualitative social norms and empathy towards people who express their inability to perform according to social expectations, thereby choosing a voluntary exit to preserve their honour. This work also considers the gradual replacement of religious definitions of the self by modern secular ideals as the public begins to view self-killing as pathological. In a sense, one detects a critical problem similar to that faced by Natalie Zemon Davis in her *Fiction in the Archives*.22 Ultimately, Bähr’s self-killers re-affirm rather than rebuke social values through their deeds, while simultaneously seeking to exonerate themselves from moral guilt. With detailed sections on Goethe, Lessing, and Kant, this is a stunning exposition of bourgeois sensibilities and sentimentality in the German Enlightenment.

The year 2003 saw the publication of yet another dissertation on suicide, Julia Schreiner’s *Jenseits vom Glück*, which appeared as part of the Oldenbourg series ‘Ancien Régime, Aufklärung und Revolution’.23 Chronologically, it takes us past the aforementioned works by Lind and Bähr and thematically it can be considered alongside Doris Kaufmann’s study of the origins of bourgeois psychiatry in late eighteenth-century Prussia.24 Schreiner begins with a useful historiographical overview of the state of the problems of suicide, insanity, and medicalization in the early modern period. In three sections she investigates these problems in terms of medical theory and practice, pathology versus tenacious moral condemnations, and perceptions of the self in the late eighteenth century.

Section one explicitly alludes to Foucault’s technical definition of the clinical ‘gaze’ with reference to both the human body and the psyche as human objects of study. Interestingly, Schreiner reveals

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that medical training performed on the corpses of suicides was actually intended by the Prussian state as a form of punishment and that, even by the beginning of the nineteenth century, religious ethics, moral revulsion and deterrence were all explicitly cited to justify the practice. Without overdrawning on Foucault’s theories, she empirically demonstrates the extent to which the era fixed on the visible body in order to gain access to the hidden realm of the soul. This was apparent in the study of diet and its influence on ‘abnormal’ psychic states, such as hypochondria. In fact, her underlying argument suggests that much atavism and even retrograde motion can be detected under the thin veneer of medical progress at the time. Section two picks up this theme once again, noting aspects of medical discourse on secular pathology which represented little more than thinly veiled religious morality. In many quarters, the debate over the criminalization of suicide continued. Finally, Schreiner successfully locates these medical and legal controversies within the larger picture of bourgeois morality and the literary marketplace for profit, which played a significant role in identity formation. As evidence she draws on the literature on love, emotion, onanism, and the so-called Werther fever, a perceived epidemic of suicide resulting from Goethe’s melodramatic novel. Here, however, one might also refer to Bähr’s analysis of Werther and the death of Carl Wilhelm Jerusalem.

Also in 2003, a fine piece of work originating in an MA thesis was published in a collection of essays on magical culture and official control edited by Johannes Dillinger.\(^{25}\) The collection itself consists of three extended essays based on original archival research on the Duchy of Württemberg, plus a systematic introduction to the Duchy and its bureaucracy in the early modern period by Dillinger. Certainly it is tangential but fitting to mention the other two essays here, if only to reinforce the connection between popular perceptions of suicide and the supernatural as part of one and the same belief system. Angelika Bachmann’s contribution on superstition and magic in village society describes confrontations with the authorities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while Dillinger’s own piece on treasure-hunting is a fascinating depiction of the continued willing-

ness of elites and rulers to employ supernatural means for reasons of state, hedging their bets as part of the search for hidden wealth in the field of treasure-hunting.\(^{26}\)

A third essay by Karin Schmidt-Kohberg considers suicide in the Duchy and is based on the famous collection A209 from the Central State Archives in Stuttgart. This eclectic collection of *criminalia* has been successfully mined for a number of previous social and cultural histories, including Ulinka Rublack’s *The Crimes of Women in Early Modern Germany*,\(^{27}\) and as with all the other regional histories of suicide, it fills in another piece of the puzzle with local details and peculiarities. The essay begins with the obligatory *tour d’horizon* followed by an interesting consideration of motives: death of spouse, depression, post-partum depression, alcoholism, insanity, fear of punishment, ageing, illness, death, and so on. After moving on to public and official reactions to several case studies, Schmidt-Kohberg also examines an aspect that is often missed: parasuicide, for example, attempted suicide and attempted treatments, especially through spiritual physic. This is followed by an examination of the sociological profile of self-killers (status, gender, age, and so on) and followed by conclusions. This is a stiff but well-structured piece of regional history fitting a standard pattern and is therefore a welcome contribution to comparative analyses and grand syntheses. Particularly useful is the inclusion of several woodcuts apparently discovered as the result of a systematic search of the Germanisches Nationalmuseum catalogue.

At the moment, another significant piece of on-going research is being conducted by Alexander Kästner, who is preparing a promising dissertation on early modern Saxony and who maintains another useful bibliographical website.\(^{28}\) However, as with witchcraft studies, there is certainly room for a number of regional studies which will gradually fill in our map of Central Europe, piece by piece. In


\(^{28}\) Kästner maintains his bibliography at: http://rcswww.urz.tu-dresden.de/~frnz/Suizid_FNZ/Start.htm

Suicide in Early Modern Central Europe
addition, in the area of eighteenth-century university disputations dealing with aspects of self-killing the surface has yet to be scratched. Finally, a grand synthesis of the Empire along the lines of those already available for England and France is still needed to fit all the regionally diffuse pieces into the larger puzzle. In conclusion, therefore, it is safe to say that we can look forward to much scholarship and debate to come. As studies continue to contextualize themselves within broader historiographical debates, they will be greeted by an ever widening circle of interested parties.

DAVID LEDERER is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of History at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth. His research interests include the history of psychiatry and psychology, suicide studies, and the history of gender and sexuality. His most recent publication is *Madness, Religion and the State in Early Modern Europe: A Bavarian Beacon* (Cambridge, 2006).
In his influential treatise *Du contrat social* (1762), the Swiss-born philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau outlined the key moral and legal principles behind a more humane treatment of prisoners of war, principles which later informed the Geneva Convention of 1864 (revised 1906) and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Fundamental to this was the notion that wars were fought between states and not individuals, and that soldiers from the opposing side could only be seen as ‘the enemy’ while they were in a position to fight. Once disarmed and rendered harmless, they remained men in uniform but not objects to be deliberately killed, starved, enslaved, or forcibly converted to their captors’ religion or ideology. In other words, they were to be treated with respect for their rights and dignity as human beings.¹ How far did these ideas, enshrined as they were from the late nineteenth century in international law and, with varying degrees of commitment, in the domestic military codes of the European powers, determine behaviour towards military captives during the First World War, the great conflagration which has often been described as the Urkatastrophe of the twentieth century?

Uta Hinz is not the first scholar in recent times to address this question, but she is the first to do so with extensive reference to German sources and German practices. In this sense her well-written and factual exposition is an extremely important contribution to the field, and helps to correct a number of confusions and misconceptions which have informed previous works. The one thing that is lacking, though, is an index, which I would have found very useful, especially given the large volume of detailed empirical material contained in the book.

Hinz’s thesis can be summarized as follows: Germany’s treatment of the roughly 2.4 million enemy prisoners it held between 1914 and 1918 was, with some important exceptions, broadly in accordance with the spirit of the Geneva and Hague Conventions. The picture is admittedly complicated by the confused federal structure of Germany’s wartime domestic military administration, and by the chaos and improvisation which characterized the early months of the war, when many more prisoners than expected were taken. Overcrowding and epidemics were indeed common in the winter of 1914–15. Nonetheless, in the second and third quarter of 1915 in particular Hinz sees a marked tendency towards a systematic organization and ‘Humanisierung’ (p. 136) of the conditions of captivity, a trend reinforced by attempts at standardization undertaken by the Prisoner-of-War Department (Unterkunftsdepartement) of the Prussian Ministry of War under its director, Colonel (later General) Friedrich.

The motives of Friedrich and the Unterkunftsdepartement had little to do with humanitarian feeling, however, and much more to do with what Hinz describes as the Gegenseitigkeitsprinzip, the utilitarian principle of reciprocity. In short, the German government was anxious to

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ensure basic standards of care for the prisoners it was holding in order to protect the interests of its own nationals in enemy hands. In most cases this led to agreements to allow inspections of camps by the relevant protecting power, access to relief parcels and post from home, and provision of lists of prisoners to the specialist prisoner of war agency run by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva. Material improvements and increased contact with the outside world in turn gave rise to conditions in which a burgeoning Lagerkultur could grow and flourish, as seen in the emergence of prison camp journals, theatres, sports, arts and crafts, educational courses, and so on among POWs of all nationalities.

Admittedly, there were times when the Gegenseitigkeitsprinzip could work in the other direction, leading to reprisals against prisoners in response to alleged misdeeds committed by the enemy, as in the case of the dispute with France over the treatment of German prisoners in Morocco, Algeria, and Dahomey in 1915. However, unlike the French historian Marc Michel, Hinz does not find evidence of a widespread ‘brutalization’ or ‘intoxication’ with war in Germany in 1914–15—at least on the home front.\(^3\) Reprisals, in her view, were motivated by utilitarian, not irrational, considerations, even if their impact on the prisoners concerned was harsh and inhumane.

Two further factors nonetheless gradually undermined the effectiveness of the Gegenseitigkeitsprinzip as a restraining mechanism. The first was the relationship between captivity and propaganda. As in the case of the Belgian question, tales of German atrocities against prisoners of war produced a series of loud denials and counter-accusations. The British and French, it was claimed, were the ‘real’ barbarians, particularly in colonial contexts where they allegedly undermined racial solidarity by placing German men, women, and children under black or Arab guards. The increasing effectiveness of the Allied economic blockade further sharpened the political dimensions of the POW question. Given the Allies’ intention to starve the German civilian population into surrender, it was only proper—so German propagandists argued—that diet and nutrition in German prison camps should reflect conditions on the German home front.

more generally. Even so, news bulletins for domestic audiences did not go as far as suggesting that individual Englishmen, Frenchmen, or Russians were personally responsible for the actions of their governments, and even more importantly, there was little ‘transference of hatred and animosity on to enemy soldiers in captivity’, according to Hinz’s findings (p. 362).

A second and much more important factor accounting for deviations from the Gegenseitigkeitsprinzip, in her view, was the ‘economization’ (Ökonomisierung) of German military strategy from 1915 onwards. Gradually concern for reciprocity gave way to growing pressures for the integration of enemy prisoners of war into the German war economy, particularly after the costly battles at Verdun and on the Somme had revealed the superiority of the Allies in material and organizational terms. Disciplinary measures, policy towards the Red Cross, and even the provision of food and medical facilities were henceforth increasingly directed towards countering the problems of low productivity, Arbeitsverweigerung, and Sabotage on the part of captive enemy soldiers and civilians. Ökonomisierung also undermined the coordinating role of the Prussian Ministry of War and its equivalents in Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg, especially as increasing numbers of prisoners were attached to Arbeitskommandos living and working outside the perimeters of the main camps or Stammlager. This was a trend which increased significantly in 1916–17 after the emergence of the third Oberste Heeresleitung (High Command) under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and the founding of the new Kriegsamt (Supreme War Office) headed by General Groener, but its origins were in 1915 and the early part of 1916, when labour shortages first began to appear (pp. 269–70).

Even so, the move towards the mobilization of POW labour did not automatically entail a departure from international conventions except in specific, localized contexts. Agricultural Arbeitskommandos, in particular, could be quite pleasant, and often entailed access to better quality food and even opportunities for fraternization with the local population. Industrial Arbeitskommandos were usually much tougher, especially those involving work in mines and quarries, and the rules governing exemptions on medical grounds became ever tighter as the war progressed, but here, too, there was a great deal of variation depending on the attitude of employers and local military commanders. Prisoners who objected to being deployed in war-relat-
ed industries and/or to working on Sundays were sometimes punished and sometimes not.

The two really important exceptions were the fate of enemy prisoners allocated to work details in occupied territories, and the treatment of Russian POWs after the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918. In the first case neither the Prussian Ministry of War nor the Kriegsamt exercised any control over the more than 250,000 prisoners held in occupied areas, who came under the direct authority of the High Command. These same prisoners were also not allowed visits from the protecting power or the ICRC, so there was nothing to prevent large-scale abuses, including the organization of forced labour battalions just behind the front lines (pp. 296–7). In the second instance, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 clearly stated that after the restoration of peace, prisoners were to be repatriated to their country of origin ‘as quickly as possible’. However, the German war machine was reluctant to let go of such a rich labour resource and so hung on to many of its Russian prisoners, who were forced to live and work in increasingly desperate conditions until the November 1918 armistice and beyond (although the last of them remained in Germany until 1921, the new republican government nonetheless made strenuous efforts to send most of them home in the winter of 1918–19). The irony here is that western propaganda did not dwell on the poor treatment of Russians; instead it focused on the alleged abuse and torture of British, French, and Belgian prisoners, often using shocking images of soldiers tied to posts and other ‘barbaric acts’ which reveal more about the cultural war and attempts to cast Germany in the role of illegal aggressor than they do about the real experience of enemy captives. Indeed, as John Horne and Alan Kramer have also shown, this was a battle which continued into the post-war era, when at one point the Allies demanded the surrender of more than 800 named German war criminals, including 150 who were accused of offences in relation to the mistreatment of POWs.4

What are the broader implications of these findings for the question of continuity of German policy towards POWs between the First and Second World Wars? Hinz’s conclusions are nuanced and subtle,
but ultimately she comes down against the views of Annette Becker, Ulrich Herbert, and others who have seen the First World War as providing a direct ‘fund of experiences’ or Erfahrungsfeld for the extreme brutalities of the Nazi era. Her detailed investigation of the application of German military law to POWs, for instance, shows that here, too, the principle that enemy soldiers had ‘obligations, but also rights’ was rigorously adhered to (p. 359). This applied even to the Russians, who, at least until March 1918, were not subjected to systematic ill-treatment or legal discrimination on the basis of their country of origin. The variation in survival rates between the different nationalities is put down by Hinz largely to the difference in attitude and financial means of their own governments rather than to the behaviour of the German military authorities, and here her findings are in line with other recent studies.

To put this another way, the German treatment of prisoners of war showed ‘traces of a total war ideology’ (‘Züge einer totalen Kriegsideologie’, p. 363), including the quasi enslavement of Russian POWs after March 1918, but did not, in the end, lead to a total breakdown of traditional norms and values. Instead, Hinz talks of an ‘economic totalization of war’ (‘ökonomische Totalisierung des Krieges’, p. 359) which she links to a ‘gradual removal of restraints’ (‘Prozeß der Entgrenzung’, p. 361) driven above all by rational calculation rather than by specific national or racial hatreds. The idea of a direct continuity with German atrocities in the Second World War is therefore ultimately unsustainable, in her view, even if there were some pointers in the direction of a greater exploitation of prisoners in the

5 The phrase comes from Ulrich Herbert, A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880–1980: Seasonal Workers / Forced Laborers / Guest Workers (Ann Arbor, 1990), p. 119. See also Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 1914–1918: Understanding the Great War (London, 2002), p. 89, who talk about a ‘culture of brutality and brutalisation’ in relation to the treatment of prisoners and deportees in the First World War, which then bore ‘fruit in later years’ when ‘new victims were born of the repercussions’.

future on the basis of Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg’s dictum ‘Not
kennt kein Gebot’ (necessity knows no law, pp. 315–6).7

II

Hinz’s main conclusions are certainly convincing and well docu-
mented. However, her study also leaves open a number of important
questions which remain to be answered. For instance, she says rela-
tively little on the transportation of prisoners from the battlefield to
their final place of captivity within Germany, although, as Heather
Jones has recently shown, this is an issue which can be very reve-
aling in terms of the development of ‘war cultures’ in the belligerent
nations in 1914 and beyond.8 Secondly, she makes only brief mention
of the existence of so-called propaganda camps, in which particular
national/religious minorities were given preferential treatment with
a view to recruiting them to the Central Powers’ cause. Those target-
ed (with very modest results) included Irish prisoners, Muslims from
the Russian, French, and British Empires, Poles, Ukrainians, and
Flemish-speaking Belgians.9 Finally, although Hinz devotes a few
pages to Lagerkultur, she says nothing at all about what might be
termed the ‘intimate’ dimensions of wartime captivity, namely the
hidden world of friendships and personal rivalries among prisoners,
as well as the impact which their absence had on families and com-
munities back at home.10

Some, but not all, of these issues are addressed in the second book

7 Bethmann Hollweg famously used this phrase in relation to the German
invasion of Belgium in his Reichstag speech on 4 Aug. 1914. Cited in Alan
Kramer, ‘Kriegsrecht und Kriegsverbrechen’, in Gerhard Hirschfeld, Gerd
Krumeich, and Irina Renz (eds.), Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg (Paderborn,
8 Heather Jones, ‘Encountering the “Enemy”: Prisoner of War Transport and
the Development of War Cultures in 1914’, in Pierre Purseigle (ed.), Warfare and
9 This aspect of German war aims and strategy was already given a great deal
of emphasis in Fritz Fischer’s Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegziele des kaiser-
lichen Deutschland, 1914/18 (Düsseldorf, 1961). For more recent studies see e.g.
Gerhard Höpp, Muslime in der Mark: Als Kriegsgefangene und Internierte in
Wünsdorf und Zossen, 1914–1924 (Berlin, 1997) and Reinhard R. Doerries, Prelude
to the Easter Rising: Sir Roger Casement in Imperial Germany (London, 2000).
10 One study which does look at prisoners’ families is Abbal, Soldats oubliés,
under review, a volume of essays by leading experts in the field, edited by Jochen Oltmer. The first section offers an overview of the treatment of POWs in the five main European powers involved in the war: Austria–Hungary, Germany, Russia, Britain, and France. The common theme here is the fragmentation and decentralization of policy caused by the growing demand for labour on the part of agriculture and industry, as well as by the political instrumentalization of the prisoner issue. The one country that stands out as exceptional is Great Britain; here (as far as Panikos Panayi’s contribution tells us) there were no propaganda camps and only very limited attempts to exploit POWs as an economic resource until very late in the war. Admittedly this was partly because most of the POWs held in the British Isles were officers or civilians; rank-and-file prisoners were usually kept behind in transit camps in France. Yet another factor was the opposition of British trade unions, who feared competition from cheaper labour and therefore demanded equal wage rates and preference for native workers over ‘foreign’ POWs (and Belgian refugees) (p. 144).

In the other countries, however, the integration of prisoners into the wartime economy began at a much earlier period, usually from the spring of 1915 onwards, and became one of the key determinants of conditions for rank-and-file POWs. Those who worked in mines or some branches of the armaments industries were exposed to the harshest treatment. But their experiences were not necessarily typical. For instance (and here all of the studies seem to agree) large numbers of prisoners worked in relatively small groups in agriculture, where the food was usually better than in the main camps and where they were frequently able to develop friendly or at least cordial relations with their employers. As well as being paid, they were often trusted to work without being permanently guarded, and could therefore enjoy the illusion of partial freedom. Officers, on the other hand, while enjoying many privileges including exemption from war work and access to well stocked relief parcels, were also left to their own devices when it came to finding methods of battling the boredom and emptiness of life in captivity. This made them more vulnerable to ‘barbed wire disease’, the name given to the symptoms of chronic depression and feelings of worthlessness experienced by long-term prisoners across Europe.11

11 Cf. Adolf Lukas Vischer, *Die Stacheldraht-Krankheit* (Zurich, 1918), also
The second section of the book considers the tensions between the selective principle of nationality and the universal principle of humanitarian action in the treatment of prisoners. Reinhard Nachtigal shows that while both France and the Central Powers tried to exploit national/ethnic divisions among POWs for propaganda purposes, this process went furthest in Russia. Here both Serb and Czech divisions (and smaller Romanian and Italian ones) were recruited on a partly voluntary, partly compulsory, basis and deployed directly in military offensives against the Habsburg army as ‘liberators’ of their respective nations. Even so, the process was far from being smooth and was held back by opposition from various quarters, including the POWs themselves (some of whom remained staunchly loyal to the Habsburgs or were simply unwilling to fight), elements in the Russian government and armaments industry (who feared losing a vital labour resource), and neutral bodies like the ICRC and its Swedish and Danish counterparts (who were concerned to prevent abuses of international law).

Meanwhile, Giovanna Procacci examines the situation in Italy, where the army and political leadership followed a deliberate policy of refusing state aid to the majority of their own soldiers who fell into enemy hands on the false grounds that they were all ‘cowards’ or ‘traitors’ who had ‘deserted’ their units. As a result, 100,000 out of 600,000 Italian POWs died in captivity, a much higher percentage than their French, British, Belgian, and even Russian counterparts (p. 196). Uta Hinz, on the other hand, looks at the minor triumphs and larger failures of the International Committee of the Red Cross in its quest to gain recognition as an impartial player in the enforcement and enhancement of international conventions. As she shows, the belligerent governments circumvented the ICRC wherever possible, relying instead on national Red Cross societies and neutral countries like Spain and Switzerland when it came to negotiating bilateral agreements with the enemy over the treatment of prisoners and the implementation of exchange deals (p. 231).

One final issue, covered by several contributors to the volume, is that of prisoner repatriation after the war. In the months following the signing of the Treaty of Versailles Britain, the USA, Belgium, and

*POWs during the First World War*
Italy sent practically all of their prisoners home, but France and Bolshevik Russia, for different reasons, held on to their captives for longer than this. In the French case, as Bernard Delpal shows, German prisoners were sent to work in clearance and reconstruction projects in the newly ‘liberated’ départements of the north and northeast, both as a form of reparation and in order to impress upon the German people at home that they had lost the war and would have to pay the price (pp. 162–3). In Russia, according to Reinhard Nachtigal, up to 100,000 former POWs were recruited into the Red Army during the Civil War (1918–20), some of them voluntarily, but others under duress (p. 253).

Germany, by contrast, was extremely anxious to ensure a rapid and orderly removal of the 1.2 million Russian prisoners it still held at the time of the November 1918 armistice, not least because of a widespread panic about Bolshevism which infected all political circles, including the Majority Social Democrats. All but around 300,000 had indeed been conducted across the new demarcation line by the beginning of February 1919, where they were more or less left to fend for themselves. However, according to Jochen Oltmer, the new republican government’s repatriation plans were henceforth thwarted by a variety of factors, including an Allied veto on further prisoner transports to the east, the continued need of German agriculture for prisoner labour, the hostile attitude of the Baltic states during 1919, and later still, complications caused by the Polish–Soviet war (1920–1). When official repatriations finally ceased in 1921, 4,500 Russians were given leave to stay on in Germany indefinitely as foreign workers, and thousands more did so illegally (p. 291).

Meanwhile, even those POWs from the west who were repatriated fairly quickly from Germany continued to suffer from the psychological consequences of their wartime internment and accompanying feelings of stigmatization. In France, for instance, as Odon Abbal shows, returning prisoners were marginalized in official commemorations of the war in favour of an emphasis on the heroism and sacrifice of those who had fallen in battle and on the grief felt by their families. A campaign for greater financial compensation for ex-POWs was launched in the late 1920s by the Fédération Nationale des Anciens Prisonniers de Guerre, but barely got off the ground before it collapsed in 1931–2. In the discourse of the right in particular, prisoners of war did not deserve to be honoured alongside former army
veterans who had given their lives in defence of the nation; by ‘choosing’ to surrender rather than fight on to the bitter end they had put themselves outside the ‘social contract’ and were therefore not entitled to official recognition.

III

What directions might future research take in order to develop and build on some of the themes raised in the books reviewed above? Firstly, there is a pressing need (as Hinz acknowledges) to integrate civilian internees and deportees into the story of wartime captivity between 1914 and 1921. Their fate was both different from, and similar to, that of combatant prisoners of war. Interestingly, only two of the contributors to Oltmer’s volume, Panayi on Britain and Delpal on France, so much as mention this category of POWs. Yet the combined figure for non-combatants interned in these two countries (32,440 and c.60,000 respectively) cannot compete with the 111,879 civilian POWs detained in Germany, and the even larger numbers held in Austria–Hungary and Russia. Overall, at least 300,000 civilians were interned in western and central Europe between 1914 and 1918, a further 300,000 in Tsarist Russia, and probably around 50,000 to 100,000 in the rest of the world.12 We still know relatively little about them.

Secondly, there is a need for more detailed studies of particular regions and localities along the lines suggested by Jochen Oltmer, Benjamin Ziemann, and others,13 but with greater reference to possible continuities and discontinuities with the Second World War, not just in relation to official policies but also with respect to unofficial contacts between civilian populations and foreign prisoners. Indeed, one of the disappointing features of Hinz’s book, which relies particularly heavily on German military records from the Württemberg


region, is that she makes no reference to the recent work done by Jill Stephenson on the presence of foreign workers/POWs in the same part of Germany during the years 1939 to 1945. Further investigation here may indeed provide some interesting results.\textsuperscript{14}

Thirdly, more research needs to be done at a comparative level, particularly in relation to the different manifestations of Lagerkultur (that is, the cultural and recreational life inside prison camps) and the subjective or personal experience of captivity more generally. Is it really the case, for instance, that prisoners and their families were only able to judge the war and their own experiences through the lens of an unremitting ‘friend or foe’ mentality, as Annette Becker has suggested in her contribution to Oltmer’s volume (p. 29) and elsewhere?\textsuperscript{15} How can this be squared with conflicting evidence of friendly relations between POWs and their guards/employers, or of prisoners’ representatives exerting pressure on their own military and political leaders not to instigate reprisals against enemy captives, but instead to arrange reciprocal exchanges on humanitarian or utilitarian grounds? What significance should we attach to the Italian experience where, according to Procacci’s evidence, prisoners’ families were often denied state financial support on the grounds that their relatives had deserted their posts and were no longer serving the nation (p. 203), or to the situation in post-war France where, as Abbal shows, repatriated POWs fought in vain for recognition of their suffering in a country which refused point blank to accept them as war heroes? Finally, how were returning POWs received in the defeated nations, namely Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey? Until we have answers to some of these more challenging questions, we will not be in a position to judge the true social and cultural significance of captivity during the First World War.


MATTHEW STIBBE is Senior Lecturer in History at Sheffield Hallam University. He is the author of *German Anglophobia and the Great War, 1914–1918* (Cambridge, 2001) and *Women in the Third Reich* (London, 2003) as well as several articles in historical journals. He is currently completing a study of civilian internment in Germany during the First World War with special reference to the camp at Ruhleben near Berlin.

*POWs during the First World War*

The first volume has appeared in a major project undertaken jointly by the Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities at the University of Essen, and the publisher J. B. Metzler. The publishers intend this to be a chronological continuation of their other established encyclopaedias, *Der Neue Pauly* (19 vols.) on the ancient world, and the *Lexikon des Mittelalters* (10 vols.) on the Middle Ages. The first volume, reviewed here, appeared in May 2005 and the last is scheduled for October 2012. A substantial discount is offered for early subscribers and the publishers intend that the work will only be sold as a complete set.

A total of 16 volumes is planned, covering subjects alphabetically from *Abendland* to *Zyklus*. Articles are graded according to the significance attached to each entry. There will be 100 ‘key articles’ of about ten pages each on overarching themes, such as agriculture, architecture, civilization, peace, or work. Another 900 major articles will focus on more specific topics like absolutism, electricity, expeditions, family, and the Thirty Years War. A further 3,000 entries of a page or two provide the detail on individual aspects of the larger topics, for example, workers’ rights as a subsection of the essay on work. It appears that the project may have hit problems of length, since the prospectus issued prior to the first volume envisaged a further thousand short entries. The first volume contains around 250 topics, few of which receive less than two pages each. The entries are cross-referenced and the series will be completed by a sixteenth volume containing an index. In the meantime, subscribers can access an interim electronic index.
The layout is clear and well-organized. Each article starts with a series of bullet points to guide the reader. The material is subdivided into short sections, generally starting with a definition of terms, outlining how the topic has been studied, providing some information and illustrative examples, and concluding with a brief list of sources and further reading. Most of the more substantial articles in the first volume have at least one well-chosen black and white illustration. These are integrated into the text and provide a valuable extension to the discussion.

The series is intended for a wider public, not just historians or history students, but anyone seeking the historical context of other disciplines. The approach is cross-disciplinary, seeking to contextualize rather than specialize, and relying on the fairly extensive supporting bibliographic detail to assist those requiring more information. The key guiding principle is thematic, and there are no separate entries on individuals, countries, or places. The editorial team has selected entries by working outwards from a group of ten basic subject groups that are introduced by the general editor in his introduction. The first group is essentially political, and includes the state, government, and the international states system. Entries derived from this include political ideals, forms of government, and strategies of war and peace. The second concept is ‘global interaction’, covering the interaction of European and non-European peoples through trade, exploration, slavery, and multi-cultural influences and perceptions. ‘Law and constitution’ encompasses the individual branches of jurisprudence, legislative procedures, and the institutions and processes of justice. ‘Life styles and social change’ group together inter-personal interaction and life courses from birth to old age, covering gender relations, family, and the like. All economic aspects, including political economy, form a fifth group of concepts. The other five are self-explanatory and are labelled ‘science and medicine’, ‘education, civilization, and communication’, ‘churches and religious culture’, ‘literature, art, and music’, and ‘environment and technological change’. These conceptual groupings are not overt, since the entries are arranged alphabetically, but they have been fundamental in deciding what subjects to include, what space each receives, and what to exclude.

While the prospectus translates the title as Encyclopedia of the Early Modern Period, the German original better describes the time frame,
since the editors intend to cover modern history from the mid-fifteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries. In doing so, they consciously distance themselves from the approach adopted by the six-volume *Europe 1450 to 1789: Encyclopedia of the Early Modern World*, edited by Jonathan Dewald, that was published by Scribner and Sons in 2004. Friedrich Jäger makes clear that his team believe that modernity is defined by socio-economic rather than political change. Political and intellectual changes are still recognized as important, helping to define what the editors term the ‘bourgeois epoch’ of c. 1750 to c.1850, but the fundamental divide between their ‘early modern’ and modernity does not occur until the mid-nineteenth century and is attributed to the breakthrough of the Industrial Revolution, modern capitalism, the intensification of market networks, class formation, and the rise of nationalism and mass politics.

It is easy to find fault with major projects such as this. Large, multi-volume compendia require complex editorial decisions. Inevitably, some topics are left out, or given reduced space, while certain themes are emphasized in preference to others. It is not the intention here to pick holes in these decisions. The editors have done an excellent job of organizing very complex material in a manner that makes it accessible for the uninitiated, whilst still providing concise definitions and precise discussions that should satisfy all but the most pedantic specialist. The contributors have been well-chosen and are recognized experts in their respective fields, such as Bernd Wunder on officialdom, or Daniel Hohrath on sieges. The cross-referencing of articles, together with the promised index, should balance the work’s framework and allow readers to access material by subjects as well as concepts. The work is attractively produced and illustrated, and any serious library will want to have a copy.

That said, some reservations need to be voiced. The focus is on Europe within a world context. While it is acknowledged that most of the entries will concentrate on ‘old Europe’, the editors deny a Eurocentric bias, stressing instead the interaction between Europe and the wider world as a defining feature of early modernity. Yet Europe is the only world region to be given a key article. Readers searching the first volume for Africa will find an entry on African religions, but otherwise will be referred to articles on the ‘Atlantic world’, ‘European expansion’, ‘colonialism’, ‘continent’, and ‘world history’. This approach is not inherently wrong, but there is a danger
that the conceptual framework will define topics by looking outwards from Europe, rather than from non-European perspectives. Moreover, this ‘European’ view looks rather ‘German’. The team is not exactly as ‘international’ as is claimed. All 24 senior editors responsible for the ten basic subject groupings are from German-speaking central Europe, with only four outside Germany itself. Only 11 of the 60 sub-editors in charge of the principal themes are not based in Germany, and only two of these are outside Europe. Of the 190 or so contributors to the first volume, only 18 are not at German-speaking universities, and only four of these have institutional affiliations outside Europe. The extensive references to American and other scholarship indicate the influence such writing has had on our understanding of the early modern period. Input from this direction during the planning stages might have produced a rather different set of key concepts, including jettisoning terms like ‘Englische Revolution’ that are no longer current amongst specialists in that field.

PETER H. WILSON is Professor of Early Modern History at the University of Sunderland. He is currently completing a book on the Thirty Years War for Penguin Press.

Two contemporary vogues, one for ‘court studies’ and the other for a more sympathetic re-appraisal of aristocratic society, have reached the historiography of the seventeenth-century Habsburg lands over the last decade or so. Our understanding of both the imperial household (Hofstaat) and aulic administration has been transformed by recent work: while Jeroen Duindam lends substance to debates about the size, shape, function, and purpose of the Austrian operation in international context, Stefan Siell for the first time establishes exact details about decision-making bodies, and a fresh female perspective is opened up by Susanne Pils. A substantial programme on ‘Patronage- and Klientelsysteme am Wiener Hof’ under Ferdinand II and III is underway at the University of Vienna. Meanwhile Adelsforschung has been energized for Austria–Bohemia by Thomas Winkelbauer and is lately reinforced with the prodigious survey of the Bohemian magnates by Petr Mat’a. Less has yet been done for Hungary, but there, too, research is afoot. All this is helped espe-

1 Jeroen Duindam, Vienna and Versailles: The Courts of Europe’s Major Dynastic Rivals, 1550–1780 (Cambridge, 2003); Stefan Siell, Die Geheime Konferenz unter Kaiser Leopold I: Personelle Strukturen und Methoden zur politischen Entscheidungsfindung am Wiener Hof (Frankfurt am Main, 2001); Susanne Claudine Pils, Schreiben über Stadt: Das Wien der Johanna Theresia Harrach, 1639–1716 (Vienna, 2002). For the Vienna programme, see: <http://www.univie.ac.at/Geschichte/wienerhof>


cially by a remarkable initiative at the young University of South Bohemia, where Václav Bůžek and others have issued a series of invaluable volumes, both individual and collective, on relevant topics. Besides, a monumental new handbook to archival and other sources also gives prime attention to court and aristocratic materials.

Mark Hengerer has now brought both these reinvigorated subject areas together in an ambitious dissertation project at the University of Constance. Its centre of gravity lies in the mid-seventeenth century, but there is much coverage of aspects of his themes back as far as Ferdinand I and on beyond the death of Leopold I. Hengerer explicitly positions himself in the latest literature—thus, for example, dispensing himself from detailed work on Bohemia by reference to Mat’a—as well as invoking the exponents of a further current academic fashion, the ‘communications history of power’ announced in his subtitle. Hengerer’s purpose is to demonstrate the symbiosis of dynastic and noble authority, as mediated by the court. To that end his book is organized in three parts, whose architectonics, while undoubtedly massive, are not entirely clear to me.

The first part, headed ‘Personal und Präsenz’, is the briefest and most straightforward. It follows the development of various court offices, with a stress on the number of holders, whether their tenure was real or nominal, salaried or not. Such questions are not always

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4 The series title is Opera Historica, the place of publication is České Budějovice, the author or editor of all these volumes is Václav Bůžek, and the contents are often multilingual. See Život na dvorech barokní šlechty, 1600–1750 (1996); Dvory velmožů s erbem růže: Všední a sváteční dny posledních Rožmberků a páni z Hradce (1997); Aristokratické rezidence a dvory v raném novověku (1999); Slavnosti a zábavy na dvorech a v rezidentních městech raného novověku (2000); Věk urozených: Šlechta v českých zemích na prahu novověku (2002); Šlechta v habsburské monarchii a císařský dvůr (2003).


susceptible of a ready answer: jobs might be held on a seasonal or other alternating basis; emoluments depended on the state of royal finances. But Hengerer identifies a definite decline of the simple noble retainer, the ‘Diener ohne Amt’; while the lower ranks of table servants (Truchsessen, Färuschneider, etc.) became largely honorific, always part-time and temporary appointments. Chamberlains (Kämmerer), on the other hand, inflated markedly in numbers, but under Ferdinand II they crucially ceased to be remunerated; on a smaller scale, privy councillors (Geheime Räte) followed a similar paradigm. The Chamber (Hofkammer), War Council (Hofkriegsrat), and Aulic Council (Reichshofrat) retained active members only (though individual councillors did not always need to be present at meetings); these courtiers were the sole ones to receive authorized Quartier in Vienna. Overall, however, Hengerer finds no more than a vague correlation between service and payment, whether in money or in kind. He is able to cast much light on how and when jobs were actually done, and on the nature of individual schedules at court.

Part II, ‘Interaktion und Organisation’, is longer, more elaborated, and sometimes hard to grasp. It is broadly devoted to the interplay among courtiers, and how such relationships were perceived. We learn about conventions surrounding the commencement of service: induction and swearing-in—contrast the absence of any equivalent on ‘retirement’, which still tended literally to mean withdrawal from activities rather than any official termination of them. The hierarchy of the court is discussed, along with the associated rules, for example, of dress, and the critics of its forms. But equally it becomes apparent that the court was no single entity; and attempts to prescribe for it as a whole always proved vain. The most arresting section here is that on access to the emperor, which includes a valuable account of the layout of public rooms in the Hofburg and of regulations for audiences, formal and informal. The passages on gifts and bribes, networks, meeting-points, and the like, by contrast, seem to me unnecessarily opaque.

The third part, ‘Ressourcen und Reproduktion’, longer and more ramified still, contains the meat of Hengerer’s interpretation. It examines patronage and who exercised it, especially the connection, rough as it was, between clientage structure and office-holding. There are particular studies of the role of the steward (Obersthofmeister), illustrated by its formidable mid-century incumbent, Maximilian Trautt-
mansdorf, and of the chamberlain (Oberstkämmerer), illustrated by another very prominent courtier of the period, Johann Maximilian Lamberg. We learn how appointments were made, according to a mixture of competence, seniority (Anciennität), and social standing. Some jobs tended to lead to others, as primitive career ladders came into being; however, at all points the system needed oiling, with set ways of recommendation and advocacy. Strategic for Hengerer’s argument is the overlap between attendance at court and service of the crown in the provinces, though he makes much of the obvious point that those engaged in the latter were often at least honorary chamberlains or privy councillors by this period. Further favours were available to some: titles and their enhancement usually went to courtiers, while the Order of the Fleece was bestowed almost exclusively on the most intimate of them; imperial wedding-gifts came strictly proportionate to office and family. And finally—important (though dense) reflections these—the credit nexus proved a two-edged sword. Höflinge could often not avoid lending to the ruler (some officers of the Chamber pledged huge sums); but they might well be able to ensure repayment from resources in their own province.

A final Zusammenfassung renders the above issues a good deal clearer (I advise reading it first). It concludes with a firm statement of one of the work’s two key contentions: the authority of the ruler was strengthened by the mechanisms of the Hofstaat, albeit often in fortuitous ways. The argument parallels that recently made for a slightly earlier period by Karin MacHardy, who stresses the role of Catholic loyalty in the apportioning of Habsburg favour before 1620. Nevertheless, the emperors in fact remain curiously remote to much of the evidence herein. Not often do we hear their own voice, as on an occasion when Ferdinand III allowed the frustrations of patronage to well up. He told his confidant Auersperg: ‘Ich habe Euch zu fürsten gemacht, Ihr seit mein geheimer Rat, ich communiciere auch alle Intrinseca quid ultra debeo facere’ (p. 434: italics mine). Ferdinand might at that juncture have been more sensitive to Hengerer’s other prime argument: that the aristocracy, while reshaped by the chang-

ing structures of imperial rule, was able thereby to assert clear social and political primacy in the Habsburg lands, even if (as some contemporaries alleged: p. 565) its proliferation of titles devalued the status of Austrian nobles in the rest of the Reich.

Further possible themes are little in evidence, perhaps surprisingly so. Hengerer does not uncover much faction, in the conventional sense, at the Viennese court—no doubt the absence of intra-dynastic rivalries in the period, a result in good part of the shortage of male archdukes, contributed to this. Nor does Vienna feature much here—beyond some discussion of empresses—as a gendered aulic realm: the absence of any Mätressenwirtschaft evidently had something to do with that (and the place of Hofdamen has lately been examined elsewhere8). Hengerer is strangely brief on venality, although he allows that claims to office could spawn some quasi-venal features (pp. 522–4). He also says little about the implications of a Herrschaftsd, stressing continuity (pp. 539–41), whereas others have pointed to the unusually high incidence of dismissals among the retinue of deceased Habsburg sovereigns. The most curious omission, given Hengerer’s subtitle, concerns the use of language at this famously multilingual court, which he disposes of in a few sentences (p. 176). His approach to Kommunikationsgeschichte tends to the severely conjectural and can, ironically, be very hard to understand; at times it seems to be engaged in intricate statements of the obvious. Yet communication, whether as political debate and publicity, as private correspondence, as ritual, as discourse, as symbol, was surely informed at all points by language, by decisions on what vernacular to employ and in what register, and by the crucial means of identification and exclusion which resulted.9

Hengerer’s book rests on very wide study. On the one hand he makes extensive and imaginative use of sources long in print: above all Pribram and Landwehr von Pragenau’s edition, back in 1903–4, of

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9 A more technical failure of communication: I could not find Hengerer’s announced lists of Amtsträger at: <www.uvk.de/app>; but there is some excellent information on the website of the Vienna University programme noted above.
Leopold I’s intimate correspondence with his ambassador Pötting, and the same emperor’s remarkably playful letters to Czernin (long hidden from most scholars under a Czech title, though the text is in Italian).\footnote{Alfred Francis Pribram and Moritz Landwehr von Pragenau (eds.), \textit{Privatbriefe Kaiser Leopold I. an den Grafen F. E. Pötting}, 1662–73, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1903–4); Zdenek Kalista (ed.), \textit{Korespondence císar Leopolda I. s Humprechtěm Janem Cerniněm z Chudenic} (Prague, 1936).} It is good to confirm that the pioneering prosopography—as we should call it today—of members of the Privy Council by Henry F. Schwarz, completed at Harvard in the dark days of the Second World War, still stands up so well.\footnote{Henry F. Schwarz, \textit{The Imperial Privy Council in the Seventeenth Century} (Cambridge, Mass., 1943), supplement (with John I. Coddington).} Yet Hengerer has also uncovered many excellent manuscript sources, notably the voluminous papers of a leading courtier, Count Franz Albrecht Harrach. A pity that here, too, he sees little need to bring his protagonists to life. After twenty pages on who invited Harrach for meals, and thirty more on his correspondents, we have still not learned much about the actual content of Harrach’s discussions, except for brief excerpts in footnotes (and these, though they occupy anything up to half the text—and in small point—are indexed only in the helpful \textit{Sachregister}, not the \textit{Personenregister}, so much good detail is effectively untraceable). Forty pages on the Trauttmansdorff correspondence likewise do not lead anywhere much; while the numerous passages on Lamberg tell us little about the Oberstklämmerer’s remarkable cultural interests.

So the fruit of Hengerer’s impressive researches is to be measured mostly in quantities, tables, abstractions, collectivities. Yet what a difference the individual touch can make, when he occasionally gives it free rein! This whole volume is full of theorizing about favours and importunity. How much more pointed when an archbishop of Salzburg actually adds the phrase ‘manus manum lavat’, in his own hand, on a letter to Lamberg (p. 493); or when the latter advises a diffident relation: ‘bin der Mainung, Sÿe sollen es begeren, dan ich sihe, der nichts begert, dem gibt man nichts’ (p. 533). Such gems hint that, at court as in scholarship, the best communication may be the most direct.
Book Reviews


In this well-informed account of the bourgeois travelling experience, Philipp Prein traces the origins of modern-day tourism back to its nineteenth-century roots. Based on an impressive number of unpublished and published travel accounts and diaries from Hamburg, and to a lesser degree from Basle and London, Prein’s study suggests that travelling in the nineteenth century was a truly bourgeois experience. The economically successful leisure classes began to travel inside and outside their countries to escape the monotony of everyday life. Although not every successful Hamburg merchant found happiness far away from work, travelling defined Germany’s new leisure class. Being able to afford to travel, however, did not automatically integrate the traveller into the city’s upper middle class. He still needed to prove that he belonged to the city’s leading circles by acting according to a certain set of bourgeois standards and values. Yet as Prein demonstrates, travelling became an essential part of Bürgerlichkeit (bourgeois value systems and attitudes) in the course of the century. In order to explore this theme, Prein approaches nineteenth-century travelling from two angles: first, he analyses travelling as confrontation with a counter-reality, and looks at the impact which modern means of transport and the media had on the experience of travelling; and secondly, he investigates its importance for the formation of class identities.

The book is divided into six chapters. The first two chapters set the scene by highlighting the place of travelling in the life of upper middle-class citizens from Hamburg, Basle, and London, and look at the various forms of travel writing. The following four chapters provide four distinct interpretations. To begin with, Prein analyses the travel experience as a rite de passage in which travelling served to create a counter-reality (Gegenwelt) to the monotonous everyday life back at home. However, the encounter with this Gegenwelt was quickly formalized by the production of travel guides which prescribed travel routes, thus standardizing the travel experience. Travel guides, paintings, and images not only provided information about the best routes, they also instructed readers about what to feel at the recommended sights. Since the British were the first to travel, they
also were the first to be scolded for their ‘blindness’. ‘Blind travellers’ ignored the beauty of the land- and cityscapes around them and thoughtlessly followed the recommendations of guidebooks.

Seeing is an important but sometimes underdeveloped theme of this study. Prein suggests that modern media (newspapers, books, museums, pictures etc.) changed the way in which European travellers experienced nature and other cultures. Travel authors participated in the creation of mental images of travel destinations. Photography and film provided ‘real’ pictures that fed the imagination and expectations of their viewers. Long before travellers arrived at their destination, they already possessed ‘clear’ images of the places they were visiting. Film, in particular, produced wide-screen pictures of landscapes such as the Alps, or famous battle scenes such as the Battle of Waterloo. For the viewer/traveller, such media representations almost abolished the distance in time and space between everyday life and vacation experience. Modern transport (trains) further contributed to the loss of space between home and travel destination. Hamburg, once far away from the Alps and from the Mediterranean, ‘moved’ closer to these tourist destinations. The space in between, it seemed, ‘disappeared’. The result was an acceleration in the pace of travelling and sightseeing, and the counter-reality became integrated into the ‘normal world’.

However, formalized travel and the proximity of the two realities resulted in a loss of authenticity furthered by technological advances. Faster trains provided the traveller with a landscape that passed quickly and looked increasingly like the pictures on film and photographs. By producing a virtual reality, these pictures contributed to a growing alienation between traveller and nature. This alienation caused travellers to search for the authentic reality, but what they were presented with was a staged authenticity invented by local tourist organizers to please their guests. Thus travelling became a spectacle. Locals and travellers worked hand in hand in the creation of tourist sites—the travellers by coming with expectations and consuming the products of local tourist industries, and the locals by fulfilling the expectations of financially well-off customers. Travel guides brought the travellers to ‘attractive’ vacation spots where local cultures were turned into a ‘product’ which could be sold to tourists.

At the end of the nineteenth century, travelling took on a new connotation as ‘time travelling’. When Wilhelm Liebknecht, for
instance, wrote about his experiences in the United States, he
described it as the country of the future. Travelling was, at the time,
clearly perceived as a movement through time and space. In this
process, some places seemed to be ahead of the traveller’s time while
others appeared to lag behind. Travelling into the countryside came
to be identified with travelling back in time, while visiting a metrop-
olis was seen as a journey into one’s future.

In his last chapter, Prein returns to the issue of travelling as iden-
tity-formation. Travel allowed tourists to look up to, or down on,
members of the social groups and classes to which they felt inferior
or superior. Spending time at spas, for instance, gave middle-class
citizens the chance to admire the lifestyle of the nobility and to min-
gle with noble tourists. Social intercourse with socially superior indi-
viduals provided social climbers with ‘training sessions’, while visit-
ing castles, famous museums, and art galleries offered instruction in
‘good taste’. On the other hand, travelling also offered encounters
with the lower classes and thus allowed well-off tourists to look
down on certain individuals. At the end of the nineteenth century
working-class and, in the context of American cities, poor immigrant
neighbourhoods attracted tourists who had read about the dangers
of such areas. Poor neighbourhoods (the ‘dark side’) thus became
sights that had to be seen. In charting these developments and
exploring the different realities of travel in the nineteenth century,
Prein’s book makes a valuable and thought-provoking contribution
to the history both of class formation and tourism.

THOMAS ADAM is Assistant Professor in the Department of
History at the University of Texas at Arlington. He is the author of
Arbeitermilieu und Arbeiterbewegung in Leipzig 1871–1933 (1999) and
has edited a number of collaborative volumes, the most recent of
which is Philanthropy, Patronage, and Civil Society: Experiences from
Germany, Great Britain, the United States and Canada (2004).

Originally a dissertation directed by Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Cornelius Torp's book is a detailed study of German trade policy in the half century before the First World War, based in particular on the records of the trade policy division of the German foreign office. Methodologically, Torp wants to escape from the 'dead end of a diplomatic history of foreign economic relations'. He aims 'to tie economic- and political-historical analysis closely together' (p. 23). Torp believes previous work on German trade policy has suffered from a number of weaknesses. It has been hampered by the 'dogma' of free trade (pp. 23–4). It has concentrated on tariff policy, neglecting non-tariff measures intended to limit and guide trade. It has concentrated on the internal political aspects of the tariff debate, neglecting the international context. And, finally, it has concentrated on the political decision-making process, neglecting the economic structures and processes that made up the objects of policy. As a result the two most common interpretations—on the one side the thesis of an agricultural-industrial bloc politics dating from Bismarck's turn to protectionism in 1878–9, and on the other, the thesis of negotiation and compromise culminating in Bülow’s ‘middle way’ in 1902—both see German tariff policy exclusively as the product of the unique ‘internal German political constellation’ (p. 21).

Torp believes that the motivation for German policy arose from the process that he labels ‘globalization’, the rising international flows of goods, capital, and people. The study ‘proceeds from the assumption that the economic globalization of the second half of the nineteenth century . . . presented a challenge with which all developed economies saw themselves confronted in a similar manner’. Further, their reactions were often similar, notably in the adoption of protective tariffs (p. 21). In addition, Torp believes that the impact of Germany’s trade policy needs to be judged ‘from case to case’ in the light of economic theory, and especially the new trade theory championed by Paul Krugman and others.

That said, Torp’s approach is neither economic nor comparative. He reworks the available German trade statistics, but does not test
the possible predictions of competing theories of international trade against the statistical record. Nor does he consider non-tariff barriers to trade systematically, although as he notes, Russia’s reaction to German quarantine regulations in 1896 shows how sensitive the issue could become (pp. 300–1). Rather, he first considers Germany’s position in the network of international trade, then deals with each of the major events in German tariff policy, and finally concludes with case studies of German trade policy towards Russia and the United States in the decade before 1914.

The Zollverein (German Customs Union) and its member states did not collect complete trade figures. Following unification, systematic reporting only began with a law passed in 1880, and in fact remained incomplete until the 1920s (p. 53). The figures used today begin in the late 1880s and rest on estimates of varying levels of reliability. They do show that as Germany’s industrial sector developed, German exports rose faster than German national product, and also faster than total world exports. They also show that German imports increased even faster than exports. Food imports rose in step with national product, but imports of industrial raw materials rose much more rapidly. Further, the average prices of exports declined relative to the average prices of imports. Germany’s terms of trade therefore declined, and Germany had a negative balance of trade that worsened over time. However, Torp raises Walther G. Hoffmann’s estimate of the return on Germany’s foreign investments, and concludes that Germany earned more than enough from its investments and service income to cover the trade deficit. Germany’s overall balance of payments was therefore continuously positive and rising over time (pp. 71–2, 85, table 5, and Appendix).

Torp concludes that there were persistent structural imbalances in the international economic system before 1914. To counter the outflow of service and interest payments, debtor countries attempted to increase their positive trade balances further through ‘restrictive’ trade policies. This, in turn, posed the risk of a ‘structural adjustment crisis’ in creditor countries such as Germany and therefore pushed them to adopt trade policies intended to maintain the status quo (p. 73). Two countries that particularly concerned Germany were Russia and the United States, suppliers of food and industrial raw materials. While the share of the United States in German exports declined from 12.5 to 7.1 per cent from 1889 to 1913, the proportion of German
imports from the United States doubled, from 7.9 to 15.9 per cent. Russia’s share of German exports rose from 5.5 to 8.7 per cent, but Russia’s share of the rising German import total remained constant at around 13 per cent. In both cases the result was a persistent and rapidly increasing German trade deficit (pp. 84, 294–9, and tables 7 and 9).

Both Russia and the United States adopted high tariffs on industrial imports in 1890. Following a nasty trade war, Russia, dependent on German markets for its grain and on German industry for its own development, signed trade treaties in 1894 and again in 1904, though Torp believes the scheduled renewal in 1917 would not have proceeded without ‘friction’ (pp. 232–4). In contrast, the United States, whose imports from Germany consisted largely of manufactured goods that competed with American products, and whose largest exports to Germany were tariff-free raw materials and most importantly cotton and copper, two critical products unobtainable elsewhere in the world, repeatedly extracted concessions from Germany while giving little or nothing in return (pp. 352–3).

Inside the German economy the interests of different branches might be expected to diverge, depending on their relations with the changing international environment. In agriculture, grain producers who faced the loss of export markets and increasing competition from imports might be expected to seek protection, while animal producers might favour lower-cost imported feed. In industry, the expanding export-oriented machinery, electrical, and chemical branches would have little interest in tariffs, but would be damaged by tariffs imposed by Germany’s trading partners. The mature textile branch and the vertically integrated and cartelized heavy iron and steel branches differed substantially in structure, but when facing intense international competition, both might look for protection (pp. 95–120).

Within this framework Torp devotes separate chapters to the free trade era of the 1860s, Bismarck’s decision to introduce tariffs in the 1870s, the trade treaties concluded by Chancellor Leo von Caprivi in the 1890s, and the tariff reform of Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow in 1902. In the 1860s the interests of an expanding industrial and commercial class intersected with those of the governing elite in Prussia. Free trade as an economic dogma worked to exclude protectionist Austria from any proposed German state, but the impact of free trade policies did not damage the interests of any significant group (ch. 3).
In the 1870s expanding transport systems opened new agricultural areas, and German grain farmers lost their traditional markets. Textile and iron and steel producers, traditionally protectionist, suffered in a prolonged depression. The changed situation suited both the financial and the political interests of Bismarck, and the result was the new tariffs imposed in 1879, although in Torp’s view the international tendency toward protectionism suggests that ‘sooner or later’ Germany would have adopted tariffs in any case (ch. 4, and p. 168).

Caprivi’s trade treaties have always been something of a puzzle, a seeming aberration in the story of increasing interest group intransigence and political paralysis leading to 1914 and beyond. For Torp, the shifting forces of globalization are again the key. Germany became more dependent on the international economy than ever, as imports had reached 17.1 per cent of German national product in 1889-93. But internationally protectionism was rising, and exports were only 10.6 per cent of national product. The treaties lowered tariffs on agricultural imports while gaining concessions for Germany’s industrial exports. Lost income from reduced duties would be more than offset by a more favourable trade balance, and as Caprivi pointed out, the treaties had the additional benefit of extending over long periods, allowing ‘every industry’ to plan and adjust in a secure environment. As Caprivi also argued, they also offset the damage being done by the ‘brutal’ protectionist policies of the United States and Russia (ch. 5, and pp. 179, 182).

But Caprivi’s treaties also stimulated hysterical opposition in agricultural circles, culminating in the debate over the trade treaty with Russia, and contributing to his fall from office. Torp follows a long line of scholars here, but the neat connection between ‘globalization’ and tariff policy begins to break down, for as Torp himself says, trade and ‘especially’ tariff policies had acquired ‘an important symbolic dimension . . . that continually increased in importance’. Opposition to the Russian treaty was in Torp’s view ‘economically irrational’ from the standpoint of Germany’s international position. The contemporary fear that a flood of Russian imports would depress domestic prices was demonstrably incorrect, because prices had come to be set in international markets, a point made in the Reichstag by Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein, speaking in his capacity as state secretary in the foreign office. Nevertheless opposition
continued, despite attempts to buy it off with concessions elsewhere (pp. 206–9).

The analytical problems become more difficult in the chapter on the Bülow tariff reform. Torp rejects both overarching ideologies, as expressed in the ‘agricultural or industrial state’ debate of the late 1890s, and formalized models of economic interest groups as explanatory frameworks for German protectionism (pp. 212–17). Instead he first says that ‘a detailed analysis of the political decision-making process’ may show the balance of causes and effects (p. 214), an approach he identified as a weakness in previous works. He then again outlines the various economic interest groups, adding the Social Democrats and consumers to the previous listing (pp. 217–51). The repeated denial of economic determinism notwithstanding, in the presentation their motives appear one-sidedly and rather simplistically economic. The ‘split in the executive’ (pp. 251–70) and Bülow’s problems with the Reichstag (pp. 270–91) reflected and grew out of these divisions.

If, as Torp concludes, policy formulation and political decision-making under Bülow ‘degenerated’ into ‘a politics of muddling through’ (p. 289, italics and English in original), then explanations of the German story will have to return to the study of internal politics that he has rejected. Germany’s position in the world economy was important, but Germany’s response was determined by its peculiar history. The compromises worked out first within the government, and then in the Reichstag, were in turn implacably rejected by the agrarians, but finally manoeuvred through. However, Bülow’s success suggests that the sort of leader who could balance the centrifugal forces in the popularly elected Reichstag as well as the equally divisive forces within the monarchical government was more likely to contribute to the paralysis than overcome it. There may have been no deep-laid plot to support the Junker class with agricultural tariffs, or to buy industry’s support with increased spending on the navy (pp. 289–90), but muddling through from crisis to crisis looks, in retrospect, almost as darkly ominous.
sively on German history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Among his most recent publications is *A History of Modern Germany since 1815* (2003). He is also a co-editor-in-chief of the *International Journal of Science and Research*. 
ANNIKA MOMBAUER and WILHELM DEIST (eds.), *The Kaiser: New Research on Wilhelm II’s Role in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), xv + 299 pp. ISBN 0 521 82408 7. £40.00 (US $60.00) (hardback)

MARTIN KOHLRAUSCH, *Der Monarch im Skandal: Die Logik der Massenmedien und die Transformation der wilhelminischen Monarchie*, Elitenwandel in der Moderne, 7 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2005), 536 pp. ISBN 3 05 00420 3. EUR 59.80 (hardback)

Any historian working on Wilhelm II’s rule today stands on the shoulders of John C. G. Röhl. More than anyone else Röhl, long-serving Professor of European History at the University of Sussex, has made it academically respectable to write about the last Hohenzollern emperor. This subject is no longer left to outsiders from the ranks of non-historians, such as the writer and journalist Emil Ludwig, who in 1925 wrote the first widely read biography of Wilhelm II, or the lawyer Erich Eyck, who after 1945 produced the first study of the monarch’s personal rule based on a thorough examination of the sources.¹ Going against the Zeitgeist among German historians, who long either ignored his work or, like Hans-Ulrich Wehler, dismissed it as ‘structurally blind personalism’, Röhl insisted that interpreting the Wilhelmine age around the person of the Emperor was justified. Röhl’s work, starting with his Ph.D. thesis on the crisis of government in the 1890s, going on to his essays on the Imperial Hofstaat, his three-volume edition of the Eulenburg correspondence, and the first two volumes of his monumental biography of Wilhelm II, provide the basis for all subsequent research on the Hohenzollern monarchy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.²


two works under review here demonstrate two different directions that research building on the work of Röhl can take.

The volume edited by Annika Mombauer and the late Freiburg historian Wilhelm Deist as a Festschrift for Röhl’s 65th birthday collects thirteen contributions by his students and friends. It promises an up-to-date assessment of the controversial monarch on the basis of the most recent source-based research. The authors share Röhl’s view that it is impossible to write a history of Wilhelmine Germany without ‘due consideration for the country’s last monarch’ (p. 5). A common framework of interpretation is provided by the concept of ‘Königsmechanismus’ (king mechanism), which Röhl borrowed from the sociologist Norbert Elias and later modified into ‘persönliche Monarchie’ (personal monarchy). This concept refers to the view that Wilhelmine court society with the Emperor at its centre formed a ruling structure above the economic, social, and administrative hierarchies. By rejecting or accepting particular political measures, or by influencing individual appointments, they dictated the course taken by the Empire. The essays by Annika Mombauer on the Boxer Rebellion and Rodrick R. McLean on the genesis of the Russo–German Treaty of Björkø in 1905 demonstrate how strongly Wilhelm II used this instrument to intervene in day-to-day politics, and especially in foreign policy. Michael Epkenhans underlines once again that the Emperor had long-term strategic plans, vague and contradictory though they might have been, concerning Germany’s building of a fleet. The monarch had been an enthusiast for this since his youth, and he pushed it forward decisively with the appointment and promotion of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz. For domestic politics, Katharine A. Lerman takes the Prussian and Imperial administrative elites and demonstrates that the Emperor’s power to make decisions concerning appointments was central to loyalty relations and the lack of enthusiasm for reform within the state administration. The Berlin administration, Lerman sums up, ‘remained the Kaiser’s elite in that ministers and state secretaries saw themselves primarily as servants of the crown and were not prepared to seek support from the Reichstag for significant political reforms’ (p. 89).

The essays by Matthew Seligmann, Ragnhild Fiebig-von Hase, and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann show what further significance direct personal relations with the monarch had for foreign and domestic politics in Wilhelmine Germany. Seligmann demonstrates
that Wilhelm II’s personal predilection for everything to do with the military led him to maintain especially close contacts with the British military attachés in Berlin. This allowed him to communicate directly with the British government, by-passing the formal diplomatic channels. Fiebig-von Hase interprets the Emperor’s ‘friendship’ with the American president, Theodore Roosevelt, as a ‘revealing model for the functioning of Wilhelm II’s “personal regime” in foreign policy’ (p. 145). Her comparison between the Emperor’s ‘personal diplomacy’ and Roosevelt’s successes as a statesman proves to be devastating for the German side: ‘Roosevelt and his advisers excelled in their rational evaluation of international developments, their country’s strength, the international environment, and even the psyche of their counter-players . . . In the Byzantinistic “personal regime” it became more important to please and satisfy the vanities of the Kaiser than to pursue a rational foreign policy and present Germany as a reliable partner in the community of nations’ (p. 174). The ‘personal regime’ had similarly disastrous consequences in domestic politics, as Pogge von Strandmann shows in his essay on Walther Rathenau’s perception of Wilhelminism. The intellectual industrialist was fully aware of the weaknesses of the dysfunctional Byzantinism at the Emperor’s court, as his critical analyses published after 1918 reveal. But until the end of the war he complied with the conditions imposed by the court, and advanced to become one of the most successful beneficiaries of the system of protection based on the monarch.

In their investigations of Wilhelm II’s power during the First World War, Matthew Stibbe and Holger Afflerbach go beyond Röhl’s earlier studies which had conceded the monarch the role merely of a ‘shadow emperor’ after 1914. Afflerbach, however, emphasizes that Wilhelm’s control over personal appointments gave him crucial reserves of power at least until the appointment of Paul von Hindenburg as Supreme Commander in August 1916. And in individual cases, he made effective use of them, as his retention of Erich von Falkenhayn until the summer of 1916, against the opposition of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, showed. ‘By way of his right to veto all important decisions’, Afflerbach sums up, ‘Wilhelm II could prevent or delay all important developments that he opposed, even if this did perhaps not amount to active policy making. What is more, his surroundings often expected or anticipated his veto and decided not to propose solutions with which he might disagree’ (pp. 215–16). In this...
way, the Emperor retained his central position within the Empire’s decision-making mechanisms in critical situations until well into the second half of the First World War, as Stibbe makes clear using the example of the transition to unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917. In this context, Stibbe suggests that the Emperor’s motives may have included that he ‘did not want to appear weak-willed in the face of his military and naval advisors . . . On top of this, [he] may have feared that he would not live up to the glorious precedents set by Friedrich the Great and by his grandfather’ (p. 234).

These considerations take us to the area of intellectual and cultural influences. They demonstrate the limits of narrowly defined political, diplomatic, and military history, and point to the need to expand traditional research approaches in the direction of a history of mentalities and cultural history as outlined by Bernd Sösemann and Isabel V. Hull in two of the most original and methodologically innovative essays in the volume. Sösemann sees the forms and the impact of the monarchy’s public self-presentation at anniversary celebrations, speeches by the Emperor, and popular festivals as one of the main factors in the undermining and, ultimately, the collapse of the Hohenzollern monarchy: ‘The emphatic identification of the Kaiser with the state, practised over decades, and the covert, but latently effective identification of the history of Prussia, or rather of the Hohenzollern, with that of the German Reich in official celebrations, connected the public perception and fate of one person with that of the state. This ideology and societal development . . . were among the prerequisites for the collapse of the monarchy and the revolutionary events of the autumn and winter of 1918–19’ (p. 62). In her essay on military culture and the end of the Hohenzollern monarchy in the First World War, Hull, too, emphasizes that the identification of the Emperor with the state placed excessive demands on Wilhelm II.3 ‘The war released the dynamics of extremism inherent in military culture, while the monarchy seemed to stand still’, she writes. ‘When forced to choose, many, perhaps most monarchists in the officer corps and upper officialdom found military–cultural tenets more real seeming and compelling than the paler “traditions” of the young monarchy’ (p. 258).

3 For more detail on this see now Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaka, NY, 2005).
Martin Kohlrausch, in the second book under review here, also subscribes to the thematic and methodological expansion of research on Wilhelm suggested by Sösemann and Hull. Kohlrausch, now a Research Fellow at the German Historical Institute in Warsaw, studied at Sussex where he was, for a time, also a student of Röhl’s. In his study Kohlrausch explicitly picks up the analytical notion of the Königsmechanismus, especially in the form of the ‘personal monarchy’ as developed by Röhl in the second volume of his biography of Wilhelm, which alludes more strongly than before to the programmatic nature of Wilhelm II’s rule. The concept of the ‘Programmonarchie’ (programmatic monarchy) serves Kohlrausch as the starting point for his study, which focuses on the last German Emperor as the object of media attention. Specifically, Kohlrausch’s aim is to close three gaps in research on Wilhelm II. First he looks at the hitherto neglected dimension of the media in Wilhelm’s rule; he systematically examines media commentaries on the monarch and analyses their central terminologies. Secondly, he studies the structural influences of the emergent mass media as a crucial but hitherto hardly investigated component of the ‘political mass market’ (Hans Rosenberg) on the monarchical system. And thirdly, he pursues the discursive transformation of the Wilhelmine monarchy beyond its end in 1918 and also investigates developments in the interwar period, in particular, the gradual superimposition, in the public discourse, of a still rather undefined Führer figure on the monarch.

As a way of approaching these leading questions, which are not all easy to grasp methodologically, Kohlrausch has chosen to concentrate on scandals in which Wilhelm II was involved. From the large number of potential examples, the author has selected three which are representative, respectively, of the early period, middle, and end of Wilhelm’s rule. Moreover, Kohlrausch believes that the scandals he has chosen were responsible for particularly drastic changes in public views of the monarch: the Caligula affair of 1894; the double scandal concerning the camarilla and the Daily Telegraph interview between 1906 and 1909; and the scandalous end of the monarchy with Wilhelm’s flight via Spa to Doorn. Kohlrausch interprets the affair of Ludwig Quidde’s Caligula pamphlet, which was not difficult to decode as a historical allegory of contemporary conditions in Germany, as the opening of a constant ‘discursive process of dismantling taboos’ (p. 446) around the monarch. The scandals of
1906 to 1909 surrounding the Emperor’s confidant, Philipp zu Eulenburg, and the *Daily Telegraph* interview are then interpreted as a critical turning point in Wilhelm’s rule. They resulted in increasing disillusionment with the monarch, and a constant radicalization of expectations of leadership, some of which were directed against the ruler. Discussion of the Emperor’s flight from Germany in the late autumn of 1918, which was seen as scandalous, for the first time concentrated directly on the perceived errors and shortcomings of Wilhelm II, without going via historical analogy or his advisers.

In the course of this gradual reinterpretation of the ruler by the mass media, according to Kohlrausch, traditional, supra-individual rulers’ virtues such as wisdom or a knowledge of human nature gave way to what were presumed to be Wilhelm II’s personal qualities. The initially positive individualization of the monarch as a person fulfilled the media’s need to personalize abstract structures and processes, and helped to confer on Wilhelm II a charismatic aura. At the same time, however, the Emperor was now measured by thoroughly bourgeois standards. The traditional ‘language of distinction’ was replaced by the ‘language of proximity’ (p. 462), which emphasized what the monarch had in common with his subjects. The Emperor no longer automatically received respect and obedience on the basis of his God-given position as a ruler, but they were tied to an increasingly refined ‘paradigm of achievement’. This demanded that the monarch had to qualify for his position by his achievements, rather like a company director, with whom Wilhelm II was now increasingly compared.

Kohlrausch interprets the media’s bending of the monarch to bourgeois standards as an achievement of a process of democratization, which was supplemented by ever more frequent calls for the people to be able to communicate with the ruler through the press. In an original insight, the author interprets this sort of demand for participation as a specifically German expression of the contemporary trend towards democratization, which elsewhere resulted in an increase in the power of parliaments. In Germany, by contrast, political discussion increasingly shifted out of the Reichstag and into the press. This observation, according to Kohlrausch, also explains why demands for parliamentarism remained so weak in Germany without the need for recourse to ‘the analytically extremely unsatisfactory argument of a general authoritarianism’ (p. 298). This highly inter-
esting thesis needs to be tested in future studies, because despite his meticulous assessment of more than a hundred national and regional newspapers and journals, several hundred pamphlets and leaflets, and numerous archives and private papers, Kohlrausch’s self-imposed limitation to three carefully selected examples, understandable though it is in practical terms, cannot support such wide-ranging conclusions.

Nonetheless, his work represents a milestone in research on the Wilhelmine monarchy because it sets new substantive and methodological horizons for future work. In some respects it has trends in common with many of the contributions to the Röhl Festschrift. Recent research on the Wilhelmine Empire has concentrated more and more on the years after 1907 and on the ‘dissolution of monarchical power, increasingly paralysed peripheral power and the rise of the military’, identified by Volker Berghahn in his essay in the Röhl Festschrift as the key themes of future research (p. 293). Thus less attention is paid to Wilhelm II as an individual and more to interdependencies, dependencies, and the impact of the monarch and his office. Most of the authors represented in the volume edited by Mombauer and Deist also concede that the old and new military, economic, administrative, and political elites set ever tighter limits on Wilhelm II’s room for manoeuvre, without going as far as Wolfgang J. Mommsen, who presented Wilhelm II as a mere puppet of the Prussian-German power elites. Epkenhans, for example, is completely justified in reminding us that the success of Wilhelm’s navy-building programme would have been unlikely if not impossible ‘if the importance of enlarging the navy had not been realized by a steadily increasing number of people’ (p. 21). In this context, the grass-roots politicization of broad sections of the population, which included the impact of the ‘media revolution’ investigated by Kohlrausch, opened up new fields of activity for the Emperor. At the same time, however, it restricted his freedom of action in other areas.


5 It is true that enthusiasm for the navy was not restricted to the Emperor and his court. Indeed, it was not even limited to Germany, but was an international phenomenon; cf. Rolf Hobson, Maritimer Imperialismus: Seemachtsideologie, seestraategisches Denken und der Tirpitzplan 1875 bis 1914 (Munich, 2004).
Other aspects of Kohlrausch’s study, by contrast, go against the trend of most the essays in the Röhl Festschrift. In conclusion, I shall outline three of these areas of tension because they provide material for discussions of content and methodology which may be useful for future research. First, there is the issue of overestimating or underestimating the Emperor’s influence. Most of the authors in the volume edited by Mombauer and Deist attempt to refute the thesis of the ‘shadow Emperor’ long supported by the mainstream of German historians. Explicitly or implicitly, they argue against a historiographical underestimate of Wilhelm II’s significance by looking for evidence of his influence (mostly considered disastrous). Kohlrausch, by contrast, is interested in the contemporary overestimation of the Emperor’s influence, which in his opinion made possible the intensity of the discourse on the monarchy in Germany. Kohlrausch explains the fact that the Emperor’s pronouncements even on trivial matters outside the sphere of political decision-making were considered to be of great significance by pointing more to Wilhelm’s ‘function as a hinge between political communication and the formation of public consensus’ (p. 445) than to his actual power. The result of these different emphases is that the essays in the Röhl Festschrift highlight the extent of the Emperor’s room for manoeuvre and his opportunities to exert direct and indirect influence, despite all the limitations placed on him. Kohlrausch, by contrast, repeatedly stresses the narrow limits imposed on the court’s attempts to direct press policy given an increasingly differentiated and confident press.

The second point concerns Wilhelm II’s personality. Most of the authors represented in the Röhl Festschrift deal with the Emperor’s nature, his character flaws, and his psychological peculiarities in order to find appropriate explanations for particular aspects of Germany’s political history. Kohlrausch, by contrast, seeks structural reasons why contemporaries suddenly regarded the monarch’s personality with increased interest at all. He argues that it was the mass media with their tendency to individualize the ruler and personalize politics that placed the Emperor’s character at the centre of general interest. It is not the actual qualities of the person that interest him, but the attributes which the public discourses ascribed to the Emperor. For Kohlrausch’s approach, the real Wilhelm is important only as a projection screen: ‘The monarch had to be controversial and problematic, had to be considered a disaster by many of his
commentators in order to gain outstanding relevance for the media’ (p. 445).

The third controversial aspect concerns the processes of democratization and modernization in Wilhelmine Germany. In the interpretations of most of the authors in the volume edited by Mombauer and Deist, the Emperor and his household appear as a late absolutist relic of the past which blocked the country’s smooth transition to modernity with fatal consequences. Kohlrausch, by contrast, points to the potential for integration which the Emperor possessed as the focus and pivot of Germany’s political discussions dominated by the media. Along with the ideal of a ‘domestication of the monarchy by the media’ (p. 453) accepted by large sections of the population, therefore, Kohlrausch’s interpretation contains a certain scope for adapting the monarchical principle to changed political, social, and media conditions which did not necessarily oppose the democratizing tendencies of the time. Kohlrausch also sees a striking continuity between the discourses of monarchy and Führer in the formulation of political programmes by a political leader outside parliament, transmitted by the mass media. He therefore pointedly describes the type of the ‘Führer’, omnipresent in the discourses of Weimar, as ‘a version of the monarch in conformity with the media’ (p. 472).

It may have become clear by now that the positions outlined here do not logically exclude each other. Rather, they point to the tension between structure and agency which is inherent in all historical interpretations, but has to be recalibrated anew in each individual case. They also make it clear that cultural history approaches can, in important ways, supplement the framework for interpreting the rule of Wilhelm II developed by John Röhl. In particular, the history of political communication can open important new perspectives on power relations in Wilhelmine Germany.

DOMINIK GEPPERT, previously a Research Fellow of the GHIL, is Privatdozent at the Free University of Berlin. He is currently completing a study entitled ‘Press Wars’: Diplomacy and the Public Sphere in
Ninety years ago, on 1 July 1916, one of the bloodiest battles of the First World War began. After seven days of heavy bombardment had prepared the ground, British troops left their trenches on the Western Front to attack the enemy in a battle which was intended to pave the way to final victory. Only a few hours later, this plan had utterly failed. British casualties amounted to almost 60,000 dead or wounded. Many units which had gone over the top in the early morning simply no longer existed in the evening. The 15 West Yorkshire Regiment, for example, suffered 539 casualties out of 750 who had attacked; the cost to the Newfoundland battalion, which was part of 29 Division, was even greater—272 killed and 438 wounded out of 790 deployed. Other regiments hardly fared better. The 11 Sussex, which lost 691 out of 800 men, summed up the disaster of 1 July when night fell: ‘Wave after wave were mown down by machine gun fire . . . very few reached the German line’ (p. 98). Instead of achieving a breakthrough or, at least, making any considerable territorial gains, Kitchener’s new armies were dying in no-man’s-land within hours, obviously as the result of a series of grave mistakes which could have been avoided. When fighting eventually ceased in November because of the weather and because both sides were exhausted, casualty figures were terrible in every respect. A total of 432,000 British soldiers, or 3,600 for every day, had become casualties. A closer look at the divisions engaged in the battle further highlights the dramatic extent of British casualties: 15 of the 52 divisions engaged no longer existed, and the average casualty figures in those that remained ranged between 70 and 85 per cent of their usual strength. Compared to British casualties, the German army had suffered ‘only’ minor losses totalling 230,000 after four months of fighting.

What had gone wrong? Although many books have dealt with the Battle of the Somme, which still looms large in British public memory, Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson once again analyse the preparations for the attack and the course of operations which began on 1 July, and eventually came to a standstill on 19 November 1916. As a result of their very detailed analysis they challenge many conventional views of the Battle of the Somme.
First, there can be no doubt that both Britain’s political and military leadership must be held responsible for the Somme disaster. Right from the start, the cabinet had been involved in discussions about the nature of the 1916 campaign. Although cabinet had demanded assurances from Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, and Douglas Haig, commander-in-chief of the British Expeditionary Force, that the battle would be fought with due regard for manpower resources and that fighting would not begin before superiority in guns and ammunition had been secured, it never examined the assurances given by the military. When the battle began, cabinet always remained in the dark about its purpose and its nature. Even though it could have known better by August, as Churchill’s harsh criticism of Haig’s operations illustrates, it did not demand a change in Haig’s conduct of battle because of the lack of a clear alternative. Thus as Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson rightly claim, the civilian leadership failed the men for whom they claimed to be trustees (p. 309).

Second, in sharp contrast to the conventional view that Kitchener’s new army was unable to carry out complicated manoeuvres, both authors stress that it was not the men who failed, but their commanders. Their detailed research reveals that battalion commanders, for example, considered their men skilled enough for quite sophisticated manoeuvres. It was not the lack of training but the inadequacy of fire support which eventually turned the first day of battle, as well as the many others that followed, into almost total disaster. Although 19 million shells, or 150,000 every day, were poured on to German positions, British artillery fire lacked accuracy. Moreover, British commanders did not fully appreciate the impact of the creeping barrage on the crossing of no-man’s-land. As a result, British soldiers often became casualties before they reached enemy trenches, if not before they even reached their own parapet. The performance of XIII Corps on 1 July, that of the Fourth Army on 14 July, and the successful attack on 23 September demonstrate that the British infantry could perform as well as their enemy if preparations and artillery support were adequate.

It is hardly astonishing that Robin Prior’s and Trevor Wilson’s judgement on Britain’s commanders is devastating. None of them seemed capable of fulfilling the task assigned to them. With regard to Haig, hardly any of his claims stand up to detailed scrutiny. The
Battle of the Somme was planned neither to relieve the French at Verdun nor to pin the Germans to the Western Front in order to help the Russians. Moreover, Haig’s planning had nothing to do with the idea of wearing down German military strength by attritional warfare. Instead, he wanted to win the campaign, if not the war, at a single stroke and by gallant cavalry sweeps. In this respect Haig tried to imitate the example of Napoleon. However, this could not work in the age of industrial warfare. Accordingly, Haig failed at both strategic and tactical level. He was unable to develop an appropriate strategy which effectively used modern weapons such as heavy artillery, tanks, and aircraft. Nor was he capable of developing a method of fighting in the maze of trench defences, barbed wire, and massed artillery and machine-guns. Unfortunately, neither Haig nor Lloyd George, who became Prime Minister in the aftermath of the Battle of the Somme, and was one of the former’s most severe critics, changed British strategy in 1917. Instead, for lack of any concrete alternative, they mounted further large and unproductive offensives on the Western Front—again causing thousands of unnecessary casualties.

In describing this battle, almost day by day, from different points of view, Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson help us to understand a campaign which lacked a coherent military strategy and responsible political leadership. Thus they also deepen our knowledge of a war which was to have a great impact on British and European history in the short as well as the long run.

MICHAEL EPKENHANS is Director of the Otto von Bismarck Foundation in Friedrichsruh. He is the author of several volumes on the Imperial German Navy, including Die wilhelminische Flottenrüstung 1908–1914: Weltmachtstreben, industrieller Fortschritt, soziale Integration (1991) and Tirpitz: Architect of the German High Seas Fleet (2006). He has also edited a number of books on military history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, most recently, with Karen Hagemann and Stig Förster, Militärische Erinnerungskultur (2006).

The recent opening of the Vatican Archives for the period up to 1939 has now provided scholars with an opportunity to gain a more informed and nuanced understanding of the Roman Catholic Church’s policies and attitudes towards National Socialism in its first years of power in Germany. As is well known, extensive controversy, often virulent and ill-informed, has arisen over the alleged failure of the Catholic authorities to condemn the Nazi regime and its flagrant crimes against humanity. For more than forty years now this debate has raged, but in the absence of the principal body of source material, it has too often been an unseemly and unscholarly activity. With the appearance of Gerhard Besier’s summary account of political developments for the period 1933 to 1939,¹ however, and now Dominik Burkard’s analysis of the activities of the Holy Office, formerly known as the Inquisition, we are much better informed as to the parameters within which this debate should take place.

Burkard rightly points out that all the previous literature focused on the political relations between the Nazi state and the Catholic Church. The signing of the Reich Concordat in July 1933 was certainly a highly political act, designed to secure a favourable relationship with Hitler’s new regime. But, as is now well known, the Nazis had no desire to implement the spirit of this accord. And the area of least agreement was the ideological sphere, where for several years a heated exchange of books, pamphlets, and propaganda had already indicated a wide and seemingly unbridgeable gulf. It is precisely this area of controversy and the policies pursued by the Vatican’s Holy Office in regard to Nazi publications which Burkard now investigates with precision and careful scrutiny of the available archival sources. His overall intention is to refute the sensationalist charges of ‘collaboration’ between the Vatican and the Nazi propagandists, especially on such matters as anti-Semitism. On the other hand, he draws attention

¹ Gerhard Besier, Der Heilige Stuhl und Hitler-Deutschland: Die Faszination des Totalitäre (Munich, 2004).
to the striking ambivalence of some of the Roman officials, and of some of the clergy in Germany and outside.

Burkard’s prime focus is on how the Vatican’s Holy Office dealt with Alfred Rosenberg’s major publication, *The Myth of the Twentieth Century* (1930). As editor of the chief Nazi newspaper, the *Völkischer Beobachter*, and as one of Hitler’s inner circle, Rosenberg undoubtedly enjoyed considerable standing in the Party’s ranks. But his book, despite enormous print-runs, was never officially approved, and Hitler could even dismiss it as a private work. The Church authorities, however, regarded it as a central expression of the Nazi movement’s ideology and ethic, with its attendant virulent anti-Christian attitude—and in February 1934 placed it on the Index of forbidden books.

Burkard’s first task is to elucidate the stages which led to this provocative step. One theory is that the first attempt to have Rosenberg’s book banned came in 1931 from the Jesuits in Holland, who recognized early on that its onslaughts on the Church and its sweeping praise for racist and nationalist ideas were incompatible with Christian doctrine. But in 1933—the year of illusions—the Curia, led by Cardinal Pacelli, still hoped that the Concordat would achieve a *modus vivendi*, when such authors as Rosenberg would be relegated to the sidelines and a new climate of co-operation would prevail. But this did not happen. By the end of 1933, the continuation of anti-clerical outbursts and anti-Catholic agitation within the ranks of the Nazi Party led to pressure on the Vatican to take more open measures of protest. As Secretary of State, Pacelli was certainly considering formal diplomatic steps, such as the publication of a White Book outlining the Nazi regime’s breaches of the newly signed Concordat. But instead, it is suggested, the less incendiary step was agreed of placing *The Myth* and a similar booklet by another Nazi propagandist, Ernst Bergmann, *The German National Church*, on the list of banned books.

An alternative theory is that the indexing of these books was a deliberate tactic of the Holy Office designed to drive a wedge between the two factions in the Nazi Party as they perceived them: the one, set on attacking the Christian churches root and branch, in favour of an exaggerated German religious nationalism, and calling for a new German man, no longer shackled by Judeo-Christian-Roman superstitions; and secondly, those favouring a Nazi revival
based solely on political renewal, but maintaining the spiritual and moral bases of the past, through support of existing church structures. By isolating Rosenberg and his ideas, and by dismissing his book as a ‘private work’, the Holy Office hoped to uphold the kind of Christian nationalism which Hitler himself allegedly supported. This was the line supposedly followed by the prominent German Catholic and former Reich Chancellor, Franz von Papen, whose influence, however, drastically waned during 1933–4. It was also adopted in numerous articles in the Jesuits’ main publication, Civiltà Cattolica. By this means the heretical errors of Rosenberg’s racist ideology could be castigated even while the hope for a political collaboration based on the Concordat could still be maintained.

This was exactly the stance taken by a consultant of the Holy Office, Bishop Alois Hudal, who was responsible for the assessment which led to Rosenberg’s book being condemned in February 1934. Hudal has long had an extremely debatable reputation, and for this reason is little known among English-speaking observers of the Vatican scene. Burkard’s researches into Hudal’s surviving papers are therefore helpful. Born an Austrian, he became in 1923 the Rector of the Anima, the college in Rome for German-speaking students, and later a consultant of the Holy Office. He was an active publicist, and had already produced several short works dealing with the Church’s involvement in current political debates. It was only logical, therefore, that he should have been assigned the task of assessing the publications of prominent Nazis, such as Rosenberg and Bergmann. Burkard makes clear that Hudal consistently attacked the excesses of the Blood-and-Soil ideologues, the anti-Christian bases of Germanic religions, and the Nazi contempt for all aspects of Judaism and its history. But at the same time he viewed sympathetically the Nazi plans for re-building German society, and openly expressed his opinion that Catholicism could well co-exist with an acceptable form of National Socialism.

It was on this basis, Burkard suggests, that Hudal’s advice to ban Rosenberg’s Myth was adopted by the Holy Office, and confirmed by the Pope himself. Rosenberg was, of course, all the more convinced of the iniquity of the clerical clique in the Vatican, its anti-German myopia, and the blindness and hypocrisy of the Catholic hierarchy. In the following years he became even more actively involved in his propaganda campaign against the Church, and aroused open hostil-
ity from both Catholics and Protestants by his violent attacks on their faiths. But Hitler never publicly endorsed such radicalism, and other leading Nazis, like Göring and Goebbels, were openly dismissive. Catholic spokesmen therefore felt free to express their opposition. They criticized Rosenberg in writing, even when they meant the whole Nazi regime. In reply, in 1935, Rosenberg issued another incendiary booklet, *An die Dunkelmänner unserer Zeit*, which likewise was placed on the Index by the Holy Office. To the end of his days, Rosenberg saw the Vatican as Germany’s chief enemy.

Within the ranks of the German Catholics there were those who hoped that placing Rosenberg’s book on the Index would mark the beginning of a more general mobilization of Catholic opposition to Nazi extremism. But, in the event, this did not happen, even after the scandalous murder of leading Catholics during the Röhm putsch. Political prudence was to dominate the relationship, and the Vatican constantly placed restraints on those who urged a more outspoken defiance. At the same time, these factors also led to restraints being placed on those, like Hudal, whose enthusiasm for the new regime was embarrassingly inappropriate.

To be sure, political factors also compelled the Nazis to a certain moderation. On the one hand, ardent champions of Rosenberg’s views sought to have them taught as mandatory texts in all schools and party indoctrination sessions. The Gestapo was apparently given orders in certain districts to confiscate any Catholic anti-Rosenberg publications as evidence of their authors’ hostility towards the Nazi Party and state. But on the other hand, such wider events as the Saar plebiscite of 1935 and the Olympic Games of 1936 prompted a more cautious approach. Nevertheless the Nazi propagandists had free rein to disseminate their wares on a massive scale, while Catholic responses were limited in their outreach. As a result, the Catholic faithful were confused. Their dilemma of how to resolve the competing loyalties between church and nation remained, and, in fact, only grew worse.

Despite all, Bishop Hudal continued to advocate his hoped-for reconciliation between the Church and a reformed National Socialism. Burkard makes good use of Hudal’s papers to expose clearly the illusory nature of such an attempt. Yet Hudal’s plea that the errors of Nazism should be exposed and condemned on a wider basis—in order to purge the movement of such faults—at first found
a ready response at the Vatican’s highest level. Pope Pius XI himself took up the suggestion that a new Syllabus would be a more effective response than merely banning a heretical book. Such a statement, broadcast world-wide, should clearly outline the Church’s teachings and warnings against the dangers of totalitarianism, radical racism, and extreme nationalism. In fact, this plan was approved. But by the time it had been sifted by various committees within the Vatican bureaucracy, more than two years had elapsed.

It was just at this juncture in 1936 that Hudal published a new book, Die Grundlagen des Nationalsozialismus, seeking to build a more constructive relationship. The book appeared in Austria with the approval of the Viennese cardinal, but again indulged in all sorts of wishful thinking. The response in the Vatican’s top circles was one of exasperation, coming as it did when wiser counsels were convinced that Nazi policy was becoming more oppressive, and that therefore no further compromises with Nazism could be entertained. Hudal came to be regarded by his superiors as a naive, and possibly dangerous, individual. He was later to be relegated to the margins of the Vatican’s activities. Needless to say, his book received an equally cool reception from the Nazi authorities.

By late 1936, the Vatican believed it to be more opportune to issue a Papal Encyclical specifically and more critically dealing with the German situation. This eventually was proclaimed in March 1937 with the title *Mit brennender Sorge*. But it is notable that the text was prepared without the help of the Holy Office. The result was, however, extremely disappointing. German Catholics were subjected to a renewed bout of oppressive measures, and there was no sign that the Nazi authorities were willing to moderate their ideological stance or anti-clerical campaigns. Above all, the Encyclical did not serve to rally Catholics against the regime. Its failure undoubtedly led the Cardinal Secretary of State, Pacelli, soon to be Pope Pius XII, to distrust this kind of tactic in the on-going struggle to preserve the Church’s autonomy in Germany. The fate of a similarly planned Encyclical on the subject of racism, which was abandoned as soon as Pius XII was elected, proves this point.

Burkard’s lengthy analyses of these debates within the Vatican hierarchy are suggestive rather than definitive, since the conclusive documentation has still not been released. But he is correct in pointing out that, in view of the Nazis’ incessant and noisy onslaughts, the
tactic of placing a few books on the Index was absurd. In any case, the whole idea of trying to control the reading habits of the Catholic faithful was obsolete. And the overwhelming advantage of the Nazi propaganda campaigns clearly showed how ineffective the Vatican’s strategy was in meeting the challenge of these modern myths and heresies.

On the other hand, it was Hudal’s achievement, Burkard suggests, that he saw the need for an on-going and vehement campaign against the ideological errors of Nazism, fascism, and other racist philosophies. But his efforts were to be sabotaged by Pacelli’s politicized calculations. Maintaining the Church’s existence in a beleaguered country seemed to Pacelli to be a higher priority than strident denunciations of ideological heresies or political criminality. Burkard lays out the arguments on both sides, while showing a certain sympathy for Hudal’s position. Too often, he laments, the Vatican’s policies were determined by political rather than theological considerations—a position also adopted by Peter Godman. But Hudal’s idealistic fantasies lacked credibility on either side. Pacelli’s sounder political sense prevailed.

Burkard’s account of these various conflicts within the Vatican bureaucracy led him to the clear conclusion that political factors, not ideological affinity, governed papal attitudes towards the Nazi regime. Daniel Goldhagen’s accusations that the Curia’s officials were rabid anti-Semites supporting Hitler’s policies of racial elimination are, therefore, totally erroneous. The silence of Pope Pius XII on the subject of Nazi crimes during the Second World War was the product not of anti-Semitism, but rather of his diplomatic training and desire to act as an impartial peace-maker between the warring sides. The failure to speak out against the Nazi war-time atrocities was, in fact, in line with the failure to attack Nazi heresies in earlier years. But, as Burkard suggests, the question of how the Church could hope to stem the tide of ideological error with the limited resources at its disposal still needs to be discussed and resolved.

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JOHN S. CONWAY is Emeritus Professor of History at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. He is the author of *The Nazi Persecution of the Churches 1933–1945* (1968) as well as numerous articles dealing with the role of the churches during the Nazi era. He is also the editor of the *Newsletter of the Association of Contemporary Church Historians*. 

*The Roman Catholic Church and Nazism*

Hanns Johst was president of the Nazi Reichsschrifttumskammer (Reich Chamber of Literature) during the Third Reich and praised by Heinrich Himmler as the new Tacitus of the Great Germanic Empire. He was a leading cultural functionary and SS General, an ardent racist with a first-hand knowledge of the Holocaust, arguably the most successful right-wing dramatist of the 1920s, and much admired by Hitler. It is surprising, therefore, that a detailed biography of Johst has not previously been published. Rolf Düsterberg aims to fill this gap with his monumental work.

Largely written as a traditional biography closely following the chronology of Johst’s life and writing, Düsterberg’s work contextualizes the different careers of a poet who felt that he was not only at the heart of the völkisch movement, but also one of its forefathers. At the same time Johst, like other prominent protagonists of the Nazi regime such as Walter Best, Franz Stangl, or Adolf Eichmann, clearly illustrated Hannah Arendt’s dictum concerning the ‘banality of evil’. Düsterberg offers a compelling study written in coherent and articulate style. He arranges his facts convincingly in a strong line of argument, which facilitates the reading of this massive book. He presents the reader with a mediocre but highly ambitious poet who was catapulted to fame and power within a few years’ time—and after the war never accepted any guilt or responsibility.

Born in 1890 into a petty bourgeois family in Saxony, Johst grew up without his father who had died early. He felt a strong bond with his mother and grandmother, and the figure of the ‘mother’ played a significant role in his later writing. During the First World War Johst did not serve on the front line because of an unidentified illness. Düsterberg does not want to cast a vote here, but it seems pretty certain that Johst quite cleverly managed to avoid fighting at the front (although already called up and in military training). This interpretation gains additional weight from the fact that the relevant files conveniently ‘disappeared’ during the Third Reich, quite obviously in order not to tarnish Johst’s image. This was paramount for a poet who praised ‘qualities’ such as struggle and war, subscribed to a Darwinian ideal of the survival of the fittest, and after 1939 insisted
Hanns Johst

on wearing the prestigious grey SS uniform (instead of the black one), which indicated front line fighting experience—which Johst clearly lacked.

Düsterberg’s biography has some of its strongest moments when interpreting Johst’s career alongside and through his œuvre. This is especially interesting as Johst did not set out to be a völkisch poet. Rather, his early works show him as influenced by Expressionism. At the same time the close interpretation of almost all of Johst’s major works in the first half of the book is sometimes lengthy and could have been cut down. Additionally, Düsterberg does not seem entirely certain where to locate his study and whether to take a literary or a historical approach. It is only at the very end of the work (in fact, in what seems to be an appendix) that Düsterberg clarifies his intentions as being to write a ‘literaturpolitische Biographie’ (p. 406). To this end he deals in detail with Johst’s dramatic work in particular, ranging from Der Einsame (1917), Der König (1920), Propheten (1922), Die fröhliche Stadt (1925), and Thomas Paine (1928), to Schlageter, which was dedicated to Hitler and premiered on his birthday on 20 April 1933. This is certainly interesting and worthwhile, but sometimes one feels that instead of detailed interpretations remaining close to the texts, a wider perspective would have been more helpful in contextualizing Johst’s writing. Less might perhaps have been more.

Johst started to write early in his life. He proved to be highly productive and had his first pieces of work published during the First World War. At the end of the war and during the revolutionary struggles in Bavaria, where Johst had moved and remained for the rest of his life, his political beliefs began to take shape. He was shocked by the revolution, the establishment of workers’ and soldiers’ soviets, and by what he saw as a general disintegration of norms and values. It was at this time that terms like ‘Blood and Soil’ and Volksgemeinschaft appeared in Johst’s writing for the first time and quickly established his œuvre as essential reading for the rising völkisch movement. Düsterberg makes it clear, however, that Johst was by no means a penniless idealist who aimed to change the world through his writing. On the contrary, from the early 1920s Johst proved to be a clever businessman who consciously tapped into a promising market of revisionist and right-wing literature, and was not afraid of promoting himself either. After his first dramatic successes Johst began to charge steep fees for dates in his busy schedule.
of lectures. He also regularly reminded his publishers to publicize his books properly, sometimes even giving them detailed instructions on how to do this. During the Third Reich Johst shamelessly used his position not only to accumulate immense wealth, but also to avoid paying taxes.

Johst was acutely aware of his role for the political Right. He regarded himself as a missionary, as a highly gifted poet who was able to lead his people out of the darkness of parliamentary democracy, defeat, and humiliation into a future of national pride, racial purity, and a powerful Führer state. Düsterberg presents an utterly self-assured man who eagerly strove for power and influence, and was egoistic, ruthless, and ambitious. At the same time Johst was realistic enough to tread carefully and not commit himself too early to one of the competing agencies which tried to influence cultural politics in the early days of the Third Reich. At first he seemed to show allegiance to Rosenberg and his Militant League for German Culture, but quickly changed political camp as soon at it seemed expedient—and was duly rewarded with a leading role in the Nazi cultural administration after the take-over in 1933.

The events of that year marked a turning point in Johst’s career. In the early 1930s he had achieved high status as a leading literary figure. He was clearly seen as having right-wing affiliations, but carefully avoided direct links with any particular party. With the Nazi take-over a second career as a cultural functionary beckoned and Johst quickly seized his chance. He became a senator in the Dichterakademie in the Prussian Academy of Arts in March 1933; only three months later he was voted its president, and received the prestigious title of Staatsrat in January 1934. In line with his tactical concept outlined above Johst did not use his role to put forward new ideas. Rather, he saw his position as merely representational—to the dismay of some of his writing colleagues. In order to avoid the danger of positioning himself too early in a political climate which seemed very much in flux until autumn 1933, he waited until it had become clear that Goebbels would prevail as the central figure. When the time came Johst immediately aligned himself with Goebbels and received the proper reward in the form of the post of vice-president (from 1935 president) of the Reichsschrifttumskammer.

Johst did not want to be bothered with the nitty-gritty of the day-to-day running of the chamber. He rarely stayed in Berlin, enjoyed
his life in the Bavarian countryside, and never worked in the afternoon. He sprang into action, however, when public attention was focused on him. This may have been why in March 1933, with Franz Ulbrich, he agreed to accept the management of the Berlin state theatre—the Reich’s pre-eminent theatre. This career move turned into a disaster for Johst, who had to vacate his post after a few months. In his usual manner, Johst had tried to impose a repertoire characterized by his völkisch concepts on the playhouse—again not entirely without furthering his own interests, as his dramatic oeuvre played an important part in his plans. This time, however, he had not taken into account the conflicting interests behind the scenes. Gustav Grundgens, the leading star of the theatre, used his excellent contacts with Göring to get rid of Johst. Perhaps even more interesting, however, is the fact that, despite this failure, Johst was able to get his career back on track within less than a year. In 1935 he was appointed president of the Reichsschrifttumskammer and embarked upon his career in the SS.

Johst clearly lacked charisma, intelligence, and artistic talent, and in stature he did not compare favourably with other figures associated with the völkisch Right after 1918, such as Oswald Spengler or Carl Schmitt. But he possessed one distinct advantage: he was utterly loyal. Johst never questioned Hans Hinkel’s authority in the Reich Culture Chamber, for example, and before taking important decisions he always consulted his superiors. Düsterberg also makes it clear that Johst’s main interest in his new position was to enjoy fame, success, and power without actively implementing political or administrative change—and that this was to the regime’s liking. Without showing contempt for the object of his biography, Düsterberg nevertheless does not beat around the bush when it comes to characterizing Johst as an averagely talented, weak but willing parvenu who liked uniforms, influence, and power. It is important to note, however, that Johst’s career worked both ways: he joined the regime’s ruling clique and enjoyed the life of a celebrity poet, and at the same time lent artistic credibility to an administration which to large parts of the bourgeoisie appeared crude, brutal, and pedestrian. Johst was more than willing to be used and marketed by the regime; he was acutely aware of publicity and easy to get on with in personal contact. In acknowledging his worth the regime literally showered Johst with prizes and awards, chief among them the National Prize worth 100,000 Reichsmark in 1939.
After concentrating on Johst’s career as a cultural functionary, Düsterberg turns to Johst’s links with the SS. This key chapter of the biography is not only the most chilling but also the most groundbreaking in terms of research. Düsterberg has unearthed new and important material and shows a side of Johst which has largely escaped scholarly attention so far. In terms of racist attitudes, Düsterberg distinguishes clearly (and convincingly) between Johst’s obvious racism and anti-Semitism, and the more radical concepts of Himmler, Heydrich, and Eichmann. Although Johst was not one of the intellectual forefathers of the Holocaust, he was happy to comply with, and support, the *Endlösung*. Apart from hero-worshipping Hitler, Johst particularly admired Himmler and the SS. Düsterberg portrays Johst’s growing fascination for, and involvement in, the SS exemplified by his rapid rise within the organization. In 1935 Johst was admitted into the SS and Himmler immediately made him an SS-*Oberführer*—an unusually high rank for someone who was not an early party member and had not even fought in the First World War. Johst enjoyed a rapid career and was made an SS General in 1938. ‘Heini’ Himmler—as Johst was allowed to call him—had special plans for the poet. He not only wanted Johst to write his biography; he also wanted him to be the great Germanic chronicler writing the ‘Aryan’ sagas of the future. To that end, Himmler invited Johst to stay in his *Feldkommandostelle* just behind the fighting line on the Eastern Front (sometimes for several months at a time), allowed him to take part in important meetings with other SS Generals and go on trips to the Front, and to witness deportations, executions, and ghetto life. Johst was also with Himmler when he gave his infamous 1943 speech in Posen, in which he openly described aspects of the Holocaust.

Johst remained a loyal Nazi right to the end not only of the Third Reich but also of his own life in 1978. What other choices did he have? His success, perhaps even his life, depended on the survival of the regime, and to deny its principles would have made Johst’s whole life appear worthless. This does not mean that he accepted his guilt; on the contrary, as Düsterberg shows in great detail. All through his long denazification trial Johst played the role of the naïve and innocent poet who fell into Hitler’s trap, but on the whole remained an apolitical humanist who only wanted to do good. Although the different judges in years of trials did not buy this entirely (and he was briefly included in the category of ‘major offend-
Hanns Johst’s oeuvre was entirely forgotten, and the only novel he published after the war (a book, incidentally, largely written in 1943 and slightly edited for the West German market) did not sell and was ripped apart by the critics. At no point in his post-1945 life, however, did Johst make any attempt to evaluate his own involvement in the Third Reich, not even shortly before his death when, as his daughter Krista confessed to Düsterberg, they had many long conversations. Johst died a frustrated man—frustrated at the West German public and the new state which failed to appreciate his qualities. At no point did he wonder whether he himself might be to blame for this. Düsterberg found only one comment of rare insight when Johst noted that he would never be a great success as a poet because for the intellectuals he was too stupid, and for the stupid ones he was too intellectual.

The appendix pays tribute to Düsterberg’s thorough and painstaking research. Sources and literature are not only listed in the bibliography but also commented on, which will facilitate future research. Apart from a brief summary of Johst’s life and a comprehensive list of his publications, the print runs of Johst’s major works are especially interesting. Düsterberg has written a classic biography which stays close to its subject and avoids touching on theoretical discourses, especially in connection with textual analysis. The close look at individual pieces of work at times appears too narrow and one would have wished for a bird’s eye perspective. Having said that, Düsterberg successfully unearths countless interesting details and draws a fascinating and gruesome picture of the writer, the dramatist, the functionary, the committed and unapologetic Nazi Hanns Johst. Without doubt, Düsterberg has written the definitive biography of Hanns Johst which will remain the standard reference work for years to come.

ANSELM HEINRICH was a Research Associate in Theatre and Cultural History in the Department of History at Lancaster University. In September 2006 he became a Lecturer in Theatre Studies in the Department of Theatre, Film and Television Studies at the University of Glasgow. He has published on different aspects of German and British history, and his monograph on regional theatre in Germany and Britain between 1918 and 1945 will be published in 2007.
The importance of the armed struggles which took place across Europe and far beyond its borders between 1789 and 1815 for the framing of the political and military culture of the nineteenth century has been largely underestimated. The enduring legacy of this period of warfare related not only to the much analysed after-effects of the French Revolution, but also to the constant state of war which existed between 1792 and 1815. These wars touched almost every European country and also parts of Asia, Africa, and North America. They were for the first time conducted by mass armies mobilized by patriotic and national propaganda, leading to the circulation of millions of people throughout Europe and beyond (soldiers, prisoners of war, and civilians). They affected, to various degrees, the everyday lives of women and men of different religions and social strata across European and many non-European regions. The new style of warfare had far-reaching consequences for civil society. Those who lived through the period between 1792 and 1815 as children, young people, and adults shared—albeit from the most varied perspectives and disparate perceptions—formative common experiences and memories.

Until now the focus of research has mainly been on the political, diplomatic, and military dimensions of the wars, viewed principally through national historiographies. Comparative studies that emphasize difference, including metropolitan–regional differences, are rare, as are studies of the social dimension of warfare. Gender difference has, as yet, hardly been considered systematically.

The third workshop of the Anglo–German project group ‘Nations, Borders, Identities’ (NBI) encouraged work in all these areas, and
highlighted the images and narratives that recur in the experience and perception of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars across and beyond Europe. It was organized by Karen Hagemann (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill/Technical University of Berlin) and Ruth Leiserowitz (Berlin School for Comparative European History) in cooperation with the German Historical Institute London and generously funded by the GHIL and the German Research Foundation (DFG). The workshop built upon discussions held at previous workshops on the existing state of research (November 2004, Military Historical Research Centre, Potsdam) and the methodological parameters for a complex comparison of war experience and memory (November 2005, European Academy, Berlin). Seventeen participants from seven countries presented papers relating to the experiences and perceptions of soldiers and civilians in different European countries.

The workshop aimed to develop further comparative study of the experiences and perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. It asked how these wars were experienced by men and women of different ethnic backgrounds, religious affiliation, political Weltanschauung, age, and familial status, as soldiers, sailors, or civilians, abroad and at home. It considered the factors that most shaped experiences and perceptions of war and asked how far these became a part of individual and collective identities. It examined the role of ‘civilians at war’, alongside the soldiers, sailors, and non-combatants who volunteered or were conscripted. The discussion paid specific attention to the autobiographical source-materials for such experiences, mainly letters, diaries, and published eyewitness reports by contemporaries. Many more letters, diaries, and memoirs appear to have been published between 1792 and 1815 than during previous eighteenth-century conflicts. The participants debated the methodological issues involved in the reading of such source materials.

In his introductory lecture Alan Forrest (University of York) insisted that the experience of the ‘ordinary’ soldiers and civilians during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars has largely been neglected. In casting around for potential historiographical models through which to approach these experiences, he pointed to the innovative work on the First World War. He suggested that, in modified form, these approaches may be applicable to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. He also stressed the variety of motives and
perceptions that were often subsumed into the official discourse of these wars. Often individual motives had little to do with state propaganda. What that propaganda did do was to highlight another important consequence of conflict: the accelerated nature of state-building.

In the first two sessions, focused on the military experience of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, Laurence Montroussier (Université de Montpellier) and Natalie Petiteau (Université d’Avignon) dealt with the experiences of the common soldiery. Montroussier examined how British and French soldiers perceived the Peninsular War. Taking a sample of war memoirs, she argued that there were remarkable similarities in perception. There were, for example, no significant differences in how the British and French troops regarded combat. However, attitudes towards the foreign ‘Other’ were more complex. The British and French seemed to have generally held each other in high esteem, but both held largely negative views of the Spaniards and Portuguese, despite the fact that they were Britain’s allies. Montroussier ended by pointing out the need for more work on the attitudes of the indigenous population to the British and French in the countries and regions which they occupied.

Petiteau raised questions about the role of soldiers in society once war is over. Focusing on demobilized soldiers, she explored the relationship between their experiences and the legends that grew up around them after 1815. Petiteau argued strongly that service in the Napoleonic army did not necessarily signify internalization of a particular national ideal. There was a great deal of continuity between service under Napoleon and service for one’s prince under the ancien régime. Moreover, the supposed unity of the Napoleonic army was more apparent than real. The purchase of replacements underlined social inequalities. The common experiences of battle did foster common identity, but demobilization after 1815 shattered that unity. Reintegration into French society meant veterans had to give up the prestige associated with the uniform. The majority seemed to have quietly returned to obscurity, but some found such a reduction in status difficult to accept and tried to subsist on their military pensions alone. Around this marginalized group the legend of the idle, Napoleon-worshipping veteran grew up.

John Cookson (University of Canterbury, New Zealand) also illustrated how soldiers were often an imperfect fit for ideas of nation-
Cookson argued that the military had only been loosely integrated into accounts of the rise of British identity. The rank and file soldiery were more likely to articulate loyalty to their regiment and officers than to an idealized notion of the nation. This regimental identity was fostered by officers and by the development of regimental economies that included banks and saving schemes. Cookson suggested that, in light of this, paternalism was a better paradigm through which to examine the British army during the conflict. It was through paternalism that the British army was able to encompass the sub-nationalities of the British Isles, especially the Catholic Irish. ‘Britishness’ was created by default through comparison with foreign troops, rather than consciously mapped out.

Issues of patriotism also formed the core of the examination by Jaroslow Czubaty (University of Warsaw) of Polish responses to the military. He illustrated how the Polish nobility eagerly answered Napoleon’s demands for troops for his Grande Armée in the hope that their desires for nationhood would be realized. Czubaty noted that nationalist sentiments were not the only motivation for enlistment. Impoverished nobles regarded the army as a source of income, social status, and adventure. However, these baser motives often coexisted with the ideals of nationalism.

The two sessions that followed focused on ‘civilians at war’. Patricia Lin (University of California, Berkeley) rejected notions that the experience of soldiers’ families must remain hidden because of a dearth of relevant sources. She pointed to the records dealing with the system of remittances and allotments by servicemen to their families. Soldiers and naval personnel could arrange to remit part of their wages to their family. She argued that the common experience of collecting these remittances from the local tax official created a physical and virtual community among servicemen’s families. Moreover, the system of allotment allowed families to collect the money and effects of servicemen killed in action. Often the amount collected by sailors’ widows could be quite high due to the prize money paid for taking an enemy ship. Lin speculated that this could allow widows to buy their way into the middle class. Soldiers’ wives were less well provided for, but the government did provide grants for the Royal Military Asylum, a school for soldiers’ children. The admission applications reveal that significant numbers of soldiers married abroad...
and that regiments often acted as an extended family for their children should they be orphaned.

Katherine Aaslestad (University of West Virginia) maintained the focus on civilians in her examination of the French occupation of Hamburg. She described the deleterious effect which the Continental System had on living standards in the port. She argued that it was this destruction of livelihoods that precipitated an anti-French revolt in 1813, rather than feelings of national identity. However, a sense of regional identity was fostered through the creation of the Hanseatic Legion and Directory. These bodies were aimed at resurrecting the independence and autonomy which the Hanseatic cities had enjoyed before occupation and were wary of German national sentiment.

The discussion that followed dealt with the relationship between military, society, and social change. The importance of military developments and their consequences for civil society were emphasized. Clive Emsley (Open University) broadened the question to ask what was new about the conflicts. There was general agreement that the rhetoric that accompanied the military campaigns, whether it was couched in the language of liberty or national identity, represented a real departure from the norms of eighteenth-century warfare.

Drawing on research into the experiences of the Southern German regions during the French Wars, Ute Planert (University of Tübingen) questioned how far it is possible to speak of a homogeneous civilian war experience. Instead, she suggested, we should investigate the conditions that structured war experiences. She noted that it was often the phenomena that accompanied warfare, such as requisitioning and the quartering of troops, rather than actual acts of warfare, which placed the greatest burden on the civilian population. Just how such impositions affected communities and individuals depended upon a variety of factors. Where those providing military quarters shared a common language, religion, or social background with those who were billeted, amity could often replace enmity. The Church, as it had done for centuries, played an important role in mediating and interpreting war to its communities. While the war was initially understood as a divine punishment, accession to the Federation of the Rhine forced the clergy to present military service as an act of Christian compassion. It was only when they joined the anti-Napoleonic alliance in 1813 that a patriotic-nationalist tone was adopted by the clergy and the press, although
this national paradigm continued to compete with alternative patterns of perception.

The role of the clergy in shaping and interpreting war experiences was also underlined in Ruth Leiserowitz’s study of the Polish Catholic priest Jan Pawel Woronicz and the Russian Orthodox cleric Filaret Drozdov. In both Poland and Russia, Leiserowitz argued, the interpretations of war articulated and disseminated by the clergy during this period formed the building blocks of national identity. When Napoleonic troops first marched into Warsaw in 1806 churches became key sites for the celebration of Polish liberation and were often decorated with regalia honouring the French emperor. In a fusion of religious and patriotic discourses Woronicz’s sermons presented Napoleon as an instrument of God and the Poles as a chosen people, drawing parallels between their fate and that of the Israelites following the exodus from Egypt. In contrast, the Russian church was responsible for galvanizing anti-Napoleonic feeling and constructing an image of Napoleon as the Antichrist. With the invasion of 1812 the Russian Orthodox clergy assumed an even more active role in anti-Napoleonic mobilization and over fifty field preachers were killed in the 1812 war. The majority, though, made their contribution in the pulpit rather than on the battlefield, most notably the St Petersburg preacher Filaret Drozdov. Through his sermons and a thanksgiving prayer composed to commemorate Russian liberation, the Russian nation received a new religious consecration.

The gendering of war experience was the subject of the fifth panel with papers by David Hopkin (Hertford College, Oxford) and Karen Hagemann. Women’s supposed inability to bear arms was used to justify their exclusion from full citizenship of the French republic, yet, as Hopkin noted, the figure of the disguised female soldier remained a prevalent image in French popular culture both before and after the revolution. Though the figure of the woman warrior has been identified as part of a semiotic system that used gender to convey the lessons of the revolution, Hopkin raised the possibility that even at the time ‘not everyone possessed the interpretive key’ and that ‘some women took these images not as allegory or analogy, but as model’. Those women who took up arms on behalf of the French republic often used language derived from fictional accounts of the female soldier to explain their actions. At the same time, rather than functioning as a symbol of female emancipation or as an allegory of
political life, representations of armed women may have been understood by contemporary audiences as referring to the domestic battle of the sexes, where the female warrior became a powerful advocate on behalf of other women.

Karen Hagemann further examined the relationship between the personal and the political, between home and front. Through an analysis of the letters of the patriotic bookseller Friedrich Perthes, who fought as a volunteer during the anti-Napoleonic wars of 1813–14, and his wife Karoline, who first remained at home in Hamburg and then had to flee with her seven children to Kiel because her husband was persecuted by the French, Hagemann showed how experience and perception of war was shaped by gender. Whilst Friedrich Perthes responded enthusiastically and wholeheartedly to patriotic appeals to defend the fatherland and did not care much about the consequences of his political and military activities for his wife and family, his wife, even though she supported his aims in general, was more reluctant to fulfil her ‘patriotic duty’ by ‘gladly’ sacrificing her husband to the war effort. Nevertheless, she would later derive some pride from having successfully preserved her family through the war despite her husband’s absence. This, Hagemann pointed out, indicates how war experiences could change women’s self-image and involve a forced, unintentional ‘emancipation’ from their fathers and husbands. The gender-specific experiences are very obvious in the autobiographical letters and diaries written by contemporaries, but were largely obscured in the collective memory of the wars, as patriotic memories of male heroism in defence of the fatherland came to predominate.

The final session focused on the relation of war, citizenship, and patriotic mobilization. While the memory of anti-Napoleonic resistance was central to the construction of German national identity, in Dutch collective memory the Napoleonic period has been viewed as a time of general calm and extreme passivity. Revising the image of a ‘veil of lethargy draped over Napoleonic Holland’, Johan Joor (University of Amsterdam) uncovered a significant amount of popular protest directed against the Napoleonic regime between 1806 and 1813, ranging from the circulation of anti-French rumours to large-scale riots. However, these protests, Joor argued, should not be understood as evidence of Dutch nationalist sentiment, but as part of a conflict between tradition and modernity, involving the defence of
traditional patterns of authority and individual liberties against the processes of centralization and modernization initiated by the Bonapartist regime.

Questions of national identity have been central to recent studies of the British volunteering. As Kevin Linch (University of Leeds) argued in his study of the Volunteers, the complexity of the movement makes it difficult to generalize about the experiences of those who were involved. Initially concerned with maintaining local order, the Volunteers would develop into a much larger national defence force. An individual’s experience of part-time soldiering therefore depended on when he was a member. While Volunteers’ exposure to intensive patriotic propaganda and their participation in military pageantry at local and national events led them to engage with a wider identity, this was often focused on the regiment, or local neighbourhood. Participation in the movement could generate conflict between civilian and military mentalities, particularly where the Volunteers were called upon to suppress civil disturbances and, Linch concludes, the ‘borders between civilian and soldier . . . were thin indeed’.

Claudia Kraft (University of Erfurt) returned to the relationship between gender, war, and national identity in her analysis of Polish patriotism between 1791 and 1815. Whereas French republicanism understood women as a threat to the fraternal martial bonding of the revolutionary army, during the Polish uprising of 1794 there was no such tension between femininity and militarism. Instead, Kraft argued, Polish women were called upon to play a key role in patriotic mobilization. However, the establishment of the Duchy of Warsaw in 1807 led to a reordering of gender relations according to the French rather than the Polish model. The Napoleonic Code enforced a conservative, patriarchal model of gender relations, whilst the adoption of uniforms by the civil as well as the military service served to demarcate the public sphere more firmly from the private. As soldiers flooded into the Duchy of Warsaw from the Polish Legions and the armies of the partitioning powers they would return imbued with the rhetoric of an exclusively male brotherhood of citizen-soldiers.

The commentators in the final round table on war experiences and identities summarized the results of the workshop and discussed the methodological issues which seemed most important to them. Richard Bessel (University of York) noted that the papers presented
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to the workshop supported the claim, made in the project, that the 
wart between 1792 and 1815 should be characterized as the first modern wars, which blurred the borders between the military and society. He moreover questioned the degree to which we can ever truly uncover war experiences from the available sources. Finally, he noted the emphasis participants had placed upon the horrors of war, and suggested that we should also be aware of the potential pleasures offered by war in terms of booty, sex, and adventure. Jörg Echternkamp (Military Historical Research Centre, Potsdam) also pointed to the limited extent to which experience was recoverable. We should be alert to the silences within the sources. Conspicuous by their absence were death and dying. He distinguished between two parallel trends during this period. While there was growing awareness of national identity among the educated elite, for the majority of the population the war meant greater state intervention in their lives. He concluded by emphasizing the need to study the legacy of the conflicts for the post-war generation. Jane Rendall (University of York) focused in her concluding remarks on the relationship between military and civilian society. She reflected on non-violent interaction between soldiers and civilians. She also commented upon how concepts and models drawn from civilian society, such as familial or paternalistic relations, might be reconstituted within the military.

At the end all participants agreed that the workshop had achieved its aim of opening up further research in this field. The publication of papers from the workshop is now being actively planned. Further information about the international research network and project can be found on the NBI website: http://www.nbi.tu-berlin.de/

CATRIONA KENNEDY (University of York)
KIRSTIN SCHÄFER (Technical University Berlin)
LEIGHTON JAMES (University of Wales, Swansea)
The first decade of the twentieth century was a defining period in the history of Anglo–German relations. Europe’s two major industrial powers had undergone unparalleled waves of modernization in the nineteenth century and continued to do so until the outbreak of the First World War. The growing economic and military rivalry between these two European ‘superpowers’ has been the subject of numerous scholarly investigations. It is therefore well established that in the early 1900s Britain and Germany were watching each other closely with growing mutual interest. The traditional scholarly focus on the rise of Anglo–German antagonism prior to the Great War has, however, largely overshadowed the fact that this mutual interest was not only characterized by fear and suspicion. In many ways, the two countries simultaneously embraced each other’s cultures with a striking intensity that was partly motivated by rivalry and hostility, but was also driven by admiration for each other’s achievements and an intention to emulate them.

The burst of intellectual, commercial, and artistic energy that had accompanied Germany’s rapid industrialization certainly did not go unnoticed in Britain. In the early 1900s Germany was widely viewed as one of the world’s most culturally progressive, dynamic, and innovative nations. At the cutting edge of social reform, scientific activity, and artistic experimentation, Germany produced goods and technical know-how (particularly in the fields of chemistry, physics, and electro-technology) that were immediately adopted in Britain. But this process was by no means a one-way street: post-Darwinist ideas were discussed in Berlin’s salons, the concept of the ‘garden city’ found its way into German city-planning, and typically ‘British’ sports such as football and horse racing enjoyed growing popularity in Germany. British admiration for German music was no less common than German interest in English literature, and the growing number of students who crossed the Channel to study in Britain and Germany respectively was a clear indicator of mutual curiosity. This is, of course, not to suggest that there was not a darker side to Anglo–German relations in the period, but dynamic cultural exchanges occurred simultaneously with the rise of antagonism.
The conference 'Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain—Cultural Contacts and Transfers', held on 23–24 March 2006 at the University of Oxford, examined the vicissitudes of Anglo–German cultural relations in the age of Kaiser Wilhelm II and King Edward VII. Sponsored by the British Academy, the German Historical Institute London, the German History Society, and the Modern European History Research Centre at the University of Oxford, the conference marked the retirement of Professor Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, and provided a platform on which to discuss recent insights from historians working on cultural transfers between Britain and Germany on the eve of the First World War. Cultural transfers and contacts occurred at a number of levels, ranging from the well researched examples of British emulation of German social reforms and the impact of British Trade Unionism on its German counterpart, to transnational academic discourses, and great mutual interest in the other’s achievements in music, literature, and visual arts. Although many of the transfer processes began much earlier than 1900, the conference’s focus on the years before the Great War enabled the delegates to consider contacts and transfers alongside mounting economic, naval, and colonial rivalry. The cultural transfers and contacts examined at this conference reflected the numerous levels at which cultural exchanges occurred. In particular, the conference focused on the often neglected fields of arts, sciences, legal culture, popular culture, and colonial culture. The contributions to this conference testified to the wide variety of Anglo–German cultural transfers and their enormous density in the decade before the First World War.

In his keynote speech, David Blackbourn (Harvard) raised the question as to what extent the recent historiographical focus on cultural contacts and transfer has subverted earlier ways of thinking about Anglo–German relations before the Great War. According to Blackbourn, the central challenge for historians working on early twentieth-century Anglo–German history is to reconcile the numerous existing contacts and transfers with the growing antagonism which culminated in a war that seemingly eradicated mutual admiration and exchange. Blackbourn further discussed the different levels at which transfers and contacts occurred. In particular, he pointed to the importance of migration and religion in the broader context of Anglo–German exchange. Blackbourn argued that the impact of British popular religious movements in Germany was profound. For
example, preachers in both countries ensured that the Welsh ‘great awakening’ of 1904–5 was replicated in the Ruhr in the form of a ‘tent mission’ in Mülheim, which attracted thousands travelling from all over the western coalfield in their ‘Hallelujah trains’. Blackbourn also mentioned the Salvation Army (Heilsarmee), which expanded across Germany from its first foothold in Stuttgart, and by 1914 had 224 corps in 150 towns.

The three papers of the first session, chaired by Christopher Clark (Cambridge), looked at political and constitutional aspects of British–German contacts and transfers, in particular, at parliamentary culture, the relationship between liberalism and women’s rights movements, and the role of satire and humour in the political realm. Frank Lorenz Müller (St Andrews) observed that between 1909 and 1911, the constitutional order in both countries was perceived to be in crisis. He then went on to ask how the political conflict triggered by David Lloyd George’s People’s Budget was interpreted in the Reich with a view to Germany’s own constitutional impasse. Müller’s findings pointed to the existence, amongst a significant section of the Wilhelmine public, of a considerable sense of contentment with the German political system and a determination to move towards a reformed Konstitutionalismus rather than fully-fledged parliamentarism. Democracy and ‘full parliamentarism’ appealed to some German observers, but a number of others—and by no means just keen supporters of the status quo—thought that the Reich emerged from the comparison with Britain with much to recommend it. Germany’s systemic crisis, which had paralysed and frustrated much governmental action, did not cause the bulk of the political establishment to demand profound systemic change. Geoff Eley (Michigan) suggested in his paper on the preconditions of women’s rights movements that the Kulturkampf of the 1870s was a watershed for subsequent alliances between national liberals and women’s rights activists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Eley emphasized that anti-clericalism was a decisive common element between the two groups which temporarily bridged other profound differences. In his paper on political and social caricatures in Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain, Lothar Kettenacker (Munich/London) drew on material from the satirical journals Fliegende Blätter, Simplicissimus, and Punch in order to emphasize the importance of the visual within the realm of politics.
The second session, chaired by Jane Caplan (Oxford), focused on legal culture in Britain and Germany, considering the women’s rights and criminal law reform movements as well as notions of law and civil society. Jean Quataert (New York) examined the nature and extent of transnational dialogues among German and British women’s rights movements. In focusing on the Women’s Internationals (the International Women’s Council and its offshoot, the International Women’s Suffrage Association), Quataert illustrated the intensity of interactions between members of British and German women’s groups after the turn of the century. In her comparative paper on ‘habitual criminals’ and penal reform movements in Britain and Germany, Sabine Freitag (Cologne) pointed out that although Edwardian England and Wilhelmine Germany had very different legal systems, the image of a ‘professional criminal’ as an incarnation of social fears was instrumental in supporting the movements’ demands for a serious revision of the legal and penal system. In England it was much easier to introduce new forms of sentencing and punishment by single statute laws, while Germany was slowed down by the time-consuming process of codifying the criminal law, marked by extensive theoretical debates amongst an academic elite. While England acted quite independently of German influences, German law professors, judges, and lawyers were greatly interested in developments in England. In her paper on law and legal systems in Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain, Jose Harris (Oxford) argued that historians have traditionally over-emphasized the differences between traditions of legal philosophy in the two countries. There was a constant stream of British commentary on German legal reforms, and many British legal philosophers engaged closely with the ideas emanating from Germany.

The third session, chaired by Abigail Green (Oxford), examined contacts and knowledge transfers between British and German institutions of higher learning at an individual and institutional level. In his paper on German students in Oxford and British students in Heidelberg, Thomas Weber (Pennsylvania) coined the phrase ‘cosmopolitan nationalists’ to describe the dominant mindset of German and British students from upper-class backgrounds, for whom nationalism and a desire for amicable Anglo-German relations were not mutually exclusive or contradictory. Despite their ardent nationalism, they shared a strong sense of cultural proximity and even a
transnational identity. A simple binary system of Anglophobe versus Anglophile and Germanophobe versus Germanophile, Weber argued, grossly misrepresents the character of Anglo-German relations in the pre-1914 era. Oliver Grant’s (Oxford) paper focused on institutional transference in the field of technical education at tertiary level. He described the Edwardian era as a time when British technical education caught up with German innovations from the period between 1830 and 1890. In Grant’s view this was a story of adaptation rather than exact replication. Britain was not only well aware of Germany’s reforms, but also of its own institutional strengths, and decided to build on these rather than import the German system without modification. As a consequence, the British rejected the German system of a rigid distinction between pure and applied science. They were also more concerned with practical vocational training than the Technische Hochschulen, and continued to teach large numbers of part-time students and to offer evening classes.

The fourth session, chaired by Ross McKibbin (Oxford), dealt with the political dimensions of various branches of popular culture, ranging from the newly emerging mass press to sport and naval spectacles. In his paper, Dominik Geppert (Berlin) asked how the popular press affected ‘public relations’ between Britain and Germany. Although conceding that warmongering was an important feature of some papers, Geppert also stressed that reporters and editors cooperated successfully and harmoniously across national and ideological boundaries. For all their patriotic posturing, newspaper proprietors were hard-headed businessmen who knew the value of international cooperation. From a commercial point of view, war between the European Great Powers was in nobody’s interest, especially in the newspaper business. It was hardly an accident that the most persuasive pre-1914 advocate of the idea that wars were economic nonsense was Norman Angell, an employee of Lord Northcliffe, the proprietor of the Daily Mail. Christiane Eisenberg (Berlin) used sport as an example to demonstrate how, in the process of cultural transfers, the ‘transferred culture’ undergoes significant changes. Transferred cultures are re-interpreted by those who adopt them and can thus differ considerably from the original. Jan Rüger’s (London) paper focused on the naval theatre with its fleet reviews, launches of warships, and other public rituals celebrating the nation and the navy. Analysis of these spectacles, Rüger argued, provides
an excellent opportunity to bring politics back into cultural history. In his view, the public staging of the navy was driven as much by governments and admiralties as by the forces of entertainment, leisure, and consumption. It demonstrated that popular culture represented a new source of power and participation which created a dynamic tension between new media and new audiences on the one hand, and the traditional masters of ceremony in governments and royal courts on the other hand.

‘High Culture’, the topic of the fifth session chaired by Nicholas Stargardt (Oxford), was represented by music, architecture, and literature. Sven Oliver Müller (Bielefeld) pointed to the ambivalent, even contradictory, nature of musical encounters between Edwardian Britain and Wilhelmine Germany. On the one hand, he argued, a common European culture of music emerged. In the two countries, the productions of opera houses and the repertoires of concert halls became increasingly similar. Even scenery and staging followed common aesthetic values and customs. Singers, directors, conductors, and composers travelled frequently between Germany and Britain, thereby exchanging concepts and adopting common tastes. On the other hand, however, an increasing nationalization and politicization of music could be observed. Both Germans and Britons thought they could reach the core of their own collective by ‘nationalizing’ music. International contacts therefore produced not only harmonious results, but also a ‘musical clash of civilizations’. Matthew Jefferies (Manchester) focused on three individual architects from three different generations to assess the transmission of architectural ideas between Britain and Germany: the German-born critic and historian Nikolaus Pevsner (1902–83), who credited his adopted homeland with a crucial role in the genesis of modern architecture and design; Hermann Muthesius (1861–1927), the architect and civil servant who spent the period from October 1896 to June 1903 as a technical attaché in London writing his three-volume study, *Das englische Haus*; and Stefan Muthesius, Honorary Professor of Architectural History at the University of East Anglia, whose research focuses mainly on British influence in nineteenth-century German architecture and design. Considering their cumulative scholarly work, Jefferies did not discover simple transfers in one direction or the other but rather ‘a truly Anglo–German perspective on architecture’. Marc Schalenberg (Zurich) looked at the personal and cultural entanglements between
British and Germany in E. M. Forster’s novel *Howard’s End* as a way of analysing literary stereotyping. The Germany portrayed in Forster’s novel, Schalenberg argued, was a rather unspecific ‘other’ to the modern but blunt English society centred around material gain and hollow etiquette. An urban but clearly non-metropolitan Germany was evoked. Although contemporary German life did not play a proper role in the novel, ‘Germany’ as an idea and perceived reality did. Forster’s ‘Germany’, in Schalenberg’s interpretation, eluded the conventional British claim to imperial dominance; it was ‘weaker’ and less resolute, but compensated for this by offering a ‘truer’ and more reflective way of life.

The sixth and final session, chaired by Niall Ferguson (Harvard), was devoted to aspects of colonial culture, such as colonial scandals, imperial popular culture, and big game hunting. Frank Bösch (Bochum) interpreted British and German colonial scandals as transnational phenomena which were often caused by cultural transfers. He pointed out that colonial scandals in Britain and Germany developed around similar themes, such as violence against the indigenous population, mismanagement, or sexual exploitation. These scandals, Bösch argued, not only helped to create images of each nation’s own colonialism as well as of the other country’s colonialism, but were also driving forces for mutual adaptations. More often than not, Britain led the way and Germany followed several years later, sometimes copying British discussions, sometimes relying on pieces of information which were transmitted via British newspapers or telegraphic agencies. In general, the German public was extremely concerned about the Reich’s image abroad, whereas the British public rarely compared their colonial scandals to events in other countries. In his paper on ‘Empire and Popular Culture’, John MacKenzie (Lancaster) stressed the fact that, in spite of the rising British–German rivalries in international affairs, imperialism on the ground was often more internationalist than nationalist, more co-operative than competitive. Particularly in the realms of science and the environment, the British sought to learn as much as possible from German expertise, whereas German colonists often co-operated peacefully and harmoniously with their British imperial neighbours. However, MacKenzie also pointed to the differences between Britain’s and Germany’s imperial cultures, for example, the striking lack of great colonial exhibitions in Germany. But he also emphasized surprising similarities ranging
from the various types of organizations involved (missionary, women’s, youth) to new cultural phenomena like a popular and widely read press, other media such as theatre and the newly emerging film industry, and the growth of a consumer society with its attendant advertising. In his paper on imperial hunting in British and German East Africa, Bernhard Gißibl (Bremen) pointed to the manifold contacts that existed between German and British colonialists in the fields of hunting and wild life preservation. Gißibl portrayed big game hunting as one of the most powerful manifestations of colonialism in East Africa and suggested that the British and German settlers were separated by arbitrarily defined borders rather than habits. Conferences on wild life preservation constituted spaces of dialogue as did the long ship passages from Europe to Africa.

The conference ended with a panel discussion chaired by Volker Berghahn (New York). The panellists (Richard Evans, Jose Harris, Ross McKibbin, Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, James Retallack, and John Röhl) discussed the ambivalence of Anglo–German relations in the period and pointed to a number of under-explored areas of research such as the role of trade in cultural exchange between Britain and Germany, language transmission, migration, and tourism. At the same time, they emphasized the difficulty of integrating the often diverse areas of cultural history research into one coherent argument about the nature of Anglo–German relations.

Nevertheless, two major threads of argument that were reflected in most of the conference papers could be identified. First, there was an emphasis on the interconnectedness of the cultural and political dimensions of Anglo–German contacts and transfers that has too often been neglected in previous historical research. Second, the very ambivalence of Anglo–German encounters seems to have been a product of the contradictory character of modernization in Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain, which was deeply influenced both by an increasing nationalization and a simultaneous internationalization. In this respect, the conference shed more light on the mutual reinforcement of two inextricably intertwined processes that were to shape the twentieth century.

DOMINIK GEPPERT (Free University Berlin)
ROBERT GERWARTH (Harvard/Oxford)
The goal of the conference was to address the problem of forced ‘mass’ migration which on this scale, according to the convenors, was the peculiar feature of a particular era, roughly from the middle of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth. The convenors specially highlighted the role of colonialism and war behind forced migration in the modern world. The conference focused mainly on the period 1850 to 1950 and sought to examine the phenomenon in a global comparative framework, but with constant reference to individual cases. By bringing together scholars working on the history of forced migration on five continents and drawing on their regional expertise, the conference tried to identify analytical and conceptual categories for a general understanding of forced migration in the modern world. The conference was divided into an introductory section, four regional panels, a section on postcolonial migrations, and a concluding panel and discussion.

The introductory panel ‘Conceptualizing Forced Migration’ addressed conceptual questions, including those of terminology, relating to forced migration. The first paper, ‘Explaining Forced Migration’ by Alf Lüdtke (Max Planck Institute for History, Göttingen, and University of Erfurt), dealt with some of the fundamental problems associated with the subject of the conference. Disavowing any claims to explaining forced migrations as the title of his paper suggested, Lüdtke instead posed the question: ‘Is the claim to “explain” historical events and processes legitimate and adequate?’ He drew on recent research on the subject in various regional studies and emphasized the need to examine forced removals not just at the macro level of policy, but to pare the phenomenon down to the micro level of practice on the ground, or what he called ‘face to face settings and figurations’. He emphasized the need for more focused research on emotion (covering a huge and complex range and including perpetrator, bystander, survivor, and, indeed, all other involved parties) and violence in order better to understand forced
migration. He drew attention to the nature of the states that forced people out and suggested that it was not only strong states but also weak ones that were involved. He also drew attention to the need to study the precise links between state-organized and state-sponsored violence for the sake of creating a homogenous nation-state and the readiness of people to accept such violence as their own agenda. In this context, he urged the need to learn from studies of massacre. Finally, Lüdtke pointed out the inadequacy of terms such as ‘forced migration’ for conveying the emotional charge that the process entails and urged a rethinking of the terminology for ‘tracing the emotional dynamics’.

Claudia Haake’s (University of York) paper ‘Breaking the Bonds of People and Land’ argued for a distinction to be made between the question of land and that of nation-building by focusing on the relocation of Native Americans following the Relocation Act of 1830 in the US. Drawing comparisons between the forced migration of the Delawares in the US and the Yaquis in Mexico, which occurred simultaneously, she suggested that land appropriation was the dominant agenda of such removals and a product of colonization. In the case of the US this economic agenda of land-grabbing remained a covert one, as the official and more widely publicized reason was ‘to turn the Delawares into Americans’, but it far outweighed the rhetoric of cultural assimilation and racial ideology.

The discussion picked up many of the conceptual questions raised by the panel. The following issues received particular attention: (1) the problem of terminology for forced migration/removal. The related point was raised of whether ‘removed’ peoples use other terms to describe their experience from those used in official accounts or in scholarship. (2) Treating emotions in historical research in a social-scientific way, (3) the relationship between state and people (for example, is the state more than the people?), (4) the question of land and its meaning: the emotional meaning of land, its signifying power as symbolic of life, kinship, and community, and its simultaneous economic value as commodity were some of the issues raised. (5) Gender-related issues such as the role (or absence) of women in perpetrating violence as well as women as a removed group were addressed. (6) The need to tell the ‘victim’s’ story, but also to define the victim, with the attendant problem of who defines the victim. In this context, the necessity for a source-critical approach in order to
distinguish between the ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ viewpoints was stressed, as was the inherent complexity and multiplicity of such ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ accounts. (7) The role of war at the centre of forced removal, and (8) the making and breaking of bonds with land among removed peoples. (9) The different paradigms of forced migration: colonization and war, the nation-state, and slavery.

The second session, ‘Colonialism and Removal: Removal in the Americas’, moved on from theoretical concerns to specific studies of the subject in North America. Many of the questions raised by the first session, such as war, colonization, nation-state, and modernity, were addressed with respect to individual case-studies. The papers were dedicated to an understanding of not only policy-making but also the perceptions of the ‘removed’ in the context of the white colonization of America and the making of the nation-state in the US, Canada, and Mexico from the eighteenth century to the middle of the twentieth. Thus multiple narratives were used to reconstruct events in order to attempt to understand forced removal from the point of view both of the policy-makers and of the removed as well. In this context, the panel also raised the issue of material and psychological benefits associated with self-perceptions of suffering of affected communities. Finally, the panel extended the idea of forced removal from war to the long-term ‘vanishing’ of peoples. Tim Alan Garrison’s (Portland State University) paper ‘Rationalizing Removal: The Southern Strategy for Dispossessing American Indians’ illustrated how an essentially cultural and racial ideology of white moral superiority and civilizing mission infused the legalistic arguments made by the supreme courts of the Southern states to dispossess American Indians of their right to land. Garrison stressed that while these arguments in no way reflected the situation on the ground and were forms of ‘rationalization’ or ‘strategies’ of appropriation, the nineteenth-century white Southerners were convinced of the righteousness and morality of these arguments to exert claims to possession of Native American land.

In his paper ‘The Federal Indian Relocation Programme of the 1950s and the Urbanization of Indian Identity’ Donald Fixico (Arizona State University) spoke about the emergence of a specifically urban Indian identity in the wake of the voluntary relocation of Native Americans returning from military service to American cities (such as Los Angeles, Denver, Colorado, and Salt Lake City) between
1952 and the early 1970s. The relocation programme offered by the federal government, argued Fixico, had behind it the cultural agenda of fashioning Americans out of American Indians and persuading them to give up not only their traditional lifestyles but also the ‘Native ethos’. In the long run, urbanization weakened this ethos, but it also led to the new development of ‘urban Indianization’. While Native Americans have embraced Americanization, they have also retained elements of tradition in what Fixico calls an urban Indian identity or a ‘new urban tribalism’.

Kiera Ladner’s (University of Western Ontario) presentation ‘Canada: Where did all the “Indians” go? Living with the Results of Relocation’ approached the subject as the narrative of the dispossessed, as she openly eschewed theory and talked about ‘the community’. Emphasizing the divergent notions of land held by the white settlers, for whom land was associated with national boundaries, and the Cree Indians of Canada, to whom land represented sacred space, she spoke about the gradual erosion of the latter’s right to self-determination and land-control since the colonization of Canada in the eighteenth century. Thus the history of the Canadian nation was, in Ladner’s view, the story of the ‘vanishing Indian’.

In the final paper of the session, ‘Slavery and Suffering: War and Deportation According to Yaqui Narrative’, Raquel Padilla (Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, Mexico) examined Yaqui narratives of their deportation from Sonora to Yucatan in and shortly after 1900. She juxtaposed these with official accounts of the event to focus on the discursive meaning and use of the term ‘slavery’ by the Yaquis to describe their experiences in Yucatan. The reasons for such a perception of their status and the continued use of the term ‘slavery’ in their oral narratives may be attributed, argued Padilla, both to the advantages it must have brought them from the revolutionary government at that time, and to the fact that the narrative of their enslavement in the past may serve as a symbol of ‘their capacity to overcome and prevail’, and hence as a source of self-esteem for present Yaqui generations.

The next panel had the regional focus of Africa and Australia. The themes of traumatic experience and the operative aspects of forced removal, national identity, the resistance to forced removal, the role of law, the importance of various kinds of narratives, and the need to study displacement on a global scale were some of the issues
addressed in the section. Paul Lovejoy (York University, Canada) in his paper ‘The Slave Trade as “Forced Migration”’ conceptualized the phenomenon of forced removal in the context of not merely the transatlantic but also the inland slave trade in Nigeria. Speaking at length about inland slavery, Lovejoy emphasized the difficulty of finding a common pattern on slave trade in African history. He concluded that there was no ‘normal’ or ‘typical’ pattern of forced removal, but highlighted the long-term consequences of such removals in Nigeria.

Mark Copland’s (Griffith University) paper ‘Calculating Lives: The Number and Narrative of Forced Removals in Queensland 1859–1972’ and Bain Attwood’s (Monash University) paper ‘Land and Removal in British Settler Societies’ returned to the question of colonization and forced migration in white settler colonies. Copland focused on the suffering and trauma of the removed Aboriginal people by referring to their own testimonies or those of their family members. He emphasized the huge discrepancy between the real and stated reasons for large-scale removal of Aboriginal peoples. He pointed out that the rhetoric of forced removal was dominated by a concern for the physical and mental health of the Aborigines and untrue assumptions about their ties to land and family, but the real reasons were more closely related to the needs of a dominant society to discipline indigenous peoples and acquire their lands. Bain Attwood took a comparative approach which included the cases of the Aboriginal peoples of Australia and the Maoris of New Zealand, and also drew parallels with the colonization of North America. Emphasizing both material conditions as well as discourse, Attwood attempted to provide an analytical framework for understanding land dispossession of the indigenous peoples in the different British settler colonies. The starting point of his comparison was that unlike in the other settler colonies, in Australia the British never acknowledged Aboriginal rights to land and consequently did not enter into treaties with indigenous peoples. Of central importance, argued Attwood, was the role of what he described as several ‘independent variables’ in the early stage of colonialism ranging from realities on the ground such as the relative strength of white settlers, their economic relations with the indigenous peoples, and the location of governmental authority in the colonies to cultural and discursive factors such as current British theories about sovereignty and property
rights, especially regarding Aboriginal land rights, and perceptions of Aboriginal people, including their military capacity. Attwood argued that it was the situation on the ground in the colonies that gave force to the legal and cultural discourses and to laws, as settler colonialism required ‘new legal arrangements’ regarding land. In this sense, Attwood suggested, the phenomenon of land rights and dispossession in the settler colonies ‘lies at the heart of the making of the modern world’.

The following session, ‘War and Removal: Removal in the Middle East and South Asia’, included four case-studies. Benny Morris (Ben Gurion University of the Negev) in his paper ‘Expulsion and Thinking about Expulsion in the First Arab-Israeli War of 1948’ attributed the origins of the Palestine refugee problem to what he described as not a ‘preconceived master plan’ or ‘governmental policy decision’ on the part of either the Arab states or the Zionist leaders, as has been propagated in Zionist propaganda and traditional Arab historiography respectively, but rather a ‘mindset of transfer’ that emerged from the war of 1948. While admitting the existence of a long-term ‘transfer thinking’ amongst some Zionist leaders, Morris argued that it was the real threat of extinction of the Jewish settlers as a result of increasing Arab violence as well as the Holocaust from the 1930s onwards that led to the hardening of the expulsionist mindset, among not just the Zionists but also the Arabs.

Ronald Suny (University of Chicago) in his paper entitled ‘Explaining Genocide: The Fate of the Armenians in the Late Ottoman Empire’ carried the theme of forced removal a step further by focusing on genocide. He rejected the traditional interpretations of the Armenian genocide in nationalist, religious, or racist terms and emphasized instead the role of ‘affective experience’ in understanding such phenomena that, according to him, social science had far too long neglected. Suny returned to the theme of the perpetrators’ mindset which, in his opinion, can be better understood with reference to emotions such as fear, pride, anxiety, resentment, and so on that were associated with national or ethnic identity. It was these ‘irrational’ factors that, in his view, led to the construction of the Armenians as the enemy of the Turkish people.

Gyanendra Pandey’s (Emory University) paper ‘A Forced Removal That’s Barely Noticed: The Case of British India’s Untouchables’ approached the subject of forced removals in terms of forgot-
ten histories of forgotten peoples, that is, the disappearance or ‘flattening’ of certain groups in historical writing on moments of extreme violence of which, as Pandey emphasized, the historian too is culpable. Pandey urged the recovery of such histories. Describing the erstwhile ‘Untouchables’ or ‘Dalits’ as ‘nobody’s people’ at the time of the partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947, Pandey dwelt on the economic motive of land-grab that he sees as the main reason for the removal of Dalits (90 per cent of whom were agriculturists) from their rights to land and the systematic policy of the post-Partition states to deny Dalits the restitution of these rights. He also drew attention to the close link between homeland and history: the Dalits’ lack of land, or homeland, explains their disappearance from history. However, just as this was a story of land denial which needed to be told, Pandey asserted that Dalit struggles to acquire land and status must be seen as a means to find a place in a democratic order. Ian Talbot (University of Southampton) in his paper ‘Forced Migration and the 1947 Partition of India: A Comparative Study of Punjab and Bengal’ pointed out the need to focus on the meta-narratives of the Partition of the Indian sub-continent, which in his opinion had long been overlooked because of the need for a broad narrative. He highlighted the complex, politically-driven, and contested history of the phenomenon in the two partitioned arms of the sub-continent, namely Punjab and Bengal.

The papers in the panel ‘War and Removal: Removal in Europe’ drew attention to the management and operation of forced removal, and raised the issue of ideology vis-à-vis contingency in this context. Detlef Brandes’s (University of Düsseldorf) paper ‘National and International Planning of the “Transfer” of Germans from Czechoslovakia and Poland’ dwelt on the planning and execution of the transfer of Germans in these territories from 1941 onwards. Brandes pointed out that although at the end of the war alternative solutions to the question of minorities existed, in their treatment of German minorities both Poland and Czechoslovakia opted for a narrow definition of the nation-state. Following from this, they pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing and expulsion of their German populations. Shane O’Rourke (University of York) in his paper ‘Trial Run: The Deportation of the Terek Cossacks 1920’ argued that the deportation of the Terek Cossacks by the early Bolshevik state in 1920, which was the first Soviet attempt at large-scale deportation, although not
numerically significant, nevertheless contained many critical aspects of the organized deportations of the later Stalin period or what O’Rourke describes as the ‘manifestation of a high modernist ideology’. Donald Bloxham’s (University of Edinburgh) paper ‘Forced Population Movement in Europe, 1875–1949’ identified the Great Eastern crisis of 1875 and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as the starting point of what he described as a genealogy of mass removal. In particular, Bloxham highlighted the role of war as a vital contingent factor in the history of forced removal. For example, he said, population exchange or deportation was often resorted to in order to pre-empt war.

The panel ‘Post-Colonial Forced Migration’, the only session not regionally but chronologically structured, consisted of two papers that stretched the analytical category of forced removal to include strategic removals for pacification and repatriation of once-privileged colonial elites. Christian Gerlach’s (University of Pittsburgh) paper ‘Sustainable Violence: Depopulation, Strategic Villages, and “Development” in Anti-Guerrilla Warfare’ argued that anti-guerrilla strategic resettlement was a key factor behind endemic and sustained violence in large parts of the world. Drawing upon the example of such tactics employed by the Germans in the Soviet Union during the Second World War, Gerlach observed that since the 1940s this pattern had become a worldwide phenomenon, often in nations on the road to decolonization. While admitting that forced resettlement itself was nothing new, he nevertheless argued that from the 1940s onwards the ‘newness’ was the offer of tangible material incentives designed to win the sympathy of the resettled and their participation in the existing or emerging political system. The significance of this participation, argued Gerlach, lay in the fact that it drew citizens into conflicts and the resultant ‘participatory violence’ led to the creation of what he calls ‘extremely violent’ societies.

Andrea Smith’s (Lafayette University) paper ‘Sending the Colonists “Home”: The Peculiar Experience of Post-colonial Exile’ used the category of ‘home’ to analyse the sense of loss of home and homeland by the French colonial elite of the pieds noirs in the wake of French decolonization of Algeria and their reluctant ‘return migration’ to France. Smith admitted the difficulty of conceptualizing the experience of the pieds noirs as forced migration, as by comparison with other dispossessed peoples, they were obviously a privileged
group and given preferential treatment in France. Nevertheless, she raised the question of whether the sense of being uprooted and homeless of even a privileged group was fundamentally different from that of the victims of forced removal.

The final session ‘Explaining Forced Migration’, which also included the concluding discussion, was conducted in the form of observations on forced removal and on the findings of the conference sessions by Richard Bessel and Joanna de Groot (both University of York). Bessel focused on certain themes that in his view would help us to understand and conceptualize the problem. Underlying these themes, Bessel suggested, was the modern age and modernist ideology, which provided the common thread between the subject of the conference in general and the individual papers. He drew attention to the specificities of the period from 1850 to 1950: the availability of the technological means that enabled forced removal of people on a large scale, the increased contact of people with others, the growth of a modern state, the development of a conviction of the need to produce homogenous states coterminous with scientific thinking and ‘nation-thinking’, and the emotions (such as anger, fear, resentment) that characterized twentieth-century history. He also raised the question of the role of religion, especially in delineating groups and influencing civilizing ideologies, and ideology both as ‘everyday practice’ and as informing policy-making, and reiterated the need to think about forced migration not just as policy-making but as on-the-ground practice. Bessel also stressed the necessity to look more closely at the ‘voices of the removed’, their memories, and the generational differences in these memories. Joanna de Groot suggested power and its many forms and modes as a conceptual framework for understanding forced removal. Power, she argued, could be that over human bodies and goods; cultural power including the politics of narrative and language, which, for example, could ‘erase people’ through ‘epistemic violence’ or power of memory; the power of institutions such as the modern state; and power as status-led or gendered.

The final discussion returned to many of the themes addressed in the course of the conference and sought to conceptualize them in terms of the connection between modernity and forced migration/removal. The conference made a laudable contribution to global history by examining a global phenomenon of the modern world.
and trying to achieve a general understanding of it, but with the help of specific regional studies.

INDRA SENGUPTA (GHIL)
Revisiting Sites of Memory: New Perspectives on the British Empire.
International conference held at Cumberland Lodge, Windsor, 29
June-2 July 2006

Against the backdrop of an upsurge in studies of social memory that
have left their mark on historical research over the past two decades,
the German Historical Institute London decided to bring together
scholars of imperial, colonial, and postcolonial history in order to
engage in a dialogue with the European lieux de mémoire/Erinnerungs-
orte thesis. This was an attempt on the part of the Institute to contin-
ue its engagement with the concept of lieux de mémoire: in 2002 the
Institute had organized a conference on European lieux de mémoire.
This time the participants were invited to examine whether an ana-
lytical tool developed essentially within the framework of the nation-
state in Europe could be applied to larger entities such as empires,
the particular case study being the British Empire. Focusing, as
Hagen Schulze (GHI London) pointed out in his introductory talk, on
certain ‘sites of memory’ that ‘capture the complexity of public mem-
ory and the ambivalence of collective identity in the imperial-colonial
context’, the papers also had the objective of discussing the theoreti-
cal assumptions of the lieux de mémoire/Erinnerungsorte thesis. In her
introduction outlining the conceptual framework and aims of the
four-day conference, Indra Sengupta (GHI London) emphasized the
need for dialogue between the lieux de mémoire/Erinnerungsorte pro-
ject in European history-writing and the ‘new’ imperial history/post-
colonial studies by drawing attention to some of their common con-
cerns, namely, the readjustment of the traditional relationship
between the nation-state and history-writing, a rethinking of national
identity, and the place of social memory in historical research. She
suggested that, in the context of the entangled histories of empire and
colony, the notion of ‘shared’ sites of memory within the British
Empire might be a useful conceptual framework for understanding
the colonial experience.

In her keynote speech ‘How History takes Place’ Aleida Assmann
(Constance University) addressed some key theoretical issues and
thus provided the broad framework for the papers and discussions
that followed. Referring to the ‘spatial turn’ in historical research
propagated by Edward Soja, Michel Foucault, and others, she drew
attention to the further shift from space to place and dwell at length

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on the importance of place in *lieux de mémoire*. Place, she argued, was a repository of memory, encapsulating, as it did, not the process but the aftermath of historical events. By being essentially ‘contested and layered’, place, according to Assmann, was often ‘the focus of divided memories and competing narratives’. It thus allowed the writing of non-linear and fragmented historical narratives, which are so central to the writing of colonial history. Drawing on the distinction between *lieux de mémoire* (‘collective and cultural’) and what she described as *lieux de souvenir* (‘private and subjective’) Assmann argued that the former, despite embodying constructed practices of commemoration, nevertheless came close to the latter. Like the places of the *lieux de souvenir*, they too served as ‘contact zones’ in which time collapsed and ‘sudden and unpremeditated transitions between the present and the past’ were possible, although, in her view, *lieux de mémoire* did need to be framed by a powerful narrative which they were to symbolize. Finally, Assmann focused on *lieux de mémoire* in the colonial and postcolonial context of entangled histories, in which, she asserted, the crystallization of ‘sites’ of memory becomes very complex. For example, a particular site could symbolize contrasting and conflicting narratives, such as imperial/national memory or social/individual memories, or it could simultaneously embody both memory and forgetting. She therefore stressed the need to explore the ‘symbolic strategies’ that are employed so that ‘an event can be turned into an enduring experience’, crystallized in *lieux de mémoire*.

The fourteen papers presented in the course of the conference were drawn from the various regions of the British Empire and in their diversity provided a balanced combination of empirical research and theoretical complexity. The first panel ‘Empire-Building’ (Chair: Benedikt Stuchtey, GHI London) comprised two papers. ‘Emin Pasha: The Construction of an Imperial Icon in the Age of the Scramble’ by Jürgen Zimmerer (University of Sheffield) focused on the figure of Emin Pasha as a transnational site of memory and raised the issues of imperial mentality and competition in a European perspective. In her paper ‘Discovering the Pleasures of War: “The Little Wars of Empire”’ Kirstin Schäfer (Technical University, Berlin) dwelt on colonial wars as the catalyst for what she described as an ‘exorbitant memory production’ and visual representation of the wars of Empire. Such memorialization of the wars of Empire by means of cultural production, argued Schäfer, served to bring home as it were by
proxy the experience of war in distant lands, with which most Britons had little to do. At the same time, these served as sites of collective memory which, in the long run, deeply influenced British stereotypes of colonized peoples and thereby strengthened the core of a British national identity.

The panel ‘Narratives of Domination and Subordination’ (Chair: Pim den Boer, Amsterdam University) consisted of two papers on the narratives of two events that were symbolic of the violence of the colonial experience. In her paper ‘Revisiting the Black Hole of Calcutta’ Gita Dharampal-Frick (Heidelberg University) traced the genealogy of a legitimating imperial myth whose origins lay in the early days of empire-building in India and which dominated colonial thinking and British public life at least until the beginning of decolonization. It also became embedded in the memory of the fledgling Indian nation under late British rule and in the long run became a universal symbol of horror. Karina Williamson (University of Edinburgh) (“We slaughtered them all”: the Morant Bay Rebellion, Jamaica, 1865’) spoke about the commemorative aspects of a watershed event in the history of Jamaica that has become enshrined as a national site of memory, albeit one that, even within the national context, contains multiple narratives. In mid-nineteenth-century Britain, Williamson showed, the event aroused outrage but, compared to other sites of imperial memory, such as the Indian revolt of 1857, very soon became a site of collective forgetting.

The papers in the panel ‘Sites of Memory at the Crossroads of Empire and Nation’ (Chair: Elizabeth Buettner, University of York) focused more strongly on intersecting sites of memory that are common to both metropolis and colony. Astrid Erll’s (University of Giessen) paper “1857/58” as a Shared lieu de mémoire: An Intermedial Perspective on Cultural Memory in Great Britain and India’ addressed some of the major theoretical issues related to the lieu de mémoire thesis. Her paper focused on the representation of the Indian Mutiny/revolt in a whole network of media in both Britain and India from the mid-nineteenth century to the present, which in her opinion collectively constitute a lieu de mémoire. Erll stressed the need to take an intermedial approach, in view of the importance of such medial networks in ‘creating and disseminating the imperial memory culture and thus in constructing, maintaining and transforming lieu de mémoire’. Using examples from newspaper reports, fiction, historiog-
raphy, works of art, and film, she showed that cultural representations of the events of 1857/58 tended to borrow heavily from one another, that they constantly pre- and re-mediated each other and thus cemented the collective memory of the event. In his paper ‘Freetown: Symbolic Crossroads of African and Colonial Memory’ Alexander Keese (GHI Paris/CEAUP Porto) addressed the question of intentionality in the construction of a lieu de mémoire by showing the symbolic meaning which colonial officials tried to infuse into the West African site of slave trade, Freetown.

The panel ‘Objects, Figures, Monuments’ (Chair: Winfried Speitkamp, University of Giessen) began with Susan Stronge’s (V&A Museum, London) paper ‘Tippoo’s Tiger: The Victoria & Albert Museum’s Man-Tiger-Organ’. Starting by tracing the history of the acquisition and subsequent popularity of the museum object, Stronge focused on the role of art historians and the art market in perpetuating a particular kind of imperial history-writing on the object’s original owner, Tipu Sultan, the ruler of the Indian state of Mysore, whose defeat by British troops in 1799 marked a triumph of British empire-building. In his paper ‘Remembering Tutankhamun: Egyptian Antiquity between Empire and Nation’ Donald M. Reid (Georgia State University) examined the debates and discourses surrounding Tutankhamun in the context of the competition for control over Egyptian antiquities—and thereby Egypt’s past—both among the European imperial powers Britain and France (Reid also added the dimension of American interest to the story) as well as within the Egyptian nation. Monica Juneja’s (Universities of Delhi/Hanover) paper ‘Architectural Memory between Representation and Practice: Rethinking Pierre Nora’s Les lieux de mémoire’ saw a return to the theoretical premise of the conference: an engagement with Pierre Nora in the extra-European context. Juneja developed her arguments with reference to the case study of an eleventh-century architectural complex near Delhi that became the site of the repeated recasting of memorial narratives ranging from the colonial to the postcolonial. Taking issue with Nora’s assumption that a lieu de mémoire is essentially symbolic or commemorative, rather than physical or functional, Juneja highlighted the interplay of remembrance, architectural space and social experience in the creation of sites of collective memory. She thus argued that Nora’s understanding of lieux de mémoire needs to be expanded to include social experience, by shifting the
focus from representation to practice and by exploring memory as ‘a process rather than an unchanging essence expressive of the “permanence of identity” (Nora)’.  

Stephen Heathorn (McMaster University) opened the session ‘End of Empire, New Nations’ (Chair: Claude Markovits, CNRS, Paris) with his paper ‘The Absent Site of Memory: The Kanpur Memorial Well and the 1957 Centenary Commemoration of the Indian “Mutiny”’. Taking issue with Pierre Nora’s notion of fixed, externalized lieux de mémoire Heathorn drew on his case study of the monument to the fallen Britons in the Indian ‘Mutiny’ to argue that such sites of memory are not self-signifying. In the case of the Kanpur memorial well, it was the colonial narrative of the Mutiny (the heroism, chivalry, and martyrdom of British men and women) that in Heathorn’s words ‘provided the framework for the meaning of the site’. The attempts of the colonial ruling classes themselves to obliterate the visible symbols of martyrdom on the site in the years leading to Indian independence, to make the site ‘absent’ as it were, thus marked a move to protect their memories of British heroism in the ‘Mutiny’ from being defaced in independent India. Ultimately, argued Heathorn, in independent India the site of memory, now displaced from the colonial narrative of the Mutiny, came to be emptied of its meaning even while it continued physically to exist. In his paper ‘Rajghat: In Memory of the Mahatma’ Dietmar Rothermund (Heidelberg University) focused on the performative aspects of a lieu de mémoire as he spoke about the creation and functioning of the so-called Rajghat Samadhi or Gandhi’s cremation place as a national site of memory. At the same time he drew out dimensions of the site that cannot be explained purely in terms of a national lieu de mémoire, as the site figures prominently in an array of supranational movements, such as for civil rights, the environment, and peace initiatives.

The focus of the panel ‘Colonial Past and Generational Remembering’ (Chair: Brigitte Reinwald, University of Hanover) was to use case-studies of the erstwhile British mandate of Palestine and the colony of Zanzibar in East Africa to engage with the theoretical premises of the lieux de mémoire thesis. Both papers in the panel problematized the factor of generation in collective memory. In her paper ‘Generations of Experience: The Transgenerational Memory of Izz ed-Din al-Qassam in Palestinian Personal Accounts’ Birgit Schäbler (University of Erfurt) stressed the centrality of commemoration and
a ritually unified remembrance’ to Palestinian aspirations for nationhood. According to her, the transgenerational collective memory of the anti-colonial and anti-Zionist leader Izz ed-Din al-Qassam as seen in Palestinian personal accounts provides an example of how a site of memory is appropriated afresh by each new generation. At the same time its overall meaning does not change: the figure of Izz ed-Din al-Qassam continues to be commemorated as a symbol of resistance. Jan-Georg Deutsch’s (St Cross College, Oxford) paper entitled ‘Colonial Nostalgia, Intergenerational Memory and Social Conflict in Zanzibar, East Africa, c.1950–2000’ made extensive use of oral history as well as archival sources to focus on a specific ‘place’, that is, architectural buildings and urban landscapes, as the physical sites of the memory of colonial rule in Zanzibar (‘memoryscapes’). He referred to the association of these ‘sites’ with violence in popular memory. In contrast to Pierre Nora’s thesis of lieux de mémoire that represent consensus, Deutsch emphasized the fractured nature of these memoryscapes: although the sites remained the same, he said, memories of the past remained divided. These divisions were largely along the lines of generation, and the memories of each generation were generated by the particular historical experience of that generation.

The single paper ‘A Sense of the Past: The Partition of India and Memory’ in the final panel, ‘Living Memory’ (Chair: Daud Ali, SOAS London), was presented by the Indian publisher and activist Urvashi Butalia (Zubaan Books Delhi). Drawing upon the theoretical issues addressed in the course of the conference, Butalia nevertheless stressed the role of activism in dealing with the history and memory of human experience. With the help of the powerful narrative of a male survivor of India’s partition embarking on a ritual visit to the ancestral homeland that his family had fled from in the violent aftermath of the partition and the multi-layered memory—scattered, as Butalia said, across several ‘unmarked’ sites—of the event, Butalia questioned the capacity of theory to accommodate the complexity of this kind of memory. She particularly emphasized the role of silence in stories such as the one she presented, especially its encoding and gendering.

The relevance of opening up the lieux de mémoire thesis to an extra-European context occupied much of the discussion. A number of issues came up in the discussion of lieux de mémoire in the colonial and imperial contexts. (1) The need to move away from the national
as the overarching framework of *lieux de mémoire* on the one hand to the local and, on the other, to the transnational (Jay Winter/Yale, Buettner). The danger of ‘imposing the nation’ (Stronge) on objects and entities that are not necessarily perceived as national by people was emphasized, as was the need to move away from ‘claiming’ *lieux de mémoire* (den Boer) as nations have traditionally tried to do. (2) The notion of ‘shared’ sites of memory between Empire and colony came up repeatedly for discussion (Juneja, Schäbler). It was suggested that, in the context of conflict and confrontation that imperialism entailed, the terms ‘entangled’ or ‘intersecting’ sites of memory might be more appropriate (Etienne François/Berlin, Schäbler, Reinwald). (3) In the imperial context, the role of the family and family networks and narratives in creating, disseminating, and perpetuating sites of memory was stressed (Winter, Andrew Porter/London, Buettner). (4) The need to examine the way in which the specific features of *lieux de mémoire* outside Europe might contribute to a fuller understanding and use of Nora’s approach even within the European context received particular attention. Here emphasis was placed on religion and the sacred which, it was agreed, had not been addressed at all in the European *lieux de mémoire* project (Winter, Ali). (5) Finally, much of the discussion was dedicated to a rethinking of the *lieux de mémoire* approach itself. The need for sharper analytical tools to define a *lieu de mémoire* was stressed, in order to prevent the approach from becoming a ‘free for all’ (Assmann). It was pointed out that the process by which memorialization takes place and *lieux de mémoire* are formed merits greater attention in historical research (Juneja). The importance of the physical (Deutsch) as well as the ‘unofficial’ site of memory, not recognized by the state (Winter), was stressed. At the same time, attention was drawn to the need to focus on the groups that try to control public memory and conflicts over a site (Benjamin Zachariah/Sheffield), as well as the mutually constitutive nature of the site and the discourses around it (Juneja). The problem of language in conceptualizing *lieux de mémoire* was also touched on (Schäbler). Further, the need to focus on not just forgetting, but also the social codification of silence, including its gender-specificity, was stressed (Winter, Butalia). (6) The extent to which *lieux de mémoire* are gender-specific was briefly touched upon, as for example, to what extent the discourses on the ‘sites’ take place in a ‘male language’ (Winter). (7) Finally, the methodological problems involved when
Conference Reports

professional historians deal with memory were briefly addressed (den Boer, Winter).

In the final talk, summing up the achievements of the conference, Jay Winter (Yale, panel Chair: Etienne François, TU Berlin) picked up on the major issues raised by the papers and discussions. Winter said that in many ways lieux de mémoire outside Europe provided greater insight into and illustrated a fuller applicability of the approach itself. He referred to the breaking down of the traditional theoretical distinction between the sacred and the secular, between memory and history, the centrality of affect, and the ‘re-sacralization’ of historical studies, which had repeatedly come up in the conference and asserted that these could only be fully studied in the extra-European context. Any general approach to creatively dealing with ‘signifying practices’, Winter stressed, would have to go beyond Europe.

The German Historical Institute plans to publish the conference findings.

INDRA SENGUPTA (GHIL)
Research Seminar

The GHIL regularly organizes a research seminar at which recipients of grants from the Institute, Fellows of the GHIL, and other scholars report on the progress of their work. Any postgraduate or postdoctoral researchers who are interested in the subjects are welcome to attend. As a general rule, the language of the papers and discussion is German, and meetings start at 5 p.m.

Due to circumstances beyond our control, most of the meetings arranged for this term are before the publication date of this Bulletin. They are recorded here, along with papers given earlier in the year, as a matter of interest to readers. For further information concerning future dates please contact Dr Indra Sengupta-Frey on 020 7309 2018, or email her on isengupta@ghil.ac.uk

9 May Andreas Klein
‘Herren des Gewaltmarktes’: Machtstrukturen der Border Reiver im 16. Jahrhundert

16 May Ina Ulrike Paul

20 June Ina Scherder
Die Arbeitshäuser von Galway: Eine Studie der Entwicklung von Armenadministration und lokaler Verwaltung in Irland, 1838–1921

4 July Axel Fair-Schulz
Gradenwitz-Brandeis-Kuczynski: Eight Generations from Enlightenment to Socialism and Beyond (1800–2000)

5 Sept. Anna Schramm
Der katholische Hochadel in England in der Zeit zwischen 1603–1648

26 Sept. Claus Ludl
Die Geschichte der vergleichenden Verhaltensforschung in Deutschland (1945–1980)
Noticeboard

3 Oct.   Ines Eben von Racknitz
         Die Plünderung des Yuanming yuan in Peking: Eine ‘imperialistische Lektion’?

10 Oct.  Angelika Epple
         Clash of Civilization? Stollwerck Bros./London

24 Oct.  Katharina Behrens
         Nat for drede of God ne Shame of the Worlde: Scham und Schande im spätmittelalterlichen England

5 Dec.   Jens Gründler
         Armut und Psychiatrie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert

Postgraduate Students’ Conference

On 12–13 January 2007 the German Historical Institute London will hold its eleventh annual conference for postgraduate research students in the UK and Ireland working on German history, Anglo-German relations, or comparative topics. The intention is to give Ph.D. students an opportunity to present their work in progress and to discuss it with other students working in the same field. It is hoped that the exchange of ideas and methods will be fruitful for all participants. The Institute will meet travel expenses up to a standard rail fare within the UK (special arrangements for students from Ireland), and also arrange and pay for student accommodation, when necessary, for those who live outside London. For further information please contact the Secretary, Anita Bellamy, by phone on 020 7309 2023, or email her on: abellamy@ghil.ac.uk
Change of Director

After six years Professor Hagen Schulze’s tenure as Director of the GHIL came to an end on 30 August 2006. He returns to his Chair of Modern German and European History at the Free University of Berlin. While at the Institute his major publications were: ed. with Etienne François, Deutsche Erinnerungsorte, 3 vols. (2001); ed. with Olaf Blaschke, Geschichtswissenschaft und Buchhandel in der Krisenspirale? Eine Inspektion des Feldes in historischer, internationaler und wissenschaftlicher Perspektive (2006); and ed. with T. C. W. Blanning, Unity and Diversity in European Culture c. 1800 (2006).

Professor Andreas Gestrich (University of Trier) took over as Director on 1 September 2006. Some of his more recent publications are: Geschichte der Familie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (1999); with Jens-Uwe Krause and Michael Mitterauer, Geschichte der Familie (2003); ed., Friedrich Schüler (1791–1873): ‘Ein vornehmer, stolzer Republikaner’ (2004); ed. with Lutz Raphael, Inklusion/Exklusion: Studien zu Fremdheit und Armut von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (2004); and ed. with Steven King and Lutz Raphael, Being Poor in Modern Europe (2006).

German History Society

The Annual General Meeting and Conference of the German History Society will be held at the German Historical Institute London on 21 October 2006.

The conference theme is ‘Sport in German History’. Speakers will include Wolfgang Behringer (Saarbrücken), Jutta Braun (Potsdam), Franz Brüggemeier (Freiburg), Kay Schiller (Durham), David Welch (Kent), and Chris Young (Cambridge).

All welcome!
Pauper Narratives. Workshop to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 17–18 November 2006.

Since the publication of Thomas Sokoll’s work on the Essex pauper letters, social historians have been paying more attention to these sorts of requests for relief as a type of source which can provide often highly detailed insights into the problems and survival strategies of the poor. In Britain, a large-scale edition of such letters from other regions is in preparation, while in Germany a number of scholars are also beginning to look at this genre of source.

Many problems of interpretation arise in connection with these sources as they cannot simply be subsumed under the category of ego-documents. Yet their potential yield is not limited to social history in the narrow sense. They also open interesting perspectives on literary and linguistic aspects of popular writing. These dimensions will be explored in the workshop by looking together at these sources from an interdisciplinary perspective.

‘The Dignity of the Poor’: Concepts, Practices, Representations. Conference to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 7–9 December 2006, in cooperation with the DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 600: ‘Strangers and Poor People: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion from Classical Antiquity to the Present Day’, University of Trier.

In December 1995 the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed the ‘First United Nations Decade for the Eradication of Poverty (1997-2006)’. A core element in the justification of this programme was the close connection between the struggle against poverty and the attempt to enforce human rights policies. This interpretation of poverty as a severe violation of human dignity is new, at least in its explicit formulation by the UN. Right into the twentieth century, in both Christian and Jewish theology as well as in Enlightenment philosophy, human dignity was defined in a much more general way. In
Jewish and Christian theology the concept of the dignity of man was based on man being God’s image, thereby changing the meaning of the Latin word *dignitas*, which used to refer to man’s position and honour in society. The German noun *Menschenwürde* did not surface before the Enlightenment period in the second half of the eighteenth century.

The conference will discuss questions of semantic analysis, asking particularly whether there was any notion of the dignity of the poor before the modern concept of *Menschenwürde* arose. It will also investigate the socio-historical dimensions of this concept and ask how the poor were treated by charitable institutions. Did they acknowledge certain needs beyond mere survival on the grounds that they formed an element of human dignity (for example, clothing, Christian burial)? Did the poor themselves perceive their situation as an infringement on their dignity? This conference will take a comparative approach, comprising studies of different periods, religious traditions, and types of social organization.

**From the Blanketeers to the Present: Understanding Protests of the Unemployed.** Conference to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 16–17 February 2007, in collaboration with the Society for the Study of Labour History.

Lack of work has been a recurrent grievance for working people and a site of protest since the early days of labour movements. This conference will bring together the most recent international research into the protests of the workless in different countries and discuss, among other things, how the protest of the unemployed can be explained, how it relates to the formation or existence of an unemployed identity, what impact the protest had, and how the protest activities of the unemployed were represented and remembered after the events.

For further information and to register please contact Dr Matthias Reiss: reiss@ghil.ac.uk
New GHIL Publications

Over the past year two new books have appeared in the series Veröffentlichungen des Deutschen Historischen Instituts London (Publications of the German Historical Institute London), which publishes studies of British history and the history of Anglo–German relations written by German scholars. The following abstracts are intended to give readers of the Bulletin an idea of their content.


Abstract
The period between the end of the First World War in 1918 and the signing of the Locarno Treaties in 1925 saw a noticeable shift in the way the British mass media reported on Germany. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the image of Germany was still overshadowed by the propaganda cliché of the ‘Huns’. By the time the Germans were admitted to the negotiating table at Locarno seven years later—for the first time on an equal footing—this had given way to a much more balanced and, in some instances, even sympathetic view of the former foe who had become a potential partner.

Two schools of thought about Germany re-emerged in Britain after the First World War, both of which were reflected in the mass media, that is, the newspapers and the newsreels. In conservative circles the negative image of the ‘Huns’ invented by wartime propaganda prevailed. Despite the German Emperor’s abdication, the November revolution, and the founding of the Weimar Republic, there was still a conviction that the Germans remained nationalists and militarists at heart, who preferred to be ruled by an authoritarian regime and could not, therefore, be trusted. Adherents of this particular way of thinking did not change their views, even when Anglo–German relations improved during the first half of the 1920s.

Among the labour movement and in liberal circles, however, the newborn German democracy was welcomed. Here real sympathy
evolved for the socialist and liberal representatives of the Republic, who tried to re-evoke positive images of Germany as a European country of art, literature, and science. By 1925 the perception of the press in general had shifted towards the latter interpretation. The reasons were twofold. First, the growing guilt complex over the Versailles Treaty led to the belief that the Germans had been victims of unjust treatment by the victors. Second, attempts by French foreign policy to enforce the peace settlement culminating in the occupation of the Ruhr allowed the Germans to appear as victims of unfair aggression. Both developments stirred up sympathy for the perceived underdog which, from a British perspective, had lost its military and political power and therefore no longer posed a threat.

In the dawning age of mass communication, images of other nations subject to public opinion via the media were not to be neglected in the foreign policy decision-making process. Politicians listened more and more to ‘what the papers said’. At the same time, successive British governments in the 1920s tried to re-establish good relations with Germany in order to stabilize the Continent politically and stimulate the European economy. It is therefore safe to assume that the political elite used the means at their disposal to portray Germany and the Germans in a more favourable light.

The ongoing and extremely controversial discussion about the Versailles Treaty serves as one example of politics and the media interacting and shows what role the perception of Germany played in the formulation of British foreign policy between the armistice and Locarno. It also demonstrates what institutions and instruments the British government used to communicate its policies towards Germany to the wider public via the press.

At a more personal level, it is possible to reconstruct the network of contacts and even friendships that existed between leading politicians and journalists, and served as an informal channel of communication for the exchange of views and opinions. This again underlines how important the mass media were for the formulation of British foreign policy at that time. However, the extent of this influence remains impossible to quantify.

The image of Germany in the British mass media after the First World War has so far largely been ignored by contemporary historians. This book, based on a wide selection of sources, is the first monograph on the subject, which it approaches from a variety of different
perspectives. These include the complex relations between politics and the mass media, which puzzle historians, political scientists, and experts in communication studies to this day.


Abstract
The English constitution—as has long been recognized—was a key topic in the political thinking of the Enlightenment. The precise course of this debate, which was not exclusively British but genuinely European, and conducted, beyond Britain, mainly in France and Germany, has so far not been comprehensively reconstructed, and the question of its origins has only been answered incompletely, and often incorrectly. This book traces the debate about Britain’s constitution from its inception in the context of the Glorious Revolution of 1689 to the French Revolution of 1789 by examining the writings of the best known historical-political authors of the time, and a large number of less prestigious texts including works of popular historiography, legal tracts, political brochures, travelogues, novels, and so on.

There are two main findings. First, it becomes clear that the widespread political Anglophilia of many important eighteenth-century authors did not, as has been assumed until quite recently, start with authors such as Voltaire and Montesquieu, but goes back much further, namely, to the Huguenots who, around 1689, as part of their propaganda against the absolutist, Catholic France of Louis XIV saw the English constitution as a liberal, Protestant counter-system. These authors (among them Jurieu, Abbadie, and Rapin de Thoyras) had an enormous and widespread impact, influencing not only Montesquieu, Voltaire, and other French writers but also many authors in Protestant northern Germany. Second, the study makes it clear that there was not only significant Anglophilia in continental Europe, but also strong political Anglophobia in both France and Germany, where Frederick the Great was among those who firmly rejected the English type of constitution in the name of Enlightened Absolutism.
Thus an extremely differentiated picture of the interpretation and reception of the English constitution after 1689 emerges. In both the liberal and conservative camps there were supporters and critics of the British political system. The former saw the English ‘mixed constitution’ as a successful model for a system geared towards conciliation, assuring freedom and maintaining historical continuity; the latter criticized the forms of ‘corruption’ in parliament and administration, and the tendency towards ‘parliamentary absolutism’. What can also be established is that even the Anglophiles on the Continent did not, in general, think that the English model could be applied there because they regarded Britain’s geopolitically secure island location as the main prerequisite for the emergence of its liberal constitution. When we look back at the debate, however, it also becomes clear that Britain was equally seen as a sort of ‘laboratory of political modernity’ in which key aspects of modern political existence—separation of powers, protection of certain basic rights, the rule of law, parliamentary involvement in the formation of government, the political party system, and contrast between government and opposition—became visible in Europe for the first time.
LIBRARY NEWS

Recent Acquisitions

This list contains a selection of recent publications in German and English, primarily on German history, acquired by the Library of the GHIL in the past year.


Angster, Julia, Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie: Die Westernisierung von SPD und DGB, Ordnungssysteme, 13 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003)


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Bahrmann, Hannes and Christoph Links (eds.), Am Ziel vorbei: Die deutsche Einheit, eine Zwischenbilanz (Berlin: Links, 2005)


Bavaj, Riccardo, Von links gegen Weimar: Linkes antiparlamentarisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik, Politik- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte, 67 (Bonn: Dietz, 2005)


Beller, Steven (ed.), Rethinking Vienna 1900, Austrian History, Culture and Society, 3 (Oxford: Berghahn, 2001)

Benecke, Werner, Die Ostgebiete der Zweiten Polnischen Republik: Staatsmacht und öffentliche Ordnung in einer Minderheitenregion 1918–1939, Beiträge zur Geschichte Osteuropas, 29 (Cologne: Böhlau, 1999)


Benz, Wolfgang and Barbara Distel (eds.), Der Ort des Terrors: Geschichte der nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslager, vols. 1–3 (Munich: Beck, 2005–6)

Library News

Blaschke, Karlheinz and Uwe John (eds.), Geschichte der Stadt Dresden, i. Von den Anfängen bis zum Ende des Dreissigjährigen Krieges (Stuttgart: Theiss, 2005)
Bönnen, Gerold (ed.), Geschichte der Stadt Worms (Stuttgart: Theiss, 2005)
Boll, Monika, Nachtprogramm: Intellektuelle Gründungsdebatten in der frühen Bundesrepublik, Kommunikationsgeschichte, 19 (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004)
Borst, Arno (ed.), Der karolingische Reichskalender und seine Überlieferung bis ins 12. Jahrhundert, Monumenta Germaniae Historica; Antiquitates, 3; Libri memoriales, 2, 3 vols. (Hanover: Hahn, 2001)
Breitmann, Richard et al., U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (Washington, D.C.: National Archives Trust Fund Board, [2004])


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Diepgen, Eberhard, Zwischen den Mächten: Von der besetzten Stadt zur Hauptstadt (Berlin-Brandenburg: edition q im be.bra verlag, 2004)


Ethnizität und Geschlecht: (Post-)Koloniale Verhandlungen in Geschichte, Kunst und Medien, ed. Graduiertenkolleg Identität und Differenz (Cologne: Böhlau, 2005)


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Frank, Mario, *Der Tod im Führerbunker: Hitlers letzte Tage* (Munich: Siedler, 2005)


Görtemaker, Manfred (ed.), *Britain and Germany in the Twentieth Century*, German Historical Perspectives, 18 (Oxford: Berg, 2006)


Hanke, Andrea-Katharina, Die niedersächsische Heimatbewegung im ideologisch-politischen Kräftespiel zwischen 1920 und 1945, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Geschichte Niedersachsens, 123 (Hanover: Hahn, 2004)


Hartmann, Peter Claus, Das Heilige Römische Reich deutscher Nation in der Neuzeit 1486–1806 (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2005)


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Hein, Bastian, Die Westdeutschen und die Dritte Welt: Entwicklungspolitik und Entwicklungsdienste zwischen Reform und Revolte 1959–1974, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 65 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006)


Hempe, Mechthild, Ländliche Gesellschaft in der Krise: Mecklenburg in der Weimarer Republik, Industrielle Welt, 64 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2002)


Herbers, Klaus and Helmut Neuhaus, Das Heilige Römische Reich: Schauplätze einer tausendjährigen Geschichte (843–1806) (Cologne: Böhlau, 2005)


Holzfurtner, Ludwig, Die Wittelsbacher: Staat und Dynastie in acht Jahrhunderten (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2005)


Kempowski, Walter, *Culpa: Notizen zum 'Echolot'* (Munich: Knaus, 2005)


Kißener, Michael, *Das Dritte Reich: Kontroversen um die Geschichte* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005)


Kohlrausch, Martin, *Der Monarch im Skandal: Die Logik der Massenmedien und die Transformation der wilhelminischen Monarchie*, Elitenwandel in der Moderne, 7 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2005)


Krohn, Claus-Dieter, Erwin Rotermund et al. (eds.), *Autobiographie und Wissenschaftliche Biografik*, Exilforschung, 23 (Munich: edition text + kritik, 2005)


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Kunz, Andreas, _Wehrmacht und Niederlage: Die bewaffnete Macht in der Endphase der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft 1944 bis 1945_, Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte, 64 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005)


Lackmann, Thomas, _Das Glück der Mendelssohs: Geschichte einer deutschen Familie_ (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 2005)


Lattek, Christine, _Revolutionary Refugees: German Socialism in Britain, 1840–1860_ (London: Routledge, 2006)

Lau, Matthias, _Pressepolitik als Chance: Staatliche Öffentlichkeitsarbeit in den Ländern der Weimarer Republik_, Beiträge zur Kommunikationsgeschichte, 14 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2003)


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Lilla, Joachim, Der preußische Staatsrat 1921–1933: Ein biographisches Handbuch. Mit einer Dokumentation der im ’Dritten Reich’ benannten Staatsräte, Handbücher zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, 13 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2005)


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Mazlish, Bruce and Akira Iriye (eds.), The Global History Reader (New York: Routledge, 2005)


Melville, Gert (ed.), Das Sichtbare und das Unsichtbare der Macht: Institutionelle Prozesse in Antike, Mittelalter und Neuzeit (Cologne: Böhlau, 2005)


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Partner, Nancy (ed.), *Writing Medieval History* (London: Hodder Arnold, 2005)
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Pesek, Michael, Koloniale Herrschaft in Deutsch-Ostafrika: Expeditionen, Militär und Verwaltung seit 1880 (Frankfurt/M.: Campus Verlag, 2005)
Pettegree, Andrew, Reformation and the Culture of Persuasion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
Pflüger, Christine, Kommissare und Korrespondenzen: Politische Kommunikation im Alten Reich (1552–1558), Norm und Struktur, 24 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2005)
Platz, Dorothee, We Had Been the Women’s Army—Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps: Kriegserfahrungen von Frauen im Hilfsdienst der britischen Armee des Ersten Weltkrieges, Moderne Geschichte und Politik, 20 (Frankfurt/M.: Lang, 2005)
Raithel, Thomas, Das schwierige Spiel des Parlamentarismus: Deutscher Reichstag und französische Chambre des Députés in den Inflationskrisen der 1920er Jahre, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 62 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005)
Reichel, Peter, Schwarz, Rot, Gold: Kleine Geschichte deutscher Nationalsymbole (Munich: Beck, 2005)
Rieger, Bernhard, Technology and the Culture of Modernity in Britain and Germany, 1890–1945, New Studies in European History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
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Rowe, Dorothy, *Representing Berlin: Sexuality and the City in Imperial and Weimar Germany* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003)


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Salewski, Michael, *Deutschland und der Zweite Weltkrieg* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2005)

Scales, Len and Oliver Zimmer (eds.), *Power and the Nation in European History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)


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Schilp, Thomas (ed.), Reform, Reformation, Säkularisation: Frauenstifte in Krisenzeiten, Essener Forschungen zum Frauenstift, 3 (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2004)


Schmieder, Klaus, Medizingeschichte und Politik: Karrieren des Fritz Lejeune in der Wiener Republik und im Nationalsozialismus, Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Medizin und der Naturwissenschaften, 96 (Husum: Matthiesen, 2002)
Recent Acquisitions

Schmitt, Sigrid (ed.), *Kriminalität und Gesellschaft in Spätmittelalter und Neuzeit*, Mainzer Vorträge, 8 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2005)


Recent Acquisitions


Vom Bruch, Rüdiger and Christoph Jahr (eds.), *Die Berliner Universität in der NS-Zeit*, i: Christoph Jahr and Rebecca Schaarschmidt (eds.), *Strukturen und Personen*; ii: Rüdiger vom Bruch and Rebecca Schaarschmidt (eds.), *Fachbereiche und Fakultäten* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2005)

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Wende, Peter, A History of Germany (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)


Werner, Matthias (ed.), Spätmittelalterliches Landesbewusstsein in Deutschland, Vorträge und Forschungen/Konstanzer Arbeitskreis für mittelalterliche Geschichte, 61 (Ostfildern: Thorbecke, 2005)

Westphal, Siegrid, Kaiserliche Rechtsprechung und herrschaftliche Stabilisierung: Reichsgerichtsbarkeit in den thüringischen Territorialstaaten 1648–1806, Quellen und Forschungen zur Höchsten Gerichtsbarkeit im Alten Reich, 43 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2002)

Westphal, Siegrid (ed.), In eigener Sache: Frauen vor den höchsten Gerichten des Alten Reiches (Cologne: Böhlau, 2005)

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Wiesehöfer, Josef and Henning Börm (eds.), *Theodor Mommsen: Gelehrter, Politiker und Literat* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2005)


Wurzer, Georg, *Die Kriegsgefangenen der Mittelmächte in Russland im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2005)


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PUBLICATIONS OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE LONDON

Vol. 1: Wilhelm Lenz (ed.), Archivalische Quellen zur deutsch–britischen Geschichte seit 1500 in Großbritannien; Manuscript Sources for the History of Germany since 1500 in Great Britain (Boppard a. Rh.: Boldt, 1975)


Vol. 4: Paul Kluke and Peter Alter (eds), Aspekte der deutsch–britischen Beziehungen im Laufe der Jahrhunderte; Aspects of Anglo–German Relations through the Centuries (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1978)

Vol. 5: Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Peter Alter and Robert W. Scribner (eds), Stadtbürgertum und Adel in der Reformation: Studien zur Sozialgeschichte der Reformation in England und Deutschland; The Urban Classes, the Nobility and the Reformation: Studies on the Social History of the Reformation in England and Germany (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1979)


Vol. 31: Angela Schwarz, Die Reise ins Dritte Reich: Britische Augenzeugen im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland (1933–1939) (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993)


Vol. 43: Knut Diekmann, Die nationalistische Bewegung in Wales (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1998)


Vol. 50: Jörn Leonhard, Liberalismus: Zur historischen Semantik eines europäischen Deutungsmusters (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001)


Vol. 57: Ulrike Lindner, Gesundheitspolitik in der Nachkriegszeit: Großbritannien und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Vergleich (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004)


STUDIES OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE
LONDON – OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS


Alfred Haverkamp and Hanna Vollrath (eds.), England and Germany in the High Middle Ages (Oxford, 1996)


**FURTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE LONDON**

Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Wolfgang Mock (eds.), *The Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany* (London: Croom Helm, 1981)


Adolf M. Birke, Hans Booms and Otto Merker (eds.), *Control Commission for Germany/British Element: Inventory; Die britische Militärregierung in Deutschland: Inventar, 11 vols* (Munich etc.: Saur Verlag, 1993)

Günther Heydemann and Lothar Kettenacker (eds.), *Kirchen in der Diktatur* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993)


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**BRITISH ENVOYS TO GERMANY**


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**HOUSE PUBLICATIONS OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE LONDON**


Adolf M. Birke and Eva A. Mayring (eds), *Britische Besatzung in Deutschland: Aktenerschließung und Forschungsfelder* (London, 1992)


Adolf M. Birke, *Britain’s Influence on the West German Constitution* (London, 1995)


**Research on British History**


**Annual Lectures of the German Historical Institute London**


1990  *Not available*


2002 *Not available*


*Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London, Issue 1* (Spring, 1979)–


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