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CONTENTS

Seminars 3
Public Lectures 5
Annual Lecture 7

Articles

Lyra Germanica: German Sacred Music in Mid-Victorian England (Michael Ledger-Lomas) 8
Ambiguities of Transnationalism: Fascism in Europe between Pan-Europeanism and Ultra-Nationalism, 1919–39 (Arnd Bauerkämper) 43

Review Article

From Naturschutz to Umweltschutz: Nature Conservation and Environmental Reform in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1950–80 (Thomas M. Lekan) 68

Book Reviews

Wolfgang Behringer, Hartmut Lehmann, and Christian Pfister (eds.), Kulturelle Konsequenzen der ‘kleinen Eiszeit’: Cultural Consequences of the ‘Little Ice Age’ (C. Scott Dixon) 96
David Lederer, Madness, Religion and the State in Early Modern Europe: A Bavarian Beacon (Alexander Kästner) 102
Christopher Clark, Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947 (Ewald Frie) 107 (cont.)
Contents

Oliver Grant, *Migration and Inequality in Germany 1870–1913* (Angelika Epple) 114
Alf Lüdtke and Bernd Weisbrod (eds.), *No Man’s Land of Violence: Extreme Wars in the Twentieth Century* (Dennis Showalter) 117
Uwe Schulte-Varendorff, *Kolonialheld für Kaiser und Führer: General Lettow-Vorbeck – Mythos und Wirklichkeit; Tip and Run: The Untold Tragedy of the Great War in Africa* (Eckard Michels) 123
Benjamin Ziemann, *War Experiences in Rural Germany, 1914–1923* (Matthew Stibbe) 130

Conference Report
From the Blanketeers to the Present: Understanding Protests of the Unemployed (Matthias Reiss) 149

Noticeboard 159

Library News
Recent Acquisitions 170
Seminars at the GHIL
Autumn 2007

23 Oct. Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger (Münster)
Much Ado about Nothing? On the Function of Rituals in the Holy Roman Empire, 1495–1806
Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger has been Professor of Early Modern History at the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster since 1997. An expert on Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, she has published widely on cultural, intellectual, and constitutional history, and on the history of communication. In 2005 she received the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Prize of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. Her most recent book is Das Heilige Römische Reich Deutscher Nation (2006).

30 Oct. Leonard E. Scales (Durham)
Peoplehood and Power: Germany and England in the Late Middle Ages
Len Scales, who is Lecturer at the University of Durham, studies the political culture of late medieval Europe, particularly the German-speaking lands. He is also exploring the history of medieval ideas about ethnicity and common identity more broadly, across the whole of the medieval period. He is the editor (with O. Zimmer) of Power and the Nation in European History (2005).

4 Dec. Philipp Sarasin (Zurich)
Early Twentieth-Century Popular Science: The Example of Wilhelm Bölsche (1861–1939)
Philipp Sarasin is Professor of Modern History at the University of Zurich, Forschungsstelle für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte. His main research interests range from the history of the body to the theory and methodology of historiography. He is the co-editor of Bakteriologie und Moderne: Studien zur Biopolitik des Unsichtbaren 1870–1920 (2007).

(cont.)
Seminars

11 Dec. JOHN N. HORNE (DUBLIN)
Allegory and Identity: Monuments to the Nation in Europe, 1850–1914

John Horne is Professor of Modern European History at Trinity College, Dublin. His main research areas are French history in the twentieth century, comparative labour history, and the cultural history of the period of the First World War. He is the author (with A. Kramer) of German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (2001).

Seminars are held at 5 p.m. in the Seminar Room of the GHIL. Tea is served from 4.30 p.m. in the Common Room, and wine is available after the seminars.
PUBLIC LECTURES AT THE GHIL
AUTUMN 2007

24 Oct. HANS PETER MENSING (BAD HONNEF/RHÖNDORF)
(6.30 p.m.) ‘. . . The wisest German statesman since Bismarck? Konrad
Adenauer and Great Britain 1918–1933/1945–1967
Joint lecture with the British-German Association: Prince Frederick
of Prussia Lecture 2007
See:<http://www.britishgermanassociation.org/index.php>
Hans Peter Mensing has worked for the Stiftung Bundes-
kanzler-Adenauer-Haus in Bad Honnef/Rhöndorf near Bonn
since 1980. He is editor-in-chief of the Adenauer papers, pub-
lished in the Rhöndorfer Ausgabe, and responsible for organiz-
ing the Foundation’s Rhöndorfer Gespräche.

13 Nov. DOROTHEE WIERLING (HAMBURG)
A Self-Made Generation? War Children as a Generation in
Post-War Germany
Joint lecture with the European Studies Centre, St Antony’s
College, Oxford
Dorothee Wierling has been the Deputy Director of the Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in the University of Ham-
burg since 2003. Her research interests range from social and
gender history of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries
to the generational history of East Germany, and method-
ological and theoretical problems of historical memory. She is
the author of Geboren im Jahr Eins: Der Geburtsjahrgang 1949 in

29 Nov. SIMONE LÄSSIG (BRUNSWICK)
German-Jewish Experiences of Emancipation and Modern-
ity: European and Transnational Perspectives
Joint lecture with the Modern German History Seminar, Institute
of Historical Research
Simone Lässig was appointed Professor of Modern and Con-
temporary History at the Technische Universität Brauns-
schweig and Director of the Georg-Eckert-Institut für Inter-
nationale Schulbuchforschung in 2006. From 2002 to 2006 she
Public Lectures

was a Research Fellow at the German Historical Institute Washington D.C. An expert on the social and cultural history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, she has published widely on Jewish history, the history of religion and religiosity, and the didactics of history. Her most recent book is *Jüdische Wege ins Bürgertum: Kulturelles Kapital und sozialer Aufstieg im 19. Jahrhundert* (2004).

Lectures are held at 5 p.m. in the Seminar Room of the GHIL unless otherwise indicated. Tea is served from 4.30 p.m. in the Common Room, and wine is available after the seminars.
THE 2007 ANNUAL LECTURE

The Battlefield: Towards a Modern History of War

will be given by

PROFESSOR STIG FÖRSTER
University of Berne

on Friday, 9 November 2007, at 5 p.m.

at the German Historical Institute.
Apart from ladylike women, what William Stanley Jevons (1835–82) really missed in Sydney was hearing good music. Having arrived in Australia in 1854 to work at the Mint, the young Unitarian from Liverpool began writing letters home to his devoted sister Henrietta. One leitmotiv of their correspondence was anxiety about religious truth. William scolded Henrietta for her leaning towards Catholicism and counselled that the best defence against atheism was neither contested dogmas nor unquestioning faith in the Bible but the simple ‘love of Man’. The other leitmotiv was music. Jevons envied the ‘Mendelssohn nights and great concerts’ his sister enjoyed in England and scoured the Sydney shops for oratorio scores. He revelled in performing Handel’s *Israel in Egypt*, Mendelssohn’s *Elijah*, Mozart’s *Requiem*, and Beethoven’s *Mount of Olives* on his pianoforte. ‘There are no characters one loves so much as Great Musical Composers’, he wrote in June 1858. ‘Mozart, Beethoven, and Mendelssohn seem to be intimate friends and benefactors of all who hear their music . . . These three poor Germans will be known when Victoria is forgotten, and London perhaps will be distinguished as the place where the *Messiah* was first performed.’

Jevons resembled many other educated mid-Victorian Protestants in seeing music as a crucial vehicle for the religious benefits of German culture. The language barrier—not to mention suspicions of its heterodoxy—inhibited really widespread appreciation of German philosophy, theology, and literature, while fresco-painting quickly

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lost its allure. Jevons tried to learn German in Sydney by translating a page of Schiller a day, but the ‘crackjaw words’ defeated him; he eventually learned enough to sample Kant, but found him ‘full of wordy nonsense’. Yet German music was a powerful auxiliary in his search for a creed of undogmatic benevolence, ‘grounded in the feelings of the human heart’. This mid-Victorian symbiosis between German music and the quest to defend and purify Protestant faith is the subject of this essay. It begins by explaining the rising importance of German sacred music to Protestant worship and devotional culture in England. This was a function of a wider phenomenon which Jim Obelkevich termed the musicalization of Victorian Protestantism. Singing hymns or listening to oratorios in the concert hall became a more attractive means of affirming religious faith than overt assent to such dogmas as biblical infallibility or eternal punishment, obviating tension between the churches and modern culture. Lutheran hymns and their chorale tunes, or Handel, Mendelssohn, and Bach’s great sacred works were easily appropriated for this process, for they seemingly expressed an unmediated sense of communion with God. This resembled the inward spirituality also found in German theology and philosophy, but in a form that did more to reinforce than unsettle orthodox Protestantism. The music of the Germans, argued the American radical Protestant Theodore Parker (1810–60), was a striking indication that they were ‘imaginative as no other nation has ever been . . . with a natural or acquired tendency to the world of thought and feeling rather than to the details of commerce or art’ and therefore ‘singularly fitted to solve the theological problems of the world’.

Having discussed German sacred music’s contributions to English devotional culture, the essay goes on to suggest a more com-
plex picture. Even oratorios were more than handmaids to Scripture. Their music itself became a source of spiritual meaning and bearer of religious reassurance. For a section of the educated classes, the sacralization of German sacred music preceded and blended into a wider, often post-Christian religion of art music, in which the composition of music became a holy cause in itself, whose priests were the great German composers.

Hymns from the Land of Luther

Hymnody was the most obvious way in which German music could come to the aid of English Protestant culture. If the ‘Christian singers of Germany’ had never existed, their admirers might have invented them, for as Michael Wheeler has recently emphasized, religious people in the mid-nineteenth century felt embroiled in a struggle between Protestant and Catholic world views encompassing not just theology and ecclesiology but art, literature, and sexuality.6 Cardinal Newman later commented that his generation had been forced to choose between the Tiber and the Rhine.7 The Tiber, towards which the Tractarians and their successors inclined, symbolized recovering sacramental Christianity, the apostolic authority of the Church, medieval architecture, and cloistered asceticism. The Rhine, as invoked by their opponents, meant unmediated contact with God through the Bible and the conscience, and Christianity’s compatibility with nationhood, domesticity, and liberty of inquiry. The appropriation of Christian history by the Tractarians forced their opponents to develop their own, rival form of what has been called ‘subjective historicism’, seeking in idealized visions of privileged historical periods cultural resources to determine England’s religious future.8 German Protestantism offered plenty of advanced intellectu-

7 Quoted in James Martineau, ‘Personal Influences on Present Theology’, in id., Essays, Reviews, and Addresses, 4 vols. (London, 1890–1), i. 228.
al disciplines to fight Tractarianism’s idealization of the Catholic past—biblical criticism, church history, and the like—but their rationalist connotations offended as many as they enticed. By contrast, German hymnody sunk a well shaft down to the spirit of the Reformation. Like its founder Martin Luther, it represented a radical breach with superstition, which had taught people ‘the blessedness of singing God’s praises in good honest German, instead of gazing idly at the mass, or joining in a Latin litan[y].’\(^9\) From the 1840s onwards, several volumes of translations of German hymns appeared, many of which went into numerous editions.\(^{10}\)

The tradition these collections extolled had only recently been reconstructed, if not quite invented, in Germany. Over the course of the eighteenth century, hymns from Luther’s time to the mid-eighteenth century had been heavily altered by cuts and interpolations to bring their language and theology in line with the rational moralism of enlightened Protestantism. They had also been outnumbered by that century’s own sentimental and moralizing compositions. Efforts began after the Wars of Liberation to reverse these changes, prompted in part by the 1817 and 1830 Tercentenaries, which renewed interest in the Reformation. Church hymn books for Berlin (1829), Württemberg (1841–2), and Hamburg (1842) reinstated original texts and the balance between old and new hymns. Private publishing enterprises ran much further ahead of these official moves.\(^{11}\) Although not the most scholarly, the most important of these works for England was the *Versuch eines allgemeinen evangelischen Gesang- und Gebetbuchs zum Kirchen- und Hausgebrauche* (1833; 1846) by the Prussian scholar-diplomat Christian Carl Josias Bunsen (1791–1860). Like many of Bunsen’s projects, it sought to deploy the scholarly methods of his


Articles

mentor Niebuhr to recover the spirit of a lost epoch so that it could be used to reform Germany’s religious present and determine its future. Bunsen shared with Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia a deep dissatisfaction with the state of German Protestantism. Only a strong church could counteract the corrosive impact of theological rationalism. Yet the impoverished public worship of the Protestant churches, which had shed the liturgical traditions of universal Christendom, meant that individuals did not feel part of an objective community of faith. Unlike the King, Bunsen believed in redressing this poverty not through bureaucratic fiat, but by nourishing an organic revival of piety with roots in particular households and congregations. The Gesangbuch would help by recovering the lost riches of Germany’s Reformation hymnody, purifying hymn texts, weeding out unworthy embellishments that had spoiled their chorale tunes, and arranging them in a dignified liturgical cycle. Thus presented as not merely Lutheran but national treasures, hymns would convince the Germans both of their membership of a living ethnic church and of their participation in the longer history of Christian consciousness.12

The Gesangbuch was not particularly successful in Germany. The interest it aroused in England reflected Bunsen’s flair for cultural diplomacy. The books Bunsen published during and immediately after his stint as Prussian ambassador to England (1841–54) dealt his hosts a cleverly alternated series of slaps and caresses. Bunsen scolded them for their muddle-headed materialism and pig-headed suspicion of German spirituality, but was disarmingly frank in admitting that the Germans could learn from the vigorous practicality of the English. For Bunsen was convinced that every nation had its own distinctive but one-sided gifts, which were best realized in combination with those of others. Freed from its corruptions, the ‘Germanic mind’, as Bunsen’s preface to a translation of the Theologia Germanica (1854) called it, would be a valuable partner to the English. Its deep aversion to priestcraft or to any barrier to man’s unmediated connection with God, which could be found alike in medieval works of devotion and

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Kantian philosophy, should be very agreeable to the home of ‘old Teutonic liberty and energy’.  

Although consciousness of Protestant Germany’s inferiority to the Church of England in public worship and its specific lack of a national equivalent to The Book of Common Prayer had partly inspired the Gesangbuch, Bunsen came to think of it as a textbook for English instruction. They had much to learn from German hymnody, that ‘Divine Iliad . . . the unbroken succession of the Divine inspiration of the German people concerning the world’s history’. The Church of England was strong on dignified devotional exercises, but weak at evoking the direct, spiritual connection between congregations and God that was so arresting captured in Luther’s doctrine of justification by faith. One mark of that deficit was its poverty in hymns, which could be redressed by extensive loans from ‘the great lyric epos of Christianity’.

The English anthologies that followed the Gesangbuch adopted its argument that restoring German hymnody’s golden age could reinvigorate contemporary Protestantism. Like Bunsen, they argued that this age had run from Luther’s time to Paul Gerhardt’s (1607–76), and that it had been followed by a period of degeneration, which the new breed of devout hymnologists were now acknowledging and reversing. Such imitation was unsurprising, because Bunsen and his musical son Henry had often helped these translators or editors in producing their works. The most successful of them was Catherine Winkworth’s Lyra Germanica (1855–7), whose first series was still selling a thousand copies a year twenty years after publication. Winkworth (1827–78) could well appreciate both the challenges and
opportunities that German culture offered English Protestants. Youthful travel in Germany had shaken her inherited evangelicalism and she had briefly flirted with a Goethean religion of self-culture, before recovering a liberal Protestant faith in the same Germanophile Unitarian circles that had nurtured Jevons. Her acquaintance with Bunsen, who commissioned her sister Susanna to translate both the *Theologia Germanica* and his own works, provided the stimulus for the *Lyra*.* Like those books, it was meant to demonstrate that fuss about theological rationalism had obscured the deep inward piety of the German race, which found its best expression in its ‘inborn love of music’. ‘Sacred song’ had thus been its contribution to the ‘vast treasury’ amassed by the gifts of ‘each Christian people’. That gift had withered since and was still threatened by the ‘quietly contemptuous scepticism’ or ‘arrogant orthodoxy’ of the present. Yet the ‘undergrowth of a genuine religious life’ had survived, as evidenced by the hymnological revival.* Winkworth hoped that in using her *Lyra*, which followed the *Gesangbuch* in arranging its translations in a quasi-liturgical cycle, the English would not only be drawing on Germany’s reserves of piety, but learn to feel ‘the deep and true Communion of Saints . . . in different churches and lands’.*

The *Lyra* found its readiest welcome among the liberal Anglicans who admired Bunsen and his search for a ‘Church of the Future’ rooted in the distinctive spiritual histories of different races and nations. That quest was analogous to their defence of liberal, nationalist

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Protestantism against the medieval superstition of the Tractarians. For Bunsen’s friend Charles Kingsley, a hammer of their cringing asceticism, the Lyra represented ‘Teutonic’ Christianity: a manly, incarnational religion that identified piety with trust in the nation and with domestic and social affections. Kingsley and others respected Lutheran hymnody as they loved Luther, the romantic poet of manly trust in God. What enthused them and a broader evangelical constituency was less the texts of specific hymns than an impression that German hymn-writing and singing was an essentially Protestant activity. In Luther’s time, it had shattered Catholicism’s false claim that the church, rather than the natural world, the family, or the nation was sacred, and that priests rather than God judged men’s consciences. The Reformation had transported sacred song from ‘the narrow walls of the cloister, to the workshop, the harvestfields and the home’, argued Elizabeth Rundle Charles, a prolific devotional writer, in 1858. Charles had flirted with Tractarianism before conversion, marriage, and reading German hymns settled her in a cosily evangelical faith. Luther frees the characters of her best-selling historical novel, Chronicles of the Schönberg-Cotta Family (1864), from wasted lives in monasteries to find fulfilment in marriage. That liberation is symbolized by lusty hymn-singing, which replaces the wan chant of monks, and the conversion of silent convents into homes, filled with the ‘pattering feet and ringing voices of little children’.

It took considerable selectiveness to see German hymnody as essentially a celebration of married love or the goodness of the world.

The pessimistic mysticism of many seventeenth-century hymns disconcerted translators—they tended to put it down to the sufferings of the Thirty Years War. So did Moravian hymnody’s ghoulish attentiveness to Christ’s physical sufferings. Translators, Winkworth included, toned down or omitted such hymns—at just the time that the Wesleys’ gorier verses met the same fate. Many translators showed much more appetite for the tame effusions of their contemporary Philipp Spitta (1801–59) than for the stern hymns of the Reformation. Richard Massie’s Lyra Domestica (1860), a tellingly titled sequel to his Martin Luther’s Spiritual Songs (1854), incorporated much of Spitta’s Psalter und Harfe (1833–43) on the grounds that no other hymns were ‘so suited to the modern tone of thought . . . and . . . to promote . . . the edification of the domestic circle’. Spitta’s God was not Luther’s fortress but a loving father; his Christ not a bleeding Messiah but a gentle comforter. ‘O how many hours of beauty / Has the Master dealt around! / O how many broken spirits / Has he tenderly upbound!’ he warbled in Sarah Borthwick and Jane Findlater’s very popular collection, Hymns from the Land of Luther (1854–62).²⁷

Despite emphasizing song as the medium between devout congregations and God, many anthologies hardly explained how to sing their hymns, beyond directing readers to German reference books. Their main aim was to present words without songs for private meditation, mirroring the Gesangbuch’s interest in fostering domestic piety. Serious efforts to introduce translated hymns with their chorale tunes into public worship did, though, take place. The context was a desire to reform what was seen as the florid and objectionably secular tunes of anthems and ‘gallery music’ in English

²⁶ Massie, Lyra Domestica, viii. John Kelly likewise followed his translation of Gerhardt’s Spiritual Songs with Hymns of the Present Century from the German (London, 1886).
²⁷ Sarah Borthwick and Jane Findlater, Hymns from the Land of Luther (London, 1884 edn.), 185.
²⁸ For such references, see e.g. Arthur T. Russell, Psalms and Hymns, Partly Original, Partly Selected, for the Use of the Church of England (Cambridge, 1851); Massie, Spiritual Songs, p. xv.
Lyra Germanica

churches, while also augmenting congregational involvement in worship. To their backers, hymns with chorale tunes were a better option either than training picked choirs, or introducing Gregorian plainchant, which had suspiciously monkish associations. Their broad, simple tunes seemed both dignified and easy for whole congregations to learn, while the habit of singing thus encouraged would imbue the people with religion and remove temptation to vice and crime. Though connoisseurs of church music sniffed at the drawing simplicity of chorales, they freely admitted that they created a ‘thick stream of sound’ that was ‘impressive and heart compelling’ and took on the ‘force and glow of a liturgy’. A commonplace of the sight-singing movement, which gained thousands of adherents and state sponsorship in this period, was that basic musical instruction combined with singing simple chorales made the Germans more moral than the English.

Nonconformist congregations took the lead in popularizing chorales, a reflection of their close ties with Continental Protestantism. Thomas Binney (1798–1874), the cultured Congregationalist minister of the King’s Weigh House chapel in London, got his flock singing chorales by the late 1840s. Henry Allon (1818–92), another London Congregationalist, followed suit at the Union Chapel, Islington. As editor of the official Congregational Psalmist (1858), a tune book for the many hymnals then being published, Allon hoped to popularize ‘the grand Chorales of Germany’ and drive out the

Articles

‘worthless tunes of the preceding century’.33 Churchmen followed suit. William Mercer (1811–73), the evangelical vicar of Sheffield, published his Church Psalter and Hymn Book (1854), which sought to reproduce nationally the ‘exhilarating’ revolution in taste he had wrought in his own parish. Mercer had weaned his congregation off the ‘broken rhythm, and interminable appoggiaturas’ of the ‘flip-pant’ tunes still in vogue in favour of chorales. His Church Psalter matched reprinted and newly commissioned translations with chorales harmonized by the organist of St Paul’s Cathedral, John Goss. For Mercer, the alliance between a particular hymn and a given tune would serve as a mnemonic vehicle for evangelical doctrine.34

Winkworth shared Mercer’s faith in the alliance of hymn and tune, although she and Bunsen smiled at Mercer’s simple zeal. The commission of a musical edition of the Lyra led her to produce The Chorale Book for England (1865), which sought to make German hymns as central to sung Anglican worship as the Lyra had to devotional reading. She accordingly selected the less meditative and complex of her translations for the Chorale Book. Winkworth also had to fight the antiquarianism of her musical collaborators, the composer William Sterndale Bennett (1816–75) and the Hamburg-born pianist Otto Goldschmidt (1829–1907). Both were Bach experts who wanted to produce a handbook with ‘scientific value among a learned musical class’. By contrast, Winkworth insisted on altering metres and rescoring chorales if necessary, so as to boost the ‘practical and devotional use of the work among English people’.35

Relatively few churches adopted the Chorale Book, even after the issue of a supplement containing traditional English hymns and tunes. In truth, both Mercer and Winkworth were bringing spiritual coals to Newcastle. English hymnody had never been as exiguous as Bunsen pretended. The early nineteenth-century collapse of clerical reservations about hymn-singing had, moreover, triggered an orgy of domestic composition and translation, particularly from the Latin. Hymnals had to be comprehensive to conquer this huge but over-stocked market, not works of advocacy for particular national traditions. The dominant hymnals, notably Hymns Ancient and Modern (1860), which was edited by moderate high churchmen and sold a million copies yearly by the late 1860s, were thus constructed and soon crowded out Mercer’s volume, despite its respectable annual sales of 100,000 copies. Their popularity rested not just on their eclecticism but on the increasing number of newly composed tunes they contained. Richly chromatic, these tunes involved congregations as just one element of a complex artistic performance, whose style was deeply indebted to the fashionable music of the time. They were remote from the severe antiquarianism and the congregational ideal of Gregorian and Germanizing purists alike. Winkworth’s translations did retain a place in Ancient and Modern — and an honoured one in more evangelically inclined anthologies. But in the last analysis, emulation of Germany’s achievement in making music a dominant part of worship mattered much more than imitation.

The Handmaid of Religion: Oratorio

On 18 November 1852 the Duke of Wellington was buried in St Paul’s Cathedral. As his coffin was lowered into the vault, the ‘Dead March’ from Handel’s Saul was heard, impressing upon the congregation that a ‘Prince and a great man had that day gone from Israel’. The

37 E.g. in J. C. Ryle’s much reprinted Hymns for the Church on Earth (London, 1860).
Articles

Garter King of Arms recited the Duke’s title and honours, then took the broken staff from the controller of his household and cast it into the vault. As he did so, the choir sang the chorale ‘Sleepers awake!’ [Wachet auf, ruft uns die Stimme] as harmonized in Mendelssohn’s oratorio St Paul. A military band had earlier played the same oratorio’s chorale ‘To Thee, O Lord, I yield my spirit’ [Dir, Herr, will ich mich ergeben] before the coffin was borne up the nave.38 As Wellington’s obsequies demonstrate, German sacred music composed for the concert hall also suited the cathedral. Parts of St Paul, composed as ‘imaginary church music’, served as the real thing. Less than ten years later ‘To Thee, O Lord’ accompanied Prince Albert’s interment at Windsor. Indeed, it became a favourite at funerals—the sad counterpart to the composer’s ‘Wedding March’.39 Conversely, sacred music aroused full-blooded religious responses in the concert hall. Handel’s ‘Hallelujah Chorus’, the ‘Sanctus’ from Mendelssohn’s Elijah, and Beethoven’s masses regularly brought weeping or trembling audiences to their feet. During a Norwich performance of Elijah in 1854, a drought year, there was even a mild furore in the audience when gathering clouds apparently showed that the prophet’s sung intercession for rain had been answered.40 This section therefore pursues Celia Applegate’s argument for nineteenth-century Prussia: performance of Christian music in apparently secular spaces did not so much destroy as expand its sacred significance.41

German oratorio not only occupied a commanding position in the musical world of mid-nineteenth-century England but had heavy extra-musical significance.42 Handel’s oratorios, which established...
what English audiences expected of the genre, had long been prized for allying sublime music with sublime Old Testament language. Eighteenth-century audiences felt they sanctified the feelings of their hearers and defended the prophetic and moral worth of the Old Testament against deist sneers. Monarchy, aristocracy, and the middling classes had united to celebrate Handel’s genius at festivals integral to what Tim Blanning identifies as a British way in public culture, advertising the indissolubility of art, Protestantism, and nationhood.\(^{45}\) Events dedicated to Handel grew in size and ambition in the mid-Victorian period, culminating in the triennial festivals held in the Sydenham Crystal Palace from 1857. The press hailed the ‘monster’ performances of the *Messiah* given by choirs of thousands on these occasions as ‘pleasurable Oases of Wonder, ecstasy and religious awe combined’.\(^ {44}\) These events were supplemented by newly founded or expanded choral festivals in provincial cities. Music festivals were highly ritualized expressions of civic pride, founded to raise money for charity, run by local grandees, and often held in newly built town halls. German oratorios had pride of place at them. The Queen opened Leeds Town Hall in September 1858 but it was consecrated by a musical festival. Sterndale Bennett began it by conducting Mendelssohn’s oratorio *Elijah* before an audience uniting the ‘rank, fashion, and beauty of Yorkshire’.\(^ {45}\) Along with the *Messiah*, *Elijah* also opened Liverpool’s St George’s Hall in 1854, while *St Paul* inaugurated both Birmingham and Bradford Town Halls. Musical festivals boomed thanks to the rampant commercialization and urbanization that made English society seem aggressively materialist in comparison with Germany. The mechanics’ institutes and sight-singing classes founded in response to fears of urban social breakdown proved to be nurseries of choral societies, which provided singers for festivals as well as putting on their own concerts.\(^ {46}\) The


\(^{45}\) *Leeds Mercury*, 11 Sept. 1858, 240.

Articles

rapid industrialization of print, which enabled music publishers to slash prices of complete oratorios and parts, greatly benefited both festivals and choral societies. By the 1860s Novello was issuing around 3,000 octavo copies of St Paul, 4,000 of Elijah, 2,000 of Israel in Egypt, and 6,000 of the Messiah a year from its ‘sacred music warehouse’ in Soho, with the price of the cheapest editions falling to 1s. 4d. The expansion of print also brought about the emergence of a body of musical journalists, the so-called ‘watchmen of music’, who keenly publicized ‘musical progress’ wherever it was found. The most important in the mid-nineteenth century were Henry Fothergill Chorley (1808–72) of the Athenaeum and James William Davison (1813–85). Davison was the opinionated editor of the Musical World, but in 1846 also became music critic for The Times, giving him what Richard Wagner called a ‘colossal and universal’ power over public opinion. Davison often affected patriotic disdain for foreign musicians, but most ‘watchmen’ saw German composers as fellow musical idealists, patrons of their quest to establish music as an art independent of commerce or fashion. Their journalism both reflects and helped to fashion discourse about the religious worth of German oratorio.

Before industrialized print had made singers of the English it had turned them into a nation of Bible readers. England’s literate Protestantism largely explains why Handel and Mendelssohn, above all other German composers, dominated the burgeoning market for sacred vocal music. Festival-goers and choral societies were amid-


ly quite ecumenical and became more so over time. Haydn’s Catholicism did not, for instance, prevent the *Creation* becoming enormously popular. Festival-goers also quickly took to Rossini’s *Stabat Mater*, a piece so florid that Davison jokily published an arrangement of it for quadrille dancing. Until the early 1850s, though, festival organizers had to inch through the unmarked minefield of anti-Catholic prejudice. Some festivals took place in or close to cathedrals, while most hoped that ministers would patronize their charitable objectives. Even after slowly accepting the lawfulness of oratorio as a genre, Anglican and dissenting clergy regularly damned works with Latin texts, which served the Roman Catholic liturgy, or introduced Christ as a character. The Sacred Harmonic Society (1832–82), whose performances largely shaped the canon of sacred classics, thus avoided both Mozart’s *Requiem* and Rossini’s *Stabat Mater* until 1853. By then, these prejudices were collapsing and had often been circumvented, with the *Requiem* performed as the *Redemption* and masses as ‘services’.  

Handel and Mendelssohn not only passed but helped to set the standard by which oratorio must deepen the hearer’s understanding of Scripture. Handel was celebrated as the first composer to write not for ‘the Church’ but ‘the Bible’, whose highest inspirations were kindled by ‘immediate contact with these holy words’. Handel biographies always toasted the love of Scripture he had shared with the ‘great public of the middle class’.

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51 Davison, *From Mendelssohn to Wagner*, 40.  
53 [John Mills], ‘George Frederick Handel’, *British Quarterly Review*, 36 (1862), 53, 56–7. Some of Handel’s oratorios, such as *Judas Maccabeus*, were composed to contemporary paraphrases of the Bible, but it became fashionable to deplore his reliance on clerical poetasters in these works.  
54 See e.g. [Henry Fothergill Chorley], ‘Schoelcher’s *Life of Handel*’, *Edinburgh Review*, 106 (1857), 237; [John Hullah], ‘Handel’, *Fraser’s Magazine*, 56 (1857), 253–71; Hugh Reginald Haweis, ‘Handel’, *Contemporary Review* (1866),
that his oratorios were pious Scriptural commentaries. The Sacred Harmonic Society’s historian proudly noted that it had rescued them from performance in theatres, where they had been ‘paraded before the vitiated ears of unappreciating audiences’. Its performances were held in London’s Exeter Hall, the headquarters of evangelical religion, and its members had to be ‘strictly moral characters’. Its management frowned on encores and applause. Star soloists were paid lavish sums by the Sacred Harmonic and festival committees to sing Handel’s arias, but critics expected of them a chaste style, free from operatic flourishes, in pronouncing the words of Scripture.55

Although Mendelssohn’s appeal as a composer to the English was many-faceted, his sacred works were integral to it. Richard Wagner was justified in observing in 1855 that he had ‘composed and conducted oratorios for [the English] with the result that he became the true saviour of the English musical world. Mendelssohn is to the English what Jehovah is to the Jews’. The suggestion that Mendelssohn had consciously pandered to English religious appetites was admittedly unfair.56 Yet Elijah, written for the 1846 Birmingham Festival, quickly attained enormous popularity for satisfying just those appetites. Though St Paul (1836) was not as immediately popular in England as in Germany, it, too, had become a festival standard by the 1860s. A few examples illustrate the scale and durability of their appeal. The fifteen performances of Elijah given at the Birmingham Musical Festival from 1855 to 1891 routinely attracted audiences in excess of 2,000 and grossed over £3,000 each—figures outstripped only by the Messiah. In 1874, the Birmingham festival committee advised their Leeds counterparts that omitting either


Elijah or the Messiah from their programme would risk financial ruin. At a humbler level, the Nottingham Harmonic Society (1856), which derived from a Mechanics’ Institution Singing Class, was launched with performances of St Paul and the Messiah. By 1914, it had given thirty-one performances of Elijah and fifty-one of the Messiah. The Huddersfield Choral Society (1837) did not mount their first Elijah until 1859, but gave fourteen more performances before the century’s close and sixteen of St Paul. Mendelssohn’s Hymn of Praise (Lobgesang, 1840) symphonic cantata, his Hear my Prayer (1844) anthem, and his psalm settings were also very popular—the latter being very suitable for more modest choral societies.

The thoughtful historicism Mendelssohn displayed both in St Paul and the Hymn of Praise, and specifically his inclusion of harmonized Lutheran chorales, became very controversial in German musical circles. For the English, it offered an attractive route into the Lutheran piety of the past. Despite initial misgivings that Mendelssohn in these works was too scholastic and too indebted to Bach, his chorales soon saw him hailed—like Bunsen—as a gifted translator of Reformation piety for the needs of the present. Mendelssohn made chorales so

59 As Krümmacher, ‘Composition’, 100 and R. Larry Todd, Mendelssohn: A Life in Music (Oxford, 2003), 468 point out, Hear my Prayer was central to later accusations that Mendelssohn had descended into Victorian religious kitsch.
popular that some English composers penned their own, to the irri-
tation of purists. In Germany and particularly in Prussia, contro-
versy over the question of confessional union and divisions about
what historical style was the best basis for the restoration of 'church
music' meant that it was often easier to reconstitute the chorale in the
concert hall. Likewise, St Paul and the Hymn of Praise were the real
chorale books for England. Their chorales almost turned the place
they were performed into a church: audiences reacted to them as if to
shards of a dimly-remembered liturgy, standing up with religious
respect for their most moving examples. As Davison wrote of a
Bradford audience listening to 'Sleepers Awake!', they were 'absorb-
ed in one feeling of awe, united in one act of earnest and sincere
devotion': music, 'the handmaid of religion, [was] plac[ing] its fin-
gers on the lips of the scoffer'.

Appreciation of Mendelssohn’s achievement was reinforced by
the revival in England of Bach’s sacred music—derivative of his ear-
lier efforts in Berlin—which gathered pace from the mid-1850s. The
St Matthew Passion began to be reassessed as a great work of sacred
music to set alongside the Messiah, and great respect was paid to its
liturgical origins. An 1871 performance in Westminster Abbey, inte-
gral with a sermon and special service, saw it incorporated into
Anglican worship. Impressed witnesses noted that the atmosphere
was far removed from that of a regular concert: here were no ‘fussy
stewards, no smartly dressed sopranos . . . no sayings of soft things

62 George A. Macfarren, Musical History Briefly Narrated and Technically Dis-
cussed (London, 1885), 50–1.
63 Georg Feder, ‘Decline and Restoration’, in Friedrich Blume (ed.), Protestant
64 Paul and Carl Mendelssohn Bartholdy (eds.), Letters of Felix Mendelssohn
Bartholdy from 1833 to 1847, trans. Grace Wallace (London, 1863), 162–5; Felix
Moscheles (ed.), The Letters of Felix Mendelssohn to Ignaz and Charlotte
65 [James William Davison], ‘Bradford Musical Festival’, Musical World, 10
Sept. 1853, 577.
66 One important link was Sterndale Bennett, a founder of the Bach Society,
whose edition of the St Matthew Passion adopted many of Mendelssohn’s edi-
torial decisions: Isabel Parrott, ‘William Sterndale Bennett and the Bach
Revival in Nineteenth-Century England’, in Cowgill and Rushton (eds.),
Europe, Empire and Spectacle, 29–44.
to lady listeners’, but only a ‘solemn message to souls’. The service was repeated in 1872 and duplicated in St Paul’s Cathedral before a ‘religiously attentive’ congregation of 10,000. Portions of St Paul were likewise arranged for a St Paul’s service—performed by a supplemented orchestra. The excitement these experiments aroused indicates how responses to German sacred music occluded the boundaries between religion and aesthetics, church and concert hall. Davison even hoped to confine the Passion to churches, with audiences-cum-congregations learning to sing the chorales, while his friend the composer George Macfarren hoped that the successful Bach and Mendelssohn performances would nudge the Church into an extensive integration of the great German oratorios into its liturgical year. Macfarren urged the church to take a hint from the concert hall and use music to unite those normally divided from one another by sectarian and dogmatic quarrels.68

Deeply attractive as was Mendelssohn’s revivification of Lutheran piety, he was mainly prized in England as a champion of Handel and the heir to his style, who had largely restricted himself to the Bible in choosing his texts and evoked its message in intensely dramatic, but not sinfully theatrical ways. Elijah was the keystone of this reputation, for in this work he had dropped the chorales of St Paul in favour of a determined effort to create characters that ‘act and speak as if they were living beings’, inhabiting ‘a real world, such as you find in every chapter of the Old Testament’. Elijah spoke to nagging doubts about the value of that Testament to modern Christians. Critics attacked its morality as blood-thirsty, its conceptions of the natural world as crude and erroneous, and its messianic predictions as just the product of an Oriental way with metaphor. Elijah had a powerful, yet subtle, Christological answer to such qualms. Its music


68 George Alexander Macfarren, ‘Oratorios in Church’, Musical Times, 1 Mar. 1872, 399–402; Macfarren, ‘“St Paul” at St Paul’s’, Musical Times, 1 June 1872, 718–21; [Davison], ‘St Paul’s Cathedral’, The Times, 26 Jan. 1875, 6, col. g.

vividly portrayed Elijah’s fierce struggle for righteousness in such Handelian scenes as his slaughter of the prophets of Baal. Yet it also implied that Christ, whose forerunner Elijah was, must come before they could attain a fuller and higher fulfilment. The intricate musical clues to this relationship went unremarked by most critics. But they certainly understood it. The Messiah had accustomed them to the idea that music in combination with Old Testament texts could evoke Christ. They also pointed to the often performed fragments of Mendelssohn’s unfinished oratorio Christus. These showed that Mendelssohn had been at work on the Christological keystone that would have capped the arch linking Elijah with Paul. The theological writings that Mendelssohn had mined for his typological ideas were also widely read in England.

Elijah’s most popular numbers were consequently those which revealed that the fatherly God of the New Testament, who loves all his children, had already been present in the Old. ‘O rest in the Lord, wait patiently for Him’, the soprano number that early audiences quickly hailed as ‘the song of the oratorio’, was especially prized. The Angel’s dulcet blandishments to a fierce, despairing Elijah are a glimpse of ‘the spirit of the new dispensation’, giving to faith ‘a character of touching confidence’. One prominent Congregationalist minister and music-lover described how it provided troubled listeners with a ‘message from the fount of life . . . a stream within the soul’.

Mendelssohn’s English hearers craved that message. To read the voluminous concert reviews of St Paul or Elijah is to be struck by their repetitiveness. Their most celebrated numbers were endlessly

73 Henry Robert Reynolds, Yes and No: Or, Glimpses of the Great Conflict, 3 vols. (London, 1860), ii. 188. Reynolds would recently have heard Elijah at the 1858 Leeds Festival, of which he was a patron.
Lyra Germanica

praised as ‘soothing’, ‘plaintive’, ‘reposeful’, or ‘comforting’. Davison wrote of the martyr Stephen’s parting apostrophe in *St Paul* that ‘if ever consolation could be administered through the medium of sound, it would be in such a strain as this’. The claim that art music should not just represent but instil religious reassurance may seem illegitimate—a prescription for ‘religious kitsch’. Yet it did no more than reflect the expressive aesthetics of music then dominant. Music’s role was to express the emotions of the composer and to reproduce them in his hearers. If music was the ‘royal Art-medium of emotion’, to quote one popular theorist, the greatest music should express the highest emotions. These were religious: guilt, dread, repentance, and faith. Great sacred music should use its emotional hold on hearers to conduct them over the rapids of despair and into the calm waters of faith. Handel’s great works were thus celebrated as epics of deliverance: earthly and national in *Israel in Egypt*; spiritual and personal in the *Messiah*.

Mendelssohn’s works provided similarly grand trajectories, arcing from the slough of despondency to renewed faith in God. The *Hymn of Praise* was thus prized for its thrilling evocation of transition from darkness to the light of revelation, as the anguished tremolos of the tenor’s despairing question, ‘O Watchman will the night not pass?’ give way to the soprano solo, ‘The night is past’, an exultant D major chorus and the ‘Nun danket alle Gott’ chorale. An arresting example of its impact comes from New England, where the *Hymn of Praise* was the centrepiece of an 1865 Boston concert, held to celebrate the end of the Civil War and mourn Abraham Lincoln. The ‘thrilling impressiveness’ of the passage, wrote one reporter, ‘set every chord vibrating in the inmost American and human heart of every one of us; for it told us the very story, all the suffering, the hope and fear, the waiting, the joy, the miracle of those four great years in the histo-

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ry of the cause of Freedom’. Likewise, St Paul was one long musical exploration of awakening faith, expressed through extensive use of accelerando and crescendo and the steady intensification with which its chorales are treated. Its musical and emotional high point comes at the end of the first part, where Saul’s persecuting rage gives way to his conversion on hearing the voice of Christ, ethereally scored for a female chorus, repentance, and baptism. In Elijah, passages of popular agitation and Elijah’s desolate yearning, such as his aria ‘It is enough, O Lord, now take away my life’, precede his triumphant ascension to heaven.

How German was Handel and Mendelssohn’s gift for providing such redemptive experiences? This became a problematic question. In life, Mendelssohn was received as a figurehead for the German tradition sketched by such critics as the widely read A. B. Marx. His argument for the existence of national characters in music and the superiority of the ‘deeply poetic mind of the German nation’ to the French or Italians as a vessel for the spirit of music found support in England. So did his notion that German music sprang from the Reformation and that its development from Bach to Beethoven was an essentially Protestant story of deepening ‘science’ and spiritual profundity.

From an English point of view, Mendelssohn’s sacred

music satisfyingly contained this progress within itself: it ‘cast a wistful look at two neighbouring elevations, on one of which stood Bach and on the other Beethoven’. Mendelssohn’s increasing predilection for Beethoven’s romanticism had enabled him to capture the ‘restless and troubled spirit . . . of modern life’. But his humble willingness to learn from and reanimate the chaste gravity of Bach’s works showed that he was a trustworthy custodian of the German canon, as well as its latest representative. He had the genius for ‘retrogression’ as well as ‘advance’, his friend Chorley remembered, which made for true artistic progress.

That gift, though, seemed to have died with Mendelssohn. Chorley and other critics did not accept the Hegelian arguments put forward by Marx and others that Beethoven’s career had ruled out Mendelssohn’s recurrence to past styles, instead requiring a further, revolutionary leap towards a ‘Music of the Future’ independent of exploded formal rules and external sources of spiritual significance. Both Chorley and Davison loathed the ‘miserable phantom’ of the ‘so-called Aesthetic school’, seeing in the apparently formless ugliness of Schumann, Liszt, and Wagner’s music the consequence of wilfully junking Germany’s artistic heritage. Seeing melody as the soul of music, religious or otherwise, they detected only cacophony and empty grandiloquence in Mendelssohn’s German successors and rivals. Chorley contended that Leipzig’s waning interest in Elijah after 1847 was symptomatic of the ‘feverish impatience of everything

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85 For Hegelian critiques of Mendelssohn see Garratt, ‘Mendelssohn’, 59, 68; John Michael Cooper, ‘Mendelssohn Received’ in Mercer-Taylor (ed.), *Cambridge Companion to Mendelssohn*, 238–43.
86 [J. W. Davison], ‘Sacred Harmonic Society’, *The Times*, 6 Nov. 1852, 8, col. d.
like duty and obligation, that wordy crusade in destruction of established things’ that had stirred first in politics and then ‘seized upon Music . . . to bring Babel worship into its temples’.\(^87\) Chorley was fanatical in his contempt for European revolutionaries, but his dislike of the music of the future was widespread. It was a facet of the suspicion, recently revived by the failed 1848–9 revolutions, that the Germans were too speculative, too reckless of received truths, for their own good. Their need to be ‘Columbuses of new worlds’ was thought arrogant; their vaunted idealism the unhealthy phosphorescence given off by political and social disintegration.\(^88\)

Celebration of German sacred music accordingly became both sharply proprietorial and pessimistic. The English cared for the Messiah or Elijah better than the Germans, who had ‘taken up the trumpets of ignorance and arrogance’ and headed for an aesthetic ‘Dead Sea’. The critics felt that in the constancy of their taste and in such mammoth demonstrations of fealty as the Handel Festivals, the English might finally convince foreigners that they were a musical nation. So warm was the relationship both living and posthumous between Handel, Mendelssohn, and their pious public that they were said to be virtually English.\(^89\) Mendelssohnian critics phrased this constancy and opposition to the music of the future in Protestant terms of fidelity to truth. Davison warned Musical World readers against the ‘musical Jesuits’ of Leipzig, the ‘new Gospel of Harmony, the Gospel of St Richard [Wagner]’ — a ‘Koran’, whose prophet was Liszt, the ‘musical King Death’.\(^90\) His worst gibes were directed at Wagner—the apostle of revolution who openly despised Mendels-
Mendelssohn. He and Liszt were ‘prophets of Baal’, ‘false preachers’, ‘maggots’, and ‘hateful fungi’. Though vehement, such prejudices did not last. Even critics who took pride in the public’s conservative loyalties could not resist calling for musical novelty. They despaired of finding a new Mendelssohn, but still criticized organizations such as the Sacred Harmonic that repeated the Messiah and Elijah ad nauseam, or domestic composers who recycled the style of Mendelssohn, their ‘Ebenezer’.91 Such was the demand for new oratorios that their composition became an industry in later nineteenth-century Britain. That demand initially helped the careers of Mendelssohn’s epigones, such as his pupil Charles Edward Horsley (1822-76), but taste in sacred music became increasingly eclectic. It embraced not only Joseph and Gideon, Horsley’s chips off the Mendelssohnian block, but Gounod and Dvorak, Elgar, and Brahms.

Lyra Germanica

David Friedrich Strauss’s request to be buried to the strains of Die Zauberflöte might be taken as emblematic of the cult of art music which emerged as an alternative to Christian faith among the nineteenth-century German bourgeoisie. The prestige of sacred music in England perhaps obviated or at least delayed the need for the overt sacralization of music in itself. Yet any contrast between a churchy English public and Germany’s heterodox culture vultures would be overdrawn. Mid-nineteenth-century England counted a growing number of internal exiles from Christian orthodoxy, who found German music’s uplifting swell useful in detaching the human spirit from dogmatic and historical moorings.92

Articles

Love of German oratorio might express the very opposite of firm Christian conviction. Chorley and Davison, for instance, both went through adolescent rebellions against Christianity, perhaps explaining the fervid vagueness with which they praised oratorio’s consoling qualities.93 Even open doubters in this period often remained passionately fond of sacred music, because they were anxious to preserve as much of Christian culture as was compatible with their moral and intellectual revolt against Christian dogma.94 The translator of Strauss, Mary Ann Evans (‘George Eliot’, 1819–80) was a case in point. Just after finishing her version of his Das Leben Jesu, she thrilled to Elijah in Exeter Hall; translating Feuerbach did not stop regular visits to performances of the Messiah either.95 To Evans, these works represented the ‘poetry of Christianity’. The aural equivalent to the Sistine Madonna worshipped by her Positivist friends, they were Christian masterpieces that now symbolized humanity’s post-Christian spiritual progress. This reassessment is strikingly captured in reminiscences by the agnostic preacher Moncure Conway (1832–1911) of a Sunday spent at the house of the Spinozist philosopher Charles Bray in the 1860s. Unsurprisingly, no one went to church, but Bray did treat his guests to a pianoforte rendition of the Messiah. ‘There we sat’, Conway recollected, ‘souls who had passed through an era of storm and stress and left all prophetic and Messianic beliefs, but found in the oratorio hymns of an earth in travail.’96

German oratorio had a conversely strong appeal to those attempting to reach the unchurched with a Christian or at least a broadly theistic message. Anthems and oratorio numbers by Handel, Mendelssohn, and Mozart were constant attractions of the ‘Sunday lectures’ organized from the 1860s by liberal Anglicans, Nonconformists, and unconventional theists to entertain cultivated truth-seekers or win back alienated working men for religion. In such non-ecclesiastical

settings as music halls, performances of favourite numbers, such as ‘How lovely are the messengers’ [Wie lieblich sind die Boten] from St Paul, served as spoonfuls of sugar to sweeten discreetly religious lectures.97 The Rev. Hugh Reginald Haweis (1838–1901), a violinist manqué and the author of Music and Morals (1869), took to this work with particular gusto. As a London clergyman, he organized popular concerts and shilling oratorios for the poor, believing that religion and musical ‘recreation’ both aimed at spiritual rebirth and moral regeneration through the discipline of the emotions.98 Haweis thought that great music, which was chiefly German, could be inherently Christianizing partly because he had a minimalist conception of Christianity. An ardent broad churchman, he urged Anglicans to reject outdated dogmas and recognize that Christianity would survive best as a simple ethical commitment, which constantly assimilated cultural and intellectual advances. Churchmen must quit their ‘dead pulpit’ and incorporate the concert-hall, the race-course, even the ‘Borderland wisdom’ of the seance into their preaching.99

The career of George Grove (1820–1900) displayed even closer connections between liberal Christianity and the idealization of German music. Grove’s work in organizing the Saturday Crystal Palace concerts made him among the most influential of mid-Victorian taste-makers. He was also a keen biblical scholar, whose studies had instilled in him passionate contempt for ‘slavish devotion to the Bible’ and its ‘crude, horrid ideas of God’. For Grove, Christianity, which meant pure, almost stoic, devotion to duty was damaged by narrow bibliolatry, which had caused ‘modern Christian saints and prophets’ to go unrecognized.100 German musicians were chief

97 For St Paul, see e.g. reports in ‘Sunday Evening Lectures for the Working Classes’, Inquirer, 15 Feb. 1868, 107 and Charles Maurice Davies, Unorthodox London (London, 1873), 45.
98 Hugh Reginald Haweis, My Musical Life (London, 1884 edn.), 116; see also two 1875 lectures in Moncure Conway’s South Place Chapel, which prefaced performances of numbers from Elijah: ‘Emotion’ and ‘Recreation’, in id., Current Coin (London, 1876).
99 Hugh Reginald Haweis, Thoughts for the Times (London, 1872); id., The Dead Pulpit (London, 1896). Stirring stuff, though Haweis was posthumously exposed as a spendthrift who kept a mistress.
100 C. L. Graves, The Life and Letters of Sir George Grove (London, 1903), 127, 304–5. The key influence on Grove’s religious views was Arthur Penrhyn
among those saints. Grove did not believe reductively in music’s moralizing power, but he did think its highest flights were essentially religious, awakening as they did man’s spiritual and intellectual nature. He brought to championing Schubert and Schumann’s music at the Palace or to writing the life of Beethoven the same dogged reverence he did to investigating Scripture.101 Chorley, who felt insuperable distaste for Schumann, commented sourly on the ‘congregation’ Grove assembled at the Palace for his music. Joseph Bennett (1831–1911), the younger, Schumannite critic of the Daily Telegraph, felt rather that it had become the ‘temple of a new and graceful gospel’ and recalled Grove’s face shining ‘like Moses, with the glory of the eternal’, as he listened to Schubert’s Unfinished Symphony.102 Grove’s call in 1886 for subscription concerts in churches, to include not just oratorios but Beethoven symphonies, which were ‘as truly religious as any oratorio’, renders explicit his belief in German music as a teacher of pure religiosity.103

German music might then not just be the handmaid to scriptural Protestantism, but a source in its own right of transcendent, non-material values. One indication of this attitude was the growth in quasi-religious reverence for composers themselves, as at once keepers of a spiritual revelation and Christ-like types of suffering humanity. On approaching Beethoven’s grave at Währing, whimpered the poet Robert Lytton (1831–91) in 1872, ‘all within us goes as still and holy as a church; a sacred silence takes possession of the soul, and the spell of that silence is permeated by only one great name—Beethoven’.104 The centenary of Beethoven’s birth, which occasioned

Stanley, Dean of Westminster, among other things a good friend of Haweis, a liberal Anglican writer on Scripture interested in German criticism, and the (tone-deaf) sponsor of the 1871 Westminster Abbey St Matthew Passion.


102 Joseph Bennett, Forty Years of Music, 1865–1905 (London, 1908), 340, 375; Hughes, English Musical Renaissance, 44–5. Bennett’s alertness to Grove’s emotions reflected his background as a devout nonconformist who had been a chapel organist and ‘sat under’ Henry Allon.


these remarks, was one celebrated high point in the tendency of nineteenth-century musical culture towards hagiography. As David Gramit writes, the classical tradition was imagined as not just a museum of great works, but a pantheon of great men. Composers were made icons for their art: their statues were put up, their literary relics hoarded and published, and their lives written in duly whitewashed form.\textsuperscript{105} The English quickly appropriated Germany’s hagiographical traditions, erecting literary and sculptural monuments to their favourite composers. A composer’s exemplary character, once established, ‘irradiated’ (Haweis) his works: they were the ‘flower of his personality’ and evidence that he was the ‘highest type of mankind’.\textsuperscript{106}

Mendelssohn was the object of the first full-blown personality cult of this kind. According to Prince Albert’s handwritten but quickly publicized tribute after the London premiere of \textit{Elijah}, he was ‘another Elijah’, come to rescue the public from the ‘Baal-worship of corrupted art’.\textsuperscript{107} Struggling to establish music as a high calling, not just a trivial diversion, English musical idealists detected in Mendelssohn and his noted perfectionism their ‘high priest’.\textsuperscript{108} Shock at his sudden death in 1847 sealed the image of his martyrdom to art. Davison had a three-hour screaming fit on hearing the news, an account of which he obligingly published.\textsuperscript{109} Grief soon mutated into ‘Mendelssohn


\textsuperscript{109} [P.A. Fiorentino], ‘From the Constitutionnel’, \textit{Musical World}, 20 Nov. 1847, 733.
Articles

MANIA': a deep preoccupation with his personality. Haweis remembered his sense of ‘calamitous, irreparable, personal loss’, which led him to buy a bust of Mendelssohn, draped in black, for his undergraduate rooms; to moon over engravings of his death-bed; and even to see his ‘transfigured, splendid’ face in dreams.\textsuperscript{110} In Elizabeth Sheppard’s schoolgirlish novel \textit{Charles Auchester} (1853), Mendelssohn was the marble-browed composer Seraphiel, a Biedermeier Christ wearing a ‘crown of martyrdom’.\textsuperscript{111} The constant publication of biographies and volumes of correspondence stoked Mendelssohn mania, sustaining an illusion of what Evans termed ‘communion with an eminently pure, refined nature’.\textsuperscript{112} Biographies of such German predecessors as Handel and Mozart could be just as glowing, but Mendelssohn was a perfect icon: refined yet manly; a lover of mountain walks; a hard worker as well as a genius; a committed father and loving husband to a pious Huguenot wife. Like Albert – also the object of a posthumous cult – he combined high intellectualism with freedom from the rackety morals often thought to compromise Continental geniuses.\textsuperscript{113}

Fashions in composers changed. By the 1870s connoisseurs were openly challenging the Mendelssohn cult, arguing that he was both a lesser composer and a less impressive spiritual exemplar than Beethoven, Schubert, Schumann, and (in time) even Wagner.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{110} Haweis, \textit{Musical Life}, 13, 16–17, 92. The bust was said to smile when the light caught it.
\textsuperscript{111} Bennett, \textit{Sterndale Bennett}, 179.
\textsuperscript{114} Telling early examples of the shift in non-specialist periodicals are [Joseph Bennett], ‘Robert Schumann’, \textit{Pall Mall Gazette}, 30 Nov. 1868; [H. J.].
Critics fastened on the sunny disposition and privileged background recorded in the memoirs to argue that he had been too genteel to be a Man of Sorrows.\textsuperscript{115} Grove’s entry on Mendelssohn in his \textit{Dictionary of Music} conceded that he had not produced music with ‘abiding possession of the depths of the human heart’ because he had been spared the ‘fiery trials’ of Beethoven or Schumann.\textsuperscript{116} Beethoven was, in fact, the greatest beneficiary of a religion of music in which composers revealed truth by revealing their turbulent selves. His ascendancy, which was clearly established by the time of his centenary, coincided with the proliferation of venues for serious instrumental music.\textsuperscript{117} Coupled with the new discipline of musicological analysis, this helped the musical public appreciate that Beethoven’s later music abounded not with regrettable eccentricities but genuine glimpses into a spiritual and emotional realm transcending the workaday world.\textsuperscript{118} A new generation of German executants contributed their glamorous earnestness to his inscrutable grandeur. Haweis described

the violinist Joseph Joachim playing Beethoven with ‘the rapt infallible power of a seer delivering his oracle’.\textsuperscript{119}

That oracle was more humanist than Christian. Beethoven, wrote the German virtuoso Edward Dannreuther in 1876, was an ‘ethical, religious teacher’, who ‘delivers a message of religious love and resignation—of identification with the sufferings of all living creatures, deprecation of self, negation of all personality, release from the world’. For Dannreuther, Beethoven was another Schopenhauer, not another Elijah. Even his masses were mystic expressions of sympathy with humanity rather than clear expressions of Christian faith.\textsuperscript{120}

Nonetheless, no linear transition from a love of German sacred music to a general sacralization of German music occurred. Neither the symphony nor the ‘music of the future’ toppled the \textit{Messiah}, \textit{Elijah}, or \textit{St Paul}, which were staples of choral societies and musical festivals down to the Great War. Despite grumbles that the festival public was ‘musically Tory, and refuses to reform’, these works never went stale.\textsuperscript{121} When it did embrace radically different German works, it was with little sense of their incongruity. Admittedly, convinced Wagnerites such as George Bernard Shaw joined the Master in railing against the philistine cult of oratorio and Mendelssohn’s religious kitsch. Conversely, cultural Christians such as Grove and Joseph Bennett stubbornly abhorred Wagner’s operas,\textsuperscript{122} Haweis, though, gamely classed Wagner alongside Mendelssohn as a musical moralist. Musical festivals followed suit, from the 1870s billing excerpts from \textit{Tannhäuser} and \textit{Lohengrin} along with \textit{Elijah}. English Wagnerism’s historians note that it was a strenuously high-minded, Protestant affair—decadent camp followers excepted—which sought

\textsuperscript{119} Haweis, \textit{Music and Morals}, 513; Barbara Bryant, \textit{Portraits by George Frederic Watts} (London, 2004), 33 reproduces a celebrated painting of Joachim in this attitude.


\textsuperscript{121} Edwards, \textit{And the Glory}, 76–7.

guidance in resolving social and moral evils through studying texts as well as hearing music. 123 Similarly, Joseph Bennett drew comfort from the fact that the pagan Beethoven had at least not been a Roman Catholic and that his humane, moral religiosity was still essentially Christian. 124

The durability of the passion for German sacred music was therefore as flexible as understandings of what it meant to be sacred. It does much to explain the ceaseless rise in the prestige of German music, which was always as much about English hopes and fears as it was about the notes. 125

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125 Robert Lytton was nonplussed by Beethoven’s scores; Evans and her partner George Lewes were fastidious in revering Beethoven and Brahms but beat time wrongly to their music: Lytton, ‘Beethoven’, 19; Graves, Grove, 318.
AMBIGUITIES OF TRANSNATIONALISM: FASCISM IN EUROPE BETWEEN PANEUROPEANISM AND ULTRANATIONALISM, 1919–39

Arnd Bauerkämper

Deeply impressed by the Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution (Mostra della Rivoluzione Fascista), Benito Mussolini claimed to represent the new universal civilization of the twentieth century after his inaugural visit to the Mostra on 28 October 1932. When he left the monumental rooms in the Palazzo delle Esposizioni in central Rome, the Duce declared: ‘In ten years Europe will be fascist or fascisized.’ This attitude on the tenth anniversary of the glorified March on Rome contrasts starkly with the prevailing positive interpretations of transnationalism in public debates and the historiography of cross-border transfers, entanglements, and interconnectedness. In fact, research on the cross-border cooperation between fascists (and Communists) highlights the normative ambivalence of transnational exchange. Its repercussions are as contradictory as the expansion of civil society across territorial, social, and cultural boundaries.

In this article, it will be argued that the relationship between transnational relations and cross-border entanglements on the one

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hand and nationalist delimitation on the other is not only contradictory but also complementary and even dialectical. More precisely, the investigation of initiatives to set up a Fascist International clearly indicates that pan-European concepts are ambivalent, if not ambiguous in normative terms. In modern history, ‘Europe’ has repeatedly been a referential framework used to legitimize the pre-eminence of specific states. It has served as an argument for vested and often contradictory interests. This exploitation reached unprecedented proportions in the interwar period, when the Italian Fascists and the German National Socialists referred to Europe in order to justify their hegemonic claims. However, fascist Europeanism cannot easily be dismissed as a mere propaganda manoeuvre. This proposition will be supported by reconstructing the ties and barriers between fascists in Europe in the interwar period.

Previous historical research on transnational connections and exchange between fascists in Europe has largely been restricted to historical comparisons, whereas research on entanglements and relations between fascists has received less attention. Moreover, published studies of this cross-border exchange have concentrated on top-level cooperation between fascist leaders. Thus Michael Ledeen has investigated the Comitati d’azione per l’universalità di Roma (CAUR), which had been set up in 1933 by the Fascist regime in Italy. Yet the collapse of the Comitati in the mid-1930s has led historians to conclude that fascist internationalism was merely a pretence, if not a camouflage for nationalist aspirations. Wartime collaboration, which has largely been equated with unqualified submission to German and (to a lesser degree) Italian demands, seems to provide further evidence in support of this proposition. 4 Undeniably, hyper-national-
Fascism was deeply ingrained in fascist ideology and continuously impeded the cross-border interchange between European fascists. Yet it did not prevent continual top-level cooperation. Even more importantly, nationalism did not impede contacts between lower functionaries and activists at grass-roots level, which have been neglected in historical scholarship. The common view that 'international fascism is unthinkable, a contradiction in terms', therefore needs differentiation.

Despite all due recognition of the fascists' failure to institutionalize cooperation between themselves, I will present some evidence that Italian Fascism and German Nazism were genuinely attractive throughout Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. Cross-border ties emanating from the 'magnetic field' of these two major regimes cannot be reduced to a camouflage of quests for predominance. Far beyond high politics, interchange between fascists extended to fields such as the organization of leisure and public relations. There was a sense of community between fascists in different European states in the 1920s and 1930s. Moreover, transnational ties transcended the realm of ideology and included cross-border activities. Thus, 'fascism' was by no means 'largely a construction of political opponents'. Yet fascist

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movements and regimes appropriated foreign doctrines and policies selectively in order to avert the potentially damaging charge of pale imitation. For the same reason, they were cautious about publicizing their transnational cooperation, which was neither restricted to wartime collaboration nor to the abortive attempts to institutionalize high-level cooperation between fascist leaders. Most importantly, the interchange between fascists by no means remained inconsequential, but had a lasting impact on their political and social practice, and their movements and groups. Studies of transnational exchange between fascists can therefore shed light on fascist agency as a counterbalance to the strong emphasis on the ideology of national renewal and cultural representation prevailing in recent scholarship.7

Despite their hyper-nationalism, European fascists maintained mutual relations that accentuated their bonds. They were brought together by different motives and interests. Apart from mere sympathy and ideological affinity, pragmatic considerations assumed considerable importance. Thus political revisionism lent Fascist Italy and nationalist Germany support from fascists (and authoritarian governments) in states which had been punished by the Versailles settlement. Similarly, fascists in Europe hoped for economic cooperation and funds from their successful ‘comrades’ in Italy and Germany. In the 1920s, the Italian Fascists seemed to embody and propel the new transnational civilization. After the ‘March on Rome’ in late October 1922, the Italian capital acted as a magnet for fascists throughout Europe. Despite his disappointment at the military failures of his Italian alliance partner, Hitler cherished Mussolini as an ally and a friend as late as April 1945, when the Third Reich lay in ruins. Yet in the mid-1930s, European fascists had increasingly turned their attention to Nazi Germany.

Interchange between fascists in Europe was not limited to overtly political issues such as mutual assistance in war and propaganda, but also concerned the seemingly non-political fields of cultural and aesthetic representations. Neither the doctrines of fascist movements and regimes nor their policies can therefore be adequately explained without taking the multiple interrelationships between European fascists into account. Not least, the adversaries of fascist movements and regimes emphasized the cross-border interchange and universal claims of fascism as much as many of its members and supporters.8

After an overview of the impact of Italian Fascism in Europe in the 1920s and early 1930s, the increasing competition between the Italian Fascists and the National Socialists from 1933 to 1935 will be reconstructed. In the latter half of the 1930s, which will be elaborated (London, 2002). See, however, Morgan, Fascism in Europe, 159–89; Woller, Rom, 28. Oktober 1922, 148–90; Borejsza, Schulen des Hasses, 252–70; Arnd Bauerkämper, Faschismus in Europa, 1918–1945 (Stuttgart, 2006), 166–82. For more explicit comparisons and transfer studies, see the contributions to Armin Nolzen and Sven Reichardt (eds.), Faschismus in Deutschland und Italien: Studien zu Transfer und Vergleich (Göttingen, 2005).

upon in the third part of this article, the Third Reich increasingly prevailed over Fascist Italy. Nevertheless, cooperation between the two regimes persisted as much as ties between them and smaller fascist groups and movements in Europe. Fascist collaboration during the Second World War will only be touched upon—this complex issue certainly deserves a separate investigation. I will conclude by proposing detailed investigations on cross-border interaction between fascists and fascist agency, and drawing two more general conclusions concerning transnational historiography.

I The Impact of Italian Fascism, 1922–33

Even though he was only able to establish a fully-fledged dictatorship during the 1920s, Mussolini’s seizure of power on 22 October 1922 attracted considerable attention throughout Europe. Shocked by the hitherto unknown atrocities of the First World War and disappointed at the post-war settlements and the economic slump of the early 1920s, many contemporaries perceived Italian Fascism as a promising alternative to liberal democracies struck by party strife and social dislocation. As Mussolini was able to stabilize his rule at the expense of his conservative coalition partners from 1922 to 1925, the Duce found an increasing number of admirers in European states as different as Britain, France, and Hungary. The impression of strong leadership, the vision of a ‘new era’, and the aggrandizement of Italian power compared favourably with the performance of the governments of western and central European democracies. Although the Italian Fascists emphasized autarchy as an important political objective, corporatism also seemed to pave the way for cooperation between European nations.

Most importantly, however, the new political style of a plebiscitary dictatorship and marching Blackshirts aroused particular admiration. The Partizio Nazionale Fascista (PNF), which had been established in November 1921, thus became a model that inspired the foundation of fascist groups and parties in various European and non-European states. According to a contemporary estimate, parties which presented themselves as ‘fascist’ had been founded in forty states by April 1925. In fact, Italy became the centre of a network of fascist groups evolving throughout Europe after the glorified ‘March
on Rome’. Although relations were unequal, they lent the project of fascist pan-Europeanism legitimacy by increasing cross-border exchange. This interaction was fostered by the deliberate representation of Italian Fascism as a modern force for cross-border renewal.9

Although Mussolini and his lieutenants initially emphasized the national character of Italian Fascism, their political ambitions clearly transcended the confines of Italy. They busily advocated the ideal of a new transnational European Fascist civilization, supposedly embodied by the new dictatorship. Mussolini therefore encouraged Italian Fascists in Europe to assemble and support the doctrines and claims of the new regime. Thus organizations such as the Fasci Italiani all’Estero, which were set up by the prominent Fascist Giuseppe Bastianini in 1923, not only integrated Italians living in foreign states into Italian Fascism, but also spread the regime’s claim of a renewal of European civilization beyond the confines of Italy. Although they refrained from direct intervention in the politics of their host countries, the Fasci unequivocally espoused Mussolini’s regime and propagated it as a model. Even before the Duce openly committed himself to a ‘political and spiritual renewal of the world’ in 1932,10 Italian Blackshirts were delegated to countries as distant as India in order to mobilize support for the Fascist regime.11

It was therefore by no means surprising that ardent admirers of Mussolini such as Rotha Lintorn Orman, founder of the British Fascisti in 1923, and Pierre Taittinger, who set up the Jeunesses patriotes in France two years later, established organizations modelled on the PNF. Yet these groups appropriated Italian Fascism selectively, borrowing those elements which suited their specific needs. Thus the

10 Ibid. 73.
British Fascisti emphasized fascist militancy in order to combat the growing unrest among the working class and trade unions which finally initiated the General Strike of May 1926. By contrast, Taittinger was mainly attracted by the concept of the corporate state, which seemed to be a panacea to the French economic crisis and the devaluation of the currency in the mid-1920s. Italian Fascism was clearly appropriated according to specific needs and conditions in the receiving societies. It also served as a political tool in the feud between competing fascist groups in European countries. Thus Action française (AF) embraced Italian Fascism and denounced its rival fascist movements in France as deviations. When the Faisceau of Georges Valois, who occasionally invited Italian Fascists to speak at his meetings, emerged as an increasingly influential organization in 1925, for instance, the founder of AF, Charles Maurras denied the feasibility of fascism in France while expressing his admiration for Mussolini’s regime in Italy. Nevertheless, AF themselves highlighted their national roots in their propaganda campaigns in order to evade political stigmatization as an imposed foreign import. The French fascists were reluctant to align themselves publicly with the Italian dictatorship in the 1920s. This cautious approach and tactical silence was also adopted by the new fascist organizations in France in the 1930s, as they, too, were anxious to assert their national loyalties.12

Even in seemingly strong parliamentary democracies such as Britain, where the monarchical prerogative had been undermined as early as the seventeenth century, Italian Fascism met with support and sympathy, not only among like-minded followers but also among more mainstream politicians, high officials, and journalists. Despite strong criticism of Italy’s occupation of the Greek island of Corfu, dismay at the murder of Italian opposition politician Giacomo Matteotti, and unease about the establishment of one-party rule in 1925, some Conservative politicians such as Winston Churchill

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applauded Mussolini’s anti-socialist and anti-Communist stance and policies. Frightened by the Bolshevik revolution, industrial unrest in Britain, and the General Strike of 1926, British journalists and intellectuals also expressed their admiration for the Fascist dictatorship. As the moderate policies of Conservative Party leader Stanley Baldwin, who had agreed to form a National Government with Ramsay MacDonald’s Labour Party in 1931, gave rise to growing criticism, Italian Fascism was increasingly espoused by radical British Conservatives. Thus newspapers such as the *Morning Post*, Lord Rothermere’s *Daily Mail* and *Daily Telegraph*, and magazines like the *National Review*, which had already applauded Mussolini’s ‘March on Rome’, hailed Fascism. Support for the corporate state propagated by the Duce, in particular, transcended the confines of the Conservative Party. A corporate system of government seemed to combine political integration and a powerful foreign policy. In sum, Mussolini’s adulation of the state and his emphasis on national strength seemed to compare favourably with the liberal consensus prevailing in western and central Europe.\(^{13}\)

On the Iberian peninsula, too, Italian Fascism furthered the formation of fascist groups. Thus Integralismo Lusitano, which emerged in Portugal as early as 1923, was shaped by the ideology of Italian Fascism, especially the ideal of social harmony and cooperation as well as the concept of the corporate state. Rolão Preto’s National Syndicalism was also influenced by the Faisceau. Similarly, Preto had closely studied the Spanish Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (JONS).\(^{14}\)

In Spain, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, who set up Falange Española (FE) in 1933, espoused a nationalist strand of socialism. Although he denied any connections with Italian Fascism, Primo de


Rivera visited Italy in May 1935 and accepted subsidies from the Fascist regime in the following month. The FE defended Italy’s aggression in Abyssinia and fought on the side of the Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War. Like the British Union of Fascists (BUF), the organization increasingly turned towards Nazi Germany. Primo de Rivera had visited Berlin as early as April 1934 when he had a conversation with Hitler. Primo de Rivera’s successor Manuel Hedilla also attracted strong support from representatives of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, who harboured reservations against Franco’s suppression of the Spanish working class. In the early 1940s the FE, which in April 1937 General Francisco Franco forced to merge with the traditional conservatives in the new state party Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS, supported the war effort of the Axis powers and increased the exchange of delegations with Italy and Germany. The Spanish fascists hoped to participate in the new world order which they expected to establish alongside victorious Italy and Germany. But the Falangists were submerged by Franco, who in turn was inspired by Fascist Italy in his efforts to establish a strong organizational structure. Nevertheless, ties with Latin America were equally important, as the fascist movement and Franco were united in the project of forming a cross-border Hispanic community reminiscent of Spain’s pre-eminence as a colonial power in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.¹⁵

Italian Fascism had struck a particularly strong chord among German nationalist conservatives and völkisch (racist-nationalist) groups aiming for anti-parliamentary authoritarian rule in a strong state. Thus members of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-

partei (NSDAP) who had been asked to name great personalities in history in an opinion poll in 1929 placed Mussolini in third place, behind Bismarck and Hitler. Yet adherents of the Duce and his dictatorship were also to be found in the German bourgeoisie, especially among entrepreneurs and in liberal circles. After it had won 36.9 per cent of the vote in the Reichstag elections of 31 July 1932, Hitler’s movement attracted considerable attention even among leading Italian Fascists. Mussolini, who had preferred to support the paramilitary Stahlhelm before 1930, increasingly favoured Hitler. In October 1930, the Duce charged Giuseppe Renzetti, who had set up an Italian Chamber of Commerce for Germany in Berlin in the 1920s, with establishing secret contacts with Hitler. Renzetti pressed the Führer and some other leading National Socialists to stage a coup d’état after their fortunes seemed to be declining in late 1932. By contrast, Mussolini had constantly advocated a ‘legal’ seizure of power according to the Italian model. The Duce had therefore ordered Renzetti to initiate closer cooperation between the National Socialists and the other organizations of the German right, especially the increasingly radical politicians of the Conservative Party and the leaders of the Stahlhelm. Although this procedure was also espoused by Hitler, Mussolini’s Fascist regime indirectly contributed to the Nazi seizure of power on 30 January 1933. Like Mussolini, Hitler had been able to convey the impression of continuity and the promise of stability to his conservative coalition partners.

The spectacular electoral success of the National Socialists, however, not only heightened admiration but also raised concern in Rome. Not least in order to counter the National Socialist challenge, Mussolini declared in 1932 that Europe would either be Fascist or ‘fascisized’ in ten years. As he claimed political leadership in Europe, Italian Fascists emphasized their bonds with the minor fascist movements in Europe. The Duce also extended subventions to

18 On Mussolini’s statement of 1932, see Laqueur, Fascism, 66.
these groups. Thus the Italian ambassador to London, Dino Grandi, passed considerable funds to the BUF in 1933–4, even though he did not share Mussolini’s enthusiasm for universal fascism. The BUF had been officially founded by former Conservative and Labour politician Sir Oswald Mosley in October 1932. Initially, he unreservedly espoused the doctrines of Italian Fascism. In fact, Mosley had decided to found the BUF after his conversations with Mussolini in Rome in January 1932. The model of the corporate state, which Mussolini had established in Italy, proved to be particularly attractive to British fascists disenchanted by parliamentary politics and yearning for a strong state. After Mosley had openly committed himself to National Socialism and anti-Semitism in late 1934 onwards, however, the Italian Fascists decided to abandon their financial and political support for the BUF. In Mosley’s movement, this reorientation exacerbated tensions between the radical nationalists and the radical anti-Semites. Although they were strongly influenced by Nazism, proponents of fascism as a pan-European movement vacillated between these two camps. To sum up, the rivalry between Italian Fascism and National Socialism caused frictions and splits in the heterogeneous camp of European fascists, who deliberately exploited the competition for their own particular ends in domestic political strife.19

The Duce also lent his support to some other fascist groups and parties in Europe such as the Austrian Heimwehr (home guard movement) and Léon Degrelle’s Belgian Rexists. In the early 1930s the leading officials of these movements admired Mussolini’s regime as much as intellectuals whose belief in a renewal by universal fascism took priority over their national loyalties. In fact, scholars and writers favouring fascism as a solution to the perceived cultural crisis interacted in transnational networks. For instance, French intellectual Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, who established a close cross-border

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exchange on his rejection of parliamentary politics with British writer Aldous Huxley, condemned the seemingly all-pervasive alienation in western ‘mass society’. Against this background, the cultural ideal of Romanità considerably reinforced the attractiveness of Mussolini’s dictatorship throughout Europe. In the eyes of other intellectuals, such as Romanian writer Mircea Eliade, a distinguished theorist of comparative religion and leading proponent of ‘Romanianism’, Mussolini’s dictatorship seemed to embody the Roman empire of antiquity and its warlike virtues. Fascist thinker Julius Evola even praised ‘eternal’ spiritual values as a solid foundation for European unity.20

II The Common and Divided Fascist Universe: Initiatives for Cooperation and the Struggle for Leadership, 1933–5

As Hitler rapidly marginalized his conservative coalition partners in Germany in 1933–4, Italy’s Fascists were increasingly confronted with a mighty rival. The Duce therefore reactivated plans for a propaganda campaign to strengthen support for the Italian model of fascism throughout Europe. Fascist officials such as Giuseppe Bottai, who had vociferously demanded that Italian Fascism be transferred to foreign states as early as the 1920s, were given free rein. As minister for corporations, Bottai glorified Fascism as a youthful movement of spiritual renewal (Novismo).21 According to this doctrine, the Fascists were to establish a global order of the ‘new man’. Mussolini’s brother Arnaldo, who had set up a School of Fascist Mysticism in


21 As education minister (1936–43), Bottai was responsible for the expulsion of Jewish scholars from Italian universities. Nevertheless, he was widely regarded as almost an ‘antifascist fascist’. See Donald Sassoon, ‘Italy after Fascism: The Predicament of Dominant Narratives’, in Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann (eds.), Life after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe during the 1940s and 1950s (Cambridge, 2003), 259–90, at 287.
Articles

1931, proposed to educate a new elite capable of inspiring enthusiasm for ‘young Italy’ in European states. In fact, the Fascist regime continued to attract attention in the early 1930s, as demonstrated by the visits of European fascists who came to Italy to see the Exposition of the Fascist Revolution opened exactly ten years after the ‘March on Rome’. The Mostra della Rivoluzione Fascista, which attracted over 2.8 million visitors from 1932 to 1934, was to represent the transnational claim to superiority staked by the Italian Fascists. For instance, twelve young French fascists bicycled from Paris to Rome in order to inspect what was claimed to be the radiating centre of European fascism. The cross-border interchange between fascist movements and groups was therefore by no means restricted to their leaders. Ordinary fascists met each other as well. 22

However, Fascist pan-Europeanism was deeply intertwined with power politics. In 1933–4, the doctrine of fascist universalism, which aimed for a transnational alliance dominated by Italian Fascism, was primarily directed against the increasing international influence of German Nazism. Thus Mussolini ordered the imposition of restrictions on the NSDAP’s activities in Italy in February 1934. Antagonism between Italy and Germany grew after talks between Mussolini and Hitler in Venice had ended in a profound disagreement on 14 and 15 June 1934. The assassination of the Austrian chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuß, on 25 July 1934 and the failed coup d’état by Austrian National Socialists raised the Duce’s suspicions about the foreign policy being pursued by Germany’s new leaders. Mussolini’s contemptuous disavowal of Nazi anti-Semitism and the German repudiation of Italian claims to political leadership reflected the profound disagreements between the leaders of the two major fascist powers in Europe. 23

Frenzied attempts to promote the concept of pan-European fascism under Italian tutelage resulted in efforts to institutionalize cross-border co-operation between fascists. Thus Asvero Gravelli, editor of the magazine Ottobre, invited European fascists to Rome in November 1932. This Volta conference was attended by right-wing politicians such as the Germans Hermann Göring and Alfred Rosen-

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22 Stone, ‘Staging Fascism’, 238.
berg. Encouraged by the responses to Gravelli’s initiative, Mussolini ordered CAUR to be established in July 1933. Its foundation initially met a strong response from leading European fascists such as Léon Degrelle and Horia Sima of the Romanian Legion of the Archangel Michael (Iron Guard). In December 1934 CAUR therefore held a conference of European fascists at Montreux. In addition to Gravelli, it was attended by Vidkun Quisling, leader of the Norwegian Nasjonal Samling, Oswald Mosley, General Eion O’Duffy who had founded the Irish Blueshirts, and French fascist Marcel Bucard. Yet the German National Socialists delegated only a minor official to Montreux. At the conference, moreover, profound disagreements soon surfaced. Thus a resolution in favour of the corporate ideology of the Italian Fascists met strong opposition. In fact, Quisling unequivocally demanded that the völkisch doctrine of ‘Nordic’ racism espoused by the Nazis be officially endorsed. As the conflicts could not be settled at Montreux, only a vague, non-binding resolution was passed at the conference.

Nevertheless, fascist internationalism had by no means completely foundered by 1935. Even though the fascists had failed to establish a formal institutional framework for top-level cooperation in Europe, cross-border interaction, exchange, and transfer were not disrupted. Despite their rivalry and considerable mutual acrimony, collaboration between Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy continued and even intensified in specific fields. Advertising, for example, became an important sphere of medium-level cooperation, as it had to be redirected in order to achieve controlled consumption in the autarchic economies of the two states. Against this background, intensified exchange between Italian and German experts was to reshape advertising as a tool of political education and indoctrination. The National Socialist leisure organization Kraft durch Freude, too, was largely modelled on the Italian Dopolavoro, which had been established in

May 1925. The Italian Fascists promoted the social policies pursued after their seizure of power in the International Labour Organization (Internationale Arbeitsorganisation), which had been founded in Geneva in accordance with the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919. As an agency of knowledge transfer, the Internationale Arbeitsorganisation advocated the combination of state policies in order to transform leisure activities without abandoning individual freedom. In this institutional framework of cross-border cooperation, Italian experts had succeeded in impressing their German colleagues with the Dopolavoro. It was only in 1933–4 that the National Socialists clearly disentangled their Deutsche Arbeitsfront from the model of Italian social policies. The ambiguous relationship between Fascism and National Socialism was to continue after the rapprochement between Italy and Germany, culminating in the formation of the Berlin–Rome Axis on 25 October 1936.25

### III When Pupil Became Teacher: National Socialism as the New Model for European Fascists, 1935–9

The rapprochement between Fascist Italy and the Third Reich in 1935 and 1936 promised new perspectives for cross-border cooperation between the two major powers and even seemed to promote the project of a universal fascism. Its invasion of Abyssinia had completely isolated Italy in international politics, as the unequivocal indictment of the League of Nations and the ensuing embargo of the Italian peninsula clearly demonstrated. Moreover, their common support for the Nationalist insurrection of General Francisco Franco against the Republican government tied the leaders of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany ever closer together from late 1936 onwards. Beyond the cooperation between these two major powers, however, the Spanish Civil War became an important arena for transnational collaboration

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between European fascists. Thus Eion O’Duffy, who had considered supporting Italy’s attack on Abyssinia as early as 1935, sent 700 Irish Blueshirts to Spain where they suffered heavy casualties against the Republican troops. The Romanian Iron Guard also provided fighters for the Spanish Nationalists. The influential Legionaries Ion Moţa and Vasile Marin, who were killed in combat in Spain in December 1936, even became martyrs in Spain and Romania. In Britain, twelve Blackshirts managed to sail the 3,708-ton Spanish Republican vessel Rita García, which the British authorities had impounded in Grimsby, to Nazi Germany.26

Yet the Fascist rulers of Italy were increasingly relegated to a subordinate position by the National Socialist leadership. Hitler’s visit to Italy in May 1938 accelerated the radicalization of Italian Fascism which had begun in the mid-1930s. With the publication of the Manifesto of Race and the enactment of stringent racial laws in 1938, Italian initiatives to institutionalize transnational cooperation between fascist leaders in Europe under Italian tutelage had clearly foundered. The dependency of Fascist Italy on Nazi Germany directly affected the development of the minor fascist groups in Europe. Despite their initial reservations about the Social Darwinist doctrines, anti-Semitism, and expansionist programme espoused by the National Socialists, many European fascists had enthusiastically applauded Hitler’s seizure of power. Thus the leaders of the fascist movements in France and the Netherlands did not hesitate to approach the new rulers of Germany as early as 1933. After they had rapidly established their undisputed dictatorship in 1933–4, the Nazis managed to increase their influence among European fascists.

The seemingly unbeatable Third Reich assumed the status of the dominant model, increasingly surpassing Italian Fascism. Nazi organizations such as Ernst Wilhelm Bohle’s Auslandsorganisation and Alfred Rosenberg’s Außenpolitisches Amt of the NSDAP cultivated the image of an omnipotent Third Reich. The turn towards anti-Semitism reflected the growing attractiveness of National Socialism. Thus Anton Mussert’s Nationaal Socialistische Beweging (NSB), which was initially inspired by Italian Fascism, launched a propaganda campaign against the Jews in 1935. Anti-Semitism was particularly promoted in the NSB by Rost van Tonningen, who was received by Hitler in Berlin in August 1936. 27

In similar vein, the BUF was renamed British Union of Fascists and National Socialists in 1936. In the summer of that year, the party was granted a subsidy of £10,000 by Hitler who was also involved in Mosley’s secret marriage to Diana Mitford in Berlin in October 1936. Although the leading National Socialists remained sceptical about the British fascists’ political clout, the latter’s overtures to the Third Reich undermined their bonds with the Italian Fascists. As the lean-

ings towards National Socialist Germany became obvious, ties between the London Fascio and the BUF loosened, and Grandi shifted his allegiance from the British fascists to the Conservatives. Similarly, the Belgian Rexist of Leon Dégrelle, who had initially been supported by Mussolini, received German subventions in the mid-1930s. Not least the French fascists, who had fused their traditionally strong anti-Bolshevism with anti-Semitism from 1933 on, gradually adopted a more positive view of Germany. This transition to pro-German attitudes was considerably fuelled by the election of Léon Blum’s Popular Front in 1936.28

The overtures of European fascists to National Socialism and the activities of the Third Reich’s diverse fellow-travellers aroused the suspicions of the leading Fascists in Italy. Mussolini therefore attempted to strengthen ties with the fascists in south-eastern Europe, whom he regarded as an indispensable pillar of Italy’s future Mediterranean empire. In particular, the Italian Fascists attempted to tie the Romanian Iron Guard, Ferenc Szálasi’s Hungarian Arrow Cross Party, and the Croat Ustashi movement of Ante Pávelić to their regime. They had been sponsoring groups such as the Ustashi even before 1933. In fact, the Croat fascists had found refuge in Italy after King Alexander had set up his royal dictatorship in Yugoslavia in 1929. In sponsoring the fascists of south-eastern Europe, the Italian regime claimed cultural superiority over Nazi Germany. As Mussolini’s prestige as the instigator of fascism declined in the 1930s, Italian culture

allegedly rooted in ancient Rome was increasingly juxtaposed with German power in Fascism’s foreign propaganda.\textsuperscript{29} Yet the increasing rivalry between the Fascist and Nazi regimes did allow for pragmatic cooperation, which was largely pursued below the level of high politics. In fact, close interaction continued in a number of policy fields. It was therefore no coincidence that the German propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, complained about the increasing flow of high-ranking Fascists and National Socialists between Italy and Germany in 1937.\textsuperscript{30}

As a consequence of the increasingly strong claims of allegiance, fascists in the European democracies were largely associated with Italian Fascism or German Nazism and seen as copies of foreign regimes. They were therefore excluded from the construction and representation of dominant national traditions. The majority of Britons, for instance, apparently saw Mosley’s Blackshirts as pale imitations of the Italian Fascists who also wore black shirts. Violent confrontations at BUF meetings and the rabid anti-Semitism which the British fascists integrated into their propaganda arsenal in 1934 contradicted the deeply rooted self-images of fair play, peacefulness, and civility in Britain. Popular conceptions of ‘Englishness’ rested on individual freedom, which the BUF clearly threatened. In order to avoid the impression that they were Hitler’s or Mussolini’s lackeys, Mosley’s men and the other European fascists had to stress their autochthonous roots. Nevertheless, national representations co-existed uneasily with pan-European aspirations. In the last resort, the fascists were successfully discredited as imitations of Italian Fascism or National Socialism. Their outward appearance as somewhat ‘alien’ was a major reason for their ultimate failure.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{29} John R. Lampe, Balkans into Southeastern Europe: A Century of War and Transition (Houndmills, 2006), 113; Laqueur, Fascism, 63.
\textsuperscript{30} Woller, Rom, 28. Oktober 1922, 192–3; Sennebogen, ‘Propaganda als Populärkultur?’, 127–30, 144, 146.
Following the German occupation of Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France and Italy’s entry into the war, high-level exchange between fascists was increasingly reduced to military cooperation and political collaboration. Interaction between the indigenous fascists and the Nazi or Fascist occupiers increasingly bordered on treason, and fears of subversion led to the internment of fascists in states such as Britain. In occupied Europe, volunteers were recruited for the German Army as well as for the armed SS in different European states, and a large number of fascists consented to defend ‘Europe’ against ‘Bolshevism’. Thus many soldiers of the Spanish Blue Division juxtaposed Europe with the tradition of Russian ‘despotism’. In fact, the Nazis utilized the symbol of Europe on the ox in order to legitimize their dictatorial supremacy on the Continent. Yet they ultimately aimed for a new Germanic empire that would leave the European nations little autonomy. At this stage, therefore, the doctrine of pan-European fascism was a mere camouflage for German claims of unrestricted domination. From 1941 on, Nazi hegemonic policies were also directed at their Italian ally. 32

IV International Fascism: A ‘Magnetic Field’ of Changing Relations

Fascists in Europe vacillated between pan-Europeanism on the one hand and hyper-nationalism on the other. Borders between European states were crossed, constructed, or redrawn. After Mussolini’s spectacular ‘March on Rome’, Italian Fascism served as a model for like-minded fascists in Europe. From the mid-1930s on, however, the minor fascist movements and groups accommodated themselves to the seemingly superior National Socialist regime. Even Italian Fascism could not escape the tentacles of the Nazi regime, as the official adoption of racial anti-Semitism in 1938 clearly indicated.

Despite Mussolini’s role as mediator in the Munich Agreement of 30 September 1938, the Duce gradually lost his strong reputation among fascists in Europe. Nevertheless, the imperialist ventures pursued by both Italian Fascists and German National Socialists ultimately undermined national sovereignty. Cross-border interaction between European fascists therefore remained significant, preparing and facilitating wartime collaboration. The fascists not only regarded and portrayed themselves as the vanguard of a new, universal creed, but they also developed a sense of common destiny underpinning expansionist policies. Any tight and rigid analytical separation between fascist movements and regimes in the various nation-states is therefore misplaced. Instead of reiterating the national paradigm in historiography, scholars should also highlight cross-border exchange, interaction, and cooperation between fascists in Europe. Apart from comparisons, recent approaches to the investigation of interconnectedness are particularly suited to grasping analytically this dimension of fascism, which should be taken seriously by historians.  

More specifically, studies of relations, entanglements, exchange, and transfers between fascist regimes, movements, and groups in Europe draw scholarly attention to the agency of the fascists themselves. Continuously interchanging across borders, they established...
a network of transnational social practice. Despite their strong nationalism, which they maintained, the fascists were by no means completely separated in national communities of devoted followers of their respective leaders. On the contrary, they not only observed their fellow fascists in foreign countries and exchanged ideologies and concrete political demands but also adapted strategies of attack, for instance, street fights against political opponents. Thus the scuffles that the Stormtroopers deliberately initiated in the streets of Weimar Germany were largely modelled on the militancy and raids of Mussolini’s fasci di combattimento in northern Italy in the early 1920s. Similarly, the marches of Mosley’s Blackshirts, which culminated in the violent clashes in Cable Street in the East End of London on 4 October 1936, are inconceivable without fascist militancy in other European states. Whereas recent research has highlighted the quest for national renewal as a crucial source of fascism in Europe, investigations of transnational interchange draw scholarly attention to the agency and actions of fascists across national borders. In general, fascism emerges as cross-border political and social practice. Although published historical studies have already highlighted the central role of the fascists as actors, only investigations of transnational entanglements and transfers can reconstruct and explain the exogenous roots and limits of fascists’ agency, their world views, and performance. Despite the radical nationalism characterizing fascism, the uneven network of asymmetrical relations between fascists must be taken into account by historians. Similarly, fascist ideology should be strongly related to the actions, performance, and social and political practices of the fascists themselves.34

Yet research on the transnational dimensions of fascism also leads to conclusions that transcend research on international fascism. First, the cross-border interchange between fascists highlights agency as the conceptual foundation of a transnational history of social practice. The cultural turn has deprived German social historiography of its essentialist notions. This epistemological change has placed core issues on the agenda of social historians. In particular, the new emphasis on agency and social practice is apt to tie diverse findings to a network of transnational social practice. Despite their strong nationalism, which they maintained, the fascists were by no means completely separated in national communities of devoted followers of their respective leaders. On the contrary, they not only observed their fellow fascists in foreign countries and exchanged ideologies and concrete political demands but also adapted strategies of attack, for instance, street fights against political opponents. Thus the scuffles that the Stormtroopers deliberately initiated in the streets of Weimar Germany were largely modelled on the militancy and raids of Mussolini’s fasci di combattimento in northern Italy in the early 1920s. Similarly, the marches of Mosley’s Blackshirts, which culminated in the violent clashes in Cable Street in the East End of London on 4 October 1936, are inconceivable without fascist militancy in other European states. Whereas recent research has highlighted the quest for national renewal as a crucial source of fascism in Europe, investigations of transnational interchange draw scholarly attention to the agency and actions of fascists across national borders. In general, fascism emerges as cross-border political and social practice. Although published historical studies have already highlighted the central role of the fascists as actors, only investigations of transnational entanglements and transfers can reconstruct and explain the exogenous roots and limits of fascists’ agency, their world views, and performance. Despite the radical nationalism characterizing fascism, the uneven network of asymmetrical relations between fascists must be taken into account by historians. Similarly, fascist ideology should be strongly related to the actions, performance, and social and political practices of the fascists themselves.34

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Articles

of a broad scope of empirical studies together. Beyond the fixation on images and discourses, social historians need to devote their efforts to the investigation of social practice, which no longer presupposes historical ‘reality’ and given structures, but identifies and explains individual and collective perceptions, interpretations, appropriations, and the construction of meaning and sense. Thus culture has to be related to social action and vice versa. The construction and exchange of self-images, representations, and stereotypes are to receive particular attention. Arguably, the analytical focus on social practice and agency in certain constellations can provide the new social history with the glue it needs to maintain a profile. In any case, it will propel historians towards a radical contextualization and historization. It is the fascists themselves who merit close attention.35

Second, transnationalism has had an ambivalent impact on the course of modern European history. Cross-border interchange has characterized civil society as much as the Third International and fascism. Pan-Europeanism clearly can serve very different purposes. Thus fascists were inspired by the vision of overcoming national antagonism in a unified Europe. At the same time, resistance movements in the occupied states and in Germany referred to their vision of a unified, peaceful, and democratic Europe. This ambivalence cannot easily be disentangled, but it leads to the insight that pan-European ideas and activities designed to promote a peaceful unification of nation-states depend on basically symmetrical relations and the principle of reciprocity. However, in democratic states as well, the notion of ‘Europe’ has served different and at times even contradictory purposes and aims. In all probability, it will continue to be both an argument and a tool.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

FROM ‘NATURSCHUTZ’ TO ‘UMWELTSCHUTZ’: NATURE CONSERVATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL REFORM IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, 1950–80

Thomas M. Lekan


In the introduction to their essay collection Natur- und Umweltschutz nach 1945, editors Franz-Josef Brüggemeier and Jens Ivo Engels aptly describe German environmental history (Umweltgeschichte) as a ‘branch of research that is still young, but has recently come of age’ (p. 10). Parallel to scholarly developments in the United States and Great Britain, the first ‘environmental histories’ appeared in Germany during the 1980s, during the founding decade of Germany’s Green movement and the time when the country gained a reputation...
as one of the most environmentally conscious industrialized nations.\textsuperscript{1} As the field has matured, ‘passionate methodological manifestos’ calling for an ecological approach to historical inquiry have given way to a more pragmatic integration of environmental themes in which Umweltgeschichte serves as a topical umbrella rather than a methodological framework.\textsuperscript{2} And like their counterparts in the US and Britain, the contributors to Natur- und Umweltschutz nach 1945 demonstrate a continuing preference for socio-cultural rather than materialist approaches to the environmental past, as evidenced by essays devoted to the roles of discourse, media, visual interpretation, scientific institutions, and emotionality in framing environmental issues and politics.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1} Examples of classic environmental histories from this era include Klaus-Georg Wey, Umweltpolitis in Deutschland: Kurze Geschichte des Umweltschutzes in Deutschland seit 1900 (Opladen, 1982); Rolf-Peter Sieferle, Fortschrittsfeinde? Opposition gegen Technik und Industrie von der Romantik bis zur Gegenwart (Munich, 1984); Ulrich Linse, Ökopax und Anarchie: Eine Geschichte der ökologischen Bewegungen in Deutschland (Stuttgart, 1986); Alfred Barthelmess, Landschaft, Lebensraum des Menschen: Probleme von Landschaftsschutz und Landschaftspflege geschichtlich dargestellt und dokumentiert (Freiburg, 1988); Franz-Josef Brüggemeier and Thomas Rommelspacher (eds.), Besiegte Natur: Geschichte der Umwelt im neunzehnten und zwanzigsten Jahrhundert (2nd edn.; Munich, 1989); and Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn, Auf der Suche nach Arkadien: Zu Landschaftsidealen und Formen der Naturaneignung in der Jugendbewegung und ihre Bedeutung für die Landespflege (Munich, 1990).


Still, most of the contributions deal in one way or another with the German environmental movement, which is not surprising given the relative success of the Greens among Europe’s ecology parties and the growing historical literature devoted to early twentieth-century homeland protection (Heimatschutz) and nature conservation (Naturschutz) movements as well as the ‘green wing’ of the National Socialist movement. The intervening period between the Third Reich and the establishment of the Green party (1945–80) has received much less attention, or has been dismissed as an environmentally apolitical age of economic reconstruction, which makes the Brüggemeier-Engels collection and the other works reviewed here especially welcome additions to the broader scholarly literature on


environment and politics in modern Germany.\textsuperscript{5} As these works make clear, modern environmentalism did not emerge suddenly in the 1970s as a reaction to accumulating evidence of ecological deterioration following the economic boom years of the 1950s and 1960s. Rather than seeing this era afflicted by a ‘50s syndrome’ that valorized economic progress at all costs,\textsuperscript{6} these authors demonstrate convincingly that the negative ecological effects of Germany’s transition from a coal-powered, heavy industrial economy to a petroleum-based, consumer economy were well known among government administrators, scientists, health experts, nature conservationists, and a growing portion of the reading public in the first two decades after the war.\textsuperscript{7} Within scientific circles, emerging cybernetic notions of diversity, stability, and feedback mechanisms in the natural world became increasingly mainstream and health officials’ pleas for government regulation of industrial emissions into the air, water, and soil became more frequent. In addition, local citizens’ groups used new democratic powers and media attention to protest at the loss of treasured natural landscapes or pollution that harmed their health and property. Though these tendencies did not coalesce into a self-conscious ‘environmental movement’ (\textit{Umweltbewegung}) until the early 1970s, they did call into question the state’s one-sided emphasis on economic reconstruction and advanced a ‘pre-ecological’ envi-


\textsuperscript{6} See Christian Pfister, \textit{Das 50er Syndrom: Der Weg in die Konsumgesellschaft} (Berne, 1995).

Environmental agenda on several fronts during the years of the ‘economic miracle’.8

By focusing on the period from the end of the Second World War to the early 1980s, these works help scholars to understand better the continuities and discontinuities within environmental discourses, policies, and organizations from the first half of the twentieth century. In particular, they undermine earlier assertions that post-war *Heimat* and nature protection ideals were discredited by conservationists’ early enthusiasm for the Nazi regime, which had enabled them to pass the first nationwide conservation legislation, the Reich Nature Protection Law of 1935, and to participate in morally dubious land-use planning schemes in Nazi-occupied Poland.9 After Germany’s defeat in 1945, there was no ‘zero hour’ for German *Natur- schutz*; the 1935 law, along with a number of ‘denazified’ conservation leaders, remained in power well into the 1960s, a factor that provides important insights into how social conservatives reconstituted themselves and made sense of the Nazi past in the post-war decades. At the same time, West Germany inherited Prussian-era regulatory and technological frameworks for dealing with air and water pollution that proved to be inadequate to the challenge of post-war environmental cleanup. In this context, state officials, engineers, and public health experts expanded the realm of social policy (*Sozialpolitik*) to include environmental management without casting doubt on the technocratic assumptions that had guided emissions control since the early 1900s. Yet as these studies show, international trends and the mobilization of the New Left in the late 1960s and 1970s helped to

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8 Environmentalism was among the many contradictory cultural tendencies during this period; see e.g. the provocative essays in Hanna Schissler (ed.), *The Miracle Years: A Cultural History of West Germany, 1949–1968* (Princeton, 2001).

shift environmentalism within the space of a decade from the nationalist-conservative and landscape-aesthetic traditions of German Naturschutz to the cosmopolitan, ecological perspectives of environmental protection (Umweltschutz). Environmentalism thus shaped and was shaped by the democratization, globalization, and liberalization of West Germany in these decades.

I Continuity and Modernization in Post-War Naturschutz

Of the works surveyed here, Frank Uekötter’s Naturschutz im Aufbruch and Jens Ivo Engels’s Naturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik offer the most compelling evidence of continuities in the ideology and practice of nature conservation and landscape planning between the 1920s and the 1960s. Rejecting the conservationists’ lament that the post-war era was a ‘dark age’ by comparison with the ‘triumph’ of the mid-1930s, Uekötter characterizes Naturschutz as a ‘silent authority’ that enjoyed widespread sympathy among government ministers and used the ‘closed door’ influence of its elite membership to stop or modify construction, mining, and river canalization projects that threatened cherished nature reserves. Employing rhetoric inherited from turn-of-the-century critiques of materialist civilization (Zivilisationskritik), nature conservationists portrayed their effort as a moral crusade that stood above politics, creating a bulwark against the rising tide of consumerism, atomization, and Americanization. By replacing dubious völkisch and xenophobic references to protecting the homeland with a universalist commitment to human rights, conservationists carved a comfortable niche within the Adenauer era’s patriarchal, conservative order. But because conservationists clung to their traditional ambivalence toward the masses and commercialized leisure, they failed to test the limits of their own power, missing the

opportunity to galvanize a broad-based, pro-conservationist coalition. In Uekötter’s judgement, ‘An important enemy of official nature conservation in the early Federal Republic was official nature conservation itself’ (p. 12).

To demonstrate the validity of this thesis, Uekötter uses a series of eight empirically rich and engagingly written case studies from the heavily industrialized state of North Rhine-Westphalia that illuminate the gap between conservationist elitism and popular aspiration. The case studies range from the early 1950s effort to prevent the British military from blowing up the Balver caves in the Sauerland (previously used as a Nazi forced labour site) to a 1974 campaign to prevent the construction of a prison hospital in the Ruhr city of Bochum. Uekötter shows that a range of motivations prompted local protests, including genuine concern about disappearing flora and fauna, anger over the potential loss of favourite picnic and hiking areas, frustration over a diminution of local autonomy, and NIMBY (‘Not In My Backyard’)-style worries about declining property values or health risks.

Befitting a ‘pre-environmentalist era’, these were ‘single issue’ campaigns in which local protagonists did not see themselves as part of a larger movement for the ecological restructuring of industrial society; once local citizens had prevented the Königsdorfer forest near Frechen from being used as a slag heap for mining wastes, for example, the momentum dissipated and people went back to their daily routine. The forces hoping to stop or at least modify development prevailed most of the time, but usually with little or no support from Naturschutz officials and honorary commissioners. In some cases, such as a proposed Sauerland race track in the 1960s, conservationists went against popular support for a new tourist attraction. In other cases, such as early 1970s efforts by birdwatchers to protect Lake Füssenich in the Eifel as a breeding ground for waterfowl, conservation officials did not deem a former coal-mining quarry ‘natural’ enough to warrant their attention. Uekötter sees such examples as signs of a growing alienation between nature conservation officials and the public, a legacy of conservationists’ perception of themselves as an ‘exclusive minority’ that needed to protect scenic landscapes from enjoyment-seeking swimmers, boaters, or campers who lacked the capacity for appropriate nature appreciation. Yet it was precisely this popular will, not government-sanctioned nature conservation,
that Uekötter believes formed the nucleus of the future Umweltbewegung.

Local officials’ noticeable absence from the front lines of citizen protest provides compelling evidence for Uekötter’s thesis about the conservationists’ lost opportunity to gain public support. Yet just as post-war nature conservationists failed to test the limits of their own cultural and political power, so too does Uekötter neglect to exploit his own materials and case study to their fullest. North-Rhine Westphalia is one of the most studied regions in German environmental historiography because it contains Germany’s industrial heartland, the Ruhr coal-mining region, and witnessed some of the country’s earliest landscape preservation, green-space planning, and pollution-control efforts. Because Naturschutz im Aufbruch devotes its attention almost entirely to nature conservation campaigns rather than local demands for pollution control, improved industrial hygiene, or bans on pesticide use, it neglects to examine how North Rhine-Westphalian officials pioneered the development of air emissions permits, or built upon existing traditions of green space planning in the Ruhr to expand the scope and purview of regional planning (Landespflege). Uekötter’s case studies also completely neglect the public outcry that occurred as a result of massive fish kills along the Rhine in the 1950s and 1960s, which prompted local, state, federal, international, and private business water clean-up efforts. Beyond a desire for geographical and chronological balance, there is little information on how the case studies were selected and little connective analysis between them. Instead, the author sees his work as an ‘overarching’ thesis on which to base future studies, particular-


13 On Rhine fish kills see Lekan, ‘Saving the Rhine’ and Hünemörder, Frühgeschichte der globalen Umweltkrise, 84–7.
ly a forthcoming second volume from the Stiftung Naturschutzge- schichte (p. 10).

Given Uekötter’s bold assertions about the growing division between conservation officials and the public, the ‘popular will’ remains diffuse in his case studies, which rely primarily on material from state archives and individual conservationists’ papers. We learn that the North Rhine-Westphalian minister-president received 3,000 individual protest letters and a petition with 1,750 signatures from over 60 municipalities during the campaign to save the Königsdorfer forest (p. 66), but the broader context of the letter-writing campaign and its effect on concrete decision-making are not examined. Fewer case studies, with greater attention to the diverse roles and motivations of various government ministers and discontented citizens, would have strengthened Uekötter’s study. One has the impression that an additional iteration of the book, using the same material but with an eye toward the broader significance of North-Rhine Westphalia in post-war environmental historiography, would have yielded a more compelling case study of a critically important European region. Perhaps the anticipated second volume of this study will fill in some of the conceptual and information gaps left by this initial monograph.

Jens Ivo Engels, whose habilitation Naturpolitik in der Bundesrepu- blik is the most ambitious study of post-war nature conservation organizations to date, also argues that there was a continuity in nature conservation ideology and practice in these decades. Like Uekötter, Engels focuses primarily on nature protection and landscape planning rather than ‘technical environmental protection’.


Engels traces these non-state actors’ shifting styles of political behaviour (politishe Verhaltensstile), which he defines as ‘stable but not fixed forms of behaviour on the part of groups and individuals in the face of a lifestyle problem’ (p. 25), from the ‘pre-ecological’ 1950s and 1960s to the ‘ecological Wende’ of the 1970s. He then applies this concept to three ‘pillars’ of analysis—organizations, media, and protest—which he examines through a combination of chapters devoted to diachronic narrative and synchronic ‘thick descriptions’ of everyday environmental practice. The result is an impressive investigation of the changing legitimation strategies, social patterns, and symbolic forms that propelled nature politics from an elitist, conservative, and oligarchical network in the 1950s and 1960s into a populist, left-leaning, and grassroots ‘new social movement’ in the 1970s.

Engels sees his study primarily as a ‘contribution to qualitative social research’ and situates it in emerging sociological debates about ‘post-material’ value systems (Ronald Inglehart) and the ‘risk society’ (Ulrich Beck) that began in the 1970s, a methodological choice that often bypasses more traditional environmental-historical questions about the origins and impact of the Umweltbewegung or the ecological factors that spurred popular mobilization. As he notes in his introduction, ‘I do not seek to explain why the environmental movement emerged, but how the problem of an endangered natural world . . . was handled in the political realm’ (original emphases, p. 20). His styles of political behaviour should not be seen, therefore, as expressions of political party ideology, but rather as manifestations of unconscious patterns of social interaction, conflict resolution, and cultural meaning. While the concept of politische Verhaltensstile comes from Martin Dinges, Engels’s work is primarily indebted to Pierre Bourdieu, whose concepts of habitus and lifestyle provide him with ethnographic tools for dissecting and deriving meaning from often overlooked details of organizational life, such as the choice of letter-head in written correspondence, clothing style, leisure activities, or meeting protocols. For Engels, such quotidian decisions about style reveal politically significant processes of social inclusion and exclusion that defined associations’ antagonists, informed their choice of tactics, and shaped the alliances they built to achieve their goals.

Naturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik is divided into two parts: the ‘pre-ecological’ Naturschutz and environmental conflicts of the 1950s and 1960s, and the ecologically informed Umweltschutz of the 1970s.
Mass media, in the form of animal documentary films and television programmes, serve as Engels’s bridge between the conservative world of the nature conservationists and the cosmopolitan, populist mobilization of the Umweltbewegung. Part I is further divided into four individual chapters that describe (1) the organizational landscape of the 1950s and 1960s; (2) the Verein Naturschutzpark (VNP) as a case study in post-war nature conservation; (3) the Deutsche Rat für Landespflege (DRL) as an example of corporatist-technocratic landscape planning; and (4) pre-ecological environmental conflicts. Chapter one confirms Uekötter’s broad thesis about continuities from the Wilhelmine to Adenauer eras in conservationists’ state relations, social profile, and peculiar fusion of ‘metaphysical’ and material concern. Though chapter one contains only a small excursus about the National Socialist legacy for Naturschutz, Engels does describe how the natural destruction caused by the war provided a convenient way for conservationists to distance themselves from the regime even as they successfully fought to keep in force the 1935 Reich Nature Protection Law. Like many conservative elites and ordinary Germans of the late 1940s and 1950s, conservationists preferred to see the German people as the real ‘victims’ of the war, seduced by Hitler and then forced to endure Allied occupation that often threatened their homeland and its natural beauty, a sentiment that bubbled beneath the surface of the locals’ clash with British occupation forces over the Balver caves in Uekötter’s account.

Though West German conservationists publicly avowed the new democratic order and its social market economy, their demeanour and attitudes remained wedded to hierarchical, corporatist structures and elitist social tastes that precluded effective public outreach. Under the leadership of millionaire trader Alfred Toepfer, for example, the VNP emerged from the war period with a vision of nature parks throughout Germany that would serve as ‘oases of regeneration’ for an increasingly urbanized and mobile population. For Toepfer, nature was a site of order and discipline, rather than care-free pleasure; behind his demand for recreational access was a social hygiene effort to divert urban visitors, especially young people, from tobacco, alcohol, and sexual licence. Engels brings a critical, often sardonic eye to his material in these sections as he notes with irony Toepfer’s view of the VNP and the state as neutral instruments of the public good while at the same time using his business contacts to
secure behind-the-scenes support from government ministers, corporate leaders, and cultural elites for his programme. The close identification of the VNP mission with Toepfer’s personality and the careful ways in which he cultivated ‘tastefulness’ and privilege at award ceremonies, association meetings, Heimat evenings, and hiking excursions (usually with journalists in tow) bespoke the association’s ‘barricade’ mentality toward the masses and Americanized popular culture. In a similar vein, Engels lambastes ‘his excellency’ Duke Lennart Bernadotte’s pompous efforts to constitute the DRL as an exclusive, ‘apolitical’ advisory board to German president Heinrich Lübke on matters of landscape planning and resource management in which public comment was deemed neither necessary nor desired.

The value of studying these styles of political behaviour is that it connects disparate phenomena, such as sociability, class privilege, gender, and aesthetic taste, into an explanation for political interaction. To a far greater extent than Uekötter, Engels is able to demonstrate the dysfunctional consequences of an elite habitus, in that it led Toepfer and Bernadotte to downplay critical differences of opinion within their own ranks, such as between conservationists, foresters, hunters, and Autobahn planners, for the appearance of unity. And because they viewed their work as a ‘calling’ rather than hard-nosed lobbying effort, the VNP and DRL were unable to form effective alliances to realize their goals. Toepfer was also unprepared for the ability of local lobby groups to transform the nature park vision to suit local modernization and tourist promotion efforts; parking lots, water parks, and camping grounds soon turned the VNP’s ‘instrument for a regional counter-modernity into its very opposite’ (p. 129), according to Engels.

Chapter four examines five case studies of local environmental conflicts from the 1950s and 1960s, including the campaigns to shield the Wutach gorge in the Schwarzwald from hydro-electric dams; to save Kleinbittersdorf, the ‘Pompeii on the Saar’, from the dust and ash caused by a French-owned coal-fired power plant across the river; to protect the Knechtsand, a small island between the Elbe and Weser rivers, from British Royal Air Force training bombs; to safeguard the town of Menzenschwand in the Schwarzwald from uranium mining; and to stop a riverbank highway extension along the Rhine in Eltville. Many of these conflicts have been the subject of previous historical analyses; what is unique about Engels’s approach is
Review Article

his use of comparative analysis to illuminate patterns of motivation, symbolism, and style that elude discrete narrative treatment. For readers unfamiliar with these case studies, the comparative model is often difficult to follow as Engels inserts events and persons from different campaigns into different sections of the chapter. The advantage of this method, however, is that it reveals striking parallels with the VNP and DRL case studies. Local actors emphasized the universal ethical import of their actions and sought close alliances with state officials, whom they viewed as neutral arbiters of the public welfare, even in cases where state decisions had endangered the environment in the first place. Eschewing direct conflict, local protesters rarely mentioned their antagonists by name and did not see their actions as part of a broad-based environmental reform of society. Even when local protests directly challenged the state, such as the decision by Kleinbittersdorf citizens to initiate a school, voting, and tax ‘strike’, these actions were understood within a consensual moral framework in which protest would end when the air pollution lessened, not continue onward in a ‘dissident lifestyle’ that became common in the 1970s.

II 1970s: The Grosse Wende in Nature Conservation?

Engels departs from Uekötter’s scepticism about the ‘ecological transformation (Wende)’ in his support for Patrick Kupper’s assertion that the 1970s represented an epochal turning point in Western environmental history, when large sections of society called into question the reigning post-war paradigm of materialism, economic growth, and technological development. In Germany, mounting


evidence of ecological damage and resource depletion at home and abroad, leftist youth mobilization, and international scientific concern impelled the newly elected social-liberal coalition to initiate an unprecedented period of environmental reform that resulted in fifty-four new laws and ordinances between 1970 and 1976. In addition, the environmental movement itself cast off its conservative, statist moorings to become associated with anti-establishment, anti-technocratic, and radically reformist forces in German society. Indeed, as Engels notes about the year 1970, ‘the beginning of environmental protection provides a rare case where a historical break can be dated to a specific year’ (p. 209).

While most scholars interpret this transition as a result of government reform ‘from above’ or ‘from outside’, especially in the form of US environmental models,18 Engels makes a strong case that changes in habitus and lifestyle prepared the ground for the ideological and global shift in environmental priorities. Part II examines the formation of the Umweltbewegung from the 1970s to the formation of the Green party in 1980, with six chapters devoted to (5) the role of mass media, particularly television, in stimulating a shift in environmental attitudes; (6) the largely negative popular response to the social-liberal environmental reform effort; (7) the ecologization and modernization of Naturschutz groups; (8) the citizens’ initiative movement within the context of ‘new social movements’ in the mid to late 1970s; (9) ecological protest, particularly the anti-atomic movement at Wyhl in 1975; and (10) the habitualization of the ecological left in the late 1970s. Engels argues convincingly that televised animal documentary series, particularly Bernhard Grzimek’s Ein Platz für Tiere, prepared otherwise ‘apolitical’ German citizens to accept the legitimacy of environmental protection by providing emotionally charged, ‘victim–perpetrator’ tales and transforming viewers into ‘virtual protagonists’ whose letters to politicians and donations would help to rescue the world’s endangered mammals and their living spaces.

In chapter six Engels analyses the increasingly dissatisfied public response to Interior Minister Hans-Dieter Genscher’s technocratic programme of environmental protection because of its failure to undertake a more thorough and democratically negotiated ecological reform of society and economy. The call for ecological reform did not resonate exclusively with the political left, however; conservationists with authoritarian leanings such as Konrad Lorenz and Herbert Gruhl also embraced ecology as a scientific justification for nature reserves and a critical stance toward mass society, as shown in chapter seven. In chapter eight Engels analyses citizens’ initiatives as part of the ‘new social movements’ of the 1970s. He examines how ecology galvanized the formation of the loosely affiliated Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz (BBU) and its critique of the government’s inadequate, technocratic response to the Club of Rome’s *Limits to Growth* warnings. These tensions between government and civil society crystallized around the theme of nuclear energy. As a result of the OPEC oil crisis of 1973, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s government (elected in 1974) hoped to expand atomic power from 5 to 50 per cent of the nation’s energy supply within a little over a decade.\(^\text{19}\)

In chapter nine Engels focuses on the dramatic 1975 citizen occupation of a nuclear reactor construction site near Wyhl in Baden, which catalysed the anti-atomic movement. He concentrates especially on the tensions and strategic alliances that emerged at Wyhl between the regional Kaiserstühler, who viewed the protest primarily through the lens of *Heimat* feeling and local autonomy, and leftist students and academics from the nearby University of Freiburg, many of whom regarded the grassroots protest as a clarion call for opposition to, even revolution against, the ‘atomic state’. Despite deep differences in *habitus*, the two groups were willing to maintain pragmatic alliances to achieve the immediate goal of stopping construction. Older forms of *Heimat* regionalism remained salient to the farmers, vintners, and townspeople of the Kaiserstuhl, but they joined the Freiburg protesters in courting media attention, naming and disparaging their antagonists (in this case the Baden state government and its publicly owned energy company), and portraying their local struggle in the light of a larger movement to protect ordinary

citizens from the state’s technological hubris and ecological disregard.

In chapter ten Engels explores urban citizens’ initiative groups, whose Kulturkampf against unbridled consumption, carelessness toward the non-human world, and the oppression of indigenous and Third World peoples created a politicized and fluctuating lifestyle that turned the staid, conservative world of the Naturschützer on its head. The loosely affiliated BBU championed ecological reform through direct democracy over behind-the-scenes lobbying, spontaneity over formality, outward expressiveness over inner transformation, and open conflict resolution over stylized appearance of unity. Many local groups used ‘ecology’ as a blanket term for a variety of progressive causes, including feminism, peace, and Third World justice. In response to the Club of Rome’s blanket condemnation of Third World overpopulation, for example, the BBU identified Western over-consumption as the real threat to the global environment and advocated the cause of aboriginal land rights. Yet Engels, like Uekötter, is careful not to idealize the 1970s milieu and is equally attuned to the contradictions and ironies of both the leftist Umweltschutz and conservative Naturschutz circles. The citizens’ groups’ demand for inner authenticity and scepticism toward the reigning order, for example, betrayed an aversion to mass society just as deep as that of the conservatives, an attitude Engels characterizes as a ‘habitualized defensive posture toward supposedly environmentally unaware fellow human beings and their ‘traditional, uncultured styles of political behaviour’ (p. 385). Like the Naturschutz advocates of the 1950s, the BBU groups also viewed nature and themselves as ‘victims’, whether of an unresponsive state or thoughtless automobile drivers who terrorized pedestrians. Yet despite their radical rhetoric toward the state and society, the BBU, no less than the VNP or DRL, accepted state subventions and benefited from a privileged position as educated, white-collar professionals in West Germany’s post-industrial economy.

Engels’ use of the ‘soft’ sociological categories of habitus and lifestyle represents a broader socio-cultural turn in the environmental-historical investigation of the Umweltbewegung, as is evident in his co-edited collection Naturschutz nach 1945.20 As he and Brüggemeier

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20 This socio-cultural turn in Germany toward habitus and lifestyle has
Review Article

note, even though scholars have called into question the effectiveness of the early 1970s environmental reform programme, especially when viewed at regional level, socio-cultural interpretations have shifted the terrain of this debate from the level of policy to that of horizons of expectation and meaning. For contributors such as Anna-Katharina Wöbse, Albrecht Weisker, and Thomas Dannenbaum, the ecological Wende shifted the relationship between state and civil society by redefining ordinary citizens’ perceptions of environmental ‘problems’ and risk, creating a more sceptical attitude toward brute force technologies and the state, and opening up new forms of visual experience and political participation (p. 13). As such, cultural interpretations offer the opportunity to link environmental history to broader questions about the democratization and modernization of West German society.

Wöbse’s innovative essay ‘Zur visuellen Geschichte der Naturschutz- und Umweltbewegung’, which employs media studies and visual culture approaches to study the changing optical iconography of the conservation movement, is indicative of this trend. Before the era of Greenpeace and its dramatic photographs of inflatable boats arrayed against oil tankers and whaling ships, she notes, early twentieth-century nature conservationists were slow to integrate photographs into their associational literature and public appeals, and did not link images of nature’s beauty, impending threats, and a call for action into an aesthetic whole. Wöbse attributes this stylistic choice to their anxieties about photography, a medium they associated with a debased mass media and advertising culture. Except for a few notable exceptions, such as the campaign to end the use of bird feathers in the women’s fashion industry, conservationists also shied away from directly confronting enemies and emphasized the internal unity of their organizations and the ‘civilized’ demeanour of their bourgeois audience. In the post-war era, on the other hand, the mass numerous affinities with US literature on the post-industrial, suburban, white-collar origins of American environmentalists. See e.g. Samuel P. Hays, *Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955–1985* (Cambridge, 1987); and Adam Rome, *The Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American Environmentalism* (Cambridge, 2001).

21 On the inadequacies of regional and local reform see Bergmeier, *Umweltgeschichte der Boomjahre.*
media, rather than conservation organizations, dominated and often skewed the dissemination of images in a democratic, mass-consumer market. Greenpeace seized back associational control over image production and ‘solved’ the dilemma of environmentalist representation in the mass media era by creating exciting, morally unambiguous, and highly consumable ‘David-and-Goliath’ images of environmental protest (p. 242).

Socio-cultural approaches also lead Weisker and Dannenbaum to analyse contestations over the definition of environmental health and the risks of technology within the anti-atomic protests of the 1970s. As Weisker notes in his essay ‘Powered by Emotion’, the dynamism of the movement depended on the emotional transition from the technological euphoria of the 1960s to the apocalyptic angst of the 1970s, in which ‘fear’ and ‘mistrust’ became catchwords for more general scepticism and hostility toward political leaders, corporations, and unbridled technological development. Dannenbaum examines the divergent lenses through which citizens’ groups, police, and the Schmidt government viewed their antagonists, especially given the anxieties caused by Red Army Front (Rote Armee Fraktion, or RAF) terrorism during the mid-1970s. The Schmidt government clung to a long-held social democratic belief in the promise of technology to solve social conflicts, and hoped that a cheap source of power would calm social unrest, decrease unemployment, and bring back the golden prosperity of the 1960s. This techno-optimistic perspective ignored the deeper sources of popular discontent and the contested meaning of ‘standard of living’ within the Umweltbewegung and other sectors of German society. Schmidt viewed calls for ‘no growth’ as a fundamental threat to democracy and did not hesitate to conflate peaceful environmental protesters with ‘extremists’ and ‘terrorists’ on the far left. At the same time, the anti-atomic power movement viewed Schmidt’s push for atomic energy and condoning of harsh police tactics as symbols of the atomic state’s ‘life-threatening ideology of growth’ (p. 273). These frameworks for interpreting social action, Dannenbaum avers, linked environmental and anti-atomic protest to broader struggles over the direction and meaning of politics and technological development.

Taken as a whole, the Wöbse, Weisker, and Dannenbaum essays demonstrate the rich interpretative possibilities of qualitative social research for environmental history. Like Engels’s ‘styles of political
Review Article

behaviour’, these authors’ embrace of media studies, histories of emotion, and discourse analysis open up new ways of evaluating the relationship between politics, culture, and everyday environmental practice. Yet there are important limitations to this type of analysis. As Engels concedes, his investigation of style cannot answer questions of causation, such as why the Umweltbewegung emerged in this form at this particular time, even though it can illuminate the assumptions and habits that guided historical actors. Citizens’ perceptions of risk were indeed shaped by media, government initiatives, and social milieux, but such analyses risk ignoring the everyday evidence of environmental abuse, from stinking dead fish in the Rhine to rare forms of cancer among workers at a PVC production facility, which gave citizens good reason to fear that they were being used as ‘guinea pigs’ in a technological complex out of touch with citizens’ needs.22

Despite Engels’s desire to utilize a ‘flexible patchwork method’ (p. 28), moreover, his political styles often appear reified and structural, rather than the product of historically contingent negotiation inside nature conservation and Umweltschutz organizations and with their various audiences. And while the methodology works well for describing the relatively closed world of Toepfer and Bernadotte, the political styles become more diffuse and difficult to categorize as one moves into the late 1960s and 1970s. Engels’s lengthy list of the various political styles in his conclusion—‘a style of security in the VNP, a style of genuineness in the DRL . . . an ambivalence between geniality and protest with Grzimek, an entertaining rebellious style in Horst Stern, a distanced-technocratic style in the environmental division of the interior ministry, an inclusive style in the ecologized nature conservation, and an anti-establishment conspiratorial style in the fully developed citizens’ initiative movement’ (p. 411)—leaves one wondering how much analytical purchase these categories have for understanding concrete historical behaviour and political decision-making.

Fortunately, Kai Hünemörder’s study rounds out Engels’s theoretically sophisticated investigation of nature conservation with a detailed analysis of German participation in international environmental networks and conferences, a previously neglected factor that helps to explain the timing and resonance of ecological issues in the 1970s. Without this international impetus, Hünemörder asserts, the Brandt government would never have initiated its environmental protection programme (p. 13) and citizens’ groups would not have been able to connect local concerns with global processes in ecologically meaningful ways. The age of globalization, Hünemörder contends, began in the realm of environmental politics, not neo-liberal market deregulation, and he shows this through an innovative weaving together of a regional case study of the Ruhr with environmentally significant international events. The case study reaches back to the early years of pollution control in the 1950s, but the core of Hünemörder’s book focuses on the transitional period between 1969 and 1973 when a series of events—the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth report of 1970, the Stockholm United Nations Conference on the Environment of 1972, and the OPEC oil embargo of 1973—galvanized a new environmental movement in Germany and abroad that called into question the dominant ideals of industrial growth and material affluence.

Hünemörder’s synthetic approach brings together nature conservation, regional landscape planning, and air and water pollution control in one extended introductory chapter that highlights the Ruhr’s pioneering, if ultimately inadequate, role in West German environmental protection during the 1950s and 1960s. Hünemörder provides clear evidence of widespread state and local recognition of and concern about the health risks and economic costs of air and water pollution and green space loss, ranging from public concern over fish kills in the Rhine (of which over 100 occurred between 1949 and 1952 alone) to Willy Brandt’s promise to bring back ‘blue skies over the Ruhr’ in his 1961 campaign speech. Regular contact with air emissions experts in the United States also prompted North Rhine-Westphalian officials to recognize the inadequacies of the existing Prussian emissions control regulatory framework. In Hünemörder’s view, the fact that pollution control and land use planning capacities...
were split among dozens of different levels of government administration and professional bodies prevented state officials, nature conservationists, and the public from seeing disparate examples of environmental deterioration as part of a comprehensive problem in need of far-reaching solutions. To a greater extent than Uekötter and Engels, therefore, Hünemörder blames ministerial gridlock, rather than organizational elitism or technocratic hubris, for the lack of a coordinated conservationist response to environmental woes in the 1950s and 1960s.

International networks were critical for expanding Germans’ frontiers of environmental perception before 1970. Hünemörder details Germany’s participation in a host of international groups that discussed transnational environmental issues, including the International Union for the Protection of Nature (IUPN), the Council of Europe, the European Economic Commission (EEC), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the United Nations Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Organization (UNESCO). For example, Swedish scientists released data in the early 1960s that pointed to sulphur dioxide releases in Germany and Britain as the cause of acidification in Scandinavian lakes and streams, an unintended consequence of short-sighted policies that simply built higher smokestacks rather than invest in expensive air filters on factories and coal-fired power plants. These exchanges allowed German scientists and policymakers to share environmental data and learn about advanced cybernetic computer modelling techniques that had begun to predict a disturbing, neo-Malthusian future of resource depletion, biodiversity loss, and long-term carcinogenic risks from environmental toxins. Hünemörder also notes that German awareness of global environmental problems increased as a result of its participation in NATO, whose little-known ‘third pillar’ began to assemble data on global warming as early as the 1960s (p. 145).

Engels and Hünemörder agree that Genscher’s environmental policies remained firmly wedded to technical fixes rather than deeper reform and that the government quickly lost its ability to define environmental issues in a way that would advance its own agenda. The social-liberal reform initiated milestone legislation banning DDT, setting air emissions standards, and creating a new nationwide conservation law and helped to accelerate a discussion about ‘quali-
ty of life’ that was already underway in the late 1960s. Among the 1968 student generation, the perceived inadequacies in the scale and scope of Genscher’s reforms in light of the *Limits to Growth* report revived a belief in the need for extra-parliamentary opposition capable of confronting the technocratic state. Even neo-Marxists once optimistic about the possibilities of technological development under democratic socialism embraced ecological issues and shifted the tenor of their critique from the social relations of production to the destructive effects of over-consumption. Neither the reformist social-liberal government nor the conservative *Naturschutz* organizations were capable of harnessing these new political energies, a factor that helps to explain their coalition’s bumbling responses to the militant anti-atomic protests and the emergence and staying power of the Green party as an umbrella group for the new ecological left.

These West German divisions between technical and socio-ecological reform ideals mirrored the divergent interests present at the first United Nations conference on the Human Environment in 1972, which Hünemörder argues catalysed the formation of a global environmental movement. The conference programme’s emphasis on technical details of environmental management led alternative voices, such as the union of concerned scientists known as DAI DONG, to call on the assembly to embrace the Club of Rome’s zero growth sentiments and infuse ecological concern with social justice ideals of non-violence and peace. DAI DONG championed the cause of emerging Third World movements, rejected those parts of *Limits to Growth* that emphasized the threats of overpopulation, and pointed to First World consumption as the major strain on the globe’s natural resources.

Hünemörder then describes West Germany’s preparation for the conference in great detail and demonstrates how, for the first time, all levels of administration in Germany developed policies with regard to global environmental problems. In general, government representatives rejected zero growth scenarios in favour of technological innovation within the dominant capitalist system, arguing that environmental pressures would spur corporations to create more efficient, environmentally friendly products for the mass market. By contrast, Robert Jungk and others spoke for the new environmentalist movement in arguing for a ‘soft’ technology society, even though the concrete steps needed to achieve such a social order remained
vaguely formulated. These divergent conceptions of quality of life remained salient throughout the 1970s and reached their high point in the anti-atomic movement even though West German citizens in general had not jettisoned older definitions that depended on income and wealth. As Hünemörder discusses briefly, the oil crisis of 1973 and the deepening unemployment crisis that followed fuelled organized counter-attacks from industry and labour on ‘job-killing’ environmentalists. Hünemörder’s final chapter returns to North Rhine-Westphalia and examines how changes in environmental policy and citizens’ engagement helped to stop the construction of a large petrochemical refinery at the Orsayer Rheinbogen.

Within his broadly chronological treatment of German environmentalist trends of the late 1960s and early 1970s, Hünemörder pursues two thematic areas, the role of science in policymaking and the influence of American environmentalism on West Germany, which make his work particularly relevant to contemporary environmental debates. Hünemörder argues that the new ‘science’ of futurology gave academic legitimacy to a neo-Malthusian pessimism that went far beyond the cultural lamentations of late-nineteenth-century cultural critics. In particular, West German scientists, political leaders, and the public were well informed about the Club of Rome’s 1972 *Limits to Growth* report, which was published by a team of researchers under Dennis Meadows at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with partial support from the Volkswagen Foundation. They also avidly read translated American books such as Alwin Toftler’s *Futureshock*, which helped to bring a doomsday scenario about resource scarcity, overpopulation, and toxic overload to a wide audience. Hünemörder analyses how such popular non-fiction, along with other mass media such as television and radio, magazines, and newspapers, disseminated apocalyptic ecological and futurological perspectives, though it would be worth exploring in greater detail to what extent scepticism about such models, as well as public exhaustion with dire ecological warnings, may have contributed to a partial decline in environmentalists’ influence during the course of the 1980s and 1990s.

Given Europeans’ frustration with the Bush administration’s intransigent stance toward the Kyoto Protocol and its careless disregard for existing environmental protection in the United States, Hünemörder’s thought-provoking investigation of American re-
searchers’ and politicians’ bipartisan role in shaping the global environmental movement is especially timely. Toepfer’s nature park campaign borrowed liberally from the North American national park model, for example, while North Rhine-Westphalian state officials and technical experts kept in close contact with colleagues in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in updating outdated Prussian regulations. Such contact helped the state to borrow and adapt American air emissions standards, which covered whole industrial sectors, rather than dealing with individual culprits according to an outdated culpability principle (Verursacherprinzip). America also served as an anxiety-producing counter-model in German environmental discourses. Media comparisons of air quality in the Ruhr industrial corridor with the situation in Pittsburgh or Los Angeles, for example, encouraged state officials to accelerate their reform efforts.

Though Hünemörder finds little evidence that Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring had a significant impact on West German discussions about pesticide use outside a small circle of nature conservationists, he does argue that John Kenneth Galbraith’s Affluent Society, Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall’s path-breaking regulatory efforts, and the Nixon administration’s creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) had direct influence on German policymaking and scientific circles, as evidenced by the direct translation and use of American terms such as ‘environmental protection’ (Umweltschutz), ‘zero growth’ (Nullwachstum), and ‘affluent society’ (Überflüssiggesellschaft) in German environmental debates. This influence extended well beyond the administrative elite to shape the emerging New Left. The German student movement protested against the Vietnam war and the US military’s use of environmental warfare against civilian populations by using non-violent civil disobedience borrowed from American youth.

While Hünemörder’s work analyses the influence of American resource management models and popular environmentalism on the West German scene, Jens Ivo Engels reminds us that such frameworks were not adopted wholesale, but selectively adapted to fit existing German social traditions and political demands (pp. 424–5). German citizens’ groups’ concerns about an authoritarian ‘atomic state’ evoked fears of latent fascist tendencies in German society that made direct reference to the National Socialist legacy, even though
these same groups remained closely linked to the state through sub-
ventions unthinkable in the more libertarian American system. More
significantly, Germans channelled ecological and progressive causes
into Europe’s most significant green party that, despite notable set-
backs in voting support at the federal and state level in the 1980s and
1990s, successfully championed innovative recycling, municipal
transport, eco-auditing, and eco-tax initiatives. In the US, on the
other hand, the environmental movement has been battered by
decades of stridently anti-environmentalist Republic administra-
tions, corporate greenwashing, and loosening environmental regula-
tions. Hopefully, future scholarship will examine more closely the
reason for these divergent environmental trajectories in light of
Hünemörder’s and Engels’s groundbreaking analyses.

Hünemörder’s admirable attempt to tackle dozens of questions
about the impact of scientific modelling, regional reform, interna-
tional conferences, American exchanges, and the 1968 generation is
both an impressive strength and unfortunate weakness of the book.
The literature and sources he assembles are immense in number and
scope and include government ministerial files, newspaper articles,
popular fiction, international reports, the transcripts of radio and tel-
evision programmes, and polling data. Yet unlike Engels, he does not
follow a well-defined methodology, thesis, or even well-defined set
of research questions that guide the analysis of sources or the flow of
elements. The problem of ‘scope creep’ is evident even in the conclu-
sion, when, after 357 pages of dense narrative, the author states that
‘it appears that it is not possible for the author to provide a conclu-
sive historical interpretation of the first years of a general perception
of a global environmental crisis’ (p. 330). Readers do not expect such
a conclusive answer, but the author misses the opportunity here to
venture even tentative hypotheses or to discuss why his study mat-
ters to the broader historiography of twentieth-century German envi-
ronmentalism.

Despite these problems of argument and scope, Die Frühgeschichte
der globalen Umweltkrise convinces readers that international trends
shaped national, regional, and local environmental discussions in
Germany and furthers the original hope of environmental history to
expand beyond national borders. Such a transnational focus is also
evident in several contributions to Natur- und Umweltschutz nach
1945. West Germans’ relatively high level of environmental aware-
Environment and Politics in Modern Germany

...ness is especially evident in light of Karl Ditt’s survey of British environmentalism and Florence Rudolf’s examination of French environmental thought. Other scholars look across the former border to the German Democratic Republic to assess questions of continuities from the National Socialist to Stalinist dictatorship. Among the contributors to Natur- und Umweltschutz nach 1945, Hermann Behrens and Hans-Peter Gensichen assess the possibilities and limits of environmental mobilization in local assemblies and the Protestant church despite the watchful eye of the secret police. These studies are part of an emerging environmental history of the GDR that is moving beyond 1980s activism to a broader examination of environmental management, popular environmental attitudes, and outdoor leisure under ‘real existing socialism’.

Viewed in the broader context of twentieth-century German and European environmental history, the studies under review here demonstrate convincingly that an array of state officials, nature conservationists, public health experts, and members of the reading pub-


lic were aware of environmental issues, including local deforestation, regional water pollution, border-crossing air pollutants, and even global climate change well before the conventional beginning of the environmental movement in the 1970s. Scholarly questions about why state and civil society ‘failed’ to mobilize in defence of the environment, usually in accordance with a normative model of modern environmental management and protest, have given way to a more nuanced assessment of the ideological parameters and organizational *habitus* of post-war nature conservation associations, which displayed strong continuities of corporatist organization and conservative social critique reaching back to the early part of the twentieth century. Indeed, these works underscore conservationists’ extraordinary ability to accommodate and adapt to a variety of political regimes—monarchical, republican, fascist—while keeping intact their core associational milieu. Such an interpretation accords well with studies that emphasize the regionalist-autonomous strains of *Heimatschutz* and *Naturschutz* and their uneven ‘coordination’ by the National Socialist regime. This defensive political style and conservative *habitus*, however, proved increasingly out of touch with the broader democratization of West German society and culture in the 1960s and 1970s.

Also continuous was a Prussian tradition of technical emissions management, along with overlapping and competing layers of administration, which excluded popular participation and clear lines of competency. Though health experts and engineers of the 1950s and 1960s in North Rhine-Westphalia experimented with more comprehensive, industry-wide emissions standards, the underlying technocratic impulses in the realm of pollution control extended across party lines and created a ‘democracy deficit’ in the social-liberal coalition’s dealings with the public in the early 1970s.

While regional studies have downplayed the significance of the ecological *Wende* of the 1970s in bringing real environmental reform at provincial and local levels, most of the scholars surveyed here agree that this period witnessed a significant socio-cultural transformation in prognoses about Germany and the industrialized world’s environmental future. This shift from the technical optimism of the 1960s to the doomsday scenarios of the 1970s stemmed in part from an awareness of the global scope of environmental ills put forward by concerned scientists in America and abroad that reached its high
point in the Club of Rome’s *Limits to Growth* report of 1972 and the UN Conference on the Environment in Stockholm in the same year. Within Germany, the social-liberal coalition attempted to capitalize on this international energy and to diffuse public environmental concern by initiating a relatively bold series of environmental reforms in the 1970s. But as these studies demonstrate, this strategy ultimately backfired as the government lost the initiative to a host of citizens’ initiatives and New Left groups calling for a turn towards zero growth and more radical ecological reforms. Distrust of the government’s reform programme then crystallized in the mid-1970s within the anti-atomic movement, which demonstrated the potential of ecology to assemble a diverse array of environmental and social concerns under a diffuse but nonetheless politically significant umbrella. Rather than viewing environmental reform as solely a product of international or ‘top-down’ government initiative, future studies should examine more closely this dynamic negotiation between government reform and an array of organizations, on both the left and right, calling for a more sustainable environmental future.

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BOOK REVIEWS


There is at present no shortage of speculation about changing weather patterns or ready explanations for the recent period of climate extremes. Everything, it seems, contributes to the carbon footprint and thus adds to the weather malaise, from cut-rate airliners to flatulent cows. But this is not the first time that Europeans have experienced extremes of climate; nor is this the first age that has taken note of unique weather events and offered explanations for their occurrence. As the contributions to Kulturelle Konsequenzen der ‘kleinen Eiszeit’ make clear, there is ready evidence to suggest that people of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were just as concerned about the weather. What the contributions also point out is that the people of the early modern period, and in particular those who lived during the final decades of the sixteenth century and the initial decades of the seventeenth, had reason to take note of the weather, for this was a phase within the so-called Little Ice Age (hereafter LIA) (c.1300–1900) that experienced close-sequenced patterns of extreme conditions. The intention of the volume is not only to provide the historical evidence to bear out this suggestion, but more importantly to offer new perspectives on the historical impact of this event and how the historian might best understand its importance. The collection thus looks to bridge the gap between the history of culture and the history of climate, to register the effect of something so macrohistorical as weather on something so microhistorical as perception. The primary concern is thus less the natural world than the human reaction to it. How did people come to terms with climate extremes? What sort of strategies developed in order to cope with them? How should we understand the social and cultural crises of this period (wars, witchcraft, persecution) against the backdrop of severe weather? What sort of effect did the climate extremes have on sensibilities.
and how did these concerns come to the surface? As the editors point out in the introduction, these are questions which not only join specialist research fields but might lead to new perspectives on the early modern age.

The opening contribution is by Christian Pfister, who provides both a survey of recent research and a range of methodological issues raised by climate history. Pfister makes it clear at the outset that the LIA does not describe a uniform or continuous climate. It was a period of cold winters and wet conditions punctuated by long spells of average weather. But it is the periods of severe weather and their effects that are the subject of interest. The volume refers to them as ‘Little Ice Age Type Events’ (hereafter LIATE), periods when both proxy data and direct testimony speak of unusually severe weather conditions, and it focuses in particular on the second such event that reached from 1570 to 1630. The challenge facing historians, and one which Pfister and the rest of the contributors set out to resolve, is how to make these climatic facts significant to the scholar interested in the history of human experience. ‘In order to become meaningful’, writes Pfister with a view to ecology and economy,

‘climate and history’, as a collective issue, needs to be broken down to lower scales of analysis, with a special focus, for example, on the food system, the health or the energy system, or on specific activities such as transportation, communication, and military or naval operations. Particular focus must also be given to short-term and medium-term events. Moreover, concepts need to be worked out in order to disentangle the severity of climate impacts and the efficiency of measures for coping with them (p. 59).

In short, details provided by the study of climate in general, and LIATEs in particular, should be approached as ‘heuristic tools against which a given evidence can be compared’ (p. 66) rather than as yardsticks to quantify and qualify the conditions of life.

Most of the contributions are devoted to the issues raised by Pfister. In Erich Landsteiner’s study of the effect of climatic change on nutritional habits, for instance, we see how local societies adapted their material culture and their traditional diets to compensate for crises and extremes. That might mean replacing bread grains with
other cereals or, as in the case of the Vienna Spital, consuming more beer in order to cope with the drop in wine production. This was a conscious attempt to deal with exigencies, and it reminds us that contemporaries were well aware of the changes in the weather. Indeed, as Otto Ulbricht’s study of the diary of the Swiss reformer Heinrich Bullinger reveals, some people were concerned enough to keep track of the changes. His comments were lapidary, but over the course of decades Bullinger’s concern over the weather conditions worked to sharpen the sense of crisis in his mind and found ready expression in his calls for moral reform and a heightened eschatology.

This line of inquiry is followed up in the section entitled ‘Religion and Mentality’. In contributions by Benigna von Krusenstjern, Manfred Jakubowski-Tiessen, and Hartmut Lehmann we see how the experience of severe conditions could be reflected through religious culture. By drawing on lay chronicles, von Krusenstjern describes a mentality impressed by the idea of an omnipotent God whose duality (both loving and wrathful) was easily captured in the climate. It was a measure of the divine majesty, and a reminder that there was an intelligence at work, even if, as the weather proved, mankind had no clear understanding of its purpose. Extremes of climate thus worked as outer signs of a deeper system of belief, a point made by Jakubowski-Tiessen in his study of the rise of the festival of Good Friday to the highest feast in the Lutheran calendar. The suffering caused by severe weather—the pestilence, poverty, hunger, and lack—was read as a type of re-enactment of the Passion, a reminder that suffering was necessary for the faith. And just as there was suffering, there was hope of redemption, the reality of Good Friday. At some stage, the weather had to lift. Of course, this mix of theology and meteorology did not always lead to a strengthening of the religious spirits. In the Paul Gerhardt hymn analysed by Lehmann, we are reminded of the most common reaction to severe weather: the conviction that God was punishing the people for their sins. Taken together, the conditions were best read as one of ‘nature’s sermons’, delivered by God in order to wake the people and return them to a state of fear.

Of course, searching for connections between weather and culture does run the risk of establishing causal relationships where none actually existed. As Robert Jütte’s study of the German poor laws reminds us, subsistence crises were relatively frequent during this age. Most towns and cities had sumptuary measures in place and
could deal with erratic climatic conditions, even those visited during the LIATE of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Weather was just one factor among many that shaped legislation, even if it played a major role. Even more complex was the effect of the conditions on the outlook of the age. In his contribution on melancholy H. C. Erik Midelfort asks the question: did the century have a mood? And if so, was it affected by the weather? Of course, works devoted to the study of melancholy were common during this period. They sat quite easily on the same shelves with books by Lutheran eschatologists and Paracelsian doctors. Indeed, as Midelfort points out, the sheer ubiquity of this discourse makes it difficult to tie it down to time and place. In fact, while the LIA may have occasionally contributed to bouts of even deeper gloom, the main fascination with melancholy itself was a later phenomenon. No doubt, as David Lederer suggests in his contribution on suicide, the best way to approach the evidence is from the perspective of the age. And to a large extent, as Lederer remarks, it was an age of despair. Severe weather may not have caused the sense of melancholy or despair, for this was a feature of the time; but it certainly added to the overall mood.

The most appropriate working hypothesis seems to be that the weather was complicit rather than causal. To offer a quote by Bernd Roeck, whose contribution investigates the effects of the LIA on the world of art: ‘It was, so to speak, an ingredient that made the soup that much more bitter’ (p. 329). In Roeck’s survey of changes in themes and styles the climate has an ambiguous position, similar to the conclusions in Jütte’s study of poor-law legislation. It is difficult, if not impossible, to trace lines of influence from climatic conditions to artistic outlook. One is on much safer ground, as Roeck points out, looking at the fiscal aspect, how the crises affected the markets and impacted on what was bought and sold. The point is made with some force by Lawrence O. Goedde in his discussion of Brueghel’s famous snow scenes. This cycle is often invoked as a visual document of the harsh winters of the later sixteenth century. But the scenes should not be viewed as transparent renderings of a bygone climate. Not only was Brueghel borrowing extant motifs and styles, he was using the backdrop of the natural world to relate deeper notions about the human condition. As Goedde writes, the winter scenes are primarily ‘fictional constructs’: ‘they do not survey the experience of those win-
ters objectively or comprehensively but rather selectively and interpretatively’ (p. 320). The same holds true for much of the Dutch landscape art that followed. (The cloud formations of Aert van der Neer, for instance, are pure invention.) Safer ground can be found in less ambitious art. In Patrice Veit’s study of Lutheran hymnody, extreme weather conditions, along with war, pestilence, and disease, clearly emerge as a theme. Analogy and mystery were kept to a minimum; the text clearly spells out what was meant by its references to the climate, and that was no less than the orthodox refrain of the wrath of God visiting the people because of their mounting sins. Weather was complicit in this process, but just one factor among many; another prominent theme in the ‘ever-increasing intensity of the thematisation of suffering’ (p. 293).

The final sections of the volume move away from conscience and imagination and turn to the broader social consequences. Impressions of despair or crisis were not just voiced in sermons or visualized in art; the authorities reacted to events with tangible social and political measures. As Peter Becker illustrates in his contribution on the theory and practice of rule during periods of crisis, the very nature of sovereignty itself might be affected by the weather. Spates of extreme climate that worked against the fulfilment of the expectations of a ruler (such as preservation of the common good) would necessarily have an impact on relations of power. But there is still much research to be done before historians can draw conclusions for Europe as a whole. In two essays on the LIA in Spain, for instance, many of the basic claims are called into question because of a lack of evidence. Henry Kamen begins and ends his survey with doubts about the validity of the theory for the Spanish lands. Kamen’s conclusion: research is in the early stages, but thus far what we know ‘gives no support . . . to the thesis of an extended and radical change in weather conditions’ (p. 375). The piece by Mariano Barriendos on climate and culture in Spain investigates the documentation related to religious processions and liturgical means through which the local population reacted to the environment. Barriendos’ conclusion: that there was ‘irregular behaviour’ during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, periods when rogation ceremonies were especially intense. But this type of research, as Barriendos concedes, is in its infancy. The broader context of climatic conditions has yet to be reconstructed.
In a final, magisterial summary of present research and future perspectives, Wolfgang Behringer returns to the discussions that opened the volume. Behringer develops the point made by Pfister, that the LIA works best as a heuristic aid to the past rather than a script for understanding a mentality or a habitus. This is particularly relevant for the LIATE under consideration in this collection, because it sat to a certain extent between two eras, the medieval and the modern. These are contested distinctions, of course, but they are extremely useful helpmeets to dialogue, and if nothing else, a study of severe climatic conditions across these periods will prompt historians to look again at some well-known themes. For instance: how might we relate the period of severe weather to social unrest, the increase in crime, the heightened persecution, the campaign of confessionalization? More to the point, where might we best locate its effects: in the published ordinances of the early modern state, in the objects and symbolism of the churches and the household, or perhaps in a collective psychogram of the age? The real value of the idea of the LIA and its integration into historical analyses lies less in what it might answer directly than in what sort of questions it might throw up. As Behringer remarks, the concept offers historians the opportunity to rethink aspects of the age from a completely new perspective. Nothing gets people talking like the weather.

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For a number of years David Lederer has been among those scholars who have contributed to discussions about the extent of mental illness, suffering, and suicides in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In his book *Madness, Religion and the State* he presents a study of the Bavarian lands in which he quantitatively and qualitatively assesses the extent of afflictions and chances of care for the mentally ill between 1579 and 1679. In particular, he aims ‘to identify spiritual physic as a coherent set of practices, highlighting the lives of the afflicted, their neighbors and kin, the ideologies of healers and the learned elite, as well as the political problems facing local and central authorities’ (p. 40). He fully achieves this aim because his study offers precise historical contextualization. Along the way, Lederer introduces his readers to such complex subjects as insanity, religion, and the problems involved in the construction of the pre-modern state by linking them to spiritual physic.

Pre-modern society had a wide vocabulary for what is nowadays known as ‘folly’, ‘madness’, or ‘insanity’. This wealth of linguistic descriptions already indicates the subject’s complexity. Language always reflects the cultural experience of distinctive phenomena that it classifies and categorizes. In his book Lederer looks at a variety of afflictions ranging from small affective disorders to suicidal despair and demonic possession. The central subject of his study, however, is a special form of treatment, ‘spiritual physic’, which presents particular problems with regard to sources. Lederer points out that inner suffering can be analysed only if sources originating from the treatment of these sufferers by others exist. Taken together with the lack of a precise terminology, the different treatments explain the multi-layered nature of the term ‘spiritual physic’, which can roughly be translated into German as ‘geistig-seelische Heilkunde’. In addition, however, the term signifies a particular form of institutionalized treatment of the mentally ill, namely, one that was organized differently from the treatments of mainstream medicine and followed different rules. From the early modern point of view spiritual physic was nothing more nor less than *animi consolatio*. And, finally, because
of the cultural predominance of the clergy, spiritual physic was also intended to console people and offer moral advice for the self-improvement of the faithful in a period commonly perceived as an age of crisis. Lederer approaches this latter aspect by taking auricular confession as an example (ch. 2). In particular, spiritual physic’s purpose of consolation and the varied fields of its application help us to understand why pre-modern society retained spiritual physic until the end of the eighteenth century and beyond, and why there was such a demand for different forms of spiritual physic and soul remedies.

Lederer’s book is divided into seven chapters and contains nineteen plates, two figures (illustrating, for example, the administration of public health in seventeenth-century Bavaria), two maps, and seven tables. A useful index facilitates the finding of central terms and places. All in all 2,000 individual cases serve as the empirical basis for this study. In the first chapter, ‘On the Soul’, Lederer starts by analysing the roots, central ideas, and guiding principles of early modern psychology. He deals with classical sources (for example, Galen’s humoural pathology and Aristotle’s faculty psychology that was important for the instruction of Jesuits) as well as moral theology and its impact on the holistic model of early modern psychology, which assumed that ‘salvation actualized justified human existence on both the material and the spiritual levels’ (p. 24). Both Christian and pagan ideas were predicated on a concept of moral psychology that saw the cognition of sin (cognitio peccati) and human guilt as the preconditions for any mental health care. Sin represented a deficiency in Christianity and was considered an essential cause of disease. Regardless of whether the modern observer considers pre-modern psychology as meaningful or not, Lederer emphasizes its vast importance in the everyday life of pre-modern society. This becomes clear, in particular, when one considers the demand for the variety of methods of spiritual physic on offer then.

The second chapter, ‘Sackcloth and Ashes’, describes the rituals of confessional inclusion and exclusion in post-Tridentine Bavaria. Above all, Lederer highlights the perspective of the authorities, focusing on the Wittelsbach dynasty and Jesuit advisers at the Bavarian court. In order to achieve this he first discusses the purpose of auricular confession, namely, to console the penitents, and, secondly, demonstrates that despite appearances the Jesuits were hesi-
tant to gain political predominance by close connection with social elites. Lederer then elucidates the rigid implementation of the duty of expiation and the penalties for offences. In this context, he points out a specificity of Bavarian history. In the course of the seventeenth century regional and local bureaucracies were enlarged all over Bavaria and the administrative grip on the country intensified. As a result, we now have a vast quantity of sources from this period. This situation changed markedly in the eighteenth century because of the vicissitudes of Bavarian history during that era. The whole study, therefore, demonstrates to what extent the availability of sources, historical assessments, and comparisons of diabolical phenomena in the pre-modern period depend on the existence of the administrative structures that registered these phenomena.

The next chapter, ‘Bavaria Sancta’, focuses on the experience of psychic crises by individuals as illustrated by the use made of holy places in Bavaria. Thus Lederer depicts the selective patronage of holy cults (especially of Mary) and pilgrimages by the Wittelsbach dynasty. Particularly illuminating are the passages about the blood pacts with the Virgin Mary which Maximilian I and Ferdinand Maria signed in the pilgrimage church of Altötting, one of the most popular holy places in the seventeenth century. Surviving miracle books also tell us something about the use made of holy places by ordinary people and the suffering of those searching for comfort. Furthermore, as Lederer shows, news about the effectiveness of holy places and relics spread rapidly through Bavaria. Rumours and stories about people who had been healed contributed to the increasing knowledge of spiritual physic as did a number of publications. One miracle book, for example, written by the convert Martin Eisengrein and published in 1571 with frequent reprints, ‘located the Chapel of our Lady of Altötting at the geographic heart of a devotional covenant, safeguarding faithful Bavarians from invading pagans and natural catastrophes’ (p. 106). The miracle book of the St Anastasia shrine in Benediktbeuern, which survives as a manuscript, listed 1,099 visits for the period between 1657 and 1668, thus indicating the high demand for solace and spiritual physic. It also documents the symbolic meaning of the shrine in Benediktbeuern as the ‘Bavarian Beacon’ or the ‘Bayerischer Pharos’, as Aemilius Biechler called it in 1663. Incidentally, the miracle book of Benediktbeuern is among the main sources for this study, since besides purely ‘biographic infor-
information on the sufferers, [it lists] their symptoms, attempted cures, results and votive offerings’ (p. 121). The different forms of inner suffering are more widely discussed in the fourth chapter (‘Spiritual Afflictions’). Here Lederer points out that it was mainly simple mental disorders and heartsickness which afflicted the people and made them seek advice, attendance, and consolation. However, the existing secondary literature often ignores these conditions, focusing instead on more fashionable subjects such as melancholy, obsession, and dementia.

The next two chapters, ‘The Decline of Religious Madness’ and ‘Confinement and its Vicissitudes’, chart the rise of a secular defence of insanity and the decline of religious notions of inner suffering as the result of ‘reason of state policies’ and the influence of the Aulic Council in Munich as well as regional and local administrations. Ironically, the Jesuits also played an important role in this process because they effectively demanded rational arguments when they were involved in the diagnosis of supposed cases of mental illness. Even at the height of the confessional age, under the reign of Maximilian I, the Aulic Council maintained a sceptical attitude in the face of rising numbers of exorcisms, which at that time were regarded as a church abuse. Despite this prevalent scepticism among sections of the elite, Rosina Blökhl-Huber, for example, a carpenter’s wife, managed to rise to the position of ‘ghost-buster extraordinaire’ with the help of official protection (pp. 223–6). Lederer’s study draws on her story and other cases at length in order to illustrate the history of spiritual physic and to provide insights into the mental mechanisms at work in the early modern world.

The theme of growing doubts about religious definitions of mental health is further explored in the discussion of patterns of demonic possession, witch-hunting, and suicide during the Little Ice Age (ch. 6). As Lederer argues, the fact that an increase in these phenomena coincided with the rise of a more rationalist concept of insanity was not accidental: both developments showed remarkable parallels, as the example of suicides illustrates. Because the ‘burial of a suicide in hallowed ground represented a casus belli in the popular mind’ (p. 244), some communities rose up and took arms in revolts to prevent such burials. Nonetheless, among the 300 reported suicides between 1611 and 1670, ‘stille Begräbnisse’ (silent funerals, that is, burials without the pealing of bells and in secluded places) in cases of unin-
tentional suicide or diminished capacity (*non compos mentis*) were the rule. From 1668 the agreement between the Bavarian elector and the church authorities even obliged the authorities to examine the state of mind of the suicide before a decision on the burial was taken. As these findings indicate, the rise of insanity as a defence was based firstly on elite reactions to popular prejudices, and secondly on a trend towards rationalized procedures and greater leniency in the decisions of the electoral Aulic Council.

In the remainder of this chapter Lederer debunks the narrative of the ‘great confinement’ (Michel Foucault) as an ideology of the early modern state and a claim which had only a slight chance of ever being put into practice during the early modern period. Political benchmarks for the territorial state in dealing with mad or possessed people crystallized because of the perceived threat to the social order as a result of individual disharmonies. Lederer describes in detail the structural limits of the pre-modern Bavarian state that prevented the effective treatment of sufferers and insane people. In this respect, the findings of both Lederer’s and my own ongoing research on early modern Saxony correspond, so that a common pattern emerges. A comparison with Protestant areas is indeed particularly promising since it raises the further question of whether or not Protestants lacked certain options of spiritual physic that Catholic societies had at their disposal. If the former was the case, it must be asked what alternatives to spiritual physic existed.

In his conclusion, Lederer summarizes his findings and discusses the ‘Legacy of Spiritual Physic’. He clearly states that ‘the end of the ancien régime and the foundation of a Bavarian insane asylum [on 1 July 1803] did not spell the end of spiritual physic’ (p. 306) and that ‘the history of madness in early modern Bavaria is a prime example of the political and social forces at work in mental health care’ (p. 283). After reading his book, one is bound to agree with this statement. *Madness, Religion and the State* is a well researched historical study and will henceforth count as a standard work on early modern health care and spiritual physic.

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Christopher Clark, Reader in Modern European History at St Catharine’s College, Cambridge is well known as an expert on Prussian history in general and its religious history in particular. He has now published a peerless overview of Prussian history. In just under 700 pages of text he presents the remarkable history of a state which, from inglorious beginnings in the sands of Brandenburg during the early modern period, rose to European greatness and became the core of the *kleindeutsche* empire during the nineteenth century, but did not survive its nationalistic excesses and decline in 1945.

Clark’s account is always right up to date with the most recent international research. Rejecting the *Sonderweg* thesis and notions of Prussian militarism, Clark presents Prussia as a model of the early modern idea of the state as a work of art and product of the ruler’s will. It is no coincidence that the narrative only really takes off with the Great Elector. The state as a work of art held together by the Crown, the military, and the bureaucracy was, ultimately, no match for nineteenth-century forms of socialization such as religion and nation. Absorption into Germany, announced by Frederick William IV in 1848 and completed by Bismarck in 1871, was, for Prussia, both salvation and downfall. As far as Clark is concerned, it marked the end of Prussia’s real history. What followed—and Clark, rather unwillingly, merely sketches it in—was the appropriation, restoration, and reinvention of costumes that had already been cast off.

The book consists of seventeen chapters arranged in chronological order. Each chapter is divided into a number of sections which, as a rule, are thematically organized. Sections often begin with a vivid miniature drawn from the specialist literature, or sometimes directly from the sources. The reader is privy to Frederick III’s (I) coronation celebrations in Königsberg in 1701, rides into battle with Lieutenant Johann von Borcke at Jena a hundred years later, and, along with Karl Sand, murders the writer August Kotzebue in 1819. Out of these miniatures, the larger arguments are developed. Together they yield up the characteristic features of each period. This combination of
detailed account, analysis, and the careful drawing out of the larger picture is typical of this book. It is well written in an appropriate style, and the author has the courage to make his point. In the first part, in particular, it shows sympathy with the little people, the soldiers and peasants who had to live, and often die, as a result of policies they could not influence.

The book has a number of central arguments. The geopolitical situation is one of them. In Clark’s view this made it more difficult for Brandenburg, Brandenburg-Prussia, and then Prussia-Germany to make unequivocal decisions, with the result that vacillating between options became a permanent state of affairs. Another is the central role of the state, which is important for Clark, who derives from it the disastrous experience of the Thirty Years War and the country’s devastation. Clark suggests that the geopolitical situation and the central role of the state combined to produce a ‘sense of vulnerability’ (p. 66). In Clark’s view, the often difficult situation between ruler and successor frequently determined Prussian history. This was also the outcome of rather unstructured central decision-making processes in Berlin, which encouraged rival parties at court to attempt to lay claim to ruler and successor. The structural arguments which run through the book make it easier to explain Prussia’s meteoric rise. They also allow understanding judgements to be made about dark and murky episodes such as Frederick II’s attack on Silesia in 1740.

All the chapters have snappy but telling headings. Only one contains dates, the central chapter entitled ‘Hubris and Nemesis: 1789–1806’. It is true that the period between the French Revolution and the Prussian catastrophe was one of the ‘most eventful and least impressive epochs in the history of the Prussian monarchy’ (p. 284). And the ruling monarchs Frederick William II (‘perhaps the least impressive figure to have mounted the Prussian throne over the last century and a half’, p. 292) and Frederick William III (‘At a time when Prussia’s cultural and political life was dominated by brilliant personalities—Schleiermacher, Hegel, Stein, Hardenberg, the Humboldts—the monarch was a pedantic and narrow-minded bore’, p. 314) were not impressive figures. Yet the chapter has a pivotal function. It closes the history of the rise of an early modern state to European great power status, which was achieved under a ‘freakish run of abnormally gifted Hohenzollern rulers’ (p. 246). Prussia had attained an impressive position, and not only in politics. Chapter 8,
under the heading ‘Dare to know!’ borrowed from Kant deals with the Prussian Enlightenment. In the introduction to chapter 9 the notion of ‘tradition’ for the first time figures in a central position (p. 284), whereas in the introduction, Clark had still written: ‘The core and essence of the Prussian tradition was an absence of tradition’ (p. xvi). Yet defeat by Napoleon in 1806–7 put everything in jeopardy: ‘A question mark hung over the political order of old Prussia’ (p. 311). Defeat and reform mark the beginning of the second, more German history of Prussia. This is a religious, military, and increasingly political history. The author’s eye for the social and cultural history of the Prussian lands which had been well developed in the first part of the book becomes less sharp.

However, as the military and politics take centre stage, Prussian history after 1866–71 risks losing its real subject. It becomes the history of those picking and choosing among Prussia’s traditions for new purposes. Clark’s treatment of the Nazi period makes this clear. Goebbels and the resisters of 20 July both used the argument of Prussia as a ‘virtual homeland’ (p. 670).

We naturally look more kindly on one of these Prussia-myths than on the other. Yet both were selective, talismanic and instrumental. Precisely because it had become so abstract, so etiolated, ‘Prussiandom’ was up for grabs. It was not an identity, nor even a memory. It had become a catalogue of disembodied mythical attributes, whose historical and ethical significance was, and would remain, in contention (p. 670).

As the whole of Prussian history in the twentieth century ultimately becomes a postscript, the question of Prussia’s contribution to the Nazi catastrophe loses much of its point. Clark addresses this issue in the last chapter, ‘Endings’, which deals with history after 1918, but ultimately does not consider it of central significance. He suggests that the Prussian identity had already been worn down in the nineteenth century, ground between German nationalism and provincial regionalism. The Prussian structures had lost their contours during the German Empire and the Weimar Republic. After the total defeat of 1945, all that was left of Prussia was Brandenburg. It is not by chance that in the introduction Clark already mentions the passionate public debate of 2002 about renaming Brandenburg ‘Prussia’.
Clark’s treatment of the twentieth century will be controversial, as will his rather positive judgements on, for example, Frederick II’s Silesian wars, and Frederick William IV. Incontestably, however, what we have here is a peerless survey of Prussian history in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. A Prussian history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that wants to plough the field that Clark has left fallow will have to draw its arguments from beyond politics, from the regions, economic and social structures, and identities.

EWALD FRIE was Hochschuldozent at the University of Duisburg-Essen from 2001 to 2007, since when he has been Professor of Modern History at the University of Trier. His research focuses on German history from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, a comparative history of the European nobility, and the history of Australia. Among his recent publications are Friedrich August Ludwig von der Marwitz 1777–1837: Biographien eines Preußen (2001) and Das Deutsche Kaiserreich (2004).

David Blackbourn, long one of the most important Anglo-American historians of Germany, has, in his own words, written a ‘wet book of history’ (p. 18). He gives a new and unusual perspective on 250 years of German history from Frederican Prussia to the Federal Republic. He reports the draining of swamps in Brandenburg, the straightening of the course of the Rhine, the building of North Sea harbours, the construction of massive dams in the low mountain ranges of central Germany, and other attempts by man to change nature and shape the landscape. This provides an important corrective to the myth of Germany’s special relationship with nature, expressed over the centuries in attempts not to encroach upon ‘German’ nature and to sanctify the ‘German’ forest and ‘German’ rivers, especially the Rhine, in their primeval, natural state. Blackbourn is well acquainted with myths, not least the ‘myths of German historiography’. With Geoff Eley, he in the 1980s criticized the thesis of the German Sonderweg, Germany’s ‘special path’ to modernity, a phrase which at that time was well-nigh ubiquitous in German historiography, especially that originating from Bielefeld.¹ In his new book Blackbourn returns to these concerns. By turning to the history of human intervention in nature, especially in the area of hydraulic engineering (the regulation of rivers, drainage, hydroelectric technology), and separating it out as a broad and clearly identifiable strand of modern German history, he once again banishes to the realm of myth the thesis of a specifically German hostility to modernity and progress.

But there is more to the book than this history-of-historiography subtext. At least equally important is Blackbourn’s confrontation with one of the propositions of environmental history, a movement that has gained momentum and breadth over recent years in Germany as elsewhere. This proposition derives, in countless variations, from an approach that sees environmental history as a linear story of

¹ David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung: Die gescheiterte bürgerliche Revolution von 1848 (Frankfurt am Main, 1980); expanded English version: The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford, 1984).
decline, the history of human intervention in a primeval, untouched nature, in short, the history of the destruction of nature by humans. Blackbourn energetically refutes this notion. For him, there is no such thing as a landscape in a purely natural state. Every landscape, at least in Europe, bears traces of human intervention. And this human intervention, its aims and consequences, is the subject of his book. This programmatic orientation by man and his works implies a definite rejection of holistic concepts of natural history—the historian ‘thinking like a river’. Yet Blackbourn also makes a vibrant case for integrating nature, and with it, geography, back into historiography again. By this, of course, he does not mean the old geo-politics or the new géo-histoire. Instead, he aims to look at mutual relations between man and nature rather like the Annales school. In Germany and German historiography this approach, he claims, is still discredited by National Socialism, which to the present day has prevented important classics such as Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl’s Naturgeschichte des Volkes (1851–69) from being re-read. Blackbourn, however, argues that Riehl’s work cannot be judged by its völkisch reception.

Thus Blackbourn’s history of Germany since 1750 is not bound to the soil. Rather, it is a book about how the German landscape has changed over these 250 years, and how the human impact on nature reflects the development of German society itself. This is a story of progress, not decline. It does not hide the cost of progress and the ambivalences of modernity, but it does not restrict their story to the twentieth century and National Socialism. The book tells the story of lost villages which literally drowned; of soldiers who drained the swamps of the Oder so that Frederick the Great could say that he had once conquered a province peacefully. The connection between shaping the landscape and war is obvious. Prussian troops could march more easily over moors that had been drained; Jade Bay with its navel base was created for the Prussian, later German, war fleet. And the Second World War gave German area planners and landscape architects huge scope for action in the Eastern regions conquered from 1939. The infamous Generalplan Ost of 1941 displayed only one aspect of this. The East became the laboratory of landscape architecture, and landscape architecture was closely connected with genocide. Eastern central Europe had no empty spaces that the Germans could cultivate and colonize. The prerequisite for settlement was genocide.
Political-ideological hydro-semantics and the metaphorical language of hydraulic engineering deserve a study in their own right. Blackbourn touches on these themes only in passing. The image of swamps which need to be drained was not limited to the racist language of the Third Reich. The rhetoric of containment (Eindämmung) was directed against the East, ‘Slavs’ or Communists, as early as the first half of the twentieth century. In the context of the Cold War it became internationally acceptable. In the 1950s, when eminent German historians called for the building of dams to protect the West ‘against the Red flood’, they were not alone in using this sort of imagery. Blackbourn’s book, which should quickly be published in German translation, repeatedly opens such wide-ranging perspectives. Although it focuses closely on its subject it is not a specialist study but a political history of nature, brilliantly written and containing perceptive analyses. David Blackbourn reflects the history of Germany and the Germans in water, producing a ‘wet book of history’ but certainly not a dry read.

ECKART CONZE is Professor of Modern History at the University of Marburg. He was a Visiting Fellow at the GHIL from January to March 2007 and is currently a Visiting Fellow of Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge. Among his recent publications are (ed. with Ulrich Lappenküper and Guido Müller) Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen: Erneuerung und Erweiterung einer historischen Disziplin (2004) and Kleines Lexikon des Adels: Titel, Throne, Traditionen (2005).
Oliver Grant spells out his main concern in the heading of the tenth and final chapter of his social and economic history of Imperial Germany: ‘Challenging the Kehrite View of Imperial Germany’. The Kehrite school can quickly be summed up: it is based on the unconditional primacy of domestic policy. In the Kehrite view, the internal weaknesses of the German Empire ultimately prevented Germany from developing into a normal, modern, and democratic industrial state. Whether the ‘incomplete modernization’ diagnosed by Hans-Ulrich Wehler, or the view that the July crisis of 1914 precipitated by Germany expressed a deeper malaise in the country — Grant’s aim is to challenge these interpretations by arguing that most of the internal conflicts in Imperial Germany were necessary preconditions for industrialization, and that the political leadership would have had little room for manoeuvre to remedy the situation. Domestic and foreign policy are to be looked at entirely separately from each other.

For Grant, it is especially important to acknowledge the fundamental independence of foreign policy. From this he deduces that ‘revolution from above’ was normal and not a fault. Economic development and political progress, he argues, did not proceed hand in hand, as they were pursuing different goals. The much cited ‘incomplete modernization’ was not an exception but the norm in an industrializing society.

In order to prove his hypothesis, Grant takes an interesting model of economic development that has so far been used primarily in the analysis of developing countries and, for the first time, applies it to a historical process. The ‘model of development with unlimited supplies of labour’, that is, the Lewis model, distinguishes between two phases of economic development, the classical and the neoclassical. In the classical phase the capitalist can rely on the certain availability of surplus labour, and the yields of industrial progress accrue exclusively to the owners of capital. Wages are hardly ever increased although profits rise strongly. In the second phase this changes: the surplus labour supply has been exhausted and wages begin to rise. Whereas social inequality increases enormously during the first
phase, the turning point at which the first phase gives way to the second provides a chance to achieve a new social and political stability.

Grant criticizes the Lewis model on a number of points. It does not explain, he says, how the unlimited supplies of labour come about, nor how this phase comes to an end. In this gap is where he locates his own study. Drawing on the work of Max Weber and Simon Kuznets, Grant develops a general theory of relations between economic development, mobility, and inequality which he exemplifies by reference to Imperial Germany. Industrialization and the spread of modern values and relations, he argues, brought about social change in agriculture which initially led to increasing rural inequality and later resulted in a transfer of the rural labour force to the towns. In contrast to Arthur Lewis, Grant, like Theodore Schultz, emphasizes the efficiency of traditional agriculture, the introduction of new techniques and knowledge to production, and large-scale investment in education in industrialized agriculture. Grant thus identifies different reasons for the mobility between town and country. However, he does agree that the resultant excess urban labour force encouraged income inequality. During the same period, the significance of the urban areas had increased, which reinforced the general social inequality.

Grant supports his arguments with a comprehensive statistical section. Even facts that are generally well known, such as the incredible pace of Germany’s economic development between 1880 and 1914, are given new life in these figures. Grant’s comparative approach is particularly illuminating here. It shows that England in 1801 was more urbanized than Germany at unification; and countless tables detail how within just seventeen years Germany’s urban population increased from 23 per cent to more than 34 per cent, while England and Wales took fifty-two years for the same process. Grant demonstrates convincingly that agricultural reforms created an excess labour force that streamed to the urban markets. After a period of transition in the 1890s, however, patterns of migration changed, and it was no longer dictated by the excess rural labour force.

Grant’s highly empirical study is undoubtedly convincing and makes an immensely profitable read. In many respects it provides new insights into Imperial Germany, a topic which has already been intensely researched. Grant’s economic history approach in particular is refreshing and, in itself, valuable enough. The way in which he
draws conclusions about potential political developments from his carefully prepared data, however, is less convincing. From the end of the excessive labour force phase, for example, he draws the rather speculative conclusion that it created conditions ‘which were favourable to the creation of a modern mature industrial society, and to a process of social and economic reconciliation which could have led to the emergence of democratic institutions and a reduction of social conflict’ (p. 113). That the Sonderweg thesis is untenable, and that many of the social problems of Imperial Germany’s deeply divided society go back to the country’s rapid economic development, nonetheless, is untouched by this caveat.

ANGELIKA EPPLE teaches Modern History at the University of Hamburg. She is the author of Empfindsame Geschichtsschreibung: Eine Geschlechtergeschichte der Historiographie zwischen Aufklärung und Historismus (2003) and editor (with Peter Haber) of Vom Nutzen und Nachteil des Internet für die historische Erkenntnis, Version 1.0 (2005). She is currently writing the history of the German chocolate manufacturer Imhoff/Stollwerck from 1839 to 2002.
The study of war has historically been undertaken from the top down: strategy and tactics, operations and command. Recent emphasis on the study of ordinary people—soldiers or civilians—tends to present them in a context of victims, whether of war’s institutions or war’s violence. The essays in this book reflect a fresh perspective: the materiality of violence, in particular, extreme forms of violence. Whether in regular or irregular war, civil unrest, or terrorism, violence constantly, and successfully, threatens to break through any limits imposed on it, whether by religion, custom, or codes of honour. Nor is that pattern restricted to its most frequently discussed region and period: twentieth-century Europe. In 2003, the Göttinger Gespräche zur Geschichtswissenschaft held its twentieth congress on the theme of extreme wars in the twentieth century. The integrating framework is provided by the editorial introduction. Extreme violence is an unknown area of meaning for perpetrators and victims alike. At the same time, however, the act of violence embodies its own logic. The nine essays in this volume seek that logic from a global perspective.

Alan Kramer begins the anthology with a survey of the Great War as a ‘war of atrocities’. As the war progressed, he argues, all the belligerents increased the scale and expanded the scope of violent behaviour. The British and French bombarded civilian targets from the air. The Russians and the Austro-Hungarians treated their prisoners with contempt and neglect. Nevertheless the atrocities of the First World War were as much a question of definition as fact. The German killing of six thousand Belgian and French civilians in the war’s early months was not a product of extreme combat, but the reflection of a toxic combination of irrational fear of partisans and lack of combat experience. It did not set a pattern for either the front lines or the occupied zones. The Turkish slaughter of Armenians and the mutual Greek–Turkish population expulsions in the Middle East took place essentially outside the war zones, and had the political goal, however perverse, of creating an ethnically pure Turkish state. The Great War, in short, was a threshold for the concept of extreme violence in modern war.
Michael Geyer takes the concept of extreme violence a stage further by discussing the concept of ‘fighting to the end’ that influenced German military thought between 1918 and 1945, popularly associated with Adolf Hitler. The idea of an *Endkampf* actually grew from the High Command’s aborted consideration in the summer of 1918 of waging a final, all-out struggle in Germany itself. Geyer notes that this projected struggle had an internal dimension. It involved the eradication of all individuals and forces opposed to the idea of war as self-sacrifice. As the Second World War approached its denouement, the Nazi leadership set out to destroy Germany even more completely, hoping ‘to snatch memory from the jaws of defeat’ (p. 55). Yet even as the German people turned increasingly against this cult of death, they continued to wage the war of self-destruction they wished to avert, mobilizing themselves to match their enemies’ extreme violence. Not ideological or mythical ideals, but ordinary hopes and fears turned Germans into the ‘ferocious fighters, relentless workers, and committed killers’ (p. 66) of 1944–5.

The extreme violence visited on Germany in the final stages of the Second World War is the subject of Richard Bessel’s contribution. He describes a ‘perfect storm’: a synergy of a desperate struggle with the Red Army, increasingly fierce fighting in the West, the culmination of the Combined Bomber Offensive, and not least the unprecedented levels of domestic terror unleashed against foreign labourers and Germans alike by the Nazi regime. A *Wehrmacht* no longer capable of mounting effective resistance committed a kind of collective suicide, fighting to a finish rather than accept defeat. This explosion of violence, according to Bessel, transformed the German people, in their own minds, to a nation of victims. Ironically this led to a fundamental recasting of collective attitudes to war, violence, and the military. Unlike the situation after 1918, the German public, East, West, and reunited, no longer derived positive meaning at any level from war experience in a nationalist or militarist context. Armed forces were justifiable only as a deterrent, and then grudgingly. The recent wave of publications openly asserting German victimhood may seem ironic in the context of events from 1933 to 1945. In another sense, however, it is a sign of German normalization in a world where every group and every nation glories in victim status.

Joanna Bourke eloquently describes the cultivation during the twentieth century of ‘killing frenzy’ in combat soldiers. The physical
and emotional traumas engendered by war’s random terror have become familiar enough to be almost a cliché. The language used to describe them, however, has changed over time, shifting in particular from tropes of hysteria to tropes of anxiety. The emotions evoked by modern war, according to Bourke, are less liable to be linked to fear based on threats to survival, and more to anxiety caused by the loss of agency. Remaining constant, however, was the relief of tension when men were able to act against the immediate enemy they perceived as the author of their dismay. Bourke offers the provocative insight that the often-cited ‘dehumanization’ of the foe in modern war actually increases anxiety by enhancing his mystery, his ‘otherness’—a fact long recognized in war movies. The result could often be indiscriminate killing when soldiers came face to face with an enemy who was, after all, human. At the same time fantasy and story-telling were used to construct killing as an ‘act of carnival’ (p. 121), a kind of Saturnalia that at once set participants apart from society and enabled them to re-enter it without being brutalized, at least in public contexts.

Alf Luedtke presents another way of coping with the stresses of twentieth-century war: contextualizing it with industrial society. The factory system and its spin-offs—schools, businesses, hospitals—feature compartmentalization of tasks in an environment of stress, not exactly a counterpart of the battlefield, but not the worst preparation for it either. The alienation from one’s work, noted by so many social commentators, further enhances the comparison. A dirty job in civilian life and a dirty job in combat are both things to be endured, then either forgotten or processed into the general sense of anomie. At the same time, Luedtke argues, responses to industrial work at the point of production are ambivalent. Workers appropriate the settings of work, establish personal niches, and adjust systems. The same process occurs in non-industrial settings organized on industrial models. Even the comradeship, the small-group fellowship so often described as characteristic of twentieth-century war, replicates to a significant degree the characteristics of the industrialized workplace. It features a code of conduct separated from that of the controlling institution, featuring acceptance in return for conformity, and having a short way with dissenters who go beyond the limits of consensus. Building on the work of Thomas Kühne, Luedtke argues that soldiers, needing to belong in order to survive physically and mentally,
seek out and affirm the collective’s values to a point where they willingly participate in acts of extreme violence—and process them as all in a day’s work. Doubts, scruples, and inhibitions are experienced before and after the collective behaviour that affirmed the group against external challenges.

The first counterpoint to the volume’s male orientation is provided by Gyanendra Pandey. She begins by establishing a paradox. On the one hand, extreme violence creates a zone where no rules apply. On the other, that zone exists in an environment where community, in the sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’, is particularly strong. Focusing on the Indian experience in 1947–8, Pandey describes women as central to the processes of extreme violence. Brutalization, rape, abduction, and murder were part of a male discourse: revenge for past wrongs by degrading the enemy’s women; humiliating the enemy by demonstrating his inability to intervene; and sealing the defeat by taking his women as booty. Underlying that behaviour was the concept of women as property—a concept so strongly reinforced by religious and social pressure that it was internalized by many women as well as for practical purposes all men. While some attempts were made between India and Pakistan to recover stolen women, Pandey correctly states that no punishments have been imposed for the rape, loot, and murder. ‘A wind blew’: the wind of partition. But at a time when imperialism is denounced as the unforgivable Western sin, it might be appropriate to remember a British Raj that for a century controlled collectively sanctioned violence in a climate of impunity that is the theme of Pandey’s essay.

At first glance Janet Cherry might seem reckless in her proposal to compare South Africa and Northern Ireland. Racial violence on the one hand and sectarian violence on the other might seem to have little in common beyond surface manifestations. Cherry, in fact, makes a solid case that both feature localized, low-intensity conflict in permanent environments of violence. She argues as well that the state she describes is a state of war, whose personalized cruelties are the more painful for being marginalized by the global media. She presents a context of state repression of unarmed civilians, which in turn leads armed groups to mobilize support against the state and against each other. Noteworthy here are the limitations of public security forces in controlling the kinds of violence that, again paradoxically, results from their disproportionate technical and material superiori-
In both South Africa and Ulster the ability of the opposition to implement their struggle even by direct terrorism was so limited that they turned to the people, their own community as opposed to the ‘others’, religious and ethnic rivals who increasingly became the direct antagonists in place of a state power too relatively strong to be challenged. The problem of governing societies riven by this kind of violence remains an open issue despite the apparent successes of South Africa’s reconciliation programme.

Wolfgang Höpken uses the Balkans as a case study on a major twentieth-century development: the replacement of politics as a motivator of violence by ethnic or religious identity. Beginning with the Balkan wars of 1912–13, states and armies lost much of their roles to paramilitary groups and similar non-state entities. ‘Ordinary people’ were drawn into the dynamic, both as victims and participants. Killing became arbitrary, increased in scale and randomness, and was strongly sexualized. Restrictions protecting noncombatants—children, the elderly, and, above all, women—were inverted, making them prime targets because of their helplessness. All this may sound distressingly familiar form recent headlines. Höpken is, however, reluctant to generalize from the Balkan experience. Instead he asserts that in particular the fluid boundaries between regular armies and armed civilians reflect specific historical traditions, as opposed to prefiguring a new post-modern type of violence. In that he is perhaps the most optimistic of the contributors.

Bernd Weisbrod’s concluding essay uses the strategic concept of ‘shock and awe’ to link extreme acts of violence and religious fundamentalism. The intention in each case, he argues, is the same: to compel unconditional compliance by an overwhelming display of power. Fundamentalism is not inevitably violent, but when its world-transforming impulse is changed to world-conquering through ‘apocalyptic urgency’, all bets are off. Violence becomes a religious act conferring eternal values, even in the secular forms advocated by George Sorel and Franz Fanon. It confers ‘holy status on not so holy men’ (p. 276).

Weisbrod’s concluding aphorism epitomizes the thrust of this anthology. The essays individually and collectively depict not merely the breakdown of restraints on violence, but the affirmation and legitimation of that process. To this devolution of ‘hard power’, ‘soft power’ offers at best limited, post facto alternatives: amnesties,
apologies, reconciliation commissions, and perhaps war crimes’ tribunals. None of the contributors address the prospect of rehabilitating or reconfiguring hard power. Yet a light may possibly exist at the end of the tunnel constructed in this book. In 1998 Michael Ignatieff, among the West’s leading public intellectuals, published a now forgotten book, *The Warrior’s Honour*. In it he advocated challenging extreme violence in failed states and societies by inculcating and appealing to a sense of honour: there are things a warrior does not do precisely because he is a warrior. This concept, in many ways as old as civilization itself, may seem eclipsed by the factors described in these essays: industrialism, fundamentalism, ethnicity, and the rest. Talk of reviving it may be idealistic, even Quixotic. Yet there are worse beginnings to a way out of the abyss that is so eloquently described here.

DENNIS SHOWALTER is Professor of History at Colorado College. He is the author of numerous books on military and German history, among others *Patton and Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century* (2005) and *The Wars of German Unification* (2004), and he is co-author, with William Astore, of *Hindenburg: Icon of German Militarism* (2005).
Since the 1960s countless popular accounts of the East Africa campaign in the First World War have been published. They anecdotally recount the story of this remote and exotic theatre of war where about 3,500 Germans and several thousand African mercenaries (askaris) under the leadership of General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck defended themselves against vastly superior British, South African, Indian, Portuguese, and Belgian forces for more than four years. They did not stop fighting until the middle of November 1918, when they found out about the ceasefire in Europe. The events of 1914–18 are anchored more firmly in the collective historical memory of Britain than of Germany, thanks not least to their popularization in the 1951 Hollywood film *African Queen* with Humphrey Bogart and Katharine Hepburn, based on the novel by C. S. Forrester, and William Boyd’s 1982 prize-winning novel *An Ice-Cream War*. While there is a wealth of English-language publications on the topic, German historians have so far displayed a total lack of interest in this aspect of East African colonial history. As far as German historians are concerned, the beginning of the war in 1914 marked the end of Germany’s colonial era. Thus events in German East Africa, Cameroon, and German South-West Africa during the First World War receive at most cursory treatment in survey accounts. Yet even the English-speaking world had to wait until 2004 for Ross Anderson’s *The Forgotten Front*, which grew out of a dissertation supervised by Hew Strachan. This was the first overall account of the campaign which satisfied academic standards and was based on the sources of all the states involved.¹

Since then, has everything been said on this topic? Certainly not, for while it is true that Anderson’s account convincingly places the

East Africa campaign into the context of the overall strategy of the participating powers and emphasizes the colonial rivalries between Britain, South Africa, Belgium, and Portugal which hampered the conduct of the war on the part of the Entente, the author, himself an ex-officer, concentrates mainly on the operational aspects of the war. At the end of his book he mentions, almost in passing, that one consequence of this war that lasted more than four years and took place in what is today Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Ruanda, Mozambique, and Zambia was a considerable loss of life among the civilian population. In short, Anderson’s book does not enlighten any reader who wants to know how the African or white population of German East Africa and the neighbouring colonies reacted to this war, what consequences it had for them, how those who took part in it—African mercenaries, European conscripts, and professional officers—experienced the war, what motivated them, how the public in the Entente states and Germany perceived the events of 1914 to 1918 in East Africa, and how they were historically instrumentalized and remembered after 1918.

The two studies under review here make an important contribution towards closing these gaps. They differ fundamentally, however, in respect of structure, source material, and thematic emphasis. In both cases the number of primary sources consulted and the amount of new information they convey even to experts in the field is impressive. However, the strange emphases they sometimes place are surprising. They complement each other to the extent that Uwe Schulte-Varendorff hardly draws on English-language literature, while in his overall account of the war in East Africa, Edward Paice avoids the German archives and the German academic literature. However, in addition to the British archives, he draws upon sources in Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Portugal, and even Australia and Italy.

Schulte-Varendorff’s study provides the first biographical sketch based on the (German) sources of Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck (1870-1964), probably the best known German colonial personality. Schulte-Varendorff aims to destroy the myths which have grown up around Lettow-Vorbeck, that is, the master narrative of the chivalrous and brilliant officer whose black soldiers remained loyal to him to the end, and who thus became the symbol of an allegedly popular German rule in Africa. On the basis of a precise reading of the memoirs of German war veterans, the documents of the Reichskolonial-
East Africa Campaign in the First World War

amt (German colonial office) held in the German federal archives in Berlin, and the history written until 1989 in the former German Democratic Republic, which specialized in drawing as gloomy a picture as possible of German imperialism in Africa, Schulte-Varendorff has been able to correct some of the myths that have grown up about events in East Africa between 1914 and 1918. The war in East Africa was by no means chivalrous, but a humanitarian catastrophe for the black civilian population and cost the lives of around 700,000 people; Africans did not support the German war effort freely, but only under duress; the askari were not as loyal as colonial apologists, including Lettow-Vorbeck, always claimed after 1918, but deserted in droves; and Lettow-Vorbeck’s attempt to relieve the German fronts in Europe by his offensive in East Africa failed. However, Schulte-Varendorff makes no attempt to subject Lettow-Vorbeck’s actions as military commander in East Africa to close analysis. Military history is obviously not the author’s forte. His account of Lettow-Vorbeck’s career as an officer until the end of the First World War with postings in, among other places, China during the Boxer uprising and in German South-West Africa against the Herero and Nama testifies to a blithe lack of interest in the structures of the Prussian-German army and its colonial arm, and in the socialization and training of the contemporary officer corps. To describe Lettow-Vorbeck at the end of the book as a ‘soldier who would not learn’ (‘unbelehrbaren Militär’, p. 149) in order to explain his actions as an officer is about as helpful as accusing a clergyman of trying to spread Christianity.

More than half of this rather biased book concerns Lettow-Vorbeck’s actions after 1918 and his image in the German public as an alleged colonial hero and ‘living stab-in-the-back legend’, that is, an officer undefeated on the battlefield. Schulte-Varendorff convincingly presents Lettow-Vorbeck’s initial cross-party popularity on his return from Africa in the spring of 1919, his anti-democratic activities during the Weimar Republic focusing on his active participation in the Kapp putsch of 1920 as an example, and his early susceptibility to far-right politics and anti-Semitism. This soon used up any political credit which he had enjoyed, even on the left. Lettow-Vorbeck’s attempts to revise the image of German colonialism during the Third Reich are well documented, as is the use made of his name as a model for the West German armed forces from the 1960s. Given the material he presents, the author sees this as a scandal, especially as repeat-
ed attempts have been made over recent years to rename streets and military barracks that had been named after him.

Unfortunately, in his zeal to deconstruct the myth of Lettow-Vorbeck, Schulte-Varendorff often overshoots the mark. For example, he emphasizes that many askari deserted during the war, but does not mention that the majority did not. Thus many Africans must have had some loyalty to the German colonial force. Schulte-Varendorff does not try to explain this. Ninety years after the end of the First World War it is certainly necessary to adjust the historical image of Lettow-Vorbeck. But it is important to present a balanced picture of a historical figure and to attempt to understand (without necessarily excusing) and contextualize his motives and actions, even if, like Schulte-Varendorff, one avoids the label, long disdained in German historiography, of ‘biography’ for one’s study. The author, by contrast, sifts the sources for evidence as if for an indictment. Unfortunately, he makes no attempt to place Lettow-Vorbeck and his actions in a historical context, to explain them in terms of his socialization, or to compare them with those of other officers. Similarly, the author does not analyse the social forces which made Lettow-Vorbeck one of Germany’s most popular public figures from 1918 until well into the 1960s. Such an analysis would have shown, for example, that after 1918 Lettow-Vorbeck by no means sought the limelight of publicity and became politically active out of opportunism and greed, as the author suggests. Rather, Lettow-Vorbeck mutated into a public figure because society needed models from an allegedly better past. The main value of Schulte-Varendorff’s study and its excellent bibliography is, therefore, to have documented Lettow-Vorbeck’s life. It does not explain his personality and place it in the context of German military, colonial, and political history from the Kaiserrreich to the Federal Republic. Nor does it provide new information about the professional group and social class that he represented, or the institutions that shaped his life.

Despite its title, the book by Edward Paice deals exclusively with the war in East Africa from 1914 to 1918. The presentation of this exciting, anecdotally written study, however, makes it look like a coffee-table book addressed to a broad reading public. This has the unfortunate consequence that the author sometimes succumbs to a style dominated by superlatives. We often read of the biggest battle, or the greatest tragedy, about overwhelming military superiority, or
the extraordinary importance of what happened in Africa, without all this being placed in relation to other events during the war. The material on which the book is based and the claims that it makes suggest that it is an academic study, and a reference to the author’s Visiting Fellowship at Cambridge is obviously meant to reinforce this impression. Unfortunately, however, much of the new, interesting information it contains (such as Governor Schnee’s attempt to neutralize German East Africa via the American ambassador in London, or a 1915 German colonial office memorandum) is not documented in the rather sparse footnotes. Other evidence, however, is drawn from rather dubious sources, suggesting a lack of heuristic rigour. Thus, for example, Paice quotes a German officer’s letter in which he admits that it was necessary to kill a large number of Africans (p. 288). If one looks up the corresponding footnote, however, it emerges that the information comes from a memorandum by the American delegation at Versailles which, in 1919, was looking for evidence of the cruelty of German colonial rule in order to justify the removal of Germany’s colonies. This memorandum, in turn, refers to a British wartime publication as the source of the letter.

Most of the account is devoted to military events at tactical and operational level. But unlike Anderson’s study, this book gives a voice to the participants in the war thanks to the author’s utilization of an impressive number of papers left by British and South African soldiers. Paice thus provides the first history which accounts for the experiences of those participating in the campaign (at least from the point of view of the white soldiers), while in Anderson’s book the participants in the war are largely reduced to dumb, functioning followers of orders. Particularly illuminating in Paice’s book are the passages about tensions between Smuts and Van Deventer, the South African commanders-in-chief who largely took charge of troops not from the Cape. Also of interest are those sections about the lack of coordination between British troops and Portuguese units after Lettow-Vorbeck’s attack in Mozambique in November of 1917. These internal tensions and losses caused by friction within the Entente in East Africa made it possible for the German colonial force to hold out for so long against an enemy force that was, at least on paper, far superior, as Paice demonstrates in relation to the battles of 1917–18 in Portuguese East Africa. Moreover, this is the first overall account of the war in East Africa to take as a theme the suffering of the Africans.
both as bearers, hundreds of thousands of whom were recruited by both sides in the war, and as victims of the starvation and epidemics that the war brought to this part of Africa. Paice justifiably writes of the 'appalling consequences' (p. 6) for the Africans of Lettow-Vorbeck's strategy.

The account of events within the Entente and the discussion of military and political considerations as part of the decision-making process in Britain, South Africa, Belgium, and Portugal are undoubtedly a strength of Paice's book. Less convincing, however, are the passages about the German side. For a start, a number of errors of detail have crept in: at the start of the war Lettow-Vorbeck was not a colonel but a lieutenant colonel, he did not play a 'leading role' in the Herero war, and had not been instructed by the General Staff in Berlin to study the defence of Africa; like almost all German colonies, German East Africa was not profitable until 1914; the German General Staff in Berlin studied the Boer War not with a view to future colonial wars, but in relation to conflicts expected in Europe; Governor Heinrich Schnee did not die, like Lettow-Vorbeck, in his nineties in the 1960s, but in a traffic accident in 1949 at the age of 78, to name just a few examples. More serious, however, is that in Paice's account of German motives, speculation and a desire to see the East African battles of the German colonial force under Lettow-Vorbeck playing an important role in Germany's global strategy replace solid historical analysis based on sources or research literature. Thus, for example, Paice interprets the dispatch of an air ship to East Africa in the autumn of 1917 as evidence that Berlin regarded the survival of the German colonial force as important. On closer inspection, however, it turns out that the German colonial office's original plan to send a U-boat to East African waters had been rejected by both the army and navy leadership. U-boats, it seems, were required for more important things, and the air ship was sent merely as a symbolic gesture to show the colonial force that they had not been totally forgotten.

Moreover, the Germans in Paice's book are like caricatures in an old war film to make it easier for the (British) reader to identify with the right side. They eat sausage before battle and worry about the beer supply, and while they are efficient in battle, they—unlike the British soldiers—lack a sense of humour and are uncommonly brutal and unfeeling towards the Africans. The British involved in the war
had demonstrated sensitivity for the suffering of the Africans in this theatre of war, but according to Paice, the Germans completely lacked this empathy. Among the evidence of the German side’s alleged indifference to the African victims of the war which Paice cites is that the German colonial administration did not even keep records of the numbers of African bearers employed, which testifies to their contempt for human life (p. 398). However, someone who has not taken the trouble to look for such figures, whether in the records of the German colonial office in Berlin or in what has remained from colonial times in the Tanzania National Archives in Dar-es-Salaam, and, it seems, is unaware that most of the papers were lost either during the First World War in East Africa or in 1945, when the war archive in Potsdam was bombed, should perhaps pass less sweeping judgement.

However, I fully agree with Paice when he points out that after 1918 the German side was less than willing to acknowledge its part in causing the humanitarian catastrophe that was the First World War in East Africa. Rather, Germans collectively rejected the statement made by the Entente that Germany had been inhumane towards the Africans, and had therefore forfeited the right to have colonies. Any such admission was therefore avoided where possible, in order not to give the Entente additional ammunition, after the event, for the statements made at Versailles. Yet the books by Schulte-Varendorff and Paice establish beyond a doubt that the war in East Africa between 1914 and 1918 was one of the darkest chapters of German colonial history and cost the lives of more Africans than the Herero or Maji Maji rebellions.


Over the last decade or so historians have increasingly sought a more nuanced understanding of the consequences of the First World War, deploying cultural concepts such as ‘experience’, ‘identity’, and ‘memory’ in order to challenge older assumptions about the relationship between war and national trauma. ¹ Benjamin Ziemann’s book, first published in 1997 as Front und Heimat: Ländliche Kriegserfahrungen im südlichen Bayern 1914–1923 by Klartext Verlag, Essen, and now appearing in an updated, English-language edition in Jay Winter’s series The Legacy of the Great War, can justifiably be seen as one of the seminal works in this area. Indeed many, if not all, of his conclusions have stood the test of time (if ten years is an adequate test); and the on-going influence of his book can be seen in the numerous references to it in other scholarly works. ² As such, the decision to make it available to a wider audience of anglophone students and scholars is as welcome as it is inevitable.

Ziemann’s subjects are the peasant farmers of rural southern Bavaria, both those who were conscripted and spent time in the replacement army or at the front, and their wives and older relatives who were forced to shoulder the extra burdens of running the farm or family business during their absence. How did they interpret and cope with the extended period of war, revolution, and economic crisis which made up the ‘inflation decade’ of 1914–23? And how did their subjective perceptions contrast with official discourses on the

¹ For an excellent introduction to the most recent historiography see Belinda Davis’s review article ‘Experience, Identity and Memory: The Legacy of World War I’, Journal of Modern History, 75 (2003), 111–31. Also very useful is the account by Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present (Cambridge, 2005).

² In addition to the two works cited above, see e.g. Gerhard Hirschfeld, Gerd Krubeitsch, and Irina Renz (eds.), Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg (Paderborn, 2003); and Roger Chickering, The Great War and Urban Life in Germany: Freiburg, 1914–1918 (Cambridge, 2007), 4.
war, as seen, for instance, in Bavarian regimental histories or patriotic newspaper articles?

To answer these questions, Ziemann first re-examines what we mean by the ‘front experience’ and shows that there were indeed many different ‘components of socialisation’ within the Bavarian army (p. 269), not all of which fit into the conventional model of ‘industrialized’ warfare as epitomized by the battles of Verdun and the Somme. For instance, rural conscripts were less frequently deployed on the front line than their urban counterparts, and were more likely to be given leave, especially at harvest time (p. 39). Often they were transferred to artillery regiments in the rear area of the fighting zones (where their knowledge of horses came in useful), or to garrison duty in the replacement army on the home front. Even the Western Front itself had quieter sections where nothing much happened for months on end. Regular contact with home in the form of letters and periods of extended leave in turn allowed civilians to embrace some of the prejudices being forged in the trenches (such as the anti-Prussian sentiment which became widespread in Bavarian regiments) while vice versa, farmer-soldiers also interpreted the war in domestic terms as a battle over food and food prices between rural producers and urban consumers. In this sense, home front and fighting front were connected through a constant stream of communication, rather than being opposites unknown to and irreparably alienated from each other. This also allowed for a relatively swift reintegration of veterans into rural society after 1918.

Secondly, Ziemann looks at the importance of popular piety as a means of coping with the terrible moments of large-scale death and mourning which faced Bavarian villages and their menfolk at the front at particular junctures in the war. Instead of taking pleasure in killing the enemy or bonding with comrades from other parts of Germany in an idealized ‘community of fate’, he argues, rural soldiers found comfort in the power of prayer and in the notion that suffering ennobles. This, in turn, led to resignation and a sense of victimization, occasionally punctured by notions that God had forsaken the troops by failing to watch over them during the worst battles and bombardments. Certainly, military chaplains were less successful when they filled their sermons with references to war aims and nationalism than when they confined themselves to simple messages regarding the relationship between human sin and redemption
This is also confirmed by Patrick Porter’s comparative study, ‘New Jerusalems: Sacrifice and Redemption in the War Experiences of English and German Military Chaplains’, in Pierre Purseigle (ed.), Warfare and Belligerence: Perspectives in First World War Studies (Leiden, 2005), 101–32. Admittedly, the Protestant field chaplains examined by Porter do seem to have given more weight to the idea of *national* redemption than their Catholic counterparts, but otherwise the similarities are more striking than the differences.

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Thirdly, even when rural soldiers felt that God had forsaken them, they did not automatically turn to the secular religions of nationalism or revolutionary socialism as represented by the two political extremes, the Fatherland Party and the USPD. Rather, the more prevalent coping strategy was a simple individualistic will to survive the war and get home in one piece. This was evident, for instance, in the irreversible collapse of army discipline on the Western Front from mid-July 1918, which came as a result not of collective protest but of individual acts of disobedience and desertion ‘on a massive scale’ (p. 108). For the same reason, Bavarian peasants gradually, albeit temporarily, came to support the position of the moderate wing of the SPD after 1917—not because it offered the prospect of radical social change but because it promised to restore the pre-war order on the basis of a ‘peace without annexations or indemnities’. As soon as the SPD government’s post-war economic policies began to favour urban consumers over rural producers, however, peasants shifted back to the right—as seen in the Landtag and Reichstag elections of 1920 (p. 236).

Yet returning to the right did not mean a desire for the restoration of the monarchy or support for the Kapp putsch. Politics in rural Bavaria had simply become a matter of protecting property and community against ‘urban’ looters, while the idea that suffering ennobles had given way to a new form of class snobbery (a *Standesbewußtsein*) summed up in the view of one Swabian farmer that ‘factory workers’ who complained about rising food prices should consider spreading ‘cow dung on their bread instead of butter’ (p. 198). Certainly, there

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was no evidence here of the völkisch belief in a new ‘national community’ of all Germans, as put forward by the ideologues of the extreme right. Of course, Communism was also rejected, and occasionally peasants were willing to fight to ensure its defeat, but not if this meant going beyond their own immediate locality. Killing for its own sake was an insufficient motive for involvement in post-war violence, in other words, as was the desire to revive the lost spirit of ‘comradeship’ from the trenches. Thus there was virtually no identification with the aggressive exploits of the Freikorps in the Baltic states and Poland, while some peasants even refused to join the local militias (Einwohnerwehren) on the grounds that ‘the Spartacist threat had already been fully dealt with’ (p. 232).

The post-war marriage boom and desire for bourgeois respectability are further indicators of this rejection of militarism (pp. 224–5). Indeed, like Richard Bessel, Ziemann focuses on the ambiguous nature of the transition from wartime to peacetime within rural communities, where bitter hostility towards ‘Prussian’-style state intervention went hand in hand with the gradual dismantling of the command economy and a partial return to older employer–employee relations. The post-war period had been as much a ‘swindle’ as the war itself, but this time Bavarian farmers were determined to benefit economically, using the inflation to reduce their debts and/or to make structural improvements to their land and properties with payment in devalued marks. In contrast to urban areas, there was always enough food, and peasant women had been sufficiently passive during the war itself not to resent the return of their husbands and the restoration of the old patriarchal order (pp. 155–66).

At times, though, some of the points made by Ziemann are a little over-stretched. For instance, it seems doubtful whether the increased prevalence of birth control in Bavaria can be put down to women’s resentment that the ‘powerful’ had taken their sons off to war and had them killed (p. 162). Other factors were probably more important, for instance, the estrangement between the sexes caused on the one hand by soldiers’ encounters with foreign women (and STDs) in occupied territory, and on the other hand by rural women’s flirta-

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tions with POWs on the home front (pp. 122–4 and 165). Indeed, one does not have to look hard to find evidence that such things happened or were imagined to have happened, and that they caused something of a crisis in gender relations after the war; the fact that this was seldom discussed in the letters between husbands and wives or mothers and sons is hardly surprising.5 Of course, extra-marital infidelities are not in themselves incompatible with the idea that husbands and wives missed each other and longed to be reunited, but they do put something of a question mark over the idea of a smooth return to ‘normal’ family life after 1918.

More generally, Ziemann has been criticized for overplaying the passive, negative aspects of rural soldiers’ war experiences, while ignoring the possibility that they may have positively enjoyed killing and/or the perks and feelings of power that went with being part of an occupying army.6 For instance, Bavarian farmers’ occasional references to the ‘impressive sights’ they saw in France, such as churches and cities, cannot be explained solely in terms of benign touristic impulses (p. 117), but must surely be set against the backdrop of their knowledge of some of the darker sides of the occupation. To be fair, in his new introduction Ziemann goes out of his way to emphasize that his main sources—soldiers’ letters—merely reveal ‘how Bavarian peasants constructed their subjective war experience’, and should not be taken as ‘evidence of the “objective” facts and events which shaped the course of the war’ (p. 13). All the same, this still begs the question as to why Bavarian peasants should wish to present themselves as unenthusiastic, homesick conscripts (or, less frequently, ‘tourists’) rather than as warriors and occupiers. Is this genuinely

5 For further evidence of the ‘policing’ of relationships between German rural women and POWs see Uta Hinz, Gefangen im Großen Krieg: Kriegsgefangenschaft in Deutschland, 1914–1921 (Essen, 2006), 191–201.
how they felt about ‘their’ war, or was it more a means of suppressing guilt about their role in the devastation of Belgium and northern France, a guilt which turned to anger and resentment in the wake of the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in 1923?

This brings me to my final point, which relates to Erich Maria Remarque and his famous anti-war novel *All Quiet on the Western Front* (1929). Ziemann is doubtless correct to challenge ‘the literary topos of the front-line soldier alienated from his home and family’ which, of course, owes a lot to Remarque’s book in particular (p. 7). Yet in other more immediate ways, his portrayal of the subjective experiences of rural soldiers tallies very strongly with some of the episodes described in *All Quiet*, for instance, the profound disillusionment which went with the discovery that ‘comrades’ stole from each other; the tendency to form bonds of friendship only between small groups of soldiers who knew and trusted each other personally; the obsession with food, both quantity and quality; the widespread hatred of officers and military discipline; and, above all, the fatalistic view of the war as a ‘swindle’ which could not, however, be stopped or altered. Furthermore, the soldier who eventually deserts in *All Quiet*, Detering, is a farmer who, like many of the rural recruits in Ziemann’s book, longed for a return to pre-war normality and ‘the customary seasonal labour on the home farm’ (p. 270). Significantly, the novel’s narrator-hero, Paul Bäumer, sees Detering’s actions as neither cowardly nor brave, but rather as ‘stupid’ because he was bound, at this particular stage in the war, to get caught by the ‘despicable military police’:

He had headed toward Germany, that was hopeless, of course—and, of course, he did everything else just as idiotically. Anyone might have known that his flight was only home-sickness and a momentary aberration. But what does a court-martial a hundred miles behind the front-line know about it? We have heard nothing more of Detering.7

Indeed, perhaps Ziemann’s most significant finding is the extent to which Bavarian soldiers celebrated the end of the war as a person-

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al victory, not in the positive sense that they had been ‘fighting for something’, but in the negative sense that they had survived (p. 271). Were Paul Bäumer and his friends still alive and able to return home on 11 November 1918, they would have reacted, I feel, in exactly the same way. Yet writing ten years later, Remarque chose to cast Paul’s last thoughts in a manner which reflected the much more bitterly divided society of the late 1920s: ‘If we go back now we will be weary, broken, burnt out, rootless, and without hope. We will not be able to find our way any more.’

8 Ibid. 190.

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There seems to be no end to the production of biographies of Winston Churchill. It must be assumed that British publishers regard the market as insatiable. In recent years, as earlier, Churchill has attracted the attention of a wide range of authors who have produced fat, medium-sized, or slim assessments of his remarkable career. Since this reviewer has himself written a ‘profile’ of Churchill—now apparently being eagerly read in Latvian translation—he is not one to complain about the ‘Churchill industry’. It is easy to understand why for British writers, at least those of a ‘senior’ generation, it has come to seem necessary to ‘come to terms’ with Churchill. His own ‘finest hour’ has so often been projected as Britain’s too. So, even though Churchill was too idiosyncratic to be easily emulated, subsequent generations of British politicians (and the current United States President) have acknowledged the inspiration which he provided. Here was a national talisman, whose glittering array of talents might have fizzled out inconsequentially in ‘failure’ had the ‘call to greatness’ not come so unexpectedly in 1940. Of course, the chorus has not been invariably laudatory. Exposure of ‘myths and legends’ about Churchill is also a British industry. Whether or not particular criticisms have substance, however, it has rarely been possible for British writers to consider Churchill without at the same time being agitated about the inner meaning of ‘our island story’. The command of history is a complicated business.

In such a context, it is particularly welcome to have an assessment of Churchill by an ‘outsider’ who has to understand the currents which swirl around a ‘national narrative’, but who can navigate them from a different position. In this respect, Peter Alter’s volume sits alongside that in French by François Bédarida (1999), which also displays a detached affection for his subject, though Alter does not refer to this book in his bibliography. A different perspective is evident from the outset. It must be unlikely that any British biographer would begin where Alter begins, namely with Churchill in 1956, as an 82-year old, receiving the Charlemagne Prize. The accompanying photograph brilliantly shows Churchill leaning over, trying to understand what another old man, Konrad Adenauer, was saying to him.
Whether Churchill really understood ‘Europe’ and whether ‘Europe’ really understood Churchill could form the subject of a book in itself. How far and when did Churchill become ‘a great European’?

A glance at Alter’s bibliography confirms, however, as one would expect, that the author is thoroughly up to date in his knowledge of all that has been written in English over recent decades—as his text also demonstrates his personal knowledge, long-acquired, of the social nuances of British life which a biographer needs. The very volume of books on Churchill, not to mention those by Churchill, overwhelms some authors but Alter has shown an admirable capacity to be comprehensive without being prolix. The scale of Churchill’s life and the fact that he became so early a ‘public figure’ naturally means that any biographer must skim over some aspects of it at speed. Yet, while more could always be said, what we have here is sufficiently succinct to be accessible to a general readership in German and sufficiently scholarly to satisfy an academic readership.

At this juncture, with so much material publicly available, books are not likely to establish themselves by making some huge new archival discovery. What has to be done, rather, particularly in this case for a readership in German, is to place Churchill in his social context, to seek to understand and portray how the different facets of his character came together (or failed to), and to relate ‘private’ and ‘public’. Alter tackles this task of integration successfully. He devotes 128 pages to Churchill’s life and career up to 1939, nearly a further hundred to the period from 1940 to 1945, and a final shorter section to the last couple of decades. The emphasis on the Second World War is both understandable and proper. Despite his early prominence in the Liberal governments before 1914 and his re-emergence as a post-war Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer, it was possible to see Churchill in the 1930s as a brilliant maverick who had behaved erratically too often. Although the first biography of Churchill appeared in 1905 when the subject was only 31, one written thirty years later might have had as sub-title ‘A Study in Failure’. It was the war which ‘rescued’ Churchill and propelled him into being one of the ‘Big Three’. His role as ‘war leader’ is carefully considered—both as the word-master who rallied ‘the people’ and as strategist and negotiator in an alliance framework. The extent to which, in power terms, Churchill was struggling against the tide is subtly conveyed. Could one man have done more as Washington and Moscow eyed each
other directly? Was Churchill sometimes carried away by his own verbal exuberance? Alter does not seek to give simple answers to these and related questions. We are left to ponder further for ourselves. In the attention he does give to high politics, however, he never loses sight of the fact that this ‘great statesman’ was also a writer-historian and ‘hobby painter’, a man conscious of ‘high destiny’, yet plagued by the ‘black dog’ of depression.

Churchill wrote about his own ‘Great Contemporaries’. It is now difficult to think of Churchill as a ‘contemporary’, so greatly have both Britain and the world changed since 1965. Even in his own times, however, he was scarcely a ‘typical Englishman’. It is difficult to think in terms of ‘The Age of Churchill’. Alter’s achievement is to have grasped the ways in which, at different stages, Churchill’s extraordinary personality explains both the failure and the success of his career.

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Kurt Georg Kiesinger was the third chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. The great coalition of CDU/CSU/SPD which he established in December 1966 was the first of its kind at federal level. In many ways it was outstandingly successful. It calmed fears of an economic crisis, carried through a formidable programme of reforms in education and social welfare, rejected the constant demands for an end to the investigation and prosecution of Nazi crimes, and even chipped away at the stifling restraints on West German foreign policy imposed by the Hallstein doctrine. Finally, in the Bundestag election of November 1969, it overcame, however narrowly, the threat of neo-Nazi representation in the Bundestag, and thereafter the radical right was never able to gain a voice in the West German federal parliament.

Yet, as Philipp Gassert notes in this admirable biography, Kiesinger has never quite established a reputation as one of the founding fathers of German democracy. Adenauer restored West German sovereignty; Erhard liberated the Federal Republic’s economy; Brandt was associated with a successful _Ostpolitik_; Schmidt steadied the ship in the turbulent waters of the oil crisis and the threat of Soviet nuclear blackmail; Kohl achieved unification. Kiesinger’s historical profile seems fuzzier.

From the outset of his term in charge of the new government he was accused of being a ‘Nazi chancellor’ who should never have been allowed to lead the Federal Republic. Gassert devotes considerable space to Kiesinger’s constant efforts to clear his name. That is understandable because the issue cropped up repeatedly after 1945. Yet in some ways it distorts the analysis of Kiesinger’s career. The need to focus on the problem occasionally leads Gassert, despite his meticulous scholarship and even-handed approach, to make apologetic statements about Kiesinger that do not carry conviction. For example, he suggests that with the exception of Brandt, who had chosen the path of resistance in exile, the other leading figures in the early history of the Federal Republic had all been more or less compromised during the Third Reich, including Adenauer, Heuss, and Lübke. Yet Adenauer was expelled from office as mayor of Cologne, subjected to
persistent harassment, and arrested towards the end of the war. Heuss had made his opposition to the Nazis quite clear before they came to power and even anti-German British newspapers had to admit that he was of impeccable character when he visited Britain in 1958. Lübke had spent twenty months in jail as an enemy of the new regime. Kiesinger, on the other hand, had joined the NSDAP in 1933. According to his own post-war version of events, this occurred in February, before the March elections triggered off a wave of new applicants. As a leading member of a Roman Catholic student corporation in Berlin, Kiesinger saw it as his task to persuade its members to support the Third Reich. He became Korporationsführer, and by the spring of 1934 was expressing satisfaction that the Führerprinzip had eliminated frictions within the organization.

At about the same time Kiesinger also joined the Nazi motorized corps (NS Kraftfahrerkorps). Thereafter he qualified as a lawyer, participating in a Nazi indoctrination course for lawyers before his final examinations in October 1934. He did not join the Nazi lawyers’ association or try to obtain an official position, but nor did he resign from the Nazi party. When the war broke out he sought government employment, partly to avoid military service. In April 1940 he joined the German foreign office as a temporary official, working on German radio broadcasts to foreign countries. This brought him into contact with Goebbels’s propaganda ministry, and his diplomatic skills were useful in smoothing relations between the two bodies. He did not, as was later alleged, deal directly with Goebbels, but it is inconceivable that he would have been selected for such sensitive work if his Nazi superiors had not regarded him as reliable. He was the only temporary wartime official to reach the rank of Ministerialdirigent in Ribbentrop’s foreign office.

After the war Kiesinger might justifiably claim that he was personally opposed to the Nazi destruction of the rule of law—he was evidently shocked by the Röhm purge, in which several leading Roman Catholic politicians lost their lives. But the fact remained that when he became federal chancellor in 1966, he was the first Partei genosse to hold that office. His determined efforts to overturn this verdict by claiming not only that he had not been a Nazi, but that he had actually been working against the Nazis as part of a discreet opposition, eventually bore fruit as the result of Allied loss of interest in denazification and the help of many of his old friends from the
German foreign office. The effectiveness of what later came to be termed Seilschaften, or networks, of former officials who helped each other by providing testimony to obtain the so-called Persil Certificates of denazification is well documented in this book.

Yet the real defence for Kiesinger is the one that was made in January 1967 by the first post-war rector of Heidelberg university, Karl Heinrich Bauer. Writing to Karl Jaspers, who had condemned Kiesinger’s appointment as federal chancellor in a television interview, Bauer admitted that Kiesinger might have erred in earlier years, but during the previous two decades he had shown in his ‘daily work’ for the new German democracy that he could be trusted with the affairs of the Federal Republic. Looked at from this perspective, the arguments about the extent to which Kiesinger was or was not a ‘Nazi’ lose their relevance.

Nevertheless, the political culture that conditioned Kiesinger’s thinking between the end of the First World War and the Nazi seizure of power was of considerable importance for his attitudes towards the future of Germany after 1945. Gassert is surely right to stress that Kiesinger was indeed a statesman ‘between two eras’ (zwischen den Zeiten) whose ideas and preconceptions exhibited considerable continuity with the inter-war period, even though he realized that National Socialism had been a disaster. Kiesinger’s commitment to his Roman Catholic faith was certainly of great importance, and may have saved him from the total commitment to the Third Reich exhibited by other members of his generation. He was, however, deeply affected by the nationalist fervours that dominated conservative thought in the Weimar Republic. Despite his religious faith, Kiesinger was not attracted by the Centre Party milieu, but was more influenced by the patriotic, romantic idealism of the Catholic youth movement. He joined the Bund Neudeutschland, led by Jesuits but full of national sentiment.

In his youth, the patriotic Swabian Kiesinger had been very conscious of the French military presence in the Rhine valley. He maintained a strong commitment to his Württemberg homeland and to the German nation. Ideals of a supra-national European future, which appealed to younger men such as Helmut Kohl, did not really figure in his calculations, except as a means of restoring Germany’s place among the powers of Europe. This did not make him the warmonger or revanchist that propagandists in the GDR liked to portray him as.
He was fluent in French and well-versed in French literature. But it did mean that the issue of German unification occupied a prominent place in his list of objectives.

Kiesinger’s denazification was very important for him because it enabled him to play a leading role in West German politics. Using contacts in his Swabian homeland he became regional CDU administrator, and was able to obtain a safe constituency in the mainly Catholic district of South Württemberg for the Bundestag election of August 1949. Using the slogan ‘all Christians to the polls’, and with the enthusiastic support of the clergy, he achieved the third best result in the whole of the Federal Republic. His legal expertise and undoubted gifts as an orator, together with his Swabian networks, enabled Kiesinger to become a prominent figure in the Bundestag. He played an important role in parliamentary committees, and was a member of the core committee (Vorstand) of the Christian Democratic parliamentary group, which meant that he participated in high-level discussions about government policy.

His profile as a CDU foreign affairs spokesman was established when he became chairman of the Bundestag foreign affairs committee in December 1954. But his attempts to obtain more open discussion of foreign policy in parliament were not welcome to Adenauer, and Kiesinger was disappointed at being overlooked for a cabinet appointment. This was especially true after the overwhelming government victory in the 1957 Bundestag elections.

It was therefore not surprising that Kiesinger took the chance to take over the CDU-led government in his home state of Baden-Württemberg as minister-president. Apart from his need for pensionable employment, he had from the start supported the creation of a large south-west German state out of the three existing Länder of Württemberg-Baden, Württemberg-Hohenzollern, and South Baden. The Land of Baden-Württemberg, established in the early months of 1952, was the only federal state to be created after the establishment of the Federal Republic. It had faced serious opposition from the Roman Catholic population of Baden, and was regarded with disfavour by Adenauer because it threatened to split the CDU and cause difficulties for his government in the Bundesrat. Kiesinger showed toughness and courage in pushing the measure through the Bundestag, helped when necessary by SPD and FDP votes. Thereafter he had used his public relations skills to reconcile the inhabitants of
Baden to the new Land, pointing out the economic and social advantages that would accrue to them from membership of a powerful and forward-looking state. Despite recurrent friction, some of it inspired by Roman Catholic clergy, time was to prove Kiesinger right; Baden-Württemberg has become one of the most prosperous parts of Germany.

The years between 1958 and 1966, which Kiesinger spent as minister-president in the villa Reitzenstein in Stuttgart, were probably the happiest in his career. He continued to devote much time to public relations, and in 1960 opinion polls showed that he was by far the most popular politician in the Land. A visionary leader with little concern for bureaucratic procedures, Kiesinger pressed ahead with projects he saw as important, such as the foundation of a new university in the city of Constance, the development of the Upper Rhine in such a way that the purity of its water and the natural beauty of the region were preserved, and the creation of a network of good roads, enabling the indigenous economy to grow with that of the Federal Republic itself.

His post as minister-president of one of the most important Länder in the Federal Republic brought Kiesinger another position of influence when he was elected president of the Bundesrat. This meant that he was officially the third most senior figure in the hierarchy of the Republic after the president and the chancellor, and it gave him prestige when visiting foreign countries, something he did with great enthusiasm.

From 1963 to 1966 the conflict between Adenauer and his successor, Ludwig Erhard, over the policy to be adopted towards France, the USA, and NATO intensified. Kiesinger came down on the side of those who wanted to ensure that relations with de Gaulle should receive priority. When in the autumn of 1966 it became clear that Erhard could no longer continue as chancellor, Kiesinger was in a good position to replace him. He was a prominent and respected figure in federal politics, with acknowledged expertise in foreign affairs. He had not been compromised by participation in cabinet government under either Adenauer or Erhard. He had worked with the SPD in parliamentary committees, and his first coalition in Stuttgart had included Social Democrats as well as liberals. He had secured the support of the Bavarian CSU by promising to restore Strauß to a cabinet post. Although he was not committed to a great coalition, and
would have been happy to work with the FDP, the inclusion of Strauß ruled that option out. It was also felt that a great coalition was needed to carry through root and branch reforms at a time of crisis, among them a change in the electoral law to bring it nearer to the British ‘first-past-the post’ system, thereby eliminating both the FDP and the apparent threat from a neo-Nazi movement. Although there were tensions within the great coalition, particularly between Kiesinger and Brandt, some observers pointed to it as an example of domestic reconciliation since it forced the Christian Democrats to swallow their prejudices against the ‘Sozis’ and vice versa.

Gassert describes Freiherr Karl Theodor von und zu Guttenberg as the ‘grey eminence’ of the new government, and even ‘the man of the great coalition’. After some delays he became the political state secretary in the federal chancellery. Guttenberg was by no means popular in his own party (the CSU), nor was he seen as a natural ally of the SPD. But Kiesinger esteemed him as a staunch anti-Communist committed to collaboration with the French. He was known to have very close contacts in the Quai D’Orsay. Kiesinger himself was eager to improve relations with Paris, and assured de Gaulle of this when he saw him a few weeks after taking office. Kiesinger sought to appease de Gaulle by refusing to give serious support to the entry of the United Kingdom into the EEC, a cause for which he had little enthusiasm anyhow. He felt that the British seemed secretly to be signalling to the Soviet Union that they were no more bothered about German unification than were the Soviets themselves. Nor was he uncritical of the Americans. On 27 February 1967 he told a gathering of CDU-friendly press correspondents that the current situation in NATO was intolerable because the Americans were evidently following other interests than those of the Germans and the Europeans in their relations with the Soviet Union. With an obvious reference to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) agreed between Washington and Moscow he spoke of a sort of ‘atomic complicity’ between the two superpowers.

It probably did Kiesinger no harm in Bonn or Paris when President Johnson indicated his displeasure at this public criticism of American policy, even if the extent of his rage (‘If I had a dollar for every consultation with the Germans I have had, I would be a millionaire’) was not made public. The NPT had, indeed, aroused very strong reactions in the CDU/CSU. Adenauer called it ‘the
Morgenthau plan squared’ and Strauß spoke of a ‘Versailles of cosmic proportions’. Adenauer wrote to Kiesinger criticizing him for his ‘feeble’ response to this Soviet/American enterprise. Doubtless the public row between Washington and Bonn owed something to Johnson’s need to show toughness before Congress and Kiesinger’s desire to placate his own party in the Bundestag. But there is no doubt that he himself was reluctant to sign the treaty and, in fact, he never did so. This illustrated a clear division between the CDU/CSU and their Social Democratic partners. The former had always hoped to obtain access to the nuclear deterrent; the latter were willing sincerely to abjure it.

To what extent, then, did Kiesinger’s accession to office mark a change in West German foreign policy? Certainly the atmosphere between Bonn and Paris became warmer, but in reality little changed in the Franco-German relationship. De Gaulle did not help West Germany gain concessions from Moscow, as the German ‘Gaullists’ hoped; for their part the Germans were not willing to ditch NATO, nor was Kiesinger willing to recognize the Oder/Neiße line, as de Gaulle would have wished. In the autumn of 1968, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, de Gaulle berated the West Germans for their intransigent attitude and implied that their rigid insistence on re-unification had given Moscow an excuse for violating Czech sovereignty. The meeting in Bonn at which these accusations were made was as unpleasant for the Germans as anything endured by Ludwig Erhard.

Kiesinger, like Brandt, realized that progress towards a settlement of relations with Eastern Europe would have to be made through Moscow. He appreciated that West Germany was losing credibility with its allies by its rigid stance over the Hallstein doctrine and the absolute non-recognition of the GDR. Yet he was not ready to offer concrete concessions, such as recognition of the status quo with respect to European frontiers. Nor would his party have supported him had he wished to do so. Instead he fell back effectively on Erhard’s policy, but without its anti-French tone. In Bonn the word went round that ‘Kiesinger is the most handsome Erhard we ever had’.

At first, the great coalition seemed to be working in favour of Kiesinger’s party. The SPD lost ground in Land elections and the CDU/CSU made comforting gains. But this had the effect of increasing the strains within the coalition itself as the Social Democrats tried
to create a separate profile from their Christian colleagues. In turn Kiesinger’s own followers became resentful, especially as foreign policy gains did not seem to be forthcoming. In 1968 the background noise of student unrest triggered off strong reactions within the conservative press and its many sympathizers in the CDU. Kiesinger seemed caught between a desire to appease youthful frustration and the need to uphold law and order. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 aroused understandable indignation amongst CDU/CSU politicians. Kiesinger was also shocked, but avoided sabre-rattling in his reactions, and once again seemed to be wishy-washy in the eyes of his critics. Prague heralded the end of hopes for an arrangement with the Soviet Union that would be acceptable to Kiesinger’s followers. Gradually the coalition began to crumble, although it retained much public support. The symbolic importance of Gustav Heinemann’s election to the Federal Presidency on 5 March 1969 has sometimes been questioned, but it certainly helped to weaken Kiesinger’s position. He had favoured a candidate who might attract votes from the Free Democrats. But his own party, and Strauß’s CSU, insisted on supporting Gerhard Schröder, who was regarded as a hard-liner. Thanks to the support of FDP votes, the SPD was able to elect the first Social Democratic German president since Friedrich Ebert. This foreshadowed the combination that would eject Kiesinger from power the following September.

Not that the result of the Bundestag election on 28 September 1969 could be seen as a rejection of Kiesinger’s policies. The CDU/CSU was clearly ahead of its rivals with 242 seats in the Bundestag; the SPD obtained 224 and the Free Democrats only thirty. Nevertheless, this gave Brandt the chance to press ahead at once to form a coalition with the liberals—even though it only had a majority of twelve.

Kiesinger could certainly claim that his government had served the Federal Republic well. It had an outstanding legislative record. In foreign affairs he had maintained relatively good relations with de Gaulle without more than temporary alienation of the USA. Indeed, the recently elected President Nixon was obviously sorry to see him go. Yet, despite these achievements, one cannot help feeling that Kiesinger’s ministry had come to the end of its natural life in September 1969. For all that he was more flexible than his predecessors in his way of conducting diplomacy, his objectives remained those of the 1950s, and his mind-set was still conditioned by the
ideals he had developed in his youth. These were not necessarily bad in themselves, but they were not appropriate to the era in which Willy Brandt took the helm in the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, Kiesinger made an important contribution to the stability and development of the Federal Republic, and he deserves a biography as scholarly, balanced, and sympathetic as this one.

CONFERENCE REPORT

From the Blanketeers to the Present: Understanding Protests of the Unemployed. Conference of the German Historical Institute London in collaboration with the Society for the Study of Labour History, held at the GHIL on 16–17 Feb. 2007

Why are the unemployed so passive? Why do they not take to the streets in numbers to protest against their fate? These questions have troubled historians and sociologists ever since the publication of the Marienthal study in the 1930s. This seminal work by Paul Lazarsfeld, Marie Jahoda, and Hans Zeisel, together with other studies in different countries, supposedly proved that after losing their jobs workers eventually enter a downward cycle of depression and despair which ultimately leads to complete political apathy. The so-called Marienthal thesis is still widely accepted, although a number of historical studies have shown that not all unemployed by far remain passive and that their protest, or at least the fear of it, has profoundly influenced and shaped emerging welfare systems in industrial societies since the late nineteenth century. Even at the time when Lazarsfeld and his colleagues studied the unemployed of Marienthal, Hunger Marches and other forms of organized popular resistance provided an outlet for the frustrations and demands of the unemployed in Germany, Britain, France, and the United States. While only a fraction of the registered unemployed participated in these organized collective efforts, such protest activities often enjoyed tremendous local and regional support and were carefully watched by the state. Those who did not join in frequently developed individual strategies of protest and resistance.

The attractive simplicity of the Marienthal thesis and the fact that it was backed up by empirical data and contemporary observation can be seen as one reason why the historical profession has for so long paid little attention to the protest of the unemployed. Other reasons were that the protest of the workless was to a large extent dominated by the radical political left and that the unemployed were primarily interested in improving their standard of living. Classified as insignificant, short-lived Communist stunts and as too materialistic...
Conference Report

to claim revolutionary flavour or qualify as class-conscious working-
class activity, unemployed protest triggered little interest across the
whole of the political spectrum. However, rising unemployment fig-
ures across the industrialized world since the 1980s have led to the
renewal of unemployed protest in many countries and to coordinat-
ed activities across national borders. This has attracted the attention
of political scientists as well as social psychologists, and in recent
years also of historians.

To bring the different strands of research on this issue together
and to place recent protest activities into a historical context, the
German Historical Institute London (GHIL) in collaboration with the
Society for the Study of Labour History held a conference at the
Institute’s premises in Bloomsbury on 16–17 February 2007. For the
first time participants from Germany, Britain, Ireland, France, the
United States, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Israel working in the
fields of history, political science, and social psychology came togeth-
er to discuss the focus, method, and results of their research and fos-
ter cooperation for further projects.

The conference was opened by the GHIL’s director, Andreas
Gestrich, and the two organizers, Matt Perry (University of
Newcastle) and Matthias Reiss (GHIL/University of Exeter). The
speakers in the first session, which was chaired by Matthias Reiss,
summarized the state of the field through the lens of their respective
academic disciplines, social psychology and history. Based on his
research on the Dutch unemployed movements, Bert Klandermans’s
(Free University Amsterdam) keynote speech addressed the question
of why it is so difficult to organize the workless. Klandermans pre-
sented a thoroughly structured overview of the process and dynam-
ics of participation in collective protest activities. Unemployed
protest is frequently discounted because not all the unemployed par-
ticipate and it is often short-lived. Klandermans addressed these
issues by pointing out that the ‘free rider’ problem affects all social
movements: members of an aggrieved group often see not joining a
public protest as the most efficient strategy in terms of costs and ben-
efits, as long as they expect others to voice their demands and them-
selves to benefit from others’ engagement. Klandermans also point-
ed out that more research has been done on why people participate
in protest than on why they quit, and that the dynamics of disen-
gagement needed to be studied further.
Richard Croucher (Middlesex University), who was once the chairperson of an unemployed work centre, then addressed the conference topic from a historical perspective. Croucher defined unemployed movements as organizations of, in contrast to movements for, the unemployed, which are concerned with the problems of the workless. He stressed the large number of people around the world who had direct or indirect experience of unemployment in the twentieth century and the value of this issue as an indicator to examine the positions of trade unions, social democratic parties, and cooperative movements. According to Croucher, the little attention unemployed protest has so far received cannot be justified from an archival viewpoint, although the short-lived and fragmented nature of many unemployed organizations does impede historical research. Identifying gaps in the existing scholarship, Croucher argued that, for example, the issue of leadership, the blend of motivational forces, and the role of trade unions and the Catholic Church needed further work.

Andrew Thorpe (University of Exeter) then introduced Margrit Schulte Beerbühl (Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf), who opened the case studies with a paper on the March of the Blanketeers in March 1817. Although not the first of the unemployed Hunger Marches in Britain, it was the best known of that period. Summarizing the negative judgements passed by historians on this march, Schulte Beerbühl recounted the event, arguing that it built on existing patterns of public protest and resulted from various unsuccessful collective attempts to get relief. She attributed the failure of the march to the lack of staunch leadership, weak organization, and a climate unfavourable for such activities. According to Schulte Beerbühl, labour historians’ preoccupation with political reform, revolutionary movements, trade unionism, and pre-industrial hunger riots has led them to pay little attention to the March of the Blanketeers, which does not fit neatly into any of these categories.

Because of a cancellation, this was the only paper on the early protest of the unemployed. The following panel, ‘The Golden Age of Unemployed Protest’, chaired by David DeVries (Tel Aviv University), focused on the interwar years. Jeannette Gabriel’s (City University of New York) paper, ‘“Natural Love for a Good Thing”: The Unemployed Workers’ Movement’s Struggle for a Government Jobs’ Programme, 1931–1942’, turned attention to the protest of the unemployed in the United States during the New Deal. After the stock
market crash of 1929, unemployed groups began to organize locally and by the early 1930s small groups held weekly meetings in tens of thousands of communities, arranged rent strikes and marches to relief offices, and even coordinated marches to Washington DC. Because of its geographical and political divisions, however, the unemployed movement was unable to prevent the termination of the first short-lived government work programme in 1934. The second, much less generous and inclusive government work programme, the Works Progress Administration (WPA), was created in the following year. When it, too, came under threat, however, a now unified unemployed movement was able to offer successful resistance in alliance with the newly created industrial labour federation, the Congress of Industrial Action. The movement even organized occupations of buildings in state capitals, and the actions of the unemployed forced several state legislatures to back down from proposals to discontinue funding for government jobs’ programmes in 1936. The movement’s pressure on state and national government officials, Gabriel concluded, ensured the continuation of the WPA until 1942, long after the Roosevelt administration intended it to be dismantled.

In ‘Community, Crisis, Party and State: Explaining Unemployed Protest in the Ruhr at the End of the Weimar Republic’, Alex Zukas (National University, San Diego) stressed the success of the Communists in organizing the unemployed in this highly industrialized part of Germany. Unemployment was the issue which helped the Communist party to gain influence and win elections in this region, which had many young people, high unemployment, and tight-knit working-class communities. Ninety percent of the unemployed protest was organized by the Communists and their organizations, who linked immediate demands with longer-term ones. By the mid-1930s, Communist street and community cells outnumbered factory cells, and their well-organized protest encompassed mass marches, the occupation of town halls, and other activities.

Philip H. Slaby (Guilford College, Greensboro NC) then spoke on ‘The Protests of Jobless Immigrants in Interwar France’, a group so far largely neglected by historians. Slaby focused on the largely Polish immigrants in the Pas-de-Calais from 1932 to 1934. The economic crisis and rising unemployment led to increased pressure on the immigrants to return to their countries of origin. Many French perceived them as a threat to their economic interests and to nation-
al security at the same time. Under government pressure, coal-mining companies sought to remove foreign miners from their payrolls and tried to coax them into accepting voluntary repatriation to their native countries, while state officials in the département exercised their considerable discretionary powers to override immigrants’ rights. Despite the threat of forcible deportation, foreign workers began to protest in the spring of 1934, aided by the trade unions, and their unrest culminated in three days of often violent protests in May of that year. Local authorities saw this as a vindication of their hard line and continued it in defiance of clear instructions from the central authorities in Paris. In 1935, however, the national government itself enacted discriminatory legislation against immigrants which, for example, allowed the expulsion of unemployed foreigners after a period of grace, even if they were legal residents.

The second day of the conference started with a session on the media, which was chaired by David Stewart (University of Central Lancashire, Preston). Antoine Capet (University of Rouen) spoke on the ‘Protests of the Unemployed in Victor Gollancz’s Left Book Club’. While the Left Book Club, formed in 1936, was mostly associated with foreign affairs, a number of its publications addressed the domestic issue of unemployment without explicitly indicating this in their titles. Capet argued that for the authors of the Left Book Club the struggle against fascism and unemployment was essentially the same, as the former was seen as leading to the latter. Wal Hannington in particular, the leading figure of the National Unemployed Workers’ Movement (NUWM), stressed this nexus in his books and presented his organization and its protest activities as a means of preventing the workless from falling for fascist seducers. Hannington and other authors defended the unemployed against accusations of laziness, but the Club also published testimonies by un- or underemployed workers. According to Capet, all Left Book Club publications projected a picture of doom and gloom when dealing with unemployment, which became part of a discourse of warning during and after the Second World War. The Left Book Club was dissolved in October 1948, partly because the disappearance of unemployment and the capital it could make by its representations of it had deprived the Club of one of its mainstays.

Ingrid Hayes (Paris 1-La Sorbonne) discussed the history of ‘Lorraine Coeur d’Acier, 1979-1980: A Radio Station in Longwy

From the Blanketeers to the Present
against the Dismantling of the Steel Industry. Threatened with unemployment, the steelworkers started an unprecedented eight-month-long protest in December 1978, based on the strong tradition of workers’ militancy in this region. New forums of action were created which took the struggle out of the factories. They organized demonstrations by children, blockades, and occupations of government buildings. In addition, an illegal ‘free radio’ station, NCA, was set up by the trade union CGT and run by two journalists from Paris. Anybody could interrupt the programme and women had their own time on air. Gradually, NCA became a local station and the struggle to protect it replaced the struggle for the steel industry. The people who spoke on air where mostly not elected leaders and many felt that participating in NCA broadened their horizons and enabled them to imagine a different future for themselves. In the summer of 1980, however, the CGT fired the two journalists and stopped supporting the station.

As Hayes’s paper showed, the individual dimension and implications of unemployed protest should not be neglected in favour of the traditional focus on collective street protest. Indeed, the first paper of the panel ‘Beyond Collective Protest’, which was chaired by Cybele Locke (Connecticut College), suggested that collective protest was not necessarily the natural reaction of those on the fringes of the labour market. In ‘Protesting Individuals: The French Unemployed in the 1930s’, Michael Seidman (University of North Carolina-Wilmington) contested the notion established by Marie Jahoda and others that unemployment was a curse or something evil that always had profoundly destructive effects. Focusing on French women, in particular cleaning women, in the 1930s, Seidman argued that a significant number committed deception or benefit fraud. He stated that unemployment, absenteeism, and violation of rules established by the state could be seen as acts of individual resistance to the dominant model and ideal of wage labour. Denunciations of such acts were frequent and often paired with descriptions of immoral behaviour, such as drunkenness. Seidman concluded that such acts of individual resistance contradict the prevailing image of working-class solidarity and productiveness.

In contrast, Stephanie Ward’s (University of Aberystwyth) paper ‘New Perspectives on British Interwar Unemployed Protests: The Case of the Means Test’ dealt with forms of protest against unem-
ployment which were deemed more respectable than street protest. While historians have so far dealt mostly with the NUWM’s marches against the means test after its re-introduction in 1931, the test was the focus of much protest by different groups. The demand for its abolition channelled the anger of the unemployed into one clear aim and acted as an umbrella for wider grievances. It provided a clear target in the form of officials, buildings, and organizations, and a wide range of people were able to participate in the protest because the demand for abolition was not revolutionary. Ward stressed that opposition to the test was expressed not only in big marches and rallies. To focus exclusively on these creates a false impression of the much wider levels of discontent with the test. Deputations, petitions, letters, and meetings provided outlets for positive action without radical connotations, and Ward argued that these forms of protest were taken seriously by the authorities. They could not easily be ignored, were deemed more respectable than street protest, and generated support against the test, which made the large demonstrations possible.

Malcolm Chase (University of Leeds) concluded this panel by arguing that failure to protest was the norm for the unemployed between the world wars. In his case study on ‘The Ironstone Mining Communities of East Cleveland in Interwar Britain’, Chase described attempts to occupy unemployed miners on a plot of land aptly named ‘Heartbreak Hill’. A large proportion of the 2,600 registered allotment societies in 1936 were associated with the unemployed, but the effort in East Cleveland was a communal farming project, not an allotment society, and was initiated by the local squire. Chase described it as an exercise in Tory paternalism in a marginal seat which aimed to demonstrate to the unemployed that the local social and political elite cared about them and that something practical was being done. He highlighted the environmentalist and racialist ideas on which the project was based and its connections with the German youth movement and later National Socialism. The movement back to the land had a certain appeal for the unemployed miners during the depression, although they preferred individual allotments over communal farming. Chase concluded by arguing that voluntary schemes like this one diffused tensions and depoliticized the unemployed during the interwar period.

The final session, which was chaired by Matt Perry, dealt with ‘Recent Project Activities’ of the unemployed. In their paper ‘Ex-
plaining the Mobilization of the Unemployed: About some Theoretical Issues’, Didier Chabanet (Institute of Political Studies, Lyon) and Jean Faniel (Centre de recherche et d’information socio-politiques, Brussels) presented some of the results of their research on unemployed protest in ten different European countries since the mid-1970s. They argued, for example, that protests are more widespread in countries with high levels of social protection, as the expectations of the unemployed increase in line with their rights, and in countries with a pronounced separation between insiders and outsiders. They called trade union support a mixed blessing for unemployed movements and pointed out that collective action by the marginalized is more likely where levels of unionization and centralization are low. Nevertheless, Chabanet and Faniel stressed the crucial role of organizations in helping to transform objective grievances, subjectively perceived relative deprivations, and political opportunities into action and in providing links between local organizations. Faniel and Chabanet concluded by emphasizing that unemployed protest is a significant political phenomenon, and that the strategy of the unemployed has changed in recent years towards challenging the discourse about unemployment and the people affected by it.

This issue was picked up Deborah Vietor-Englander (Technical University Darmstadt) in her paper on internet-based protest by the German unemployed since 2000. Her sample comprised six of around thirty internet forums, including those for civil servants working in benefits administration. Each forum is frequented by 3,500 to 7,000 users. Vietor-Englander summarized the recent changes in the German benefits system which increased pressure on the unemployed by reducing payments, introducing a means test after one year, 1-Euro jobs, and imposing tighter controls, including domestic visits. With 8.5 million Germans receiving benefits of some kind, unemployment is now affecting or threatening wider social circles, including skilled workers and academics, who have started to protest in public. Vietor-Englander pointed out that people who (still) have a job are easier to mobilize in vastly greater numbers than the actual unemployed, and the German trade unions have helped to organize their protests against job cuts and low wages. The unemployed, however, are using the internet forums to debate and dispute official unemployed figures, exchange experiences, and organize resistance to the regulations, for example, by educating the unem-
ployed about their rights, encouraging lawsuits, and recommending lawyers. This has led to a massive increase in the number of court cases and the subsequent collapse of the system in Berlin. Gender- and age-specific problems are also discussed, as are problems of ethnicity, while attempts to deceive and cheat the system are explicitly not supported. Vietor-Englander ended by pointing out that the internet is also used by civil servants to share their experiences and views of the unemployed, which often focus on the apathy of the latter.

In his final comment on the conference, Dick Geary (University of Nottingham) picked up Chase’s point by emphasizing that most workers were never engaged in any form of protest and that it was therefore not surprising that the more vulnerable unemployed also largely abstained from it. Geary also stressed the crucial role of the labour movement and the state in the success or failure of unemployed movements, and their divisive potential for the labour movement, which often saw itself as the organ of the productive workers only. According to Geary, one cannot totally discard the findings of social psychologists such as Paul Lazarsfeld as their observations have been confirmed by many contemporaries and also by subsequent studies. Some unemployed indeed despaired and became apathetic. The reaction to losing one’s job depends on the individual psyche, the level of integration into social networks, individual expectations, and other factors. Geary pointed out that ‘the unemployed’ have multiple identities based on region, age, gender, faith, and political affiliation. As the unemployed are such an amorphous group, studies of unemployed protest have to pay attention to how an economic crisis undermines workers’ solidarity and how individuals use niches in the system to survive. Geary argued that accommodation and resistance do not represent a dichotomy. Drawing an analogy with the behaviour of slaves, he stressed that individuals often adopted highly rational survival strategies to deal with unemployment, and suggested that these need to be researched more.

Seidman had addressed some of these individual strategies in his paper, which had triggered a discussion on whether such actions could really be regarded as ‘unemployed protest’. Similarly, the March of the Blanketeers had raised the question of whether its participants could already be called ‘unemployed’. Vietor-Englander had pointed out that public protests of employed people against the spectre of unemployment were often more impressive and enjoyed
more trade union support than the protests of the actual unemployed. What in fact constituted unemployed protest therefore needs to be more clearly defined. The conference showed that not all the unemployed by far were passive and accepted their fate, and that much more research needs to be done, for example, on individual strategies, the dynamics of engagement and disengagement, and the importance of regional traditions. It was repeatedly pointed out during the conference that traditional labour history leaves little room to study the actions of the workless. While unemployed protest is still widely seen as an insignificant minority phenomenon within the historical profession, it is hoped that this conference has started to change this by fostering exchange between historians working on this subject and by initiating contacts across academic disciplines and national borders. Given that many European countries have experienced mass unemployment for decades, a fresh look at the behaviour of the unemployed could be called timely. A publication of the conference papers is planned.

Matthias Reiss (GHIL/University of Exeter)
Research Seminar

The GHIL regularly organizes a research seminar at which recipients of grants from the Institute, Fellows of the GHIL, and other scholars report on the progress of their work. Any postgraduate or postdoctoral researchers who are interested in the subjects are welcome to attend. As a general rule, the language of the papers and discussion is German, and meetings start at 5 p.m.

Due to circumstances beyond our control, most of the meetings arranged for this term are before the publication date of this Bulletin. They are recorded here, along with papers given earlier in the year, as a matter of interest to readers. For further information concerning future dates please contact Dr Martina Steber on 020 7309 2015, or email her on msteber@ghil.ac.uk

5 June   Alexander Schunka (Stuttgart)
          Englisch-preußische Konfessionspolitik in der Korrespondenz Londoner und Oxforder gelehrt Zirkel um 1700

17 July  Markus M. Nöhl (Trier)
          Kulturelle Symboliken und Aneignungen des Automobils in den 1960er Jahren im europäischen Vergleich (1958–74)

24 July  Klaus Nathaus (Berlin)
          Die industrielle Produktion von Kultur in ihrer sozialen Einbettung: ‘Cultural Industries’ in Deutschland und Großbritannien

21 Aug.  Maren Möhring (Cologne)
          Ausländische Gastronomie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Migrations- und konsumhistorische Perspektiven
Noticeboard

21 Aug. Mio Wakita-Elis (Heidelberg)
Die Vermarktung der Kimono-Schönheiten in der japanischen Souvenirfotografie der Meiji-Zeit

4 Sept. Helke Rausch (Leipzig)
US-amerikanische Wissenschaftsphilanthropie in Frankreich, Deutschland und Großbritannien in der Zwischen- und Nachkriegszeit (ca. 1920–70)

11 Sept. Ferdinand Leikam (Munich)
Empire, Entwicklung und Europa: Großbritannien zwischen europäischer Integration und Dekolonisation, 1945–75

18 Sept. Thorsten Schulz (Cologne)
Die Sicherheitsdimensionen der internationalen Umweltpolitik in Europa: Grenzen—Möglichkeiten—Tendenzen. Das Beispiel Deutschland, England und USA 1965 bis 1975

9 Oct. Andreas Willershausen (Augsburg)
‘Viae Pacis’: Die Friedensvermittlung der Päpste von Avignon (1337–78)

16 Oct. Katharina Böhmer (Kassel)
‘Halbstarke’ in Westeuropa—Amerikanisierung und Gesellschaftswandel in Frankreich, Großbritannien und der Bundesrepublik, 1955–65

16 Oct. Ulrike Lindner (Munich)
Deutsche und britische Kolonialidentitäten im imperialen Zeitalter: Gegenseitige Wahrnehmung von Kolonialherrschaft und Kolonialpraktiken in Afrika 1890–1914

20 Nov. Peter Kramper (Freiburg)
‘Drink beer by the pint, not the litre’: Messen, Zählen und Wiegen in Großbritannien 1750–1914
Forthcoming Conferences


Researchers on the Middle Ages are showing increased interest in the topic of the family, as can be seen by the numerous academic conferences devoted to this subject in the recent past. Medieval research thus demonstrates once again that it is a political discipline that reflects present-day issues through the medium of history: ‘family’ is, after all, one of the topics at the centre of current political interest. Research on family and relatives in the Middle Ages is influenced by traditions that can vary tremendously from country to country. Viewed from the macro-historical perspective, English and German research seem, at first glance, to be fundamentally different. The aim of this year’s annual meeting of the Brackweder Arbeitskreis für Mittelalterforschung is to overcome the ‘bafflement’ between Anglophone and German historians working in this field, which has recently been pointed out by Bernhard Jussen, and to contrast the various research traditions. If possible the question as to the range of the family model within the medieval Occident is to be discussed in detail—theoretically, spatially, and socially. Particularly interesting are those phenomena which do not correspond to the model of the ‘Western family’: patrilinearity, expansion of the ‘simple household system’ into more complex intermediary household forms, etc. How did family reconcile itself with other models of social links? Where did they complement one another? Where were there tensions and conflicts? The papers at this year’s conference will take up the challenge posed by the ‘Western family’ and, at the same time, pose a counter-challenge. Our present is characterized by the pluralization of family models, and present-day historians are therefore more sensitive to the plurality of the latter, as the title of the conference indicates.
Cosmopolitan Networks in Commerce and Society 1660–1914. Conference to be held in collaboration with Historisches Seminar II, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, at the German Historical Institute London, 6–8 Dec. 2007.

The concept of networks as a particular form of social interaction and organization has become very popular in many disciplines over the last two decades. However, the subject has not yet lost its challenges. Network theory has been applied in economic history to explain the contemporary growth of international and global trade. Actor-oriented and focusing particularly on the coordinating activities of individuals, the network approach can also be used to explain economic and social changes in the early modern period.

From the seventeenth century long-distance trade was organized and managed not only by large trading companies but increasingly also by individual merchants and their informal networks. This led to the emergence of extensive cosmopolitan trade networks based on family ties, ethnicity, business, or religion.

The conference will address such topics as (1) the geographies of transnational trade networks and their dynamics, (2) their strengths and structural weaknesses, and (3) their influence and power on trade and society.

Monarchy and Exile, 1600–1941. Conference of the Society for Court Studies in conjunction with the German Historical Institute London, to be held at the GHIL, 14–15 Dec. 2007.

Monarchical culture is now being explored from many new angles. Particular emphasis has been laid on the interaction between monarchy and the public. The transformation of monarchical rule into representative duty, the popularization of reigning families as part of the public image of monarchy, and attempts to re-invent monarchical culture at the end of the nineteenth century have provided us with a much more complex picture than the traditional paradigm of monarchical decline. Although monarchical control over political decision-making decreased, the public role of monarchy, its social, cultural and, not least, economic significance did not disappear.
Despite this renewed interest in monarchical culture, little has been written about monarchy and exile. The most notable exceptions are works on the courts of the exiled Stuarts and the German Kaiser. Although they provide us with important insights, they cover only part of a more analytical approach to the topic. The conference aims to establish a coherent framework for studying monarchies and exile from 1600 to the present, dealing with the topic at organizational, dynastic, and political level.

Speakers include: Karen Britland (Henrietta Maria); Edward Corp (James II and III); Peter Hicks (Napoleon I); Anna Keay (Charles II); Philip Mansel (Louis XVIII); Heidi Mehrkens (The Empress Eugénie); William O’Reilly (Charles VI); Toby Osborne (Marie de’ Medici); Jim Retallack (Johann of Saxony); Torsten Riotte (George V / Ernst August of Hanover); John Röhl (Wilhelm II); W. H. C. Smith (Napoleon III); Guy Stair Sainty (The Bourbons of Naples); Ferenc Toth (Ferenc Rákóczi) II; and Emmanuel de Waresquiel (Louis XVIII during the Hundred Days).

The conveners are Torsten Riotte (T.Riotte@em.uni-frankfurt.de), and Philip Mansel, Society of Court Studies (SCS) London (philip-mansel@compuserve.com).

Postgraduate Students’ Conference

On 10–12 January 2008 the German Historical Institute London will hold its twelfth annual conference for postgraduate research students in the UK and Ireland working on German history, Anglo–German relations, or comparative topics. The intention is to give Ph.D. students an opportunity to present their work in progress and to discuss it with other students working in the same field. It is hoped that the exchange of ideas and methods will be fruitful for all participants. The Institute will meet travel expenses up to a standard rail fare within the UK (special arrangements for students from Ireland), and also arrange and pay for student accommodation, when necessary, for those who live outside London. For further information please contact the Secretary, Anita Bellamy, by phone on 020 7309 2023, or email her on: abellamy@ghil.ac.uk
Keeping Secrets: How Important was Intelligence to the Conduct of International Relations from 1914 to 1989? Conference to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 17–19 Apr. 2008.

The study of intelligence has long had a negative press. Until recently it was seen as a cloak-and-dagger genre confined to cranks and hobby code-breakers. The conference will ask at what points, if at all, military and political intelligence played a decisive part in the history of twentieth-century Europe. We will examine intelligence from its early stages technologically during the First World War to the more complex operations during the Cold War. This raises the obvious question: did advances in interception and decryption transform the contribution of intelligence to the conduct of international relations? For our purpose five countries and their intelligence agencies form the focus of the conference: the USA, Russia, Britain, Germany, and France.

New GHIL Publications


Abstract

This collection of essays is a pioneering survey of the spiritual dimensions of kingship in eighteenth-century Europe. It investigates the role of clergymen in the mechanics of the court, the religious observances of monarchs and their entourages, and the importance of religious images and ceremonial in underpinning royal power. The volume compares the British, French, Russian, and some of the German monarchies in order to allow comparisons to be drawn between different national and especially confessional settings. Based on original research and new source material, the fifteen essays by established scholars chart mostly unknown territory. Previous research on the subject has focused on the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries at the expense of the age of Enlightenment which has widely been regard-
ed as a period of desacralization of monarchy. The essays open up new perspectives on the function of court clerics, conspicuous and internalized forms of aulic devotion, the gendered framing of religion, the purpose of court ritual, and the divide between the public and private spheres of monarchy. Overall the essays maintain that despite the gradual decline of monarchy by divine right, religion still permeated almost all aspects of court life and monarchical representation. The volume thus challenges received wisdom about the disenchantment of kingship and the rise of more rationalized forms of absolutist government during the period between c.1688 and 1789.


Abstract
Public protest marches and meetings have become a global and transnational phenomenon. Images of Asian Muslims protesting against cartoons published by a Danish newspaper are aired into living rooms in Europe and America. Coordinated mass demonstrations on different continents voice demands to ‘Make Poverty History’ or to stop the war against Iraq, while the process of economic globalization has created an equally transnational network of critics. Given the worldwide adoption of Western-style street processions and meetings with their familiar symbols and rituals, it is easily forgotten that this form of organized public protest only developed in the nineteenth century and was long regarded with intense suspicion. Until well after the Second World War participating in street processions and meetings was viewed by the elites as a challenge to their predominant role, and the protestors were regarded as unrespectable or worse. This volume examines the evolution of the protest march and its subsequent adaptation and use by different groups, such as nationalists, the labour movements, suffragettes, Communists, fascists, and peace and civil rights activists in Europe and the United States. The case studies focus especially on the use of symbols, rituals, traditions, public spaces and symbolic places, the interaction between the marchers, the state, and the public, the use of
Noticeboard

the media and the question of violence, as well as the success and legacy of the marches. Three further essays introduce the reader to the most important figures, questions, and the methodology of protest march studies in social psychology, sociology, and geography.


Abstract
This volume brings together the most recent research on European aristocracies in the first half of the twentieth century. An international array of social and political historians analyses the aristocracies of eleven countries at a particularly testing time: the interwar years. After the First World War aristocrats were confronted with revolutions, republics, and an influx of ‘Bolshevist’ ideas. Debates about a new order in which aristocrats would play a leading part took place in all countries after 1918. The Mussolini model, in particular, seemed an ideal solution and had an impact on aristocrats all over Europe. Here the exchange of ideas between networks of related aristocratic families played a part in spreading pro-fascist ideas. Anti-Semitism, anti-Bolshevismin, and a belief in charismatic leadership also led to admiration of leaders such as Horthy and Franco. In all countries radical right-wing movements tried to recruit aristocrats as symbolic if not strategic figureheads. Is it possible, therefore, to speak of a last flourishing of the aristocracy in countries where fascist or authoritarian regimes were successful? Or are we falling for a left-wing conspiracy theory by overestimating the aristocracy’s political prowess and failing to see that they often stood as a conservative bulwark against the radical right? The book shows that if radical right-wing parties could not offer new avenues to power centres, aristocrats, despite a natural predisposition, were not tempted to join, or soon lost interest. Yet their flirtations and short-term entanglements with these movements show that they played a destructive role in the great crisis years of parliamentarism.
Abstract

This third volume in the series *British Envoys to Germany* comprises a selection of official reports sent by British diplomats from Germany to the Foreign Office between 1848 and 1850.

For the Foreign Office in London, the unstable situation in Germany immediately resulted in an unprecedented flood of diplomatic dispatches. The brief period of three years covered in this volume—from the outbreak of revolution to the start of the Dresden Conferences in late 1850—allows the density of events to be reflected at the level both of the individual states of the German Confederation and of Germany as a whole. Given the wealth of events that were worth reporting and increasingly worrying to British observers, the envoys largely dispensed with the descriptions of the economic, social, and cultural aspects of their host countries that had been a feature of their reports during the Vormärz period up to 1847. Instead, the diplomatic correspondence vividly illustrates the importance of the 1848 revolution and its aftermath as an epoch-making political event in German and European history. Among other things, it is notable that in 1848 and subsequently, local and regional processes were interpreted in a wider German context. As a result largely of the controversial discussion of the German question and the Schleswig-Holstein crisis, Germany’s federal dimension acquired a new ‘national’ character in the envoys’ reports of the revolutionary period.

All originals selected for this edition are held in the National Archives/Public Record Office, Kew and are transcribed and annotated for the first time. As in the preceding volumes, the selections made for this volume are based on the quality, originality of perspective, and informative value of the dispatches, and are balanced between the individual missions. The diplomatic correspondence includes dispatches from the British missions in Frankfurt (Diet of the German Confederation/Provisional Central Power), Berlin (Prussia), Hamburg (Hanse Towns), Hanover, Dresden (Saxony), Stuttgart (Württemberg), Munich (Bavaria), and Vienna (Austria).
Further information and a combined subject and biographical index of the series (including short biographies of all individuals mentioned in the reports) are available online at <http://www.ghil.ac.uk/envoys/>. Additionally, all dispatches are listed and accessible via search tools. Data from volume 4 (1851–66) and the follow-up volumes on the *Kaiserreich* era will be added to the digital indexes as each volume is published.


Abstract

Apart from the Rothschilds, the Barings, and a few other famous English bankers of German origin, little is known about the history of the German commercial elite in England. As early as the eighteenth century, however, German merchants constituted the largest group of European merchants. This book looks at a forgotten majority.

Starting with the naturalization laws, a quantitative and qualitative survey of the German commercial elite in England was undertaken. By assessing hitherto unused source material in Britain, information was discovered about the commercial and cultural strategies of more than 500 German merchants in London, their social and economic networks, and where they were located. From the mid-seventeenth century a chain of immigration to the British capital started to form, about which little is so far known. It led to a considerable entanglement of the proto-industrial textile regions of north-west Germany, Silesia and Saxony, with the British colonies and, beyond the borders of the Empire, with the previously independent trade networks of the other European colonial powers and with Russia. From their base in the British capital the Germans organized what amounted to worldwide trade. The precondition for participating in British world trade was the acquisition of British citizenship.

Migration to London cannot be explained solely in terms of the British Empire. It was part of an extensive drive for international
expansion on the part of the German commercial families, with the aim of placing family members in the main locations for European trade. In this way, in the age of mercantilism, they secured direct access to the regional and colonial trade networks of the other European states. The London branch, however, played a particularly important role because of the infrastructure available there in the service sector, especially in finance and shipping.

By opening for business on the Thames the German merchants served not only their own foreign interests, but also Britain’s hegemonic aspirations. Britain used its trade networks to further its expansionist aims. Particular attention is paid in this study to the reciprocity of interests of the two parties. The fact that they worked together played a crucial role in Britain’s rise to become a leading world trade power.
LIBRARY NEWS

Recent Acquisitions

This list contains a selection of recent publications in German and English, primarily on German history, acquired by the Library of the GHIL in the past year.


Aly, Götz (ed.), *Volkes Stimme: Skepsis und Führervertrauen im Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2006)


Art, David, *The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)

Recent Acquisitions


Bähr, Andreas and Hans Medick (eds.), *Sterben von eigener Hand: Selbsttötung als kulturelle Praxis* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2005)

Balcar, Jaromir and Thomas Schlemmer (eds.), *An der Spitze der CSU: Die Führungsgremien der Christlich Sozialen Union 1946 bis 1955*, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 68 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007)


Bauerkämper, Arnd and Christiane Eisenberg (eds.), *Britain as a Model of Modern Society? German Views*, Beiträge zur Englandforschung, 56 (Augsburg: Wißner, 2006)

Beck, Ralf, *Der traurige Patriot: Sebastian Haffner und die deutsche Frage*, Berliner Beiträge zur Zeit- und Mediengeschichte (Berlin: be.bra Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2005)


Behrisch, Lars (ed.), *Vermessen, Zählen, Berechnen: Die politische Ordnung des Raums im 18. Jahrhundert*, Historische Politikforschung, 6 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2006)


Library News


Berghoff, Hartmut (ed.), *Marketinggeschichte: Die Genese einer modernen Sozialtechnik* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2007)


Blickle, Peter and Rudolf Schlögl (eds.), *Die Säkularisation im Prozess der Säkularisierung Europas, Oberschwaben: Geschichte und Kultur, 13* (Epfenberg: Bibliotheca academica, 2005)

Bock, Gisela (ed.), *Genozid und Geschlecht: Jüdische Frauen im nationalsozialistischen Lagersystem* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2005)


Recent Acquisitions


Bösch, Frank and Manuel Borutta (eds.), Die Massen bewegen: Medien und Emotionen in der Moderne (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2006)


Brunner, Claudia and Uwe von Seltmann, Schweigen die Täter reden die Enkel (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2006)


Clinefelter, Joan L., Artists for the Reich: Culture and Race from Weimar to Nazi Germany (Oxford: Berg, 2005)

Library News


Diamond, Jared, *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive* (London: Allen Lane, 2005)

Diehl, Paula (ed.), *Körper im Nationalsozialismus: Bilder und Praxen* (Munich: Fink, 2006)


Eckart, Wolfgang Uwe, Volker Sellin, et al. (eds.), *Die Universität Heidelberg im Nationalsozialismus* (Heidelberg: Springer, 2006)


Elz, Wolfgang (ed.), *Quellen zur Aussenpolitik der Weimarer Republik 1918–1933*, Freiherr vom Stein-Gedächtnisausgabe. [Reihe B:] Ausgewählte Quellen zur deutschen Geschichte der Neuzeit, 32 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007)


Faulstich, Werner (ed.), *Das Erste Jahrzehnt: Kulturgeschichte des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts* (Munich: Fink, 2006)


Fleiter, Rüdiger, *Stadtverwaltung im Dritten Reich: Verfolgungspolitik auf kommunaler Ebene am Beispiel Hannovers*, Hannoversche Studien, 10 (Hanover: Hahn, 2006)


Forster, Marc R. and Benjamin J. Kaplan (eds.), *Piety and Family in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Honour of Steven Ozment* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005)
Library News


Frieser, Karl-Heinz (ed.), *Die Ostfront 1943/44: Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, 8* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2007)


Fulbrook, Mary (ed.), *Un-Civilizing Processes? Excess and Transgression in German Society and Culture: Perspectives Debating with Norbert Elias, German Monitor, 66* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007)


Recent Acquisitions

Gatz, Erwin (ed.), Die Bistümer der deutschsprachigen Länder von der Säkularisation bis zur Gegenwart (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2005)


Görtemaker, Manfred, Thomas Mann und die Politik (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2005)

Gotzmann, Andreas and Stephan Wendehorst (eds.), Juden im Recht: Neue Zugänge zur Rechtsgeschichte der Juden im Alten Reich, Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung, Beiheft 39 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2007)


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Günther, Niklas and Sönke Zankel (eds.), *Abrahams Enkel: Juden, Christen, Muslime und die Schoa*, Historische Mitteilungen, Beiheft 65 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006)


Hein, Dieter, Klaus Hildebrand, and Andreas Schulz (eds.), *Historie und Leben. Der Historiker als Wissenschaftler und Zeitgenosse: Festschrift für Lothar Gall zum 70. Geburtstag* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006)


Hübner, Peter, Christoph Kleßmann, and Klaus Tenfelde (eds.), Arbeiter im Staatssozialismus: Ideologischer Anspruch und soziale Wirklichkeit, Zeithistorische Studien, 31 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2005)


Hürtner, Johannes, Hitlers Heerführer: Die deutschen Oberbefehlshaber im Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1941/42, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 66 (2nd edn.; Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007)


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Kaplan, Marion and Beate Meyer (eds.), Jüdische Welten: Juden in Deutschland vom 18. Jahrhundert bis in die Gegenwart, Hamburger Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Juden, 27 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005)


Kissling, Peter, Freie Bauern und bäuerliche Bürger: Eglofs im Spätmittelalter und in der Frühneuzeit, Oberschwaben: Geschichte und Kultur, 14 (Epfendorf: bibliotheca academica Verlag, 2006)


Körte, Clemens, Rechtsbewusstsein und Verrechtlichung in der irischen Agrargesellschaft 1760–1850 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006)

Kortüm, Hans-Henning (ed.), Transcultural Wars from the Middle Ages to the Twenty-First Century (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2006)

Kossert, Andreas, Ostpreussen: Geschichte und Mythos (Munich: Siedler, 2005)


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Kruppa, Nathalie and Jürgen Wilke (eds.), *Kloster und Bildung im Mittelalter*, Studien zur Germania Sacra, 28; Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, 218 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006)


Leiser, Erwin, 1937: *Kunst und Macht. Hitlers Sonderauftrag Linz*, 2 Filme (Berlin: absolut Medien, [2006])


Maleczek, Werner (ed.), *Fragen der politischen Integration im mittelalterlichen Europa*, Vorträge und Forschungen/Konstanzer Arbeitskreis für mittelalterliche Geschichte, 63 (Ostfildern: Thorbecke, 2005)


Mascha Kaléko (ed.), *Heimat und Exil: Emigration der deutschen Juden nach 1933*, exhibition catalogue (Frankfurt am Main: Jüdischer Verlag im Suhrkamp Verlag, 2006)


Mazlish, Bruce and Akira Iriye (eds.), *The Global History Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2005)


Moore, Bob and Barbara Hately-Broad (eds.), *Prisoners of War, Prisoners of Peace: Captivity, Homecoming and Memory in World War II* (Oxford: Berg, 2005)
Moorhouse, Roger, *Killing Hitler: The Third Reich and the Plots against the Führer* (London: Cape, 2006)
Müller, Klaus, *Köln von der französischen zur preußischen Herrschaft: 1794–1815*, Geschichte der Stadt Köln, 8 (Cologne: Greven, 2005)


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Pugh, Martin, ‘Hurrah for the Blackshirts!’: Fascists and Fascism in Britain between the Wars (London: Cape, 2005)
Rademacher, Michael, Die Kreisleiter der NSDAP im Gau Weser-Ems (Marburg: Tectum Verlag, 2005)
Ramsden, John, Don’t Mention the War: The British and the Germans since 1890 (London: Little, Brown, 2006)
Ribbe, Wolfgang (ed.), Schloß und Schloßbezirk in der Mitte Berlins: Das Zentrum der Stadt als politischer und gesellschaftlicher Ort (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2005)
Riemann, Dietmar, Laufzettel: Tagebuch einer Ausreise, Biografische Quellen, 3 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005)
Rogge, Jörg, Die Wettiner: Aufstieg einer Dynastie im Mittelalter (Ostfildern: Thorbecke, 2005)
Rose, Norman Anthony, Harold Nicolson (London: Cape, 2005)
Rublack, Ulinka, Reformation Europe, New Approaches to European History, 28 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
Rüsen, Jörn, Kultur macht Sinn: Orientierung zwischen Gestern und Morgen (Cologne: Böhlau, 2006)
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Safley, Thomas Max (ed.), Ad historiam humanam: Aufsätze für Hans-Christoph Rublack (Epfenfodd: bibliotheca academica Verlag, 2005)
Saldern, Adelheid von (ed.), Stadt und Kommunikation in bundesrepublikanischen Umbruchszeiten, Beiträge zur Kommunikationsgeschichte, 17 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006)
Schaus, Margaret (ed.), Women and Gender in Medieval Europe: An Encyclopedia (London: Routledge, 2006)
Schein, Sylvia, Gateway to the Heavenly City: Crusader Jerusalem and the Catholic West (1099–1187) (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005)
Schildt, Axel, Die Sozialgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis 1989/90, Enzyklopädie deutscher Geschichte, 80 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007)
Schmidt, Georg, Martin van Gelderen, et al. (eds.), Kollektive Freiheitsvorstellungen im frühneuzeitlichen Europa (1400–1850), Jenaer Beiträge zur Geschichte, 8 (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2006)
Schmieder, Felicitas, Die mittelalterliche Stadt (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005)
Recent Acquisitions


Schott, Dieter, Bill Luckin, and Geneviève Massard-Guilbaud (eds.), *Resources of the City: Contributions to an Environmental History of Modern Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005)


Sommer, Michael (ed.), *Politische Morde: Vom Altertum bis zur Gegenwart* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005)

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Speitkamp, Winfried, *Deutsche Kolonialgeschichte* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2005)


Stollberg-Rilinger, Barbara, *Das Heilige Römische Reich Deutscher Nation: Vom Ende des Mittelalters bis 1806* (Munich: Beck, 2006)


Recent Acquisitions


Tyerman, Christopher, God’s War: A New History of the Crusades (London: Allen Lane, 2006)


Vavra, Elisabeth (ed.), Virtuelle Räume: Raumwahrnehmung und Raumvorstellung im Mittelalter (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2005)


Walter, Rolf (ed.), Innovationsgeschichte, Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Beiheft 188 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2007)


Wolfbring, Barbara, *Neuere Geschichte studieren* (Constance: UVK Verlag-Gesellschaft, 2006)


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Ziegler, Dieter, *Die Industrielle Revolution* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005)


PUBLICATIONS OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE LONDON

Vol. 1: Wilhelm Lenz (ed.), Archivalische Quellen zur deutsch-britischen Geschichte seit 1500 in Großbritannien; Manuscript Sources for the History of Germany since 1500 in Great Britain (Boppard a. Rh.: Boldt, 1975)


Vol. 4: Paul Kluke and Peter Alter (eds), Aspekte der deutsch-britischen Beziehungen im Laufe der Jahrhunderte; Aspects of Anglo-German Relations through the Centuries (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1978)

Vol. 5: Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Peter Alter and Robert W. Scribner (eds), Stadtbürgertum und Adel in der Reformation: Studien zur Sozialgeschichte der Reformation in England und Deutschland; The Urban Classes, the Nobility and the Reformation: Studies on the Social History of the Reformation in England and Germany (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1979)


Vol. 43: Knut Diekmann, Die nationalistische Bewegung in Wales (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1998)


Vol. 50: Jörn Leonhard, Liberalismus: Zur historischen Semantik eines europäischen Deutungsmusters (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001)


Vol. 57: Ulrike Lindner, Gesundheitspolitik in der Nachkriegszeit: Großbritannien und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Vergleich (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004)


STUDIES OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE
LONDON—OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS


Alfred Haverkamp and Hanna Vollrath (eds.), England and Germany in the High Middle Ages (Oxford, 1996)


Matthias Reiss (ed.), *The Street as Stage: Protest Marches and Public Rallies since the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford, 2007)


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**FURTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE LONDON**

Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Wolfgang Mock (eds.), *The Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany* (London: Croom Helm, 1981)


Adolf M. Birke, Hans Booms and Otto Merker (eds.), *Control Commission for Germany/British Element: Inventory; Die britische Militärregierung in Deutschland: Inventar*, 11 vols (Munich etc.: Saur Verlag, 1993)
 Günther Heydemann and Lothar Kettenacker (eds.), *Kirchen in der Diktatur* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993)


**BRITISH ENVOYS TO GERMANY**


HOUSE PUBLICATIONS OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE LONDON

Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Two Centuries of Anglo-German Relations: A Re-appraisal (London, 1984)

Adolf M. Birke, Britain and Germany: Historical Patterns of a Relationship (London, 1987)


Adolf M. Birke and Eva A. Mayring (eds), Britische Besatzung in Deutschland: Aktenerschließung und Forschungsfelder (London, 1992)

Gerhard A. Ritter, Big Science in Germany: Past and Present (London, 1994)

Adolf M. Birke, Britain’s Influence on the West German Constitution (London, 1995)


Research on British History


Annual Lectures of the German Historical Institute London


1990 Not available


2002 *Not available*


203