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ARTICLE

GOD’S ANTI-LIBERAL AVANT-GARDE: NEW THEOLOGIES IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

Friedrich Wilhelm Graf

I. Theologians, or: Intellectuals with Extraordinary Mandates

In his sociology of elites Pierre Bourdieu characterized modern intellectuals as ‘specialists in dealing with symbolic material’. To this extent, academic theologians can be described as experts in the cognitive, rational care and accumulation of religious symbolic capital. In the text-working knowledge industry, they are responsible for texts of a special type: for Holy scriptures, religious communities’ declarations of belief, subjective confessions of pious virtuosi. Theologians conduct the transgenerational ‘eternal’ conversation about the interpretation of age-old myths and claim the authority to interpret the knowledge of salvation. Fundamental oppositions play an essential role in Jewish and Christian symbolic terminology, for instance, between creator and creature, heaven and earth, this world and the next, salvation and destruction, righteousness and sin. Bearing such elemental differences in mind, religious symbolic terminology can be reconstructed as ‘imagined systems’ in which the normative bases of politics or culture are fixed. Since the Hebrew Bible, the Old Testament, and the New Testament ‘God’s law’ promulgate God’s instructions and commandments, theologians often

This article is based on a Seminar held at the German Historical Institute London on 2 Feb. 2010. Trans. Jane Rafferty, GHIL.

2 Cf. Emerich Francis, Wissenschaftliche Grundlagen soziologischen Denkens (Munich, 1957); along the same lines M. Rainer Lepsius, Interessen, Ideen und Institutionen (Opladen, 1990), 232 ff.
claim a specific ability to distinguish between good and evil. European theological histories since the eighteenth century have been shaped by numerous theological intellectuals who cultivate an exceptionally elitist image of their role. From the notion that religion forms ‘the substance of culture’, a formulation by Paul Tillich hotly discussed in the 1920s, they derive the claim that given the manifold differentiations in the modern world of knowledge dominated by the expanding cult of specialization, their discipline should remain the ‘leading discipline’. Theologians’ recourse to religious symbolic terminology puts them in a potentially dangerous position because they do not see themselves as specialists in the special, the particular, but as experts in the unparalleled whole, in God. They often think they know more, can see further, and decide more clearly than other cultural interpreters in the universities. They not infrequently tend to identify their own point of view with omniscience specific to God. Anyone who constructs the absolute sometimes threatens to confuse himself with what has been constructed.

In the early Weimar Republic this tendency towards a totalizing interpretative manner, to ‘absolutism’, was hotly disputed by theologians, for young, expressionistic interpreters of God with revolutionary ideas and highly aggressive rhetoric now migrated into the ‘discursive field’ of German-language academic theology. They radically called into question the older theology, both the liberal theology of Adolf von Harnack and Ernst Troeltsch, for example, and the ‘positive’ conservative theology of thinkers such as Reinhold Seeberg and Martin Kähler, as well as the traditional methodological canon, for instance, the historical-critical standards of meticulous textual interpretation. These young men defined themselves through an emotional fundamental criticism of the bourgeois nineteenth century, sent their academic fathers to the guillotine of Jacobin brutality, and adopted the elite manner of an avant-garde with absolute knowledge of God to the point of self-stylization.


4 Regarding Tillich’s intellectual worlds, see Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, ‘“Old harmony”? Über einige Kontinuitätsfaktoren in “Paulus” Tillichs Theologie der “Allversöhnung”’, in Hartmut Lehmann and Otto Gerhard Oexle (eds.), Nationalsozialismus in den Kulturwissenschaften (Göttingen, 2004), ii. 375–415.
When the older theologians accused them of being intolerant ‘absolutists’, they did not react defensively by withdrawing, but with fiery absolutist emotionalism. In terms of historicism and its crisis, their much-varied argument was that consistent historicization means relativization, in other words, validates comparison, the dissolution of substance into mere relations and functions, unlimited, unrestrictable fragmentation, and indeed—Dilthey and Troeltsch would have admitted this themselves—anarchy of thought and the erosion of all basic commitments. Through the process of historical-critical research, they maintained, ‘holy texts’ had been philologically frayed and distorted to the point of incomprehensibility. Everything preserved or passed on at any time, by anybody, in any way, in other words, the conventional European cultural rubbish, now seemed relative in historical terms and all equally valid, so that there was no longer any underlying certainty, but only the anomic pluralistic worlds of Musil’s ‘man without qualities’ who tries, unsuccessfully, to disguise his lack of characteristics by donning, at random, costumes from the prop cupboard of ‘history’. Historically created relativism could, they said, be overcome only by those with the courage to embrace absoluteness, intellectuals who, with Friedrich Nietzsche recognize the disadvantage of history for life, with Franz Overbeck the scepticist repercussions of basing religious belief in history, and are prepared to learn from Kierkegaard the crucial technique of dehistoricizing, the bold leap of faith.

II. God’s Frontgeneration, or:
The Holy Alliance of Generational Brothers

The young German-speaking theologians of the early 1920s exhibited very strong generational solidarity crossing confessional boundaries, and a binding, elemental awareness of crisis. Detlev J. K. Peukert’s concept of the Frontgeneration\(^5\) also applies very well to the theological discourse. From the wealth of evidence for the highly emotionally charged selection processes of this intellectual brotherhood, I shall provide just one example. In July 1920, when Franz Rosenzweig first received texts by Paul Tillich about his cousins

Hans and Rudolf Ehrenberg, who had converted from Judaism to Protestantism for reasons of belief, he wrote enthusiastically to his mistress Margrit Rosenstock-Huessy: ‘In Berlin there is a Privatdozent Tillich. Theologian. Man of the future. One of our generation. . . . He put forward the same as I did in Stern . . . Swims in terminology, but can still walk on the dry land of real language. He’s the right sort.’ 6 And a few days later he added: ‘I don’t know anyone else who could understand what I want.’7

So, apart from Rosenzweig, Friedrich Meinecke’s Jewish pupil from Freiburg, Tillich, the Protestant armchair socialist striving for ambivalence, and the Ehrenbergs, who else belonged to the theological Front generation? First of all, the known suspects: the Protestant theologians Paul Althaus, Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, Werner Elert, Friedrich Gogarten, Rudolf Bultmann, and Emanuel Hirsch. Of the Catholics, amongst others, Romano Guardini, Peter Wust, Odo Casel, and the influential Munich Jesuit Erich Przywara. In the second row, but most definitely present as networkers, the most prominent were the religious intellectual Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, who converted from Judaism to Protestantism and was a difficult friend of Rosenzweig’s, the Catholic publicist Ernst Michel, Barth’s friend Eduard Thurneysen, and Karl Ludwig Schmidt, the power-conscious publisher of the Theologische Blätter. I shall briefly mention this generation’s dates of birth: Hans Ehrenberg was born in 1883; Peter Wust and Rudolf Bultmann in 1884; Werner Elert, Hefele, and Guardini in 1885; then in 1886 Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, Franz Rosenzweig, Odo Casel, and the Catholic theologian Karl Eschweiler; in 1887 Friedrich Gogarten and Tillich’s close friend Carl Mennicke. In 1888 Paul Althaus, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Eduard Thurneysen, and Emanuel Hirsch first glimpsed the light of the historical world of the Kaiserreich, perceived by them as depressingly dark. They were followed in 1889 by Ernst Michel and Erich Przywara; in 1890 by Karl Barth’s brother Heinrich Barth, a philosopher, as well as the Protestant New

7 Rosenzweig, ‘Gritli’-Briefe, 26 July 1920.
Testament theologian Erik Peterson, who converted to the Roman Catholic faith in 1930; and finally in 1891 Karl Ludwig Schmidt and Otto Piper, from 1920 Barth’s successor to the chair of Systematik at the University of Münster. Some of them maintained close contacts with Viktor von Weizsäcker, born 1886, a medical man deeply engaged in religious matters, and most of them were read very meticulously by Carl Schmitt, born in 1888.

Without any generational essentialism and without describing in any more detail their respective experiences of socialization and ruptures in their life histories, I should stress that historians of modern theology—like all other intellectual historians—do not have at their disposal any viable theory for describing possible connections between biography and knowledge production, in this case theological programme and writings. Generally speaking the ideological worlds, conceptual constructs, and methodological standards of theology are far too complex to be ‘traced back’ to immediately apparent biographical ‘influences’, in a sort of psychologizing or sociologizing perspective. Nonetheless, in the case of the theological Front generation, it can cautiously be asserted that anyone born between 1885 and 1890 in Germany was between 25 and 30 years old in 1914 and thus an ideal candidate for war. If he survived, he experienced the end of the war and the Versailles Treaty, now five traumatizing years older. He could be called to a university chair in the late years of the Weimar Republic, in his early to mid-forties, and was now in a position to make academic or church policy in grand style.

Regardless of all political, religious, and theological differences, the leading lights of this generation shared two striking assumptions. They regarded historicism as the representative discourse for the crisis of modernity per se, so that an elemental suffering from quite diverse phenomena and repercussions of modern pluralism, perceived as relativism and a threat to identity, became more intense in the thematic complex ‘crisis of historicism’. Their writings, and those of the three Swiss Dialectic Theologians Karl Barth, Eduard Thurneysen, and Emil Brunner, were marked by crisis rhetoric, and it is no coincidence that the Dialectic Theology of Barth, Brunner, and Bultmann has been known in the English-speaking world since the mid-1920s as Theology of Crisis. The feeling of degeneration, decline, collapse, crisis, and the demand for a completely new way of thinking in all dimensions of life, was absolutely essential to the new theo-
ology of the young generation. There are no parallels to this at all in the British theological discourse of the 1920s. Secondly, they were linked by an offensive consensus, typical of their profession, that the only way to escape from the crisis of modernity was by courage of belief, by means of religious renewal. For many of them, theology was the science for coping with ethical crisis par excellence.

Members of the generation who were not theologians, such as Leo Löwenthal and Walter Benjamin, Ernst Bloch, Georg von Lukács, Siegfried Kracauer, and Hans Freyer wrote works in the early 1920s which show that the theologians were confirmed in many ways in their hopes for a central guiding force in religious matters. In 1921 Karl Adam postulated before Catholic academics in Stuttgart, in rhetoric reminiscent of nineteenth-century German jingoism: ‘The world will flourish through Catholicism.’

Not least, the crisis theologians were able to create a sense of community by deliberately and dramatically opposing the older members of their discipline, that is, above all, the liberal teachers with their historicist academic culture. The binding power of contempt, abhorrence, sometimes even hatred can be seen, for a start, in the terms used against the religiously superficial, the mystically befuddled. For the young theologians Margarinekatholiken, Hatschizionisten, and Kulturprotestanten constituted an ecumenical coalition of the soft, femininely weak, tired, and sentimental theologians of resignation, of impressionists without any decisive will or formative power—trapped and passively tied down to experience, committed only to experience. The images and concepts ascribed to these older religious thinkers, Harnack and Troeltsch, Hermann Cohen and Martin Buber, use the terms of medical pathology: sick, degenerate, dying off, they already stink, they represent death in the midst of life. In his programmatic manifesto of 1920 ‘Zwischen den Zeiten’, Friedrich Gogarten declared that people did not like living amongst corpses.

Interest in getting away from the traditional contexts of history was

9 Karl Adam, Glaube und Glaubenswissenschaft im Katholizismus: Vorträge und Aufsätze (Rottenburg, 1923), 164.
linked with a high degree of aggression which was radicalized rather than diminished by personal encounters. Hirsch wrote of the old Harnack: ‘He is a ruin.’ Similarly in the inner-Jewish generational struggle, Scholem branded Buber’s remarks as ‘chit-chat about experience’, and wrote in his diary that Cohen only offered ‘transcendental confusion’.

The generational brothers read one another very intensively. Apart from Barth and Tillich, Rosenzweig also digested Gogarten and other dialectic theologians. Przywara showed great interest in all new Protestant publications and, indeed, in many Jewish ones; and even if the opposite is often claimed, Protestant theologians also took serious notice of Rosenberg’s *Stern der Erlösung*. The generational brothers met quite often at conferences, and Karl Barth, for example, invited Przywara, the Jesuit, to speak to his students and take part in his seminar. Paul Tillich even developed contacts with

11 See Emanuel Hirsch to Hans Lietzmann, 10 Jan. 1928, in Kurt Aland (ed.), *Glanz und Niedergang der deutschen Universität: 50 Jahre deutscher Wissenschaftsgeschichte in Briefen an und von Hans Lietzmann (1892–1942)* (Berlin, 1979), 563; Hirsch’s brutal conclusion, after a visit to Harnack, commenting on his ‘intellectual shrivelling’, reads as follows: ‘Now I forgive the man for everything, he has the right to be an invalid’ (p. 564).


16 In this regard, see my review of Amy Marga, *Karl Barth’s Dialogue with Catholicism in Göttingen and Münster: Its Significance for His Doctrine of God*
Russian Orthodox intellectuals and met Nikolai A. Berdyaev at the Berlin Russisches Wissenschaftliches Institut in 1922.17

The nervous, self-agonizing, and inflationary world of Weimar could easily be construed as a fascinating laboratory for theological intellectual experiments. Apart from innovative re-interpretations of old dogmatic concepts, a linguistic revolution escalated encompassing virtually all disciplines. Great willingness to take risks with the semantics of religion reflected creative curiosity. The Front generation’s seekers after God loved holy role-play. Only a few of them wanted to be priests or apostles; they preferred prophets, repentance-preachers, guardians, custodians, or ethical legislators who reminded an amoral culture dominated by pluralistic anomie and sceptical relativism of the absoluteness of God’s law. The terminology used in the theologians’ ethics discourse, so far little researched, the semantics of natural law, ‘God’s will’, *lex divina*, ‘creative will’, *Volksnomos*, and ‘political theology’, are precisely what reveal a marked willingness for self-mobilization in the service of a better world *ordo*. In ‘Das hilflose Europa oder Reise vom Hundertsten ins Tausendste’ of 1922 Robert Musil wrote: ‘The life that envelops us has no ordering concepts.’18 To exactly the same degree as the feuilletons elevated this finding to the fundamental feeling of the era, a theological avant-garde with missionary zeal could appropriate the leading role as creators of order with a mandate from God. It catered to the ‘hunger for wholeness’ (Peter Gay) with Eucharistic suppers and to modern man’s ‘hunger for meaning’ with the totality of faith.

III. Clash of Ideologies in the Weimar Republic, or:
The Holy Warriors’ Rhetoric Weaponry

Modern European histories of religion are marked by intense ideological disputes and positional struggles between those competing to

offer meaning. From the eighteenth century onwards there were endless Kulturkämpfe,¹⁹ and since the late nineteenth century many theologians and religious intellectuals had seen themselves as God’s warriors in the struggle over Weltanschauung. Numerous leading thinkers of the theological Front generation exhibited a massive radicalization in the rhetoric of war. Typical examples are terms such as ‘crusade’, ‘holy war’, ‘war for God’, and ‘battlefield’. They are particularly prominent in Karl Barth’s writing of this period. In a study of Dialectic Theology published in 1931, the Swiss theologian Adolf Keller spoke of a new ‘combative theology’.²⁰ Guardini geared up his ‘fighting troops’ of the Catholic youth movement for victories of formulation, Offensiv-Katholiken found their martial equivalent in Kampfjuden, and Erich Przywara preached about the need for a Sieg-Katholizismus, a fighting Catholicism.²¹

The fascination with war terminology cannot be explained merely by reference to the lasting effects of the war experience on these people’s lives. The polemical visions of a decisive struggle over Weltanschauung are better explained by the interaction of a threatening pluralism, encirclement by the many others, and subjectively suffered economic and cultural weaknesses, which could be shrouded in declamatory formulae of God’s power, but not effectively compensated for. Under the conditions of a parliamentary party democracy, these disagreements over Weltanschauung were constantly intensified in the political public. In addition, with the rapid expansion of the religious market from the 1880s onwards, alternative religious interpretations were communicated which partly served the intellectual theologians of the 1920s as resources of terminology and imagery for their new conceptions of God, but were also perceived as destructive, undermining true Jewish or Christian belief.

It was precisely the younger representatives of the discipline with their greater sensitivity to crisis who were committed to absolute self-assertion, which materialized as a rigid pathos of truth. The

²⁰ Adolf Keller, Der Weg der dialektischen Theologie durch die kirchliche Welt: Eine kleine Kirchenkunde der Gegenwart (Munich, 1931), 15.
polarization specialists focused on diastasis, guaranteed by the one God of absolute distinction, anti-synthesis, and radical talk of the death of all of modernity’s gods of immanence, not least the evolutionary idols of ‘historical pantheism’ (Rudolf Bultmann).

Some of the Front theologians cultivated an anti-academic manner, precisely because this was how to gain career advantages and attract greater attention. The specific structure of the theological public played a crucial role in this. In the religious institutions the theologians found a receptive space that enhanced their public effectiveness. The publicity structures of the two major churches in the Weimar Republic have so far been far less researched than the worlds of communication of Jewish Germany. But it is clear that in and through the churches a specific attention economy for theological intellectual products was promoted. In the publishing world, for example, the feuilletons of the major daily newspapers and the cultural periodicals that directed the discourse, there was a great willingness to discuss new titles on the theological book market. Here the yet to be written histories of how the new theologies were received are not restricted to the eroding readership of the educated bourgeoisie, let alone to the feuilleton pages of the Frankfurter Zeitung, for which Rudolf Bultmann, for instance, wrote numerous texts and reviews. Even the editors of the Sozialistische Monatshefte showed great interest in the religious discourse and commissioned the socialist theologian Theodor Siegfried, a like-mind of Tillich, to edify their left-wing readers with regular reviews of new titles on theology, religious studies, and religion. The new theologies were also discussed intensively in those papers of both revolutionary and radical-conservative intellectual groups that had once been subsumed under the problematic collective term Conservative Revolution, but which represented a remarkably broad spectrum of belief.

25 Stefan Breuer offers a critique of the notion of Conservative Revolution. See Stefan Breuer, Anatomie der konservativen Revolution (2nd edn., Darmstadt, 1995); see also Gangolf Hübinger, ‘Geschichtsmythen in “völkischer
IV. Annihilatio historiae, or:
All History Turns to Dust before God

The spectrum of topics written about and disputed by German theologians, both Christian and Jewish, in the 1920s was extremely broad. One particular complex of topics, however, attracted new and particularly intense attention: time, experience of time, understanding of history. The religious scholars talked about ‘time’ and ‘history’, ‘beginning’ and ‘end’ primarily by reformulating and reconstructing mythical notions and concepts from traditional eschatology. The dogma of locus de novissimis, of the last things, is traditionally one of the symbolically most complex doctrines of both Jewish and Christian theology. In the old dogmatics de novissimis was understood to mean the individual’s post-mortal fate, the end of time, heaven and hell, and for Catholics purgatory as well, but, above all, God’s judgement. Amongst the numerous eschatological symbols, the old doctrine of the annihilatio mundi was also passed down, which especially Lutheran theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries expounded in highly differentiated ways: the end of all destructible substances brought about by God, the great inferno of the worlds, the definitive destruction of all worldly reality. In the discourse on eschatology of the 1920s, these old notions of annihilatio were reformulated in many ways; even a Jewish religious intellectual such as Gershom Scholem often spoke of ‘annihilation’. To put it succinctly, the Weimar Front theologians talked about ‘time’ primarily in terms of the ‘end of time’ and about history mainly such that the transience itself, in other words, the frailty of everything historical was stressed. In the eschaton not only man, but also his history turns to dust.

The massive increase in interest in eschatology may reflect traumatic experiences of the world war. Yet the booming, polyper-
val constructions of war apocalypses in the 1920s, and the theological language games with nothing, nihilism, annihilation were also fuelled by eschatological energies whose driving forces reached further back into the past. The Dance of Death scenes of the demise of bourgeois culture culminated in eschatological images; whoever conjured them up wanted to administer the coup de grâce to the despised nineteenth century.

The theological eschatologism of the early 1920s can first be seen as a radical criticism of traditional temporal terminology. Instead of a clear distinction between past, present, and future, the theologians now developed a far more multifaceted temporal terminology, with the main intention of reflecting on the acceleration of time. As expert interpreters of the fundamental differences between time and eternity, this world and the next, they had, since time immemorial, claimed for themselves perspectives on history specific to their profession. During the world war and in the early years of the Weimar Republic theologians began to reformulate traditional notions of eternity in favour of theological diagnostics of the Zeitgeist, in such a way that the present could be qualitatively reconceived. In competition with the many other academic constructors of history they developed their own very distinct theological views. Traditional concepts of time were differentiated with great experimental enthusiasm, their boundaries removed and redefined. In his early sermons Paul Tillich, for example, talked of the ‘spirit of eternity’, ‘people of eternity’, ‘stamp of eternity’, ‘depth of eternity’, ‘silence of eternity’, and ‘value of eternity’. These amalgams of the concept of eternity made it possible for him to interpret the hic et nunc of the present sub specie aeternitatis more succinctly than the conventional dogmatic language games: eternity as a longue durée that encompasses the present, defines the now, deepens the moment, beyond which nothing more lasting or foundational can be conceived.

The theologians and religious virtuos of the Front generation also developed differentiations for the concept of history, which, with all

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27 For detailed accounts see Klaus Vondung, Die Apokalypse in Deutschland (Munich, 1988); and Jürgen Brokoff, Die Apokalypse in der Weimarer Republik (Munich, 2001).

respect, make the historians’ terminology seem comparatively paltry. For instance, theologians took up the concept of super-history as propagated by Schelling in his *Philosophie der Offenbarung* and, with a view to God’s radical transcendence and self-revelation, now spoke a great deal about metahistory. Karl Barth talks of ‘prehistory’, ‘revelation history’, ‘God’s history’, ‘history of the word of God’, ‘final history’, ‘earthly history’, ‘heavenly history’, ‘history of God’s kingdom’, and ‘history of God in history’. What is more, theologians now wrote enthusiastically about the ‘ultimate fate of the world’, of ‘super-historical forces’, and the ‘materialization of the super-historical’. They repeatedly stressed that the history of the professional historians was dead history, a pale cult of relics, mere academic corpse-plundering, which must be considered as always already annihilated by God if the historicist graveyards were to be left behind.29

So *Annihilatio historiae* means that one can imagine the paltriness of the historical, expose its frailty, as relief from the pressure of tradition. Gogarten’s ‘People don’t like living amongst corpses’ and Barth’s fight against the ‘modern de-eschatologicized consciousness’ convey the message that for theologians ‘historical vision’ is something quite different from the specialist, particularizing insights which historians command *ex professione*. The historical realities that can be grasped from the viewpoints of professional historians were, they maintained, just shadowy realities, just superficial, empty show, the path into a ghostly realm of shades. For them, true history was higher—or, indeed, lower—in any case, beyond those events and developments that the professional historians receive and reconstruct. To this extent, theologians claimed to be able to grasp a truer reality.30


30 Werner Elert, *Der Kampf um das Christentum: Geschichte der Beziehungen zwischen dem evangelischen Christentum in Deutschland und dem allgemeinen Denken seit Schleiermacher und Hegel* (Munich, 1921), 489.
The exploratory theological adventures at conferences of the Quickborn-Bund—‘We dig below the layers of culture into the absolute’—display this self-conception as an epistemological elite. Anyone who did not break away from the groundedness of history sacrificed perceptual opportunities. Thus in one of his obituaries for Ernst Troeltsch, Paul Tillich remarked concerning Troeltsch’s ‘European cultural synthesis’: ‘It is a historical standpoint from which history is judged, but not the super-historical, which is the only one capable of interpreting history.’ The theologians’ writings of the 1920s contain veritable legions of the new, emotionalized formulae of super-historical, meta-historical transcendents of history. In 1925 Martin Dibelius summed it up soberly: ‘Perception of the super-historical cannot be achieved by the historian’s means of acquiring knowledge.’ The theologians became all the more committed to a new anatomy of theological thought, for example, through dogmatic language games or in the form of a specifically theological historicity and philosophy of history. Their intensive work on time theories, temporal semantics, and new concepts of eschatology culminated in intellectual attempts to make the historical moment transparent in terms of God’s presence, notwithstanding the transcendence of God they had embraced. Theodor Siegfried, for example, demanded that eschatology de futuro should be converted into present-day eschatology. The dichotomy between continuity and diastasis was overcome by the hermeneutics of contemporaneity; time that lasts for ever mutated into explosive time, the moment, the minimal period of time, was fascinating as the opposite of eternity, and simultaneously as its most important place of representation. From 1916, the theological debates of all three confessions contain contemporarizations of the ‘eternal moment’ owing partly to Goethe, partly to Stefan George. Ever new variations of the theme that paid homage to the ‘fulfilled’, ‘historical’, ‘absolute’ moment eventually produced a sort of explosive condensation of all concepts of the moment in the kairos, which, in the spirit of George’s

31 Hermann Platz, speaker at the Quickborn-Bund’s 1920 federal conference, cited in Ruster, Die verlorene Nützlichkeit der Religion, 84.
33 Martin Dibelius, Geschichtliche und übergeschichtliche Religion im Christentum (Göttingen, 1925), 170.
terminological magic, was communicated in a particularly suggestive manner by Friedrich Gundolf as a new keyword. In 1922 Paul Tillich then elevated kairos to the central concept of his action theory of time, which he developed in contrast to Troeltsch’s all too linear historical thinking.34

Something structurally similar can be seen in the dramatic boom in Messianic rhetoric, not only amongst young Jewish intellectuals, but also amongst both Catholic and Protestant theologians. Of the numerous relevant new concepts I refer, as an example, to Walter Benjamin’s theology of time, which he developed particularly succinctly in his later theses ‘Über den Begriff der Geschichte’.35 Benjamin talks there of the ‘Messiah’, of ‘messianic power’, indeed of ‘messianic time’ and the ‘messianic empire’. For the philosophers of history it becomes absolutely crucial, in the sense of the Messianic tradition, to think of salvation in terms of this world and therefore to identify with ‘social liberation’. Messiah—in Benjamin’s interpretative cosmos, this is a cipher for the fact that people can activate their own ‘messianic power’ in order to disrupt the continuum of history geared towards exploitation and suppression.36 In relation to God, the ‘moment’ here means being outside oneself.

The visual semantics of theology were also updated. Where theologians in the 1920s spoke of ‘eye’ and ‘seeing’, they sought to occupy super-human ‘points of view’. In the tradition of the old images of ‘God’s eye’,37 Karl Barth, in his first interpretation of the Epistles to the Romans, referred back to a godly ‘central perspective’. The equivalent in Franz Rosenzweig was the ‘total subject’ which could encompass the entirety of the super-natural object. The crucial systematic achievement in both cases was to be able to identify a subject that has always been regarded as a blessed participant in God’s perspective. For Barth this subject, faithful to God, was the church, which listened

34 Alf Christophersen, Kairos: Protestantische Zeitdeutungskämpfe in der Weimarer Republik (Tübingen, 2008).
36 Ibid. 700 ff.
37 For this tradition of representation in the context of the ‘confusingly colourful’ eye-imagery, see Michael Stolleis, Das Auge des Gesetzes: Geschichte einer Metapher (2nd edn., Munich, 2004).
to the word of God; for Rosenzweig it was the eternal Israel. In Stern der Erlösung Rosenzweig wrote that the Jews were located outside history and politics, ‘outside a bellicose temporality’. He advised them to remain there, ‘for other nations, also on the path towards God, needed history; the Jews, who were already with God, did not’. Naturally all these formulations also reveal the systemic problem of the new theological super-history rhetoric. What does it mean to take up a metahistorical point of view, or an absolutist position? What theological intellectual strategies can prevent a relative place of seeing and interpreting being elevated into an absolute position, God’s self-revelation from being functionalized for the legitimatory sacralization of minority standpoints? Just as in the temporal language game of theology the old is definitively declared as past and a space is opened up for the absolutely new, so the question concerning the power to define the ‘eternal moment’ acquires central significance. Who can and should decide where God’s absolute transcendence appears in the absolute moment?

V. Apokatastasis toon pantoon, or: The Re-creation of History

The warehouse of symbols of both Christian and Jewish eschatology contains the notion of the apokatastasis toon pantoon, the gracious restoration, at the end of time, of everything that has been. This notion was traditionally regarded as heretical, because it also granted to potential inhabitants of Hell the possibility of rising to heavenly Paradise. After Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher and David Friedrich Strauß, the ‘restoration of all’ quickly became established in Protestant theology. This was hotly disputed in the 1920s. The subtle scholarly struggle between theological dogmatists can be deciphered as the question of which imagined contents could refill the notional historical space that had been annihilated eschatologically. For no one can live long-term ‘between times’, and anyone who celebrates the kairos of God’s presence must be able to define it in terms of

places where God is represented in this world. If the historical universe is annihilated, then as a potentially unlimited space for imagination it cannot only be re-measured, but also filled with many ‘quite real’ super-historical histories, indeed with representations of the divine. Like the historical images of the George School, normative selection is preferred to researching and collecting. The ‘greats’ of the past function as power-sources for the present, absent-minded wandering about in the endless picture-galleries of history is transformed into concentrated ‘intellectual vision’ and ‘history of forces’. The new post-historical concepts of history took shape, for example, in the ‘Luther renaissance’ and the ‘Jewish renaissance’. Such diverse religious projects of the 1920s as Scholem’s Hasidim research, Buber’s and Rosenzweig’s ‘Verdeutschung der Schrift’, Bultmann’s studies on historical and super-historical religion in Christianity, and Barth’s Christian dogmatics are all agreed in using counter-historical memoria to develop commitments for shaping the present. Scholem worked on the authority of ‘God’s law’ and described the Bible as ‘the absolute text’. And Barth’s dogmatics were also supposed to be nothing but a specific form of textual interpretation, marked by pure fidelity to the word of God.

What remained disputed was how revelation is conveyed, how the absolute appears in the relative, and how the momentary presence of the unfixable absolute can be fixed in the relative—a topic of violent disputes about the concept of analogy and here, in particular, the Old Catholic notion of an *analogia entis*. But God’s law could also be reified in the ‘holy Volkstum’, for instance, in the case of Scholem, Althaus, and various Catholic theologians, and the people could not become fully aware of the presence of God without a charismatic ‘leader’. At the same time a dispute erupted between the representatives of the various Christian confessions as to whether the hoped-for vanquishing of historicism was not much more likely in specifically Catholic figures of thought than in genuinely Protestant terminology. In his obituary for Ernst Troeltsch, Przywara declared that only the

Roman church represented the ‘ultimate unity of absolute and relative that Troeltsch strove for in vain’. And Erik Peterson also presented the Catholic Church as the place for the definitive abolition of relativism. With a view to the historical relativism practised mainly by Protestant historians he decreed uncompromisingly that ‘Considering the (altar) sacrament, to talk of historical relativism becomes blasphemy’, and sums up his contempt for all conventionally taught concepts of history in a laconic, cold sentence: ‘The historian should hang himself, like Judas.’

Despite their basic agreement about replacing the liberal pre-war theologies, the crisis theologians of the 1920s were incapable of reaching consensus on the guiding concepts and dogmatic methods of a distinctly post-historical theology of authority. It was precisely in the fascinating diversity of their search that they radicalized theological pluralism, which they had complained about so verbally, and which soon culminated in an ever intensifying dispute on all sides concerning the place in which God was represented in history. The theological Front generation experienced the plural religious and ethical worlds of the Wilhelmine era as the dissolution of all substantial obligations, and in this kairos struggle against the relative they could, in fact, only intensify the pluralistic hallmark of ‘classical modernity’. At the end of the 1920s the Weimar pantheon was full of absolutely binding monotheistic figures of God, each representing the one true God of biblical self-revelation and which should therefore testify to absolute faith. De facto, however, these were just tribal idols, ‘gods of the moment’, of individual groups and movements — there was not a single political ideology in the late Weimar republic that was not supported by an exclusive god in the theological field.

44 See now Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, Der Heilige Zeitgeist: Studien zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte der protestantischen Theologie in der Weimarer Republik (Tübingen, 2010).
So the fundamental political ‘world civil war’ of the inter-war period was not overcome by theological reflection on normativity: strictly speaking it was actually intensified by religious terminology. In the certainty that they were only interpreting the word of God, they had to destroy with iconoclastic zeal all the false idols of the other participants in the theological discourse. Anyone who, with God, conceived of the present as a place of action beyond all historical mediation, as the field for absolute deeds, could do little else but perceive the pluralization of such versions of God as an escalation of tension. In the same place and at the same time the god-fearing people of this decade were living in non-simultaneous ideological worlds. This also gave rise to a permanent dynamic of intensification in the theological discourses of the 1920s.

VI. Exaltation Specialists, or: Thinking Ambivalence in the Political Field

In 1922 Carl Schmitt established in his *Politische Theologie* that metaphysics is the most intensive and clearest expression of an era: “The metaphysical image that a particular era makes of the world has the same structure as the form of political organization that it automatically prefers.” In the Weimar Republic the fundamental tectonic shifts in the political gave rise to intensive debates about new political theologies. In their anxiety to interpret the present, the theologians now became embroiled in fundamental political controversies, which always led them to read supposedly metapolitical dogmatic language games, including the most intricate doctrinal distinctions, politically as well. Apart from the German Democratic Party (DPP) activist Rudolf Bultmann who remained faithful to the republic, there was a high level of consensus here about anti-bourgeois emotionalism and anti-liberal conviction. Nonetheless the spectrum of political positions amongst the Weimar exaltation theologians was more multifaceted, more contradictory than is often assumed.

People like to stage the history of Weimar intellectuals by means of clear interpretative models that can be utilized both politically and

morally: good liberals versus bad anti-liberals; republican left against anti-republican right; revolutionary-utopian messianism versus conservative-restorative messianism; modern Ullstein authors versus anti-modern, regressive Grünewaldverlag authors. However, the way in which the Weimar theologian-intellectuals formulated their opinions and positions meant that they considered such dualisms and oppositional figures as far too superficial and deliberately reductionist. In spite of *kairos* rhetoric the characteristic mood of the decade remains not the spectacular contrast between the lightness of belief and black shadowy darkness, between blazing lightness and all-encompassing night remote from God, but rather the diffuse twilight of ambivalence, changing and ambiguous.

Irritating examples of a high degree of political ambivalence can be found not only amongst leading Catholic and Protestant intellectuals of the anti-republican right-wing parties. The intellectual worlds of prominent Jewish theologians and religious intellectuals also reflect elementary phenomena of political oscillation. Understandably, until well into the 1980s the trauma of the annihilation of the Jews of central Europe prevented perception of the great religious, theological, and political diversity within the German-Jewish minorities. But a new look at the charnel-houses of knowledge now show, for example, that Franz Rosenzweig’s death masks, removed by intellectual historians, only portrayed his contradictory intellectual physiognomy in a one-sided, distorted way. The Frankfurt Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus is readily associated with the trade union movement; messianic left-wing intellectuals with the Institut für Sozialforschung. But in the early years of the Weimar Republic the author of the *Stern der Erlösung* located himself in a quite different political framework. During the world war the passionate Wagner-fan was an aggressive radical nationalist who despised the ‘democratic thickheads’ of the new republic. When, to his utter despair, the Kapp Putsch failed, he hoped, *horribile dictu*, for a ‘southern German counter-revolution’ against the Weimar coalitionists in Berlin.47

The Protestant scenes of politicized theology are equally shrouded in ambiguity. Theologians in the religious-socialist groups shared fundamental values and political ordering concepts with colleagues who then took the side of the Deutsche Christen in the Church

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47 See my review of the new edition of Rosenzweig’s ‘Gritti’-Briefe (see n. 6 above), esp. 153–4.
Struggle after 1933 and celebrated with enthusiasm the National Socialist ‘German Revolution’. Paul Tillich, of all people, whom people liked to revere as the representative of a better Germany because of his enforced exile, left his (reader) community, who were waiting for political identification of the *kairos*, in uncertainty about his path through the ‘new era’ until 1934. In particular the *Sozialistische Entscheidung* published in December 1932 and later read as a document decisively rejecting National Socialism, exposes the high level of ambivalence in a totalizing mode of thought that is supposed to merge right and left together in a unity of will of religious substance. Tillich took up the terminology of race and *Volkstum* here, so that his close friend Emanuel Hirsch, a very convinced supporter of the Nazis, read the political tract as ‘a discernable conversion to National Socialism’.

At that time Tillich himself could not imagine that the German Revolution would lead to a really new *Volksgemeinschaft* without his own energetic intellectual commitment.

Finally, a few brief words about the complex pattern of theological interpretations of the National Socialist revolution. Many theologians acted in a contradictory way, and the stylization of Hitler into the national Messiah even attracted criticism from supporters of National Socialism. Thus, for example, in 1933 Paul Althaus criticized political expectations exaggerated by ‘false messianic inflation’. In 1931 Richard Karwehl had already interpreted National Socialism as ‘secularized eschatology’. Here, he said, ‘Jewish messianism’ was being replaced by ‘Germanic messianism’. But the distinctions between eschatology legitimized or not legitimized by the church remained hotly disputed amongst theologians. So the revolution of 1933 seems like a gigantic projection screen for shaping theological fantasies. In the dynamics of self-mobilization, experienced as

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48 See Emanuel Hirsch’s letter to Paul Tillich, 14 Apr. 1933, Andover-Harvard Theological Library, Paul Tillich Papers: ‘Dear Paul, much to my dismay I have just read in the newspaper . . . about your suspension as well. I regret that your growing tendencies toward National Socialism already discernible in your last book, which you belong to (even though [you] do not know yet) and for which you could have been a prudent and responsible spiritual leader, are questioned so suddenly.’


liberation, the theologian-intellectuals also hoped to be able to steer the revolutionary process normatively. Declaration of belief, whether in Barmen or by the Catholic bishops, then seemed like a new restriction on a discursive horizon that had been continually de-restricted in Weimar—even by many of those later active in the ranks of the Confessing Church.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

MONARCHY AND ITS LEGACIES
IN GERMANY SINCE 1918

Matthew Stibbe

THOMAS BISKUP and MARTIN KOHLRAUSCH (eds.), Das Erbe der Monarchie: Nachwirkungen einer deutschen Institution seit 1918 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2008), 331 pp. ISBN 978 3 593 38727 7. €34.90

I

The appointment of Gabriela von Habsburg, sculptor, diplomat, and granddaughter of the last Austrian Emperor, Karl I, to the post of Georgian ambassador to Germany in November 2009, and her formal investiture in March 2010, were occasions for much comment in the German press. The journalist Frank Herold, for instance, wrote in the Berliner Zeitung:

The times when the higher nobility dominated the diplomatic service are long gone. The only thing that survives is the extravagant form of speech which is formally reserved for ambassadors. On official occasions the representatives of foreign states are still addressed, in modern democratic Germany, as ‘Your Excellency’. But even this . . . would not be appropriate for the rank of Gabriela von Habsburg . . . [she] is an Archduchess and ‘Her Imperial Highness’.

Such comments, together with references to von Habsburg’s ‘celebrity’ status as a habituée of Lake Starnberg, the ‘playground of fashionable Munich society’, speak volumes about contemporary media images of royalty and aristocracy in Germany. But in spite of this, historians have had relatively little to say about the cultural or political legacy of the institution of monarchy since 1918. There are a number of reasons for this.

First, as Lothar Machtan points out, the unheroic way in which the German princely rulers abdicated at the end of the First World War, with hardly a murmur, let alone a fight back, meant that monarchism itself became an ‘orphaned principle’ (p. 13)—a model of government which no longer had any determined supporters, even among the most militant anti-republicans of the 1920s. In the words of one disillusioned count, who later went over to the Nazis, the German monarchy of the early twentieth century had turned out to be a system ‘that failed to display greatness even in death . . . but instead, broken inside and with its nerves frayed, abandoned its posts at the first pistol shot’ (p. 16). In many ways, the whole 1930s cult surrounding Hitler, the public adulation of an authentic Führer who could really translate his political will into actions and deeds, derived from the emotional fallout from this earlier, and spectacular, failure of political leadership.

Secondly, German history-writing since 1945 has been dominated by attempts to explain the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of the Nazis, and in respect of both events, the former royal households have been seen as playing far less of a role politically than other, more obvious ‘villains’: Hindenburg, Ludendorff, Ebert, Hugenberg, Brüning, von Papen, and von Schleicher. Above all, the Weimar constitution has been seen as offering inadequate protection against the abuse of state power. Thus as Heinrich Mann, no friend of the German monarchical system, once pointed out, the three Kaisers of the post-1871 era, for all their many and varied faults, never tried to suspend the constitution or pass finance bills without reference to parliament. Yet Ebert and Hindenburg, using the emergency powers granted to them under Article 48 of the new constitution, both did this on several occasions. Meanwhile, in the decades

2 Ibid.

Heinrich Mann to Rudolf Feistmann, no date (stamped 15 Mar. 1947), in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundes-
after 1945 it was left to historians outside the (West) German historical establishment to highlight the malign role played by Wilhelm II in German politics, notably the GDR Marxist scholar Willibald Gutsche, the American academics Thomas A. Kohut and Lamar Cecil, the Cambridge historian Christopher Clark, and, most prominent of all, the Sussex-based Anglo-German expert John Röhl.4

Finally, if Wilhelm II has been largely written out of history, then this applies even more to the other sovereign princes who ruled in Germany up to 1918. The latter, if mentioned at all, have been dismissed as more minor examples of the ‘semi-absolutist’, ‘authoritarian’ tendencies inherent in Imperial German politics,5 or, more convincingly, as the product of Bismarck’s idiosyncratic ‘solution’ to the German question in 1866–71, which left some royal houses in place while arbitrarily abolishing others, most notably the former Kingdom of Hanover.6 Bismarck was, strictly speaking, always more of a Prussian hegemonist than a traditional monarchist, and the dualism between Prussia and the Reich which he created continues to irritate historians to this day, particularly as its legacy can still be felt in the highly complex and confusing organization of German government archives for the period 1866 to 1945.

Given all this, and given Wolfram Pyta’s recent biography of Hindenburg, which argues that the *Ersatzkaiser* of the war years and the Weimar Republic consciously projected an image of himself as the exact opposite of Wilhelm II in terms of personality and leader-

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ship qualities, it might legitimately be asked whether the former royal houses had any relevance to state and society in Germany after 1918. The two items under review here both try, in different ways, to offer a more nuanced view, demonstrating the surprising importance of monarchical legacies in a number of different political and cultural contexts, without denying the undoubted importance of the year 1918 as a decisive (and final) break with all twenty-two monarchical systems that had previously, and unhappily, ruled in Germany.

II

Lothar Machtan, also known as the author of a provocative study of Hitler and homosexuality, 8 sets out in his new book to provide the first detailed account of the part played by Germany’s princely rulers in bringing about their own downfall. In his view, ‘the collapse of the monarchy [in November 1918] was no natural catastrophe, or twist of fate, but was in good part due to the active and passive ruination of this institution by its foremost representatives’ (p. 351). In particular, he focuses on their anachronistic self-understanding as monarchs ruling ‘by the grace of God’; their disastrous personal interventions (and non-interventions) before and during the war; and their ‘collective renunciation of power’ (‘kollektive Selbstauflage’) (p. 355) during the 1918 revolution, culminating in the Saxon King Friedrich August III’s riposte to one of the ministers in the new provisional government on 12 November: ‘Macht doch eueren Dreck alleene’ (p. 311). 9 This, together with the deliberate blocking of moves towards parliamentarization until the last minute, and the pursuit of self-serving dynastic war aims during the war, demonstrates the complete failure of the German monarchs to fit in with the spirit of the age, and also bears witness to their ‘notorious aversion to democracy’ (‘notorische Demokratieferne’) which ‘they were never able to overcome’ (p. 355).

9 A rough translation would be: ‘Now go and do your dirty business on your own.’
Machtan provides an excellent overview of how monarchical rule functioned between 1871 and 1918, challenging many orthodoxies in the process. Imperial Germany, in his view, was not governed by a Wehlerite ‘semi-absolutist sham constitutionalism’, but by a modern, nineteenth-century constitutional monarchy, albeit one ‘which left the monarchs in full possession of their special rights and privileges (Sonderrechte)’ (p. 61). Within this system, royal power was restricted by the existence of partially representative Landtage in all the federal states, although often elected on an extremely restricted franchise; by the growth of a professional civil service and military; by the rise of a free press and civil society; and by the democratically elected Reichstag as the Empire’s supreme law-making body. But it was also limited by collective weakness, lack of ambition, and the absence of princely solidarity in the face of new internal and external challenges. The domination of Prussia was, of course, partly assured by the person of the Kaiser and the constitutional make-up of the Bundesrat, but—contrary to Bismarck’s intentions—the other federal princes also by and large neglected their duty to act as sovereign co-leaders of the Reich, seeing themselves ‘first and foremost as territorial rulers and not as co-actors on the national stage’ (p. 63). Bismarck’s removal from office in 1890 paved the way for Wilhelm II, as primus inter pares among the princes, to become a ‘figure of national integration’ and even a de facto Imperial Monarch (Reichsmonarch), albeit one who completely failed to live up to the image he created for himself (p. 62).

Wilhelm II’s responsibility for the collapse of the German monarchical system was thus broader and deeper than that of his fellow royals. But, equally importantly, within their own territories, the kings, grand dukes, dukes, and princes continued to insist on their supposed divine right to rule, thus hindering the development of a modern parliamentary state with proper scrutiny over appointments to public office (p. 59). They also saw any interference in these privileges, whether bureaucratic or democratic, as an ‘unacceptable deprivation of their rights’ (p. 69). In their view, it was self-evident that they knew what was best for ‘their’ subjects. Yet the modern media-driven age threw up new expectations of the princely rulers, namely that they should act as exemplary leaders in their personal and public lives, govern within the laws and customs of the land, and join together as a Fürstenbund to protect the interests of the Reich and the welfare of its people at moments of crisis. And this proved to be
beyond most of them, particularly during the closing stages of the war when they failed utterly to recognize the severity of the political, economic, and military situation. Hence for Machtan it was ‘not only the personality of the Kaiser which proved to be calamitous for the monarchy; the marked reluctance of the other monarchs to seize the moment also worked in the same direction’ (p. 130).

Reactionary figures such as Friedrich August III of Saxony and Friedrich II of Baden are obvious targets for criticism in this respect. Yet even more enlightened rulers, such as Ernst Ludwig, Grand Duke of Hesse, who was cosmopolitan in his tastes, open to modern art, menschenfreundlich, and highly contemptuous of the political pretensions of his royal cousin Wilhelm II, receive short shrift from Machtan. Traditionally, Ernst Ludwig’s refusal to flee or abdicate—which makes him unique among all the German monarchs in November 1918—has been presented in a positive light: he respected democracy, apparently wanting to await the outcome of elections before making his decision; and he did not lose his nerve, or abandon his people in their hour of need. However, Machtan challenges this assertion, showing that it was the Hessian Social Democrat leaders who acted decisively on 9 November. They appealed to the revolutionary soldiers and sailors who had gathered in front of the Neues Palais in Darmstadt to refrain from violence, while forcing the Grand Duke to negotiate with representatives of the newly elected councils. Their main motive, in fact, was not to save the monarchy, but to uphold law and order and ensure the safety of the state against the ‘incalculable dangers of mass revolutionary action’ (p. 336). Meanwhile, even after Ernst Ludwig accepted his removal from power following the Reichstag elections on 19 January 1919, he still refused to make a formal declaration renouncing his throne, instead insisting on his right to the continued use of his official residences, the Neues Palais in Darmstadt and the former hunting lodge at Schloss Wolfsgarten, and to the title of ‘Grand Duke’. Unlike other monarchs, he did not go into exile or engage in plots to restore his throne after 1918–19; for him, the Sonderrechte of his class had always been more important than political ambition of any kind.

All in all, Machtan’s critique of Germany’s princely rulers, while devastating, is largely fair and backed by extensive documentation, much of it previously unused by historians. Yet some of his broader conclusions are less convincing. In particular, his excessive preoccu-
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...ulation with failings at the personal and dynastic levels blinds him to the bigger picture. Thus his argument that the question of individual responsibility should not be ‘hidden behind references to a doom-laden determinism or abandoned to notions of the First World War as a Moloch demanding many sacrifices’ (p. 352) is undermined by his own form of reductionism, which puts the failure of the royal houses to ‘grasp the reality facing them’, and their ‘cluelessness as to where the German ship of state was heading’ down to their ‘high birth’ and their subsequent lack of political intelligence (pp. 75 and 121). Wolfram Pyta perhaps comes closer to the truth when he argues that Wilhelm II ‘was driven into the background in terms of symbolic representation above all by the inherent dynamic of wartime events’ (‘Eigendynamik des Kriegsgeschehens’) — and not simply because of his personal shortcomings as Kaiser and Supreme War Lord. The same might well apply to the other federal princes. Contingency, in particular, Hindenburg’s surprise victory against the Russians at Tannenberg in late August 1914 and his ability successfully to manipulate that victory, also had a part to play.

Secondly, Machan is undoubtedly correct to stress that the November revolution was based largely on a popular revolt ‘from below’ which from the start contained a ‘strong anti-monarchical thrust and a considerable potential for violence’ (p. 353). Yet he personalizes this issue again when he argues that the individual monarchs failed to survive as rulers partly because of their inability to show empathy for the suffering and sacrifices of the ordinary people during the war. Here I think he exaggerates the importance of empathy over leadership in 1918, not least because the people, having faced years of material hardship and the possibility that the war might continue if peace could not be made, found themselves revolting against the entire system of ‘Prussian’ military-bureaucratic rule which had manifestly failed to provide leadership at all levels. This, surely, is why the ‘progressive’ king Wilhelm II of Württemberg also had to go in November 1918; not just because of his association with the war and monarchical system per se, but, as the Schwäbischer Merkur put it, because ‘this prince also showered military decorations on Ludendorff, the dictator of Germany, when the latter left office, thereby showing his support for a system of government that was in many respects more Prussian than Prussia’ (p. 318).

10 Pyta, Hindenburg, 111.
In my view, the monarchs could only have saved themselves, if at all, by taking charge of the domestic reform process in October 1918 in alliance with moderate Social Democrats and the ‘bourgeois’ centrist parties. But of course they were unable or unwilling to do this (even Ernst Ludwig did not consider any need for change in Hesse until 7 November), rendering them guilty in the eyes of the people of having tolerated the war and the ‘Prussian’ system of military rule. Nor, in spite of their constitutional position as a league of princes, were they able to reach a collective agreement on the position of Wilhelm II as Kaiser, leaving the hapless Max von Baden to send the Prussian Interior Minister, Bill Drews, to military headquarters at Spa on a doomed mission to persuade the chief monarch to sacrifice himself in order to save the monarchy as a whole. The November revolution, born of despair and an overwhelming desire for peace, then overthrew the system entirely, without, however, settling the question of leadership in anything like a permanent manner.

Leaving the revolution to one side, it might be more plausible to suggest that one of the reasons why Hindenburg succeeded in salvaging and even furthering his reputation during the transition from war to peace, while the image of the royal houses (and Ludendorff) declined, was his greater ability to display empathy with the German people at crucial moments, for instance, in November 1919 when he told the Reichstag Committee of Inquiry that the army was not defeated in the field but ‘stabbed in the back’ by hostile elements at home.\(^\text{11}\) The ‘Hindenburg cult’ and the victory of the Ersatzkaiser in the second round of the 1925 presidential election is indeed often taken as evidence of the continuation of pseudo-monarchical beliefs in Germany, or at least of a scepticism towards republican democracy.\(^\text{12}\) Yet a little over a year after Hindenburg’s election, almost the same number of Germans—14.46 million compared to 14.66 million—turned out to vote in a referendum in favour of the outright dispossession of the former royal houses.\(^\text{13}\) Those who supported this

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\(^\text{11}\) Ibid. 405–9.
\(^\text{13}\) Hans Mommsen, *The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy*, trans. Elborg Forster and Larry Eugene Jones (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996), 240–3. The ex-Kaiser Wilhelm II subsequently called these 14.46 million Germans ‘sons-of-bitches’ (ibid. 242). Although the ‘yes’ vote failed to reach the 50 per cent of the electorate necessary to force a change in the law, it was still a substantial achieve-
measure were not just responding to the political calls of the SPD and German Communist Party (KPD), or to anti-monarchical sentiments stemming from the war, but were also acting on Schiller’s classical humanist message of 1801: ‘The majesty of the German people never rested on the shoulders of its princes’ (p. 355). The great merit of Machtan’s book is that it shows just how right these German voters were.

III

Given the political and symbolic significance of the 1926 referendum, it is a shame that it is only mentioned in passing in one or two of the chapters in the collection edited by Thomas Biskup and Martin Kohlrausch, which is the second work to be considered in this review article. In fact, as the introduction makes clear, the volume’s aim is not to investigate the failure of a political system at the personal or collective level, but to examine the more subtle, hidden, or persistent legacies of the monarchical past for Germany since the end of the First World War. Hence there are essays on media representations and sentimental understandings of ‘monarchy’; on royal palaces, art collections, and other forms of material inheritance; and on political cultures, movements, and institutions under different regimes since 1918. At the same time, the editors are keen to use evidence of such legacies as a means of shedding new light on the changing role of monarchy in late nineteenth-century Germany, including its contribution to the rise of ‘modern’ conceptions of family, ‘celebrity’, mass spectacle, and the public sphere.

The ‘strategies of self-representation’ (p. 40) adopted by monarchs who had already lost their thrones between 1830 and 1870, including their bizarre tactical alliances with republicans and Bonapartists, their cultivation of specific (anti-Prussian) cultural memories and traditions, especially when one considers that Hitler, at the height of his electoral popularity, only managed 13.75 million votes. In 1926 a mere 585,714 Germans turned out to vote against the dispossession of the royal houses. Voting figures taken from the website Wahlen in der Weimarer Republik <http://www.gonschior.de/weimar>, accessed 19 Apr. 2010.

ditions, and their selective publication of secret diplomatic documents, might be one aspect of this process, as Heidi Mehrkens and Dieter Brosius both show. Yet another example, provided by Eva Giloi, is the repackaging of Kaiser Wilhelm I’s image after 1871 in terms of his childhood relationship with his mother, the famous Queen Luise of Prussia. This was intended to create an emotional identification between the people and their Emperor based on the idea of a just victory in a defensive war against France followed by a return to civilian norms and values. Gifts sent to the monarch on specific festive occasions also encouraged such sentimental myth-making, and became a special form of communication between the old Kaiser and ‘his’ subjects in the 1870s and 1880s.

The decisive advantage that late nineteenth-century ‘monarchy’ had here was that, like ‘empire’, it became a fictional object onto which the media could project ‘modern’ emotions and feelings, thereby ‘fill[ing] a void left by the political rationalism of the [mid-nineteenth-century] liberal era’. Or, to put it another way, the life story of an individual monarch like Wilhelm I could be told in a personalized, intimate way, thereby reconciling the twin principles that modern Germany claimed to be built on: the modern ‘bourgeois’ family combined with traditional military values. This message was reinforced, as Jürgen Luh argues, by the use of the new Hohenzollern museum, opened in 1877 in the Monbijou Palace in Berlin, as a forum for exhibiting the domestic or even vulnerable side of the Prussian rulers alongside their soldierly exploits on the battlefield. Admittedly, though, it also came at the risk of encouraging a certain amount of nostalgia for the ‘good old days’ which was at odds with the more opulent ‘money and power’ image consciously and disastrously projected by the new Kaiser Wilhelm II after 1888, an image skilfully analysed by Dominik Petzold in his essay on the role of cinema as a modern stage for monarchical myth-making.

The various scandals which engulfed Wilhelm II’s reign were indeed largely attributable to what Christopher Clark describes as a ‘devil’s pact’ between the Imperial court and the media (p. 319). Events such as the Harden–Eulenburg–Moltke libel trials of 1907–8 and the Daily Telegraph affair of 1908–9 showed the inherent dangers in personalizing and sensationalizing the monarchy, and in creating

too many (false) expectations of a close emotional bond between ruler and ruled. Hence the significance of 1918, as portrayed by the essays here, is that it completed a process by which the nineteenth-century vision of a ‘modernized monarchy firmly entrenched in state and society’ became decoupled from the increasingly tarnished image of individual monarchs (p. 23). At one level this gave the republican regime that followed a certain degree of freedom; unlike the French Third Republic in the 1870s and 1880s, for instance, it did not have to fear sustained attempts to restore the monarchy or a sudden revival of royalist sentiment (p. 311). Even the German–Hanoverian party abandoned its previous campaign to reinstate the Welf dynasty after 1918, while Hohenzollern weddings in the 1920s and 1930s were hardly ‘national’ events, as Daniel Schönpflug shows (pp. 88–91). On the other hand, the continued presence of material reminders—palaces, museums, art collections—and of monarchical mentalities in a broader sense, exposed the lack of equivalent, emotionally appealing republican symbols and legacies which could be used to support more democratic visions of the German nation, at least in the interwar period.

The solutions found by Weimar-era bureaucrats and administrators were only partly successful, and tended to highlight the incomplete nature of the 1918 revolution. The individual states, or rather the state-appointed trustees who acted on their behalf, had no intention of bowing to the political demands of the left for all former royal property to be confiscated without compensation. Nor were they willing to subordinate the interests of the state to those of the recently deposed princely houses. Rather, they sought a ‘reconciliation between the old system and the new’ in an attempt to ensure the continuity of the Rechtsstaat in spite of the change of regime (p. 182). The result was that former ruling dynasties often ended up as official patrons of state art collections or foundations, even though in theory they were now just private citizens without any Sonderrechte. This hardly restored the political legitimacy of monarchy, but it did help in part to underscore its ongoing symbolic presence in the public sphere, as both Cajetan von Aretin and Marc Schalenberg emphasize in their contributions.

As far as the Third Reich is concerned, the main question, as Christopher Clark notes, is whether the idea of a German Führer was a direct legacy of late nineteenth-century monarchical beliefs and
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fantasies, or whether it represented a renunciation of the past (p. 315). Several of the contributors stress continuity here, including Daniel Schönflug and Monika Wienfort, both of whom focus on marriage ceremonies and other high-profile public events, which allowed the Nazis to tap into certain types of memory and at the same time to transform them into something new and more modern (or, using Jeffrey Herf’s phrase ‘reactionary–modern’\textsuperscript{16}) (pp. 94–5, 138–9). Goering’s state wedding to Emmi Sonnemann in 1935, for instance, borrowed heavily from former monarchical rites and symbols, including the use of the leitmotifs \textit{Liebe} and \textit{Treue} to symbolize the return of strong ties of love and trust between rulers and ruled; it was described in positive terms by \textit{Germania} as an ‘authentic National Socialist family celebration’ (‘ein echt nationalsozialistisches Familienfest’) (pp. 91–3). On the other hand, Arne Hofmann is also correct to point to the hostility which many of the more extreme monarchists, that is, those who made the restoration of the monarchy the be all and end all, felt towards the \textit{Führerkult}. For some, it could be a bridge between the Second Reich and the Third Reich, but for others it was precisely the anti-monarchical and anti-federal tendencies within the fascist cult of the leader that eventually brought them into political opposition to the Nazi regime. Even so, there was absolutely no chance of a restoration of the monarchy while Hitler remained alive, and even the July 1944 plotters do not seem to have seriously considered bringing back such a discredited and politically compromised institution.

After 1945 the GDR and the Federal Republic were both seemingly more confident about their political status as republics, and therefore less sensitive to the supposed threat of an emotional identification of the people with monarchy, albeit for different reasons. Franziska Windt focuses in her essay on the role of Schloss Schönhausen, a former Hohenzollern royal palace situated in the Pankow district of Berlin, as the official residence of the East German President Wilhelm Pieck (1949–60) and then as a guest house for visiting foreign dignitaries. Here she shows how the GDR’s monarchial heritage was used as a means of symbolizing its diplomatic presence in the world and simultaneously of portraying the victory of

socialism at home. Pieck’s personal preference for displaying Old Masters and books by Goethe in his study was thus an important part of presenting the ‘workers’ and peasants’ state’ as the legitimate heir of the classical humanist tradition in Germany, in contrast to the ‘fascist’ and ‘militaristic’ Federal Republic (p. 235). At the same time the rebuilding of the palace was a demonstration of the ‘productive potential of the GDR’s construction industry and handicrafts’, and with a former carpenter as head of state, an illustration that the revolutionary workers’ movement had now ‘inherited’ a rich material culture which had been created by labourers but had hitherto belonged to the ‘decadent’ aristocracy and middle classes (p. 224). In many ways, then, the East German regime’s deliberate association with this former royal palace from 1949 onwards prefigured the later debates about ‘heritage’ and ‘tradition’ which took place during the Honecker era in the 1970s and 1980s.17

In West Germany, on the other hand, the popular fascination with European monarchy, and especially with the British royal family, became part of a broader project of integration with the West and ideological separation from the East. This could be seen, for instance, in the positive media reception of the coronations of the Belgian King Baudouin in 1951 and the British Queen Elizabeth II in 1953, the latter ceremony being remembered as one of the ‘major television event[s] of the 1950s’ (p. 142). Nonetheless, Tobias Kies is right to warn against overplaying the monarchical aspects of the new office of Bundespräsident or Federal President in the public imagination (p. 282). Rather, the ‘Europeanization’ and popularization of monarchy after 1949 probably had more to do with legitimizing the Federal Republic as a new regime which, after the calamity of the two world wars, could help Germany return to its supposed rightful place among the ‘core countries of bourgeois society’.18 Or, as Monika Wienfort puts it, the ‘aesthetic enjoyment’ of royal weddings and coronations had no perceptible impact on the ‘unspoke core republican consensus’ (‘unausgesprochene republikanische Grundkon-
sens’) which lay at the heart of the new constitution and political system and was shared by all of the mainstream parties in the Bundestag (pp. 140 and 157). Whether this Grundkonsens should be explained in negative terms as a rejection of the (Prussian) past and its ‘heritage’, or whether it had more to do with the positive experience of building a strong and stable Kanzlerdemokratie in the 1950s and beyond—an outcome which was, of course, unforeseeable to the original framers of the Grundgesetz in 1949—is a question cleverly raised by Christoph Schönberger in a penultimate chapter.

One final point relates to balance. All of the contributors to this volume seem to be united in agreeing that 1918 was a major historical turning point for Germany in political terms, marking the permanent end of monarchical rule, while also pointing to evidence of continuities in the emotional reception, popular appreciation, and symbolic representation of ‘monarchy’ before and after the First World War. This is fine in itself but, to my mind, it also carries the danger of underplaying the vital role of overtly anti-monarchical and republican discourses in the transformation of Germany into a modern state and society. The development of the revolutionary, anti-imperialist wing of the SPD between 1890 and 1914 was certainly a part of this, but so too were the radical nationalist criticisms of the Kaiser’s foreign policy at the time of the Boer war, and the general condemnation on both right and left of the hollow ‘Byzantinism’ associated with official royal festivities and celebrations, especially in the anniversary year of 1913. One is also reminded of Jeffrey Verhey’s finding that after the outbreak of European war in 1914 ‘German intellectuals clearly felt that the old myths, largely monarchical myths, did not suffice, that a new collective identity was needed’ if the country was to hold together in the future. Scepticism, ambiguity, and even outright hostility towards monarchy therefore played a key role in the formation of Wilhelmine culture and politics. How and why such sentiments were expressed, and by whom, also has an

important bearing on our understanding of the heritage that was bequeathed by that era to different German regimes after 1918.

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Marriage is central to medieval, as to most, societies. If sex is a private affair, its potential implications are wide: producing children and uniting two people over a long period, reproducing the social order, but also, through its passions, potentially disrupting it. Marriage is the term normally used for one of the major social forms for regulating all this: for formalizing and distinguishing long-term sexual relationships in the interests of partners, families, village or economic community, employer, lord, or ruler; for transferring rights and claims on property, inheritance, protection, and support to partners and children, designating which sexual partner(s) and children qualify for such recognition. Ines Weber has produced an important book on this central topic, covering the period from around AD 500 to 900, though a handful of her sources take her into the eleventh and even the early twelfth century. She thus deals with a crucial period between Late Antiquity, with its Greco-Roman and Early Christian legacy, and the developments in canon law and rituals which cemented what historians such as Georges Duby, Michael M. Sheehan, and Christopher N. L. Brooke have called ‘Christian marriage’, often seen as one of the greatest legacies of the Middle Ages to the West. Marriage is a topic in whose study cultural, economic, social, and ideological factors interact, and where their historiographies meet. Weber’s extended title is an indication of how fully she is aware of, and informed by, this matrix. Her main title, however, responds particularly to the recent historiographies of women’s and gender history. ‘One law for men and women’, a direct quotation from the council of Compiègne, is a challenge to these latter.

German-language work was central to the study of medieval marriage in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This work was often
legal-historical, the earliest overtly confessional; some was influenced by Romantic, often ‘Germanist’ views of the early Middle Ages. Although Weber sees modern feminism as producing a caesura in the study of medieval marriage, it has, since the Enlightenment, been affected by the contemporary ‘Woman Question’. The resulting historiography produced typologies or categorizations of early medieval marriage which have had a profound influence on the historical literature. Whilst most studies of sexual unions would distinguish marriage and concubinage, and both, as forms of long-term union, from promiscuity, these typologies are much more complex, especially in their categorization of marriage. They recognize a series of forms of marriage distinguished by two critical constitutive factors: the presence of dower and related property arrangements (Muntelehe and the similar Dotalehe), and the giving of consent by the parents (Muntelehe and Dotalehe), but also by the woman. This latter might be given without that of parents, producing Friedelehe. Where parents and property were involved, some argued also for the transfer of control/protection of the woman (Munt) from father to husband. Raubehe was formed by the open living together of a couple after abduction, but, as with Friedelehe, involved no transfer of Munt.

In this older historiography, the Christian church and ideology can be found set against pagan Germans, especially against romanticized Germanic female freedoms; paradoxically, it also often appears as the champion of individual consent vis-à-vis parents. Crucial statements like that of Pope Nicholas in the ninth century ‘not copulation but free will (voluntas) make marriage’ were read in this way, as precursors of the twelfth-century canon-law codifications which enshrined consent of the couple as the constitutive element in marriage. This long-standing, though far from monolithic, historiography and typology has recently come under question, directly and indirectly, including in the work of a series of historians of German women. Among these Ines Weber’s book must now be counted.

As the title suggests, the role of the Christian church and its ideas is a recurrent, though not a dominant theme. That role is of a Christian church transformed within, rather than set against early medieval society. Weber returns constantly to the social significance of marriage, to marriage in social context. She praises the work of Hans-Werner Goetz, Regine Le Jan, and Pierre Toubert. But this is not a social history of marriage. Its methodology is self-avowedly
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that of recent cultural history, with its attention to groups and consensus and to the cultural tools through which this is achieved. This is an attempt to understand and elucidate the basic principles of early medieval marriage through a geographically wide-ranging and diachronic study. Its sources are not the (meagre) documentation of individual cases, or of the marriage practices of particular times and places. They are the normative texts of a five hundred year period—the laws, formularies, capitularies, conciliar decrees, and penitentials. The book’s overt aim is thus to capture what is common, fundamental, and, by implication, unchanging—and its suggestions about the longue durée are a challenge to students of marriage beyond AD 1000. Weber rightly values the normative texts as responses to social realities; she is aware of textual traditions and the transmission of ideas from earlier contexts, though this does not consistently inform the detailed analysis. She is acutely conscious of the need to read her laconic texts in context, attentive to the severe problems of interpretation and translation, to eschew the importation of anachronistic concepts whether from the ancient world or the modern, a consciousness which she uses to great effect in, for example, her reading of the nature of (non-individualistic) consent. But the context is the broad one of the social and thought-world of the early Middle Ages as a whole, not the specific ones of, say, ninth-century Carolingian Francia. She emphasizes the common ground between, for example, Lexes on the one hand and penitentials on the other; but there are real differences, and the reader needs to be very attentive to these, including in the areas of alleged gender equality.

The method pays big dividends. It allows the elucidation of difficult and laconic texts through comparison. It picks up the occasional unpacking of such a term as ‘consent’ in the much-neglected formularies and applies it more widely to explore contemporary understanding. It exposes wide agreements across time and place, as with the near unanimity of texts in strong condemnation of abduction, and the forbidding of marriage in its wake—a unanimity which she relates to abduction as an offence against ‘consent-thought’. Here widely accepted fundamental ideas rooted in broadly similar social realities are revealed. There is no place left for Raubehe as a form of marriage. It is, however, a method which iron out difference. The texts are the products not merely of a common worldview, but of particular times and places. They can be contradictory, as were the
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councils of Compiègne and Ver on the question of entry into religion and indissolubility. Behind them lurk murky problems for which the texts may offer misleadingly simple answers; couples lived together after abduction, and that social reality had to be faced. Weber tries hard, and often successfully, to hold on to these differences—her arguments are subtle and complex. But a diachronic and broadly comparative method which has the very valuable result of emphasizing the longue durée has its downside.

The first volume is divided into three sections. Part A covers marriage of the free. Part B deals with the marriage of the unfree, or dependents. Part C focuses on penitential literature, using the levels of penance for marital offences as a mirror for the understanding of sin and penance. The second volume is a boon in itself, printing and translating all the sources on which the argument is based.

Part A is the heart of the argument, and its richly detailed discussion will be required reading for students of early medieval marriage. It is centrally concerned with consent and property arrangements in the making of marriage, but also with extramarital sexual relations and offences, and incest (in its early medieval sense of the prohibition of sexual relations among a range of kin). The question of the equality or valuation of women is addressed specifically here in relation to marriage as contract and its property transactions. This is undoubtedly the most successful, important, and challenging part of the work. It is here that Weber completes the demolition of the established typologies, arguing for a single form of marriage, begüterte Konsensehe, propertied but centred on consent, which Part B extends to the unfree/dependents. That consent involved individuals and the couple, but the wider kin, of which the couple were a part, were the critical groups. We have been misled in our reading by anachronistic notions of the individual; Friedelehe was built on ideas alien to the early medieval conceptual world. Marriage brought together two kins, forming a new one. It is this, and not primarily New Testament ‘one-flesh’ or pollution ideas, which is the key both to the pattern and to the wide extension of incest regulations at this date. Marriage was a contract between two kins, which created claims and duties between hitherto separate groups. Like all medieval contracts, it was made in stages, though with betrothal of paramount and binding importance; like all medieval contracts it was made in the legal public sphere, where action was definitively male.
This does not mean that women and their involvement were unimportant. Weber draws out, for example, the full implications for marriage of the work of Doris Hellmuth, Ingrid Heidrich, and Brigitte Resl on women’s property and inheritance, emphasizing how far such claims and control fatally undermine the notion of Munt over a woman transferred at marriage from father to husband. Like Ruth Karras, she would reject the idea of Muntehe. Guardianship and protection were, however, early medieval concepts, and the property transactions of marriage were designed both to establish the new household, creating obligations which bound men as well as women, and to protect the future of wife and children. These provisions were made by kin, and had implications for kin. Hence the requirement of wide consent: all are affected, all must consent. In such a world, abduction was classified as adultery, itself an inclusive term covering all offences against marriage, by men and women. The consent of women was sought, and there could be no valid marriage without it. Weber can produce no evidence of the mechanics of this, but then nor can the mechanisms of kin consent be revealed. Part A provokes much thought. Her treatment of incest, for example, highlights just how odd and problematic such restrictions were in the living conditions of the day, and the real anomalies they produced. Illegitimate/natural children, for example, were excluded from kin as defined for/by inheritance claims, but included in kin as defined for/by incest taboo.

Weber insists that status not gender is the key to understanding early medieval society. But that requires more qualification than she provides. The central importance of status distinctions—for example, widow, unmarried woman—is unquestionable; few would now generalize ‘women’. But recent Anglophone gender and women’s history would look to the complex interaction of status and gender, rather than setting them against each other. Her bibliography is rather thin on such work, including that of scholars such as Jinty Nelson. The fact that the groom was an active partner in negotiation whilst the bride was not is difficult to square with the ‘ein Gesetz’ of the title. Husbands were benign, themselves bound by notions of consent and to the survival of the household unit; but in Rothari’s edict, they were also permitted to kill their fornicating wives (vol. ii, p. 62). Weber faces these conundrums. But her answers sometimes reveal a conceptualization of patriarchy whose crude workings will
always be overt and calculating as opposed to unconscious and hegemonic.

The central argument of Part B is that, unlike the slaves of Antiquity, the early medieval unfree married. Christian ideas played a central role here, though Andrea Esmyol’s point—that Christian laws of indissolubility were compromised in the case of the unfree—is not fully answered. Consent was again central, though in this case the consent of lords. Comparison shows that it was not the marriage of the unfree, but mixed status marriage which was the recurring issue for normative texts. Such marriage was uncommon (thus Weber) but of great moment because it focused the conflicting interests of the lord of the unfree and the family of the free partner. Of great moment also, perhaps, because marriage forced the crucial question: ‘who is unfree?’ Part B highlights the problems of definition which unfreedom/dependence posed, for contemporaries as well as for modern historians. In the shifting social and economic realities of the early Middle Ages marriage arguably acted as a crux—the point at which clear definition had to be made. The recurrence of this issue may suggest not simply how crucial the question was for lords and kin, but also how difficult the answers were. The study of marriage still has much to offer to this central debate of social history.

In Part B benign husbands are matched by fatherly lords, whose control does no more than mirror that of kin in the case of the free. Power arguably needs to play a more important role than it is given here. Weber’s marriage contracts were themselves often between unequal kins. Inequality affects contracts, not least when the latter are made in stages, each with symbolic significance, allowing for different emphases and understandings. Weber’s book would not prepare us for the endless politics, if not strategies, of marriage and separation in the Carolingian elite world. Sylvia Konecny produced her own typology of marriage, and one which addressed precisely this social praxis.

Weber, however, makes no claims to be writing social history, and it would be wrong to end on such criticism. She is concerned about forms of marriage, the acts of making marriage, and the cultural understanding of these. On the questions it addresses, Ines Weber’s book offers new conclusions and synthesis which will be starting points for future work.
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Frederick Barbarossa might not be the most famous medieval emperor as the dust jacket of Laudage’s biography claims, but he certainly contends for that title with Charlemagne and Barbarossa’s own grandson, Frederick II. Indeed, his reign is one of the most studied periods in medieval history and he has been the subject of numerous biographies in various languages, quite a few of which have been published recently.¹ The English reader, however, still relies on works published forty years ago that by now are certainly outdated.² There are good reasons for Frederick’s enduring legacy and fame through the centuries, since he was deeply involved in expanding the influence of the Holy Roman Empire, enjoyed a long and remarkably stable rule in Germany (relatively speaking), was engaged in a momentous struggle with the papacy and the Lombard city communes, and had extensive contacts with the other Christian rulers in Europe and the Mediterranean, not to mention the crusade that he undertook and during which he died. Frederick came very close to killing the autonomy of the Italian city-states shortly after their birth, to re-establishing imperial control over the papacy, and to expanding his hegemony in the Mediterranean as well. A recent series of conferences has also underlined the profound influence of his reign on the development of public law.³ Therefore it would be good to have an updated biography of Frederick Barbarossa in English, one that

¹ e.g. Franco Cardini, Il Barbarossa: Vita, trionfi e illusioni di Federico I imperatore (Milan, 1985), reprinted with bibliographical updates; S. Gasparri, Federico Barbarossa (Florence, 1996); Ferdinand Oppl, Friedrich Barbarossa (Darmstadt, 1990), also reprinted with bibliographical updates; Pierre Racine, Frédéric Barberousse (1152–1190) (Paris, 2009).
² The most recent biographies of Frederick in English are Peter Munz, Frederick Barbarossa: A Study in Medieval Politics (London, 1969) and Marcel Pacaut, Frederick Barbarossa, trans. A. J. Pomerans (London, 1970).
³ For the influence of Frederick’s reign on the development of public law see Gerhard Dilcher and Diego Quaglioni (eds.), Gli inizi del diritto pubblico. L’età di Federico Barbarossa: legislazione e scienza del diritto. Die Anfänge des Öffentlichen Rechts: Gesetzgebung im Zeitalter Friedrich Barbarossas und das Gelehrte Recht (Bologna, 2007); eid. (eds.), Gli inizi del diritto pubblico. ii. Da
also showcases and sums up the most recent research, since this has adopted new approaches and immensely furthered our understanding of Frederick’s life and world. This could perhaps be achieved by translating one of the biographies published recently. Laudage was in a very good position to write a biography of Frederick Barbarossa, having worked on his reign, and in particular, his relations with his main opponent, Pope Alexander III, for his Habilitationsschrift, which was published as a monograph more than a decade ago. However, in order to evaluate Laudage’s biography of Barbarossa it is necessary to keep in mind two issues, namely, that it was aimed at a wider audience than a purely academic one, and, above all, that it was unfinished when Laudage died in a traffic accident at the beginning of 2008. As the work was at a very advanced stage, it was decided to publish it with the help of Lars Hageneier and Matthias Schröer, with all the difficulties that such a task implies. Laudage’s death brought to a premature end a distinguished career whose research interests went far beyond the reign of Barbarossa. It is possible to make a good guess at how Laudage intended his biography of Barbarossa to be by looking at his biography of Emperor Otto the Great, because the two works share the same publisher and their approach seems to have been similar. This suggests that the work was meant to be without footnotes in order to make it more appealing to a wider public. However, the death of the author prevented the inclusion of the extensive commentary (more than thirty pages long) that is to be found in his book on Otto the Great and constitutes part of its appeal. The map provided at the beginning of the volume under review is also the wrong one, because it does not portray the political geography of Europe and of the Mediterranean in the twelfth century as it claims, but instead that created by the Fourth Crusade. If this does not make an enormous difference for continental Europe, it does for the Byzantine Empire, whose emperor, Manuel Komnenos, was one of the main opponents of Frederick Barbarossa, not to mention that Frederick himself crossed the Byzantine lands to die in Anatolia.


4 Johannes Laudage, Alexander III. und Friedrich Barbarossa (Cologne, 1997).

during his fatal crusade. The last thirteen years of Frederick’s reign are also examined quite briskly, but it should be kept in mind that, as already noted by the late Timothy Reuter, this is quite a common feature of works on Frederick Barbarossa because primary sources, such as the *Gesta Friderici*, written by Frederick’s uncle, Otto of Freising, as well as Frederick’s successes, are clustered in the first half of the reign.6

Yet the main problem of the unfinished manuscript was certainly the fact that Laudage had still to write the section concerning the period between the late 1160s and 1178, almost a quarter of Frederick’s reign. While the decision not to fill the gap is perhaps understandable, this means that there is a ten-year void in the coverage of the book between chapters six and seven. This is not a trivial matter because what is missing is a decisive decade in Frederick’s life, corresponding to the campaign in Italy that decided the conflict with the Lombard League and the papacy, sealing the fate of the Holy Roman Empire in Italy. In fact, this decade includes Frederick’s defeat at the Battle of Legnano in 1176 by the army gathered by the Lombard League, which crippled any hope that Frederick had of prevailing over the Lombard cities by military force. As recently underlined by Paolo Grillo, the Battle of Legnano is also of great relevance for the history of warfare, not only because of its magnitude, but also because infantry-based civic militias prevailed against the cavalry-based imperial army at a period when warfare was dominated by aristocratic heavy cavalry.7 Laudage’s biography of Emperor Frederick resumes after the Peace of Venice of 1177, which brought a final settlement with Alexander III, along with truces with the King of Sicily and the Lombard League that paved the way for the final settlement with the League six years later at the Peace of Constance. Indeed, the Peace of Venice was also a great international congress, as testified by the large number of participants from northern Italy as well as from Germany and various other kingdoms, including Sicily and England. There is no doubt that given his past expertise Laudage would have covered these momentous events more than appropriately.

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As the work stands, the eight chapters, many of which are assigned catchy titles, are organized mainly chronologically. The first three deal respectively with Frederick’s early life and rise to the throne, his coronation journey to Rome, the early years of the reign and the imperial Diet of Roncaglia in 1158, where Frederick unfolded what proved to be a doomed attempt to enhance imperial control over Italy by claiming a series of royal rights (regalia). The English translation of the title of this chapter about the Diet of Roncaglia reads ‘Italy, or the Illusion of Reason’. In chapter four a thematic approach is preferred, examining the issues of chivalric culture, the imperial curia, economy and finance, and then rule and social praxis. The last four chapters are chronologically ordered again. The chapter ‘The Turning Point of his Life’ concerns the apex of Frederick’s rule in Italy from the destruction of Milan in 1162, when he attempted to introduce a stable apparatus of government, to the disastrous conquest of Rome in 1167, after which the newly established apparatus crumbled in the Po Valley under the blows of the Lombard League. The chapter ‘Phoenix from the Ashes’ deals with Frederick’s re-consolidation of his rule in Germany after his Italian setbacks before the new Italian campaign, which, as mentioned, is unfortunately missing. The last years of Frederick’s reign are then examined, including the quarrel with Henry the Lion, the agreement with the Lombard League at the Peace of Constance in 1183, and the taking of the cross at Mainz in 1188. The title of the last chapter is self-explanatory: ‘Crusade and Death.’ This is followed by a conclusion that attempts to weigh up Frederick’s experience, followed by a chronology of the most relevant events, an extensive bibliography, and an index.

Overall, Laudage put a great deal of effort into placing Frederick within the knightly culture of his time, often availing himself of the latest historiography, but his biography focuses mainly on Frederick’s rule rather than on his life. It is not a particularly innovative work, but it shows that if Laudage had been able to finish it, the book would have succeeded both in appealing to the general educated public and in being useful to the academic community, as was the case with Laudage’s previous book on Otto the Great. This in itself would have been no small achievement.⁸

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Rainer Christoph Schwinges, who was Professor of Medieval History at the University of Berne until 2008, is among the most knowledgeable experts on the history of universities and education during the late Middle Ages. The book under review brings together important essays of recent decades which have already been published elsewhere and in which the arguments of his pioneering Habilitationschrift of 1986 are to some extent prepared, but largely developed further. In addition, gaps in the research are identified and the recently begun long-term project of a Repertorium Academicum Germanicum (RAG) is outlined.

This collection of essays is divided into five sections. The title of the first is simply ‘The University’. In it, Schwinges identifies the basic outline of how universities developed in the Holy Roman Empire and their typological peculiarities (pp. 3–17), and discusses their corporate constitution (pp. 19–33) and how they were financed (pp. 35–55). His comments on ‘Results and State of University History’ (pp. 57–84) show how his social history approach responded to certain deficits of research on education that had long been strongly shaped by the history of ideas. In this tradition, the medieval university was interpreted as an egalitarian scientific community to which status thinking was irrelevant. Schwinges, by contrast, stresses that the universities were ‘faithful mirror-images of the society . . . of which they were a part’ (p. 61). Consequently, he argues, any attempt to study them must also be an ‘analysis of inequality’, which can best be achieved by an evaluation of ‘large-scale serial sources’, in other words, various student registers (p. 64). The German-language area provides a highly favourable situation in this respect, as student registers have survived relatively intact for a long period. In them, students were often entered according to their social rank, revealing a social range corresponding to medieval society from peniless pauper to aristocratic student.

If we see the university as a social body, the phenomena of ‘Fre-
frequency, Recruitment and Migration’ are crucial, and they are the subject of the second section of this volume. With the topic of fluctuating numbers of university students over time (‘frequency’) Schwinges touches on the work of Franz Eulenburg, but uses a much more sophisticated methodology. The complex procedure of a time series analysis allows him to demonstrate that university attendance in the Holy Roman Empire during the fifteenth century (Reichsfrequenz) followed a cyclical structure. Upswings can be discerned in the period from 1385 to around 1430, and again from 1450 to 1480, while phases of stagnation can be observed from about 1430 to 1450 and again from 1480 until into the sixteenth century. It could be objected that the statistical analysis of medieval student registers is a tricky matter, given that by far not all students were entered in these registers, and conversely, not everyone who was enrolled at a university was a student. Schwinges, however, points out rightly that despite these problems, university registers are among ‘the best serial sources that have ever been preserved’ (p. 97). He suggests that a degree of uncertainty should not prevent this sort of fundamental research from being undertaken (pp. 87–118). The general findings concerning Reichsfrequenz are confirmed in the essay on Franconia (pp. 159–90). This example also casts light on the regional catchment areas of German universities. The University of Leipzig, in particular, attracted students from Franconia, as did the universities of Vienna and Erfurt. Findings on the ‘migration’ of German students in general are informative. It transpires that they were much less mobile than the popular image of the ‘wandering scholar’ might suggest (pp. 119–34). More than 80 per cent of students only ever travelled between their homes and their universities. Only 10 to 20 per cent of students attended a second university, and no more than 2 to 5 per cent went to a third one, while the chance to travel to a foreign university remained the preserve of a tiny percentage of especially well-to-do students.

The next section, ‘Groups, Classes, Estates’, looks first at the paupers at universities (pp. 237–63). Their most important distinguishing features were not only a low income of less than 12 to 16 Gulden per annum, but also a lack of connections. Even among themselves, they generally networked less than students from the middle and upper classes. They received reductions on the fees they paid, but this hardly compensated for the other disadvantages they suffered, such as being allocated seats in the back rows at lectures. Their share
of the student population was remarkably constant throughout the whole fifteenth century, although their distribution across the German universities differed. While even less mobile than the other students, they more often completed an academic degree. A further essay in this section deals with students at the other end of the social scale, those from aristocratic families (pp. 317–37). They could also be exempted from paying fees, but as a mark of respect and in the hope that they would voluntarily donate larger amounts. Schwinges demonstrates that the percentage of aristocratic students attending universities in the south of the Holy Roman Empire was higher than in the north. This may have been connected with the fact that universities in the south were closer to the legal universities of Italy, which offered the most attractive options for aristocratic students.

The fourth section looks at important aspects of ‘University Culture and Student Life’, starting with the organizational units of medieval Burser (students’ hostels, pp. 341–87) and Kollegien (courses of lectures, pp. 389–99), and at the formal procedures associated with admitting students to university (pp. 401–29). The sometimes extreme initiation rituals practised by the student body and other ceremonies at the universities are also discussed (pp. 489–512). The essay on ‘Student Education, Student Life’, finally, sums up many of these themes and provides a concise account of the content of courses and accommodation and living costs (pp. 431–88). It also asks what place women could have at university. The examples cited from Italian universities are explicitly presented as exceptions to the rule (p. 439).

The fifth and final section is devoted to the themes ‘Studies, Career, and Profile’, and asks what career chances there were for university graduates. First it should be noted that the majority of university students in the Holy Roman Empire attended the arts faculty (Artistenfakultät) which had little weight within the university compared with the other faculties (pp. 609–36). Even after attending university, its graduates did not have good prospects as the demand for their services was not big enough either in the Church or the gradually professionalizing secular institutions (pp. 553–78). On the basis of two ego documents, Schwinges demonstrates that only the interplay between academic qualification and patronage could guarantee a secure livelihood. He analyses the personal notebook and account book of a student and later clergyman from Cologne, who was
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patronized by his uncle and, in turn, supported his own nephew (pp. 529–51). Here, as a change from the otherwise dominant quantitative methods, new methodological paths are trodden. Comments on the career patterns of a group of university students from Cologne demonstrate once again that the Church, above all, offered a suitable field of activity for scholars. Lawyers, in particular, often found well-paid livings at collegiate churches (Stiftskirchen) (pp. 512–28). Beyond this, much remains to be clarified concerning the significance of scholarly knowledge and its bearers for the processes of change in late medieval Europe. The long-term project of a Repertorium Academium Germanicum,¹ which aims eventually to assemble data on all graduate scholars in the Holy Roman Empire between 1250 and 1550, will undoubtedly make it possible to take prosopographical approaches to a new level (pp. 579–607).

Even if a certain amount of repetition is inevitable whenever collected essays are reprinted, this publication is welcome. It allows quick orientation within the social history research on education of recent decades, which was largely influenced by the studies assembled here. Given the high price of the volume, however, the editorial sloppiness of the publisher in some of the sections is irritating. In addition to a number of printing errors in German texts (pp. 128, 179, 321, 440) and in Latin quotations (p. 443), something seems to have gone badly wrong in the scanning-in of an English essay (pp. 443 ff.). We can put up with the fact that the page numbers of the first edition, which appear in the margin, wander in one instance (p. 472), but it becomes very confusing when the number moves into the text straight after a date (p. 174).


GEORG STRACK’s dissertation on a prominent German student and learned counsellor of the fifteenth century has been published as Thomas Pirkheimer (1418–1473): Gelehrter Rat und Frühhumanist (2010). He is coordinator of the Centre for Medieval and Renaissance Studies at the University of Munich, and is currently preparing a second book on papal oratory in the Middle Ages.
For the last few decades, spousal abuse as a topic has been rising on historians’ agendas as an indicator of changing gender relations and perceptions of gendered violence in history. Medievalists, however, have long been remarkably silent on this subject, by and large leaving the field to scholars of early modern history. As far as later medieval England is concerned, widely discussed studies such as *Crime and Conflict* by Barbara A. Hanawalt have opened up a field of research that has reasonably frequent citations, but very few substantial investigations have actually followed. In the new study under review here, Sara M. Butler takes up the challenge, providing the first comprehensive investigation of domestic violence in late medieval England.

Butler’s first chapter starts with a survey of late medieval discourses of marriage, violence, and the nature of the two sexes. Already at this early stage of her investigation she interweaves theoretical and normative positions with concepts drawn from court records. But there is more: legal theorists, clerical catechetical writings, and even Geoffrey Chaucer come together to form a cluster of texts and meanings. Later in this chapter, some carvings from the choirs of Stratford-upon-Avon (the church is not specified) and Westminster Abbey are discussed. This opens up a fascinating range of possible sources but runs a high risk of being unspecific regarding individual records and their possible significance. For instance, treating Bracton’s *Tractatus* and the *Mirror of Justices* as equally significant sources ignores the marked differences in the reception of these two legal works. Yet the way in which Butler links the discourses of castigation with those of female passivity and aggression is intriguing.

In the second chapter, Butler turns from a more theoretical discussion to actual jurisdictional practice by collecting ‘types and frequency of abuses’ from court records. The material she consults for this and the following chapters consists of records not only from ecclesiasticals courts, but also manor and borough courts, coroners’ rolls, and gaol deliveries. Thus her study is noticeably broader than

those which concentrate on ecclesiastical court assessments, where we expect to find cases of marital violence. But what is a strength of this study also demands a great deal from the reader. At times, a little more introduction to the confusing complexity of late medieval England’s heterogeneous (and expanding) legal system would have been helpful. Drawing on sources other than ecclesiastical court records, however, provides a remarkable new perspective on marital violence. While ecclesiastical courts were concerned with marriage, disorder within it, and its possible break-up, royal and manorial courts were concerned with violence. Consequently, Butler argues, ecclesiastical courts were more often willing to excuse a husband physically chastising his wife for disobedience.

Geographically, Butler focuses primarily on the counties of Yorkshire in the north and Essex in the south, supplementing her material with records from other counties where there are gaps for her investigation. No matter how problematic this strategy might be strictu sensu, she has good reason to do so. A narrowing of the scope is inevitable, and for both of these counties the extant records for all the types of courts covered in this study are especially good.

One specific category of crime which Butler is interested in is spousal homicide as ‘a reasonable indicator of levels of extreme marital violence’ (p. 86). English common law charged a wife killing her husband with felonious homicide, while a murderous husband was charged with petty treason, a completely different crime. In her interpretation of the 1352 statute of treason Butler finds that ‘a wife’s relationship with her husband resembled that of lord and vassal’ (p. 87). This effectively made murdering a husband treason. Acquittal rates, however, were remarkably high: thirty-two of the forty-nine cases Butler finds before the royal justices in medieval Essex and Yorkshire resulted in no conviction (p. 91).

Butler’s third chapter looks at the causes behind marital tension that led to violent disruptions. Certainly, it is difficult to identify such causes from court records, but Butler addresses a few more regular narratives, namely, adultery, economic deprivation, insanity, the absence of spousal cohabitation, and the wife’s disobedience. The material which this chapter relies on is almost exclusively ecclesiastical because these records pay attention to the reasons for violent outbursts. Ecclesiastical courts were more concerned to uphold marriage than to punish violence. This also leads Butler to the interesting find-
ing that although ‘the church’s willingness to hold disobedient wives accountable for their husbands’ violent actions contradicts contemporary notions of self-governance’ (p. 130), ecclesiastical courts regularly acknowledged the plight of women and displayed a serious concern to address the problems that lay behind instances of marital violence. Free from the constraints of common law, the records of these courts show a broad range of possible outcomes.

Despite the wide range of records covered in this book, it discusses no more than 300 cases of domestic violence. This comparably small number, Butler argues, indicates that a certain level of physical chastisement was socially accepted in late medieval England. Consequently, chapter four explicitly spells out the fundamental question underlying the whole book: what did medieval men and women regard as ‘acceptable violence’? What separated compulsory disciplinary sanctions from transgressively excessive force? The term ‘chastisement’, it shows, was open to interpretation and, as Butler makes clear in her investigation, ‘medieval society left it to the husbands to negotiate the limits to force’ (p. 65). In six case studies of divorce a mensa et thoro (a couple’s separation of table and bed), she analyses each partner’s (and now party’s) different perspectives on physical conflict within marriage as reflected in their court narratives. This is indeed fascinating material which makes for a fascinating chapter.

One female narrative strategy which Butler unveils is that of echoing popular hagiographic tales as, for instance, when Cecilia Wyvell told the story of her outrageous husband in terms of the martyrdom of St Lucy, who had her eyes ripped out by her torturers (pp. 177–9).

In the last two chapters Butler treats spousal violence not so much as an individual as a communal threat. She also links cases of marital violence and their prosecution with the crime of scolding, a charge that became markedly more frequent in English courts during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. These two chapters suggest a number of interesting ideas that go beyond the scope of the study, but in general, too little evidence is provided to substantiate them (for example, Butler’s notion of a poor and bellicose society in Essex that had fewer problems with scolding than southern Yorkshire). The pictures Butler paints of communal and family conflicts, however, are vivid throughout the whole book.

This is a fundamental examination of the topic, fluently written and full of fascinating material. It shows clearly that late medieval
English officials of both church and manor treated marital violence as a matter of significance. While a certain degree of violence was acceptable, a husband’s over-reliance on physical correction was deemed morally abject and could also display his inability to maintain an orderly household. From this perspective, the study contributes not only to the history of women and marriage, but also to that of manliness and male honour, matching investigations such as that by Elizabeth Foyster for the early modern period.²


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The solemn triflings of this so-called “Diet of Deputation” — which Frederick the Great compared to dogs in a yard baying at the moon — have probably never been equalled elsewhere. Questions of precedence and title, questions whether the envoys of princes should have chairs of red cloth like those of the Electors, or only of the less honourable green, whether they should be served on gold or silver, how many hawthorn boughs should be hung up before the door of each on May-day; these, and such as these, it was their chief employment not to settle but to discuss.™

James Viscount Bryce’s verdict on the irrelevance of the Reichstag typifies the nineteenth and early twentieth-century condemnation of the Old Empire as a ‘soulless sham’ where ‘form’ had long outlived ‘substance’. It has long become commonplace to contrast this older historiography with the more positive interpretations advanced since the 1960s stressing the vitality of imperial institutions, as well as the lively public discussion on the Empire’s future which continued beyond its actual demise in 1806. The older view that the Empire was not (or no longer) a state because it lacked viable institutions has been replaced by assertions that it was, indeed, a state (possibly even the first ‘German nation-state’) precisely on the basis of evidence of such institutions. Both views ignore the ‘gildings and trappings’ (Bryce) which so vexed envoys at the Reichstag and other eighteenth-century observers. Rituals and symbols remain either ignored or marginalized as cultural aspects somehow disconnected from ‘real’ politics, which are traced through the development of institutions with written records and formalized procedures.

In one of the most important books ever to appear on the Old Empire, Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger challenges both perspectives by placing ritual at the centre of her study. Her book’s impact is assisted by the force of her arguments and their expression in clear, accessible language which seamlessly weaves insights from anthropology, sociology, and other disciplines with fresh archival research and a firm command of the historical literature.

The customary focus on institutional development is replaced by discussion of the ‘presence culture’ (*Kultur der Präsenz*) involving face-to-face interaction, which had greater prestige and legitimacy at the end of the fifteenth century than communication either by proxies (such as envoys) or in writing. The personal presence of key actors sustained the Empire in two fundamental ways. Formal powers and responsibilities were not defined in relation to an abstract, written constitution, but through each actor’s personal bond to the emperor as feudal overlord. This bond expired if either party died, and had to be renewed publicly through a solemn oath affirming each party’s place in the hierarchy of status categories ranging from emperor, through the electors, princes, and other imperial Estates collectively constituting the Empire. Second, personal presence signalled acceptance of common decisions in a system based on the ancient Roman principle that ‘anything that affects all, must be agreed by all’. Here the solemn oaths of those estates assembled before their monarch substituted for a developed institutional infrastructure. The Empire lacked an effective means of enforcing decisions and especially coercing those who refused to accept the majority view. Matters remained unresolved until a consensus was reached. The material resources, coercive power, and social capital of the imperial estates were all necessary, but not sufficient factors in the Empire’s development. Imperial politics only became ‘real’ for contemporaries through their physical embodiment in common rituals, not through expression in written contracts or other documents.

Such documents had long existed, but played a subordinate role until the rapid expansion of written culture, assisted by the print revolution, in the late fifteenth century. Stollberg-Rilinger’s most important argument is that this written culture did not replace presence culture in some linear modernization process. Rather, it reinforced it by serving as an ever-more precise script to guide ritual and precedence. This process is examined in four micro-historical studies chosen to reflect major stages in the development of the early modern Empire: the Reichstag meetings in Worms (1495), Augsburg (1530), and Regensburg (1653–4), as well as the 1764–5 session of the ‘eternal diet’, which coincided with Joseph II’s coronation as King of the Romans and the failure of his policy to reassert the formal investiture of imperial estates.

With ‘presence culture’ still predominant in 1495, politics remain-
ed flexible. Changes to the imperial hierarchy could be accommodated, such as the elevation of the count of Württemberg to the status of duke and full imperial prince. There was room, too, for ambiguity, including that surrounding Lorraine’s relationship to the Empire, or the fact that both the elector of Brandenburg and duke of Pomerania sported the Pomeranian title and coat of arms. Order was stabilized through ritual performance involving a high proportion of those who actually mattered in imperial politics. Investiture ceremonies were conducted by the emperor ‘in majesty’, surrounded by the electors and numerous other imperial estates. Immediate demonstration of status was more important than definitive victory in disagreements. Offended parties could show their disapproval symbolically during a ritual, or by leaving early to await a more opportune moment to renew their case.

The growth of written culture unintentionally eroded this flexibility. Writing things down was intended to address the deficiencies of presence culture by settling disputes arising from differing interpretations of status, and by assisting the common framework by specifying obligations to the Empire more clearly. Far from being resolved, disputes grew more numerous and intense as the room for ambiguity disappeared. The growing acceptance and prestige of the written word also discouraged attendance at the Empire’s rituals. The emperor and the majority of the imperial estates had attended the 1495 Reichstag in person, but were already accompanied by their learned officials and professional advisors. These councillors, equipped with written instructions, gradually replaced their masters at all key events. This practice greatly complicated disputes over precedence, since the personal status of envoys did not match that of their absentee masters. Further difficulties emerged in the mid-seventeenth century as other European states perceived ceremonial as a barrier to efficient negotiation and simplified or abandoned it. The Empire could not ignore this development since some of its leading princes acquired foreign crowns, while several European monarchs were represented in imperial institutions through their possession of the qualifying German land. A powerful monarch like Frederick II of Prussia could hardly be addressed in his capacity as mere count of Tecklenburg, yet it proved impossible to reconcile the possession of different lands and titles within the formal hierarchy of status categories.
At this point Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger departs most substantially from previous interpretations which have largely followed Hegel’s depiction of the Empire in 1802 as a hollow shell, devoid of real meaning. She argues that preoccupation with such comments fails to explain why disputes continued over precedence and why, for example, it remained important to Frederick II that his representative should not have to kneel before the emperor when seeking his master’s investiture as imperial prince. Her answer lies in how written culture reinforced ceremonial, even when such acts were no longer being performed. Discussion of status spawned an entire new branch of jurisprudence known as the law of precedence (*ius praecedentiae*), which became the main topic in the discourse on imperial law. While this contributed to the Empire’s development by regulating relations between its components more precisely, it also undermined the legitimacy of the established status hierarchy. Each party to a dispute sought to discredit its rivals’ claims by casting doubt on the authenticity of the objects, titles, and other symbols used to demonstrate status.

By the eighteenth century most intellectuals no longer believed that the imperial regalia and the emperor’s other ‘old clothes’ were actually relics once possessed by Charlemagne. They increasingly distinguished between the formal structure symbolized by such insignia and the reality of Austro-Prussian rivalry and great power politics. The Empire assumed a spectral character, exemplified by the dishes placed before the empty chairs set for the absentee princes at Joseph’s coronation in 1764. It also shrank physically, not just in the contraction of imperial frontiers, but more significantly in the reduction of its symbolic sites to Regensburg (for the Reichstag), Frankfurt (elections and coronations), and Vienna (investitures). After 1764 the monarch no longer travelled in his capacity as emperor: Joseph journeyed incognito; to see, not to be seen.

And yet, as Stollberg-Rilinger argues, the imperial estates were unable to escape the old symbolic system entirely since their own status depended on it. Status was never logically related to any of the criteria used in written discourse to justify it: dynastic lineage, size of territory, military or other resources. No one was prepared to forgo their own privileges for the sake of giving the Empire a more rational, abstract order. Instead, each wanted to enhance their own position relative to their rivals. With no one prepared to accept change to their
disadvantage, the Empire was locked into an endless cycle of disputes it could not resolve.

The formal structure was sustained by ‘organizational hypocrisy’ (pp. 274–81), in which the participants masked every deviation from the norm by excusing it as ‘exceptional’. The formal status hierarchy remained frozen in its sixteenth-century form, increasingly disconnected from the real balance of power in the Empire and in Europe. Development had stalled at the point where the Empire created the mechanisms to express protest in (generally) non-violent forms, but before it established effective means to enforce decisions in areas of disagreement. The unresolved disputes accumulated precisely because ceremony remained important. These disputes in turn hindered the resolution of all other matters like justice, taxation, defence, and religion, not least because they were open to manipulation by those seeking to frustrate decisions on these questions.

Stollberg-Rilinger is most successful where she criticizes traditional constitutional history for its fixation with written documents and formalized institutional procedures. She convincingly demonstrates the importance of ritual in embodying the early modern Empire, as well as the persistence of a culture of presence alongside that of writing. Her account of political decline and incapacity is far more striking and controversial. Though she stresses her book should be taken as a supplementary perspective, not an alternative constitutional history (pp. 18–19), it is hard to reconcile her findings with the now five decades of generally positive interpretation of the Empire’s institutional development—a reappraisal to which she contributed an admirably succinct overview as recently as 2006.2 She seems at times herself uncertain whether still to stress flexibility or stasis, especially in her discussion of events after 1648. The ‘organizational hypocrisy’ allowed, for example, imperial elections to proceed despite disputes over precedence amongst the electors, as well as resolutions to be passed in the Reichstag whilst envoys still squabbled over precedence.

It is unlikely that further research on the central imperial rituals and symbols can do more than fill the gaps in her chronology, and these gaps are much shorter than a cursory glance at her four case

studies might suggest, since her discussion ranges widely over the background and subsequent development of imperial elections, coronations, and other phenomena. A potentially more fruitful area would be to investigate how ritual may have embodied the Empire in the localities, and especially whether this extended beyond symbols and ceremonies in the imperial cities. This might provide connections to the rich social history of imperial politics under way since the 1970s, which has demonstrated the relative effectiveness and importance of imperial courts and other institutions in defusing local problems and in stabilizing the smaller imperial Estates. Whilst such activities did not involve the major actors in formal rituals, they nonetheless sustained a common political culture linked directly to the Empire. They also featured prominently in discussions of the Empire as a common framework for Central Europe and potentially a model for the entire Continent. These discussions filled volumes in the eighteenth century and, to an extent, did render the disputes over precedence meaningless by offering an alternative vision of the Empire freed from the constraints of tradition and with the potential to develop as a ‘modern’ constitutional state.

Finally, we would need to consider whether the new forms of sentimentality which developed in the eighteenth century perhaps gave new meaning to the Old Empire. The tears shed by Emperor Francis I during his son’s coronation in 1764 might have no place in traditional protocol, but were perceived by some as signs of genuine attachment to the formal order. Romanticism, with its ambiguous blend of liberalism and conservatism, was perhaps ideally suited to the hybrid character of the old Empire. It was certainly an element in the nostalgia for the lost imperial framework expressed by lawyers and intellectuals like Friedrich Carl von Savigny during the first half of the nineteenth century.

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CHRISTINE R. JOHNSON, *The German Discovery of the World: Renaissance Encounters with the Strange and Marvelous*, Studies in Early Modern German History (Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press, 2008), xii + 304 pp. ISBN 978 0 8139 2712 1. $45.00 (hardback) 978 0 8139 2734 3. $22.50 (paperback)

When and how do world views shift? For a long time, it was agreed that during the Renaissance an intellectual sea change transformed European philosophy, enabling scholars finally to overcome classical wisdom and turn instead towards a new epistemology. The discoveries made during the European expansion were thought to have produced a beneficial shock, giving rise to radical doubts about ancient ideas that had been developed by scholars such as Ptolemy. Francis Bacon’s *Novum Organum* (1620), which features as a frontispiece the symbolic image of a ship sailing through the mythical Pillars of Hercules, was thought to embody the new scholarship. This long-cherished master narrative has recently been called into question by Anthony Grafton and others, who have revealed the continuing hold of ancient texts on early modern scholarship.¹ The study under review focuses more specifically on the impact of the Iberian expansion on developments in the German-speaking territories and looks beyond academia. Although not at the time directly engaged in colonial enterprises, Germans were nonetheless deeply involved because they were connected to the rest of Europe by close-knit scholarly, diplomatic, and commercial networks. Like Grafton, Christine R. Johnson opposes a static and rigid concept of ancient learning and highlights the longevity and flexibility of the inherited structures of thought. She points to ways in which German merchants, map-makers, cosmographers, and botanists made new discoveries fit into familiar categories and ancient theories, rather than using them to challenge the old knowledge system.

Johnson’s time frame spans the ‘initial phase’ (p. 16) of the German response to the New World, beginning with the publication of the Behaim Globe in 1492. It ends around 1580, when the Iberian empire was increasingly challenged by the English and the Dutch. In

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the German lands, the widening confessional split began to affect all areas of cultural production, fundamentally changing the context of reactions to journeys of discovery. This chronological scope reflects the assumption that the growing acceptance of the Reformation heralded ground-breaking intellectual developments that did, eventually, lead to the replacement of old theories.

The book is divided into an introduction, five chapters, and a conclusion. In contrast to previous scholarship, which examined how travel accounts construed extra-European cultures as new and fundamentally different from everything European, the first chapter shows how they described similarities. Since these texts mainly came to Germany as translations, Johnson proposes to pay close attention to paratexts, which reflect contemporary readers’ tastes. These rendered the travelling ‘both adventurous and commonplace’ (p. 27), linking up sixteenth-century accounts with ancient and medieval ones, thereby placing new findings in a familiar frame of reference. German authors thus implemented a new emphasis rather than a new epistemology; Johnson concludes that the intensified interest in newly discovered regions was ‘at most a quantitative, not a qualitative, change’ (p. 35).

Cosmography and cartography played a key role in incorporating new discoveries into ancient theories. In chapter two, Johnson shows how texts and maps depended on each other, sharing the themes of ‘attainability, variety and intelligibility’ of newly discovered regions (p. 48). Eye-witness accounts were subordinated to theoretical cosmographic thinking, and new findings adapted to the current topographical system. This view contrasts with earlier work that treats the Ptolemaic system as outdated by the middle of the sixteenth century. It agrees with findings showing that some of Ptolemy’s ideas survived much longer (for example, the notion of a Southern continent counter-balancing the known landmasses of the Northern hemisphere, which was still being discussed when James Cook embarked on his second Pacific voyage in 1772). German scholars thus helped to reinvigorate ancient theory as cosmography advanced. They emphasized historical change, thereby establishing ‘historical as well as geographical distance’ (p. 55). They also used new material to reach conclusions that had been anticipated in ancient theories, for example, in mapping the torrid and frigid zones of the earth and deciding whether they were habitable. Despite the inaccuracies in
early modern measuring methods, cosmographers and map makers created an ‘illusion of accuracy’ (p. 71). By preserving the old system and highlighting the merits of their own interpretations in resolving ancient problems, they secured a superior position for themselves.

Chapter three examines the long-distance trade between Europe and the New World. Johnson finds that earlier scholarship overemphasized the Europeans’ greed for material gain, neglecting the strategies they developed to access the new resources. Drawing on the German commercial correspondence, she argues that German merchants were well prepared: they already had the necessary capital and expertise when Vasco da Gama discovered the sea route to India. By the middle of the sixteenth century, they had integrated the new routes into their regular trading system. Profiting from the interdependence between long-distance trade and the money business, south German merchants became favoured partners for the Spanish and the Portuguese monarchs. Johnson shows how they carefully calculated their investments and profits by sending factors to the newly discovered regions, instructing them to send detailed accounts. She concludes that German merchants were far from blinded by greed but, on the contrary, were very conscious of the need to gain a pragmatic evaluation of the business opportunities. Accountancy helped to quantify exotic goods and make them compatible with familiar classifications. Techniques such as double-entry book keeping, which had already been developed for trade within Europe, turned out to be equally useful in the overseas trade. Using mathematics to take stock of the bewildering variety of new products had a homogenizing effect, enabling ‘control and surveillance’ (p. 112). It was therefore not marvellous riches but the realistic estimation of New World resources that caught the merchants’ interest. In Johnson’s view, this holds true for both India and North America, although she concedes that in the Atlantic region, ‘commercial and conquistadorial expeditions’ overlapped (p. 120).

Some unsympathetic German commentators levelled charges of disease, contagion, and moral corruption against the overseas trade. In chapter four, Johnson demonstrates that it was, in fact, economic change that their attacks were aimed at, especially the accumulation of power and capital by south German merchant corporations like those of the Welsers and the Fuggers. Criticism was based on the scholastic reproach of morally unacceptable commercial practices
such as hoarding and usury, and coincided with popular disapproval of merchant success. It often followed a profoundly political agenda, as became apparent when members of the Imperial Diet accused pepper merchants of unsound business during the Monopolstreit of the 1520s. Religious reformers such as Martin Luther and Ulrich von Hutten tried to ban the foreign products on moral grounds, representing them as unnecessary luxuries and combining their criticism of the spices with a critique of the clergy they were opposed to. Johnson challenges the notion that newly discovered species revolutionized botanical taxonomy by showing that some well-known spices were now criticized while other, newly discovered plants were quietly incorporated into existing classifications. German botanists favoured domestic herbs, or ones that were able to thrive in European soil, over foreign ones and excluded tropical medicinal spices from their herbals, objecting to the merchants’ commercial gain. Johnson concludes that because Germany did not possess colonies, but was deeply affected by economic and religious changes that contemporaries associated with the colonial expansion, criticism largely concentrated on the figure of the merchant.

In the course of the century, however, the German merchants’ hitherto thriving business ventures started to go less well. In her final chapter, Johnson interprets their failures as a result of inner-European developments: increasing competition with European rivals and dwindling profits in the money business began to make the overseas trade less attractive around the middle of the sixteenth century. Taking the examples of the Welsers’ withdrawal from Venezuela and the Augsburg merchant Konrad Rott’s disastrous bankruptcy, Johnson shows how the merchants made complaints to portray themselves as victims during the Monopolstreit, but in the end did incur real losses when the constellations that they had earlier profited from turned to their disadvantage.

In contrast to the view casting the sixteenth-century geographical discoveries as suddenly and completely disrupting agreement with the ancients, Johnson’s emphasis is on continuity. Political, economic, and intellectual developments within Europe enhanced scholars’ and merchants’ ‘need and ability to come to grips with the overseas expansion’ (p. 198). She proposes that her findings could be generalized in the sense that colonial powers’ representations, too, used familiar categories to contain the unfamiliar. Johnson concludes that
Bacon’s sanguine portrayal of the new epistemology may have been strategic optimism. By contrast, she suggests that although important discoveries were made during the Renaissance, the emphasis on newness was more characteristic of the Baroque age. This implies that the strange and the marvellous in the New World were emphasized increasingly as the first encounters ‘grew chronologically more distant’ (p. 202). Johnson believes that familiarization of the new and strange preceded the acknowledgement of New World otherness: scholarly progress was only conceivable on the basis of ‘psychological comfort’ (p. 204) and ‘the old made possible the new’ (p. 205).

It is the study’s main strength that Johnson takes into account intra-cultural dynamics in dealing with cross-cultural encounters and economic and political contexts in charting intellectual developments, and her argument is highly convincing. However, it also invites further investigation. Most importantly, the underlying assumption that the seventeenth rather than the sixteenth century finally brought the radical changes making ancient texts obsolete raises more questions than it helps to resolve. Johnson chronologically defers the date of fundamental innovation through the confrontation with an unprecedented wealth of empirical data, while she does not engage with the thesis itself, although it has already been qualified in important ways. Steven Shapin famously announced in his popular account of the Scientific Revolution that ‘there was no such thing as a Scientific Revolution’ in the seventeenth century. The very example that Johnson invokes to illustrate her point, the cabinet of curiosities, which reached its peak of popularity during that century, has recently become the object of close scrutiny, and the idea that it was a prototype of the laboratory, a subject of debate. On the whole, however, Johnson makes a valuable contribution both to the history of knowledge and to that of cultural contact in the context of colonial expansion. It is to be hoped that her stimulating and insightful study, which throws yet more doubtful light on the validity of the whole concept of sudden and comprehensive breakthroughs in intellectual development, will lead to new research in these fields.

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Analysing the South African War as a ‘media event’, the author has conducted a careful investigation into a large number of German-language newspapers and periodicals against the historical background of the complex relations between the Germans, Afrikaners, and British. When the South African War erupted in 1899, an enormous wave of Burenbegeisterung (pro-Boer enthusiasm) began to wash over the German population. The position of the German government and of the Kaiser was, however, ambivalent. The leadership of the Reich was torn between the all-round euphoria triggered by the struggle of the two Afrikaner republics for independence on the one hand, and strategic manoeuvring vis-à-vis the British rival on the other. Most German observers of Britain’s biggest war effort since the Crimean War agreed, however, that the British Goliath had unleashed an unsolicited attack on the Afrikaner David. A multitude of associations, publications, and commercial products celebrated the Afrikaner militia fighters, whose martial spirit supposedly owed a great deal to their Germanic ancestry. Thus many Germans bought into the ethnic stereotypes that frequently underpinned nationalist fervour during the age of imperial rivalry.

Anticipating later academic debates about the causes of the war, the contemporary media sought to identify the political and economic reasons for the conflict on a scale between ‘gold’ and ‘empire’. Conservative and left-wing papers alike agreed that ‘gold’, that is, naked capitalist greed, was the prime mover for Britain to push the Afrikaners into the conflict. Liberal publications tended to argue for ‘empire’ by emphasizing that Britain had forced the war upon the small Afrikaner republics in order to safeguard its imperial interests. Especially when instigated by Pan-German circles, public discussion of the war was increasingly radicalized by Anglophobia. Some commentators prematurely interpreted the initial series of British defeats in December 1899 as proof of the overall incompetence of the British military. Many observers gloated at the lack of leadership qualities among British officers who had allegedly been spoiled by a protracted history of effortless victories against ‘primitive’ tribes, but were
out of their depth when facing more sophisticated European enemies.

Unrealistic expectations of an impending Afrikaner victory were dampened when the British officially annexed the Afrikaner republics in 1900. This marked, however, the beginning of a renewed phase of fighting which assumed all the ugly aspects of a bitter guerrilla war. The ensuing systematic burning of farms and the imprisonment of Afrikaner women and children in concentration camps—not much notice was taken of the existence of similar camps for black South Africans—enraged the public and exacerbated the anti-British mood. Criticism of the inhumane conditions was, of course, also articulated in the British media and public, but in Germany the debates about whether or not British tactics amounted to premeditated genocide fed into pre-existing anti-British notions. The author points out that these ideas proved to have an extraordinary longevity in Germany. In 1941, the Nazi film *Ohm Krüger* indulged in images of sadistic British soldiers maltreating their victims in the camps. Conversely, some newspapers emphasized that Germany’s position in the South African conflict should be strictly neutral with a view towards consolidating the Reich’s global position. A few commentators even poured cold water on pro-Boer passions by arguing that the popular image of the Afrikaners, who allegedly lived in some sort of pre-modern, rural idyll, indicated that national independence for these backward, farming communities was an anachronistic project in the age of industrialization.

The German government declined Afrikaner pleas for diplomatic mediation in the conflict because it hoped to be rewarded for abstaining from making anti-British gestures in public. At the same time, some German leaders were rubbing their hands in anticipation of a decisive dent in Britain’s prestige. Thus German attitudes towards their ‘Germanic cousins’ in southern Africa were marked by conflicting views in relation to the question of how Germany should interact with Britain in the competition for a strong position in the network of international relations. Apart from political considerations, Emperor Wilhelm himself was influenced by his close familial relations with the British royal house and not at all fired up by the kind of ‘perfidious Albion’ propaganda that whipped up emotions among the rank and file in Germany. His sympathetic attitude towards Britain became public on the occasion of Queen Victoria’s death in 1901,
while the war was still raging in South Africa. His tactful appearance in England at the time of his grandmother’s death earned him positive comments in the British press, but was noted in much less friendly terms by conservative German papers. Especially when Wilhelm awarded the commander of the British forces in South Africa, Lord Roberts, the highest German military honour which could be bestowed on foreigners, many German observers were alienated. Keeping his eyes on Britain, the Emperor declined to receive Afrikaner delegations, including the venerated President of the Transvaal Republic, Paul Kruger.

Despite popular support for the Germanic brethren, ambivalence towards Afrikaners unmistakably coloured German views when dealing with the immigration of Afrikaner farmers into German South West Africa. There were exaggerated expectations of an increased influx of Afrikaners after the outbreak of hostilities in South Africa. Thus Afrikaner settlers were initially hailed by some enthusiastic proponents of German influence in southern Africa, who claimed that hardy Boers were useful in preparing the virgin soil in South West for colonization by a superior Teutonic race. Disappointment increased, however, when the cultural disparities between the two settler communities began to emerge more sharply, and fears of being swamped by hordes of ‘uncivilized’ Afrikaner settlers began to replace uncritical adulation.

This study covers much familiar ground in terms of the event history of the South African War and its international ramifications. It would be churlish to take the author to task for clearly being on more familiar ground when dealing with the European than with the South African aspects of the history of the war. For example, J. B. M. Hertzog, contrary to the author’s assertion, was not actively involved in the Afrikaner Rebellion of 1914–15, but he kept his cards closer to his chest than the insurgents (pp. 259–60). Moreover, it is inevitable that the extensive quotations from papers and periodicals at times tax the reader’s attention span. Bender’s focus on the South African War as a media event is fruitful, however, in presenting a nuanced analysis of the complexities of German domestic and foreign politics. The disparities between the Reich’s policies and popular support for the Afrikaner republics generated vigorous public debates. The author provides a useful reminder of the wide range of opinions which were expressed by the media, despite the authoritarian structures of the
The Boer War and the German-Language Press

German Empire, which conducted much of its diplomacy in a secret manner. Tensions between the German leadership and its conservative and liberal critics were thrown into sharp relief with every diplomatic crisis as it emanated from the bitter military conflict in South Africa. The author has therefore made an important contribution which is relevant beyond the historiography of the South African War.

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The history of the Weimar Republic has always been the subject of intensive research, and this is still true today. But if we look at current work on the topic, it quickly becomes clear that priorities have changed. For some time now, the Weimar Republic’s failure has no longer been at the centre of interest. It no longer plays its earlier dominant role as a political example of a democracy’s loss of power and self-sacrifice.

In fact, the historiography of the Weimar Republic has long since completed its own ‘cultural turn’. This, however, has only been possible against the background of the pioneering older works that highlighted its crucial problems and the reasons for its political instability and ultimate collapse. The findings of these works continue to be valid. Yet it is also true that the Weimar Republic no longer needs to be pressed into service primarily as a negative foil for the Federal Republic and to validate its political legitimization. Given the Federal Republic’s mature traditions and secure basis in civil society, the significance of Weimar as a historical-political argument has, if not disappeared entirely, certainly become much weaker. Dichotomies that were previously dominant, such as those between ‘republican’ and ‘anti-republican’, have moved into the background in favour of the ambiguities of Weimar culture. The narrative of the Weimar Republic thus no longer necessarily encompasses its flawed development and the failure of Germany’s first democracy, giving rise to the German triad of democracy, dictatorship, and the successful re-founding of democracy after 1945. Instead, more recent research focuses on the experiential history of cultural modernity.

The edited collection under review here fits into this context, but has the great advantage of avoiding any methodological one-sidedness. The editor rightly emphasizes the fundamental problems inherent in looking back at the Weimar Republic ‘from the vantage point of “1933”’ (p. 5), stressing instead the openness and indeterminacy of Germany’s first democracy. Starting from here, the most important factors weighing down the Weimar Republic are named, but following the lead of Detlev Peukert, the editor and authors overwhelm-
ingly choose the ‘ambiguities of “classical modernity”’ as their point of reference, around which the chapters are structured. As Anthony McElligott points out, these ambiguities largely grew out of the Weimar Republic’s social modernization, which was highly advanced in international comparison. The result was that conditions were chronologically out of step with each other, something that was characteristic of the Weimar Republic.

In a total of nine chapters, this volume treats the essential themes in a balanced way. McElligott’s detailed analysis of political culture understands this term as covering both the constitutional structure of the Weimar Republic and the increasing tendency, anchored in the constitution, towards a state drawing on plebiscitary legitimation, going beyond the parliamentary system. In accordance with the existing research, William Mulligan highlights the problematic role of the Reichswehr, which aimed for a militarization of society and the rebirth of Germany’s great power status. While Wolfgang Elz and Harold James concisely sum up the main problems of Weimar foreign policy and economic development, John Bingham, Karl Christian Führer, Adelheid von Saldern, and Kathleen Canning provide source-based analyses of the urbanity of the Weimar Republic, the creation of a new mass and leisure culture, new ways of living, and the role of women. All four authors emphasize the specific ambivalence between the avant-garde modernity of Weimar culture, and its conservative or even backward-looking elements. This comes across especially clearly in the area of gender roles. The completely new scope for action which women achieved, especially in an urban culture, was followed at the end by a bitter debate about double earners and the reproductive duty of women which merged almost seamlessly into the Nazi period.

The history of the Weimar welfare state is also characterized by such ambivalences. Young-Sun Hong, however, rightly warns against taking a view that all too simplistically advocates a continuity thesis. Even a ‘dialectical continuity’ (p. 203) in Peukert’s sense in Young-Sun Hong view plays only a subordinate part. Rather, he argues, Nazi welfare policy’s fixation on racism and eugenics must be taken into account.

The Jews more than any other population group represented the specific ambiguity of Weimar culture. To the extent that they embodied ‘modernity’, internationalism, and cosmopolitanism, they attrac-
ed the hatred of those who feared that these things would lead to Germany’s decline. Yet German Jewry was by no means homogeneous, containing a wide range of traditions and orientations which are described impressively by Anthony D. Kauders.

Written throughout by acknowledged specialists, this volume represents the most up-to-date research. The essays are clearly structured and fluently written, and paradigmatically connect basic information with a presentation of the most important historical problems. Cleverly selected references make it easy to follow up topics with further reading. For an English-speaking student readership in particular, a number of key themes could have been treated in more depth, such as the history of the 1918–19 revolution, the problems of the party system, and the rise of National Socialism and its electorate. Nonetheless, the volume is highly recommended as an introduction to the topic, as a source of quick information, and especially for academic teaching.

Recent years have seen the publication of three monographs about Field Marshal and Reich President Paul von Hindenburg, undoubtedly a key figure of German history in the turbulent years between 1914 and 1933. Hindenburg is a rewarding topic for a cultural history of politics because his power was based not only on the office of \textit{Reichspräsident} that had been conferred on him, but also on mythically heightened acclamation of him as an individual. For the publication of her 2007 Oxford Ph.D. thesis, Anna von der Goltz had to contend with the difficulty that two studies published in 2007,\footnote{Jesko von Hoegen, \textit{Der Held von Tannenberg: Genese und Funktion des Hindenburg-Mythos} (1914–1934) (Cologne, 2007); and Wolfram Pyta, \textit{Hindenburg: Herrschaft zwischen Hohenzollern und Hitler} (Munich, 2007).} including one by the present reviewer, anticipated many of the findings of her work. Thus the crucial question to ask is: what can she present that is new in terms of methodology and content? For essentially, she comes to identical conclusions concerning Hindenburg’s political influence, namely, that he was by no means a politically inexperienced dotard manipulated by sophisticated advisers, but an alert and confident instinctive politician who was well aware that his biggest political capital was his symbolic standing. Thus Hindenburg himself took an active part in the process of creating the myth that surrounded his person. Von der Goltz thus makes an important contribution to characterizing Hindenburg as a thoroughly modern ruler who was, to some extent, a ‘great communicator’.

Methodologically, however, the author does not exhaust the conceptual and heuristic potential of cultural history to mark the translation of culturally anchored disposition into political action. It is difficult to understand why the concept of the symbol, which is well established in the cultural sciences, is not given a more central part in her argument, for it suggests that Hindenburg was capable of embodying politically and culturally anchored assumptions and thus of achieving the feat of representation that was fundamental to his claim to power. Instead, von der Goltz restricts herself to concentrating on the concept of myth, which allows her to treat the narrative
embellishment and emotional evocativeness of the qualities ascribed to Hindenburg, but enables her to say less about the politically and culturally anchored substantive core of his capacity to be representative.

Von der Goltz’s main achievement is to emphasize the enormous scope of this myth. From 1914 on, Hindenburg attracted the projections of various different political ideologies to himself like a magnet, and from 1925 particularly of the Social Democrats and left Liberals. Hindenburg’s image was permanently developing, and this flexible ‘styling’ allowed him to connect with whatever the most important political movement of the time was. In this way he was even able to survive the defeat of 1918 politically undamaged.

In demonstrating this, the author provides important support for the thesis recently emphasized by the political scientist André Brodocz, namely, that functioning polities must give their citizens offers of integration with a high degree of interpretative openness. Hindenburg can serve as a model for this: his person and the imaginations placed upon it created an integrative area which differed structurally from the deep oppositions in the society and party politics of the Weimar Republic.

But at the same time—and this is another theoretical conclusion that can be drawn from the study under review—the integrative phase of Hindenburg’s period of office (1925–32) created the illusion among many supporters of the Republic that Hindenburg would not surrender the achievements of the constitutional state to Hitler. To a certain extent, therefore, they fell victim to a political illusion created by the Hindenburg myth that they themselves had fostered. Hindenburg disarmed even conservative misgivings about the transfer of power to Hitler because his myth fed false hopes that he would stop Hitler if he tried to set up a dictatorship. Von der Goltz pointedly describes this ambivalence of the Hindenburg myth as follows: ‘Hindenburg could be a saviour from Weimar and a saviour of Weimar within the space of a few years’ (p. 214).

A more profound cultural history would have found it worth asking why Hindenburg was so successfully able to mobilize the qualities ascribed to him by a large majority of the German people: doing one’s duty, calmness and inner unity in the First World War, and loyalty and a willingness to make sacrifices during the turbulent times of 1918–19. Here it is appropriate to ask whether Hindenburg’s sym-
bolic leadership qualities were subject to a process of attrition, as can be shown, for example, by looking at how the concept of loyalty was interpreted differently by Hindenburg and his initial antagonist, Hitler. For Hindenburg, ‘loyalty’ ultimately meant the expectation that others would subordinate themselves to his leadership because of his achievements as a military leader in the world war. This expectation was undermined to the extent that a generation of people who had taken part in the war claimed political leadership for themselves, arguing that ‘loyalty’ could only be demanded in a community based on the experience of the trenches and with an egalitarian constitution. From this we can seamlessly derive the conclusion that van der Goltz rightly stresses, namely, that his victory in the elections for Reich President in 1932 made Hindenburg the ‘final arbiter of Hitler’ (p. 166): a Field Marshal who had much in common with Hitler, but wanted to dictate the terms under which the representative of the Front generation should be allowed to have power. On the whole, therefore, this precisely written study by Anna von der Goltz encourages us to take a closer look at the interdisciplinary cultural history of politics in the Weimar Republic.

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The part played by Britain in Hitler’s mental map has long been recognized as central to the evolution of Nazi foreign policy. From his original conviction that for racial and geo-political reasons an alliance with Britain would be natural and beneficial to both, to his progressive disillusionment with Britain from 1936 onwards, to the conviction that Britain must be dealt such a blow that it would be incapable of intervening on the Continent, Hitler turned a complete circle. Having criticized Wilhelmine Germany for engaging in a land war for Continental mastery and a sea war for global dominance at the same time, he ended up in a similar predicament. His attitude was a curious mixture of dogmatism and imagination. He was dogmatic about the roots of British imperial power—Britain’s racial strength and ruthless brutality—and therefore his belief that it would recognize its true interests in sharing the world with Germany. He was also, however, imaginative in playing on Britain’s actual desire for peace and its reluctance to become involved in another Continental war.

Hitler was proved right in the Munich crisis, though he resented Chamberlain’s interference, which forced him to accept a two-stage elimination of Czechoslovakia. But, from 1938 he also accepted the risk that Britain would fight in what had become, as he said to Goebbels in October, a conflict for ‘hegemony over Europe’—a conclusion confirmed after Germany took over the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and Britain gave guarantees to Poland, Romania, and Greece. In other words, although Britain was no longer the formidable and clear-sighted power it had once been, Germany was nevertheless engaged—as he told his most senior commanders in May 1939—in a ‘life and death’ showdown with Britain for hegemony. A natural alliance for sharing the world had been replaced by an inevitable conflict. This raises an interesting question. Had Hitler not seen at first that his goal of ‘living space’ in the East would make Germany the strongest power on the Continent and therefore provoke British resistance? Or did he just change his mind about Britain’s willingness to accept German ‘hegemony’?
One of the virtues of Hermann Graml’s short study is to offer an answer to this question. He sees the key (p. 101) in a radical widening of Hitler’s aims by 1937 from expansion to the East to the simultaneous domination of Western Europe, encapsulated in the new talk (to Goebbels) of liquidating the Peace of Westphalia. It was this new vision that made Hitler realize that Britain could at best be forced to accept the inevitable and would not willingly cooperate in a new order which would, for example, give Germany control of the Channel ports. Graml sees the expansion of Hitler’s aims as linked to the successes of Italy and Japan and his feeling that Britain was in any case a weakened power. It could also be seen, however, as simply coming to terms with what was needed for expansion to the East. He had, after all, accepted in the 1920s that France would resist, though by November 1937 he argued that Britain would not intervene for Austria or Czechoslovakia, and France would not act without Britain. In 1938 he changed his mind again at the time of the May crisis over Czechoslovakia, when Britain reacted forcefully. It may be, therefore, that Hitler’s conclusion that he would have to disable Britain from intervention on the Continent was more a result of his recognition of the hardening of British (and French) attitudes than his own vaulting ambition. Indeed, if the Western powers were going to resist, he had no alternative to what he called liquidating Westphalia unless he was going to give up the fundamental goal of living space in the East. The fact that he had to compromise again after 1940 because Britain did not accept defeat, Italy staked its own claims, and Pétain and Franco refused to fall in with his wishes for the Mediterranean and North Africa shows only how constrained Hitler’s choices had become.

There are also fresh perspectives or emphases in Graml’s treatment of Hitler’s early diplomacy. He is interesting on Hitler’s attempt to cultivate Yugoslavia during the friction with Italy over Austria in 1934 and per contra the crucial importance of Italy’s successful facing down of the League over Abyssinia in changing the pattern of alignments to Germany’s advantage. He also makes good use of the Goebbels’ diaries.

In the final chapter, which takes the story to September 1939, Graml defends the view that Hitler was not interested in preventing British and French intervention on Poland’s behalf, and feared another Munich which would deprive him of justification in the eyes of the German public for destroying Poland. On this view, Hitler made no
attempt to isolate Poland from the Western powers but rather pressed forward to war, convinced that Britain and France had no way of aiding Poland in any case and also that war with them was inevitable and would follow as soon as Germany had destroyed Poland. This interpretation may well catch the main thrust of Hitler’s thinking accurately. But there are some straws in the wind which suggest that he was not quite as consistent as Graml maintains. The commentary given by Goebbels in his diary during the critical days from 26 to 30 August 1939—passages curiously not discussed by Graml—certainly suggests that Hitler lost confidence once Mussolini made it known that Italy would not join a war with the Western powers. In particular, in reference to Hitler’s last-minute idea of offering a plebiscite in the Polish corridor on 29 August, Goebbels noted: ‘He hopes in this way perhaps still yet to prise London apart from Warsaw and find an occasion to strike.’ That did not mean that Hitler was prepared for another Munich, but it does suggest that he was temporarily at least in two minds about isolating Poland, even if he soon lost interest again in diplomacy and reverted to war with or without Italy.

This is a refreshing essay on a well-worn theme, even if it sometimes makes Hitler even more single-minded than he was.


‘Do we need a new biography of the most notorious demagogue of the twentieth century?’ (p. 1). The fact that Toby Thacker, Lecturer in Modern European History at Cardiff University, poses this burning question right at the beginning of his work shows that, as far as the answer is concerned, one can be confident of divided opinions. What the author subsequently does manage to present plausibly, however, is that it is the stereotypical image of the Nazi Propaganda Minister, seemingly indelibly etched into the public memory, that is urgently in need of revision in the light of new sources.

What Thacker has in mind here in particular is the recently completed new edition of Joseph Goebbels’ diaries. Their publication was indeed eagerly awaited since the last volume, eventually published in 2006, covered the sensitive period from October 1932 to March 1934. Referring to Ian Kershaw’s earlier assertion that the wide availability of the Goebbels Diaries certainly justified a new Hitler biography, Thacker’s argument, as obvious as it is valid, is that this applies even more to the writer of the diaries himself.

At the same time, however, Thacker practises modesty. He does not want his study to be seen as the Goebbels biography, nor does he seek to examine every facet of his subject’s life. What is rather surprising in this context, however, is that it is precisely Goebbels’ activities as propagandist and minister that the author has decided to treat more marginally, referring amongst other things to Ernest K. Bramsted’s work of 1965.1 For the obvious question is this: which aspect of his life is more deserving of critical re-evaluation in the light of the diaries than his activities as Party propagandist and Reich minister? Thankfully the author does not stick to this self-imposed restriction, and in chapters 6 to 12 does, in fact, focus on Goebbels as the more or less classical prototype of the Nazi homo politicus.

More than earlier Goebbels biographers, however, Thacker is at pains here to link Goebbels’ private and political life and to reflect the effects that each of these had on the other. In this way, by choosing a distinctly different and to some extent integrative perspective, and

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by using the now complete edition of the diaries, the author seeks to
dispel at least some of the myths and legends surrounding Goebbels,
which he discussed and considered at the beginning as a sort of
stock-taking of the image of Goebbels still prevalent today.

Yet since the biographer deliberately proceeds strictly chronolog-
ically, following the text of the diaries, his depiction of his subject in
the early chapters remains rather pale. Ultimately he has nothing
new to say about the period of Goebbels' life before he became
Gauleiter of Berlin. With its emphasis, certainly not misplaced, on
those factors that played a particular role in building Goebbels' char-
acter—physical disability, material insecurity, and perceived isola-
tion because he was not accepted for military service—this biography
initially follows in the footsteps of all earlier biographies.

Eventually, however, on the basis of Goebbels' decision to answer
the call to Berlin, Thacker manages to show convincingly that the
holistic approach he takes to Goebbels' personality can indeed pro-
duce new and plausible explanations. For example, by linking
Goebbels' inner conflict over his very personal 'Berlin issue' with the
fact that virtually at the same time his unstable relationship with Else
Janke came to its crisis-laden end, he shows that Goebbels' decision
to go to Berlin was not simply based on obsequious obedience to his
Führer, Adolf Hitler. In fact, his departure from his native Rhineland
was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to regain the emotional
equilibrium that had threatened to be lost completely as a result of
the vicissitudes in his highly problematic relationship with Else
Janke.

The sections which then deal with Goebbels' activity in Berlin up
to the seizure of power in January 1933 once again seem to be fairly
conventional, even though Thacker uses the diaries to illustrate vari-
ous sensitive situations during this phase in which Goebbels was
clearly at odds with Hitler in matters of day-to-day politics. Yet since
these differences are constantly restricted to reflections in the diaries
they can by no means be regarded as proof that Goebbels was less
politically and ideologically bound to Hitler. On the contrary, pre-
cisely because Goebbels expressed his doubts in secret, for example,
about whether Hitler's decision to take part in the elections was right,
yet accepted it without any noticeable criticism, this is actually an
argument in favour of a close political-ideological identification with
Hitler.
Joseph Goebbels

What Goebbels saw as particularly beneficial about this relationship with Hitler becomes clear in the light of the constantly escalating conflict between Goebbels and the brothers Otto and Gregor Strasser. For, as Thacker rightly points out, around 1930 Goebbels was so fixated by his opponents that conversations with Hitler generally started with a tirade against the Strassers. It does not take a great deal of imagination to see in this behavioural pattern an attempt to curry favour with the *Führer*, at a time when Goebbels possibly saw his position as under threat from the Strassers. What also fits in here is that Goebbels took Hitler’s supposed intransigence on this issue as his cue to call the whole relationship of trust into question, though it should be noted, once again only within the confines of his diary-writing self-help therapy.

Another passage that attracts particular attention is the one in which Thacker describes the case for high treason against Goebbels heard at the Leipzig imperial court. The Berlin *Gauleiter* had been accused of making treasonable statements in a speech or of indirectly inciting Nazi Party (NSDAP) and SA members to treason. The accusation was based on detailed records of the said speech, to which the Munich police had access. However, when the Leipzig imperial court approached the Munich officials with a request to view these papers, or to be given copies, it was rejected. ‘[T]hey replied that the record of the meeting was derived from a confidential source who could not be exposed’ (pp. 114–15.) This should be quite an eye-opener for the present-day observer of day-to-day politics in the Federal Republic—one only has to think of the circumstances surrounding the recent failed attempt to ban the far-right National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). Here, too, it was informers and representatives of the police or the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz whose mere existence, in the eyes of the Federal Constitutional Court, prevented the banning procedure for formal reasons. One is reminded somewhat of Karl Marx’s aperçu according to which all world-historical events always happen twice, the first time as tragedy, the second as farce. It is regrettable that Thacker himself does not deal at greater length with this striking coincidence. However, it can probably be explained by the fact that at the time such a clearly domestic topic as the attempt to ban the NPD did not attract a great deal of media attention outside Germany.

The nearer Thacker now comes to January 1933, following in the steps of the diaries, the more difficult it becomes to adhere to the plan
mentioned at the beginning, namely, always to analyse and interpret Goebbels’ life in the context of the historical present. The reader does learn important things about Goebbels’ role and function within the NSDAP: ‘It was in the public sphere of campaigning that Goebbels played a critical role’ (p. 125). But within the Party’s real leading circle, which during the civil war year of 1932 was in constant negotiation, either overt or covert, with Franz von Papen, Kurt von Schleicher, or Hindenburg, there is no trace of him. Here Göring, Streicher, and Röhm were the key players after Hitler. Yet instead of using this quite correct assertion to relativize the hitherto clearly over-estimated significance of Goebbels within the Party, and using this to explain the fact that the ambitious Gauleiter was not immediately made a minister in 1933, Thacker immediately devalues these findings, for instance, by suggesting, with reference to Goebbels’ diary, that in February 1932 he had decided that in the presidential elections Hitler would stand against the incumbent, Hindenburg.

In this context, the author also gives a false impression of Goebbels’ infamous speech in the Reichstag of 23 February 1932. For while Thacker maintains that in this speech Goebbels was ‘carefully avoiding personal attacks on Hindenburg’ (p. 127), he did, in fact, attack the President directly and quite harshly. With the emerging support of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) for Hindenburg in mind, Goebbels stated: ‘Tell me who praises you, and I’ll tell you who you are! Praised by the Berlin gutter press, praised by the party of deserters.’ 2 This last remark must have been particularly hurtful to Hindenburg the soldier.

In the literature on Goebbels or the Nazi seizure of power this speech is rightly also referred to in order to explain why Goebbels was initially persona non grata with the NSDAP’s conservative coalition partners in January 1933 and was therefore not made a minister. Referring back to the diary, Thacker quite rightly depicts the palpable disappointment of the ambitious Goebbels, who felt he had been abandoned by the world and, even worse, betrayed and sold out by Hitler.

However, when Thacker blithely explains Goebbels’ later appointment as Propaganda Minister by claiming he was overlooked

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only as a ‘temporary arrangement’ because Hitler ‘had greater plans for him’ (p. 140), this, particularly in the light of the diaries, seems like a criminal under-estimation of the centrifugal forces and conflicting interests in Hitler’s coalition government that was still young and fragile. For while Thacker ultimately makes the person of Hitler the prime mover in later events, he fails to do justice to his own express claim not to consider events from the end backwards. In terms of power-politics in January and February 1933, Reich Chancellor Hitler was not the Führer of later years who made his decisions autonomously.

This restricted perspective also pervades the other chapters which look at the course of Goebbels’ life, especially as reflected in his personal relationship with Hitler. Here Thacker comes to the conclusion, possibly rightly, that from 1925 onwards Goebbels had a closer relationship with Hitler than any other leading Nazi (p. 168). But what ultimately remains unanswered is what significance this personal relationship really had for Goebbels’ power position in the day-to-day conflicts with Göring, Dietrich, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Ley, Bormann et al. For however close and confidential Goebbels and Hitler clearly were, this personal attachment was obviously not translated into Hitler’s political backing for Goebbels.

It was not until the second half of the war, when Hitler was increasingly avoiding the public and Goebbels, travelling through the bombed-out cities, became the dominant public representative of the regime, that he finally managed to acquire significant political power. The zenith of this trend was his appointment as Generalbevollmächtigter für den totalen Kriegseinsatz, an office which, as we know, Goebbels exercised with a certain satisfaction and thirst for action. It sometimes seems here as though for Goebbels, though he was aware of the desolate military situation, the fact that he had finally gained political recognition glossed over the bleak future prospects. In the end—and his appointment as Reich Chancellor in Hitler’s will appears to confirm this—Goebbels the mere communicator had himself become the crucial political player.

The fact that Goebbels, the latecomer to political power, nonetheless committed suicide after his wife Magda, having previously murdered their children, shows that at this point all he was really interested in was his own reputation. Bormann, Himmler, Göring, or Speer might have fled the sinking ship, but Goebbels wanted his sui-
cide to be understood above all as the final proof of his vassal-like loyalty to Hitler. This willingness to make what really was the ultimate sacrifice, as well as the fact that he carefully preserved his diaries throughout the turmoil of the war were, Goebbels was convinced, the foundations on which his posthumous reputation would be built.

At the end of his study Thacker recapitulates once again the common stereotypes which still today inform the image of Goebbels, at least amongst the broader public. One cannot but agree with him when he says it is ‘high time that the different, enduring misunderstandings of Goebbels are challenged’ (p. 311). And indeed, here and there he has demonstrated where this potential for revision could be found. To this extent his biography really is a first step towards a reassessment of the role and significance of Joseph Goebbels in National Socialism. Yet as Thacker himself concedes at the beginning of his book: the Joseph Goebbels biography it is not (yet).

Book Reviews

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Over the past five to ten years, popular German memory discourse has been shaped by a public debate about ordinary Germans as victims of the Second World War and of the Nazi regime. Best-selling books such as Günter Grass’s *Im Krebsgang* (2002) and Jörg Friedrich’s *Der Brand* (2002) were followed by TV and cinema films, such as *Das Wunder von Bern* (2003), *Dresden* (2006), *Die Flucht* (2007), and *Die Gustloff* (2008), all of which deal with aspects of German victimhood rooted in the experience of war and its aftermath. These victim stories have largely been discussed by experts and contemporary witnesses. In addition to this public, non-academic debate, there is also a wide scholarly interest in the post-war constructions of narratives of victimhood of German civilians and soldiers.¹

Narratives of victimhood also feature prominently in Neil Gregor’s inspiring book *Haunted City: Nuremberg and the Nazi Past*. This study provides a micro-history of post-war Nuremberg and the ways in which the city and its inhabitants dealt with the Nazi past and its legacies. Its core concern is to explore the ways in which social structures and political frameworks shaped public memory. The strength of the book lies in its profound interest in local society and local administration and politics, and the evolution of a local memory culture in Nuremberg between the early post-war years and 1968. Using a wide range of primary sources from local archives and media, Gregor sets out to explore how the citizens of Nuremberg developed their own language to deal with the recent past. This language was manifest in the ways in which the civil administration mastered the after-effects of war, in local media discourse, in the rhetorics of local associations and pressure groups, in local memorials, monuments, and sculptures, in ritual ceremonial acts organized by the city’s authorities, and in various educational initiatives of museums, exhibitions, and conference projects. Gregor also shows that certain aspects of the past could not be expressed in these ways and were accordingly silenced. His focus on the local level allows

¹ For an overview see Bill Niven (ed.), *Germans as Victims: Remembering the Past in Contemporary Germany* (Basingstoke, 2006).
him to explore in great depth what made the victim narrative(s) so popular among ordinary Germans and their local political elites.

Nuremberg is a particularly interesting subject for this kind of micro-investigation. In many respects, it was typical and, as such, comparable to other West German cities. Before and after the war, Nuremberg was a major industrial centre with a strong Social Democratic and Protestant tradition. Nevertheless, the National Socialists gained a great deal of support there during the Third Reich. A large part of the local bourgeois and conservative elites collaborated with the National Socialists, and only a minority of the population openly resisted the Nazi regime. What sets Nuremberg apart, yet makes it even more interesting as a subject of historical research, is the close association of the city with the National Socialist Party, expressed in the Party rallies held there and in the Nuremberg Laws. This resulted in severe post-war image problems for the city and its inhabitants.

Gregor analyses the post-war history of Nuremberg in four sections, each consisting of several chapters. The first section deals with social history from the time of the occupation of the city to the return of the last POWs and the closure of the refugee camps around Nuremberg in 1957. In those years the local administration categorized fates of Nuremberg’s inhabitants during and after the war by creating various ‘victim groups’: the relatives of soldiers missing in action or in captivity, returning soldiers and POWs, expellees and refugees, the war disabled, victims of the air raids, the ‘victims of denazification’, and the marginalized ‘victims of fascism’. These groups were confronted with traditional social groups, that is, members of the working class and the local bourgeoisie. The resulting social situation in Nuremberg was characterized by (re-)emerging social cleavages and fissures. Gregor argues that the social and material conditions of those years, the existing cleavages in society, and the success with which the victim groups were able to gain the attention of the civil administration provided the framework within which an engagement with the past was situated.

In the second section Gregor embeds the emerging local memory culture into wider political and social developments in post-war West Germany. Against this broader background he explores the memory activities of various local victim associations in the 1950s, and their interaction with each other and with the city authorities. He examines the establishment of memorials for victims of war and war
captivity, public commemorative rituals and events such as the Day of National Mourning, and local ceremonies for the victims of the air raids as manifestations of a civic memory. Gregor shows how existing memorials and rituals, which had been established in the post-First World War period and during the Third Reich, were transformed and filled with new meaning. He also explores attempts to incorporate refugees and expellees into the narratives of Germanness told in Nuremberg’s Germanic National Museum. The 1950s were shaped by the dominance of victim narratives that referred to former soldiers and civilian victims of the war, by a certain reluctance fully to integrate the experiences of the expellees and refugees into the urban official memory culture, and by a widespread (yet never complete) silence about the victims of National Socialist persecution and their experiences.

Sections three and four extend the timeframe to the end of the 1960s. Gregor argues that various factors were responsible for an increasing local engagement with the Holocaust in those years: the easing of the Cold War, economic stabilization, the democratization and liberalization of West German society, changes in the structure of urban society and its elites, and the interest of various agents (the trade unions, the churches, pressure groups, and the city authorities) in local memory activities.

In the third section Gregor examines the emergence of a discourse that was shaped by an increasing awareness of the crimes committed during the Nazi regime and of those who had been persecuted. In particular, he explores various local activities focused on the Jewish victims, such as exhibitions about the Warsaw Ghetto, Auschwitz, and the history of Nuremberg’s Jews, and the establishment of academic round table discussions about the Nazi past. Gregor argues that the reception of the war crime trials of the late 1950s and 1960s by the local media influenced the ways in which the Nazi past was dealt with in cultural and educational activities. Although more attention was paid to the crimes committed during the National Socialist period and to their victims, the author demonstrates that the 1960s did not bring about a critical local memory culture which addressed the involvement of individual Nurembergers with the criminal Nazi regime.

In the last section Gregor retraces the co-existing strands of local memory culture in which the victimhood of ordinary Germans as
victims of the war and its aftermath was maintained throughout the 1960s. He shows that local circumstances functioned as obstacles to a more radical shift in memory culture. Members of the war generation, particularly those organized in associations and *Traditionsverbände*, perceived the increasing public attention being paid to the Holocaust as a major threat to their own experiences and memories. Because they tried to counter this threat, the war generation and its suffering remained highly visible in local memory culture. On the basis of his analyses of tourist guides and literary representations of Nuremberg, Gregor argues that the city itself was turned into a victim of the Nazi regime, and of the circumstances of war. Ways of remembering the ‘German victims’ in Nuremberg in the 1960s were shaped by continuities in rhetoric and forms of memory construction. Yet they also mirrored shifts and changes. This can be seen most explicitly using the example of the experience of being expelled, which became part of the local memory culture (for example, by the establishment of a memorial or administrative support for mass events organized by refugee and expellee associations). The Jewish victims, however, were only to a minor degree integrated into the official rhetoric and commemoration rituals.

Gregor’s specific local perspective on memory construction yields highly interesting and insightful results, as ‘the local’ determined the manifold ways in which the past was narrated, visualized, and ritualized, yet also silenced. Two important factors shaped the ways in which the past was dealt with in Nuremberg in the post-war period, namely, Nuremberg’s tradition as a former Social Democratic, working-class city, and as a Protestant city. Social Democratic Party functionaries and Protestant Church authorities were key agents in contributing to the constitution of the urban memory culture. These traditions created and cemented long-existing social cleavages which shaped Nuremberg’s civil society. The timeframe of his study allows the author to examine and explain the transition from a period shaped by marginalization of the Holocaust and those groups persecuted in the Third Reich and an emphasis on the ‘German victims’ during the 1950s to a period when a much more self-critical way of coping with the past emerged during the 1960s. Gregor convincingly argues that this shift in memory culture resulted from ‘a renegotiation of the compromise between speaking and keeping quiet’ (p. 15).
Gregor derives his approach to memory from the theoretical studies by Alon Confino who argues that memory culture does not so much reflect as help to bridge existing conflicts in society. Gregor claims that there is a connection between what he calls the ‘representational aspects’ and the ‘experiential aspects’ of memory (p. 17). He argues that the representation of the past is rooted in the actual situation in which this representation was created. As he shows, the urban memory culture of Nuremberg was the result of a process of negotiation between local agents—both individuals and groups, each with their own specific interests—who constantly faced the need to find ways of cooperating with each other. Taking into account the social history and the everyday situation of Nuremberg, the book contributes to our understanding of memory by arguing that ‘the social’ is a key dimension for memory construction. Gregor does not support an understanding of memory in which a hegemonial narrative is followed and replaced by another. Instead, he argues that during the 1960s various narratives existed alongside each other. In addition to a growing interest in the Holocaust and German guilt, there were various concurrent narratives which still featured the Germans as victims of war, of flight and expulsion, and of Allied air raids.

In contrast to most studies on the after-effects of the Second World War and their integration into memory discourse and activity, Gregor’s book does not focus on a specific group. Instead, he unearths a fascinating spectrum of social and memory activities among various groups of local society, and explores the ways in which these groups interacted with and competed against each other. This approach allows Gregor to discover the fissures in the local...
population which have shaped local politics, social life, and ways of dealing with the past. Gregor argues that in order to create a stable post-war society, the civil administration in Nuremberg always attempted to bridge these rifts by supporting the construction of common powerful narratives of the past. The most powerful of these was the narrative of collective victimhood. Gregor therefore provides an analysis of the relationship between memory and (local) politics that neither overemphasizes the narrative of German victimhood as the force driving the formation of a homogeneous society, nor regards existing cleavages as a mere expression of the divergent ideological worldviews of the core agents.

Gregor’s study is a coherent, comprehensive, and inspiring piece of work. He provides both an insightful history of memory of Nuremberg, and a detailed social history of a West German city through the perspective of civic administration and civil society. This intricate relationship between social and demographic structures, the ideological climate, the everyday situation in Nuremberg, and the evolving local memory culture forms the core of Gregor’s work. His agent-centred micro-analysis is an important contribution to our understanding of the very mechanisms of public memory construction and of West German post-war history. Gregor’s focus on public memory means that he could not examine in depth more individual and private forms of memory, such as family memory. An exploration of whether the silences which Gregor discovers for the public realm were transformed into forms of language in the more private spheres might produce further results for our understanding of memory construction.

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The Cultural Industries in the Late Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Britain and Germany Compared, conference organized by the Großbritannien-Zentrum, Humboldt University Berlin and the German Historical Institute London, and held at the GHIL, 19–21 Nov. 2009.

‘Cultural industries’ are commercial, in other words, profit-making enterprises run by professionals in the sphere of culture. Although they already played an important part in shaping public life in Britain in the eighteenth century, they did not make a breakthrough in Germany until the early nineteenth century. The Arbeitskreis Deutsche Englandforschung held a first conference on the history of the cultural industries in England in 2008. This follow-up conference, convened by Christiane Eisenberg (Großbritannien-Zentrum, Humboldt University Berlin) and Andreas Gestrich (GHIL), shifted the focus to the German perspective and tried to draw comparisons. In the forefront were questions of general social and cultural history and media history; methodological approaches to the subject were also to be explored.

The opening paper, ‘Media and Mass Culture in Britain and Germany’, given by Corey Ross (Birmingham), already offered a multifaceted insight into the complexity of the topic. Ross first looked at common features (urbanization, challenge to old hierarchies posed by new markets, and so on) and differences (interplay with political developments at national and global level) in the development of cultural industries in the two countries. Using the examples of cinema, press, and radio, Ross then raised the question of whether the cultural industries in Britain in the first half of the twentieth century had a greater integrative effect than in Germany. His answer was ‘yes’ in the case of the cinema, based on attendance statistics, and ‘no’ for the press, with reference to political polarization. For the radio Ross diagnosed in both countries a marked resistance to commercialization of programming, which led in both cases to a rather didactic talking-down to the audience. The breakthrough of radio as an enter-
tainment medium could, he said, be dated to the 1930s in both Britain and Germany, although in Germany the conditions of National Socialism led to quite specific emphases being placed.

Several of the research issues raised by Ross were dealt with in greater detail in the following sessions of the conference. The first session, ‘1870–1914: Britain, the Pioneer—Germany, the Latecomer?’, focused on theatre and film. Anselm Heinrich (Glasgow) in his paper, ‘Dream Palaces: Regional Theatres in Britain and Germany’, compared developments in northern England and the Ruhr area. First he looked at common features in the world of the theatre. Around the turn of the century regional theatres in both England and Germany were largely privately financed; contrary to common belief, in Germany, too, theatres did not start to be funded from the public purse until after the First World War. For this reason in the period under examination the theatre in both countries was highly profit-oriented. This was the criterion by which directors and managers were measured. With their emphasis on comedies and operettas the English theatres were more geared towards popular taste. In Germany, on the other hand, plays were fairly clearly directed towards the educational ideals of the bourgeois elite, especially since many of them had supported the theatres with donations. A second paper on the subject of the theatre in which Tobias Becker (Berlin) compared developments in London and Berlin between 1880 and 1930, confirmed Heinrich’s diagnosis. Becker further remarked upon the drive towards commercialization unleashed around the middle of the nineteenth century by the removal of royal patronage (in England) and the introduction of Gewerbefreiheit (in Germany). By the turn of the century, he said, the theatres in both countries were completely dependent on market forces and general economic developments, which in the early twentieth century led to requests for subsidies, not least in London. In addition Becker was able to show that there was a lively German–British exchange as regards programme structuring; this he saw as evidence of an increasing internationalization of the theatre business around the turn of the century.

For early film Martin Loiperdinger and Jon Burrows confirmed this image of parallel developments in the two countries, a finding which in this case can also be explained by the fact that film technology had become more universal. The two speakers illustrated this connection using the example of the transition from feature films to
epics, the tendency bound up with this for exclusive contracts with actors, and, specifically, the rise of the Danish actress Asta Nielsen to international film-star status. The essential difference between Germany and Britain was, in their view, that Nielsen achieved her breakthrough in Germany with the film *Abgründe*, but in Britain, somewhat later, with *Fools of Society* which, because of its somewhat ‘liberal’ presentation, provoked calls for censorship. According to Loiperdinger and Burrows, developments in the two countries’ film industries did not diverge until the outbreak of the First World War. The decrease in German (and American) film exports to Britain that now set in encroached on cinema-owners’ profits, but gave rise to the hope amongst British film producers of being able to ‘counteract a future monopolization of the film market by raising the standard’, as they put it at the time. In the subsequent discussion not least this aspect caused the relativization of the common view that the roaring Twenties saw a first flourishing of commercial mass culture and that the turn of the century was to some extent just a ‘warming-up’ period, to be examined using other examples, and to be established explicitly as a first finding of the conference.

In the second session, ‘The Inter-War Period: Commerce and Culture in Conflict?’, the speakers showed how this largely unified picture in the two countries did, in fact, vary and in the process brought certain surprising examples to light. In his paper, ‘Europe Versus Hollywood in the Inter-War Years: A Study of Failure’, Gerben Bakker (LSE) looked at the reasons for America’s growing dominance of the film industry from about 1910. He saw one of the main reasons as the fragmentation of the European markets and, connected with this, the inability to use economies of scale, the Americans’ greater capital availability, and their consequent ability to invest in talkies. Although the protectionist policy of the European states had initially been able to obviate the negative consequences for the international markets, the public preferred the imports because of the new stars and the fact that the American companies blocked the best performance times. Thus the new significance of language in the international film business further eroded the ability of the European film industries to compete. In Britain there were no such language problems.

What language was to film, copyright was to the picture agencies—this was what Rita Gudermann (Berlin) argued in her paper on
picture agencies in Britain and Germany. Here, she said, it was a question of successfully marketing content that was protected by copyright. The success of the picture agencies depended on being able to sell image rights to as many media as possible. Using the two Leipzig publishing houses of Weber and Spamer and their trade relations with Britain as examples, she demonstrated that Britain’s different copyright regulations made life difficult for the Leipzig picture agencies. As a result, they were only able to deal on the German market.

A third factor that contributed to national differentiation in the cultural industries was revealed in the presentation by Susann Lewerenz (Berlin) on ‘Germanizing the Arts? Circus, Vaudeville, and Funfair Entertainment in Nazi Germany’. She certainly recognized a peculiar national development in the Nazis’ Gleichschaltung of the cultural sector. But contrary to generally held opinion, she was able to show that the regime’s restrictive measures did not initially have much impact on the sphere she was looking at because the employment of foreign artistes, even those of a ‘foreign race’, was forbidden only gradually. It was by no means only for propaganda reasons, she said, that the ban was watered down. Other factors were the travelling-circus tradition of ethnographic performances and the self-perception of the Third Reich as a ‘white colonial power’. It was not until the outbreak of war that the Nazi regime adopted a more restrictive attitude, but it still remained flexible, especially in the case of Asiatic, particularly Japanese, artistes.

The force of these differentiating factors—different copyright laws, the multitude of languages in Europe, and the cultural impulses from America—was taken up again in the following session, ‘After 1945: Unlimited Growth of the Cultural Industries?’, but this time from a different perspective. The speakers, all experts in the history of the music business, were not only concerned with giving well-informed statements on developments within their sphere of contemporary history. They also discussed the specific economy of the cultural industries for which different criteria have to be considered from those usually applied.

In his paper, ‘The British Popular Music Business 1950–75’, Richard Coopey (LSE) discussed the significance of large and smaller independent enterprises in the British music scene, with reference also to its creativity, but did not make general statements about the
optimal size of an enterprise. In this branch of the cultural industries, Coopey said, such assertions were virtually impossible. In Britain numerous changes had taken place in the sphere of creative management and staging during the period in question, and a number of small firms, some of them extremely innovative, had even supported an anti-commercial direction. Nonetheless, at the end of the period the big labels (EMI, Decca) still dominated the British music industry because they had managed to adapt the profitable innovations of the alternative scene and make them part of their marketing strategy. Other factors had to be included if the business success of this branch were to be explained.

Similar thoughts were expressed, this time in relation to copyright, by the economic historian Christian Handke (Rotterdam) in his paper, ‘Another Round? Cyclicality in the Record Industry and its Implications for the Debate on Copyright’, in which he dealt with the negative consequences for the music industry of the Internet (downloads, Napster). Handke raised the question of whether copyright really did have the effect, always stressed in public, of maintaining the industry’s innovative power, or whether it merely protected the owners of the legal titles from competition—a thesis which he impressively confirmed on the basis of material concerning the development of the recording industry. In this connection he appealed for future studies to look in more detail at the unintended consequences of copyright for the cultural industries. Handke also reminded the audience that the relationship between boom and crisis in the music industry could only be described in terms of the usual categories of growth, innovation, and competition to a limited degree because a symbolic product was being produced. More was needed than purely economic approaches, and he therefore appealed for cooperation with historians.

The same appeal for interdisciplinary cooperation, though this time from the perspective of the social historian, was expressed by Klaus Nathaus (Bielefeld) in his comparative paper, ‘Why was there a “Rock Revolution” in Britain?’. Here he analysed the weak American influence on the German music market in the 1960s and 1970s. The reason, he said, was that new editions of successful English-language titles could easily be produced with a German text. It was quite different in Britain where American bands were top of the charts. There the music industry felt compelled to develop creative
solutions in order to survive. It developed marketing strategies for new talents, and so in Britain a reorientation came about, known as the Rock Revolution. The new specifically British rock and pop music could be produced relatively cheaply, so that the British music industry could also extend to the American market, thereby experiencing a lasting boom. Nathaus’s strategic argument turned out to be irritating for some of the participants, since up to then social and cultural history had focused on studies on the structure of demand (keywords: baby-boomer and Zeitgeist), to which his approach did not seem directly to connect. On the other hand, it was understandable that those who looked at the supply strategies of the music industry—Nathaus included among these strategies music reviews sponsored by the industry—had to reorientate themselves and also take account of the industry’s specific ‘cultural economics’.

The final session also stressed the individuality of the cultural industries and their tendency to develop their own dynamics. This session transferred the field of enquiry from Germany and Britain to Australia, in other words, to a country in which the cultural industries, for lack of any competing cultural traditions, had already become the dominant culture soon after settlement of the continent and today are particularly influential for the way of life. In some respects Australia therefore offered laboratory conditions for analysing the function and development of the cultural industries. Sinje Steinmann (Berlin) underlined this peculiarity of the Australian example in her paper, ‘A Little-Known Heyday of Cultural Business: Operatic Entrepreneurship at the Antipodes’, in which she described British cultural transfer to Australia in the sphere of opera. She was able to show that until the Second World War constant attempts were made to copy the British style, but that in Australia the cultural industries, because of their lack of professionalism and the delay with which innovations reached the colony, never reached the same level. As a result, in Australia more than in Britain commercial success rather than further development of cultural forms was the focus right from the start. As Steinmann recalled, an opera house of architectural significance was built in Sydney as early as 1903, but a specifically Australian opera tradition did not develop.

In his paper, ‘Surf Culture as a Way of Life’, Stephan Schwanke (Berlin) linked up chronologically with Steinmann, and then went on to concentrate on the most recent developments since the mid-1980s.
In this advanced stage in the history of the Australian cultural industries it was, he said, certainly no longer a case of imitating the British; in fact, the Australians wanted to be distinct protagonists of a specifically Australian leisure culture, and to build a national identity on the basis of commercial culture. According to Schwanke this movement was promoted mainly by those born between 1945 and 1960, the baby-boomers, and this social basis was the main reason why the attempt to functionalize the universally loved ‘surf culture’ for the processes of building a national identity could be considered to have failed. For the baby-boomer Australians, he said, were a self-orientated ‘Generation Me’. They had no specific values or ideals; their surf culture represented nothing more than the desire for hedonistic self-gratification, striving for perpetual leisure. This view of Australia also irritated some of the participants since it frustrated the aims of social and cultural history, namely to look for interpretations and ‘sense’. Yet the subsequent concluding discussion showed that young historians in particular were quite prepared to take on the challenge of the topic ‘cultural industries’ connected with this, as regards methodology as well.

The conference ended with a discussion of source problems and some brainstorming about appropriate approaches for future research. The conference was generously supported by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung. Publication of the contributions to this and the earlier conference is planned in the series of the Arbeitskreis Deutsche England-Forschung.

SEBASTIAN WEHRSTEDT (Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg) and DOMINIK BÜSCHKEN (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn)
At the Margins of the Welfare State: Changing Patterns of Including and Excluding the ‘Deviant’ Poor in Europe 1870–1933, conference organized by the German Historical Institute London in cooperation with the Collaborative Research Centre ‘Strangers and Poor People: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion from Classical Antiquity to the Present Day’ (CRC 600, University of Trier), sub-project ‘Poverty and the Politics of Poverty in European Cities in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, and held at the German Historical Institute London, 25–7 Feb. 2010.

The ambivalence and dynamics of discourses and social practices referring to the poor are among the central topics of the research which the Collaborative Research Centre ‘Strangers and Poor People:Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion from Classical Antiquity to the Present Day’ has carried out at the University of Trier since 2002. The conference at the GHIL concentrated on modes of dealing with the ‘deviant’ poor, such as vagrants, ‘lunatics’, criminals, and the ‘work-shy’. One of the main questions it raised was how the emergence of the modern welfare state since the late nineteenth century had influenced the perception, representation, and treatment of the ‘deviant’ poor. The conference papers illustrated a wide range of perspectives, including the discourses of contemporary experts, administrative practices, and the strategies of the ‘deviant’ poor when dealing with the changing patterns of inclusion and exclusion.

Andreas Gestrich, Director of the GHIL, opened the conference with an overview of different approaches to inclusion and exclusion in the social sciences. To be at the margins, he said with reference to the conference title, does not necessarily equal exclusion in so far as the concept of inclusion was based on communication. Gestrich named integration into the labour market, the right of citizenship, and residency as some of the decisive factors defining inclusion or exclusion in the modern nation-state.

The first section dealt with ‘Transnational Discourses on Poverty and Deviance’. In her paper on ‘Poverty in Transnational Discourses: The Debates of Social Reformers in Germany and the Netherlands around 1900’, Christina May (Münster) investigated whether reformers’ societies in these two countries were able to introduce new perspectives on the causes of poverty into political discussions. Using new methods of researching societal problems, she stated that
German and Dutch experts stressed the structural causes of poverty, thereby questioning the dominant view of poverty as an individual and moral problem. In Germany, structural explanations put forward by experts from the Verein für Socialpolitik had played an important part in the discussions of political elites, while in the Dutch case a strong liberal tradition contributed to retaining the conventional view of poverty. In contrast to this account of general patterns in the discussion of poverty, Beate Althammer (Trier), in her paper ‘Transnational Discourses on Vagrancy around 1900’, focused on the debates about a specific group of the ‘deviant’ poor. Outlining the interrelated national and transnational discourses on the ‘vagabond question’ in the fields of criminal law and poor relief, she highlighted the interchange of ideas between experts and philanthropists from various European countries and the United States. Another field of contemporary discourse which Althammer examined was the medical interpretation of vagrancy as an expression of ‘mental inferiority’, a mode of defining deviance that appears to have been more dominant in Germany than in other countries. The transnational experts’ discourse about poverty in medical terms was also discussed by Jens Gründler (Trier) in his paper on ‘“Degeneracy” and “Moral Imbecility”: Transnational Discourses of Deviancy in Local Scottish Poor Relief Administration’. Gründler analysed the statements made by Scottish witnesses to the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded and a number of case files from a Scottish asylum. Based on these sources he demonstrated that local discourses and practices were influenced by national and transnational developments in the medical and political sciences and reflected, for example, the ambiguous definitions of mental illness. Wilfried Rudloff (Kassel) spoke on ‘Benefit and Intervention: Two Modes of Operation of the Local Welfare Administration in Germany between 1890 and 1939’. He drew on concepts from the administrative sciences, namely, Leistung and Eingriff, in order to categorize the local welfare administration’s modes of operation. Using examples from different fields of welfare, he showed that each administrative operation combines benefit and intervention. However, different mixtures of these two modes can be observed in various local environments and political circumstances. A lively discussion ensued on whether these concepts could be used to create a typology of welfare administrations, and on the limitations inherent in the administrative perspective.
The second section, ‘Modes of Criminalization and Rehabilitation’, started with Philipp Müller’s (London) paper, “But we will always have to individualize”: Police Supervision in Prussia and its Reform around 1900. Müller showed that police supervision had been intended to support and control former prisoners. Its reform could be explained as a reaction to the failure to re-integrate these people into society. Müller concentrated especially on the important part played by welfare associations in the new regime of ‘monitoring care’ after the reform and argued that despite some methodological changes, such as an emphasis on the individuality of the ex-prisoners, the dual function of support and control persisted. The issue of inclusion and exclusion of prisoners and ex-convicts was explored more deeply by Désirée Schauz (Munich). In her paper, ‘Convicts at the Margins of the Welfare State: Permanent Detention or Rehabilitation?’, she described how private welfare associations involved in prisoner care had reacted to new societal expectations raised by the modern welfare state and the penal reform movement. One of the main problems was that the majority of released prisoners would not accept any help from religious charity associations because of their paternalistic strategies. But when these associations were confronted with their failure to reintegrate ex-prisoners, they did not react by introducing fundamental reforms. Instead, they picked up the newly invented category of the mentally inferior and the suggestions of the penal reform movement in order to exclude habitual criminals from support. In her paper, ‘Defence of Necessity? Begging and Vagrancy in the Context of Social Policy, Police, and Legal Practice (Austria, 1920s and 1930s)’, Sigrid Wadauer (Vienna) returned to the subject of itinerant people. While begging and vagrancy were strictly forbidden by a law of 1885, her analysis of court records from various regions of Austria provided evidence that these rather vague categories were, in practice, used in a variety of ways. In some cases, begging was not only tolerated but even permitted, for example, if the authorities acknowledged the failure of public social assistance. This was true even when the persecution of beggars and vagrants intensified during the period of Austrofascism from 1933 to 1938. Juliane Hanschcow (Trier) spoke on ‘Becoming “Gypsy-Like”: The Process of Labelling Homeless and Itinerant People in the Prussian Rhine Province before 1933’. On the basis of administrative sources and case studies from the poverty-stricken regions of Eifel and Hunsrück,
she demonstrated that Prussian ‘anti-gypsy’ regulations left ample scope for the local police to ascribe the labels of Zigeuner or nach Zigeunerart unherziehend to people whose way of life was perceived as ‘deviant’. Thus homeless families and itinerant tradesmen and craftsmen became objects of permanent observation and deportation. Ignoring structural causes such as the housing shortage and a lack of employment opportunities, authorities criminalized and stigmatized the poor and restricted civil rights such as free choice of residence.

In the third section the focus turned to workhouses and their inmates. In her paper, “‘A Den of Drunkenness, Immorality and Vice’: Public Representation of the Workhouse and the Poor in Late Nineteenth-Century Belfast”, Olwen Purdue (Belfast) concentrated on the debate about those workhouse inmates who used it as a ‘casual lodging house’ and often only stayed for one night. In contemporary debate this was seen as an abuse of the workhouse system, which was originally expected to provide a form of ‘moral policing’. Inga Brandes’s (Trier) paper, ‘Survival and Stigmatization: Poor Relief Recipients in Ireland, 1885–1925’, explored the relationship between receiving poor relief and stigmatization. While it was commonly assumed that workhouse inmates in particular were stigmatized, she pointed out that there was often no sound empirical basis for this claim. In order to achieve a more differentiated view of stigmatization in research on poverty and poor relief, she reconsidered the indicators that could be used to identify it. The research presented by Megan Doolittle (Open University) was based on working-class autobiographies. As she showed in her presentation, ‘Enforcing/Contesting the Duty to Provide: Fatherhood and the Workhouse in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Century England’, fathers were expected to be the main providers for their families. In reality, however, poor families often relied on different additional strategies and resources, such as the help of relatives or the income of women and children. Still, the failure to live up to this role model was associated with shame and stigmatization. This became especially apparent if a family had no other option but to enter the workhouse. In contrast to the workhouse system in Britain, workhouses in Germany had a different history, as was shown by Thomas Irmer (Berlin) in his paper, ‘Deviant Poor between Preservation, Detention and Annihilation? The Municipal Workhouse in Berlin-Rummelsburg 1879–1951’. Irmer surveyed the history of this workhouse, focusing on the Nazi era,
when most workhouse inmates were classified as ‘anti-social’ or ‘workshy’. Many of them were sent to concentration camps, a fact that is not very apparent in the German culture of remembrance. In the discussion, it was pointed out that the history of the workhouse as a whole should not be seen only in the light of what happened there between 1933 and 1945.

The last section, ‘Colonies and Camps: Places of Inclusion or Exclusion?’, dealt with the spatial dimension of inclusion and exclusion. The papers given showed that the concentration of deviant poor into colonies or camps could have different motives and effects. In her paper, ‘Labour Colony, Model Village, or Research Station? The Heimatkolonie Friedrich-Wilhelmsdorf and European Discourses of Social and Environmental Improvement, 1882–1914’, Elizabeth B. Jones (Colorado) showed how discourses of social and scientific improvement were closely intertwined around the turn of the twentieth century. Although the Protestant pastor Eberhard Cronemeyer had founded this agricultural labour colony with the main aim of teaching vagabonds the ‘joy of work’, the colony also served as an agricultural research station which aimed to fertilize the moorlands. In this way, the colony sought to reform both land and people. Different attitudes towards poverty and deviance within a work colony played a significant role in Edward Snyder’s (Minnesota) paper, ‘Friedrich von Bodelschwingh and the Vagabond Question: A Transnational Examination of German Protestant Attitudes Towards Poverty and Deviancy, 1880–1923’. Snyder highlighted the connection between the Bethel foundation’s missionary work in East Africa and the project of reforming vagabonds. With emphasis on work ethic and religion, vagabonds in Germany and Africans in the colonies were to be reformed into good Protestants. After the First World War, however, attitudes changed among the leaders of Bethel, who now became receptive to eugenic approaches. The missionaries returning from Africa after the war, however, held on to the traditional approach of moral reform. In her paper, ‘“New Morocco” in the No Man’s Land between Trier and Euren: Drawing Boundaries and Constructing Deviance (Germany, 1925–33)’, Tamara Stazic-Wendt (Trier) focused on links between poverty, social and spatial exclusion, and labelling processes. Because of a housing shortage in the 1920s, the city of Trier had removed more than a hundred poor families to a barracks camp outside the town. The stigmatizing attribution of difference, reflected
in the label New Morocco, enforced, stabilized, and legitimized the social and spatial exclusion of the families living in that ‘undesirable’ place. As letters written by the inhabitants show, those labelled as ‘deviant’ questioned the symbolic and practical boundaries in many ways.

In his summary at the end of the conference Lutz Raphael (Trier) outlined the most important results and some further perspectives. He pointed out that the notion of ‘marginality’ was constantly changing and that ‘margins’ should also be seen as the result of labelling processes. He suggested using Michel Foucault’s concept of the _dispositif_ to link the analyses of discourses and practices of inclusion and exclusion. Concerning the definition of deviance, the increasing weight of psychological explanations of poverty, which were at the same time linked to older moralizing discourses, seemed to be a striking characteristic around the turn of the century. As some presentations showed, the utopian ideas of experts who viewed rural colonies as a solution to the problems of industrial society also played an important part. While he acknowledged that a strength of the conference was that it shed light on the options open to the poor when dealing with administrative and institutional frameworks, Raphael also emphasized the power of explicit spatial exclusion.

As the lively discussion throughout the conference demonstrated, combining such different perspectives as transnational discourses and local practices opens up a promising field for further research on the changing patterns of inclusion and exclusion. Without any doubt, the planned publication of the conference proceedings will make a valuable contribution to the research on poverty and deviance.

KATHARINA BRANDES (University of Trier) and ELISABETH GRÜNER (University of Trier)
**Slave Revolts and (Anti)-Imperialism: From Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century**, workshop organized by the German Historical Institute London and held at the GHIL, 7–8 Mar. 2010.

This two-day interdisciplinary international workshop, convened by Raphael Hörmann (Rostock), aimed to provide a survey of slave revolts from antiquity to the nineteenth century. In particular, it wanted to inquire into their relation to imperialism and colonialism. Records of slave rebellions reach back to antiquity and revolts have affected almost all societies in which the socio-economic system of slavery was practised. By now it has become almost a truism in slavery studies to emphasize the role of slave resistance in the overthrow of slavery. One of the problems with the notion of ‘slave resistance’, however, lies in its very broad scope. It encompasses extremely diverse forms of resistance, ranging from ubiquitous, everyday manifestations such as indolence, faked stupidity, insubordination, and so forth to the more exceptional (but still relatively frequent) instances of armed resistance. While aware of the various other types of slave resistance and the often fluid boundaries between them, this workshop considered the most spectacular and often extremely violent examples of slave resistance: slave revolts.

After a warm welcome by Benedikt Stuchtey, the first panel considered the role of slave revolts in antiquity. Although focusing on the largest and most dramatic slave revolt in antiquity, one that posed a severe threat to the Roman Empire, namely, Spartacus’ Revolt (73–71 BC), Keith Bradley (Notre-Dame) also provided a panoramic picture of slave revolts in the Roman world. In his presentation he fleshed out both the similarities and differences between antique and modern slave revolts. While he asserted that individual and—less frequently—collective resistance to enslavement was already widespread in antiquity, he insisted that antique slave revolts never questioned the institution of slavery as such. Even Spartacus’ Revolt did not aim to destroy slavery, but to secure freedom for his army of slaves. Drawing on Eugene Genovese’s thesis of a paradigm shift from revolt to revolution that took place in the eighteenth century, Bradley maintained that, by contrast, New World slave revolts since the Haitian Revolution had aimed to eradicate the socio-economic institution of plantation slavery. Bradley’s thesis was criticized by some of the participants, who argued that a massive
slave revolt, such as that of Spartacus, would have been inconceivable without a certain consciousness of the injustice of slavery. In the second paper in the panel Piotr Wozniczka (Trier) philologically investigated a fragmentary narrative on the first Sicilian slave war (138?-132 BC), presumed to have been written by the Greek historian Diodorus Siculus. As Wozniczka argued, a comparison with other surviving parts of his forty-volume world history, the *bibliotheke*, suggests that Diodorus was indeed the author of this debated text. Wozniczka indirectly supported Bradley’s thesis, as he illustrated that the narrative strongly condemns the abuses of the Sicilian slaves, considering them to be the principal reason for the revolt. But it never debates the validity of the institution as such.

The unfortunate illness of Mary Turner (London) and Jochen Meißner (Berlin) meant that the panel on slave revolts in the Americas had to be modified. Gelien Matthews (St Augustine, Trinidad) attacked the dominant scholarly opinion that slave revolts were entirely counterproductive to the campaign of the British abolitionists. She compellingly argued that even the mainstream abolitionists around Wilberforce gradually learned to employ Caribbean slave revolts to advance their propaganda against the slave trade and chattel slavery. In the ensuing discussion, however, it emerged that there were limits to this strategy of rhetorical–ideological incorporation of slave revolts. In particular, the Haitian Revolution as an extremely violent anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle for black self-emancipation remained incompatible with paternalistic–liberal ideas of an emancipation that was to be granted to slaves by the British government. The repercussions of the Haitian Revolution, this time on the Spanish Caribbean, more precisely, in Puerto Rico, constituted the focus of Antonio Jesús Pinto Tortosa’s (Madrid) paper. As he illustrated, the foiled Epiphany Day rising of 1812 was both modelled on the Haitian Revolution (the plan to burn all the plantations and kill the colonists) and conjured up its spectre. He insisted that in contrast to the later stages of the Haitian Revolution, however, the conspirators on Puerto Rico did not pursue any anti-imperialist or anti-colonialist goals but ‘solely’ wanted to destroy plantation slavery. Yet following the revelation that the conspiracy also crossed colour lines and even involved a number of white Creoles, the question was raised in the discussion of whether some of the white participants had not also been swayed by separatist sentiments?
The third panel shifted to literary representations of slave revolts. Ulrich Pallua (Innsbruck) looked at eighteenth-century British stage adaptations of a foundational literary text on slave revolts, Aphra Behn’s 1696 novella *Oroonoko: or, the Royal Slave: A True History*. Pallua showed that even the later stage adaptations could not overcome the aporia of Behn’s text: the simultaneous ‘ennobling’ of its tragic heroic black protagonist and the condemnation of violent resistance against slavery to which Oroonoko is driven. Peter J. Kitson (Dundee) investigated another literary text that is beset by ideological ambiguities: John Thelwall’s Jacobin Gothic novel *The Daughter of Adoption* (1801), a third of which is set in the French colony of Saint-Domingue shortly before and during the outbreak of the Haitian Revolution. While Thelwall is adamantly opposed to both slavery and imperialism, he casts doubt on the success of revolutionary self-emancipation. Moreover, his vicious portrayal of a mixed-race character as the novel’s Gothic villain, contrasting starkly with the heroic black rebel slave who sacrifices his life to prevent the rape of his mistress by fellow rebel slaves, begs questions about Thelwall’s politics of race, and especially his fears of miscegenation.

The first panel of the second day continued the topic of literary representations, starting with a talk by Adrian Knapp that compared portrayals of two rebel leaders in British literature after the British abolition of slavery: the depiction of the Haitian revolutionary Toussaint Louverture in Harriet Martineau’s historical romance *The Hour and the Man* (1839) and of the Xhosa prophet–warrior Makanna, who threatened British rule in the Cape Colony in 1819, in the anonymous eponymous novel *Makanna; Or the Land of the Savage* (1834). In the section on Martineau’s novel, Knapp drew on the theoretical framework of the so-called ‘Haitian turn’ in the humanities: the notion that the Haitian Revolution lies at the crux of transatlantic modernity. As he illustrated, Martineau symbolically ‘castrates’ Toussaint, turning him into a pious, conscience-ridden Christian. Deprived of his blackness and any ‘African’ traits of character, Martineau’s idealized Toussaint becomes a model for emancipation within the liberal–humanist paradigm. He not only epitomizes the civilized and Europeanized ex-slave who has shed all ‘savageness’, but also functions as a shining example for the future emancipation of the British working class through (self)-education. While not a slave, the literary figure of Makanna in his diabolical savagery serves
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almost as an antithesis to Martineau’s Toussaint, Knapp insisted. Returning to the Haitian Revolution, Raphael Hörmann (Rostock) investigated the role of the Gothic mode in narratives of the revolution. He showed that similar tropes of ‘horror’ and ‘terror’ have been employed in both fiction and non-fiction texts from the eighteenth century to the present day, albeit to different ideological ends. While most contemporary narratives could be considered as belonging to the ‘conservative’ anti-revolutionary Gothic that demonizes the Haitian Revolution and the rebel slaves, several narratives use it to endorse violent self-emancipation. Here the radical black abolitionist Robert Wedderburn (1762–1834?) is of key importance, as he takes the conservative demonizations of the slave rebels and recasts them as anti-imperial menacing visions of slave and proletarian self-emancipation. In a final section Hörmann demonstrated how the uncritical appropriation of historical atrocity stories about black violence in the revolution by Madison Smartt Bell in his historical novel *All Souls Rising* (1995) threatens to reiterate the same racist allegations of unbound black savagery that characterize his historical sources.

Because of the cases of illness, the final panel consisted of only one speaker, Alan Rice (Preston). However, his intriguing paper with its great historical and thematic scope more than made up for the lack of a co-panellist. Investigating transatlantic remembrance of slavery, slave resistance, and abolitionism since the nineteenth century, he identified the blind spots and cases of conscious repression in historical and museological memory culture. Despite the boom in slavery studies, radical abolitionists such as Robert Wedderburn are still often marginalized in official celebrations of abolition and emancipation. Even a highly canonical figure such as Frederick Douglass only becomes palatable for official memory culture if he is deprived of his radical edge. By contrast, present-day black visual artists, such as Ellen Gallagher in the USA and Lubaina Himid have reinstated African Atlantic working-class figures as central to the narrative of black resistance in works beginning a ‘guerrilla memorialization’ that will, it is to be hoped, alter future interpretations of black radicalism.

As the workshop suggested, the relation of slave revolts to imperialism and colonialism largely remains intangible. While major revolts from Spartacus’ Revolt onwards did pose severe threats to empires, it is only in a number of rare instances, such as the Haitian Revolution or some Jamaican slave revolts, for example, that a pro-
nouncedly anti-colonial agenda emerged openly. Both the high quality of the presentations and the engaged discussions by the audience contributed to the success of the workshop.

RAPHAEL HÖRMANN (University of Rostock)
The nature of adoption has changed greatly over recent decades. New trends, such as gay and lesbian couples, single parents, and patchwork families, and a dramatic decline in the birth rate provide new challenges. Today the welfare of the child is the major concern, but it has taken a long time to arrive at this attitude. This workshop, convened and moderated by Benedikt Stuchtey (GHIL), aimed to explore the history of child adoption as a national and an international issue from the nineteenth century. Nine papers on adoption in different contexts were given by historians, one lawyer, and one youth worker from Canada, the USA, the UK, Germany, and Turkey. The main aims were to exchange experiences in the study of the history of adoption, to find similarities and differences within various national contexts, and to reconstruct the development of child adoption up to the present as a transnational issue.

The two-day workshop was chronologically divided into five sections, each thematically building a rounded idea of adoption within the last century. After a welcome and general introduction to the history of child adoption, the problems it involved, and the perspectives of historical research by Benedikt Stuchtey, the first paper was given by Christina Benninghaus (Bielefeld). Entitled ‘Inspiring Concern: Adoption in Early Twentieth-Century Germany’, her paper gave an insight into why adoption inspired so much concern. Her sources were fictional texts by Clara Viebig and Adele Schreiber, and reviews of these texts and other popular writings. While Viebig depicted adoption as a fascinating idea in her fiction, she identified several major problems and difficulties, with the result that her novel was not very encouraging regarding adoption. *Einer Mutter Sohn*, written in 1906, was highly successful and went through eighteen editions, but it portrayed all the negative consequences of adoption, mainly for the adoptee, including alienation, loneliness, economic failure, moral decay, illness, and even death. In 1932 Viebig wrote a novel called *Das Kind* with a happy ending for the adoptee and the adoptive mother. The question of matching the adoptee’s age, religion, and social standing was raised in the discussion, and the conclusion could be drawn that in Germany, social and religious matching with
the new family took precedence over the child’s interests and well-being.

Jenny Keating’s (London) paper, entitled ‘Adoption in England, 1918–1945’, gave an insight into adoption and family life in Britain between the wars. She started by suggesting that solutions to the question of best interest varied over time. Adoption was illegal in Britain until 1927, but baby-farming was very common. The majority of women were mothers, and those who could not give birth naturally often adopted children. However, there was no secure and organized procedure and adoption was seen as the last resort. Adoption helped to create new families and new households. The discussion provided answers to a number of questions. Interestingly, single men were also allowed to adopt. In the 1950s and 1960s adoption agencies were established and the welfare of the child became the main focus. Unfortunately, many records from the pre-war period were destroyed or lost.

After an intense discussion, Jörg Lewe (Meckenheim) spoke on ‘Adoption during the Third Reich’. Hitler’s regime was not able to abolish all adoption agencies which had been founded in the Weimar Republic. It should be remembered, of course, that there were many Nazis in the local organizations. Lewe’s paper highlighted the religious aspects of adoption, particularly Jewish identity, and also demonstrated the enormous power of the state. In her paper entitled “In the Best Interests of the Child”: Post-War Efforts to Right the Wrongs of Nazi Adoption Policy’, Michelle Mouton (Wisconsin Oshkosh) pointed to the well-being of the child and the common thinking that children were best off with their biological parents. She gave an insight into the work of the Kindersuchdienst and other organizations. If relatives could not be found, agencies found it difficult to give children away for adoption. She cited the example of Scandinavian children who looked like Germans and were adopted by families who then changed their names. It was common to interview these children about their family life and habits in order to discover their true identity. Finally, new adoption problems developed after the end of the war, when German children ‘turned into Poles’. The main topics of the following discussion were gender and race.

The afternoon session began with a paper on ‘Changes in Adoption Practices among Muslim Ottomans and Turks’ given by Ferhunde Özbay (Istanbul). Özbay explored the similarities between
informal adoption and domestic slavery. Although the anti-slavery law of 1964 prohibited slavery and slavery-like practices, informal adoption could not be abolished for good as the ideology and interests of the state took priority. Özbay stressed that the slave trade continued in different forms. Middle-class Muslim Ottoman families kept Turkish girls to raise as Muslim Ottomans. She explained that the introduction of legal adoption was a significant step forward regarding child and family protection. Problems remained and new ones occurred with the legalization of adoption, and regulations often changed within years. While private adoption is illegal, the welfare of the child is still not the focal point. The discussion looked at the role of religion and the interpretation of the Koran. The Koran outlaws adoption on the grounds that biological parents play a very important part in a child’s life. The recent interest in the child’s welfare as part of Turkey’s Westernization must therefore be regarded with caution. The afternoon ended with a guided tour through the Foundling Museum in London.

The second day of the workshop began with a paper on ‘The Humanitarian Origins of Inter-Country Adoption: Rethinking Genalogies’ by Heide Fehrenbach (Northern Illinois) dealing with the question of racism within society. She explained that there was more support for transnational adoption than for adoption within the country, because the countries who provided children for adoption wanted to get them off the streets. Many mixed-race children, known as ‘brown babies’, were among these and provoked informal racism. In the 1960s, transnational adoption was considered the last resort. The following discussion focused on German-American children and asked whether mixed-race babies helped to liberalize the United States.

In her paper on ‘Babies without Borders: Transnational and Transracial Adoption between Canada and the Americas’, Karen Dubinsky (Kingston, Ontario) considered the political symbolism of children and visualizations of ‘the helpless and innocent child’. Dubinsky spoke of ‘imperialist kidnap’ in North America, Cuba, and Guatemala, concentrating on the sending rather than the receiving end. She distinguished between three types of babies put up for adoption. First, there were national post-war babies whose parents were encouraged to send their children to white middle-class families. Secondly, the so-called ‘hybrid baby’ was a metaphor for an
inter-country adoption. And thirdly, she claimed that the plight of children needing help is highlighted at times of terrorism and war, when the media take the opportunity to involve potential adopters at an emotional level. Dubinsky concluded that transnational adoption implies a special type of kidnapping, but that it is the most privileged form of immigration.

Nayanika Mookherjee’s (Lancaster) paper ‘Available Motherhood: Legal Technologies, State of Exception, and the Dekinning of War Babies in Bangladesh’ focused on women’s rape and its consequences. She explored the connection between adoption and politics and the law in Bangladesh. It became clear that the Bangladeshi Court regulated and controlled motherhood, and when numerous Bangladeshi women were raped by Pakistani soldiers in the 1970s, the government was concerned that these women needed to be protected from their emotional experience of motherhood. The term ‘war baby’ can therefore be explained as a baby born as the result of sexual violence during war. In their desperation, many women saw abortion (illegal at the time) as their last chance not to give birth to a ‘Pakistani bastard’. Abortion centres were located in middle-class areas where these women had access to medical treatment. Throughout 1972, Bangladeshi children were sent to a number of Western countries. In the following discussion similarities between post-war Germany and post-war Bangladesh were identified and debated. In the case of Bangladesh, the question of why rapes had happened can be explained in terms of a racial discourse generated by stereotypes.

The final paper, ‘International Adoption in Germany 1995–2008: A Short History of Mixed Feelings’ by Michael Busch (Frankfurt am Main), focused on the struggle between independence and economic constraints in private placing agencies. Providing German statistics from 1994 (8,449 adoptions) and 2008 (4,201 adoptions), Busch pointed out that the number of agencies almost tripled in these years. He drew attention to the Hague Convention which demands strict observation of laws and high-quality placement of children. As a result, Busch pointed out, private placing agencies have struggled. Germany’s infrastructure for international adoption, he suggests, is far from satisfactory. Today German agencies concentrate more on international activities.

Legal traditions and public opinion regarding adoption, to name
but two topics, are particularly interesting in the study of the history of adoption. The workshop demonstrated that birth parents have so far played a relatively small part in historical research and the media. Nine individual papers with different concerns and historical aims provided a chronological overview of adoption from the nineteenth century in the context of a transnational comparison. The focus was on child rather than on adult adoption. Questions concerning the role of the media, the power of institutions, international organizations, the birth parents, and the influence of fostering were taken into account. The workshop was inspired by new cooperative international research in the history of adoption. Publication of the proceedings is under consideration.

DORIT BRIXIUS (University of Potsdam)

This conference began by referring to an earlier one. In 1979 the German Historical Institute London held a conference entitled ‘Herrschaftsstruktur und Gesellschaft des Dritten Reiches’, which is remembered mainly for its passionate and embittered debates.1 At the time, the conference provided a forum for discussion in which ‘intentionalists’ and ‘functionalists’ confronted each other directly, thus raising the temperature of the debate,2 and controversies about the retrospective evaluation of this conference pushed the discussion even further.3 At the 1979 conference, one paper had seemed uncontroversial. Lothar Kettenacker had suggested that the term Volksgemeinschaft ‘should not be dismissed as a mere propaganda phrase’,4 and called for acknowledgement that it went beyond ‘propaganda and represented reality for the people’.5 What had been considered a relatively uncontroversial statement in the polarized debate between

1 The proceedings were published as Gerhard Hirschfeld and Lothar Kettenacker (eds.), Der ‘Führerstaat’: Mythos und Realität. Studien zur Struktur und Politik des Dritten Reiches (Stuttgart, 1981).
2 The terms ‘intentionalists’ and ‘functionalists’ were coined by Timothy Mason at this conference.
4 Bohrer, ‘Hitler oder die Deutschen’.
the ‘intentionalists’ and ‘functionalists’ of the late 1970s, has for some years been the subject of intense discussions, and the GHIL, in cooperation with the Institut für Zeitgeschichte München/Berlin, once again provided a forum for direct confrontation. As Martina Steber (London) and Bernhard Gotto (Munich) explained in their introduction, the main purpose of the conference was to explore the scope and usefulness of the Volksgemeinschaft approach in a British–German dialogue. They argued that the Volksgemeinschaft should be seen as an ‘imagined order’ that, because of its action-driving character, had shaped Nazi society. Consequently, they suggested, the social dynamic deriving from the notion of Volksgemeinschaft, which held out a utopian promise and shaped a political programme, must be taken seriously. The connections that can be established between the Volksgemeinschaft approach and various other theoretical approaches and methods, they argued, represented one of its main potentials.

The papers delivered at the conference therefore took different perspectives. The first group of papers looked at the structural inequalities of Nazi society. Claus-Christian Szejnmann (Loughborough) examined the categories of class and race, and argued that class became less significant under National Socialism. Although social classes had largely remained in place, they had exerted little influence on attitudes, mentalities, and lifestyles. Race, by contrast, had produced a change at this level, as contemporaries had increasingly perceived their social surroundings in racist categories. Similar conclusions were reached by Winfried Süß (Potsdam). Starting from the position that the idea of social order associated with the Volksgemeinschaft was linked to practices of inclusion and exclusion, he asked how existing social inequalities changed, and new ones were created. Süß also stressed that inequalities in the social structure persisted, but argued that the increasingly racist structuring of society placed them in a new context and thus influenced their character. Elizabeth Harvey (Nottingham) investigated changes in relations

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6 However, at the conference Martin Broszat pointed out that ‘the unity of the Volksgemeinschaft, which was so strongly stressed in the propaganda . . . fell apart . . . in an increasing chaos of specific powers’. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, ‘Einleitung’, in Hirschfeld and Kettenacker (eds.), Der ‘Führerstaat’, 9–19, at 18.
between men and women. In her view, the occupied areas of Eastern Europe in particular offered women activists chances to develop new forms of solidarity between the sexes via the notion of comradeship. Yet relations between the sexes in these areas were overlaid by the racist division between Reichsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche. While they, too, could have made a claim to equal rights, their relations had remained as hierarchical as those between the sexes.

The second group of papers focused on specific social groups and their position in Nazi society, concentrating on the extent of social cohesion in the 1930s and 1940s. Jill Stephenson (Edinburgh), looking at Württemberg villages, asked to what extent the Nazi aim to replace existing social communities was realized. With reference to the research hypothesis that the new mass media had produced a feeling of community embracing the whole of society, she pointed to the limited opportunities for listening to the radio or attending the cinema in rural areas. In other respects, too, Stephenson suggested, Nazi attempts to influence rural society were largely unsuccessful, so that we cannot see the impact of Volksgemeinschaft ideas and practices in Württemberg villages. The paper by Willi Oberkrome (Freiburg), looking at Nazi blueprints for rural communities and their resonance in agrarian society, followed on thematically from this. Against the background of a large-scale flight from the land, he argued, securing the continued existence of the rural population was a central challenge to which various Nazi drafts for order responded in different ways. However, these concepts, which also aspired to transform village life into a Nazi Gemeinschaft, did not succeed. Rüdiger Hachtmann (Potsdam), looking at functional elites, placed a second social group at the focus of attention. His paper concentrated on institutional places where members of the traditional elite and the new Nazi elite met regularly. He found that these meetings tended to result in the new Nazi elites adopting traditional patterns of behaviour and manners, while the traditional elites were not shaped by National Socialism to the same extent. Their commitment to Nazi aims, Hachtmann suggested, can be explained by their exposure to radical nationalism and militarism in the late Wilhelmine period. His conclusion that the elite was little changed by National Socialism was supported by Johannes Hürter (Munich) in his paper on the army generals. The social opening up and modernization of the officer corps had little impact on the generals, he found. Yet especially in the
1930s, there had been a consensus among them supporting the Volks-
gemeinschaft as a vision of a nation freed from internal tensions—
racial exclusion was not seen as part of this vision. In his paper on the
relationship between religion and National Socialism, Friedrich
Wilhelm Graf (Munich) also underlined the potential of the
Volksgemeinschaft idea to link up with other concepts. Both compo-
nents of the word, Volk and Gemeinschaft, had offered theologians
many possible connections. Consequently, the revolution of 1933 rep-
resented a broad canvas on which theologians had projected various
expectations, going as far as hoping for a wide-ranging re-Christian-
ization, while rejecting central elements of Nazi ideology.

A third group of papers asked more widely about perceptions of
Nazi policies and the attitudes of society as a whole. In his analysis
of perceptions of concentration camps in the 1930s, Nikolaus
Wachsmann (London) pointed out that these must be assessed dif-
ferently for different social groups at different times. By distinguis-
hing between official and private knowledge, he was able to show that
in 1933 there was an extensive private awareness of the camps,
although it varied by social class and region. By the end of the 1930s,
this knowledge was limited to social groups on the margins of socie-
ty. In her paper Birthe Kundrus (Hamburg) investigated social per-
ceptions of Nazi consumption policy, arguing that the Nazis had
used the socially utopian character of consumption to make their
vision of the Volksgemeinschaft more plausible. Yet the promise of a
future völkische Konsumgemeinschaft had remained ambivalent, and
the danger of disappointment was always inherent in it. In practice,
therefore, sophisticated crisis management was required, as Kundrus
showed using the example of family maintenance during the war.
Nick Stargardt (Oxford) in his paper dealt with the social legitima-
tion of the war and proposed a new psychological periodization. He
concentrated on the long middle phase of the war, from December
1941 to December 1944, when the end was no longer expected, but
self-sacrifice was not yet pointless. During this period support for the
war did not decline in a linear manner, he explained. Rather, we see
the public mood swinging between hope and fear. Stargardt used
two examples to show that the feeling of powerlessness gave rise to
even more radical support for the war.

While the papers discussed so far all examined the attitude of the
German people and thus the mental integration of German society
into the Nazi state, a fourth group looked at the functional integration of society by means of social praxis. In his paper Detlef Schmiechen-Ackermann (Hanover) spoke in support of *Volksgemeinschaft* as an analytical concept. Using examples of social and political control in National Socialism, he emphasized that *Volksgemeinschaft* had been produced not following a top-down model, but in social practices. In his paper, Armin Nolzen (Bochum) identified six strategic practices used by the Nazi Party. Of these, he focused most closely on registration, ideological training, and social assistance. The vision of the *Volksgemeinschaft* attained central significance within these, he suggested, and its application produced a (self-)binding power between the Nazi Party and German society. In this way Nolzen identified linkages between a social history of the Nazi state informed by system theory. Nicole Kramer (Potsdam) was interested in the mobilization of women in the war, and in the entanglement between Nazi rule and society created by social praxis. She also emphasized the significance of Nazi organizations which, as networks of communication, both carried propaganda into society ‘from above’ and offered opportunities to articulate dissatisfaction ‘from below’. Kramer stressed that women’s work for survival in the war had not been a private matter, but was embedded in a network of relationships between *Herrschaft* and society identified by the term *Volksgemeinschaft*. Nazi organizations also played a part in the paper by Dieter Pohl (Munich), which dealt with society’s empowerment and disempowerment. After the *Gleichschaltung* of 1933, there could be no question of a frozen society. The expansion of the system of functionaries and the conquests of the war in particular meant that many new positions of power were created which, within the boundaries set by the regime, had extended society’s scope for action. Pohl emphasized that most of these newly created minor functionaries worked in line with the regime’s demands, but did not necessarily ideologically identify with it. The relationship between ideology and social praxis was the theme of Frank Bajohr’s (Hamburg) paper. Taking three examples, he argued that social commitment should be measured not by individual attitudes, but by actual behaviour. He

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7 Michael Wildt’s paper on the connection between violence and social change was to have been part of this session, but unfortunately he was unable to attend because of illness.
emphasized the significance of individual interests for participation in the practices of Nazi rule and concluded that social integration under National Socialism was the result less of ideological conversion than of social praxis. Regardless of the attitudes of individual actors, they had all contributed to the creation of the social hierarchies of the *Volksgemeinschaft* through their behaviour. However, Lutz Raphael’s (Trier) deliberations showed that an analysis of practices could also contribute to a better understanding of Nazi ideology. Raphael suggested that research should focus less on the effect of Nazi ideology than on its production. This should be imagined as a field of ideas, he said, which could attach to many different notions of order, and not as a set of fixed beliefs. This ideological field, within which *Volksgemeinschaft* represented an important concept, defined what could be said and what could be thought during the Nazi period, and pluralism and substantive differences were permitted within its borders. Specific practices of participation, especially among experts, had been associated with this discursive field, he claimed.

The final group of papers complemented these contributions, which focused strongly on the Nazi period, by taking a longer-term perspective. Andreas Wirsching (Augsburg) concentrated on the interaction between the public and the private sphere from the 1920s, which he saw as especially significant for an understanding of the social and cultural function of the *Volksgemeinschaft* idea. The central motif of this interaction, he suggested, was a longing for ‘normality’ and ‘private happiness’ which grew out of a feeling that individual life paths had been blocked. Even before 1933 the Germans had seen themselves not only politically, but also privately, as a ‘community of victims’ which would have to be overcome in ‘battle’. The success of National Socialism was firmly grounded on this mental image, to which it appealed via its vision of the *Volksgemeinschaft*. Ulrich Herbert (Freiburg) investigated the transition from National Socialism to the Federal Republic, concentrating on five different factors. He examined the social structure, in particular, the experience of contemporaries and their relevance for this political transformation. In addition to strengthening social mobility and individualization, wartime experiences produced expectations of stability and the rule of law, which the Federal Republic ultimately delivered. A comparison with other European societies showed, he suggested, that
Germany’s long-term development was not influenced by the National Socialists. In his paper, Richard Bessel (York) asked about the repercussions of the Volksgemeinschaft for the transition to the German Democratic Republic. Instead of strengthening solidarity and social harmony, the final phase of the war had produced social isolation and self-pity, leaving behind only the belief that the Germans were part of a ‘community of victims’. Thus Bessel suggested that after 1945, forms of communalization were not directly based on the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. However he pointed out that despite the impossibility of a public debate, the awareness of being a ‘community of victims’ had also been preserved in the private sphere in the GDR. This resulted in the sense of community splitting into a public and a private part.

This account of the papers in terms of their theoretical approaches makes clear that the term Volksgemeinschaft was used in different ways at the conference. In his keynote lecture, Ian Kershaw (Sheffield) identified three overlapping ways of using the term Volksgemeinschaft. It was employed, he explained, to explore social change, the affective integration of the people, and the dialectic of inclusion and exclusion. Even if the concept had explanatory power with respect to social mobilization during the Nazi period, he said, the term as a whole was ‘not a gift’, and was associated with various problems. These kept coming up in the discussions. For example, the temporal scope of the concept was not made clear in the discussions. While Kershaw put the focus on the 1930s, in many papers the period of the war itself was crucial. In his paper Christopher Browning (Illinois) argued that a double connection existed between the idea of the Volksgemeinschaft and the Holocaust. Ideologically, the reshaping of the ‘spirit of 1914’ into an exclusively conceived Volksgemeinschaft concept had been of central significance. In addition, the perpetrators of the Holocaust had been able to see their actions as necessary to preserve the Volksgemeinschaft. However, there was general agreement that the annihilation of the European Jews could not be explained by reference to the Volksgemeinschaft alone. Hans Mommsen (Bochum) in particular pointed to the danger of losing sight of political decision-making processes by focusing on the Volksgemeinschaft concept. From the opposite perspective, this was confirmed by Thomas Schaarschmidt (Potsdam), whose paper emphasized the role of the Nazi Gaue in mobilizing for war as opposed to the older view.
of dysfunctional and self-destructive competition between them. In his paper, which concentrated on the political system, Schaarschmidt paid little attention to the *Volksgemeinschaft*. The question of to what extent the *Volksgemeinschaft* concept had an inherent moral dimension gave rise to a controversial discussion. One objection was that it turned the whole population into ‘perpetrators’ by claiming that all Germans had become *Volkgenossen*. Against this, it was argued that functional integration through social practices could co-exist with very different motives and convictions. The objections raised by Ulrich Herbert and Birthe Kundrus—convincing precisely because of their moral quality—that the *Volksgemeinschaft* concept suppressed the ‘just’ who had tried to distance themselves from National Socialism as much as the experiences and perspectives of those who were excluded from it, showed that a simple moralizing approach was inadequate. Ultimately, behind the moralizing objection there seemed to be more fundamental issues concerning the conditions under which individuals acted, subjective identity in dictatorships, and the criteria which we use to assess them. Mary Fulbrook (London) pointed out the basic similarities with the GDR, and called for the development of a broader theoretical concept to take account of conditions when asking how actors behaved and rationalized their behaviour in dictatorships. Whether ambiguous ways of behaving and multiple identities can be treated adequately, and where responsibility for individual behaviour lies—with the conditions imposed by the dictatorship, with the behaviour itself, with the inner attitude, with subjective identity—are questions that will have to be discussed further in future. The question of whether *Volksgemeinschaft* should be seen as a concept or an important subject of research on the Nazis gave rise to a discussion that was no less controversial, and remained open at the end of the conference. Ulrich Herbert and Mary Fulbrook in particular pointed out the need to distinguish consistently between methods of analysis and the subject of research. To understand *Volksgemeinschaft* as an analytical concept, they said, involves the risk of circular argument. In addition, they suggested, the concept lacks analytical force, as all types of behaviour could potentially be understood as participation, thus forfeiting any differentiation. Instead of taking the *Volksgemeinschaft* as a starting point, they proposed, research should start from specific questions. Others clearly contradicted this view. Yet on precisely this point, statements by
advocates of the *Volksgemeinschaft* approach displayed a tentative convergence. Winfried Süß understood the term as an ‘organizer of attention’ on the basis of which specific questions must be developed, and Andreas Wirsching stressed the concept’s heuristic potential when supplemented by concrete questions. In their concluding remarks, Martina Steber and Bernhard Gotto supported the *Volksgemeinschaft* approach, but spoke only of a ‘medium-range term’. Despite the lively discussions, this conference, unlike its predecessor in 1979, will perhaps be remembered less for its polarizing effect than for opening up opportunities for further understanding. The planned publication in English of the conference proceedings should help to foster this.

JANOSCH STEUWER (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
In the 1950s the historiography of Europe flourished where this could perhaps least be expected, in Britain and Italy. During the inter-war period French and Swiss historians had largely stimulated historiographical thinking about Europe, but after the Second World War this activity was relocated to the edges of the Continent, as Heinz Duchhardt pointed out in his introduction to this colloquium. Against this background, doubts must be raised about René Girault’s statement that Italian and especially British historiography were generally ‘frosty’ towards Europe.\footnote{See René Girault, ‘Das Europa der Historiker’, in Rainer Hudemann, Hartmut Kaelble, and Klaus Schwabe (eds.), \textit{Europa im Blick der Historiker} (Munich, 1995), 55–90, at 84.} According to the organizers, Heinz Duchhardt (Mainz), Michael Matheus (Rome), and Andreas Gestrich (London), the aim of the colloquium was to identify reasons for this trend, to investigate the institutional and intellectual settings of European historiography in the 1950s, and to illuminate its biographical dimension.

The colloquium focused on individual historians of Europe and their works, supplemented by a paper on publishing and one on the 1955 Congress of Europe held in Mainz. In Christopher Dawson (1889–1970), Bernhard Dietz (Mainz) presented a central figure in Britain’s dialogue with Europe. Dawson points to several features characteristic of attempts to write histories of Europe in the 1950s, and not only in Britain. His interpretation, developed in his work \textit{Understanding Europe} (1952), was rooted in the 1920s, when he was moving in the circles of what Dietz described as a ‘radical conservative neo-Toryism with a tinge of cultural pessimism’ and seeking right-wing alternatives to liberal parliamentarianism in the whole of Europe. In \textit{The Making of Europe} (1932), Dawson had already conceived of Europe as created by Christianity out of the traditions of antiquity as an anti-Bolshevik, anti-liberal, and genuinely Christian
alternative. The unity of the Church, he argued, had guaranteed the unity of Europe, which had broken down in the Reformation, when the sluices had been opened to modernity. This is where he located the roots of twentieth-century totalitarianisms. It is hardly surprising that this version of a Christian theory of totalitarianism was positively received in a Federal Republic in the throes of enthusiasm for the Abendland. According to Dietz, Europe provided the new right in Britain between the wars with both the argument and the space in which to argue. Dawson had supplied the historical basis for this.

In the figure of Carlo Curcio (1898–1971), Luigi Mascilli Migliorini (Naples) presented the Italian counterpart to Dawson. The interpretation of Europe which Curcio developed in Europa: Storia di un’idea (1958) was also rooted in the inter-war period, when he had pinned his hopes on a fascist Europe. The bridge between the concept of Europe presented in Verso la nuova Europa (1934) and his 1958 book, Migliorini suggested, had been built on Curcio’s enthusiastic support for voluntarism. According to Curcio, Europe existed only as an idea and would emerge out of the will to create it. Characteristic of this Italian concept of Europe, Migliorini claimed, was the significance accorded to Latinity and, along with it, the Mediterranean area.

In his comment, however, Thomas Großböltling (Münster) suggested that more weight should be given to the discontinuities in Curcio’s notions of Europe. In the 1930s Curcio had seen himself as a political adviser and Europe as part of an optimistic political strategy, but by the 1950s he had become resigned in this respect. Compared with the USA and the USSR, Europe had obviously lost out in world political terms, although the idea of Europe had been gaining in popularity since 1945. Raising very fundamental questions, Großböltling wondered whether a traditional history of ideas approach was adequate to understand the history of European historiography in the twentieth century. Instead, he advocated newer approaches to the history of historiography, such as those developed by Jan Eckel and Thomas Etzemüller, and Martin Sabrow’s notion of ‘Zeitgeschichte als Streitgeschichte’ (contemporary history as the history of conflict).
In his earlier commentary, Wolfgang Schmale (Vienna) had already called for alternative perspectives on the European historiography of the twentieth century. Thinking about European history, he said, had not been the exclusive preserve of historians, but had been enriched by contributions from many sides, and he called for the history of historiography to do justice to this. The crucial point of this sort of European historiography, which encompassed intellectuals such as Hannah Arendt, Max Horkheimer, and Theodor Adorno, was when they started to think about the experience of the Second World War in the decades following it. This had sharpened up the ways of looking at Europe. Referring to the title of the colloquium, Schmale suggested that only a critical school of this sort could be called ‘modern’. Gestrich, doubtful about the validity of Schmale’s concept of modernity, pointed out that the new approaches of Horkheimer and Adorno, as well as those of Dawson and Curcio, could be read as genuine constituents of a European modernity distinguished by self-reflexivity. In this understanding, the crisis of the inter-war period, he suggested, continued through the 1950s, moulded by the Second World War.

Winfried Becker (Passau), whose subject was the Abendland movement in the Federal Republic, examined an important personal and intellectual network of the 1950s in which ideas of European historiography also flourished. Becker argued that in this intellectual edifice built on Catholic convictions, the function of history was primarily to create meaning. Consequently, he suggested, the Abendland movement’s ideas about Europe should be assigned to historical philosophy rather than historiography. Encouraged by the Allies’ licensing practice and with political support, their ideas were widely disseminated, especially as the movement had a strong educational aspect.

When the three-volume work The European Inheritance, edited by Ernest Barker (1874–1960), George N. Clark (1890–1979), and Paul Vaucher (1887–1966) and published by Oxford University Press appeared on the British book market in 1954, it almost seemed like an anachronism, for as Keith Robbins (Lampeter) explained, it was an official project conceived in 1942–3, in the context of the Second World War. It was intended to be available after the war to convey a ‘different’ view of Europe. Although historians of other nationalities, mainly from the English-speaking world and France, had been involved, the British stamp on it was unmistakable. According to
Robbins, the ‘other Europe’ was oriented by the principles of British liberal parliamentarianism and Protestantism. At the same time, OUP published the *Oxford History of Modern Europe*, which was edited by Alan Bullock and F. W. D. Deakin, a younger generation of historians. Unlike *The European Inheritance*, it was dominated by the history of nation-states and international relations, and marked a paradigm shift.

Marcello Vergas (Florence) provided some insights into the role of publishing for the historiography of Europe in his paper on the publishers Laterza and Einaudi. In contrast to the position of the university presses in Britain, he said, the Italian book market was dominated by publishers with a political profile. As the historiography of Europe in the twenty years after the Second World War had been the domain of liberal and Catholic intellectuals, Vergas explained, the left-wing publisher Laterza had hardly contributed to the subject. Socialist historians had not taken any interest in Europe until 1956 (Hungary), he said, and Communist historians until the 1970s. The leftist liberal publisher Einaudi, too, only exceptionally published on Europe.

In his comment, Gestrich called for more attention to be paid to market mechanisms in the history of European historiography. Thinking about Europe, he said, did not develop in a market-free zone, but in a space shaped by the culture of publishing. He also pointed to the significance of translations for the emergence of a European arena of discourse.

The last pair of historians to be discussed at the colloquium were introduced by Benedikt Stuchtey (London) and Guiseppe Galasso (Naples), whose text was read in his absence by Lutz Klinkhammer (Rome). In Geoffrey Barraclough (1908–84), Stuchtey presented an author who briefly sympathized with Marxism. Wandering restless-ly from one university to another, both in Britain and the USA, Barraclough wrote for the popular market and also became a bestselling author in the Federal Republic. From the perspective of universal history he put forward a new image of Europe between East and West by portraying it as an entangled space in the Middle Ages, and believed he could find European unity in a positive diversity. Stuchtey suggested that by calling for a ‘problem history’, Barraclough was also methodologically challenging the intellectual edifices of European historiography. In his contribution to the discus-
sion, Matheus pointed to the significance of medieval history for a
new definition of Europe in the post-1945 world.

The existential experience of civil war, political responsibility, and
the questioning of fascist sympathies in the 1940s undermined
Federico Chabod’s (1901–60) concepts of Europe of the inter-war
period. These had primarily been founded on power political ideas of
balance, Galasso argued. After 1945 Europe needed a ‘different idea’.
This flexibility was possible because as early as the 1920s Chabod had
presupposed a dynamic concept of Europe. He now emphasized the
part played by the European Enlightenment, and conceived of
Europe as a community of shared values and culture, as Klink-
hammer pointed out. Nonetheless, the category of nation continued
to be at the heart of Chabod’s interpretation of Europe. Klinkhammer
explained the fact that Chabod’s concepts of Europe were still opti-
mistic, even after 1945, by pointing to the specific situation of Italy.
The profound turning point of 1943 and the experience of civil war
allowed intellectuals like Chabod to interpret fascism as a parenthe-
sis while reconstructing a positive national tradition which, in
Chabod’s case, was combined with a European dimension. In his
comment, Gestrich argued that the end of imperialisms also gave
Europe’s historiographical readjustment with the world after 1945 a
huge boost in both Britain and Italy.

At the Mainz Congress of Europe in 1955, on the occasion of
which the recently established Institut für Europäische Geschichte
first attracted international attention, the two historiographical tradi-
tions under scrutiny here were very unequally represented, as
Duchhardt showed. The Italian historians had at least one voice in
Federico Chabod, who actively participated in discussions during the
congress, although most of Italy’s important historians were missing.
Britain, however, was very weakly represented after Christopher
Dawson had to withdraw because of illness. The Abendland-oriented
argument of his paper, which was read out in his absence, fulfilled
the expectations of the Mainz institute’s director, Martin Göhring.
Even after 1945, the networks of German historiography on Europe
continued to look towards the Continent.

The concluding discussion once again stressed the need to incor-
porate publishing cultures and marketing strategies into historio-
graphical enquiry. Beyond this, Wolfgang Schmale called for the (his-
torico-)political dimension of European historiography to be more
clearly profiled. In order to avoid writing the historiography of Europe as a success story, Benedikt Stuchtey noted, the focus should be on failed transfers, the lack of dialogue between historians, and national monologues on Europe. In conclusion, Gestrich suggested that a readjustment of the idea of Europe and thus of its historiography had been necessary after 1945 largely because interpretations could not longer be centred on Europe’s ‘civilizing mission’.

In their introduction, the organizers had made clear their awareness that the Rome colloquium would only be able to take first steps. Indeed, it opened up many new perspectives for future research on this topic. In addition to those already mentioned, three will be outlined here. First, it will be important to pay more attention to networks of historians and arenas of discourse because the questions of whether thinking and writing about Europe took place in a European or rather a national context, and what function taking recourse to Europe had, remained open at the end of the colloquium. Another issue that remained open was whether the European historiography of the first post-war decade was really shaped so strongly by conservative and liberal voices. It would certainly be worth investigating left-wing networks and concepts more closely. Secondly, a greater interest should be taken in the methodological development of the historiography of Europe. European history was written from the margins of the subject. It was open to methodological experimentation and pre-eminently suited to historiographical transfer across borders and national historiographies. Thirdly, historical periodization should be more closely investigated. Did the concepts of the 1950s not represent the last flaring up of a historiographical tradition which had started at the turn of the century and reached its peak in the inter-war period before, broken by the experience of the war, it was finally extinguished in the late 1950s or early 1960s? And was this period of European historiography not fundamentally modern in its search for ‘unity’, its firm belief in a leading ‘idea’, and its desire to define a particular space with an expansive drive? Read in this way, it is hardly surprising that the books on Europe written in the 1950s lost any power to convince soon after publication, had a limited impact, and were quickly forgotten.

MARTINA STEBER (GHIL)
Scholarships Awarded by the GHIL

Each year the GHIL awards a number of research scholarships to German postgraduate and postdoctoral students to enable them to carry out research in Britain, and to British postgraduates for research visits to Germany. The scholarships are generally awarded for a period of up to six months, depending on the requirements of the research project. British applicants will normally be expected to have completed one year’s postgraduate research, and be studying German history or Anglo-German relations. Scholarships are advertised each year in September on H-Soz-u-Kult and the GHIL’s website. Applications may be sent in at any time, but allocations are made in April (deadline for applications 15 Mar.) for the current year and October (deadline 30 Sept.) for the following calendar year. Applications, which should include a CV, educational background, list of publications (where appropriate), and an outline of the project, together with a supervisor’s reference confirming the relevance of the proposed archival research, should be addressed to the Director, German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2 NJ.

During their stay in Britain, German scholars present their projects and the initial results of their research at the Institute’s Research Seminar, and British scholars do the same on their return from Germany. In the second allocation for 2010 the following scholarships were awarded for research on British history, German history, and Anglo-German relations.

Benjamin Bühring (Göttingen): Die hannoversche Deutsche Kanzlei in London als Trägerin der Personalunion zwischen Großbritannien und Hannover 1714–60
Maximilian Drephal (FU-Berlin): British Perceptions of Russia in the Twentieth Century/Britische Russlandwahrnehmung im 20. Jahrhundert
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Fernando Esposito (Tübingen): Zukunftsmusik: Punk und der Wandel moderner Ordnungsvorstellungen in Großbritannien und der Bundesrepublik
Stefan Esselborn (Munich): Die Übersetzung Afrikas: Afrikanistik als Expertise und das International African Institute, 1920–70
Christina Jetter (Tübingen): Vermittlung und Bekehrung: Der Pietist und Londoner Hofprediger Friedrich Michael Ziegenhagen (1694–1776)
Ute Kühlmann (Mannheim): Pflegekindschaft: Erziehung in der Fremde als vormoderne Sozialisations- und Bündnisform
Michael Mohr (Heidelberg): Allegorische Verkörperungen politischer Ordnung in Großbritannien und im Heiligen Römischen Reich Deutscher Nation
Ulla Reiß (Frankfurt am Main): Herausbildung/Entstehung einer spezifischen Verwaltungssprache/Expertensprache im englischen Schatzamt, des 12. Jahrhunderts
Saskia Richter (FU-Berlin): Die Friedensbewegung in Großbritannien zwischen 1965 und 1990 unter Berücksichtigung transnationaler Kontexte in den USA und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Alice Riegler (UCL): West Germany and Italy in the 1970s: Mutual Perceptions during a Decade of Crisis
Esther Ries (Frankfurt am Main): Eine andere transatlantische Perspektive? Afrikanische Studenten im Großbritannien des 18. Jahrhunderts
Stefanie Schild (Bonn): Der Investiturstreit in England
Andreas Schneider (Gießen): Televisuelle Geschichtsschreibung: Die Verbrechen des Nationalsozialismus im bundesdeutschen, britischen und niederländischen Fernsehen, 1950–95
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Tanja Skambraks (Mannheim): Kinderbischöfe im europäischen Mittelalter

Sven Speek (Bochum): Agrarökologische Forschung in British Central Africa: Zwischen Weltwirtschaftskrise und Second Colonial Occupation (c.1929–51)

Wiebke Wiede (Trier): Das arbeitslose Subjekt: Konzepte und Techniken sozialer Mobilisierung in Großbritannien und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–90

Sonja Wimschulte (Tübingen): Die Jakobiten am Stuart-Hof in Frankreich 1688/89–1712: Exilerfahrung und Fremdheitswahrnehmung als konstitutive Elemente ihrer Gruppenbildung und Identitätsfindung

Forthcoming Workshops and Conferences

New Approaches to Medieval Religious Cultures: Concepts, Perceptions and Practices of Piety and Charity. Workshop organized by the German Historical Institute London and the Centre for the Study of the Middle Ages, University of Birmingham, to be held at the GHIL, 16 Dec. 2010. Conveners: Jochen Schenk (GHIL) and William Purkis (Birmingham).

This interdisciplinary workshop will explore new directions in the field of medieval religious cultures (c.500–c.1500) mainly by focusing on broad conceptual topics such as the correlations of poverty and charity; sensory experience and spiritual awareness; mental maps, religious landscapes, and the creation, use, and abuse of sacred space; emotional responses to violence; and religious objects and economies of the sacred. Its emphasis will be on methodologies and the formulation of research questions and problems with the aim of identifying new fields of enquiry and research trends, and encouraging and facilitating interdisciplinary and transnational collaboration.
Noticeboard

*Networks of Paupers and Debtors: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches to Forms of Monetary Dependence in the Modern Period.* Conference of the German Historical Institute London and the *Exzellenzcluster Gesellschaftliche Abhängigkeiten und soziale Netzwerke* of the Universities of Trier and Mainz, to be held at the GHIL, 24–6 Feb. 2011. Conveners: Andreas Gestrich (GHIL) and Martin Stark (Trier).

Social networks play an important role in overcoming material dependence resulting from poverty and debts. Access to credit, the availability of material and social support, even access to community and state support can be regarded as social relationships that could be described as social networks. Sociological and social-historical research has so far been particularly interested in networks of power (for example, networks of the nobility, networks of business and banking families) but has hardly paid any attention to the social relationships and strategies of dependents and paupers beyond close family relationships (for example, neighbours, pawnbrokers). The conference will examine theoretically and empirically the concept of network-building as a strategy for overcoming extreme social difficulties. This requires a multi-methodological approach, which ideally combines quantitative and qualitative perspectives. Given the availability of sources, however, this can seldom be converted into wide-ranging individual projects. The heterogeneity of the methodological approaches and the source material (personal accounts, letters, legal sources, capital inventories, mortgage books) often leads to very different perspectives on the overall topic. The conference will therefore offer a platform for forming, by means of mutual exchange, a comprehensive view of the historical phenomenon of network-building as a reaction to poverty and debt in the modern period in both Europe and beyond. We are looking for papers relating to both past and present which deal with this topic using quantitative and/or qualitative approaches.

The aim of the conference is to take stock of recent and current research in the burgeoning field of criminal and legal history and to facilitate conversation between historians working on different countries in order to provide a comparative perspective on European developments. The conveners have received more than 120 proposals presenting historical research on the legal, political, cultural, and social history of criminal justice, which has enabled them to put together a comparative programme with panels on criminal justice in transnational perspective, penal reform, the criminal trial, and punishment.

The Dilemmas of International Humanitarian Aid in the Twentieth Century. Conference organized by the German Historical Institute London and the Department of International History at the London School of Economics, to be held at the GHIL, 12–14 May 2011. Convener: Johannes Paulmann, Gerda Henkel Visiting Professor 2009/10 (University of Mannheim).

The conference will investigate cross-border aid in a European and global frame from the end of the nineteenth century to our times. It will focus on the dilemmas, contradictions, and ambiguities of humanitarian commitment. In a historical perspective, humanitarian assistance covered a broad range of measures: emergency relief delivered to people struck by natural or man-made disasters; longer term efforts to prevent suffering from famine, ill health or poverty; and schemes such as international adoption, specific campaigns against human rights abuses, and humanitarian intervention by armed forces. The respective role of donors and recipients will be assessed in the context of colonial rule, decolonization, economic dependency, international politics, and global governance. Non-governmental, governmental, religious, and secular organizations and
individuals were active in the field. Efforts and agency were determined, to various degrees, by needs as well as by politics, organizational or personal interests, and moral issues.
Recent Acquisitions

This list contains a selection of recent publications in German and English, primarily on German history, acquired by the GHIL library in the past year.


Althoff, Gerd (ed.), Heinrich IV, Vorträge und Forschungen, Konstanzer Arbeitskreis für mittelalterliche Geschichte, 69 (Ostfildern: Thorbecke, 2009)


Amos, Heike, Die Vertriebenenpolitik der SED 1949 bis 1990, Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Sondernummer (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2009)


Asal, Sonja and Stephan Schlak (eds.), Was war Bielefeld? Eine ideengeschichtliche Nachfrage (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2009)


Baumgärtner, Ingrid, Paul-Gerhard Klumbies, and Franziska Sick (eds.), *Raumkonzepte: Disziplinäre Zugänge* (Göttingen: V & R Unipress, 2009)


Böhler, Jochen, *Der Überfall: Deutschlands Krieg gegen Polen* (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn, 2009)

Bösch, Frank and Constantin Goschler (eds.), *Public History: Öffentliche Darstellungen des Nationalsozialismus jenseits der Geschichtswissenschaft* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus-Verlag, 2009)
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Drossbach, Gisela (ed.), *Von der Ordnung zur Norm: Statuten in Mittelalter und Früher Neuzeit* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010)

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Eisenberg, Christiane, _Englands Weg in die Marktgesellschaft_, Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, 187 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009)


Epstein, Steven A., _An Economic and Social History of Later Medieval Europe, 1000–1500_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)


Evans, Richard John, _Das Dritte Reich, iii. Krieg_ (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2009)


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Frei, Norbert, *Flick: Der Konzern, die Familie, die Macht* (Munich: Blessing, 2009)


Gassert, Philipp and Martin Klimke (eds.), *1968: Memories and Legacies of a Global Revolt*, Bulletin of the German Historical Institute Washington, DC, Supplement 6 (Washington: German Historical Institute, 2009)


Gestrich, Andreas, Lutz Raphael, and Herbert Uerlings (eds.), *Strangers and Poor People: Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion in Europe and the Mediterranean World from Classical Antiquity to the Present Day*, Inklusion, Exklusion, 13 (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2009)


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Grammbitter, Ulrike and Iris Lauterbach, *Das Parteizentrum der NSDAP in München* (Berlin: Deutscher Kunstverlag, 2009)
Gregory, Stephan, *Wissen und Geheimnis: Das Experiment des Illuminatenordens*, Nexus, 83 (Frankfurt am Main: Stroemfeld, 2009)
Hardtwig, Wolfgang (ed.), *Die Aufklärung und ihre Weltwirkung*, Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Sonderheft 23 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010)
Heinsohn, Kirsten, *Konservative Parteien in Deutschland 1912 bis 1933: Demokratisierung und Partizipation in geschlechterhistorischer Perspektive*, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, 155 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2010)
Herf, Jeffrey, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009)
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Horn, Sabine and Michael Sauer (eds.), Geschichte und Öffentlichkeit: Orte, Medien, Institutionen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009)


Hummel, Karl-Joseph and Michael Kißener (eds), Die Katholiken und das Dritte Reich: Kontroversen und Debatten (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2009)

Hundt, Martin (ed.), Der Redaktionsbriefwechsel der Hallischen, Deutschen und Deutsch-Französischen Jahrbücher (1837–1844), 3 vols. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2010)

Janz, Oliver, Das symbolische Kapital der Trauer: Nation, Religion und Familie im italienischen Gefallenenkult des Ersten Weltkriegs, Bibliothek des Deutschen Historischen Instituts in Rom, 120 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2009)


Johnson, Trevor, Magistrates, Madonnas and Miracles: The Counter-Reformation in the Upper Palatinate, St Andrews Studies in Reformation History (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009)

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Kretzer, Anette, _NS-Täterschaft und Geschlecht: Der erste britische Ravensbrück-Prozess 1946/47 in Hamburg_ (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2009)

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Mawdsley, Evan, _World War II: A New History_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)


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Overy, Richard James, _The Morbid Age: Britain Between the Wars_ (London: Allen Lane, 2009)

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Rau, Susanne and Birgit Studt (eds.), *Geschichte schreiben: Ein Quellen- und Studienhandbuch zur Historiographie (ca. 1350–1750)* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2010)
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Schott, Clausdieter, *Kindesannahme – Adoption – Wahlkindschaft: Rechtsgeschichte und Rechtsgeschichten* (Frankfurt am Main: Metzner, 2009)


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Thomä, Dieter (ed.), Vaterlosigkeit: Geschichte und Gegenwart einer fixen Idee (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2010)


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Vol. 4: Paul Kluke and Peter Alter (eds.), Aspekte der deutsch-britischen Beziehungen im Laufe der Jahrhunderte; Aspects of Anglo-German Relations through the Centuries (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1978)


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<td>Streitfall Deutschland: Die britische Linke und die 'Demokratisierung' des Deutschen Reiches, 1900–1918</td>
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FURTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE LONDON

Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Wolfgang Mock (eds.), *The Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany* (London: Croom Helm, 1981)


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Adolf M. Birke, Hans Booms, and Otto Merker (eds.), *Control Commission for Germany/British Element: Inventory; Die britische Militärregierung in Deutschland: Inventar*, 11 vols (Munich: Saur Verlag, 1993)

Günther Heydemann and Lothar Kettenacker (eds.), *Kirchen in der Diktatur* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993)


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Andreas Fahrmeir (ed.), Research on British History in the Federal Republic of

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