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HOW TO WRITE THE HISTORY OF A DIVIDED NATION: GERMANY, 1945–1990

Stefan Creuzberger, Dominik Geppert, and Dierk Hoffmann

It is more than twenty-five years since the division of Germany came to an end, but the historiographies of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) still run on largely separate tracks. The Cold War is far from over in the historiography of post-1945 Germany. The introduction to this special themed issue of the *GHIL Bulletin* sets out to provide a brief overview. It will start by reviewing the research before examining possible research perspectives. In order to explain why more German–German entangled history has not been written, it will then look at the formative influence of the various generations of historians. Finally, this introduction will present seven questions which we believe need to be looked at by current research, and discuss the problems that are associated with them.

The many dimensions hinted at here of the history of a divided yet still in various ways connected Germany between 1945 and 1990 cannot be exhaustively explored in the essays that make up this special themed issue of the *Bulletin*. Christoph Classen looking at media history, Jutta Braun writing on the history of sport, and Franz-Josef Meiers examining the common responsibility of the two German states in foreign and security policy merely cast spotlights on the large complex of demarcation, entanglement, and contrast in the German–German historiography of the East–West conflict. They present three strands of a larger project which, thanks to the generosity of the Gerda Henkel Foundation, the German Historical Institute London, and the London School of Economics and Political Science, was first discussed and conceptually honed at a workshop held in London at the beginning of June 2017.[1] The results will be published from 2019/20 by

Trans. Angela Davies (GHIL)

[1] Workshop 'Die geteilte Nation: Deutsch–deutsche Geschichte 1945–1990', organized by the German Historical Institute London in co-operation with

be.bra-Verlag in a series planned to run to twenty volumes, 'Geteilte Nation: Deutsch-deutsche Geschichte 1945/49–1990'.

I. *Omissions: Spotlights on Current Research*

A number of histories of the Federal Republic were published around the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the state in 1949. These presented West German developments over sixty years up to the present, but included East German history only for the years after 1990.[2] Even the relatively few accounts conceived as histories of the whole of Germany often, in their internal structure, treated East and West German history separately.[3]

By contrast, the numerous connections and interactions that continue to exist between the two German states and societies, but also the rejections and demarcations, have been much less systematically studied. Christoph Kleßmann's pioneering studies from the 1980s have found few imitators.[4] While there have been a number of preliminary methodological and programmatic considerations,[5] these

the Gerda Henkel Foundation and the London School of Economics and Political Science, and held at the GHIL, 1-2 June 2017. For the conference report see <https://www.hsozkult.de/conferencereport/id/tagungsberichte-7232?title=die-geteilte-nation-deutsch-deutsche-geschichte-1945-1990&recno=3&q=geteilte%20nation%20london&sort=newestPublished&fq=&total=41>, accessed 10 Jan. 2019.

[2] E.g. Eckart Conze, *Die Suche nach Sicherheit: Eine Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Munich, 2009); Marie-Luise Recker, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Munich, 2009); Hans-Peter Schwarz (ed.), *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Eine Bilanz nach 60 Jahren* (Cologne, 2008); Edgar Wolfrum, *Die geglückte Demokratie: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Stuttgart, 2006); id., *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1990* (Stuttgart, 2003).

[3] Peter Graf Kielmansegg, *Nach der Katastrophe: Geschichte des geteilten Deutschland* (Berlin, 2000); Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 5 vols. (Munich, 1987–2008), vol. v: *Bundesrepublik und DDR 1949–1990* (2008); Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte Deutschlands im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2014).

[4] Christoph Kleßmann, *Die doppelte Staatsgründung: Deutsche Geschichte 1945–1955* (Bonn, 1982); id., *Zwei Staaten, eine Nation: Deutsche Geschichte 1955–1970* (Bonn, 1988).

[5] See e.g. Konrad Jarausch, '"Die Teile als Ganzes erkennen": Zur Integration

conceptual exercises have rarely resulted in any empirical work.[6] The Institute of Contemporary History (Munich–Berlin) took a step in this direction when, more than ten years ago, it published an edited volume on 'double Germany'.[7] Seven years later the Centre for Contemporary History in Potsdam followed up with a volume on the 'divided history' of East and West Germany. It concentrated mainly on the time after the 1970s, and included the period of transformation from the re-unification of the state to the turn of the millennium.[8]

Few of the many historians' commissions that for some years have been reappraising the impact of the Nazi period on German ministries and government departments pay any heed to the German–German perspective. Only recently has the German–German dimension of 'offices and their past' been noted as an appropriate research topic.[9] These historians' commissions mostly concentrate on the connections between Nazi Germany and the FRG. This applies to work on the German Foreign Office,[10] on the transition from the Nazi Ministry of Labour (Reichsarbeitsministerium) to the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales),[11] from the Nazi Finance Ministry (Reichsfinanzministerium) to the

der beiden deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichten', *Zeithistorische Forschungen*, 1 (2004), 10–30; Christoph Kleßmann, 'Spaltung und Verflechtung: Ein Konzept zur integrierten Nachkriegsgeschichte 1945 bis 1990', in id. and Peter Lautzas (eds.), *Teilung und Integration: Die doppelte deutsche Nachkriegsgeschichte als wissenschaftliches und didaktisches Problem* (Bonn, 2005), 20–37; Hermann Wentker, 'Zwischen Abgrenzung und Verflechtung: Deutsch-deutsche Geschichte nach 1945', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 55 (2005), 10–17; Horst Möller 'Demokratie und Diktatur', ibid. 57 (2007), 3–7.

[6] As an exception see Rolf Badstübner, *Vom 'Reich' zum doppelten Deutschland: Gesellschaft und Politik im Umbruch* (Berlin, 1999).

[7] Udo Wengst and Hermann Wentker (eds.), *Das doppelte Deutschland: 40 Jahre Systemkonkurrenz* (Berlin, 2008).

[8] Frank Bösch (ed.), *Geteilte Geschichte: Ost- und Westdeutschland 1970–2000* (Göttingen, 2015).

[9] Stefan Creuzberger and Dominik Geppert (eds.), *Die Ämter und ihre Vergangenheit: Ministerien und Behörden im geteilten Deutschland 1949–1972* (Paderborn, 2018).

[10] Eckart Conze, Norbert Frei, Peter Hayes, and Moshe Zimmermann, *Das Amt und die Vergangenheit: Deutsche Diplomaten im Dritten Reich und in der Bundesrepublik* (Munich, 2010).

[11] Alexander Nützenadel (ed.), *Das Reichsarbeitsministerium im National-*

Federal Ministry of Finance (Bundesministerium der Finanzen),[12] and on the Federal Ministry of Justice (Bundesministerium der Justiz) and its earlier incarnations.[13] It is a similar story with research on the Gehlen Organization and the German Federal Intelligence Service.[14] The only exception is an investigation of the confrontation between the GDR state security (Stasi) and the Gehlen Organization in the autumn of 1953.[15]

The historians' commissions on the Ministry of the Interior (Innenministerium) and the Ministry of the Economy (Wirtschaftsministerium) are the only ones so far to have systematically explored a German–German perspective.[16] Further research projects, for example, on the Ministries of Transport and Agriculture, are planned. In addition, a history of medicine research project on the German–German Health Agreement of 1974 is starting at Berlin's Charité univer-

sozialismus: Verwaltung – Politik – Verbrechen (Göttingen, 2017) has so far been published. For an update see <http://doku.bmas.de/die-historikerkommission#105005>, accessed 10 Jan. 2019.

12 Christiane Kuller, *Bürokratie und Verbrechen: Antisemitische Finanzpolitik und Verwaltungspraxis im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland*, Das Reichsfinanzministerium im Nationalsozialismus, 1 (Munich, 2013); For an update see <http://www.reichsfinanzministerium-geschichte.de/>, accessed 10 Jan. 2019.

13 Manfred Görtemaker and Christoph Safferling, *Die Akte Rosenburg: Das Bundesministerium der Justiz und die NS-Zeit* (Munich, 2016). For the final report see <http://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/ Publikationen/DE/ Akte_ Rosenburg.html>, accessed 10 Jan. 2019.

14 The following titles have so far been published: Christoph Rass, *Das Sozialprofil des Bundesnachrichtendienstes: Von den Anfängen bis 1968* (Berlin, 2016); Gerhard Sälter, *Phantome des Kalten Krieges: Die Organisation Gehlen und die Wiederbelebung des Gestapo-Feindbildes 'Rote Kapelle'* (Berlin, 2016); Sabrina Nowack, *Sicherheitsrisiko NS-Belastung: Personalüberprüfungen im Bundesnachrichtendienst in den 1960er Jahren* (Berlin, 2016); Armin Müller, *Wellenkrieg: Agentenfunk und Funkaufklärung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes 1945–1968* (Berlin, 2017). For an update see <http://www.uhk-bnd.de>, accessed 10 Jan. 2019.

15 Ronny Heidenreich, Daniela Münkel, and Elke Stadelmann-Wenz, *Geheimdienstkrieg in Deutschland: Die Konfrontation von DDR-Staatssicherheit und Organisation Gehlen 1953* (Berlin, 2016).

16 Werner Abelshauser, Stefan Fisch, Dierk Hoffmann, Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, and Albrecht Ritschl (eds.), *Wirtschaftspolitik in Deutschland 1917–1990*,

sity hospital.[17] And in the history department of Rostock University, a monograph investigating German–German communal responsibility in foreign and security policy is being written within the framework of a project funded by the German Research Foundation.[18]

II. *Research Perspectives and Gaps*

All this is strange because there is no lack of topics that require investigation in German–German entangled history, especially if we think beyond high politics and the symbolic and representative substance of German–German summits and state visits. For example, relations between the military and society, and militarism and pacifism in Germany after 1945 cannot be understood except in a German–German context, if only because the two German states were primarily arming themselves against each other, and because they would have been the main battlefield in the event of a nuclear war in Europe. The topography of a divided country also had a direct impact on the energy industry, for example, and on the challenges with which it presented East and West Germany: shortages of raw materials after the Second World War, the oil crisis, and, in general, the problem of securing energy supplies. If we look at gender relations, the role of women in East and West German society as housewives, mothers, and/or workers can only be understood with reference to the other side of the debate. Similarly, grand policy initiatives for historical commemorations (from the Hohenstaufen dynasty to Martin Luther and Frederick the Great) and plans to establish museums (such as the German Historical Museum in Berlin and the House of History in Bonn) all had an implicitly or explicitly German–German thrust. Even in relatively arcane areas, such as the structure and culture of state administration, the division of Germany left behind traces—in

4 vols. (Berlin, 2016); Frank Bösch and Andreas Wirsching (eds.), *Hüter der Ordnung: Die Innenministerien in Bonn und Ost-Berlin nach dem Nationalsozialismus* (Göttingen, 2018).

[17] Online at <https://medizingeschichte.charite.de/forschung/deutsch_deutsches_gesundheitsabkommen_1974/>, accessed 10 Jan. 2019.

[18] Online at <https://www.geschichte.uni-rostock.de/arbeitsbereiche/zeitgeschichte/lehrstuhl/laufende-forschungsprojekte-und-publikationsvorhaben/>, accessed 10 Jan. 2019.

remaining commonalities as well as in deliberate differentiations.[19] In future, we need to look more comparatively at forms of communication in East and West German internal administrations. For instance, recent research has revealed that oral discourse gained significance in internal communication in the GDR's Interior Ministry.[20]

Many other examples could be cited: escapes and migration movements from East to West (and, to a lesser extent, vice versa); mutual infiltration of secret services and an almost obsessive fear of the activity of hostile agents; the rivalry between the two German states, both wooing young people as the hope of the future; the bitter issue of the survival of a German nation of culture (*Kulturnation*); dealing with social difference and lives lived 'beyond the norm'; the role of religion and the churches in divided Germany; meetings, either continuing or resumed after being broken off, at family reunions, on holidays, or on business trips at border crossing points, transit motorways, or holiday resorts in Hungary and Bulgaria; and, finally, the media of everyday contacts such as the traffic in parcels (mostly from West to East, but also vice versa),[21] telephone conversations, radio, and television. The rivalry between the GDR and the FRG for influence over the 'Third World' had as much of an impact on the foreign relations of the two German states during the Cold War as did coping with state debt in Bonn and East Berlin. The question of how the personal and ideological legacy of the Nazi dictatorship was to be dealt with also impacted both German states equally and shaped their relations with each other (*Braunbücher*, *Die Rote Gestapo*).[22] The German–German antagonism took place in the shadow of the Third Reich.

III. *The Influence of Generations*

If we ask why all these topics have not already long been dealt with, we quickly come up against the impact of generations on the frame-

[19] All examples are drawn from the workshop 'Die geteilte Nation: Deutsch-deutsche Geschichte 1945–1990' (see n. 1).

[20] Bösch and Wirsching (eds.), *Hüter der Ordnung*.

[21] On this see the recently published work by Konstanze Soch, *Eine große Freude? Der innerdeutsche Paketverkehr im Kalten Krieg (1949–1989)* (Frankfurt am Main, 2018).

[22] From the 1950s both German states published various collections on Nazi

work within which historians interpret German–German history. The first (but by no means new) generation of historians to write German history after the Second World War held fast to the idea of the unity of the German nation until well into the 1960s, but for various reasons did not deal with the period immediately preceding their own (for example, because documents were not released in the archives until a certain time had elapsed, but also because, as professional historians, they traditionally preferred to avoid writing history 'while it is still smoking').[23]

A younger generation, which included centre right leaning scholars such as Hans-Peter Schwarz and Peter Graf Kielmansegg and centre left leaning historians such as Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Heinrich August Winkler, and Konrad Jarausch, supported the notion that the FRG should self-identify, intellectually and historically, as a state with its own history.[24] The liberal conservative representatives of this generation described West Germany's successful stabilization after 1945. The history they wrote focused on the economic miracle (*Wirtschaftswunder*) and the election miracle (*Wahlwunder*) of the 1950s, the consolidation of democratic institutions, and the achievement of foreign security through European integration and the conclusion of a transatlantic alliance. In their view the history of the FRG was first the 'history of its stabilization, then of its stability'.[25] The main emphasis was on the successful modernization of the 1950s, which was all the more conspicuous in comparison with the instability and crisis-ridden years of the Weimar Republic and the Nazi dictatorship with their dynamic of destruction and self-destruction. Both the latter and the GDR were held up as a negative foil in these narratives.

crimes under titles of this sort. They were intended to demonstrate the complicity of the current elites of the respective other state in these crimes.

[23] 'The recent prevalence of these hot histories on publishers' lists raises the question: Should—or perhaps can—history be written while it is still smoking?' Barbara W. Tuchman, *Practicing History: Selected Essays* (London, 1982), 25.

[24] See Dominik Geppert, 'Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Zur Geschichte', in Görres-Gesellschaft and Herder Verlag (eds.), *Staatslexikon: Recht – Wirtschaft – Gesellschaft* (8th rev. edn. Freiburg, 2017), cols. 844–55.

[25] Thus Hans-Peter Schwarz, 'Die ausgebliebene Katastrophe: Eine Problemskizze zur Geschichte der Bundesrepublik', in Hermann Rudolph (ed.), *Den*

The left liberal members of this generation were less interested in the state and the nation than in civil society. They focused not on the Adenauer era, but on that of Brandt. Their discussion was less about the stabilization of the state than about its pluralization, expanding chances for participation, the development of social security, and the dismantling of hierarchies. They wrote the history of post-war Germany as a sort of historical novel of psychological and moral growth (*Bildungsroman*): a history of the liberalizing, civilizing, and Westernizing of the post-war Germans, which mirrored their own life experience.[26] For them the GDR was not really a negative foil; rather, it more or less disappeared from view altogether, becoming, in Wehler's famous words, a 'footnote to world history'.[27]

For the next generation of historians, what had held the older generation together across political and ideological differences faded, that is, the interpretative pattern imposed by seeing the West German state, starting in 1945/49, as a success story. Amazement at the stabilization and liberalization of the Federal Republic gave way to questions about how present-day problems had come about. Current confusions could hardly be explained solely in terms of Germany's progressive anchoring in the West, or the increasing civilization of the Germans. They pointed to wear and tear, change, persistence, and adaptability of institutions and social arrangements, and to some extent still do.[28]

Thus on the one hand more attention was paid to the European and global dimensions of present problems, with an unmistakable shift in current scholarly interest in research on contemporary histo-

Staat denken: Theodor Eschenburg zum Fünfundachtzigsten (Berlin, 1990), 151–74, at 160. On this see also Hans Günter Hockerts, 'Integration der Gesellschaft: Gründungskrise und Sozialpolitik in der frühen Bundesrepublik', *Zeitschrift für Sozialreform*, 32 (1986), 25–41; Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek (eds.), *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre* (Bonn, 1993).

[26] See e.g. Konrad Jarausch, *Die Umkehr: Deutsche Wandlungen 1945–1995* (Munich, 2004).

[27] 'Fußnote der Weltgeschichte', Wehler, *Gesellschaftsgeschichte,* vol. v. pp. xv–xvi, 424–5.

[28] Klaus Naumann, 'Die Historisierung der Bonner Republik: Zeitgeschichtsschreibung in zeitdiagnostischer Absicht', *Mittelweg*, 36 (2000), 53–66; Andreas Rödder, *21.0: Eine kurze Geschichte der Gegenwart* (Munich, 2015).

ry towards European, transnational, and global history.[29] On the other hand, however, new perspectives opened up on the history of the whole of Germany leading up to the present. It was asked what legacies of the past East and West Germany shared across national borders, and what was owed to the specific conditions of a Communist party dictatorship or a pluralist democracy respectively.

In addition, since German unification in 1989–90, the question of a German national history going beyond a post-national self-perception harboured by the old FRG and the GDR has arisen anew. Reunified Germany is no longer a frontline state between the two Cold War blocs. Rather, it sees itself as the 'power in the middle' of the European continent,[30] a position that both poses challenges to notions of political balance, and invites reminiscences of past constellations from the perspective of the *longue durée* of the twentieth century or the period of high modernism since the 1880s.[31]

IV. *Current Tasks for Research: Seven Questions*

A multi-faceted history of divided Germany can therefore both pick up on current research trends and help to fill a gap in the present-day research landscape. In the selection of individual themes, preference will be given to material in which elements of a history of contrast and delimitation (of political systems) can be combined with a parallel history (two industrial societies with many similar characteristics and facing similar challenges) on the one hand, and a history of entanglement (of Germans on both sides of the Iron Curtain, who continued to be connected in many different ways) on the other.

The following research questions, which cut across the individual themes examined in the context of a history of German–German contrast, parallel histories, and entangled histories, seem especially important and potentially enlightening.

[29] Alexander Gallus, Axel Schildt, and Detlef Siegfried, *Deutsche Zeitgeschichte – transnational* (Göttingen, 2015).
[30] Herfried Münkler, *Macht in der Mitte: Die neuen Aufgaben Deutschlands in Europa* (Hamburg, 2015).
[31] Andreas Rödder, *Wer hat Angst vor Deutschland? Geschichte eines europäischen Problems* (Frankfurt am Main, 2018).

First, there is the question of the tension between the inherent momentum of division on the one hand, and the continued existence of national connections on the other. Where did the two German states influence each other? When can we establish that the influence was one-sided? When and where did delimitation prevail?

Second, the question of the differences between democracy and dictatorship is important. In what areas can we find parallel developments despite systemic contrasts? In what areas did differences in the systems exclude analogous developments?

Third, the relationship between heteronomy and autonomy must be questioned. Where and when did influences from outside dominate (for example, the Sovietization of the Soviet Zone of Occupation/GDR, or the 'Americanization', 'Westernization', and 'Europeanization' of the FRG)? When and where were national path dependencies particularly well developed?

Fourth, there is the question about the consequences of Nazi rule and the Second World War. In what ways did this past continue to impact on the present? What material problems did it create? To what extent did dealing with it shape intellectual debates?

Fifth, a question arises as to the relationship between structure and agency. What significance did individual people and decisions have for the course of history? To what extent did political, social, and economic conditions dictate developments?

Sixth, the significance of generations is revealing. Can specific processes of change in German history between 1945 and 1990 be explained in terms of the history of generations? When and where do generation-specific behavioural traits come into effect historically? When and where can generational commonalities be observed in East and West? What role was played by the need for generational distinction, and what were the motives behind delimitation processes that contributed to the formation of generations? Was there a gender aspect in the formation of generations?

Finally, the seventh question asks about the topography of a divided Germany. To what extent did the division of the country change its infrastructure and settlement patterns? When and where did the need to express ideological distinctions dominate in architecture and town planning; when and where can similar forms of expression and construction methods be found in East and West?

V. *Problems of Research: Embedding, Periodization, International References*

One conceptual challenge remains: how does the German–German theme fit into established patterns of interpreting post-war German history? It cannot be a matter simply of overlaying various themes to create a particular master narrative of German–German history. But we must be aware of any overarching patterns of interpretation that are inscribed in the various topics of German–German history.

The usual grand interpretations of West German history—the paradigms of stabilization, liberalization, Westernization, and civilization—are not really suitable for this because they relate to the history of the FRG alone and do not apply to the history of the GDR. This is true not only of liberalization and Westernization, but also of stabilization, which was always precarious in the GDR. That is why, in the end, it collapsed like a house of cards. Nor can the historical development of a regime that sealed its borders with a wall and barbed wire, and maintained a huge apparatus to spy on its own citizens, be described as heading for 'civilization'. And to distinguish between the success story of the FRG and a story of failure on the part of the GDR is, ultimately, unsatisfying.[32] But what about deradicalization as a guiding principle? Or the internal and external pacification of the Germans as a leitmotiv? Or could it help us to take recourse to the terms 'modern', 'modernity', or '(capacity for) modernization' as a red thread running through the narrative?

Added to this is the question of meaningful periodization. The years from the end of the Second World War to German unification on 3 October 1990 cover a self-contained period. The years 1945 and 1990 were turning points, which seems plausible with reference both to the international system of states (the Cold War era) and to the national context (as the period of German division), and they have generally been accepted by historians. But to start in 1945/49 and end in 1989/90, the year of the *Wende*, suggests a double pre-determination that is not entirely unproblematic.

The interpretation from the perspective of a new beginning sees developments in post-1945 Germany as a history 'after the catastro-

[32] Kielmansegg, *Nach der Katastrophe*.

phe' and generally, in good Hegelian fashion, discerns a driving force that was inherent from the start: the first Federal chancellor,[33] or the victors of the Second World War, who left their mark on post-war Germany,[34] or the total defeat that triggered a search for a new orientation.[35] This approach has been criticized, not unjustifiably, for putting too much emphasis on zero hour (*Stunde Null*) while neglecting many continuities from the period before 1945.[36] Instead of simply presupposing a new start, we need to look more carefully in order to distinguish where elements of continuity dominated, and where breaks prevailed. But to take the turning point of 1989/90 as the end of the story suggests a narrative that inscribes a teleology pointing in the direction of reunification. Here, too, we should at least investigate which processes led to the peaceful revolution in the GDR, and which ran counter to it.

In order to avoid the teleological tunnel vision that is associated with these sorts of approaches, the history of divided German should be interpreted neither from the beginning nor from the end. Rather, it should be seen from the middle, as a completed period in its own right, one that did not necessarily start with a 'zero hour' and cannot be adequately explained as leading to the problems of today. This means that the peculiarities of Germany's divided history should be at the centre of the story. While looking at individual topics, we must always ask what specific turning points arose, and what internal structures and periodizations resulted from them.

To narrate a history of Germany's division in this way does not mean writing a *histoire totale* of the years 1945 to 1990. It will be nec-

[33] Arnulf Baring, *Außenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie: Bonns Beitrag zur Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft* (Munich, 1969), 1: 'im Anfang war Adenauer' (in the beginning was Adenauer).

[34] Helga Haftendorn, *Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung 1945–2000* (Munich, 2001), 17: 'im Anfang waren die Alliierten' (in the beginning were the Allies).

[35] Martin H. Geyer, 'Am Anfang war . . . die Niederlage: 1945, historische Kontingenz und die Anfänge der bundesdeutschen Moderne', in Inka Mülder-Bach and Eckhard Schumacher (eds.), *Am Anfang war . . . : Ursprungsfiguren und Anfangskonstruktionen der Moderne* (Munich, 2008), 279–306, at 279: 'im Anfang war die Niederlage' (in the beginning was defeat).

[36] Hans Günter Hockerts, 'Zeitgeschichte in Deutschland: Begriff, Methoden, Themenfelder', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 29–30 (1993), 3–19, at 15.

essary to be selective, and leave things out. But by what criteria? The suggestion here is to focus especially on those historical phenomena that distinguished a divided Germany between 1945 and 1990 first from earlier and later periods of German history, and, second, from other countries in the second half of the twentieth century. This approach implies both that a divided Germany is placed into an international perspective, and that it is located within the longer continuities and breaks of German history.

Integration into the *longue durée* of German national history also targets, among other things, the legacy of National Socialism and the lead-up to it in the sense of a German *Sonderweg* (special path). Beyond this, it could be interesting to go back to research on German ideas of nation before the establishment of imperial Germany in 1871 and, for example, to look more closely at discourses on nation and the nation-state at a time when a unified German state did not yet exist. It could be asked, for instance, how we can explain why, for long periods of the nineteenth century, there was a national discourse with many voices while the state framework was insecure, whereas for almost forty years after 1949 we observe a divided state establishing itself while the national discourse grew increasingly insecure.

For German–German history to be integrated more strongly into its international context requires the methodology of comparison with other states and nations, but also a clearer emphasis on international relations as the force driving developments, and not only as something derived, 'as the mere result of domestic and ideological calculations',[37] as it appears in accounts by Ulrich Herbert and Hans Ulrich Wehler.[38] The international dimension can help to explain the run-up to 1989/90 better. This cannot be understood without taking account of the tectonic shifts in the international system of states, and it definitely displays parallels with earlier periods of German and European history.

Against this background, three peculiarities of the history of divided Germany stand out. First, it was a product of the Cold War—more than other countries at this time. The two German states were founded as the Cold War entered its first hot phase in the late 1940s.

[37] Harold James, 'Die Nemesis der Einfallslosigkeit', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 17 Sept. 1990.
[38] Herbert, *Geschichte Deutschlands*; Wehler, *Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, v.

At the beginning of the 1950s the two Germanies were integrated into their respective military and ideological blocs. Whenever the tension between the two superpowers eased, they faced the question of how they should react, that is, shortly after Stalin's death in the mid 1950s, and then, more lastingly, in the late 1960s and early 1970s. And when the East–West conflict came to an end, German unity ensued.

Where the two German states ended was not a German decision; rather, it was a result of the conflict between the USA and the Soviet Union. This also determined the limits of what was socially acceptable and politically possible, and not only in the Communist dictatorship of the GDR but also in the FRG's liberal democracy (although to a different extent, and with less drastic consequences for dissidents). What could be said and done in the two German states at that time clearly depended more on world politics than it had done at other times in German history; and also more than was the case in other regions of the world during the Cold War.

Second, the change in generations was more important in divided Germany than it was in other countries or at other times. The reason lies in the big political breaks that fractured recent German history more deeply than the history of other countries.[39] From this it follows, for example, that subsequent generations grew up under social and political conditions that differed clearly, and sometimes fundamentally, from those under which their immediate predecessors had been socialized. This applies especially to the period when Germany was divided, as gaps between the generations were emphasized by the national division.

A number of cohorts (based on age) grew up during phases of the Cold War that were especially conflict ridden, and were shaped by this experience, while other cohorts experienced years of political compromise and a readiness to co-operate between the two power blocs. To be sure, generations in this sense are not objective units that can be stringently defined. We are talking more about subjective perceptions of groups of people whose members, in each case, were born at around the same time, faced similar challenges at about the same age, and dealt with them by interpreting them as a collective experience. In the case of Germany, two world wars and radical shifts

[39] See Mark Roseman, 'Introduction: Generation Conflict and German History' in id. (ed.), *Generations in Conflict: Youth Revolt and Generation Formation in Germany 1770–1968* (Cambridge, 1995), 1–46, at 2.

between various political systems in the course of an extremely violent twentieth century cut deeply into the life experience of those who were born during these turbulent times, and this life experience was modelled generationally.[40]

Third, the division was not limited to the sphere of state action and the mental outlook of citizens in the two systems. It also left traces in the landscape and, over the years, shaped the topography of a divided land. The metaphor of an 'Iron Curtain' that had descended on Europe, which Winston Churchill popularized through a speech delivered in Fulton (Missouri) in March 1946,[41] became real and could be physically experienced in divided Germany. The internal German border increasingly became a death strip, secured with barbed wire and equipped with automatic firing systems. It separated families and neighbourhoods. It diverted trade flows and economic relations, or stopped them altogether. It transformed areas that had previously been at the heart of the German nation-state into remote provinces, overshadowed by border defences. Germany's internal division had an especially visible impact on Berlin, imperial Germany's former capital. Berlin was transformed into a divided city, whose eastern half became the capital of the GDR, while the western part was stranded, an isolated island, surrounded by ever more strongly policed borders. And in 1961 it was finally walled in.

[40] See Mary Fulbrook, *Dissonant Lives: Generations and Violence through the German Dictatorships* (Oxford, 2011), 12.

[41] See Winston Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' Speech, Westminster College, Fulton Missouri, 5 Mar. 1946, online at <https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/>, accessed 10 Jan. 2019.

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MEDIALIZATION IN OPPOSING SYSTEMS: APPROACHING A MEDIA HISTORY OF DIVIDED GERMANY

CHRISTOPH CLASSEN

Late in the evening of 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall was opened. This abrupt and unexpected event, without which German reunification would not have been possible, was in no small part thanks to television. The East German border guards opened the Wall due to a misunderstanding. Speaking on behalf of the East German government at an international press conference, official spokesman Günter Schabowski introduced a new GDR regulation on travel. The hastily fudged together policy had been drawn up in a hurry by the new GDR leadership under Egon Krenz as an attempt to pacify the increasingly vociferous and widespread East German protest movement and at the same time to stop the mass flight of GDR citizens to the West via Czechoslovakia and Hungary. However, the details of the policy had not yet been made public and Schabowski mistakenly announced that it would come into force with immediate effect.

The press conference was being broadcast live on television and, as a result, Schabowski's error could not be prevented from swiftly taking on a seemingly unstoppable life of its own. No sooner had the press conference drawn to a close than a major news agency announced that 'East Germany opens its border', to be followed the same evening by a special report by *Tagesthemen*, one of the most important West German evening news broadcasts, that the gates of the Wall were now 'wide open'. Although neither of these reports reflected reality, they were soon spreading to East Berlin via West German television. As a result, more and more people arrived at the border checkpoints and demanded that these be opened, assuming that at other checkpoints this had already been done. No one had foreseen any of this, and so the border guards at the checkpoints were unable to obtain clear instructions from their superiors as to how to proceed. Eventually, not knowing what else to do, they gave in to the pressure of the crowds. Only then did the event reported by the media actual-

Trans. Emily Richards (GHIL).

ly take place. The border was opened, and from that moment 9 November took its place in history as the date when the division of Germany came to an end.[1]

What happened on 9 November 1989 can therefore be viewed as a 'media event' in more senses than one. Firstly, it was electronically broadcast to a global public within just a few hours, creating a communications echo chamber that played a major role in transforming what was happening in Berlin into an 'event', that is, into something that is perceived as being of greater importance than the numerous other topics of the day.[2] Secondly, the way in which things unfolded is a direct illustration of the complex and ambivalent role that mass media play in modern societies; even if the media see themselves as mere chroniclers of history, they inevitably influence it as well. Reports on reform movements in other socialist states in 1989, for example, helped create support for the citizens' movement in the GDR.[3] And in the case of what happened on 9 November, it was television itself that set the dynamic of events in motion.

I have chosen to focus on this historical date, therefore, because I believe it demonstrates clearly the necessity of a media history from a German–German perspective. This is not only because the opening of the Berlin Wall played a direct role in the reunification of Germany, indeed, was its precondition; but also because what happened in Berlin on that date perfectly demonstrates how the media's role in the twentieth century was significant in a way that transcended any single event or set of events. The media had influence, but of a unique kind; they were no mere observers and recorders of history,

[1] Hans-Hermann Hertle, 'Der Fall der Mauer als mediales Ereignis', in Eckhard Jesse (ed.), *Eine Mauer für den SED-Staat: Berlin 1961 und die Folgen* (Berlin, 2012), 199–224. The former director of the broadcaster Sender Freies Berlin (SFB), Günther v. Lojewski, by contrast, believed that the media (especially his own channel) were simply objective reporters on 9 November. Günther v. Lojewski, 'Waren die Medien der Motor des Mauerfalls? Die Mauer fiel, die Kamera lief. Oder war es umgekehrt? Über die Rolle der Medien in der Nacht vom 9. auf den 10. November 1989. Ein Essay', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 30 Oct. 2016, 7.

[2] See Frank Bösch, 'Europäische Medienereignisse', *Europäische Geschichte Online* (*EGO*), Mainz 2010, online at <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/boeschf-2010-de>, accessed 15 Dec. 2018.

[3] Thomas Großmann, *Fernsehen, Revolution und das Ende der DDR* (Göttingen, 2015), 273–7.

yet nor were they decision-makers in a strictly political sense. The presence of a technological mass media informed (and continues to inform) politics, society, and culture in numerous and ambivalent ways, and the central importance and influence of the media cannot be overlooked by anyone who sets out to explain German history in the Cold War era.

With this in mind, it is astonishing how rarely this perspective has been adopted in historical studies to date, although modern historians have long since abandoned the discipline's former reservations in relation to modern media, which are now frequently discussed and referenced in academic research. Although this applies to both the historiography of the GDR and the FRG, in the GDR's case the historical 'Aufarbeitung' (the work of bringing hidden, problematic, or previously denied aspects of East German history to light after the end of the regime) has naturally tended to dwell on the specific role of the media in relation to the GDR dictatorship, rather than locating the history of East German media within a shared German post-war history.[4] More recently we have seen an increasing focus on transnationalism and entanglement. Along with the question of what role the West German news media played in the collapse of the GDR in 1989,[5] historians have been especially interested in the reception of Western (radio and TV) media in East Germany.[6] Lastly, we can observe an interest in the trade and exchange of TV programmes across the Eastern bloc countries and in media policies at an international level.[7] Yet no matter what their subject matter, these historical studies nearly always come back to East German history in isolation.

[4] Gunter Holzweißig, *Die schärfste Waffe der Partei: Eine Mediengeschichte der DDR* (Cologne, 2002); Stefan Zahlmann (ed.), *Wie im Westen, nur anders: Medien in der DDR* (Berlin, 2010); Rüdiger Steinmetz and Reinhold Viehoff (eds.), *Deutsches Fernsehen Ost: Eine Programmgeschichte des DDR-Fernsehens* (Berlin, 2008).

[5] Großmann, *Fernsehen*.

[6] Michael Meyen, *Denver Clan und Neues Deutschland: Mediennutzung in der DDR* (Berlin, 2003); Claudia Dittmar, *Feindliches Fernsehen: Das DDR-Fernsehen und seine Strategien im Umgang mit dem westdeutschen Fernsehen* (Bielefeld, 2010); Franziska Kuschel, *Schwarzhörer, Schwarzseher und heimliche Leser: Die DDR und die Westmedien* (Göttingen, 2016).

[7] Christian Henrich-Franke, 'Making Holes in the Iron Curtain? The Television Programme Exchange across the Iron Curtain in the 1960s and 1970s',

Research in Germany in the past three decades has been largely guided by the necessities and perspectives of the 'Aufarbeitung', as becomes apparent if we consider that the media history of West Germany before 1990 has received comparatively little attention. It is true that some studies do exist, even from a relatively early period, but these focus either on individual media,[8] or discuss specific aspects and phases,[9] while another notable research focus is the culture of memory.[10] Those looking for an overview of West German media history outside of the more encyclopaedic studies will generally be disappointed.[11] Still more rarely do we find any study of media history from a German–German point of view, if we mean by this a perspective that consistently compares or relates the two histories. The few exceptions relating to specific aspects of history—such as the history of film festivals,[12] TV dramas,[13] pop radio,[14] media dis-

in Alec Badenoch, Andreas Fickers, and Christian Henrich-Franke (eds.), *Airy Curtains in the European Ether* (Baden-Baden, 2013), 177–213; Richard Oehmig and Thomas Beutelschmidt, 'Connected Enemies? Programming Transfer between East and West during the Cold War and the Example of East German Television', *VIEW Journal of European Television History and Culture,* 3/5 (2014), online at <http://viewjournal.eu/television-histories-in-postsocialist-europe/connected-enemies/>, accessed 15 Dec. 2018.

8 Konrad Dussel, *Deutsche Rundfunkgeschichte* (Constance, 2010); Knut Hickethier, *Geschichte des deutschen Fernsehens* (Stuttgart, 1998); the GDR only appears in a short overview by Peter Hoff.

9 Jürgen Wilke (ed.), *Mediengeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Cologne, 1999).

10 See e.g. Mark Rüdiger, *'Goldene 50er' oder 'Bleierne Zeit'? Geschichtsbilder im Fernsehen der BRD, 1959–1989* (Bielefeld, 2014); Martin Stallmann, *Die Erfindung von '1968': Die studentischen Proteste im bundesdeutschen Fernsehen 1977–1998* (Göttingen, 2017).

11 Frank Bösch, *Mass Media and Historical Change: Germany in International Perspective, 1400 to the Present* (New York, 2015).

12 Andreas Kötzing, *Kultur- und Filmpolitik im Kalten Krieg: Die Filmfestivals von Leipzig und Oberhausen in gesamtdeutscher Perspektive 1954–1972* (Göttingen, 2013).

13 Nora Hilgert, *Unterhaltung, aber sicher! Populäre Repräsentationen von Recht und Ordnung in den Fernsehkrimis 'Stahlnetz' und 'Blaulicht', 1958–1968* (Bielefeld, 2013).

14 Heiner Stahl, *Jugendradio im kalten Ätherkrieg: Berlin als eine Klanglandschaft des Pop 1962–1973* (Berlin, 2010).

courses,[15] or the final years of the divided Germany and its transformation[16]—only serve to prove the rule. There is still no monograph that provides an integrated post-war history of Germany from a media perspective.

Medialization and Entanglement

With this in mind, the present essay is intended as a contribution to discussions on how such an integrated media history of the Cold War era could be written. In particular, it aims to move beyond the existing historiography that has, as shown above, tended to separate East and West German media histories, although without ignoring the central differences between the two. However, my interest lies not so much in providing a comprehensive overview of theoretical and methodological questions, nor necessarily in an entirely new approach. My goal instead is to work towards a synthesis of the various existing strands of historical research while bringing a different, broader viewpoint to bear upon them.

The theoretical framework for this discussion is shaped by the concept of 'medialization', which is here understood as an increasingly transnational pervasion of European societies by widespread, technology-based media together with their mass use and appropriation. My argument is based on the premise that this development played a major role in the rapid transformation of European societies in the twentieth century, comprehensively influencing political, social, and cultural developments.[17] For our purposes, it is essential to understand that this 'meta-process',[18] at least in its initial stages, was largely independent of any political and ideological conditions and transcended the borders that otherwise defined political geography in the Cold War era; it was something that all states, whether in the Eastern bloc or in the West, had to address. Different political fac-

[15] Jens Ruchatz (ed.), *Mediendiskurse deutsch/deutsch* (Weimar, 2005).

[16] Frank Bösch and Christoph Classen, 'Bridge over Troubled Water? Mass Media in Divided Germany', in Frank Bösch (ed.), *A History Shared and Divided: East and West Germany since the 1970s* (New York, 2018), 551–602.

[17] Andreas Hepp, *Cultures of Medialization* (Cambridge, 2012).

[18] Friedrich Krotz, 'The Meta-Process of "Medialization" as a Conceptual Frame', *Global Media and Communication*, 3/3 (2007), 256–60.

tions may have reacted differently to the challenge of medialization and found very different ways to engage with it at different times. Nonetheless, many aspects of the process could not be contained by political means in the long term. As a result, such a medialization perspective can help to turn our attention to similarities and shared experiences that up to now have largely remained unnoticed, but that were brought about by a secular development that affected socialist states no less than it did liberal democracies.

In turning our attention to such similarities, however, it is essential to bear in mind that 'the media' are not eternal entities. Like any other phenomena, they are subject to historical change and analysis. Television in the 1950s, for example, not only differed in content from that of the 1980s; it was also technically different and had a very different social significance. That television played a central role in the events of autumn 1989 was due in part to the fact that it had become the most important media format for news dissemination, but it was also thanks to technical developments that made it possible to broadcast events live (more or less) as they happened. In the 1950s, radio, rather than television, fulfilled these functions, and as a result, radio played a more significant role than television in media reactions to the 'People's Uprising' in the GDR on 17 June 1953.[19]

Secondly, this perspective can help to emphasize elements of entanglement more strongly than has so far been the case. In the history of the media to date, the histories of East and West have mainly been viewed as entirely separate from the very beginning, and even where they have not, research tends to discuss only the transfer of Western content and culture from the Federal Republic to the GDR. This is understandable in a sense, as not only Western goods but also Western cultural products were always seen as particularly desirable in East Germany, while GDR media were from the start viewed with a certain disdain in West Germany, a view that became more entrenched as the years went by.[20] Yet in fact, the transfer was not always simply from West to East. Instead, we can observe an inter-

[19] Hans-Hermann Hertle, 'Volksaufstand und Herbstrevolution: Die Rolle der West-Medien 1953 und 1989 im Vergleich', in Henrik Bispinck, Jürgen Danyel, Hans-Hermann Hertle, and Hermann Wentker (eds.), *Aufstände im Ostblock: Zur Krisensituation des realen Sozialismus* (Berlin, 2004), 163–94.

[20] Cf. Michael Meyen, '"Geistige Grenzgänger": Medien und die deutsche Teilung', *Jahrbuch fur Kommunikationsgeschichte,* 1 (1999), 192–231, at 210.

play or circulation of cultures as the result of a shared national culture and the movement of cultural actors between the two sides. Even in our initial and central example—the opening of the Berlin Wall—the dynamic of events would not have occurred without a double exchange of news between East and West. The West German media's interpretation of the East German press conference travelled 'across the Wall' to East German homes, which in turn led to citizens in East Berlin going to the checkpoints to cross the Wall themselves. We should also note the way in which transnational influences made themselves felt in the media and in reactions to the latter. 'Entangled history' (like its close cousin, *histoire croisée*) therefore seems an appropriate theoretical perspective from which to approach this subject, allowing us to consider complex processes of transference, appropriation, and circulation in a way that cannot be done using traditional relational and comparative approaches.

Using the approaches described above, I now turn to three specific case studies to show how such approaches can reveal new aspects of media history. First, I look at the politicization of the media, its problems and limitations, in both German states. I then analyse the popular East German children's television programme, *Unser Sandmännchen* (Our Little Sandman), as an example of the competition between East and West German media in their symbolic role as representative of two political systems and the resulting complex cultural appropriations. Finally, I focus on the challenge posed by the relentless spread of light entertainment programming in both states.

Politics and Propaganda in Opposing Systems

When historians turn their gaze to modern media, they are frequently interested in the media's relationship to politics. Although in Germany this is no doubt partly a consequence of the country's National Socialist past, the close relationship between politics and the modern media goes back to a time well before 1933. Political change in the twentieth century, whether of an emancipatory, democratic character or brought about by dictatorships and autocracies, occurred in the context of an ever-increasing mass media presence. The 'socialization of politics', which can be understood as the increasing inclusion of more and more sections of the population in political

discourse, largely came about initially thanks to the availability first of newspapers, then film, radio, and television to a mass audience. It is not surprising, therefore, that politicians attempted to control the media in order to use them to implement and legitimize their claim to power. This was especially the case at a time when the potential of the media to manipulate and influence the populace through propaganda was very much over-estimated.[21]

This was initially a universal development that did not respect political borders. Nonetheless, if one views the media systems in post-war Germany from a systematic perspective, there is a clear difference between the FRG and the GDR. The Federal Republic established a decentralized, pluralistic system that was not controlled by the state; instead, print media were owned by a variety of private publishers (as had always been the case in earlier times) while radio and television broadcasting was now modelled on the example of the BBC. Broadcasting in the new Federal Republic was regulated by public law and responsibility distributed between multiple federal establishments, as a way of ensuring that public broadcasting in the FRG, in contrast to broadcasting in Germany in the past, was kept at arms-length from the state. In the 1980s, privately owned radio and TV channels began to operate in addition to the public channels. It was clear that this model was based on the liberal, Anglo-American ideal of an independent media providing a public forum for debate, where opinions and ideas could be formed in a pluralistic setting. And indeed, the influence of the Western Allies played a major role in the establishment of the West German system, both in broadcasting and in licensing the press.

The GDR, on the other hand, was characterized by a centralized state monopoly on ideas and news where the media were subject to state and Party control on several levels. The state selected and trained journalists, told the media what they could say and how they could say it, and controlled licensing and distribution. This approach was explicitly based on an ideal not of pluralism and independence, but on their opposite: the media had a duty to propagate socialism as, allegedly, the best representative of the common interest. Given this standpoint, it was therefore only logical that the Socialist Unity Party (SED), as the official party of government, should also have the final

[21] Thymian Bussemer, *Propaganda*: *Konzepte und Theorien* (Wiesbaden, 2005).

say when it came to the media. The pluralistic, liberal model prevalent in the West was supposedly nothing but 'the freedom of 200 rich people to spread their own opinions'.[22] According to SED ideology, in a liberal system capital would always ensure that it controlled the media, in order to keep the workers in a state of dependency and oblivion to their true interests. During the Cold War, neither side denied that these two different systems represented two completely opposing concepts of what the media ought to do and be. The only thing they had in common was that each side believed that its own system was the best and only legitimate one.

But historical records of the first decades after the Second World War tell a rather different, far less idealistic story. In the early days of the Federal Republic, broadcasting in particular soon became a field of contention. Attempts by the Western Allies to create a politically independent broadcasting system on the British model met with huge resistance from all political factions in the Western zones. In 1950, for example, a memorandum drafted by the General Secretary of the then governing conservative party the Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU), tellingly entitled 'Mass Government in the Federal Republic' ('Massenführung in der Bundesrepublik'), stated that 'there is no doubt that [broadcasting] must first and foremost be used as an instrument of political government'. Such basic principles as impartiality, independence, and pluralism 'might seem attractive to a few intellectual heavyweights, but they will simply confuse most listeners or even add to their ignorance'. 'Our first duty', the memorandum continued, '[must therefore be] to block the Allies' "Press and Radio Act".'[23]

[22] Interestingly, this was not said by a communist, but by the conservative publisher and founding editor of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ), Paul Sethe, who had come to believe that he had been forced out of the editorship of the *FAZ* and subsequently that of its competitor *Die Welt* for political reasons. See reader's letter in *Der Spiegel,* 15 May 1965, 17–18. The correspondence between Fritz Erler and Paul Sethe that provides the source for this citation can be found in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* 23/1 (1975), 91–116, at 109.

[23] Quoted from Rolf Steiniger, 'Rundfunkpolitik im ersten Kabinett Adenauer', in id. and Winfried B. Lerg, *Rundfunk und Politik 1923 bis 1973: Beiträge zur Rundfunkforschung* (Berlin 1975), 341–84, 347–8. Trans. Emily Richards.

Attempts to evade or to temper the Allies' insistence on national and party-political independence were characteristic of early broadcasting politics in the Federal Republic.[24] But the ideal of independent, uncensored media was also resisted in many other quarters, particularly when it was a question of the supposed threat from the East. Film producers and directors, for example, were placed under financial pressure if they were suspected of having communist sympathies or had worked in the GDR.[25] Even more worryingly, the law against censorship set out in the German constitution was often ignored. An organization operating more or less underground, the 'Interministerial Committee for East–West Film Questions' took control of all imports of films from the Eastern bloc from 1953 onwards without any clear legal mandate to do so.[26] Until this 'committee' stopped operating in 1966, it prevented the import of numerous films or decreed that they could only be viewed if certain conditions were met. Wolfgang Staudte's film of Heinrich Mann's novel *Der Untertan* (known variously in English as *The Loyal Subject*, *Man of Straw*, and *The Patrioteer*), made by the East German film studios Deutsche Film AG (DEFA) in 1951, was not allowed to be shown in West German commercial cinemas until 1957, and then only in its abridged version.[27] Despite its seemingly unofficial status, the committee not only included representatives of various ministries and of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, but also operated with the explicit permission and on the instruction of the first Chancellor of the FRG, Konrad Adenauer.[28] It was not until the mid 1960s that it was

[24] Dussel, *Deutsche Rundfunkgeschichte*, 185–201.

[25] Christoph Classen, 'Antikommunismus in Film und Fernsehen der frühen Bundesrepublik', in Stefan Creuzberger and Dierk Hoffmann (eds.), *Antikommunismus in der frühen Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Zur politischen Kultur im Kalten Krieg* (Munich, 2014), 275–95.

[26] Andreas Kötzing, '"Der Bundeskanzler wünscht einen harten Kurs . . .": Bundesdeutsche Filmzensur durch den Interministeriellen Ausschuss für Ost/West-Filmfragen', in Johannes Roschlau (ed.), *Kunst unter Kontrolle: Filmzensur in Europa* (Munich, 2014), 148–59.

[27] Weckel, *Begrenzte Spielräume*, 31–4; on the committee's motives in this particular case see also 'Plädoyer für den Untertan', *Der Spiegel*, 47 (1956), 59–61.

[28] For more on this see the database project set up by the Hannah Arendt Institute for Research on Totalitarianism (Dresden): 'Filmzensur West-Ost: Der interministerielle Ausschuss und die Filmzensur von DEFA-Filmen in

dissolved in response to increasing public criticism and changes in the political landscape.

The rise of television in West Germany also shows how little the early Federal Republic had taken on board the Allied model of a critical, arms-length media. The official German broadcaster and umbrella organization for the public federal broadcasting channels, the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (ARD), was perceived by the conservative CDU party as too left-wing. To provide a political counterweight, Chancellor Adenauer pushed for the introduction of a second, more 'right-wing' channel in 1961. While potential private-sector operators were interested mainly in the profits to be made from advertising on the new channel, Adenauer's intentions were political rather than commercial; he hoped that the new broadcaster would offer a means by which the state could influence television output.[29] These hopes were ultimately dashed when the federal states saw in the government's plans a violation of federal principles and appealed to the Constitutional Court for help, eventually succeeding in stopping Adenauer's project almost at the last minute. Yet this was by no means the final attempt by a West German government to exert undue influence on public broadcasters. Such pressure merely became less obvious, from now on tending to take the form of more or less subtle attempts by the political parties to influence staffing decisions, and sometimes even programming content, via their 'cronies'.[30]

Behind such attempts and strategies lurked an older, illiberal notion of how media should function, according to which it was not their independence that mattered, but their willingness to submit to political expediency when required. The idea of the media as a 'fourth estate'—that is, as a critical observer of politics and society, providing checks and balances—was as foreign to the first Federal Chancellor as it was to most of his contemporaries. The 'Spiegel Affair' of 1963, when the Federal Public Prosecutor attempted to

der Bundesrepublik', online at <www.filmzensur-ostwest.de>, accessed 15 Dec. 2018.

[29] Rüdiger Steinmetz, *Freies Fernsehen: Das erste privat-kommerzielle Fernsehprogramm in Deutschland* (Constance, 1996).

[30] Cf. Konrad Dussel, *Die Interessen der Allgemeinheit vertreten: Die Tätigkeit der Rundfunk- und Verwaltungsräte von Südwestfunk und Süddeutschem Rundfunk 1949 bis 1969* (Baden-Baden, 1995).

bring charges of high treason against the German political magazine *Der Spiegel* after it published an article criticizing the Bundeswehr, epitomizes this attitude. Ironically, the action of the Prosecutor's office was itself the cause of the subsequent governmental crisis, as it demonstrated all too clearly that the independence of both judiciary and government in the new Republic was by no means a given.[31] This was one reason why the 'Spiegel Affair' to some extent marked the end of traditional attitudes to the media in West Germany.[32]

In the East, by contrast, the ideal of an independent media never existed at all. Yet the media's centralization in accordance with Soviet principles, and their subjugation under the authority and control of the Party, were only achieved after many years through a process that was by no means straightforward. Rather, the 1950s could be described as an ongoing attempt to create functioning governance structures and authorities. After the founding of the GDR and the end of Soviet censorship, the respective responsibilities of the Party and the state tended to overlap. As a result, disputes over who was responsible for what, and the resulting counter-productive outcomes, were inevitable, and in fact it was not until the end of the 1950s that the 'agitator bureaucracy' of the GDR took its final form, closely embedded within the Party machine. The same was true of structural and personnel issues. Established structures, like the regionally organized structure of broadcasting in Germany and hierarchies that strongly privileged the respective directors of regional institutions, continued to exert a powerful influence and were difficult to break. This was especially the case in the beginning, when the experience and skills of long-term employees—the majority of whom had no particular party allegiance—were virtually indispensable. It took many years before these established employees could be replaced by a new generation of journalists who, brought up within GDR structures and trained by GDR officials, had more or less internalized the ideal that journalism should serve Party interests.

Television, the new dominant media for the masses, was entirely controlled by the existing regime from the early 1960s on. Yet it still proved difficult to make artists and scriptwriters toe the Party line.

[31] Martin Doerry and Hauke Janssen (eds.), *Die Spiegel-Affäre: Ein Skandal und seine Folgen* (Munich, 2013).

[32] Cf. Christina v. Hodenberg, *Konsens und Krise: Eine Geschichte der westdeutschen Medienöffentlichkeit 1945–1973* (Göttingen, 2006).

Their attempts to retain artistic independence and the incorrigible political 'tendencies' in their departments never ceased to be a problem for senior managers. One internal memorandum noted in 1986, for example, that the troublesome behaviour of scriptwriters 'continually upsetting normal operations' must be brought to an end.[33]

It was not as easy as it might have seemed, therefore, to implement the goal of total politicization and control of the media in the GDR. But it would also be entirely wrong to fetishize the difficulties and dissent that the regime experienced at the expense of historical reality. In retrospect, it is far more shocking to see how comprehensive state control ultimately became. Despite all difficulties, the regime eventually managed to bring all East German publications under the control of Party institutions.[34] And while at first this was achieved through the violent repression of any dissent and the removal of individual journalists from their posts, coercion gradually became unnecessary as journalists became more loyal to the regime and internalized, or at least demonstrated the 'correct' political convictions.

Other problems proved less easy to deal with. In particular, despite all the GDR's efforts, it was never entirely possible to prevent Western influence seeping into East Germany; while media pluralism may not have existed in theory, the impossibility of stopping Western radio and TV channels being received in the East meant that it was de facto present in the GDR. 'The SED may have wanted total control, but it couldn't always get it.'[35] One example is particularly noteworthy. From the 1950s, the GDR government decided to use jamming transmitters to block broadcasts by the American radio channel RIAS, which was hugely popular with the East German people but loathed by the regime due to its pronounced anti-communist attitude.[36] Up until the early 1960s, a huge amount of time and effort was devoted to installing a network of jammers to stop the RIAS

[33] Quoted from Franka Wolff, *Glasnost erst kurz vor Sendeschluss: Die letzten Jahre des DDR-Fernsehens (1985–1989/90)* (Cologne, 2002), 225.

[34] For a general overview see Anke Fiedler, *Medienlenkung in der DDR* (Cologne, 2014).

[35] Jens Ruchatz, 'Einleitung', in id. (ed.), *Mediendiskurse deutsch/deutsch* (Weimar, 2005), 7–22, at 21.

[36] Christoph Classen, 'Jamming the RIAS: Technical Measures against Western Broadcasting in East Germany (GDR) 1945–1989', in Badenoch,

broadcasts. However, the government's expectation that it would be only a matter of time until the jammers succeeded was destined for disappointment. From the very beginning there were problems, including internal conflicts. For example, it proved technically impossible to jam all the relevant frequencies, meaning that a large part of the population continued to be able to receive RIAS more or less undisturbed.

Soon questions were raised as to whether the significant resources already invested in the jamming project would not be better spent in improving the GDR's own broadcasting infrastructure, especially considering that the latter did not yet provide full coverage in all areas. More seriously, however, the jamming attempts had the effect of delegitimizing aspects of the regime, both in the eyes of the East German population and of foreign governments. Within East Germany, people soon became aware of what was going on. It was an annoyance, but worse than this, it made their government appear weak and dishonest as it continued to deny the existence of the jammers. Abroad, the project was seen as violating international treaties on the use of radio frequencies, making it more difficult for the GDR regime to gain the international recognition and reputation it had been trying to build. As television became more dominant, the attempts to block a single Western radio channel began to look even sillier, and at the end of the 1970s the project was dismantled in an operation as cloaked in secrecy as the operation to set it up had been twenty years earlier.

It was mainly because of radio and television that the FRG, as a symbol of what an alternative society could look like, remained a continuous presence within the GDR throughout the period of German division. The East German regime was aware of this, and undertook various attempts to immunize its population against West German attractions. One example of these attempts was a television programme, *Der schwarze Kanal* (*The Dark Channel*), presented by journalist Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler every week from spring 1960 until autumn 1989. The programme was based on the principle of counter-agitation; each week, it put together a montage of various scenes from West German television with a critical, often polemical commentary from a Party viewpoint. However, the idea of enhanc-

Fickers, and Henrich-Franke (eds.), *Airy Curtains in the European Ether*, 321–46.

ing material taken from the 'other side' with an agit-prop political commentary was not originally an invention of communist propaganda, but of a West German presenter, Thilo Koch. Koch had suggested this idea in 1958 for his programme *Die rote Optik (The Red Gaze*), but it was actually based on even earlier productions such as the *Mitteldeutsches Tagebuch (Middle German Diary*) produced by Sender Freies Berlin (SFB), although the latter had been dependent on home movie footage smuggled over the East–West border.[37] But in West Germany, this kind of counter-agitation gradually lost its appeal from the 1960s on as the fear of communist infiltration lessened. The SED, on the other hand, deliberately kept up their *Dark Channel* programme permanently from 1960, knowing that the fantasy of a totally state-controlled public media presence was destined to remain an illusion.

This example of how a propagandistic TV format could travel from West to East sheds a further light on the premise of this essay: that despite the fundamental differences in their media systems, things were not as black and white on either side as they might appear at first glance, especially in the world of broadcasting. The politicization of mass media was a universal development, while the rise of television as the dominant mass medium led to politicians in both states becoming increasingly interested in its format and programming, even if outcomes differed. Traditional, diehard, or dissenting elements attempted to slow down these developments in West as well as East Germany. While in the GDR the conflicts were due to the SED's desire to fully subjugate the media to state control, in West Germany it was the Western Allies' ideal of an independent, arms-length media that conflicted, at least in the first two decades, with authoritarian, antiquated ideas about the function of the public sphere.

Competing Appropriations and Entanglement: The Sandman in the GDR and FRG

My second example is the popular television character, the Sandman, and his eponymous TV programme(s) for children. From the very

[37] Matthias Steinle, *Vom Feindbild zum Fremdbild: Die gegenseitige Darstellung von Bundesrepublik und DDR im Dokumentarfilm* (Constance, 2003), 158–66.

beginning of electronic broadcasting in the 1920s, programme-makers were aware that children and young people represented potential new audiences. The resulting programmes were not only popular with children but also with their parents; radio and TV shows fulfilled a dual function, giving the children something to do while also educating them in social values and norms. One particular aspect of programming for children also reveals a key function of the media in society generally. Children's programmes tended to be repeated often, at fixed times in the schedule, and this comforting regularity points to the ritual aspect of our relationship to media and the role they play in structuring our days. In the period under discussion, such rituals, especially bedtime rituals, played a particularly important role in bringing up young children; parents and children both knew that television would be followed by bedtime and that this heralded a period of 'child-free time' for the parents when they could be alone.

The fairy-tale figure of the Sandman, who traditionally appears at bedtime to help children go to sleep, was therefore a natural choice for children's television programmers. In Hans Christian Andersen's story, for example, the Sandman watches over the sleeping children to keep them safe from harm. The TV character of the Sandman sprinkles sand to make children fall asleep, which disappears when they wake up in the morning. Although the Sandman had appeared earlier in children's radio programmes, he only became really popular when he was given the form of an animated puppet in the show *Unser Sandmännchen* (*Our Little Sandman)*, shown daily on GDR television from 1959. This Sandman even survived the downfall of the regime, and after East German television closed down in 1991, it was the only children's programme from the GDR to be granted a second lease of life on television in unified Germany.

The East German puppet was the very first Sandman ever to appear on German television screens. But strictly speaking, the first broadcast of *Unser Sandmännchen* on 22 November 1959 was actually an expanded version of a programme that already existed. East German television had beaten the West Berlin-based station SFB to the finishing post by just a couple of days, although the idea for the character did not originate with GDR television producers, but instead was a long-cherished dream of children's broadcasting pioneer Ilse Obrig. The first episodes had already gone into pre-production in

West Berlin in the summer of 1959 and were duly broadcast as planned from early December the same year on West German television.[38]

The background to all this was a press release issued by SFB announcing that a 'Little Sandman' would form part of their children's programming in the run-up to Christmas that year. The reaction to this in the East shows the extent of the SED regime's paranoia during the Cold War. Less than three weeks after the press release, Walter Heynowski—at the time the deputy director of official East German television, Deutscher Fernsehfunk (DFF)—had fitted out DFF's children's programme *Abendgruß* (*Hello This Evening*) with an additional frame featuring puppet animations. Heynowski claimed that he saw in SFB's actions 'a hostile intention to steal our viewers',[39] and if anyone was going to steal viewers, he clearly intended that it should be the DFF. East German television had developed sophisticated and expensive puppet animation technology, which, it was hoped, would give it the competitive edge when it came to children's television.

But in the West, there was and never had been any intention of 'stealing viewers' from the East. Television producers were far more interested in turning Ilse Obrig's dream—a Sandman on television—into a reality. But instead of the originally planned animation, SFB was only able to get the backing for a low-budget production with a simple hand puppet, and the show was cancelled after just two years. It was not until the autumn of 1962 that, now under the direction of the public service broadcaster NDR, several regional TV channels began to feature an animated puppet in their early evening schedules—a puppet who would become known in West Germany as *Das Sandmännchen* ('The Little Sandman'). Although the West German Sandman never enjoyed the lavish financial backing of his rival in the East, he soon came to be loved just as much by his target audience.[40]

It might be supposed that honour had now been satisfied. But just a few years later, in 1966, Werner Höfer—programme director of the

[38] For a detailed study of the rise of the Sandman, see Volker Petzold, 'Unser ureigenes Sandmännchen: Eine deutsch-deutsche Kinderfernsehfigur in "Klassenkampf" und Politik', *Kulturation,* 2/2003, online at <http://www.kulturation.de/ki_1_text.php?id=20>, accessed 15 Dec. 2018.

[39] Ibid.

[40] 'Telemann' [Martin Morlock], 'Sandmännchens Irrfahrt', *Der Spiegel*, 3 (1963), 58.

German Television's Little Sandman Puppets in the West (left) and East (right)

Das Sandmännchen
© Image: Norddeutscher Rundfunk

Unser Sandmännchen
© Image: Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv/Gerhard Behrendt

biggest regional station in West Germany, the Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR)—attempted to buy up fifty episodes of *Our Little Sandman* from the GDR for his new Third Programme. His counterpart in the East, Hans Höschel, refused, on the grounds that the Sandman was 'an absolutely original creation of the German Democratic Republic's German Television Broadcasting',[41] which, given the Sandman's history in both Germanies, was hardly a plausible assertion. The WDR's response to this rejection was to create a third Sandman of its own, the *Sandmännchen International* (*International Little Sandman*) which this time took the form of a human actor in costume. But this third figure was never anything like as successful as his animated brothers from the East and the North, and he was banished from the screen at the end of the 1970s.

By the 1970s and 1980s, *Unser Sandmännchen* and *Abendgruß* had become a fixed institution in the GDR with a huge fan base that reacted angrily to proposals of even the smallest changes to the format.[42]

[41] Quoted from Petzold, 'Unser ureigenes Sandmännchen'.
[42] Cf. Jan-Uwe Rogge, 'Der Sandmann in Ost und West: Kurze Anmerkungen

Clearly, the ritual had now transcended its purely pragmatic, structuring function and was being taken extremely seriously by numerous (adult) viewers, who refused to entertain the idea of any alteration to the programme they loved. In the West, of course, the introduction of a dual television system with private commercial operators had long since made it impossible for programmes and schedules to remain unchanged for long, and in the course of the 1980s, as the regional early evening schedules were restructured one by one, *The Little Sandman* gradually disappeared from the screen.[43] This was mainly because its primary audience—pre-school children—was not an attractive target group for early evening advertising. The East German Little Sandman, on the other hand, became a symbol of the much-cited 'good side' of the GDR after 1990, and any attempt to get rid of him met with outraged protest, mainly from parents and grandparents rather than from children. As a result, the Sandman lives on today and makes regular appearances on special interest channels for children.[44]

As we can see, the history of the 'Little Sandman' figure is inextricably bound up with the history of the German–German divide. But in contrast to what was often believed even at the time, this was not simply an aspect of the rivalry between the two 'sides'. A closer look at some of the protagonists in the drama shows how complicated the origins of the Sandman actually were. It is especially worthwhile taking a closer look at the history of Ilse Obrig, the children's programme editor who came up with the idea of a television Sandman to begin with.[45]

zur Geschichte, zur Form und zur Funktion', in Filmmuseum Potsdam (ed.), *Sandmann auf Reisen: Eine Ausstellung des Filmmuseums Potsdam mit Unterstützung des Ostdeutschen Rundfunks Brandenburg und des Mitteldeutschen Rundfunks* (Berlin, 1993), 42–8.

[43] During the 1980s several ARD channels moved the Little Sandman to their non-commercial Third Programmes or, like the SFB, withdrew it completely. The producer with overall responsibility for the show, the Norddeutsche Rundfunk (NDR), stopped production in spring 1989. However, repeats of the West German Sandman continued to be shown on some Third Programmes until 1993. Petzold, 'Unser ureigenes Sandmännchen', n. 18.

[44] Cf. Christoph Classen, 'Das Sandmännchen', in Martin Sabrow (ed.), *Erinnerungsorte der DDR* (Munich, 2009), 342–50.

[45] On Ilse Obrig see Knut Hickethier, 'Die Anfänge des deutschen Kinder-

Obrig's career began during National Socialism, when as an employee of the Reichs-Rundfunk-Gesellschaft she created the very first radio programme for children in Germany. After the war she continued her career at the East German Berliner Rundfunk, where she created the children's programme *Abendlied* (*Evening Lullaby*) which later, in the GDR, became *Hello This Evening*. Struggling with the increasingly difficult political situation, Obrig left the channel in 1950 and moved to the Rundfunk im amerikanischen Sektor (RIAS) channel in West Berlin while also working on children's programming for Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk (NWDR). She had obviously spent a long time thinking about how the figure of the Sandman could be built into her television programmes for children before she was finally able to carry out the project in 1959. The similarities between the East German puppet, designed by Gerhard Behrendt, and its 1962 West German counterpart created by Herbert K. Schulz, was no coincidence; the two designers had both worked on the production of the East German Sandman at Dresden's 'Puppentrick' studios before Schulz later left the GDR.

The history of the television Sandman in the Cold War may be seen as a history of competing appropriations, with numerous actors changing sides throughout. But this competitive element should not distract us from an underlying shared cultural background, based on a tradition of national culture that was referenced by both sides in multiple ways. The figure of the Sandman has its roots in the nineteenth century and can be found in Romantic literature and in puppet theatre for children of that era. In creating a television Sandman, producers in both East and West were referring back to a pre-modern 'high' culture that was perceived in Germany as part of a national German cultural legacy. This legacy, as they saw it, transcended political zones and charged them, as its heirs, with passing on an aesthetic education to a new generation. Through this education, German children would be able to access the 'high' culture that underpinned civilized society. The Sandman's producers in East and West thus deliberately created a format that differed markedly from American comics and cartoons, which the SED and the West German middle classes each found equally repellent, believing that they represented both a cultural low point and a potential threat to children's moral

fernsehens und Ilse Obrigs Kinderstunde', in Hans-Dieter Erlinger et al. (eds.), *Handbuch des Kinderfernsehens* (Constance, 1998), 129–42.

values. The Sandman also appeared to prove that contemporary fears relating to television—that it would bring about the death of culture or inflict long-term damage on children and young people—were unfounded. In East as in West Germany, 'Americanization' had become a synonym for the dangers and collateral damage that were feared could emerge out of the immense social change sweeping Europe in the first decades after the Second World War, a change which was due not least to the rapid spread of television.[46]

The German–German history of children's television shows that media relations during the Cold War cannot be reduced to mere propaganda wars. Instead, we can observe a process of competing conceptual appropriations, in which mutual plagiarism, staff continuities from the early era of radio, and staff defecting to the West all played their part. The remarkable rate at which the various Sandmen multiplied in German television from the 1950s to the 1980s was partly due to the fact that the new era of television was, as already mentioned, no respecter of borders, with producers in all zones facing similar challenges, such as how to create television specifically for children. But at the same time, the Sandman phenomenon reveals shared national–cultural roots and shared reactions to rapid cultural changes in the wake of the rise of electronic media after the Second World War.

Resolving these challenges through recourse to a nostalgic, antimodern, and romantic fairy-tale tradition was clearly an attractive solution, for progressive socialism in the East no less than for capitalism in the West. But we should note that in the West, it was the introduction of private television and the resulting enforced commercialization of children's television in the 1980s that brought an end, at least for the time being, to the Sandman.

Popular Culture and Light Entertainment: Loved and Hated on Both Sides of the Wall

From the above example, we can see that even in the world of children's television, the media were perceived very differently by politicians and consumers respectively. While politicians saw the media as a tool to be exploited for their own ends, consumers turned to the

[46] Angelika Linke and Jakob Tanner (eds.), *Attraktion und Abwehr: Die Amerikanisierung der Alltagskultur in Europa* (Cologne, 2006).

media to fulfil other functions and needs. As early as the nineteenth century, mass literacy, along with improved printing and distribution processes, had led to the development of a market in literature, newspapers, and other printed matter that, like other markets, was characterized by supply and demand, so that the consumption of popular literature and theatre quickly rose to new heights. As the public realm became increasingly commercialized, the supply of popular entertainment in its various forms increased, and the advance of the new audio-visual media in the twentieth century (especially cinema, radio, and television) only served to intensify and accelerate this trend. In Germany, it was not only commercial interests that were behind the media provision of popular entertainment. The National Socialists, too, devoted extensive time and resources to developing forms of popular music and cinema that would serve to shore up their political power, and in particular, would increase support for the war.[47]

The Allies—in all zones—who took control of the media straight after the war did not think in terms of commercialism, nor were they concerned with the potential of escapist entertainment to help stabilize the system. Their interest in the media at this point was entirely educational. Under Allied rule, the German media were dominated by explicitly didactic aims and objectives, as can be seen in the countless educational and informative campaigns that the Allies instigated at this time. Although it was not exactly implied that more popular forms of media consumption were undesirable per se, it was obvious that the primary aim of most programming of this period was to contribute to education and denazification. As a result, the US-controlled Berlin radio channel RIAS, which in contrast to the other broadcasters continued to favour a more commercial, American-style entertainment culture, very soon became the most popular channel in Berlin.[48]

Even after the founding of the two German states, the principle that the media should inform and educate (in the German tradition of *Bildung*), continued to dominate perceptions. Both East and West

[47] Konrad Dussel, *Hörfunk in Deutschland: Politik, Programm, Publikum (1923–1960)* (Berlin, 2002), 218–31.

[48] Petra Galle, *RIAS Berlin und Berliner Rundfunk: Die Entwicklung ihrer Profile in Programm, Personal und Organisation vor dem Hintergrund des beginnenden Kalten Krieges* (Münster, 2003), 209–10.

Germany propagated the idea of 'raising up the masses' (*Hebung*) through education in the hope of persuading the people to adopt more highbrow cultural tastes. Outdated prejudices held by the educated middle classes against a mass culture perceived as 'trivial' continued to play a role in both political zones. In West Germany, the authority of the cultural elite had survived the war seemingly intact, and its representatives continued to see themselves as responsible for preventing 'the dictatorship of popular taste'. Discussions were held on the 'possibility of influencing and guiding the public in a discreet manner' towards more tasteful cultural offerings.[49] In radio, this took the form of an unofficial censorship that either excluded 'undesirable' popular hits (*Schlager*) entirely or banned them from certain slots in the schedule. Such actions were usually justified by referring to the broadcaster's duty of care to its audience; programmes must not fall below a certain 'standard of taste' and listeners must not be exposed to the 'depersonalization' that, it was thought, could result from hearing popular music.[50] Accordingly, programmes designed by public broadcasters continued to display a strong allegiance to highbrow culture until well into the 1960s. Meanwhile, commercially organized media like the film and record industries were far more attuned to the popular interests of German post-war society and its need to heal the wounds of the past.

But while West German rejection of popular culture was based on antiquated and anti-modern discourses, popular culture in East Germany was a burning political issue, seen—at least in many of its established forms—through the lens of a political system that insisted that the East must be utterly different from the West. In 1950, Maximilian Scheer, head of the 'Künstlerisches Wort' ('Artistic Word') department at Berliner Rundfunk, warned of 'a flood of American or Americanized printed products' that would wash away any attempts at creating a new culture. The aim of these products was 'to do away with a German national culture and open up society to American or Americanized mass production'. The cultural policy of East Germany

[49] Quoted from Axel Schildt, *Moderne Zeiten: Freizeit, Massenmedien und Zeitgeist in der Bundesrepublik der 50er Jahre* (Hamburg, 1995), 244; Edgar Lersch, '"Wir sollten nicht spielen, was der Hörer will. Der Hörer will im Endeffekt das, was wir spielen": Leichte Musik im Hörfunk der 50er Jahre. Eine Diskussion in Stuttgart 1955', *Rundfunk und Geschichte*, 20/4 (1994), 204–10.
[50] Schildt, *Moderne Zeiten*, 324–97.

therefore was based on what it saw as a duty to redirect these 'mental dregs' back to America.[51] The cultural anti-Americanism revealed in such statements was by no means new in Germany and was based on a long-established stereotype of America as a 'cultureless' nation. But in contrast to the FRG, where the relationship to the USA now made such attitudes problematic, anti-Americanism fitted in perfectly with the GDR's Cold War policy of aggressive rejection of the West and its hegemonic power, the USA.

In the following years, however, the attitude towards youth culture and popular culture in both German states began to change. In the GDR, this was mainly as a result of the near-collapse of the regime that resulted from the People's Uprising of 17 June 1953. Following this event, the need for leisure time and entertainment, which up to now had been neglected in the effort to 'build a socialist state' with propaganda, began to receive more recognition, although the state's attitude remained highly ambivalent, with the regime viewing the media primarily as a means of helping to stabilize the system and create a more 'integrated' society.[52]

Ambivalence was to remain the predominant attitude to the media in the GDR, where as a result, the state constantly veered between liberal phases and subsequent repressive interventions intended to support the enforcement of the socialist educational ideal. Such interventions tended to coincide with crises in the system. In 1957, for example, the uprising in Hungary resulted in a new clampdown on forms of 'western' entertainment and the introduction of a 60:40 East–West music quota for radio broadcasts. The Eleventh Plenum of the SED Central Committee in December 1965, where key decisions were made on policy, resulted in even more draconian measures. Although leading up to the plenum there had appeared to be a move towards greater liberalization, the Central Committee instead hardened its attitude to entertainment, singling out the media for special

[51] Protokoll der Rundfunk-Tagung anlässlich des fünfjährigen Bestehens des Deutschen Demokratischen Rundfunks im Haus der Presse Berlin (Minutes of the Broadcasting Conference on the Occasion of the Five Year Anniversary of the Founding of the German Democratic Broadcasting Organization), 11–12 May 1950; Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Potsdam (DRA), Historisches Archiv, Bestand Hörfunk, F 201-00-00-0001, fos. 311–545, at 454.

[52] Wolfgang Mühl-Benninghaus, *Unterhaltung als Eigensinn: Eine ostdeutsche Mediengeschichte* (Frankfurt/Main, 2012), 126–74.

criticism as being 'in thrall to imperialism' ('vom Imperialismus manipulierte Medienunterhaltung').[53]

But in the long term, the system could not withstand the dynamic of popular culture and had to adapt. The main reason for this was the development of Western consumer societies. From the 1960s onwards, these became immensely attractive for the younger generation in the GDR. Their attraction for this age group was closely linked to the general development of a (mainly Anglo-American) youth culture that, despite intense conservative and ideological resistance, gradually spread first to West and then to East Germany.[54] This culture spoke to the need that young people felt to find their own generational identity, a need that could not be met through socialist ideals of conformism and collectivism. The regime's rejection of Western youth culture on ideological grounds was bound to fail and only served to delegitimize the politics of the SED.[55] It was not until the 1970s and 1980s, under Erich Honecker, that the SED finally began to acknowledge the consumer needs of the East German population and as a result, to become more open to Western popular culture and entertainment. But although this new strategy might have seemed to offer greater chances of success, in fact the opposite was true; the more the SED's popular culture programme came to resemble that of the West, the more difficult it became for the Party to justify its own, essentially unchanged ideological standpoint.[56]

[53] Erich Honecker reporting on behalf of the Politburo at the Eleventh Plenum; here quoted from Dieter Wiedemann, 'Politik und Unterhaltung in Jugendsendungen des DDR-Fernsehens', in Louis Bosshart and Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem (eds.), *Medienlust und Mediennutz: Unterhaltung als öffentliche Kommunikation* (Munich, 1994), 484–90, at 485. See also Günter Agde (ed.), *Kahlschlag. Das 11. Plenum des ZK der SED 1965: Studien und Dokumente. Mit einem Beitrag von Wolfgang Engler (*Berlin, 2000); Andreas Kötzing, 'Sturm und Zwang: Das 11. Plenum des ZK der SED in historischer Perspektive', in id. and Ralf Schenk (eds.), *Verbotene Utopie: Die SED, die DEFA und das 11. Plenum* (Berlin, 2015), 11–146.

[54] Christoph Hilgert, *Die unerhörte Generation: Jugend im westlichen und britischen Hörfunk 1945–1963* (Göttingen, 2015).

[55] Edward Larkey, *Rotes Rockradio: Populäre Musik und die Kommerzialisierung des DDR-Rundfunks* (Berlin, 2007).

[56] Christoph Classen, 'Captive Audience? GDR Radio in the Mirror of Listeners' Mail', *Cold War History*, 13/2 (2013), 239–54.

Equally in West Germany, the transition from a post-war, shortage economy to a consumer society was the main reason that attitudes towards popular culture began to soften. The market for entertaining music, films, and literature with relevance to new generations and lifestyles grew hugely, supported by audio-visual technological advances that meant the media could be accessed in new, more flexible ways, such as the portable transistor radio or through the increasing availability of records and tapes. Public, non-commercial broadcasters found themselves having to adapt not only to these new technologies but also to the competition from other media—mainly television, but also new forms of entertainment in print and radio, such as Radio Luxemburg.[57]

As audio-visual media underwent a transformation, broadcasters found themselves caught up in its momentum. Their initial reaction was inevitably to increase their programming, but this meant that they then had to work harder to acquire new productions on the commercial, international markets in order to fill their expanded schedules. As a result, radio and television in West Germany gradually became more and more open to American and British content, which was traditionally more oriented towards popular culture.[58] Although the 'diktat of the educators' (Axel Schildt) continued to make itself felt, particularly in public broadcasting, a self-perpetuating dynamic emerged in the FRG at the end of the 1950s that made it increasingly impossible to ignore or dismiss popular demands. As the 1960s progressed, the conservative voices of cultural criticism began to lose their hegemonic authority, although their diminishing power did not mean they went entirely unheard. The advent of a pluralistic consumer society continued to be seen by some as a threat.

If we compare developments in the two German states, we can observe more similarities than we might expect. Despite political concerns, the victorious advance of popular culture proved unstoppable on both sides of the Iron Curtain and was achieved relatively independently of the prevailing political system. Its eventual success in East and West was due not so much to politics as to the compre-

[57]Anna Jehle, *Welle der Konsumgesellschaft: Radio Luxembourg in Frankreich 1945–1975* (Göttingen, 2018); Katja Berg, *Grenzenlose Unterhaltung: Radio Luxemburg in der Bundesrepublik 1957–1980* (Göttingen, forthcoming 2019).

[58] Irmela Schneider, *Amerikanische Einstellung: Deutsches Fernsehen und amerikanische Produktionen* (Heidelberg, 1992).

hensive medialization and 'consumerization' of society and the subcultures that arose out of these, especially among the younger generation.[59] Likewise, a dislike and distrust of popular culture was shared equally by German political and cultural elites on both sides of the Berlin Wall.

On the other hand, it would not be true to say that ideological perspectives, along with the specific conditions and developments that arose in each of the two German states, had no effect at all. The permanent competition between the media in the West had the indirect effect of legitimizing popular entertainment culture in the GDR as well as the FRG, mostly because the regime, especially under Honecker, hoped that it would have a stabilizing effect. Popular culture in West Germany was not subject to this kind of politicization; instead, in its various formats it gradually became accepted through a long process of sometimes impassioned social debate. Acceptance in the West was largely due to an economic system based on market forces, meaning that producers generally based their decisions on a broad spectrum of public demand. Public broadcasters were not immune to such pressures, as even before the licensing of private commercial broadcasters in the mid 1980s, they had had to compete with each other and (at least implicitly) with commercial film and print media. Demographic research from the 1950s on also played its part in helping to erode traditional, education-focused prejudices in relation to the media.[60]

Summary: Confrontations, Entanglements, and System-Specific Responses to the Challenges of Medialization

There is no doubt that the mass media played a key role in the antagonistic conflict of the Cold War. At the time, they were often viewed by the state primarily as instruments of political manipulation that could be used to influence their own respective populations as well as the 'other side'. On both sides, propaganda and counter-propaganda were as much a part of the political media repertoire as the attempts

[59] Axel Schildt, *Medialisierung und Konsumgesellschaften in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Bochum, 2004).

[60] Michael Meyen, *Hauptsache Unterhaltung: Mediennutzung und Medienbewertung in Deutschland in den 50er Jahren* (Münster, 2001).

to block the influence of the enemy, such as the placing of propaganda stations and transmitters close to the border along with jammers, import prohibitions, and censorship. The factitious nature of the border in Germany until 1961 meant that the conflict took on a particularly extreme character during this period, because the population still saw itself as single cultural community; this was further underlined by the fact that there were no actual linguistic or cultural barriers between the two states, and that electronic media in the form of radio and television could cross the border relatively easily.

Perhaps this is the reason why one particular narrative about the media—that they were nothing but a tool of the state during the Cold War—still exists today in numerous forms. The present essay, on the other hand, is based on the premise that the increasing availability of mass media, especially of the then new medium of television, was a process that transcended political borders and contributed hugely to the social and cultural transformation of both German societies, which in turn affected politics in ways that were never envisaged. In fact, we can observe an increasing interplay between mass consumption and mass media. In the second half of the twentieth century, the media were no longer only a vehicle for cultural messages aimed at consumers. Media content (for example, in the form of magazines and light entertainment shows) itself became a consumer product. Consumers developed their own individual relationship to the media and turned to them to fulfil a variety of needs, such as to relax or to structure their days.

In this essay, I have attempted to integrate media structures with their content and their appropriation from a social and cultural historical perspective. Such an approach modifies perspectives that are based on a purely structural analysis. In fact, the differences between the dictatorship and the democracy were less absolute in practical terms than it might appear at first sight, given each system's very different understanding of the public sphere. Ideologically, of course, the two systems had two entirely opposed ideas of the media, with the West German liberal, pluralistic model based on a mixed public and commercial offer confronting the East German belief that the media should be the servant of a one-party state in a sealed-off public sphere (although thanks to the presence of West German TV and radio in the GDR, the East German ideal could never be realized entirely). But ideology and reality were by no means identical. As we

have seen above, the political independence of the media in the early Federal Republic did not come about overnight, but had to be fought for, and was not fully achieved in broadcasting for a long time. Likewise, changing and contradictory attitudes to popular and youth culture in the GDR show that the East German ideal of a distinctively socialist media culture never became a reality and under Honecker's leadership was eventually abandoned in all but name. By the end of the 1980s the majority of films shown on East German television were made in the USA, with East German and Soviet-made productions taking second and third place respectively.[61]

From the example of the Sandman and children's television, we can see that the complex relations between the two 'sides' were not simply a matter of propaganda wars and system conflict. We can also observe actors changing sides, numerous competing appropriations, and the recourse on both sides to a shared cultural heritage. Similarities between East and West also become disturbingly apparent when we consider how easily the fear of 'Americanization'—and the cultural disintegration that would allegedly follow in its wake—could be tailored to suit the different ideological requirements of East and West, at least in the 1950s. In later periods, the differences between the two political systems became increasingly distinctive; yet neither this increasing differentiation, nor the SED's preventive efforts in the GDR until well into the 1970s, were able to stop young people in both East and West falling under the sway of Western pop culture. This shows the huge power of this cultural transformation, a transformation which was driven by the rise of mass media. The development of medialized consumer societies seems to have set in motion a dynamic that no state authority could ultimately control, demonstrating the transnational dimension of media history. Post-war popcultural trends frequently originated in the USA or Western Europe before their reception and adaptation in national contexts, so that a German–German history of the media, despite its national premise, cannot ignore what was happening at the international level. This created a tension between on the one hand, the inherently transnational character of modern mass media and on the other, the need felt by both East and West Germany to establish a distinctive national identity reflecting their respective political systems. More extensive

[61] Richard Oehmig, *'Besorgt mal Filme!': Der internationale Programmhandel des DDR-Fernsehens* (Göttingen, 2017), 187–8.

research could help cast more light on this little-recognized aspect of media history.[62]

The same goes for economic and technological aspects of media history, especially as these were also closely bound up with transnational processes. Audio-visual media, in particular, required considerable financial investment, meaning that states simply did not have the capacity to develop their own technologies or even their own content without input from 'the outside'. This fact, however, was incompatible with ideologies that sought to create a hermetic public sphere or a purely national culture. New technological developments, such as satellite transmission, challenged the very idea of national sovereignty in relation to mass media. Nor did political, economic, and technological developments exist in isolation—they influenced each other and established the conditions under which further developments could occur. For example, the introduction of private broadcasting in West Germany in the 1980s probably could not have occurred without the invention of new distribution technologies such as cable and satellite. The possibilities resulting from these new technologies led to a breakthrough for the journalistic lobby that had long demanded licensing for privately-owned broadcasting companies, and gave impetus to conservative politicians looking to break the monopoly of supposedly 'left-wing' public broadcasting.[63]

This initial attempt at an integrated German media and social history shows the complexity of the subject matter and the challenges it poses to historians. One way to approach it, as we have seen, is to start with case studies. But should such a history ever be successfully written, it could lead to new insights concerning the similarities and differences between two politically opposed societies and the transformation that they both experienced with the rise of modern media.

[62] Chistoph Classen (ed.), *Transnational Broadcasting in Europe 1945–1990*, special issue of *Spiel*: *Neue Folge. Eine Zeitschrift für Medienkultur*, 2/1 (2016).

[63] Frank Bösch, 'Politische Macht und gesellschaftliche Gestaltung: Wege zur Einführung des privaten Rundfunks in den 1970/80er Jahren', in Meik Woyke (ed.), *Wandel des Politischen: Die Bundesrepublik während der 1980er Jahre* (Bonn, 2013), 195–214.

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LEARNING FROM THE DICTATORSHIP? SPORT IN DIVIDED AND UNIFIED GERMANY

JUTTA BRAUN

Public debates on Germany's internal unity have, for some time, always come around to the fact that after almost thirty years, many East Germans still feel like second-class citizens.[1] Richard Schröder, former civil rights activist and theologian, contributed to the debate by pointing out that many citizens of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had brought a vague feeling of being second rate with them at the time of unification. This could be seen as a legacy of forty years of permanent competition with the West Germans, who were richer, enjoyed greater freedom, and were internationally more respected.[2]

Perhaps it was this notorious feeling of inferiority in the East–West comparison that, in retrospect, turned the GDR's competitive sport into such a fierce battleground, for it was here—and only here—that the East German dictatorship did better, at least in the medal tables, than its West German counterpart.[3] How much defending GDR success in this field had become a political reflex action is shown by Gregor Gysi's remarks early in the 1990s when, as leader of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), he felt called upon to defend the East German sprinter Katrin Krabbe against accusations of doping. The PDS, successor to the former East German Socialist

Trans. Angela Davies (GHIL).

[1] This was the result of an Allensbach survey in 2009: '42 Prozent der Ostdeutschen fühlen sich als Bürger zweiter Klasse', *Wirtschaftswoche*, 26 Sept. 2009. Possible reasons for this are explored from a literary and sociological point of view by Jana Hensel and Wolfgang Engler, *Wer wir sind: Die Erfahrung, ostdeutsch zu sein* (Berlin, 2018).

[2] Richard Schröder, 'Die Erfindung des Ostdeutschen', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ), 3 Oct. 2018, online at <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/pegida-und-chemnitz-was-ist-mit-dem-osten-los-15814890.html>, accessed 29 Jan. 2019.

[3] Jutta Braun, 'Wettkampf zwischen Ost und West: Sport und Gesellschaft', in Frank Bösch (ed.), *Geteilte Geschichte: Ost- und Westdeutschland 1970–2000* (Göttingen, 2015), 411–48.

Unity Party (SED), declared this accusation a deliberate defamation by the West of the icons of the now defunct 'state of workers and peasants'.[4]

While our knowledge of the realities of East German (and all-German) sport is now considerably more differentiated, opinions on this topic are, surprisingly, hardly less entrenched. When the exhibition 'Sportverräter' opened in the Willy Brandt House in Berlin in 2011—it travelled to the German Historical Institute London a year later as 'Tracksuit Traitors'—Klaus Huhn, who had been sports editor at the former East German mass-market daily, *Neues Deutschland*, accused the exhibition's academic curators of having ideological motives.[5] And it is not only historical issues that always turn up in the cross-fire of competing interpretations, but also questions relating to the culture of memory. Thus when 'Täve' Schur, the popular East German cyclist and hero of the Ride of Peace (*Friedensfahrt*), was nominated for the Hall of Fame of German Sport in 2016, a week-long controversy ensued in the German media. It ended with the legendary cyclist's exclusion from the Hall of Fame.[6]

The popular triumph of sport is undoubtedly one of the features of the twentieth century.[7] The German example shows clearly what social power sport was able to unfold. Taking a number of selected aspects—national representation, the organization of sport, questions of security and violence in sport, and the culture of memory and processing the past since 1990—this essay will show the different paths that sport took in East and West Germany, and demonstrate the long-term impact this had on sport in unified Germany.

[4] Jutta Braun, 'Dopen für Deutschland: Die Diskussion im vereinten Sport 1990–1992', in Klaus Latzel and Lutz Niethammer (eds.), *Hormone und Hochleistung: Doping zwischen Ost und West* (Cologne, 2008), 151–70, at 163; 'Hetzjagd soll Erinnerungen an DDR-Sport tilgen', *Neues Deutschland*, 17 Feb. 1992.

[5] Klaus Huhn, 'In der Parteizentrale auf der Flucht: Eine Ausstellungseröffnung', *Junge Welt*, 23 July 2011, online at <http://www.jungewelt.de/2011/07-23/021.php>, accessed 30 Jan. 2019.

[6] Christian Spiller, 'Täve Schur: Ein Held wie wir', *Zeit online*, 29 Apr. 2017, online at <https://www.zeit.de/sport/2017-04/taeve-schur-ddr-hall-of-fame>, accessed 30 Jan. 2019.

[7] On the terminology see Martin Sabrow and Peter Ulrich Weiß (eds.), *Das Jahrhundert vermessen: Signaturen eines vergangenen Zeitalters* (Göttingen, 2017).

I. *State Representation in the Battle of the Systems*

The Olympic Games, more than any other sporting event, were considered the main stage on which the battle of the systems was enacted during the Cold War. Competition with the 'other Germany' was an additional spur driving both parts of Germany on to strive for success, although its political relevance was very different in the two countries. For the GDR, which notoriously stood out as the loser in any comparison with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), its success in sport presented an extraordinary chance to showcase the achievements of the socialist system and its own profile as an independent 'nation'. This relatively small country with a population of just 17 million was able to accumulate 755 Olympic medals, 768 world championships, and 747 European championships in forty years. After the Munich Olympic Games in 1972 the Cold War in sport developed an increasing consistency and brutality. How impressive the GDR's international standing really was became clear in the 1976 Montreal Olympics, when it overtook not only West Germany in the medal tables as usual, but for the first time also passed the USA. In the 1984 Winter Games in Sarajevo the East German athletes even bested the Soviet athletes, which did not make them universally popular with their big brother.[8]

While East Germany triumphed over West Germany at the Olympics, it was a different story in football. With just one World Cup finals appearance to its name, the GDR could not compare with the success of the West German national team and the Bundesliga. Indeed, the sport and international football events represented a potential security risk for the GDR leadership, as both players and supporters used sporting encounters as a bridge for German–German understanding.[9] The highly successful West German league and national teams had many supporters, especially among the younger generation of East Germans. In the view of the East German

[8] See Hans Joachim Teichler, 'Bruderzwist an der Dopingfront: Als die Sowjetunion der DDR das Handwerk legen wollte', in Hans-Joachim Seppelt and Holger Schück (eds.), *Anklage Kinderdoping: Das Erbe des DDR-Sports* (Berlin, 1999), 299–306.

[9] Jutta Braun, 'The People's Sport? Popular Sport and Fans in the Later Years of the German Democratic Republic', *German History*, 27 (2009), 414–28.

state, however, these members of the 'Wall generation' (*Mauergeneration*) should not have had any intellectual or real ties at all with the class enemy, West Germany.[10]

One of the defining features of sports diplomacy in the twentieth century was the boycott, and the boycotts of the Moscow Olympics in 1980 and the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984 were high points of the Cold War in sport.[11] The two German states were especially affected by this. The debate about a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics was one of the worst conflicts between West German national sport and the federal government. But sports leaders in the GDR also saw themselves as victims, albeit under different circumstances, of the boycott of the Los Angeles games imposed by the Soviet leadership four years later.[12] Beyond Olympic events, boycotts of particular venues were the instruments of a policy of pinpricks in the Cold War. This had an impact on West Berlin as a host city in particular, as the Soviet Union, supported by several Eastern bloc states, repeatedly tried to sabotage events in this 'frontline city'. Thus the Soviet leadership tried to exclude West Berlin from the football World Cup of 1974—unsuccessfully. The city was, however, prevented from hosting the European Championships of 1988 out of political consideration for the Eastern bloc.[13]

Sport can therefore be regarded as a special instance of unification, as in this case West Germany was structurally prepared to learn from the dictatorship. In one of his first statements after the first free elections for the Volkskammer in the GDR, held on 18 March 1990, the FRG's Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Schäuble, declared that

[10] In the research a distinction is drawn between the old Communists, the 'Aufbau-Generation' born around 1929, and the 'Mauergeneration' born in the GDR. Mary Fulbrook, 'Generationen und Kohorten in der DDR: Protagonisten und Widersacher des DDR-Systems aus der Perspektive biographischer Daten', in Annegret Schüle, Thomas Ahbe, and Rainer Gries (eds.), *Die DDR aus generationengeschichtlicher Perspektive: Eine Inventur* (Leipzig, 2006), 113–30.

[11] On this see most recently Robert Simon Edelman, 'The Russians Are Not Coming! The Soviet Withdrawal from the Games of the XXIII Olympiad', *International Journal of the History of Sport*, 32/1 (2015) 9–36.

[12] Braun, 'Wettkampf', 430.

[13] See Jutta Braun and Hans Joachim Teichler (eds.), *Sportstadt Berlin im Kalten Krieg: Prestigekämpfe und Systemwettstreit* (Berlin, 2006).

the successes of East German sport must be 'rescued' for a unified Germany.[14] Here Schäuble found himself in full agreement with the FRG's sports organizations, which, now that the Berlin Wall had gone, were finally hoping to gain insights into the 'sports wonderland' created by the GDR, and to adopt some of its practices. In the euphoric atmosphere of unification, sports policy in the FRG was fixated on the success in the Olympic Games that the GDR had enjoyed for decades. And in 1992, at the Winter Olympics held in Albertville, the unified German team, competing as the Federal Republic of Germany, found itself at the top of the medal tables for the first time. Joining forces with the East German athletes and coaches was regarded as a clear instance of profiting from unification. The renaissance of sports schools for children and young people from the mid 1990s is an example of the adoption of former East Germany's practices. From this time on, there were constant demands to adopt further elements of the GDR's methods. And, finally, after the joint German team's performance at the London Olympics in 2012 was disappointing, a return to the GDR's approach to talent spotting was debated.[15]

At first glance, sport appears to be one of the few areas in which there was a successful transfer of elites from East to West in the course of German unification. It was not only East German athletes who were a coveted elite in unified Germany, but also their coaches. This presented a marked contrast to the situation in other social and government sectors, where East German staff often lacked the formal qualifications and informal experience to make them attractive to employers.[16]

II. *Club (Vereins-) Sport versus State Sport*

Sport as a stage for the Cold War has been the subject of a number of detailed political histories,[17] so that research can now concentrate

[14] 'Schäuble will Erfolg des DDR-Sports retten', *FAZ*, 22 Mar. 1990.

[15] 'Birgit Fischer will Sichtungssystem der DDR reanimieren', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12 Sept. 2012.

[16] Raj Kollmorgen, *Das ungewollte Experiment: Die deutsche Vereinigung als 'Beitritt'. Gründe, Prozesslogik, Langzeitfolgen* (Magdeburg, 2013), 12.

[17] Special mention should be made of the pioneering work by Uta Andrea

more on a social history approach to the subject. The recapitulation of the many German–German intrigues about flags and the right to participation should not distract us from the fact that two very different sports systems developed in East and West, and that this had major long-term effects. In West Germany, after the Nazi excesses, a club-based sports organization regained a foothold after 1945, while in the East, a hierarchically structured, state-based system of sport driven by the political parties developed.[18] In the East, clubs were no longer free associations (*Vereine*) but replaced by 'state-organized bodies',[19] known as *Betriebssportgemeinschaften* (workplace sports communities, BSG). This transformation was not, of course, restricted to sport. Throughout the GDR, associations had to comply with the guidelines of a socialist society, which meant that there was little chance of voluntary membership or autonomy. It was not only football teams, but also allotment-holders and pigeon-fanciers, all those who maintained traditions and culture, who were placed onto a new organizational footing. This put them under strict official, but always also informal, state control.[20] Thus in the East, the impulse towards emancipation represented by German associations was radically curtailed in favour of state direction.

The roots of workplace sport as an activity that was organized around an economic enterprise go back to imperial Germany.[21] Yet in

Balbier, *Kalter Krieg auf der Aschenbahn: Der deutsch-deutsche Sport 1950–1972* (Paderborn, 2006).

[18] On this see Jutta Braun, 'Sovietization in East German Football', in ead., René Wiese, Berno Bahro (eds.), for the Sportmuseum Berlin, *Sowjetfussball als politische Macht und kulturelle Kraft im 20. Jahrhundert* (Paderborn, forthcoming 2019), 35–51.

[19] Giselher Spitzer, 'Die Ersetzung von Vereinen und Verband durch politisch gesteuerte Körperschaften', in id., Hans Joachim Teichler, and Klaus Reinartz (eds.), *Schlüsseldokumente zum DDR-Sport: Ein sporthistorischer Überblick in Originalquellen* (Aachen, 1998), 15–28, at 15: 'staatlich organisierte Körperschaften.'

[20] Horst Groschopp, 'Breitenkultur in Ostdeutschland: Herkunft und Wende—wohin?', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 11 (2001), 15–22.

[21] Andreas Luh, *Betriebssport zwischen Arbeitgeberinteressen und Arbeitnehmerbedürfnissen: Eine historische Analyse vom Kaiserreich bis zur Gegenwart* (Aachen, 1998); id., *Chemie und Sport am Rhein: Sport als Bestandteil betrieblicher Sozialpolitik und unternehmerischer Marketingstrategie bei Bayer 1900–1985* (Bochum, 1992); more recently, Jan Kleinmanns, 'Betriebssport in der Zeit des

the GDR the driving force behind it was no longer the workers or the company owners, but the state, which assumed the role of the main agent and organizer of workplace sport. While this certainly presented a parallel with the Nazi period, it would be wrong to describe the tie between sport and enterprises as a concept that the GDR had adopted from the Nazi period.[22] In fact, by introducing workplace-based sports, the Soviet Occupation Zone, later the young GDR, was obeying a push towards Sovietization that was imposed upon it. The same applied to many other areas of social life. Soviet 'body culture' was the origin of this model, reflected most obviously in the structuring of sports organizations by branches of industry such as 'Tractor' and 'Construction'.[23]

One of the central questions in GDR research has always been to what extent the East German state imitated Soviet structures, or adopted them in a modified form.[24] This has never been systematically investigated for sport, although the field witnessed a profound organizational and cultural transformation. Athletes who wanted to keep the old club traditions going often saw themselves defamed overnight as 'enemies of the new democratic order'. Not only the 'bourgeois' nature of traditional sport was criticized, but also the notion that sport could be 'unpolitical'.[25] It was not only the way the

Nationalsozialismus: Alltagsgeschichtliche Aspekte betrieblicher Gesundheitsführung vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg', in Frank Becker and Ralf Schäfer (eds.), *Sport und Nationalsozialismus* (Göttingen, 2016), 67–84.

[22] This is the argument put forward by Walter M. Iber, Johannes Gießauf, and Harald Knoll, 'Fußball, Macht und Diktatur: Zur Einleitung, in eid. (eds.), *Fußball, Macht und Diktatur: Streiflichter auf den Stand der historischen Forschung* (Innsbruck, 2014), 13–23, at 18.

[23] Jutta Braun and René Wiese (eds.), *Doppelpässe: Wie die Deutschen die Mauer umspielten* (Berlin, 2006), 22.

[24] Balazs Apor and Peter Apor (eds.), *The Sovietization of Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on the Postwar Period* (Washington, 2008); Andreas Hilger, Mike Schmeitzner, and Clemens Vollnhals (eds.), *Sowjetisierung oder Neutralität? Optionen sowjetischer Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland und Österreich 1945–1955* (Göttingen, 2006); Stephan Merl, *Sowjetisierung in Wirtschaft und Landwirtschaft* (Mainz, 2011); Konrad Jarausch and Hannes Siegrist (eds.), *Amerikanisierung und Sowjetisierung in Deutschland 1945–1970* (Frankfurt am Main, 1997).

[25] Anlage 2 zum Protokoll Nr. 15 (des Politbüros) vom 8 Apr. 1949: Betr.: Verbesserung der Arbeit des Deutschen Sportausschusses, Stiftung Archiv der

old clubs worked that was frowned upon, but all the rituals, traditions, and memories that went along with them—the whole field of traditional 'memorial culture' typical of football was thus publicly proscribed.[26]

It is not surprising that such a sharp break could not happen without conflict, for in Germany as elsewhere, the role of sports and gymnastics clubs went far beyond organizing physical exercise and sporting competitions. Traditionally, they were also an expression of social localization, for example, by providing space for the development of working-class culture,[27] or a refuge for a 'conservative milieu'.[28] Clubs also worked at the level of families, the smallest social unit, so that belonging to and supporting a sports club could provide a sense of orientation and meaning that spanned generations.[29] Football clubs in particular were a focus of local identity and regional pride.[30] It was therefore entirely predictable that the new organizational unit, the BSG, promoted by the SED would not meet with unrestrained enthusiasm. And in fact, the club tradition in German sport proved to be extremely tenacious.

Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (hereafter: SAPMO-BArch), DY 30/IV2/2/15.

[26] See Markwart Herzog (ed.), *Memorialkultur im Fußballsport: Medien, Rituale und Praktiken des Erinnerns, Gedenkens und Vergessens* (Stuttgart, 2013).

[27] Eike Stiller (ed.), *Literatur zur Geschichte des Arbeitersports in Deutschland von 1892 bis 2005: Eine Bibliographie* (Berlin, 2006); Hans Joachim Teichler and Gerhard Hauk (eds.), *Illustrierte Geschichte des Arbeitersports* (Berlin, 1987); Christian Wolter, *Arbeiterfußball in Berlin und Brandenburg 1910–1933* (Hildesheim, 2015).

[28] Frank Bösch, *Das konservative Milieu: Vereinskultur und lokale Sammlungspolitik* (Göttingen, 2002), 57–8.

[29] Markwart Herzog, 'Erinnern, Gedenken und Vergessen im Fußballsport', in id. (ed.), *Memorialkultur im Fußballsport*, 15–70, at 15–16.

[30] On this see J. Bale, 'Identität, Identifikation, Image: Der Fußball und seine Verortung im Neuen Europa', in Siegfried Gehrmann (ed.), *Fußball und Region in Europa: Probleme regionaler Identität und die Bedeutung einer populären Sportart* (Münster, 1999), 281–98. On regional identity see D. Ipsen, 'Regionale Identität: Überlegungen zum politischen Charakter einer psychosozialen Raumkategorie', *Raumforschung und Raumordnung*, 51 (1993), 9–18; Europe is now also being more closely scrutinized as the reference point for this sort of regional positioning, see Wolfram Pyta and Nils Havemann, *European Football and Collective Memory* (Basingstoke, 2015).

In 1954 a commission of inquiry of the Central Committee of the SED complained about persistent traces of the old bourgeois spirit in sport. The cultivation of tradition by the first German football champions, VfB Leipzig, was especially picked out as an example to attack.[31] Supporters of the former German champions, Dresdner SC, experienced similar defamation, but with more serious consequences, as the political leadership did not hesitate to subject the supposed enemies of the system to political justice. Thus in December 1958 two leading officials of the sports club Dresden-Friedrichstadt were each sentenced to five and a half years in prison. The judgment listed the main reasons as: 'Illegal preparations for a festival to commemorate the founding of the proscribed Dresden sport club', and 'the so-called cultivation of sporting traditions' on behalf of 'Western organizations'.[32] The propaganda was thus directed not only against the 'old', but explicitly also against Western sport and its forms of organization. This contemptuous attitude, however, was to become ever more difficult for sports leaders in the GDR as—in contrast to the Olympics—football in East Germany fell behind the sport in West Germany and was outshone by it. This applied not only to the world championships of 1954, but also to the successful founding of the Bundesliga in 1963.

At the same time, competitive sport in the GDR was moving ever further from the people. The sports clubs founded in 1954 were designated centres of 'competitive sports production' for all branches of sport, and thus the whole organically grown structure of teams, clubs or enterprises, members and supporters was jettisoned. From now on the elite athletes got on with their training quite separately from the people.[33] This had serious consequences in terms of social grounding. In an internal memo signalling alarm, the GDR's football association in 1964 described the 'cutting off of the masses of football supporters

[31] Bericht der Kommission zur Überprüfung der Arbeit der Demokratischen Sportbewegung, Berlin, 12 Mar. 1954. BA SAPMO DY 30/J IV 2/2 A 347.

[32] Here and for the following see Horst Bartzsch, 'Verbrechen unter dem Deckmantel sportlicher "Traditionen" ', *Theorie und Praxis der Körperkultur*, 6 (1959) 484–9.

[33] On the system of sports clubs see René Wiese, 'Erfolge nach Plan: Sportclubs und Kinder- und Jugendsportschulen', in Jutta Braun and Michael Barsuhn (eds.), *Zwischen Erfolgs- und Diktaturgeschichte: Perspektiven der Aufarbeitung des DDR-Sports in Thüringen* (Göttingen, 2015), 146–95, at 146–8.

in the cities' as a crucial disadvantage suffered by the football teams. Their lack of a basis in the social environment was soon seen as a cardinal error: 'When the clubs were established in 1954, one major and decisive factor was not taken into account. The participation of hundreds of thousands of volunteer cadres and passive members in the community was ignored, and they were simply excluded from participating by a single decision.'[34]

Yet these warnings largely sank without trace because for ideological reasons alone, there was no going back. The most that could be conceded was some cosmetic tweaking. Thus the GDR's football association suggested that old club traditions should be at least partly revived, and classic club names such as 'FC' and 'VfB' could be used. In addition, it encouraged the names for sectors of production, such as 'Tractor', to be removed from the names of teams. With the re-establishment of ten football clubs in 1965–66 some of these suggestions were implemented. The traditional abbreviation 'FC' for 'Football Club' was re-introduced so that SC Motor Jena, for example, became FC Carl Zeiss Jena. Some of the industrial designations, such as 'Motor' and 'Empor', also disappeared so that SC Empor Rostock became Hansa Rostock. Only in the case of 'Dynamo', 'Armee', and 'Lokomotive' Leipzig did this component of the name remain. Interviews with contemporaries show that not only fans but also players were delighted with this return to old traditions because the GDR clubs now had names that sounded like those of the successful West German clubs. Thus Hans Georg Moldenhauer, today on the executive committee of the German Football Association (DFB), at the time goalkeeper for Magdeburg, remembers how pleased the players were 'when we heard that 1. FC Magdeburg was being created, because that was a synonym for Western clubs like FC Kaiserslautern. And, of course, we were really happy to be getting away from names with Turbine, Steel, and Empor in them, and were totally surprised that this idea had come up at all.'[35] And in terms of club colours, too, they looked across the internal German border: 'The only thing that we as players could influence was the colour. We had

[34] DFV, Generalsekretariat (Michalski), Gliederung über Probleme des Fußballs in der DDR, 20 May 1964, 1. Entwurf. NOFV-Archiv/Archiv Arbeitsbereich Zeitgeschichte des Sports Potsdam.

[35] Hans Georg Moldenhauer, interviewed by Jutta Braun, 29 Apr. 2008, in Leipzig.

such stupid green and red tracksuits, and we said: couldn't we have a new colour as well as a new name? Schalke was blue and white, and then suddenly we were to be blue–white, although Magdeburg's town colours are green and red.'[36] The reforms of 1965–66, although rather superficial, show how strongly German sport related to its counterpart in a divided country.

A recent research project has examined the seemingly endless restructuring and re-coding of GDR football, which went as far as the politically dictated relocation of whole teams.[37] On the orders of the SED, the army footballers of Vorwärts Leipzig, to take one example, were sent to East Berlin in 1953 in order to strengthen football in the capital. In fact, the result was a successful season with several titles being won. But then the local competition became too strong for the Stasi club BFC Dynamo, and in 1971 the army team had to move on to Frankfurt/Oder.[38] The question arises as to what consequences such drastic interventions had on integration into the region. We must ask whether sport could unfold a similar significance in constituting the emotional field of 'Heimat'—as outlined by Jan Palmowski for the GDR—as it did in West Germany.[39] We must also take into account that in the GDR the promotion of certain Olympic sports meant that new regional sporting traditions were 'invented', while others that had been around for decades were discontinued in order to tailor the sporting landscape to Olympic needs. Thus ice hockey, in which the GDR had enjoyed international success, was wound down, and many players were switched over to speed skating.[40]

The sport played by the security forces and the army was an artificial Soviet import, and those who took part counted as elite athletes

[36] Ibid.

[37] The research project on the history of football in the GDR was conducted between 2015 and 2017 by the University of Münster, the Zentrum deutsche Sportgeschichte in Berlin-Brandenburg, and the Centre for Contemporary History (ZZF) Potsdam.

[38] Militärarchiv Freiburg. DVP3-13/14699.

[39] Jan Palmowski, *Inventing a Socialist Nation: Heimat and the Politics of Everyday life in the GDR, 1945–1990* (Cambridge, 2009). Published in German as id., *Die Erfindung der sozialistischen Nation: Heimat und Politik im DDR-Alltag* (Berlin, 2016).

[40] See Jutta Braun, 'Thüringer Sportler in der Diktatur', in ead. and Barsuhn (eds.), *Zwischen Erfolgs- und Diktaturgeschichte*, 19–145, at 39–43.

in many areas. The conditions under which members of these non-civilian sports clubs of the army sports association Vorwärts and the sports association Dynamo trained were such that this organizational import from the Soviet Union resulted in a far-reaching militarization of sport in the GDR, something that was not experienced in this form and to this extent in West Germany.[41] This included training centres and sports schools for children and young people that were described by contemporaries as 'children's barracks'.[42] After the Berlin Wall came down, the Dynamo clubs had a problem with their image as the former sports clubs of the GDR's security forces. But after an interim period as FC Berlin, BFC Dynamo went back to its familiar name from GDR times in 1999. Ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the name was, it seems, associated less with the Stasi taint than with the story of BFC Dynamo's success as GDR champion. Thus 'Dynamo', an element of the Soviet sporting tradition, has found its way into the sporting culture of unified Germany.

But over forty years, two different basic attitudes to sport had entrenched themselves so firmly in the two countries that the consequences could not easily be corrected after 1990. Since the 1950s, and even more from the 1970s, West Germany had widely promoted popular sport. In the GDR, however, despite Walter Ulbricht's well-known dictum 'sport once a week for everyone everywhere',[43] there was a notorious lack of popular sport because of under investment by the state. Yet on the basis of the Unification Act (*Vereinigungsgesetz*) of 21 February 1990, free associations could be established in the GDR again, and this was an important step in the emergence of an East German civil society.[44]

[41] The Bundeswehr's support of sport can be seen as reflecting the militarization of GDR sport.

[42] See the relevant chapter titles and descriptions in Hans-Georg Aschenbach, *Euer Held, Euer Verräter: Mein Leben für den Leistungssport* (Halle, 2012), 21–9.

[43] 'Für jedermann an jedem Ort jede Woche einmal Sport', *Neues Deutschland*, 5 June 1959.

[44] On the emergence of a civil society ('zivilgesellschaftlicher Aufbruch') and the re-differentiation ('Re-Differenzierung') of society in the unification process see Konrad H. Jarausch, 'Kollaps des Kommunismus oder Aufbruch der Zivilgesellschaft? Zur Einordnung der Friedlichen Revolution von 1989', in Eckart Conze, Katharina Gajdukowa, and Sigrid Koch-Baumgarten (eds.), *Die demokratische Revolution 1989 in der DDR* (Cologne, 2009), 25–45.

But forty years of divided German sport have left lasting traces in society. Grassroots sport in Germany is still clearly divided, with a marked difference between East and West. In the *Länder* of old West Germany an average of 32 per cent of the population took part in organized sports in 2013, while in the old East Germany the corresponding figure, at 15 per cent, was less than half. The deeper causes of this asymmetry are controversial and ultimately unexplained. The social turbulence precipitated by the process of unification is one factor that has been mentioned.[45] Yet long-term cultural influences, such as fundamental differences in the club culture of East and West, must also be considered as possible explanations. Thus the fact that 'passive membership', in which several family members join a club without all of them taking an active part, while traditional in the West, is still not common in the East, has been suggested as a conceivable explanation.[46]

III. *Sport in the History of Violence and Security*

Sport and violence have entered into a close and often fatal symbiosis since the nineteenth century.[47] In divided Germany, too, sporting events were often the focus of violence or efforts to prevent it.[48] We must, however, first agree on what manifestations of sport we are talking about: sport as 'war minus the shooting' (George Orwell) in relations between states; sport as an organizational structure and

[45] Jürgen Baur and Sebastian Braun (eds.), *Der vereinsorganisierte Sport in Ostdeutschland* (Cologne, 2001), 138, 141; see also eid., *Freiwilliges Engagement und Partizipation in ostdeutschen Sportvereinen: Eine empirische Analyse zum Institutionentransfer* (Cologne, 2000); Jürgen Baur, Uwe Koch, and Stephan Telschow, *Sportvereine im Übergang: Die Vereinslandschaft in Ostdeutschland* (Aachen, 1995).

[46] Findings of the first conference on grassroots sports in the state capital of Potsdam, held at the University of Potsdam, 11 Dec. 2012.

[47] On this see Eric Dunning, 'Gewalt und Sport', in Wilhelm Heitmeyer and John L. Hagan (eds.), *Internationales Handbuch der Gewaltforschung* (Wiesbaden, 2002), 1130–52.

[48] Jutta Braun, 'Vom Troublemaker zum Integrationsstifter? Fußball und Gewaltprävention in Deutschland vor und nach 1989', *Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History*, 15 (2008), 302–28.

stronghold of structural violence; sport as a spectator event with the notorious 'third half' of fan riots; or the brutalization of game moves on the part of athletes, to mention just the main levels of meaning possible. From the twentieth century the national codification of a system of competition,[49] whether in the Olympic Games or international championships, predestined sport to provide the stage for political proxy wars. The GDR, which drew much of its self-confidence from success in elite sport, wanted to see athletes and fighting troops doing their duty as more or less the same thing, and not only symbolically. In 1971 it stated that 'class struggle on the sporting field' had reached such a degree that 'in principle, there is no difference between sport and the military'. All athletes, it went on, were to step up, like 'GDR soldiers' and 'draw the full conclusions in differentiating themselves with hatred from imperialism and its emissaries, even from the athletes of the FRG'.[50] Yet class hatred between West and East German athletes just did not happen.[51] The harsh consequences of this political demarcation advocated by the SED regime, however, were borne not by the West German athletes presented as hostile but—and this is a paradox of the Cold War in sport—by the East German athletes alone, as they were the only ones to whom the SED regime had direct access. They were patronized, controlled, and manipulated by their own state. Violence, which drew its legitimation out of a demarcation from the West and the prevention of contact with the 'class enemy', thus resulted in acts of psychological and physical violence directed against the protagonists of the GDR's own system, the East German athletes. These acts of violence included psychological *Zersetzung* (deliberate disintegration of personalities) and surveillance by the Stasi, forced doping, disciplining and punishment, and social ostracism or imprisonment.[52]

[49] Tobias Werron, *Der Weltsport und sein Publikum: Zur Autonomie und Entstehung des modernen Sports* (Weilerswist, 2010).

[50] Internal paper of the West Division of the Central Committee, 1971, quoted from Jochen Staadt, 'Die SED und die Olympischen Spiele 1972', in Klaus Schroeder (ed.), *Geschichte und Transformation des SED-Staates* (Berlin, 1994), 211–32, at 222.

[51] Braun, 'Thüringer Sportler in der Diktatur'.

[52] It is not clear whether murder should be included, for example, in the case of the footballer Lutz Eigendorf.

While the politically motivated harassment of East German athletes had no equivalent in the West, the story of doping can certainly be seen as a history of abuse in both East and West Germany. There was also pressure in West Germany, although perhaps it was not so direct, to enhance sporting performance in order to succeed.[53] But here, too, the different systems in East and West resulted in an overall distinction. The extent and systematic nature of the secretive state crimes committed by officials and coaches against young East German athletes had no precedent in West Germany.[54]

The criminal extent of doping experiments was addressed in German–German secret talks. After they had exchanged their experience of the devastating effects of anabolic steroids, for instance, sports doctors from East and West at a meeting in West Berlin expressed the hope that 'a convention against the use of anabolic steroids might be drawn up between East and West, something like the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)'.[55] The equivalence between 'supporting means' and weapons expressed here is unusually direct. The weapons in this case fatally turned against their users, as the doctors were clear that the long-term effects on the athletes 'were not foreseeable'.[56]

When there was talk in public of sport and violence during the Cold War, however, the focus was not on the athletes, but on the violent behaviour of fans during and around sporting events. The title of a pioneering 1982 study by the sociologist Gunter A. Pilz on fan culture and violence by fans, for example, is 'Sport and Violence'.[57] In the West this phenomenon was widely perceived in public, by academics, and the sport itself, but in the East it long remained swept under an ideological rug, first because violence was seen as alien to the nature of sport in a socialist society, and second because the right-

[53] On 'systematic doping' in the West see, most recently, Giselher Spitzer, Erik Eggers, Holger J. Schnell, and Yasmin Wisniewska, *Siegen um jeden Preis: Doping in Deutschland. Geschichte, Recht, Ethik 1972–1990* (Göttingen, 2013). This is the report of a research project conducted by the Humboldt University and commissioned by the Federal Institute of Sports Science.

[54] Giselher Spitzer, *Doping in der DDR: Ein historischer Überblick zu einer konspirativen Praxis. Genese, Verantwortung, Gefahren* (Cologne, 1998).

[55] *IM Philatelist*, 23 Mar. 1977 and 30 Mar. 1977. AIM 16572/89.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Gunter A. Pilz et al., *Sport und Gewalt: Berichte der Projektgruppe 'Sport und Gewalt' des Bundesinstituts für Sportwissenschaft* (Schorndorf, 1982).

wing extremist context of outbreaks of violence was not meant to exist in the East German 'anti-fascist' state.[58]

Beyond the prosecution of violent criminals, the problem remained largely unprocessed in the state-oriented GDR, while in West Germany a number of initiatives emerged. From the 1980s, for instance, 'fan projects' with a social and educational mission were set up, often in conjunction with university departments of sport and social science, and they trained volunteers to work with fans bent on violence. In the Federal Republic security policy experts also got involved. For example, the final report of the Independent Governmental Commission on Preventing and Combatting Violence, presented in 1990, also contained thoughts about violence in football stadiums.[59] And, finally, organized sport early showed itself aware of the danger of xenophobic abuse and attacks by groups of right-wing fans. In 1983, for example, the DFB cast national player Lothar Matthäus as the voice of reason when Germany was playing against Turkey in West Berlin, and radical right-wing fans mobilized against the 'Turkish pack' in the city. In an open letter, the international football player called on German fans not to follow the 'neo-Nazis', pointing out that their Turkish fellow citizens 'were not to blame for unemployment'.[60] While sport, the security forces, and academically sponsored fan projects acted largely independently of each other until 1989, this changed very quickly during the period of transformation after 1990. In the *Kontrollloch* after the collapse of the SED regime,[61] when authority broke down, fan violence in particular escalated to an unprecedented extent in the East. After a policeman shot a hooligan dead, the DFB, concerned at the possibility of incidents, cancelled the Festival of German Football in Leipzig at short notice.

[58] See Jutta Braun and Hans Joachim Teichler, 'Fußballfans im Visier der Staatsmacht', in Hans Joachim Teichler (ed.), *Sport in der DDR: Eigensinn, Konflikte, Trends* (Cologne, 2003), 561–86.

[59] Hans-Dieter Schwind et al. (eds.), *Ursachen, Prävention und Kontrolle von Gewalt: Analysen und Vorschläge der Unabhängigen Regierungskommission zur Verhinderung und Bekämpfung von Gewalt (Gewaltkommission)*, 4 vols. (Berlin 1990).

[60] Braun, 'Vom Troublemaker zum Integrationsstifter?', 312.

[61] Walter Süß, 'Zur Wahrnehmung und Interpretation des Rechtsextremismus in der DDR durch das MfS', in Heinrich Sippel and Walter Süß, *Staatssicherheit und Rechtsextremismus* (Bochum, 1994), 1–105, 111.

This was to have celebrated the organizational unification of football in November 1990.[62] What followed was a broadly based co-operation between fan projects, now extended to East Germany, and organized sport, in order to gain control of the situation in and around the football stadiums. And in 1994 a file 'Gewalttäter Sport' (Violent Offenders Sport) was created as an effective instrument of security policy. Since then, it has repeatedly given data protection activists cause for complaint.[63]

It was not only the perception of violence, but also the understanding of security in the two German states and their sports systems that differed fundamentally. The SED leadership was mainly worried about securing the GDR against Western infiltration and preventing people from fleeing the country (*Republikflucht*). If a figurehead of the socialist system and ideological idol preferred to move to the West and pursue a career in the land of the class enemy, the East German leadership saw this as seriously damaging the GDR's image. This meant that the Stasi had a wide range of duties in the field of sport. From 1971 athletes were watched at training, and their private lives were systematically monitored.[64]

Responses to the situation in the sports stadiums also followed a different logic in the two Germanies. While the GDR's security services and forces of order also had to deal with rioting fans, they saw another type of problem fan as a much greater danger, namely, those who chanted German–German greetings and identified as camp followers of Bundesliga teams or the German national team. In addition to criminalization and political repression, the state resorted to bizarre preventive measures, such as the Ministry of State Security buying up all the tickets in order to prevent unwanted fraternization between Eastern and Western fans at matches.[65] The notion of stadium securi-

[62] Ibid. 317.

[63] Thomas Kehr, *Datei Gewalttäter Sport: Eine Untersuchung der Rechtsgrundlagen des BKAGs unter besonderer Berücksichtigung datenschutzrechtlicher und verfassungsrechtlicher Aspekte* (Baden-Baden, 2015), 47.

[64] Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic (BStU) (ed.), *MfS und Leistungssport: Ein Recherchebericht* (Berlin, 1994), 56–84.

[65] Jutta Braun and René Wiese, 'DDR-Fußball und gesamtdeutsche Identität im Kalten Krieg', *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung*, 30/4 (2005), 191–210.

ty therefore had an extra level of meaning in the GDR,[66] something that was unknown in the Federal Republic and had no basis in unified Germany.

IV. *The Culture of Memory and Processing the Past*

Sporting events in East and West Germany generated stories and structures that have entered public consciousness as sites of memory. It is striking how often political horizons of meaning were associated with them, in both divided and unified Germany. They include the 'miracle of Berne',[67] 'Sparwasser's goal',[68] and sporting events such as the Ride of Peace in the GDR, and the attempt to stage the Munich Olympics in 1972 as the 'cheerful Games' (*heitere Spiele*).[69] Sporting personalities, too, attracted a political charge. This applied to Täve Schur as a personification of the 'socialist collective spirit',[70] Fritz Walter as the embodiment of the Economic Miracle, and the boxer Henry Maske in his incarnation as the symbol of united German sport.[71]

[66] Eckart Conze, *Geschichte der Sicherheit: Entwicklung, Themen, Perspektiven* (Göttingen, 2018), 157–9, also points out that different concepts of security applied in the GDR and the FRG, although he focuses mainly on social security.

[67] Peter Kasza, *1954 – Fußball spielt Geschichte: Das Wunder von Bern* (Bonn, 2004).

[68] Martin Sabrow lists Sparwasser's goal as a site of memory for the DDR. See Christoph Dieckmann, 'Sparwassers Tor', in Martin Sabrow (ed.), *Erinnerungsorte der DDR* (Munich, 2009), 351–62. The all-German selection *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*, however, gives the Bundesliga as the sporting anchor. See Gunter Gebauer, 'Die Bundesliga', in Etienne Francois and Hagen Schulze (eds.), *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte: Eine Auswahl* (Munich, 2005), 463–76.

[69] Kay Schiller and Christopher Young, *München 1972: Olympische Spiele im Zeichen des modernen Deutschland* (Göttingen, 2012).

[70] Norbert Rossbach, '"Täve": Der Radsportler Gustav-Adolf Schur', in Silke Satjukow and Rainer Gries (eds.), *Sozialistische Helden: Eine Kulturgeschichte von Propagandafiguren in Osteuropa und der DDR* (Berlin, 2002), 133–46.

[71] Along with Max Schmeling, in 1990 Henry Maske fronted a poster campaign to promote 'a public spirit for civic engagement for the creation of inner unity'. He campaigned for German unity with the slogan 'No sooner was the Berlin Wall opened than we became friends'.

Yet from the point of view of understanding the value systems on which East and West German sports were built, it is instructive to look at those who were excluded. The GDR produced an impressive gallery in this respect. As a rule, these were athletes who did not conform with the system. Their erasure from public memory via a *damnatio memoriae* could take many forms. Thus Jürgen May, star middle-distance runner, was given a lifetime ban after he was involved in advertising for the Western footwear firm Puma and fell out of political favour. He was also removed from *Junge Welt* as the 'Sportsperson of the Year 1965' elected by readers, and subsequently replaced with the runner-up, footballer Peter Ducke. Wolfgang Thüne, gymnast and individual silver medallist in the 1974 world championships, was cut out of team photos after he escaped to the West. The memorial for ski-jumper Hans Georg Aschenbach, erected in his home village of Oberhof, was demolished after his desertion, and the renegade swimmer Jens Peter Berndt was deleted from the record lists. This practice did not stop in East Germany even after the fall of the Berlin Wall. When the swimmer and gold medallist Rica Reinisch co-operated in facing the issue of GDR doping in the 1990s, her picture was removed from her home swimming pool in Dresden.[72] But there were also individuals who broke the unwritten rules in the FRG, such as Toni Schumacher, who revealed doping practices in West German football in his book *Anpfiff*.[73] Even today, there are only a few former elite athletes in the Federal Republic who openly admit that they participated in performance enhancement in West German sport.

Some East German sports stars, in particular, Katarina Witt, became symbols of *Ostalgie* after 1990,[74] but there was also criticism of the fact that along with many East German trainers and coaches, doping and the taint of Stasi association had found their way into the sporting world of unified Germany.[75] The culture of memory in the

[72] On these examples see Jutta Braun and René Wiese, 'Tracksuit Traitors: Eastern German Top Athletes on the Run', *International Journal of the History of Sport*, 12 (2014), 1519–34. Information given to the author by Rica Reinisch, 29 Mar. 2017.

[73] Harald 'Toni' Schumacher, *Anpfiff: Enthüllungen über den deutschen Fußball* (Munich, 1987).

[74] From 2003 ice-skating star Katarina Witt hosted the 'GDR-Show' on the German television channel RTL.

[75] 'Trainer in Konfrontation', *Berliner Zeitung*, 10 Dec. 1991; Herbert Fischer-

sporting community of present-day unified Germany is still struggling with the GDR past. While the involvement of elite athletes with the Nazis generally did not prevent their inclusion in the Hall of Fame of German sport, disputes regularly flared up when East German star athletes were nominated. This happened most recently in the summer of 2017, when the controversy about 'Täve' Schur showed just how strong social polarization still is in relation to some of the former idols of the East as role models or diehards.[76]

With regard to structural violence in elite sport, the GDR's experience of dictatorship set new standards. In the 1990s violent crimes committed by the former communist state sports apparatus were being prosecuted by the justice system in the FRG in cases that were unique worldwide.[77] Sport was thus one of the few areas of the GDR past in which history was 'on trial',[78] and various actors were brought to justice. Yet it was not only in the prosecution of perpetrators that the process of facing up to the crimes of GDR sport was innovative; the treatment of the victims also produced something new. The Federal Office of Administration (*Bundesverwaltungsamt*) introduced a new, sports-related category of victim, that of the 'officially recognized victim of doping'. Athletes who had 'unknowingly' been given drugs could be eligible for a one-off compensation payment.[79]

Solms, 'IM Torsten: Der Stasi-Fall des Eislauf-Trainers Ingo Steuer', *Deutschland Archiv*, 2 (2006), 197–200.

[76] The controversy was sparked mainly by Heike Drechsler's alleged past involvement in doping and Gustav-Adolf Schur's remarks playing down the GDR's doping system. 'Täve Schur lebt bis heute sportliche Ideale vor', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 20 Apr. 2017; 'DDR-Radler "Täve" Schur muss draußen bleiben', *FAZ*, 28 Apr, 2017; 'Es braucht keine Ehrenhalle', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 27 Apr. 2017.

[77] On the extent of the doping trials see Klaus Marxen, Gerhard Werle, and Petra Schäfter, *Die Strafverfolgung von DDR-Unrecht: Fakten und Zahlen* (Berlin, 2007). According to this book, charges were laid or an application for a penalty was filed in a total of 38 cases related to doping. A total of 47 convictions resulted in 30 fines and 17 people released on probation. Ibid. 28, 43.

[78] Norbert Frei, Dirk van Laak, and Michael Stolleis, *Geschichte vor Gericht: Historiker, Richter und die Suche nach Gerechtigkeit* (Munich, 2000).

[79] This is a category that applies only to former East German athletes, although some West German athletes also see themselves as victims of 'systemic doping' in the Federal Republic.

In addition, a self-help association for victims of doping was set up in 1999. This relatively late date compared with other groups was probably because victims of doping were not, as a rule, victims of political persecution like other victims of SED injustice. On the contrary, many of those affected had, as elite athletes, acted as popular figureheads for the system. In 2018 a fierce debate arose about the justification of their claims, not because they had been used by the political system, but because of their knowing participation in sports fraud.

In this context, a concept used in research also came in for criticism: forced doping. In essence, this suggests that because of their integration into a repressive system, athletes in the GDR were exposed to far greater pressure to take part in these programmes than their Western counterparts. Werner Franke, leading expert in performance-enhancing drugs and one of the strongest critics of drug abuse in sport, initiated the doping trials in 1995 by bringing charges against doctors and sports officials. Regarded as the voice of truth in German sport, he has recently argued that the notion of forced doping should not be allowed to obscure that of individual responsibility.[80] This public discussion was provoked by the case of the Olympic icon Christian Schenk who admitted, after years of denial, that he had voluntarily and knowingly taken performance-enhancing drugs in the GDR, but had nevertheless considered seeking compensation as a 'victim of doping' because of his physical impairment.[81] The value system of the sport in which he is clearly seen as a cheat and thus as a 'perpetrator', here collides with the standards for evaluating injustice in the GDR, under whose terms he could possibly also count as a victim, at least on the basis of his ties to a sports dictatorship.

By 1990 the process of dealing with the past had already developed a strong interactive dynamic between investigating doping in the East and the West. It achieved a vehemence and thoroughness

[80] For Werner Franke's criticisms see 'DDR-Doper sollen keine Entschädigung mehr erhalten', *Spiegel-Online*, 15 Nov. 2018 <http://www.spiegel.de/sport/sonst/doping-experten-fordern-aenderung-von-dopingopferhilfegesetz-a-1238550.html>, accessed 4 Feb. 2019. The dossier 'Black Box DOH' that criticizes the policies of the relief association for victims of doping is available online at <dopingalarm.de>, accessed 24 Jan. 2019.

[81] Christian Schenk and Fred Sellin, *Riss: Mein Leben zwischen Hymne und Hölle* (Munich, 2018).

that was hardly to be found in any other Western, let alone Eastern European state. The GDR's experience under a dictatorship whose doping system had been responsible not only for cheating in sport, but also for causing serious physical damage, resulted in moral indignation that ultimately also directed its critical gaze at current sports policy and its dark sides. The investigation of the failures of the SED dictatorship also led to the values of organized sport in the FRG being questioned. Thus sports associations and the German Olympic Sports Confederation were seriously put out when, in the new millennium, two East German sprinters had their records dating from GDR times and achieved by the use of drugs removed from the now all-German annals of sport.[82] They were calling for the next generation to be given a fair chance instead of being forced to measure themselves against unrealistic records. But by doing this, they were undermining the basic principles of 'higher, faster, further' and the accumulation of medals as the highest goal, even in the old FRG.

V. *Conclusion*

The history of division in German sport reveals that far beyond the top-class show battles of the Olympics, the sporting activities of both states were deeply influenced by their contrasting political systems. This applied to the internal organization of sport as either association-based or state-controlled, and has had a lasting impact, both structurally and in terms of the history of mentalities. Yet in the Cold War sport provided a socio-historically relevant bridge of understanding between East and West. Football and its fans, in particular, repeatedly managed 'to play around the Wall'. A unified Germany learned from the GDR's sporting dictatorship in various respects. On the one hand, the doping trials provided a retrospective glimpse into the abyss that opens up when performance maximization is pursued at any cost and without ethical standards. On the other, sports policy-makers were keen to imitate individual functional elements of the GDR sport system.

Only in one respect did they remain closed to a possible insight. Unified Germany, too, continues to follow the internationally accept-

[82] See Braun, 'Thüringer Sportler in der Diktatur', 83–105.

ed logic that successful top-level sport reflects the achievements of the entire community. But that the medal tally is not a reliable indicator of the prosperity, justice, or even freedom of a society—in this respect the GDR experience has provided a very clear historical lesson.

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BETWEEN THE BLOCS: THE TWO GERMAN STATES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 1955–1990

FRANZ-JOSEF MEIERS

I. *Introduction: Between Delineation and Entanglement*

Contemporary historians in the 1990s generally agreed to take a more integrated look at the history of divided Germany after the war.[1] But it is striking that studies concentrate on economic, technological, environmental, and socio-cultural developments,[2] while we still lack a comparative investigation of the classic areas of state activity, foreign and security policy. Since German unification, numerous studies have been published (in English and German) on the four areas that are relevant to the foreign and security policy of the two states: the role of the two German states in East–West crisis management; in NATO and the Warsaw Pact; in arms control; and in the project of building a common European home. But all deal almost exclusively with the Western or the Eastern part of post-war Germany.

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[1] Ulrich Mählert (ed.), *Die DDR als Chance: Neue Perspektiven auf ein altes Thema* (Berlin, 2016); Detlef Brunner, Udo Grashoff, and Andreas Kötzing (eds.), *Asymmetrisch verflochten? Neue Forschungen zur gesamtdeutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte* (Berlin, 2013); Frank Möller and Ulrich Mählert (eds.), *Abgrenzung und Verflechtung: Das geteilte Deutschland in der zeithistorischen Debatte* (Berlin, 2008).

[2] Frank Bösch (ed.), *Geteilte Geschichte: Ost- und Westdeutschland 1970–2000* (Göttingen, 2015); Tobias Hochscherf, Christoph Laucht, and Andrew Plowman (eds.), *Divided, but not Disconnected: German Experiences of the Cold War* (Oxford, 2010); Udo Wengst and Hermann Wentker (eds.), *Das doppelte Deutschland: 40 Jahre Systemkonkurrenz* (Berlin, 2008).

This essay is a response to Christoph Kleßmann's call for all three aspects of Germany's dual statehood—demarcation, parallels, and entanglements—to be analysed.[3] It will take a comparative look at similarities and differences in the attitude of the West German and East German governments to Nato's double-track decision. The main focus will be on whether the dangers of the nuclear age undermined the antagonism between the systems, encouraging the political leaders of the German Federal Republic (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to find specific German–German responses to the challenges which the East–West conflict posed for foreign and security policy in the 1980s. The essay will also look at the precarious geostrategic position of the two Germanies, situated both in the middle of the East–West conflict and on its borders, and ask what opportunities they had vis-à-vis the two superpowers, and where their scope for action was limited? It will look at how German–German chances to act changed over time. And, finally, the essay will investigate the spillover effects for German unification of the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The comparative analysis will concentrate on two decision-makers in Bonn and East Berlin who embodied specifically German–German similarities in the field of tension between competing systems, parallels, and entanglement that characterized their relations: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the FRG's Foreign Minister, and Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the GDR's ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED).

II. *The Federal Republic of Germany and NATO's Double-Track Decision*

The Alastair Buchan memorial lecture delivered by Helmut Schmidt on 28 October 1978 triggered a discussion in NATO about re-establishing a Eurostrategic balance. This culminated on 12 December 1979 in NATO's double-track decision, which was accepted by the alliance. Thus the FRG government was confronted with a double dilemma. The disintegration of the conditions for a policy of détente at the end of the 1970s cast doubt on its attempts to do away with the

[3] Christoph Kleßmann, 'Verflechtung und Abgrenzung: Aspekte der geteilten und zusammengehörigen deutschen Nationalgeschichte', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 43/29–30 (1993), 30–41, at 30.

Eurostrategic imbalance by way of negotiations.[4] The double-track approach gave the Kremlin a chance to overturn the *Nachrüstung* (rearmament) part of the treaty at the negotiating table by mobilizing the West European public and without having to make any concessions of its own. As far as the Reagan Administration was concerned, the negotiating part was limited to eliminating military imbalances by upgrading or retrofitting its weapons. This was the essence of the zero option announced by President Reagan on 18 November 1981, namely, to secure the deployment of mid-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe by raising demands that the Kremlin could not accept.

Similarly, the NATO double-track decision exposed the different foreign policy priorities within the FRG's governing coalition. The West German Foreign Office stressed the use of the deployment part, pointing out that rearmament was an inevitable response to the balance being disturbed by Soviet pre-deployment with medium-range nuclear missiles.[5] The West German Chancellery and Ministry of Defence, by contrast, argued politically, making a decision for deployment dependent on the outcome of arms control negotiations.[6] With the disintegration of rearmament and arms control as a result of the drastic deterioration in relations between the two superpowers when Reagan took office, and with the INF negotiations stalled in Geneva as expected, as the result of Reagan's zero option, the arms control part began to turn against its main protagonist. Despite threats to resign, Schmidt was unable to implement both elements of

[4] Helmut Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte* (Berlin, 1987), 230–2; Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Erinnerungen* (Berlin, 1995), 414–18, 421–4, 429–33.

[5] Genscher called this 'firmness when it matters', and 'a realistic policy of détente' building on 'an adequate defence capability'. With the 'revolution' in European policy introduced by Gorbachev's 'new thinking', Genscher's maxim became 'competitive assistance is better than an arms race'. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 475; Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 'Meine persönliche Bilanz? Dankbarkeit', *Bonner General-Anzeiger*, 2 Oct. 2010, online at <http://www.general-anzeiger-bonn.de/news/Hans-Dietrich-Genscher-Meine-pers%C3%B6nliche-Bilanz-Dankbarkeit-article28899.html>, accessed 1 Feb. 2019.

[6] Helga Haftendorn, *Sicherheit und Entspannung: Zur Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1955–1982* (Baden-Baden, 1983), 595; ead., *Sicherheit und Stabilität: Außenbeziehungen der Bundesrepublik zwischen Ölkrise und NATO-Doppelbeschluss* (Munich, 1986), 115.

the NATO double-track decision within his own party.[7] The open differences between Schmidt and the Party leadership around its chairman Willy Brandt and Herbert Wehner, chairman of the parliamentary group, on a central issue of German security policy led to the breakdown of the social–liberal coalition. On 1 October 1982 the German *Bundestag* passed a vote of no confidence in the Chancellor with the support of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP), and elected Helmut Kohl as the new Federal Chancellor.[8]

Despite strong protests at home, the Kohl/Genscher government upheld the NATO double-track decision. On 22 November 1983 the German *Bundestag* voted 286 to 226 with 39 abstentions to support 'the decision of the Federal Government to start the deployment process on time, in line with its obligation deriving from the second part of the NATO double-track decision'.[9] The Kremlin took the *Bundestag*'s decision as a reason to suspend the INF negotiations indefinitely one day later. After a year of waiting, on 22 November 1984, the US and Soviet governments agreed to launch 'new negotiations' on a range of issues relating to nuclear and space weapons. At a meeting in Geneva on 7–8 January 1985 the two foreign ministers agreed to hold Nuclear and Space Talks (NST). All questions raised in the three working groups on space, intercontinental, and medium-range weapons were to be 'considered in their interrelationship and resolved'.[10] One day after the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) elected Mikhail Gorbachev General Secretary on 11 March 1985, the NST negotiations began in Geneva.

The third phase of the INF negotiations was decisively influenced by Gorbachev's 'new thinking'. Based on an awareness of a growing

[7] Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte*, 292; Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 414, 467–8, 476.

[8] Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte*, 334; Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 453–64; Werner Link, 'Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik in der Ära Schmidt 1974– 1982', in Wolfgang Jäger and Werner Link, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, vol. v, pt 2: *Republik im Wandel 1974–1982: Die Ära Schmidt* (Stuttgart, 1986), 275–432.

[9] Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 10/36, Bonn, 22 Nov. 1982, pp. 2590–2.

[10] George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years As Secretary of State* (New York, 1993), 519.

interdependence between the states of the world community and the irrationality of a nuclear war, Gorbachev made a series of fundamental changes in the Soviet Union's foreign and security policy.[11] 'Universal human interests' should unconditionally take precedence over 'class interests'. Adversaries were to become 'partners' who would 'look together' for ways to guarantee 'universal security'. Military doctrines should be 'exclusively doctrines of defence'. Armament should be limited to a 'reasonably sufficient minimum' for defensive purposes. The permanent arms race should give way to a drastic reduction in the military arsenals of East and West. Asymmetric reductions in conventional and nuclear weapons were recognized as a binding principle for arms control negotiations.[12] The 'new thinking' put the implementation of a 'constructive and inclusive dialogue' at the centre of inter-state relations.[13] Recognizing 'the priority of humanity's survival', Gorbachev no longer saw security as a zero-sum game. Rather, he regarded it as a shared concern: security could only be achieved with, not against, the West.[14]

The 'new political thinking' was reflected in practical steps,[15] whose main beneficiaries were the arms control negotiations in Geneva, which had been suspended until March 1985. In order to cut the 'Gordian knot' at the INF negotiations,[16] Gorbachev in principle agreed to Reagan's zero option at the Reykjavik summit in October 1986.[17] In April 1987 he went a step further, offering to include nuclear weapons with a shorter range (500 to 1,000 km) on a global basis.[18] Gorbachev's willingness to make far-reaching concessions[19]

[11] Michail Gorbatschow, *Die wichtigsten Reden* (Cologne, 1987), 173, 179.

[12] Id., *Perestroika: Die zweite russische Revolution* (Munich, 1987), 179, 181–2, 337.

[13] Ibid. 188.

[14] Ibid. 186.

[15] Ibid. 176.

[16] Gorbatschow, *Die wichtigsten Reden*, 18.

[17] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 759, 765–6, 775.

[18] Ibid. 890–1.

[19] Gorbachev also agreed to exclude the problem of third countries—the inclusion of French and British nuclear weapons and the American FBS systems stationed in Western Europe—and a link between the INF Treaty and the termination of the American SDI programme. Finally, he accepted the US demand for far-reaching verification measures. Svetlana Savranskaya and

paved the way for the INF Treaty, which he and Reagan signed on 8 December 1987 during their third summit in Washington. It committed the USA and the Soviet Union to eliminate all long-range (LRINF) and short-range (SRINF) ground-based missiles and cruise missiles within three years.[20]

The double zero option proposed by Gorbachev in the spring of 1987 put the government of the FRG into an 'extremely difficult position with regard to domestic and foreign policy'.[21] While the FDP under Foreign Minister Genscher actively supported the inclusion of the *Bundeswehr*'s 72 Pershing I A carrier systems in the INF Treaty,[22] critics in the CDU/CSU, such as Bavarian Minister President Franz-Josef Strauß and Defence Minister Manfred Wörner, feared that a double zero option would remove another rung in the ladder of escalation, thus severely hampering the strategy of nuclear deterrence, given the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority.[23] For Genscher, by contrast, the double zero option provided a chance not only to eliminate clear Soviet superiority in nuclear medium-range weapons,[24] but also to stop 'the vicious circle of armament, counter-armament, and re-armament' and thus to signal 'a revolution in disarmament'. In a further step, this would lead to a reduction in the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority.[25] The US government was unwilling to allow the conclusion of the INF negotiations, which was within reach, to fail on account of what it saw as the less significant issue of the Pershing I A missile.[26]

Thomas Blanton (eds.), *The INF Treaty and the Washington Summit: 20 Years Later,* National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 238 (Washington, DC, 10 Dec. 2007, online at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/ NSAEBB238/index.htm>, accessed 1 Feb. 2019.

[20] A total of 677 LRINF and 169 SRINF US systems, and 889 LRINF and 957 SRINF Soviet systems fell under the terms of the treaty.

[21] Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 567.

[22] Ibid. 564, 567, 572, 580.

[23] Franz-Josef Strauß, *Erinnerungen* (Berlin, 1989), 513–16; Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 565–80.

[24] In Genscher's opinion, it would have been to Germany's advantage if the lower limit for SRINF had been 150 km instead of 500. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 562–3.

[25] Ibid. 566–7, 572–3, 575.

[26] Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 898–9; Paul Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost:*

After weeks of 'serious controversy' which took the coalition to the edge of 'collapse',[27] Chancellor Kohl announced his readiness, on 26 August, to dismantle the seventy-two systems that fell under German jurisdiction,[28] just fifteen days before the last medium-range missiles were disposed of. He called on the Soviet leadership to halt the ongoing modernization of short-range nuclear missiles (SNF) with a range of up to 500 km. The existing imbalance was to be reduced, in negotiations, to the lowest possible level and with equal upper limits.[29] Officially, this was a decision taken autonomously by the West German government, but as the warheads were under US control, there was ultimately nothing for Bonn to decide. As the US government expected of its loyal ally, Kohl complied with what the USA had decided in response to his initial concerns at the INF negotiating table.[30]

With the double zero option, the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles and battlefield weapons resolved by the NATO Defence Ministers in Montebello on 23 October 1983 became the focus of deliberations in the alliance. These nuclear weapons systems emphasized the FRG's special position in both geographical and political terms. Because of their short range, they threatened the German population and German territory, both East and West. In contrast to the dispute about the Pershing I A, there was broad consensus right across the political spectrum rejecting the alliance's plans for modernization.[31] The chairman of the CDU/CSU parlia-

At the Center of Decision. A Memoir (New York, 1989), 442–3.

[27] Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 569, 712.

[28] Ibid. 572, 541; Helmut Kohl, *Erinnerungen 1982–1990* (Munich, 2005), 550.

[29] Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 575–6.

[30] Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (London, 1990), 686; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 984 n. 1. Cf. Wolfram Hanrieder, *Deutschland, Europa, Amerika: Die Außenpolitik der Bunderepublik Deutschland 1949– 1994* (2nd edn. Paderborn 1995), 97–9; Helga Haftendorn, *Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung 1945– 2000* (Stuttgart, 2001), 307.

[31] The coalition partners had not decided whether the SNF negotiations should lead to a third solution. While Genscher basically endorsed this, Kohl initially ruled out such a result. Ronald D. Asmus, 'West Germany Faces Nuclear Modernization', *Survival*, 30/6 (1989), 499–514; Clay Clemens, 'Beyond INF: West Germany's Centre Right Party and Arms Control in the 1990s', *International Affairs*, 65/1 (1989), 55–74.

mentary group, Alfred Dregger, aptly expressed concerns about the Federal Republic being singled out for special treatment: 'The shorter the range, the more dead the Germans.'[32] Once again it was Genscher who advocated the abolition of all short-range nuclear systems. As far as he was concerned, it was a matter of continuing down the path paved by the INF treaty towards a 'broadly based disarmament process' and continuing the new 'dynamic' in East–West relations by withdrawing the land-based nuclear weapons remaining in Europe, without any 'ifs or buts'.[33] The West German government was able to achieve a first partial success at the NATO summit at the end of May 1988. A decision was postponed, and the communiqué mentioned modernization with the qualification 'where necessary'.

As his speech to the World Economic Forum in Davos on 1 February 1987 underlined,[34] Genscher firmly believed that Europe had reached a 'turning point' where security and stability could be created by far-reaching arms control agreements and the East–West relationship could be fundamentally changed politically. Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev opened up new chances to realize the vision of a European peace order or a common European home. Genscher warned the West that it would be committing 'a mistake of historic proportions' if it let this chance go by because it could not leave behind its old way of thinking that assumed only the worst case whenever it looked at the Soviet Union. The possibility of and responsibility for 'influencing, advancing, and shaping developments from our side' arose out of the 'new thinking'. His motto was: 'Let's take Gorbachev seriously. Let's take him at his word.'[35] 'Firmly anchored in the alliance',[36] the Federal Republic of Germany, he believed, could be the 'driving force' or the 'pacemaker' behind a

[32] German: 'Je kürzer die Reichweite, desto toter die Deutschen.' Alfred Dregger, 'Die Deutschen wollen keine Atomartillerie', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 5 May 1988; see also Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 556, 577, 604.

[33] Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 583.

[34] In his *Erinnerungen* he wrote that he 'was now absolutely certain about the real intentions of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze'. Ibid. 527.

[35] Ibid. 527; Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Unterwegs zur Einheit: Reden und Dokumente aus einer bewegten Zeit* (Berlin, 1991), 137–50.

[36] Genscher firmly rejected a policy of 'neutralism' because it would turn 'Germany into a factor for insecurity in Europe again, and into the object of power political realities'. Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 586.

process for overcoming 'the division of Europe, step by step', and creating instead 'a pan-European, just, and lasting peace order' in which 'German unity' could be achieved.[37] Looking at Erich Honecker's visit to Bonn in 1987, Genscher was convinced that a broadly based policy of co-operation could have an equally dynamic effect on German–German relations. It would deepen 'the feeling of a common past and a common future—that is, the sense of a common responsibility' in both parts of Germany.[38]

Gorbachev's startling announcement to the UN General Assembly, on 7 December 1988,[39] that the USSR would unilaterally implement far-reaching disarmament measures affecting both conventional and short-range nuclear weapons, along with the continuing political thaw in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, confirmed Kohl and Genscher in their resolve to press the alliance for an arms control policy solution to the problem of short-range nuclear weapons. In a speech to the *Bundestag* on 27 April 1989, Genscher referred to the dilemma which NATO's modernization plans presented for a German government. This modernization would involve nuclear systems 'which could reach the Polish and Czech people, who had suffered so much during the Second World War'. Similarly, these nuclear weapons would be able 'to reach the other part of our Fatherland'. As a minister, he said, he had taken an oath to 'devote all my strength to the good of the German people. This commitment does not end at the border that goes through the middle of Germany.'[40] In light of the encouraging political developments in Poland and Hungary, he concluded: 'Today the discussion about SNF proves to be even more ghostly than at the beginning of the year. Does one really want new missiles which are directed exactly against Lech Walesa's Poland and against Hungary on the way to democracy? Who can responsibly talk about the German question if he orders new nuclear missiles which will impact on the territory of the GDR?'[41] Poland and Czechoslovakia, as 'the first victims of German

[37] Ibid. 529, 527, 585.

[38] Ibid. 551.

[39] Excerpts from Gorbachev's speech to the UN General Assembly Session on Major Soviet Military Cuts, *New York Times*, 8 Dec. 1988.

[40] Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 11/140, Bonn, 27 Apr. 1990, p. 10325; Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 607, 608, 611.

[41] Interview with *Der Spiegel*, 25 Sept. 1989, 26–7.

aggression', would look at 'us, the Germans . . . and wonder how seriously the West was taking the idea of peace'.[42]

This argument, like the social–liberal coalition's new *Ostpolitik* in the late 1960s and early 1970s,[43] was based on national motives and provoked Washington's suspicions 'that the West German foreign minister was dangerously susceptible to the charms of Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking", excessively eager for good relations with Eastern Europe and personally obsessed with openings to East Germany'.[44] In the USA 'Genscherism' became synonymous with a willingness, based on illusions, to accommodate the Soviet Union.[45] The West German government's proposal of 20 April 1987 to start negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles was leaked to the press, and President George H. W. Bush and his national security adviser Brent Scowcroft called it 'a unilateral decision on an issue of such multilateral concern'. Bush was 'annoyed' with this 'unilateral move', which he saw as 'an example of how *not* to conduct alliance business'. He made it clear to Kohl that he did not want Bonn to confront him with 'a *fait accompli*' again. On the same day the NATO defence ministers confirmed that they would retain 'flexible nuclear forces across the entire spectrum and keep them up to date where necessary', while the West German government cast doubt on the 'mix of nuclear and conventional forces in Europe' with its negative attitude towards modernizing SNF.[46] Bush was determined not to let the West German government take control of this central issue of alliance policy. Until the spring of 1989 the US government was not prepared to give way to the West German government and agree to speedy disarmament talks about short-range missiles which, in its view, would lead NATO's strategy of deterrence onto the slippery slope of further

[42] Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 608, 615.

[43] Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, 1979), 405–12, 423–5, 529–34, 806–7, 809–10, 966–7; Christian Hacke, 'Henry Kissinger und das deutsche Problem', *Deutschland Archiv*, 8/9 (1975), 973–87.

[44] Flora Lewis, 'No Time for Politics', *New York Times*, 10 Mar. 1990.

[45] Jim Hoagland compared Genscher to a 'master contortionist', who distinguished himself by his 'craven enthusiasm for Gorbachev and his arms control policy'. Jim Hoagland, 'Genscher, Master Contortionist', *International Herald Tribune*, 18 Aug. 1988; cf. Emil J. Kirchner, 'Genscher and what lies behind "Genscherism"', *West European Politics*, 13/2 (1990), 159–77.

[46] George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York, 1998),

denuclearization. Instead, it made the start of negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons dependent on eliminating the imbalance in conventional weapons.[47]

To his critics, Genscher replied that they had not fully understood Gorbachev's new thinking. NATO could not 'stand against the course of history', could not block a process 'that had brought within reach developments that we in the West have been waiting decades for', namely, 'overcoming the division of Europe'.[48] With a view to the upcoming NATO summit, the governing coalition agreed on 18 April 1989 that a decision about modernizing the Lance short-range missile system would not be taken until 1991–2, 'in the light of developments in political and security policy'.[49] At the NATO anniversary summit in Brussels in late May 1989 NATO leaders and heads of government agreed to re-examine the issue of modernization in 1992 'in the light of overall security policy development'. The NATO foreign ministers had agreed to a compromise proposal of 'partial reductions' submitted by US Secretary of State James Baker as the target of the SNF negotiations.[50] Genscher could live very well with this resolution which, in theory, precluded a third zero solution, because for the present he had put a decision to modernize 'on ice'. 'A commitment to modernize without simultaneous negotiations' had become 'a commitment to negotiate without simultaneous modernization', as Genscher summed up the outcome of the summit.[51] His gamble paid off. With the changes of 1989–90, the question of modernizing short-range nuclear weapons became a footnote in the history of the alliance. On 3 May 1990 President Bush announced that the USA would not modernize the Lance short-range missile system (FOTL) or develop an air-based standoff missile, and that it would

67–71; James Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy* (New York, 1995), 87–8, 92.

[47] Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 60, 67, 71; Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 604.

[48] Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 593, 598.

[49] In a policy statement on 27 April 1989 Kohl confirmed the government's aim of 'reducing existing imbalances by implementing drastic reductions and agreeing on equal upper limits'. Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 11/140, Bonn, 27 Apr. 1989, pp. 10303, 10302.

[50] Baker, *Politics of Diplomacy*, 93–4; Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 82; Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 618–9; Kohl, *Erinnerungen*, 678.

[51] Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 618–19.

discontinue the modernization of the nuclear artillery that had already started.[52]

Genscher achieved his declared aim of preventing the modernization of short-range nuclear weapons by postponing the decision to 1992. A few months later he also achieved his real strategic goal: the opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 marked the beginning of a process that, 329 days later, led to German unification. The beneficiaries of an increasingly wider East–West co-operation were the Germans, who achieved unity in peace and freedom on 3 October 1990. German unification, surprising as it was with the opening of the Berlin Wall on that historically fateful day, was not a 'whim of fate, but the fruit of a laborious, long-term, and patiently pursued policy of overcoming the division of Europe with the aim of also ending the division of Germany', as Genscher put it.[53]

III. *The German Democratic Republic and NATO's Double-Track Decision*

NATO's double-track decision confronted the East German leadership with a politically sensitive challenge: the need to decide between subordination to Moscow and a willingness to engage in dialogue with Bonn. This balancing act became all the more difficult because at the beginning of the 1980s the balance in the GDR's relations with the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union had clearly shifted. To the extent that Moscow withdrew support from the GDR, especially in the area of energy supply, relations with the Federal Republic became all the more vital, particularly in the economic sphere.

Pointing the way, Leonid Brezhnev had explained to Honecker on 4 October 1979 how important it was 'that all the socialist countries form a united front on this question. Of course, the GDR's position plays a big part here.' Two days later he announced a 're-rearmament' if US medium-range weapons were deployed in Western Europe. Honecker endorsed the Kremlin's attitude. At the meeting of

[52] Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 268.

[53] Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 'Vorwort', in Richard Kiessler and Frank Elbe, *Ein runder Tisch mit scharfen Ecken: Der diplomatische Weg zur deutschen Einheit* (Frankfurt/Main, 1996), 7.

the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee on 15 May 1980 Honecker, like Brezhnev, condemned the NATO double-track decision as attempted blackmail by the West, 'which would considerably increase the chances of NATO forces in Western Europe using nuclear weapons against the Warsaw Pact states'.[54] On the crucial question of how to proceed vis-à-vis the West, the GDR did not yet have to declare its hand. While Schmidt was visiting Moscow in late June 1980, Brezhnev agreed to negotiate with the USA without preconditions.[55] This was in line with Honecker's advice, given to Schmidt to take to Moscow and dispensed at the funeral of Yugoslav president, Josip Tito, on 8 May 1980, that negotiations should precede any (re-)rearmament.[56] The second conclusion that he drew revealed differences with Moscow. While the Soviet leadership called for closed ranks to put pressure on Bonn, Honecker preferred the option of keeping in touch with the government of the FRG and doing whatever he could 'to prevent the international crisis affecting relations between their two states'.[57] Like Schmidt vis-à-vis Washington, Honecker felt exposed to Moscow's suspicions that he was working with Bonn to protect European détente from the disruptive influence of the two superpowers in order to pursue his own interests in German policy, which were contrary to the interests of the Soviet Union as the leading power in the Eastern bloc.

Honecker had a first partial victory for his damage-limitation policy at his meeting with Schmidt at Lake Werbellin in December 1981. Both agreed that in view of the threat emanating from Europe, the two German states had great responsibility for preserving the peace. 'German soil must never again give rise to war, but only to peace' was the core of their ideas on the 'coalition of reason' to which they had both, in a pioneering process, agreed.[58] Honecker's return visit to

[54] For Honecker's and Brezhnev's speeches see 'Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security: Collections', online at <http://www. php.isn.ethz.ch/lory1.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic1762.html?lng=en&id=17108&navinfo=14465>, accessed 1 Feb. 2019.

[55] Schmidt, *Menschen und Mächte*, 118.

[56] For the conversation between Schmidt and Honecker see Heinrich Potthoff, *Bonn und Ost-Berlin 1969–1982: Dialog auf höchster Ebene und vertrauliche Kanäle. Darstellung und Dokumente* (Bonn, 1997), 525.

[57] Ibid. 516.

[58] For the most important documents and memos on the talks see Detlef

Bonn, which had been agreed, had to be postponed several times because of resistance from Moscow. At a secret meeting in Moscow on 17 August 1984 General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko demanded that Honecker, his counterpart in East Germany, show unconditional loyalty to the bloc and called on him to renounce any independent German–German initiatives which had led the GDR to make 'unilateral concessions' to the FRG. 'In the situation that has arisen', he advised Honecker to 'refrain from making the visit'.[59] Adopting the role of an 'assistant' to the Soviet Union who had to resign in the case of a conflict,[60] which the Kremlin had assigned to the GDR, Honecker again cancelled his visit to Bonn planned for 4 September 1984.[61] For the Kremlin, the bone of contention was an accusation against Honecker which a member of the Politburo, Werner Krolikowski, had made in a letter to his Soviet comrades. Behind Honecker's back, it accused him of pursuing an 'irresponsible, double-faced, zig-zag policy', and claimed that pursuing German–German understanding was more important to him than showing loyalty to the Soviet Union's foreign policy.[62] Apart from a num-

Nakath and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, *Von Hubertusstock nach Bonn: Eine dokumentierte Geschichte der deutsch-deutsch-Beziehungen auf höchster Ebene 1980–1987* (Berlin, 1995), 57–73; Potthoff, *Bonn und Ost-Berlin*, 652–97.

[59] For the minutes of the meeting see Detlef Nakath and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, *Die Häber-Protokolle: Schlaglichter der SED-Westpolitik 1973–1985* (Berlin, 1999), 398–421.

[60] Egon Winkelmann, *Moskau, das war's* (Berlin, 1997), 27, 181, 235.

[61] Honecker had first cancelled a planned visit to Bonn on 28 Apr. 1983. The reason given was bad relations caused by the death on 10 April 1983 of a West German traveller in transit at the border crossing at Drewitz. Instead Honecker met the Bavarian Minister-President Franz-Josef Strauß in Castle Hubertusstock on 24 July 1983 for detailed political talks. Heinrich Potthoff, *Die Koalition der Vernunft: Deutschlandpolitik in den 80er Jahren* (Munich, 1995), 145–57; Nakath and Stephan, *Von Hubertusstock nach Bonn*, 132–44; eid., *Die Häber-Protokolle*, 353–60; Winkelmann, *Moskau, das war's*, 109; Strauß, *Erinnerungen*, 484.

[62] Peter Przybylski, *Tatort Politbüro*, vol. i: *Die Akte Honecker* (Berlin, 1991), 342, 347, 354–5. The same conclusion was drawn by a small group of conservative, Moscow-oriented Politburo members: Willi Stoph, Erich Mielke, and Alfred Neumann. Iwan Kusmin, 'Die Verschwörung gegen Honecker', *Deutschland Archiv*, 28/3 (1995), 286–90; Georgi Schachnasarow, *Preis der Freiheit: Eine Bilanz von Gorbatschows Berater* (Bonn, 1996), 142–3; Nakath and

ber of agreements worth millions,[63] what was at stake was a loan for billions, brokered by Strauß, which the GDR needed to avert impending insolvency.[64]

Honecker's zig-zag course was visible in the question of (re-)rearmament threatened by Brezhnev as early as October 1979. In view of the German *Bundestag's* decision on deployment, the CPSU Politburo had announced, on 12 May 1983, that it would move operational tactical missiles to the GDR and the Czecho-Slovak Socialist Republic (CSSR), and cruise missiles to the European part of the Soviet Union.[65] At a meeting of foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact in Prague on 6–7 June 1983 and at a summit of party chiefs in Moscow on 28 June 1983, Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer and Honecker endorsed the conclusion 'to reduce radically medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe on the basis of the principle of parity and equal security'.[66] In response to the Kohl government's determination to implement the rearmament part of NATO's double-track decision in case of a failure of the negotiated solution, the GDR National Defence Council (Nationaler Verteidigungsrat) announced on 25 October 1983 that its intention was 'to begin with preparatory measures for the deploy-

Stephan, *Von Hubertusstock nach Bonn*, 22–3, 49; Gerhard Schürer, *Gewagt und verloren: Eine deutsche Biographie* (Frankfurt/Oder, 1996), 179, 188; Günter Mittag, *Um jeden Preis: Im Spannungsfeld zweier Systeme* (Berlin, 1991), 35–7, 43, 112–14, 117.

[63] See Hermann Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen: Die DDR im internationalen System 1949–1989* (Munich, 2007), 421–2.

[64] Strauß, *Erinnerungen*, 470–9; Kohl, *Erinnerungen*, 173–90; Schürer, *Gewagt und verloren*, 156–8; Mittag, *Um jeden Preis*, 82–7; Manfred Kittel, 'Franz-Josef Strauß und der Milliardenkredit für die DDR 1983', *Deutschland Archiv*, 40/4 (2007), 647–56.

[65] Julij A. Kwitzinskij, *Vor dem Sturm: Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten* (Berlin, 1993), 322, 325.

[66] 'Kommuniqué der Tagung des Komitees der Minister für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages in Prag', 7 June 1983, 3, online at <http://www.php.isn. ethz. ch/kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/20337/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/8b89dfd6-8d10-4f98-aec5-006e25a8e2d1/de/070483_Communique_de.pdf>, accessed 13 March 2019; Gemeinsame Erklärung ('Moskauer Appell'), *Neues Deutschland*, 29 June 1983.

ment of tactical missiles'.[67] At a reception of Warsaw Pact defence ministers, Honecker added a qualifying statement, namely, that 'the GDR . . . will do everything in its power [to ensure] that a war will never be launched from German territory'.[68] At the International Karl Marx Conference on 11 April 1983 he had declared, as the 'order of the day', that

> all political and social forces genuinely committed to peace, irrespective of different political programmes, ideological positions, and religious faiths, will work together across class barriers and other divisions, to protect the peoples of Europe from the catastrophe of a nuclear war. . . . Defending peace as the highest good of mankind is the primary, common, and unifying interest. And a commitment to peace leaves a great deal of scope for mutually beneficial co-operation in a wide variety of fields.[69]

In an interview with *Stern* magazine published on 3 November 1983 Honecker admitted that 'we are not, of course, thrilled by the need for rockets to be deployed on GDR territory as a countermeasure'. If an approximate balance could not be maintained 'in any other way', he suggested, deployment should be kept to the 'lowest possible level'. And when relations between the two German states normalized further, he said, this would 'in any case have a positive effect on overall relations in Europe'.[70] Previously, in a letter to Chancellor Kohl, Honecker had suggested that 'no stone should be left unturned to prevent a new round of the nuclear arms race'. At the end of the letter he emphasized that 'a Europe free of nuclear weapons is, ultimately, the goal of the European people. In the name

[67] 'Mitteilung des Nationalen Verteidigungsrates der DDR', *Neues Deutschland*, 25 Oct. 1983.

[68] 'Erich Honecker empfing Komitee der Verteidigungsminister der Staaten des Warschauer Vertrages', *Neues Deutschland*, 21 Oct. 1983.

[69] His speech is printed in Erich Honecker, *Reden und Aufsätze*, vol. ix (Berlin East, 1985), 274–91, at 284–5; Erich Honecker, *Neues Deutschland*, 12 Apr. 1983.

[70] 'Besser nachverhandeln als nachrüsten: Interview Erich Honeckers für die BRD-Zeitschrift *Stern*', *Neues Deutschland*, 4 Nov. 1983.

of the German people, we endorse this goal.' In his reply, Kohl picked up on the phrase 'a necessary coalition of reason' used by Honecker and continued: 'All my efforts and all my commitment will go to help reason to prevail in all areas.'[71]

The appeal by both sides to the 'coalition of reason' lay behind Kohl's and Honecker's concern to minimize the damage to German–German relations cause by the hardening in American–Soviet relations, and to find commonalities wherever possible. Three days after the German *Bundestag*'s decision Honecker, at the 7th meeting of the Central Committee of the SED, confirmed the deployment of Soviet operational tactical missiles in the GDR in response to the deployment of US medium-range missiles in the FRG. But he added that this re-rearmament 'causes no rejoicing in our country'. Looking at German–German relations, he again stressed that his aim was 'to limit any damage as much as possible'. On the basis of existing agreements, 'the achievements should be preserved and . . . extended'.[72] In a telephone conversation with the Kohl on 19 December 1983, Honecker used the Chandellor's term 'community of responsibility' (*Verantwortungsgemeinschaft*) and expressed the hope that 'realism and reason' would really 'gain the upper hand' in East–West relations.[73] He explained what he understood by 'realism and reason' in an interview with the French weekly *Révolution* on 22 December 1983, where he expressed the expectation that 'sooner or later . . . negotiations will take place on a different basis, which will make it possible to find practical solutions'.[74]

In short, both East Berlin and Bonn insisted on ostentatiously displaying continuity in their mutual relationship, under the motto of co-operation instead of a 'new ice age'.[75] Not least because of the GDR's growing financial dependence on the FRG, it was imperative

[71] The letters are printed in Nakath and Stephan, *Von Hubertusstock nach Bonn*, 144–6, at 146, 155–9, at 155.

[72] Honecker's speech is printed in *Neues Deutschland*, 26–27 Nov. 1983. See also Honecker, *Reden und Aufsätze*, vol. x (Berlin East, 1986), 8–38, at 9.

[73] Nakath and Stephan, *Von Hubertusstock nach Bonn*, 159–70, at 159; Kohl, *Erinnerungen*, 277.

[74] 'DDR setzt Politik zur Sicherung des Friedens entschlossen fort', *Neues Deutschland*, 23 Dec. 1983.

[75] Honecker used the term 'new ice age' in his final remarks at the International Karl Marx Conference on 16 April 1983. Honecker, *Reden und Auf-*

for Honecker to stay in close contact with Bonn in the shadow of the medium-range nuclear missiles.

Honecker considered his policy of damage limitation vindicated by Gorbachev's readiness to resume a dialogue with the West and to agree far-reaching disarmament measures. In an interview with the *Saarbrücker Zeitung* he expressed unlimited support for Gorbachev's suggestions for disarmament. He welcomed a radical reduction or even total elimination of nuclear weapons as a necessary step towards removing the scourge of an 'atomic inferno'.[76] Honecker claimed his working visit to Bonn from 7 to 11 September 1987 as 'a significant political success for the GDR, an important result of its policy of reason and realism'. 'His active advocacy' of peace, disarmament, and détente, Honecker went on, left Kohl no other choice but to 'reiterate his support for a global double zero option in dealing with medium-range missiles'. Similarly, Honecker seemed to have achieved the long-held goal of 'independence and self-sufficiency' for the GDR 'in its internal and external relations' with the FRG.[77] Honecker saw the signing of the INF treaty and Gorbachev's willingness also to agree to asymmetric reductions in conventional armed forces as confirming his view that the policies of bridge-building, and of reason and realism had produced the hoped-for results. By agreeing to the double zero option 'without any ifs or buts',[78] he said, the 'devil's stuff' (*Teufelszeug*) had disappeared, and the 'nightmare of a nuclear war' had been removed from Europe and the two German states.[79]

sätze, ix. 292–5, at 295. See also Erich Honecker to Helmut Kohl, 5 Oct. 1983, in Nakath and Stephan, *Von Hubertusstock nach Bonn*, 144–6, at 146.

[76] 'DDR wirkt jederzeit aktiv für die Sicherung des Friedens: Interview Erich Honeckers für *Saarbrücker Zeitung*', *Neues Deutschland*, 13 Nov. 1985.

[77] 'SED-Politbürovorlage', 15 Sept. 1987, on Honecker's visit to Bonn, reprinted in Andreas Herbst et al. (eds.), *Die SED: Geschichte, Organisation, Politik. Ein Handbuch* (Berlin, 1997), 788–94.

[78] Thus Honecker in a speech to a meeting of the Political Advisory Committee in Berlin (East) on 28 May 1987. See Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security: Collections, online at <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/PHP/19214/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/04713d92-2251-4365-8ade-59e211447c9f/de/Speech_Honecker_1987_26p.pdf>, accessed 1 Feb. 2019, p. 52.

[79] Ibid. 46.

The large degree of agreement on security policy between the SED and the CPSU was reflected in the new military doctrine adopted at the end of May 1987 by the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee in East Berlin. Following the instructions of the CPSU's 26th Party Congress in February 1986, member states henceforth adopted the doctrine of 'sufficient defence capability'. To take a fundamentally defensive approach meant that armed forces could be reduced to a reasonable minimum, offensive forces broken up, and asymmetries in nuclear and conventional forces eliminated through armaments negotiations. Having established that in the nuclear age security was 'indivisible', the new doctrine concluded that security could only be guaranteed by working together. Thus the 'universal human interest' of protecting humankind from a 'nuclear disaster' was given precedence over class interest in socialism winning any future war.[80]

With the Warsaw Pact's Berlin Declaration, the process of rethinking its military mission and its philosophical foundations began to accelerate in the GDR. Following the logic of the new Warsaw Pact military doctrine, GDR academics at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy, the Institute for International Politics and Economics (IPW) in East Berlin, and the Institute for International Relations in Potsdam all came to the conclusion that 'peace based on hostile deterrence had to be replaced by a peace of understanding between the political opponents'. 'Peace', cutting across class barriers, 'was the primary, common, unifying interest.'[81] Even if the principles of the new military policy 'were not followed', and 'the new thinking did not overcome the political pressures and ideological blinkers . . . until

[80] The PBA's 'Berlin Declaration' on the new military doctrine is reprinted in *Neues Deutschland*, 30–31 May 1987; *Militärwesen*, 31/8 (1987), 3–6.

[81] Wolfgang Scheler, 'Neues Denken über Krieg und Frieden in der NVA', in Wolfgang Wünsche (ed.), *Rührt euch! Zur Geschichte der NVA* (Berlin, 1998), 508–25, at 518. Cf. Erhard Crome and Lutz Kleinwächter (eds.), *Neues Denken in der DDR: Konzepte zur Sicherheit in Europa in den 1980er Jahren* (Potsdam, 2014); Heiner Bröckermann, 'Zur Militär- und Sicherheitspolitik der SED am Ende der DDR', in Rüdiger Wenzke (ed.), *'Damit hatten wir die Initiative verloren': Zur Rolle der bewaffneten Kräfte in der DDR 1989/90* (2nd edn. Berlin, 2015), 17–42; Heiner Bröckermann, *Landesverteidigung und Militarisierung: Militär- und Sicherheitspolitik der DDR in der Ära Honecker 1971–1989* (Berlin, 2011), 715–51.

the social collapse of autumn 1989',[82] the debate between conservative and reformist groups contributed to the fact that the role of the two states working together within their alliances in seeking ways to protect common security was stressed. This was highlighted by the Palme Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security of June 1982 and the SED–Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) discussion paper of 27 August 1987, which had endorsed the concept of common security.[83] At home, in the light of the public protest movement which was taking to the streets of Leipzig and was active throughout the GDR in the late 1980s, the debate sent a message that forms of non-violent conflict resolution were being considered.[84]

Although the year 1987, when Honecker visited Bonn and his demand for disarmament and co-operation was fulfilled, marked the culmination of his political work, from then on he was only able to reap the rewards of anger. He faced four escalating challenges which sealed his political fate and, ultimately, that of the GDR.

First, Gorbachev's new thinking represented a fundamental change in relations with his Eastern European allies: the 'philosophy of the tank' was replaced by that of 'freedom of choice'. It was high time to understand that 'socialism cannot be based on bayonets, tanks, and blood'.[85] In his speech to the UN General Assembly on 7 December 1988, Gorbachev conceded to each socialist brother state 'freedom of choice' (*svoboda vybora*) to embark on the best path to socialism in accordance with national characteristics. In practical

[82] Wolfgang Schwarz, 'Neues sicherheitspolitisches Denken in der DDR (1980–1990): Das Institut für Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft', in Crome and Kleinwächter (eds.), *Neues Denken in der DDR*, 55–112, at 79.

[83] *'Common Security': Der Palme-Bericht. Bericht der Unabhängigen Kommission für Abrüstung und Sicherheit* (Berlin, 1982); Grundwertekommission der SPD/Akademie für Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim ZK der SED, 'Der Streit der Ideologien und die gemeinsame Sicherheit', *Neues Deutschland*, 28 Aug. 1987.

[84] Scheler, 'Neues Denken', 524; Wilfried Schreiber, 'Neues Denken in der NVA', in Crome and Kleinwächter (eds.), *Neues Denken in der DDR*, 139–200, at 173.

[85] The background to this was provided by the events of March and October 1956—traumatic for the Soviet Foreign Minister—when tanks were sent in against the civilian population of Tbilisi and Budapest. Eduard Scheward-

terms this meant abandoning the Brezhnev Doctrine,[86] by which the Soviet Union claimed the right to intervene militarily in socialist states if the Kremlin considered that the achievements of socialism were under threat, as in the Prague Spring in 1968.[87]

Its unequivocal rejection of the use of military force against allies exposed the GDR's 'basic existential dilemma',[88] namely, that its claim to power was at no time based on political and economic achievements, but on the presence of Soviet military forces in Germany (GSSD), the 'anti-fascist protective wall', an expanding repressive bureaucracy (MfS), and a growing foreign debt incurred to finance Honecker's increasingly expensive economic and social policies while the competitiveness of the GDR's national economy was in constant decline. By the end of the 1980s the GDR's leaders could no longer count on the Soviet Union to guarantee their state's existence. What Brezhnev had told Honecker in the summer of 1970 was still true in 1989: 'Erich, I tell you frankly, never forget that the GDR cannot exist without us, without the Soviet Union, its power and strength. Without us, there can be no GDR.'[89]

Second, the SED leaders made it clear that they were determined to continue on the path towards a unified economic and social policy which they had been following since 1971. They were prepared for

nadse, *Die Zukunft gehört der Freiheit* (Reinbek, 1991), 16, 60, 102, 121, 205, 215, 220–4.

[86] At the Warsaw Pact's Bucharest summit in July 1989, the Soviet Union officially revoked the Brezhnev Doctrine. See 'Communiqué of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee Conference, 7–8 July 1989 in Bucharest', in Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security: Collections, online at <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/kms2.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/ Files/PHP/102814/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/f8fc6bac-7342-48f2-8239-15e12b018af8/en/ Communique_1989.pdf>, accessed 1 Feb. 2019.

[87] Leonid I. Brezhnev, 'Speech by the Soviet Communist Party General Secretary at the 5th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, Warsaw, November 12, 1968', *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 20/46 (1968), 3–4; Matthew J. Ouimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2003); Daniel Küchenmeister and Gerd-Rüdiger Stephan, 'Gorbatschows Entfernung von der Breschnew-Doktrin', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 42/8 (1994), 713–21.

[88] Ingrid Muth, *Die DDR-Außenpolitik 1949–1972: Inhalte, Strukturen, Mechanismen* (2nd edn. Berlin, 2001), 52.

[89] Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, 394.

foreign policy commitment, but categorically excluded the possibility of *perestroika* and *glasnost* in the GDR.[90] Chief ideologist Kurt Hager summed this up in an interview with *Stern* magazine, posing a much quoted rhetorical question: 'If your neighbour was hanging new wallpaper, would you feel obliged to re-paper your flat too?'[91] As Gerhard Schürer, head of the Planning Committee, had recognized as early as 1972, the GDR could not finance a unified economic and social policy out of its own means. Instead of increasing the efficiency of the GDR's economy by structural reforms, the SED leadership raised foreign loans to finance higher imports of consumer goods. The result was that between 1971 and 1981 the GDR's foreign debt rose from 4.5 billion to 26 billion in Western currency (*Valutamark*).[92] At the beginning of the 1980s two events further exacerbated the already tense situation. High interest rates on the international financial markets forced the GDR to pay higher interest rates to roll over its debt. And in the summer of 1981 Brezhnev informed Honecker that oil deliveries to the GDR would be cut by 2 million tons annually. This meant that the GDR could export less refined oil products to the West, and thus had reduced foreign exchange receipts.[93]

For the GDR, continued co-operation with the FRG was necessary for its survival. At the start, the GDR could only avert bankruptcy by accepting bank loans guaranteed by the government of the FRG. According to Schürer's plan of October 1989, receipts from foreign exchange covered only 35 per cent of the *Valutamark* required for loan repayments, interest payments, and imports. Sixty-five per cent of expenditures were covered by new loans. By 1989 the GDR's debt in capitalist foreign countries had risen to 49 billion *Valutamark*; in the years that followed, its annual loans totalled 8 to 10 billion *Valutamark*. Schürer came to a devastating conclusion: 'Since the 8th Party

[90] See esp. Alexandra Nepit, *Die SED unter dem Druck der Reformen Gorbatschows* (Baden-Baden, 2004); Günter Sieber, 'Schwierige Beziehungen: Die Haltung der SED zur KPdSU und zur Perestroika', in Hans Modrow (ed.), *Das Große Haus: Erfahrungen im Umgang mit der Machtzentrale in der DDR* (2nd edn. Berlin, 1995), 71–95.

[91] 'Kurt Hager beantwortet Fragen der Illustrierten *Stern*', *Neues Deutschland*, 10 Apr. 1987; Kurt Hager, *Erinnerungen* (Leipzig, 1996), 384–6.

[92] Schürer, *Gewagt und verloren*, 123–7.

[93] Winkelmann, *Moskau, das war's*, 23, 90–7.

Congress, the GDR's debt in the non-socialist economic area has risen to levels that call the country's solvency into question.'[94] In early May 1988, the old SED leadership had categorically rejected Schürer's 'Reflections for Further Work on the National Economic Plan for 1989 and Beyond', which asked for a drastic reduction in the credit-financed import of consumer goods in favour of an increase in the gross investment rate, especially in the area of processing machinery.[95] Even though Egon Krenz, as the new General Secretary of the SED, 'took note' of Schürer's 1989 conclusions and 'worked with them',[96] time and options were no longer available. Honecker's catchphrase, 'Socialism in the colours of the GDR', however, did not develop the dynamic he projected for the period up to 2000.[97] On the contrary, attempts by the SED leadership to stabilize the GDR's economy by conservative system management ended in the virtual insolvency of an economically largely rotten system in the crisis year of 1989.[98]

Third, just as the leaders of the GDR were not prepared for a culture of discussion within the party, they were not willing to recognize the peace movement that emerged in the country in the late 1970s as a partner in the struggle for peace. In their commitment to détente and disarmament, the SED leadership saw an opportunity to strengthen not only the GDR's image as a power actively fighting for

[94] 'Analyse der ökonomischen Lage der DDR mit Schlußfolgerungen: Dokumentation der Politbürovorlage Gerhard Schürers vom 30. Oktober 1989', *Deutschland Archiv*, 25/10 (1992), 1112–20; Schürer, *Gewagt und verloren*, 216–21.

[95] Schürer, *Gewagt und verloren*, 152–6, 181–4, 203–6; Mittag, *Um jeden Preis*, 240–1, 259–60, 280–1, 284–5, 289–90, 307–8, 310–15, 332–3; Hans-Hermann Hertle, *Der Fall der Mauer: Die unbeabsichtigte Selbstauflösung des SED-Staates* (2nd edn. Opladen 1999), 34–41, 66–70, 143–8, 323–21; id., 'Der Weg in den Bankrott der DDR-Wirtschaft: Das Scheitern der "Einheit von Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik" am Beispiel der Schürer/Mittag-Kontroverse im Politbüro 1988', *Deutschland Archiv*, 25/2 (1992), 127–45.

[96] Schürer, *Gewagt und verloren*, 221.

[97] 'Bericht des Politbüros an die 7. Tagung des ZK der SED, Berichterstatter: Erich Honecker', *Neues Deutschland*, 2 Dec. 1988.

[98] See esp. André Steiner, *Von Plan zu Plan: Eine Wirtschaftsgeschichte der DDR* (Munich, 2004); Hans-Hermann Hertle, *Der Fall der Mauer*; Günter Kusch, Rolf Montag, Günter Specht, and Konrad Wetzker, *Schlußbilanz der DDR: Fazit einer verfehlten Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik* (Berlin, 1991).

peace on the international stage, but also their legitimacy with their own people. Instead, oppositional groups formed in reaction to the expectations for more freedom of movement and liberalization raised but not fulfilled by the GDR's leaders.[99] The Federation of Evangelical Churches in the GDR (Bund der Evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR), as the only major social organization tolerated by the SED outside the framework of democratic centralism, became the point of contact for these groups, dispensing advice and enabling communication.[100] The movement for leaving the GDR in the second half of the 1970s was followed in the early 1980s by the peace movement from below, which made peace an issue going beyond ideological and political claims by East and West.[101] As broad sections of GDR society were living under the impression that they were in a permanent economic and political crisis, the narratives of the exit movement and the autonomous peace movement converged in the late 1980s, and were adopted by large sections of the population which had not previously acted together against the SED state. The parts of the population that, as the 'silent majority', had so far kept out of politics were seized by an elemental rage at the prevailing conditions. The Alliance for Germany's victory in the elections for the GDR *Volkskammer* on 18 March 1990 was a clear signal that the silent majority, adopting the slogan 'We are *one* people', had placed their hopes and expectations on the West German model.[102] The new *Ostpolitik* introduced by the

[99] Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Peter Steinbach, and Johannes Tuchel (eds.), *Widerstand und Opposition in der DDR* (Cologne, 1999); Erhart Neubert, *Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR 1949–1989* (Berlin, 1997).

[100] Christian Hanke, *Die Deutschlandpolitik der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland von 1945 bis 1990* (Berlin, 1999); Gerhard Besier, *Der SED-Staat und die Kirche*, vol. iii: *Höhenflug und Absturz* (Berlin, 1995).

[101] Detlef Pollack, 'Zwischen West und Ost, Staat und Kirche: Friedensgruppen in der DDR', in Philipp Gassert, Tim Geiger, and Hermann Wentker (eds.), *Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung: Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive* (Munich, 2011), 269–82.

[102] Jens Gieseke, '"Seit langem angestaute Unzufriedenheit breitester Bevölkerungskreise": Das Volk in den Stimmungsberichten des MfS', in Klaus-Dietmar Henke (ed.), *Revolution und Vereinigung 1989/90: Als in Deutschland die Realität die Phantasie überholte* (Munich, 2009), 130–48; Helge Heidemeyer (ed.), *Opposition und SED in der Friedlichen Revolution: Organisationsgeschichte der alten und neuen politischen Gruppen 1989/90* (Düsseldorf, 2011); Steven Pfaff,

West German social–liberal coalition was based on a policy of change through rapprochement, that is, they gambled—successfully, as it turned out—on weakening the SED state from inside and transforming it peacefully, step by step, by more contact, communication, and co-operation.[103] The dynamism emanating from the policy of détente put an end to the SED's ideas of safeguarding the GDR's socialist future by means of a wide security net. Oliver Bange aptly summed up the causal connection: 'the GDR actually negotiated her own demise at Helsinki.'[104]

Fourth, Gorbachev's 'new thinking' in foreign and security policy deprived Honecker of his trump card, namely, presenting himself as the advocate of a policy of realism and reason in the shadow of the Soviet Union's policy of denial since the end of the 1970s. Since the West German government's support for the double-track decision at the latest, the GDR had become much less significant for the Kremlin. While Gorbachev did not veto Honecker's visit to Bonn, he did not leave the diplomatic floor to him. Honecker's trip to Bonn was preceded by Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker's visit to Moscow early in July. Gorbachev gave him a message for the Chancellor: 'The Soviet leadership feels that it is essential to rethink the relationship between the USSR and the FRG, and to lift it to a new level by a joint

Exit-Voice Dynamics and the Collapse of East Germany: The Crisis of Leninism and the Revolution of 1989 (Durham, NC, 2006); Konrad H. Jarausch and Martin Sabrow (eds.), *Weg in den Untergang: Der innere Zerfall der DDR* (Göttingen, 1999).

[103] Willy Brandt expressed the correlation between détente and transformation in the light of the dramatic changes in Central Eastern Europe: 'Civic freedom can hardly gain space without the "destabilization" of encrusted structures.' Willy Brandt, *Gemeinsame Sicherheit: Internationale Beziehungen und deutsche Frage 1982–1992*, ed. Uwe Mai, Bernd Rother, and Wolfgang Schmidt (Bonn, 2009), 368–9.

[104] Oliver Bange, 'The GDR in the Era of Détente: Conflicting Perceptions and Strategies, 1965–1975', in Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), *Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965–1985* (Copenhagen, 2010), 57–77, at 57; Hermann Wentker, 'Öffnung als Risiko: Bedrohungsvorstellungen der DDR-Führung infolge der Ost-West-Entspannung', in Torsten Diedrich and Walter Süß (eds.), *Militär und Staatssicherheit im Sicherheitskonzept der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten* (Berlin, 2010), 297– 318; Jens Gieseke with the assistance of Doris Hubert, *Die DDR-Staatssicherheit: Schild und Schwert der Partei* (Bonn, 2000), 40–86, at 68, 86.

effort. We are ready for this.' Alluding to the Russo-German Treaty of Rapallo (1922), Gorbachev declared at a Politburo meeting on 17 July that rapprochement between Bonn and Moscow was 'possible'.[105] In Kohl's view, the withdrawal of the US Pershing II medium-range missiles from the Federal Republic had had a positive effect on Gorbachev, 'one which could not have been predicted'. This concerned his personal relationship with Gorbachev.[106] Honecker overlooked that the withdrawal of the missiles had encouraged a rapprochement between Bonn and Moscow, and had displaced the GDR from the Kremlin's political radar. This change ultimately contributed to the Kremlin handing over the key for German unity to the Kohl/Genscher government at the decisive talks held in the Caucasus in mid July 1990.[107]

IV. *Conclusion: Peaceful Change*

The arguments about NATO's double-track decision reflect the pattern of competition, parallelism, and entanglement so characteristic of post-war relations between the two German states. Because of their precarious geostrategic position in the middle of the East–West conflict and on its borders, both German states faced the same fundamental security dilemma, namely, that they could not be defended, either with nuclear or conventional weapons, without running the risk of largely destroying what they were trying to defend. East and West German politicians and generals had been aware of this since the mid 1950s from their participation in NATO and Warsaw Pact manoeuvres. The system of nuclear deterrence that had developed between the two superpowers since the 1960s led to something that the two German states had in common, the view that 'German soil must never again give rise to war, but only to peace', as Schmidt and Honecker declared at their meeting at Lake Werbellin.

From the end of the 1970s the deteriorating relationship between the USA and the Soviet Union revealed a second feature that Bonn

[105] Alexandr Galkin and Anatolij Tschernajew (eds.), *Michael Gorbatschow und die deutsche Frage: Sowjetische Dokumente 1986–1991* (Munich, 2011), 46, 49–50.
[106] Kohl, *Erinnerungen*, 551.
[107] At this meeting Gorbachev no longer questioned an all-German membership of NATO.

and East Berlin had in common. Schmidt, Kohl, and Genscher, like Honecker, made every effort to remain in contact at all levels of the internal German communications network. They saw themselves as 'interpreters' or 'mediators' between the two superpowers with the declared aim of preserving what had been achieved so far in German–German relations. Like Kohl, Honecker stuck to his policy of promoting a 'community of responsibility' towards 'Europe and the German people', based on 'personal commitment'.[108] The aim was to expand co-operation between the two German states in all areas of politics, and to do everything possible to maintain peace in Europe and to protect humanity from a nuclear disaster.

The third shared feature presented itself to the two German states in a negative way and with a different weighting in each case. The double zero option, including the seventy-two Pershing I A missiles under German control, showed that Bonn had a very limited ability to enforce its ideas of security policy in the alliance if Washington had other priorities.[109] On the other hand, its demand for the decision to modernize nuclear short-range and battlefield weapons to be put on ice until 1992 was accepted by the alliance and at the NATO summit at the end of May 1989 in Brussels. What came to its aid in this was the 'overall development of security policy' in Eastern Central Europe, including the GDR, which had made any modernization of short-range nuclear weapons superfluous.

Honecker took a two-pronged approach that combined allegiance to Moscow with stronger co-operation with the FRG. He succeeded in protecting German–German relations from the crisis in international relations, and managed to conclude further agreements with Bonn, including the loan for a billion *Valutamark* guaranteed by the FRG government that was of existential significance for the GDR's solvency on international capital markets. Yet his policy of damage limitation and building bridges had a price. He had to accept the Soviet policy of (re-)rearmament, which provided for the deployment of operational tactical nuclear weapons on GDR soil. In addi-

[108] This is the assessment by the Permanent Representative in East Berlin, Hans-Otto Bräutigam, expressed in a telex dated 25 Nov. 1983. Karl-Rudolf Korte, *Deutschlandpolitik in Helmut Kohls Kanzlerschaft: Regierungsstil und Entscheidungen 1982–1989* (Stuttgart, 1998), 190, 567.

[109] Hanrieder, *Deutschland, Europa, Amerika*, 93, 97; Haftendorn, *Deutsche Außenpolitik*, 285, 291, 294.

tion, he had to bow to Moscow's veto and again cancel his already planned return visit in early September 1984. The conclusion of the INF treaty turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory for Honecker. While nuclear weapons were eliminated by the treaty, in the period that followed all that was left for him was to harvest the fruits of wrath caused by his policy of reason and realism.

The four strategic challenges which Honecker faced in the post-INF period clearly exposed the asymmetries between Bonn and East Berlin. Genscher, 'taking Gorbachev at his word', had made himself the champion of both the double zero option and a freeze on the Lance modernization. He saw his gamble pay off. System-opening co-operation in all areas of policy created, step by step, a 'complex network of relations' between East and West,[110] thanks to which the division of Europe was peacefully overcome and German unity achieved in consensus with the Four Powers on the basis of the Two Plus Four Agreement. Conversely, it could be argued that without the policy of change through rapprochement, without the 'Helsinki effect' which grew out of the CSCE Final Act,[111] without Gorbachev's rejection of 'tank philosophy' and the Brezhnev doctrine, and without a reduction of armaments to a sensible minimum for defensive purposes, the division of Europe and Germany would not have been achieved, and the social upheavals would have been violently crushed, as they had been in 1953, 1956, and 1968.[112]

The loser in these post-INF developments was Honecker, whose attempts to present the GDR as a state of peace and to renew a GDR version of socialist society did not stop his dwindling support among his own people from ebbing away altogether. In response to mass protests and a mass exodus, he had to resign from all his posts on 18 October 1989. The GDR's de facto insolvency and the opening of the

[110] Genscher, *Erinnerungen*, 609.

[111] Oliver Bange, 'Der KSZE-Prozess und die sicherheitspolitische Dynamik des Ost-West-Konflikts 1970–1990', in id. and Bernd Lemke (eds.), *Wege zur Wiedervereinigung: Die beiden deutschen Staaten in ihren Bündnissen 1970 bis 1990* (Munich, 2013), 87–104, at 87–8; Oliver Bange, *Sicherheit und Staat: Die Bündnis- und Militärpolitik der DDR im internationalen Kontext 1969 bis 1990* (Berlin, 2017), 241–99.

[112] Olav Njølstad, 'Introduction: The Cold War in the 1989s', in id. (ed.), *The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation* (London, 2004), pp. xi–xxiii, at xviii–xxii.

Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 meant that the days of the SED regime were numbered. This ineluctable development towards unification exposes the basic asymmetry between the foreign and security policy of the GDR and that of the FRG. The outcome for the GDR was determined and constrained by Moscow's imperial rule, West Germany's pull, and its own internal contradictions.[113] Going beyond this, our comparative analysis confirms Kleßmann's analysis that the tension between competition, parallelism, and entanglement in the post-war history of the two German states forms 'the specific profile of developments after 1945'. Without it, the evolution of the two German states, both internally and externally, 'cannot be understood'.[114]

[113] Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen*, 3–6, 69, 211, 233, 394, 556, 560, 563.
[114] Christoph Kleßmann, 'Spaltung und Verflechtung: Ein Konzept zur integrierten Nachkriegsgeschichte 1945 bis 1990', in id. and Peter Lautzas (eds.), *Teilung und Integration* (Bonn, 2005), 20–36, at 33; Kleßmann, 'Verflechtung und Abgrenzung', 30.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

WEIMAR TO COLD WAR: NEW BOOKS ON TWENTIETH-CENTURY GERMAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

EMILY A. STEINHAUER

UDI GREENBERG, *The Weimar Century: German Émigrés and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), ix + 276 pp. ISBN 978 0 691 15933 1 $US 37.50. £30.00 (hardback); ISBN 978 0 691 17382 5. $US 29.95. £24.00 (paperback)
NOAH BENEZRA STROTE, *Lions and Lambs: Conflict in Weimar and the Creation of Post-Nazi Germany* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), xii + 357 pp. ISBN 978 0 300 21905 0. $US 40.00. £30.00
HEINZ BUDE, *Adorno für Ruinenkinder: Eine Geschichte von 1968* (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2018), 128 pp. ISBN 978 3 446 25915 7. €17.00
ROBERT ZWARG, *Die Kritische Theorie in Amerika: Das Nachleben einer Tradition,* Schriften des Simon-Dubnow-Instituts, 27 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017), 464 pp. ISBN 978 3 525 37048 3. €49.99
STUART JEFFRIES, *Grand Hotel Abyss: The Lives of the Frankfurt School* (London: Verso, 2017), 448 pp. ISBN 978 1 784 78569 7. £18.99

The history of German political thought and ideologies is currently experiencing a moment of political urgency: comparisons, denials, and revisions are shaping public discourse and historians are increasingly under pressure to leave the confines of the academy and address a wider audience. Thus during the recent 'Historikertag', the Association of German Historians (VHD) published a resolution on current threats to democracy, arguing against populism and discrimination and in favour of democracy and pluralism.[1] At the same time,

[1] Verband der Historiker und Historikerinnen Deutschlands, 'Resolution of the Association of German Historians on Current Threats to Democracy

in a more reflective mood, historians and the public are looking back on the course of the twentieth century as a number of anniversaries converge. As far-right parties and movements are on the rise across Europe, seemingly defying the ability as much as the willingness to learn from the recent past, Germany battles with old concerns: Bonn might not have been Weimar, but would the 'Berlin Republic' see a revival of the factionalism and extremism that eventually undermined the democratic institutions of the inter-war period? Similar developments in the Anglo-American sphere call into question the longstanding transatlantic alliance, escalating the breaking apart of a shared value system based on 'consensus liberalism' that had shaped a formative part of the twentieth century.

As historically rooted values and narratives are increasingly disputed, discussion surrounding the deconstruction and reconstruction of historical storylines is revived, leading to fierce battles over prerogative of interpretation. Some voices are now calling for a 'conservative revolution' to set an end to the perceived dominance of a morally patronizing, elitist minority of leftover 68ers.[2] The far right now openly calls into question the place of the Holocaust and the National Socialist regime in the narrative of German history and identity. The liberal camp tries to counter this rhetoric with a moral consensus deeply rooted in 'working through the past'.[3] Yet it also cannot close its eyes to the demographic changes that make a homogenous, historically grounded moral identity increasingly difficult to achieve. The well-known but also worn-out storyline of twentieth-century Germany needs to be reassessed, as the straightforward narrative of a 'long path towards the West', in which an authoritarian Germany learns its lesson and proceeds steadily on a path towards democratization in the wake of the Second World War and Holocaust

(27/09/2018)', online at <https://www.historikerverband.de/verband/stellungnahmen/resolution-on-current-threats-to-democracy.html#c1553>, accessed 24 Nov. 2018.

[2] Most prominently, Alexander Dobrindt, 'Wir brauchen eine bürgerlich-konservative Mitte', *Die Welt*, 4 Jan. 2018, online at <https://www.welt. de/debatte/kommentare/plus172133774/Warum-wir-nach-den-68ern-eine-buergerlich-konservative-Wende-brauchen.html>, accessed 29 Jan. 2019.

[3] This rhetoric is, of course, fundamentally shaped by Theodor W. Adorno's essay, 'Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit' (1959), in id., *Gesammelte Schriften,* 10/2 (Frankfurt, 2003), 555–72.

no longer encompasses the historical diversity modern observers are attuned to.[4]

Scholarship increasingly recognizes the narrative structures of historical writing for what they are: literary interpretations that serve a particular status quo, consensus, or viewpoint as much as they reveal about the actual past. All the books reviewed here contribute in one way or another to this deconstruction, whilst also developing new ways of thinking and writing in the twentieth century. Spanning almost the entire century, they challenge existing intellectual histories of a period or a set of thinkers and activists, taking readers from Weimar—Udi Greenberg's *The Weimar Century* and Noah Benezra Strote's *Lions and Lambs*—to the consequences of the 1968 student movement in the works of Robert Zwarg, Heinz Bude, and Stuart Jeffries.

Two central themes stand out: first, the role of generations and intellectual cross-generational fertilization, and second, the widening of the geographical scope to include transnational, and especially transatlantic, perspectives. The latter does not remain uncontested: whilst the 'Westernization' trope popularized by historians such as Anselm Doering-Manteuffel is discernible in much of the scholarship under scrutiny here, especially Strote's work and the reflections of Heinz Bude call for a more careful acknowledgement of the inwards-turned intellectual world of twentieth-century Germany. Both these themes share, however, the overarching concern with the way ideas travel—across countries, time, and generations. Especially Greenberg's, Bude's, and Zwarg's works therefore also open new avenues in emigration and remigration history. They manage to break with a more negative trope of homelessness and pessimistic paralysis that still dominates existing literature.[5] Unlike these works, referencing even in their titles dismayed remigrants—*'Ich staune, dass Sie in dieser*

[4] Heinrich August Winkler, *Der lange Weg nach* Westen, 2 vols. (Munich, 2000). 'Westernization' as a field of historical scholarship was established by Anselm Doering-Manteuffel in the 1990s, see e.g. his *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen?* (Göttingen, 1999).

[5] Monika Boll and Raphael Gross (eds.), '*Ich staune, dass Sie in dieser Luft atmen können': Jüdische Intellektuelle in Deutschland nach 1945* (Frankfurt, 2013); Irmela von der Lühe, Axel Schildt, and Stefanie Schüler-Springorum (eds.), *'Auch in Deutschland waren wir nicht wirklich zu Hause': Jüdische Remigration nach 1945* (Göttingen, 2008).

Luft atmen können', *'Auch in Deutschland waren wir nicht wirklich zu Hause'*—Greenberg's and Zwarg's books both confidently assert the influence German émigrés had on the constitution of twentieth-century thought.

Central to this is the problem of generations and their importance for German history in the twentieth century. Thus whilst Strote calls for a greater appreciation of the generation born between 1890 and 1910 as the founding fathers of German post-war democratic consensus, shifting emphasis away from what scholars such as Dirk Moses have called the '45ers' or 'Flakhelfer' generation, Bude in *Adorno für Ruinenkinder* closes in again on the generations of the '45ers' and the '68ers'.[6] In Bude's narrative, the absence of this older generation shaped the political generation of those growing up in the ruins of Nazi Germany. Searching for new ideas and idols, they turned to figures who had never completely shaken off their 'outsider' status, in contrast to the heroes of Strote's and Greenberg's stories, who had helped build the consensus of the 1950s.

Yet in Theodor W. Adorno they again chose a figure from their father's generation—no family novel without a paterfamilias, after all. Stuart Jeffries, in his wide-ranging, eclectic account of the Frankfurt School, *Grand Hotel Abyss*, tries to capture the attraction this group of thinkers exerted over multiple generations—and establishes how the intellectual history of the twentieth century can still frame the political discussion of the twenty-first. This fascination with outsiders and the exiled and their apparent ability to provide a sense of identity and identification for younger generations was not limited to Germany but also an American phenomenon, as Zwarg shows. His *Die kritische Theorie in Amerika* shares some ground with Greenberg in emphasizing the transatlantic exchange, eventually enabling a global transmission of ideas initially conceived of in Weimar Germany. To what extent, Greenberg asks, is the 'American Century' also the 'Weimar Century', a century in which some of the most formative political and intellectual constellations from totalitarianism and militant democracy to conceptions of the individual, were forged in the heat of German inter-war ideological conflict?

The title of Greenberg's 2014 monograph neatly encapsulates his main argument: *The Weimar Century: German Émigrés and the Ideological*

[6] Dirk Moses, *German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past* (Cambridge, 2007).

Foundations of the Cold War. By tracing five biographies, Greenberg challenges some of the preconceived narratives surrounding the intellectual context of German reconstruction as well as the Cold War generally. First, he argues, émigrés are often unrecognized vital players in post-war reconstruction. Yet through American financial and institutional support, they in fact shaped much of the ideological consensus that created a stable, democratic West German state. Not only did they (re-)introduce certain ideas into the intellectual sphere, they also helped to delegitimize others that could have threatened the construction of liberal democracy: thus the doctrine of anti-communism and the theory of totalitarianism were developed and fostered by German theorists in exile. Greenberg certainly has a point here; accounts of exile and remigration tend to focus on the difficulties faced by remigrants as well as the hostilities of the German population. The figures he points to—Carl J. Friedrich, Ernst Fraenkel, Waldemar Gurian, Karl Loewenstein, and Hans Morgenthau—all had a significant impact not just on the formation of German politics, but also on the way American policies were developed and applied globally: 'Their ideas, policies, and institutional connections stood at the heart of the postwar Atlantic order.'[7]

Yet the character of Greenberg's study—individual biographies tracing the development of thought and influence of five different thinkers from the Weimar Republic to America and into the Cold War—glosses over the difficulties faced by the majority of emigrants and remigrants. Returning to Germany was generally confined to those with contacts and sufficient financial backing, whilst the 'common people' usually faced too many bureaucratic obstacles and more or less veiled hostilities to make a return seem viable. Those who returned had usually been in influential positions before the rise of the Nazis and the outbreak of the Second World War, but frustration and rejection ran high among these as well. Thus Thomas Mann's criticism of the 'inner emigration' and Alfred Döblin's ultimate decision to throw in the towel as a member of the French post-war re-education effort already demonstrate the difficulty many exiles faced reconnecting to the German population.

Finding a footing in America had been equally difficult for many exiles, as Robert Zwarg's brief analysis of the Frankfurt School in

[7] Greenberg, *Weimar Century*, 3.

America demonstrates. His argument that many emigrants struggled to integrate themselves into American institutions, despite existing organizational structures, is similarly evinced in Thomas Wheatland's account of the American years of the Institute for Social Research.[8] The impact émigrés could have was largely determined by their usefulness to the Allies. This was demonstrated by members of the Frankfurt School themselves, when in the course of the war their expert knowledge on Germany suddenly opened doors for them at the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).[9] Greenberg's second major argument, that the intellectual roots of democratization were not merely a reaction to Nazism but derived from the tense atmosphere of the Weimar Republic, thus makes sense only insofar as a particular set of 'influencers' is considered. Whilst Greenberg's case studies are coherent, meticulously researched, and conclusively analysed, the wider argument they feed into must be viewed with caution, keeping in mind the countless ideas that were born in the context of the Weimar Republic but not rekindled in the post-war world.

Greenberg's third major point then turns the readers' gaze from Europe to America, highlighting not only how the rise of the USA to superpower status enabled the emigrants to spread their ideas more forcefully, but also how these ideas helped to forge the new American empire. Ernst Fraenkel's reach thus went as far as Korea, and Loewenstein's ideas influenced policies across Latin America. However, the book does not shy away from highlighting the darker sides of this influence. In his chapters on Gurian's early conception of 'totalitarianism' and Loewenstein's 'militant democracy', Greenberg forcefully demonstrates the sad irony in the emigrants' aggressive defence of democracy. By delegitimizing any critical or deviant voices, they sometimes mirrored the practices of the authoritarian regimes they were trying to combat. Greenberg's book is hence not an idealistic account of Westernization, nor an intellectual 'rags-to-riches' story. Instead, his analysis of transatlantic exchange carefully unearths the institutional, political, and governmental factors that framed twentieth-century soft power and cultural diplomacy.

[8] Thomas Wheatland, *The Frankfurt School in Exile* (Minneapolis, 2009).

[9] Raffaele Laudani (ed.), *Secret Reports on Nazi Germany: The Frankfurt School Contribution to the War Effort. Franz Neumann, Herbert Marcuse, Otto Kirchheimer* (Princeton, 2013); Tim Müller, *Krieger und Gelehrte: Herbert Marcuse und die Denksysteme im Kalten Krieg* (Hamburg, 2010).

Like Greenberg, Noah Strote in his *Lions and Lambs* traces the biographies of several intellectuals born around the turn of the century, emphasizing the importance of Weimar thought and its relationship to German post-war consensus. In Strote's analysis, it was the generation born between 1890 and 1910 that took on the role of 'founding fathers' of the new Federal Republic of Germany, overcoming internal fissures that had, twelve years previously, hindered them in constituting a united front against Nazism. It is, however, this focus on the national that differentiates Strote's work from Greenberg's account. Taken together, the two texts help to differentiate the history of post-war German reconstruction and international order, doing so at the expense of homogenous, linear explanations.

Strote's book is divided into two parts, 'Conflict' and 'Partnership', and therefore stresses the intellectual break occurring at some point after 1937 much more clearly than Greenberg, who emphasizes continuity across the watershed of the Second World War much more vigorously. Strote consciously sets out to challenge dominating narratives asserting the importance of economic development, stable institutions, and American influence. Instead, he focuses on the reconciliation of former conflict groups within the German debate as such. His argument here transcends the framework of the specific case of German post-war reconstruction and makes a wider point about the way societal success has been analysed and theorized. Both the modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s and newer models of neo-institutionalism had focused on the relationship between prosperity and social peace on the one side, and liberal democratic institutions on the other.[10]

Strote points out another formative element: value consensus. In the course of the book, he tracks the emergence of this consensus in a region traditionally fraught with political, social, and religious strife, accentuating that this was an internal transformation.[11] Unlike in Greenberg's account, émigrés hardly play a role at all in this account. One of the reasons for the emphasis on internal developments, rather than influences coming through outside exchange, is Strote's attention to the part played by Christianity in these con-

[10] Strote, *Lions and Lambs*, 4–5.

[11] Strote himself uses the term 'region', implying that this is a conflict reaching beyond the German empire of 1871.

flicts.[12] Although he includes figures from all sides of the political spectrum, except communists, who did not manage to integrate into the post-war consensus, the long-raging conflict between Protestants and Catholics is of prime importance. Strote traces the evolution of the 'culture war' between the two confessions, as well as the struggle between church and state for influence on education and culture policy, right up to the rise of the Nazis and the growing disenchantment of religious thinkers after Hitler's lack of true commitment to supporting church influence became evident. After the war, the commitment to reconciliation and partnership allowed a new, mutually inclusive society to emerge: 'What was decisive in the postwar period was not the importation of foreign ideals, but rather the reconciliation of German ideals that had long been regarded as mutually opposing.'[13]

Participation in this consensus was vital in order to influence politics at all, as Strote demonstrates in his last chapter, in which he discusses the role of Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer. Despite their left-leaning, critical attitudes they established themselves as part of this German partnership in order to participate in its politics. To include them in this consensus might seem strange at first. Debates about their role in the 'intellectual foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany' are not resolved, although in more recent years, the work of Monika Boll and Raphael Gross among others has made headway in ascertaining their re-establishment and role in the young West German state.[14] Their case also serves well to highlight one of the major problems with Strote's otherwise excellent study. As with Greenberg, the focus on individual biographies allows Strote to give an extremely detailed overview of the evolution of actors and their ideas in the historical development of Germany. Yet at times

[12] For the current scholarly interest in Christianity and politics, see e.g. Samuel Moyn, *Christian Human Rights* (Philadelphia, 2015).

[13] Strote, *Lions and Lambs*, 149.

[14] Clemens Albrecht et. al, *Die intellektuelle Gründung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Eine Wirkungsgeschichte der Frankfurter Schule* (Frankfurt, 1999); Jens Hacke, *Philosophie der Bürgerlichkeit: Die liberalkonservative Begründung der Bundesrepublik* (Göttingen, 2006); Monika Boll, *Nachtprogramm: Intellektuelle Gründungsdebatten in der frühen Bundesrepublik* (Münster, 2004); Monika Boll and Raphael Gross (eds.), *Die Frankfurter Schule und Frankfurt: Eine Rückkehr nach Deutschland* (Göttingen, 2009).

this destabilizes his 'enemies into partners' thesis. It is, for example, not always clear whether these individuals chose 'partnership' out of a true desire for reconciliation under a (Judeo-)Christian banner, or whether they participated in the new consensus simply to play along in a new game for influence. Similarly, not everyone partaking in the new public, political, and academic sphere had renounced authoritarian or even Nazi ideologies—universities, political parties, and other public roles were still staffed by former members of the Nazi party, or those who had enabled, condoned, or fostered its rise. Strote himself admits that, when zooming out to look at the bigger picture, his conception of consensus might appear brittle, as marginal and minority figures excluded from partnership now come into focus.

Like Greenberg's book then, Strote's well-researched, detailed contribution adds another piece to the vast puzzle that constitutes the intellectual transition from the Weimar to the Federal Republic. Both are aware that the particular intellectual climate and consensus they envision did not last forever. The 1960s, with the rise of the student movement and alternative politics and lifestyles, put an end to these trajectories. Heinz Bude and Robert Zwarg follow these lines of development further, explicitly engaging with the way different generations related to their predecessors—not just across time, but also geographical, national, and cultural boundaries.

Heinz Bude's 'story of 1968', published in time for the fiftieth anniversary of that year, follows a similar structure to Greenberg's and Strote's studies: every chapter focuses on a different individual, bringing together distinct experiences to form a kaleidoscopic expression of the historical moment as a whole. Bude's book, however, is much more difficult to situate in terms of genre and objective. It follows up on his sociological research on *Das Altern einer Generation*, but is less restricted by the methodological and stylistic demands of the previous study.[15] Instead, Bude himself describes the work as a 'remix' that questions the role of the '68ers' in the 'Familienroman' of the Federal Republic and their place in the succession of generations.[16] It is as much of a socio-psychological reflection as a personal coming to

[15] Heinz Bude, *Das Altern einer Generation: Die Jahrgänge 1938 bis 1945* (Frankfurt, 1995). The book analysed the life stories of Germans coming of age around 1968.

[16] Bude, *Adorno für Ruinenkinder*, 9.

terms with a generation that fascinated, but also confused Bude. Unsurprisingly, one of his interview subjects, Peter Märtesheimer, called him a 'mix of therapist and judge'.[17]

The book brings out, in impressionistic miniatures, the non-synchronicity of critical theory (and Marxism in general) that Zwarg also describes in his own portrait of 68ers across the Atlantic and their reception of German thought.[18] Unlike their American counterparts, the protagonists of Bude's story are not interested in orthodox Marxism and theorizing—let alone practising—the revolution. Instead, the German 68ers appear preoccupied with themselves and their own biographies, which seem interwoven with the larger fate of the nation. The modern eye visualizes 1968 through demonstrations, sit-ins, and lecture-halls filled with rebellious students, images of mass power and mass agitation. Yet Bude's protagonists all emphasize the importance of autonomy and personal development; although 1968 did awaken a new sense of responsibility in them, this played out in the confines of the individual.

Hence Bude's is a story of those who did not fit in, who were uneasy with strict organization and party lines, and whose own backgrounds alienated them sometimes from the rebelling, largely middle-class students. The absence of fathers, as well as childhood and adolescence spent in wartime Nazi Germany and its aftermath, emerge as an overarching theme. Seemingly, it is this lack of an identification figure that leads Bude to anoint Adorno as patron saint of the 68ers. This move is not always convincing; some of Bude's subjects, such as Adelheid Guttmann or Camilla Blisse, appear to have developed interests outside the mainstream of the student movement's revival that for a time at least celebrated Adorno's iconoclastic, critical power. Nonetheless, their inclusion is important and laudable because it sheds light on figures who have remained excluded for a long time thanks to the idealization of the 'revolutionaries' who shouted the loudest and simply drowned out their often female challengers.[19] A defeated, resigned tone therefore dominates the book. '1968' as a political moment never lived up to the expectations of its

[17] Ibid. 24.

[18] Zwarg, *Die Kritische Theorie in Amerika*, 224.

[19] On the role of generations and other influences in '1968', see esp. Christina von Hodenberg, *Das andere Achtundsechzig: Gesellschaftsgeschichte einer Revolte* (Munich, 2018).

participants, and its second coming in the shape of the 1999–2005 coalition government of SPD and Greens might have been, as Bude contemplates, a 'perversion' of older ideals.[20] Missed chances dominate these accounts. Whilst Bude's book is not an academic study, and never attempts to be one, it can function as a discussion-piece bringing to the forefront those personalities, ideas, and projects that are not (yet) part of the collective memory of '1968' but that nonetheless shaped Germany's way towards this anniversary.

Robert Zwarg's *Die kritische Theorie in Amerika* only reveals its true subjects in the subtitle: instead of contributing to the growing interest in the Frankfurt School's first generation's exile in America, Zwarg focuses on the *Nachleben einer Tradition*, the reception of critical theory in the USA by the students coming of age around '1968'.[21] Diligently researched with great attention to detail, Zwarg's study not only manages to capture the avenues of reception and dissemination of critical theory's core texts. It also demonstrates how theories can develop a life of their own when they are confronted with new contexts, receptors, and influences. Zwarg's book is therefore also partly a history of the evolution of the American Left and its encounter with Marxism on the one hand, and German culture on the other. The towering figure in this narrative is, as in Bude's book, Adorno.

However, whilst some of the protagonists of Bude's narrative still had first-hand encounters with the philosopher, either in lecture halls or at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, Zwarg's main protagonists rely on a few translations and contact with émigrés who had stayed in the USA. The practice of reading for reception as an in-depth exegetic endeavour, rather than independent philosophizing and writing, takes centre stage. In this, Bude's 'Achtundsechziger' resemble Zwarg's 'Sixty-Eighters'. Whilst in Germany publishing houses and their distinctive publications, such as Suhrkamp's cheap and colourful paperbacks and Peter Gente's Merve-Verlag, began to shape the image of the intellectual moment, theoretical journals provided

[20] Bude, *Adorno für Ruinenkinder*, 115.

[21] Besides Wheatland's 2009 work referenced above, see also David Jenemann, *Adorno in America* (Minneapolis, 2007) and, most prominently, the works of Detlev Claussen, e.g. 'Intellectual Transfer: Theodor W. Adorno's American Experience', *New German Critique*, 97 (2006), 5–14.

the much-needed space for thought and discussion in the USA.[22] Yet, as Zwarg is quick to point out, because the reception of critical theory is predominantly a hermeneutic exercise, and because this process of interpretation is highly charged with political expectation, conflict easily emerges over who holds sovereignty of interpretation. This leads, for example, to the rejection of Martin Jay's *The Dialectical Imagination*, the first history of the Institute for Social Research.[23] In the eyes of its critics, Jay's study was too historical and too unpolitical in its assertion that the moment of critical theory had passed.

Jay, however, is only a minor figure in Zwarg's analysis that focuses on the two major theoretical journals emerging in the wake of the student movement: *Telos* and *New German Critique*. Both of these were embroiled in an attempt to make sense of the ultimate failure of the student movement and the problem of reconciling theory and praxis. They were closely linked to academic centres, Buffalo and Madison, and therefore also to the academic influences there. Zwarg points here especially to the impact of German émigrés who had remained in their US exile. Cultural and intellectual historians such as George L. Mosse or Peter Gay were not direct representatives of critical theory, but their work allowed students to immerse themselves more fully in the Weimar context of critical theory's initial inception. This contact with a generation of émigrés conscious of their outsider status influenced the students to such an extent, Zwarg argues, that a 'Jewish habitus' developed among them, transferring the experience of exile into a narrative of self-description in which the young generation suddenly saw themselves as 'displaced persons' like their teachers.[24]

At the same time, Zwarg concedes, many of the members of the close-knit editing and contributing circles around these two journals had roots outside the USA: Seyla Benhabib came from Turkey to study in America, Andrew Arato fled Hungary after 1956 with his parents, Paul Piccone hailed from Italy, and many other members were part of a Jewish diaspora that remained socially excluded—

[22] On the reading and publishing culture of the time see Philipp Felsch, *Der lange Sommer der Theorie: Geschichte einer Revolte 1960–1990* (Munich, 2015).

[23] Martin Jay, *Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute for Social Research, 1923–1950* (Berkeley, 1973).

[24] For one of the most famous conceptualizations of the role of the outsider in culture see Peter Gay, *Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider* (London, 1968).

Paul Breines, Jack Zipes, and Russell Jacoby among them. Although a certain distance to American culture and politics is therefore unsurprising, Zwarg digs deeper than this superficial 'otherness' of critical theory's new American generation to showcase also how a non-synchronicity and incommensurability of German and American contexts made a complete adaption impossible. Whilst Bude's subjects were becoming increasingly resigned to the fact that their dreams of changing the world had been naive, Zwarg's students are still leading the fight, albeit in a mainly intellectual milieu, to redefine the new left. As Zwarg notes repeatedly, this also has to do with the absence of Marxism from America in the previous decades, which had led the Left on a completely different course compared to Europe. America was also, however, always more positive about its own culture than the persistent pessimism of German intellectuals allowed—the terms of critical theory on either side of the Atlantic therefore could never completely align. And, finally, the emergence of French theory in the two decades after 1968 fed new impulses into an increasingly embattled intellectual debate.

Zwarg traces the breaking apart of the first moment of reception, seeing the dividing lines between different camps drawn up in the confrontation of Habermas and French theory as well as in different interpretations of 'praxis'. He ends, eventually, with *Telos'* turn towards Carl Schmitt under its long-time editor Piccone, which alienated many of his original collaborators. Zwarg's book is thus not only a reception history of critical theory in America but, by necessity of its subject matter, attempts to achieve something more ambitious: it traces the evolution of thought conceived in response to specific contexts and experiences, which are, in turn, received by individuals with their own specific influences.

Sometimes, the work appears to falter under the pressure of this task, and long passages on French theory seem to lead the reader astray from the initial theme, whilst passages on exchanges and travels as well as translations could have been more elaborate. All in all, however, Zwarg achieves his bold goal. *Die Kritische Theorie in Amerika* is not only a formidable study of critical theory's multiple traversing of the Atlantic, but also delivers a more general model or method for studying the transfer of ideas.

Out of all these works, Stuart Jeffries's *Grand Hotel Abyss* is in many ways the most ambitious, attempting to cover a substantial

part of twentieth-century German intellectual history. His collective biography of *The Lives of the Frankfurt School* follows a number of prominent intellectuals more or less closely associated with the so-called Frankfurt School or the Institute for Social Research. Jeffries's declared aim is to offer a re-reading of this group of thinkers that frees it of older interpretations and makes their critical apparatus accessible to the understanding of current society. Jeffries's book is most successful when it attempts to do exactly that, that is, to use the mechanism of critical thinking propagated by the Frankfurt School to understand our modern world. Whenever he veers from this political and journalistic tone, problems begin to appear. Despite his claims to offer a new reading of the Frankfurt School, he remains stuck in many of the old orthodoxies that have persisted since the 1970s. Quoting Georg Lukács's dictum that the Frankfurt School had withdrawn into a 'Grand Hotel Abyss' in which the elitist critical theorists were pessimistically and apathetically watching the decline of Western civilization, and referring to them on multiple occasions as 'armchair philosophers', means Jeffries resurrects dismissive tropes that much scholarship has successfully left behind.[25] His aim to offer a new reading is also undermined by the fact that he draws mostly on older scholarship and does not undertake any considerable primary research. Whilst this approach can partly be explained by the audience Jeffries is writing for—an interested but not academic public—it does prevent him from offering anything new to readers. The latter point is particularly disappointing because new material is constantly becoming available as the Theodor W. Adorno Archive is digitizing Adorno's vast correspondences, lecture drafts, and notes.

Whilst the book therefore does not break any new ground in the field, it can serve as a solid introduction to non-academic readers, although caution is necessary here as well, as the book contains some factual errors and superficialities. To highlight one example, Jeffries does not differentiate between the Frankfurt School and the Institute for Social Research, although the former term is much contested in research and, regarding its 'members', ideas, and objectives, not congruent with the Institute, which has its own distinct history. Without

[25] Criticisms of the Frankfurt School's apolitical attitude can be found in e.g. Tom Bottomore, *The Frankfurt School and its Critics* (London, 2002); Göran Therborn, 'The Frankfurt School', in New Left Review (ed.), *Western Marxism* (London, 1977), 83–139. See n. 14 above for works following a new direction.

an understanding of this difference it is impossible to grasp the consequences and developments of the political role of critical theorists as public intellectuals, academics, and institute directors in West Germany and across the Atlantic—a task Strote masters far more skilfully in his (much shorter) account. Jeffries's work thus lends itself well to the current political climate. Although published before Donald Trump's election and the Brexit referendum, it does capture the economic and political anxieties of the twenty-first century that increasingly have to confront the question of whether history repeats itself after all. He provides ample food for thought for a new generation willing to adapt critical theory's original texts to their own circumstances, even if it cannot replace older histories and accounts of the Frankfurt School, the Institute, and their associates.

All the books discussed here prove that the intellectual history of twentieth-century Germany has not yet been conclusively written. As the role of émigrés and permanent exiles gains more traction in research, and groups whose place in Germany's 'Bildungsroman' has previously been eyed with suspicion, the field as such opens up to new dimensions. As the above studies have shown, these are often grounded in a vast expansion of the geographical scope of what German history and thought can entail: the transatlantic connection, but also the global spread of ideas emanating initially from Germany are increasingly prominent in new historical research.

Greenberg's and Strote's books stand out with their groundbreaking research, highlighting how much of the history of exile and especially remigration remains to be written. Like Jeffries's book, their emphasis on a creative, positive German intellectual development in the twentieth century will also be significant for the evolution of German intellectual history, signalling a more substantial entanglement with transatlantic history. The role the Frankfurt School has played in many of these accounts demonstrates how, fifty years after Adorno's death, the historicization of critical theory is still very much debated. Yet as philosophy turns from praxis into history, historians need to set to work; Bude and Zwarg have, each in their own way, embarked upon this task, pushing the frontiers of historical research closer towards the contemporary once more.

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BOOK REVIEWS

JESSE SPOHNHOLZ, *The Convent of Wesel: The Event that Never Was and the Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), xiv + 283 pp. ISBN 978 1 107 19311 6. £75.00

Jesse Spohnholz, Associate Professor of History at Washington State University, devotes his second book to one single historical document: a handwritten Latin church ordinance, nowadays kept in the Utrecht Archives, that until now has generally been thought to be a record of the 'Convent of Wesel'—the protocol of a clandestine meeting of more than fifty Reformed leaders from the Netherlands in the German city of Wesel on 3 November 1568. Spohnholz has been researching the city of Wesel and the community of Dutch refugees who lived there for one and a half decades during the Dutch Revolt, but his recent publication may be justifiably called his masterpiece. Not only does he revise a venerable historical narrative that featured more or less prominently in Reformed church history for four centuries; he also utilizes his findings as an example of the history and development of early modern and modern historiography, and of the general methodological problems every prudent historian needs to face.

The book is divided into two parts. Part one provides a meticulous historical investigation of the above-mentioned document, a deconstruction of its ancient interpretations, and a reconstruction of the actual circumstances and conditions of its composition. Spohnholz demonstrates convincingly that the conventional understanding of the document cannot be upheld. In reality this 'Convent of Wesel' (which, if it had taken place, would have been by far the largest event of this kind in the Reformation era) was no more than a mystification by later historians. The neatly written Latin text of twenty-three pages, comprising articles on the institution of local church councils, ministers, the catechism, elders, deacons, baptism and communion, marriage, and church discipline, fits perfectly with the historical setting in early November 1568, when Dutch refugees were expecting William of Orange to win a military victory that would allow them to return to their homeland and build up a Reformed Church. The arti-

cles advocate a clearcut Reformed church model but are not really representative for the Dutch Reformed movement of their time. Instead they emphasize the model of the Reformed Churches of Geneva, France, and the Palatinate.

In fact, they were not the outcome of a one-day discussion, but the project of an individual man who wanted to promote his ideas about the future organization of the Dutch Reformed Church. As Spohnholz shows, the author (and first signatory) of the articles was the exiled Flemish minister Petrus Dathenus (*c.*1531–88). The sixty-three signatures were added to the document not at one single meeting, but in a series of several small encounters at Wesel, Emden, and London, to where it was taken by another exiled minister, Herman Moded, during the following two or three months. Early in 1569, however, the document was tacitly deposited in the archive of the Dutch refugee congregation in London, in response to the changed military situation and William of Orange's new political strategy. Accordingly, there is no evidence that it had a significant impact on the Synod of Emden in 1571, as has long been assumed, nor on the building of the Dutch Reformed Church or Reformed churches in north-west Germany. The articles of 1568 turned out to be a failure. On the whole, Spohnholz has thus convincingly demonstrated that the alleged 'Convent of Wesel' must be considered 'an event that never was'.

How could it be, then, that the failed initiative of an individual was reinterpreted as the documentary foundation of Reformed church-building in the Netherlands and on the Lower Rhine in neighbouring Germany? This is the theme of the second part of this book. Here the author traces, in chronological order, the history of tradition, archiving, research, and interpretation of the Wesel articles, and positions this history within the changing religious, political, intellectual, and scholarly contexts of the last four hundred years. The articles of 1568 were only rediscovered in 1618 on the fringes of the Synod of Dort, when orthodox, Contra-Remonstrant Calvinists sought archival evidence to prove that their tenets had been held by Dutch Protestants since the very beginning of the Reformation.

It was Simeon Ruytinck, the minister of the Dutch Church in London, who found the forgotten document in the local archive and praised it in his *Harmonia synodorum belgicarum* as the first of a series of six national synods. Thus the 'National Synod of Wesel' saw the light of day. Transferred to the Continent, the original document had

found its way into the office of the Provincial Synod of South Holland by 1638/40 and was published in print for the first time soon afterwards. In 1737 it was carefully scrutinized by the president of the synod and made part of a bundle of acts of National Synods. In addition, some transcripts were made and sent to other archives. On the occasion of its bicentenary in 1768 Adrianus 's-Gravenzande dedicated the first monograph to 'the first Synod of the Netherlandish Churches' at Wesel.

In the nineteenth century the narrative of the 'Synod of Wesel' (the adjective 'national' was now omitted) reached its climax. In the Netherlands, under the influence of emerging romanticism and nationalism (largely promoted by the Dutch Réveil), anti-Catholic and anti-liberal sentiments culminated in the formation of a neo-Calvinist orthodoxy. To combat liberal tendencies in the newly established state church, orthodox authors frequently referred to the alleged Synod of Wesel and other synods of the Reformation era. In Germany, the Synod of Wesel served as evidence for the ancient adoption of a presbyterial–synodal constitution by the Reformed communities on the Lower Rhine, which was eventually granted to the Protestant Churches of Rhineland and Westphalia by the Prussian King in 1835 (not 1855, p. 170). The joint celebration of the Synod of Wesel's tercentenary in 1868 by German and Dutch Reformed churches was an impressive event that finally made the Synod a 'site of memory'.

With the rise of modern historiography, research on the event that now came to be known simply as the 'Convent of Wesel' was intensified. Historians were intrigued by what Spohnholz calls the 'mystery' (*passim*) of the articles, that is to say, the lack of further archival evidence, and some even took refuge in alternative ascriptions to different years or places. But it was left to our author to draw the ultimate conclusion: that there never had been such a thing as the 'Convent of Wesel'. Thus the present study not only solves a centuries-old mystery and corrects our notion of the origins of the Dutch Reformed Church, but can teach present-day historians vital lessons on history, methodology—and themselves.

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DOUGLAS MOGGACH and GARETH STEDMAN JONES (eds.), *The 1848 Revolutions and European Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), x + 488 pp. ISBN 978 1 107 15474 2. £75.00

Historical research on the 1848 European revolutions experienced a promising boost in the late 1990s thanks to the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of that important year, but this brief flourish of scholarly activity soon gave way to two decades of relative scholarly inertia. The current edited volume seeks to reinvigorate the field by combining the conventional nation-centred approach with newer historiographical genres such as transnational and intellectual history (pp. 3–4). Contrasting the mid nineteenth-century revolutions with more recent events, such as the fall of Communism in 1989 and the Arab Spring of 2011, the contributors address topics of lasting significance: democratization and political representation as a counterweight to authoritarianism; nationalism as a driving force behind popular agitation; compatibility between national groups and supranational (imperial) entities; relations between the state and civil society, in particular, the challenge of the social question; the birth or consolidation of political ideologies (republicanism, socialism, anarchism); and, finally, the role of religion in the post-revolutionary order (pp. 6–13).

The opening essays on political representation focus on Paris, which in 1848 served as a laboratory for later ideological ferment. Thus in his essay on French republicanism after 1848 Thomas Jones argues persuasively that the Second French Republic (1848–51) was neither an accident nor a failure. Instead, he suggests, it offered a democratic apprenticeship to the generation that would go on to create the Third Republic after 1870 (pp. 70–2, 93). Popular demands, such as those for the abolition of slavery and censorship, the right to work, universal education, and even the granting of civil rights to women, were fervently debated in 1848, setting an agenda that would remain influential for many decades (pp. 72–5, 78–80, 85–7). Under these strained political conditions, socialist visions of direct democracy were also expressed. In her contribution Anne-Sophie Chambost links them to the legacy of Jacobinism (pp. 100–1). The problem of efficient representation tormented French socialists such as Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Louis Blanc, who saw contemporary parliamentary deputies not as the true representatives of the popular will,

but rather as the protectors of a tiny elite (pp. 105–10). For all their objections to the Second Republic, the socialists were unable to foresee or explain Louis Napoleon's meteoric rise to power, much less resist him (pp. 111–13).

Even more ambivalent is the case of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. By analysing the latter's unpublished notes dating from 1848, Edward Castleton highlights thus far neglected aspects of his political thought (pp. 40–1). Proudhon is conventionally considered the founding father of anarchism yet, surprisingly, provided no precise definition of it during or after the revolution (pp. 39, 67). This ideological confusion notwithstanding, Proudhon made practical and daring suggestions, such as the establishment of exchange banks where the use of money would be abolished; he even became a popular hero immediately after the June Days (pp. 50–5). The conservative regrouping following this bloody event and the rise of Louis Napoleon led to Proudhon's imprisonment, which did not stop him disseminating his revolutionary ideas from prison (pp. 56–66). This polarization after the first revolutionary months and the withdrawal of moderate voices from French politics is investigated by Jonathan Beecher. He masterfully shows how a historical work can be used to support a political argument by examining Lamartine's *Histoire des Girondins*, which was instrumentalized politically in favour of republican centrism in 1848 (pp. 14–20). Lamartine's popularity during the early revolution collapsed swiftly during the June Days. His speedily written, self-congratulatory *Histoire de la Révolution de 1848*, which was published within the year, failed to secure his return to politics, or even to maintain his image as a successful statesman during the revolution, and its vanity was openly criticized (pp. 28–38).

Not only in France but also in the German states, moderate voices were lost amidst rising political polarization. This was the case with David Friedrich Strauss, discussed by Norbert Waszek. Strauss's proposals as a parliamentarian in Württemberg in 1848 (Jewish emancipation, the establishment of a federal monarchy in Germany, the nationalization of industries, and so on), though hardly radical, failed to attract widespread support, resulting in his isolation and retirement from politics in late 1848 (pp. 244–53).

Looking beyond the spectrum of 'great intellectuals', Samuel Hayat offers a truly original piece on working-class socialism as a body of ideas produced by the workers themselves. The revolution

made a distinct contribution to the working-class movement because after it, workers distanced themselves from middle-class intellectual defenders of socialism (p. 127). More importantly, however, 1848 represented the labouring classes' mass entry into democratic processes, and redefined what those processes meant for relations between citizens. Socialism was thus no longer regarded solely as a social science, but evolved into a unifying political force for the working classes, whose political role had been recently reinforced (pp. 132–9). Hayat argues that working-class socialism was a product of political and not economic developments. In the same spirit, Gareth Stedman Jones comes to similar conclusions concerning the July monarchy. Analysing the language of mid nineteenth-century class struggle, Jones interestingly remarks that the ostensibly bourgeois regime of 1830 was bourgeois only in its rhetoric, and that the breaks with the pre-July past were in fact minimal (pp. 440–1). The label 'middle-class government' was actually used by both the right-wing and left-wing opposition. In this case, the language of class conflict enabled a discourse about a quasi-liberal regime which was both politically and economically fictitious. This, Jones insists, led to the defamation of 'bourgeois' rule as philistine and narrow-minded by its adversaries, a view perpetuated by subsequent generations (pp. 441–3).

The discussion concerning the social question is further reinforced by Douglas Moggach's essay on the writings of Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, and Karl Marx before 1848. Bauer and Marx, in particular, began to articulate their critique of capitalism in the early 1840s, based on the leftist Hegelian principle of workers' self-determination (pp. 227–8). Although their respective criticisms of early capitalism include similar points, their suggested solutions were markedly different. As with Feuerbach and Marx, 1848 once again acted as a catalyst. Bauer adopted a firmly republican position against the Prussian monarchy, while Marx saw the complete abolition of feudalism as the greatest priority. Marx believed 1848 to be nothing but the prelude to a much bigger future conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, which would come when they had grown more mature (pp. 233–4).

If Moggach's piece focuses on the work of eminent socialist thinkers, the same is not true of Diana Siclovan's essay on Lorenz von Stein. In describing him as 'a now obscure theorist' (p. 256), she neglects the plethora of monographs and smaller contributions focusing

on his writings, as well as the work of the Lorenz von Stein Institute in Kiel. Moreover, Siclovan's lengthy overview of German socialism in the 1840s (pp. 256–67) adds little to the existing literature. Given the length of this section, Stein himself receives surprisingly little attention (pp. 267–71) and Siclovan offers merely a summary of his writings during this period.

Considering the pre-eminence of thinkers who problematized state authority, the state as such also receives relatively little attention. Widukind De Ridder incorporates Belgium into the wider framework of 1848, offering the reader insights largely unknown outside Belgian historiography (esp. pp. 190–200). Ridder demolishes several established convictions, such as the idea that language constituted a significant division in newly independent Belgium (p. 189). He describes the swift police and military reactions to any imminent danger in 1848; later, he insightfully explains how the legacy of 'non-events' in Belgium in 1848 functioned as a founding myth for the later Belgian socialist movement, and even fed into a conciliatory social policy in the twentieth century (pp. 208–14).

A contribution that focuses more systematically on state-building is that by Anna Ross on post-1848 Prussia. Although Ross relies mostly on secondary literature, she does frame a new narrative about the Prussian state after the revolution. She asserts that it was characterized not by reaction but by moderate conservatism, epitomized by the new minister-president Otto von Manteuffel, who enforced a pragmatic, centrist agenda to win back the Prussian people and avoid future upheavals. Ross then provides a brief overview of a number of policy fields, ranging from agriculture to criminal justice and the way in which the press and other forums for public debate were managed, a comprehensive approach that seems somewhat too ambitious given the limited space available (pp. 284–90). Although Ross tries to incorporate the 1850s into broader narratives of nineteenth-century Germany, her claim that the Manteuffel reforms were inherited by Bismarck is hardly followed up.

The contributions relating to east central and southern Europe are preoccupied with nationalism. In the Habsburg Empire and its neighbouring territories, questions of national consciousness and self-determination dominated the agenda throughout the revolutionary months. Alan Sked builds on his earlier work on Field Marshall Radetzky and pre-March (*Vormärz*) Austria in general to offer

insightful remarks on the nature of political authority and nationalism before 1848. He points out, in line with the most recent scholarly thinking, that in 1848 Vienna was threatened not by rising nationalism, but by a disgruntled provincial nobility (Poles, Hungarians, Italians) which felt politically marginalized (pp. 327–41). As regards the various ethnic groups, Sked notes the overstated emphasis on mid nineteenth-century nationalism as a destabilizing force, as well as the existence of pro-Habsburg peasant sentiment in Galicia and Italy before and during 1848 (pp. 327, 335, 343). Another myth that Sked debunks is that of the overwhelmingly absolutist tendencies of the Austrian leadership. Most generals quickly accepted the constitutional reforms, while minister-president Schwarzenberg was later willing to tolerate some form of constitution before it was overturned by an autocratic Franz Josef (pp. 342–4).

Axel Körner further addresses the meanings of nationalism in the Habsburg Empire by comparing the regional ethnic movements of 1848 in Bohemia and Lombardy. Taking a comparative approach, he focuses on local dynamics. Following the historiographical 'imperial turn', which is highly pertinent to Habsburg studies, he writes one of the strongest essays in this volume. Körner particularly examines the thought of František Palacký and Carlo Cattaneo, emphasizing that both faced aggressive nationalism and unitary national states (Germany, Hungary, Italy) with reluctance, if not with hostility. They supported the federalist reconstruction of the Habsburg Empire in order to safeguard provincial administrative and cultural autonomy (pp. 351–2, 358–68, 370, 374–9). Cattaneo's lesser known argument against Piedmontese expansionism is possibly the most interesting part of this essay, allowing for more extensive reconsideration of how nineteenth-century nationalism interacted with regional identities.

Jean-Christophe Angaut and Maurizio Isabella offer additional reassessments of the Slavic and Italian national movements. Angaut concentrates on the cosmopolitan anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, who appeared in most major revolutionary theatres, including Paris and Posen in 1848, and Dresden a year later (pp. 409–13, 421–2). In his well-known texts from this period (*Appeal*, *Apology*, *Confession*), Bakunin argued that the forces of reaction were able to play the social and ethnic tensions of the various subversive groups off against each other skilfully in order finally to destroy them (pp. 417–20). Bakunin

was not spared prison after 1849, but he continued to spread propaganda against Prussia and Austria from the 1860s on. On the other hand, Isabella's subjects, Cesare Balbo and Vincenzo Gioberti, enjoyed a better fate: they were among the most eminent mid-century Piedmontese intellectuals and agreed that 1848 accelerated the unstoppable process of democratizing Europe. The more conservative Balbo, however, saw the aristocracy as a stabilizing force in political life, acting as a counterweight to royal absolutism and providing more responsible societal leadership than the democratic and republican regimes, which were by definition unstable (pp. 389–95). Meanwhile, Gioberti supported the constitution and hoped for a 'democratic monarchy', in which the Savoy dynasty would achieve the Risorgimento in alliance with moderate democrats and the educated middle class (pp. 397–403).

The National Question in 1848 is also examined by Georgios Varouxakis, who modifies the popular assertion that Britain was entirely in favour of national self-determination. He persuasively points out that the British tended to support nations such as Greece and Italy that fulfilled certain preconditions (a glorious past, adequate resources to form a state, and so on). Nonetheless, these doctrines remained vague, and when they conflicted with the interests of the British Empire (as in the case of the French–Canadians or Irish) or the principle of stability in Europe, the British turned against the struggling nationalities (pp. 157–60).

In conclusion, this volume provides undeniably new evidence and ideas on numerous topics related to 1848. However, a few words of criticism are in order. Many of the contributors touch on already well-known intellectuals so that their precise contribution to the existing literature is not always clear. Moreover, the editors have chosen to focus largely on France, Austria, Germany, and Britain. Other areas, such as Hungary, central and southern Italy, the Iberian Peninsula, Russia, Scandinavia, and the Balkans, are rarely addressed, which prevents the project from being as genuinely European as the introduction claims. Finally, the more radical revolutions of 1849 (Baden, Rome, Hungary) are hardly mentioned, while a number of serious issues, such as Jewish and peasant emancipation, the impact of 1848 abroad, and the attitude of the Catholic and Protestant clergy, receive only scant attention. Of course, no book can cover everything, but let us hope that future contributions to the literature of

1848 will take into account not only the strengths of this volume—which are unquestionable, as noted above—but also its gaps, and use them as starting points for further discussion.

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VOLKHARD WEHNER, *The German-Speaking Community of Victoria between 1850 and 1830: Origins, Progress and Decline*, Geschichte, 155 (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2018), ix + 292 pp. ISBN 978 3 643 91032 5. €39.90

In recent decades the history of the German diaspora has become a key theme in German historiography, focusing especially upon those who fled the Nazis and, even more, upon the economic migration of the second half of the nineteenth century. Contemporaries recognized and railed against the pre-First World War emigration, regarding it as a haemorrhaging of population to the other parts of the world—including the British Empire—which fed into the debate about the necessity for German imperial expansion.[1] The question of the loss of population remained dormant in the age of catastrophe during the first half of the twentieth century, as attention focused on the First World War and the rise and fall of the Nazis. By the 1980s and 1990s historians turned their attention both to the reasons for the emigration which took place before 1914 and to the German communities which developed throughout the world.

The key player in the German language historiography was Klaus J. Bade, who was driven by a desire to counteract the hostility which foreign workers faced in the Federal Republic of Germany by informing both historians and the wider public about the history of migration into and out of Germany. He pointed out that while Germany had become a country of immigration (despite attempts by government to deny this), it previously had the status of a land of emigration.[2] Meanwhile, by the end of the twentieth century, studies appeared on the German diasporic communities which emerged in locations throughout the world, usually written by scholars living within those locations and often focusing upon the era of the First

[1] See esp. Fritz Joseephy, *Die deustche überseeische Auswanderung seit 1871* (Berlin, 1912); Eugen von Philippovich (ed.), *Auswanderung und Auswanderungspolitik in Deutschland* (Leipzig, 1892); Wilhelm Mönckmeier, *Die deutsche Überseeische Auswanderung* (Jena, 1912).

[2] See esp. Klaus J. Bade, *Vom Auswanderungsland zum Einwanderungsland? Deutschland, 1880–1980* (Berlin, 1983); id. (ed.), *Population, Labour and Migration in 19th and 20th Century Germany* (London, 1987); id. (ed.), *Deutsche im Ausland—Fremde in Deutschland: Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Munich, 1992).

World War.[3] Most recently a number of books have emerged on the concept of German diaspora before the First World War.[4]

Volkard Wehner has also produced a volume on a specific German community, this time in the Australian state of Victoria, covering the period between 1850 and 1930. It further adds to our understanding of emigration and settlement, diasporic consciousness, interethnic relations, and destruction and assimilation (where possible and where it had not already taken place) as a result of the Germanophobia which gripped the British Empire and those states that fought against Germany (and even those that did not, including Brazil and the USA before they joined the conflict in 1917) during the First World War. Wehner has produced a local portrait of a global story.

Although this was written as a Ph.D. for the University of Melbourne, the author has, for some reason, followed the German pattern of simply reproducing his work without making any changes, whereas the norm in the Anglo-Saxon environment is to use a Ph.D. as the basis for a book. Although the original thesis may have required little revision because of its quality, the fact that it looks exactly like a Ph.D. dissertation proves irritating. Wehner has not even changed the word 'thesis' to 'book' when referring to his own narrative within this study, and retains the numbered sections typical of German theses.

These irritations (which do blemish this work) aside, Wehner has produced an interesting contribution to the history of the German diaspora. We can identify the following strengths. First, perhaps precisely because he has written a Ph.D. thesis, he has immersed himself in the extant literature on German diaspora communities throughout the world, especially in the USA but also elsewhere. Writing local studies always raises the issue of whether the example under consid-

[3] For the USA see Frederick C. Luebke, *Bonds of Loyalty: German Americans and World War I* (De Kalb, Il., 1974). See also id., *Germans in Brazil: A Comparative History of Cultural Conflict During World War I* (Baton Rouge, La., 1987). For Australia see Gerhard Fischer, *Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia, 1914–1920* (St Lucia, Qld., 1989). See also Panikos Panayi, *The Enemy in Our Midst: Germans in Britain During the First World War* (Oxford, 1991); and id. (ed.), *Germans as Minorities during the First World War: A Global Comparative Perspective* (Farnham, 2014).

[4] See esp. Stefan Manz, *Constructing a German Diaspora: The 'Greater German Empire', 1871–1914* (London, 2014).

eration is typical. Wehner helps to resolve this by constantly referring to other case studies as well as to more general publications, including that by Stefan Manz. One of the strongest features of Wehner's work is that it looks at both rural and urban settlers in the period under consideration. This is possible because Germans in Victoria resided in both types of area, a situation typical of Australia, unlike for example, in Britain.[5] Wehner therefore addresses the differences between those Germans who lived almost as isolated individuals and families in rural locations, those who lived in towns, and those who resided in Melbourne. He looks at their ability to maintain and develop German identity and how they interacted with the 'Anglo' community, both before and during the First World War, when Germanophobia gripped Victoria, Australia, and the whole of the British Empire.

Wehner has, in many ways, produced a complete history of the German diaspora in Victoria following the pattern of Manz's urban study of Glasgow, which traced settlement, economic activity, ethnicity, and destruction and elimination.[6] Wehner goes back to the origins of the migrants, especially in what he describes as the 'East-Elbian provinces' of Prussia, Mecklenburg, and Saxony. These were major providers of German emigrants in the second half of the nineteenth century, while those of the first half of the century tended to have come from Germany's south-western states of Baden and Württemberg. Wehner investigates the contrasting occupations of the settlers, which included viticulture and goldmining, along with a variety of urban occupations. In some ways, those Germans who settled in towns and cities found it easier to maintain a sense of German identity because of their greater numbers.

Religion, especially in the form of Lutheranism, proved fundamental in the development of German identity in Victoria, as it did amongst the German diaspora all over the world, no matter how small the settlement. Following the Franco-Prussian War, the German diaspora in Australia became politicized as it did in other parts of the world, inspired by organizations in Berlin. Although assimila-

[5] See Stefan Manz, *Migranten und Internierte: Deutsche in Glasgow, 1864–1918* (Stuttgart, 2003); and Panikos Panayi, *German Immigrants in Britain during the Nineteenth Century, 1815–1914* (Oxford, 1995). Both tell an entirely urban story.

[6] Manz, *Migranten und Internierte*.

tion had taken place from the first settlement of the immigrants in the 1840s, the First World War experience of the community here resembled that of Germans all over the world, especially in the British Empire. A combination of official measures and popular Germanophobia resulted in the persecution of the new enemy aliens, a process that included press vilification and internment. Wehner focuses on two German academics at the University of Melbourne, Walter von Dechend and Eduard Scharf. They lost their positions, a picture which was repeated in other parts of the British Empire,[7] as academic institutions fell victim to rampant Germanophobia. Wehner chooses to end his story in 1930 rather than in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, the usual endpoint for studies of this nature.[8] This allows him to examine the extent to which Germans and their institutions survived.

Wehner has produced an interesting, thorough, and useful study of all aspects of the history of the Germans in Victoria from the middle of the nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth century. Using a wide variety of sources, especially newspapers, he has added another piece to the jigsaw of the German diaspora of the nineteenth century. He contextualizes his research extremely well in the historiography which has emerged in recent decades.

[7] See e.g. Andrew Francis, 'Anti-Alienism in New Zealand during the Great War: The von Zedlitz Affair, 1915', *Immigrants & Minorities*, 24 (2006), 251–76.

[8] Razak Khan, focusing simply on the Indian context, does not realize this when reviewing Panikos Panayi, *The Germans in India: Elite European Migrants in the British Empire* (Manchester, 2017), in *German Historical Institute London Bulletin*, 40 (2018), 107–11, at 110–11. The community which emerged and faced internment in India during the First World War had little to do with that which developed after 1918 and therefore deserves a separate history. Alan Malpass has begun to work on the Second World War experience of the Germans in India.

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JAMES RETALLACK, *Red Saxony: Election Battles and the Spectre of Democracy in Germany, 1860–1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), xxiv + 698 pp. ISBN 978 0 19 966878 6. £95.00 (hardback)

During the process of reunification in 1989–90, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) had high hopes of doing exceptionally well in Saxony. After all, Social Democratic memories of 'Red Saxony' were a bulwark of the left—with the SPD achieving extraordinary election results in Saxony in Imperial Germany and during the Weimar Republic.[1] After forty years of 'real socialism' (*real existierender Sozialismus*), however, nothing was left of this legacy. The rival Christian Democratic Union (CDU) won the elections of 1989–90 handsomely, and today the SPD is struggling to get beyond 10 per cent, with the right-wing populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) gaining more than 40 per cent of the vote in some of the electoral districts of Saxony, rivalling the CDU as the strongest party in the Freistaat Sachsen. By comparison, in Imperial Germany the SPD in Saxony consistently polled well over 50 per cent of the popular vote after 1909, but never achieved power in a state where the rival political forces did everything to prevent the 'Reds' from taking over politically. And this brings us right into James Retallack's story about democratization processes in Imperial Germany and the role of Social Democracy within them, one that is full of rich nuances, intriguing stories, and convincing analyses.

His is a strangely contemporary story about modernization without democratization (see China). Conceptually, Retallack distinguishes between social democratization (understood as the 'fundamental politicization of German society', p. 3) and political democratization (understood as the will to implement some degree of constitutional reform), while his main argument is framed in terms of the threat of social democratization holding up the process of political democratization in Imperial Germany. It was, according to Retallack, the fear of *social* democratization felt by Germany's middle classes and their political representatives that prevented the onward march of *political* democratization in Imperial Germany. Saxony, for him, was a laboratory which revealed the anti-socialism, anti-liberalism,

[1] Karsten Rudolph, *Die sächsische Sozialdemokratie: Vom Kaiserreich zur Republik (1871–1923)* (Cologne, 1995).

and antisemitism of the German middle classes as particularly acute due to the especially impressive successes of Social Democracy in that state. At national level, Bismarck had introduced one of the most democratic electoral systems in the world between 1867 and 1871, based on full manhood suffrage. He did so in the hope of being able to establish a popular Conservatism that would trounce his old opponents, the Liberals. Over time, however, it emerged that the main beneficiaries of this system were the Social Democrats who, by 1912, managed to attract roughly a third of the vote in national elections and had become by far the strongest party in the Reichstag. Saxony was one of their biggest strongholds, yet the electoral system there was geared against them in such a way that a majority of votes did not result in a majority of seats.

Retallack has spent many years in Saxon and German archives to piece together the fascinating story of why these mutually exclusionary processes were so strong in one of the most industrialized and populous parts of Germany, and why it produced the strongest Social Democratic bulwark in the Empire. Going down to the regional and often the local level of politics, he puts together the picture of a powerful anti-democratic consensus in the non-Social Democratic parts of German society before 1918. Much of what he has to say touches on the familiar story of the German *Sonderweg*, which has a slightly dated ring in 2018. Has it not long since been decided that the idea of a negative German *Sonderweg*, leading from the 'failed revolution' of 1848 straight to National Socialism, was politically motivated and intended to justify the division of Germany after 1945?

Retallack endorses many of the criticisms of the old *Sonderweg* thesis, which pointed to the strength of the bourgeoisie, the power of civil society, the fact that the rule of law was important in Imperial Germany, and that the agrarian elites were not as powerful as was often assumed. However, it is the question of democratization that interests him, and where he begs to differ with many of those critics of the *Sonderweg* idea who have argued that Imperial Germany was well on the way to becoming a democratic state. For him, the prism of Saxony reveals the illiberal, anti-socialist, and antisemitic side of the German middle classes. Their representatives tried everything to prevent political democratization because they feared that it would lead to social democratization and the victory of allegedly revolutionary forces. Retallack can back this up with an impressive amount

of evidence, so that the reader will put this book down rethinking at least those aspects of the *Sonderweg* idea that deal with German democratization.

In his desire not to judge but to understand the reaction of the German middle classes, Retallack at times goes too far, which is also why I find his conceptual distinction between social democratization and political democratization problematic. It may well not be the author's intention, but it seems easy to construct from this concept an argument that puts the responsibility for the deficits of democratization at the door of those attempting to politicize German society in the name of genuine democracy, which in my view would be a grotesque reversal of responsibilities. It is as if the fear of a Social Democratic takeover somehow justified the anti-democratic actions of the middle classes. Yes, the SPD did speak the Marxist language of revolution and class war in Imperial Germany, and yes, it left no doubt that it aimed to overthrow the capitalist system of production. But were the Social Democrats still a party that instilled the fear of a revolutionary bloodbath, of 'red terror', of a complete turnaround of all social relations into middle-class hearts and minds? Did not those who wanted to see observe quite clearly that the SPD had long since become a political party willing to integrate into the mainstream of German society, to co-operate with other political parties and forces, and to pursue a parliamentary and reformist road to socialism under the banner of political democratization? To distinguish between political democratization and social democratization is, to my mind, opening too much of a gulf between democracy and Social Democracy in Imperial Germany. Retallack finishes his book by claiming that it 'reminds us that dictatorship and genocide are also possible outcomes of social democratization'. This, in my view, is a problematically ambiguous statement, in that it could be read by some as attributing the Holocaust and rise of National Socialism to Social Democracy, rather than to those who wilfully misinterpreted the Social Democratic campaigns for genuine democratization.

The weakness of the concept that carries the main argument of the book is all the more unfortunate as Retallack in many ways presents a masterpiece of sober historical research. He patiently examines many agendas for historical reform, and analyses parliamentary and electoral histories as well as various strategies of exclusion at many levels—rhetorical, legal, and physical. He provides a whole host of

new electoral analyses and looks in depth at party politics, their presses, finances, and political leaders, always with a regional focus on Saxony. He analyses the motives of members of parliament and the civil servants who served the authoritarian Saxon state. By delivering in-depth studies of election and suffrage battles in Saxony, Retallack produces a cutting-edge, culturally inflected political history that combines a view from above with a view from below.[2]

Election and suffrage battles often resembled veritable wars of words and actions that were motivated, on the bourgeois side, by a desire to see the socialists as representatives of a terror regime of the future—something, as I have suggested above, that in the decade before the First World War could only be believed by anyone seriously lacking judgement. Retallack's conclusion in relation to the path of democratization in Imperial Germany is a warning not to overestimate the will of the *Bürgertum* to go down the road of genuine democratization. It is shown beyond any reasonable doubt that the majority of the Saxon bourgeoisie was not liberal and had no truck with either parliamentarism or democracy. Indeed, the spectre of democracy that was connected with the French revolution of 1789, the events of 1848, the Paris Commune, and Social Democratic Marxism haunted the Saxon bourgeoisie and made many shy away from democracy, seeking to limit it and make it safe for bourgeois interests. Instead, the Saxon middle classes had a strong orientation towards order and authoritarian rule.

Political democratization in Imperial Germany was blocked not only by the Prussian agrarian elites, but also by the Saxon middle classes. The latter masterminded what Retallack calls 'the most egregious example of suffrage robbery in the history of the Kaiserreich' (p. 622)—the electoral reforms of 1895–6. Anti-democrats, so the persistent refrain of the book, left no stone unturned in their many attempts to undermine parliamentarism and universal manhood suffrage between 1867 and 1918. Anti-socialists saw democracy as a threat to their own safety and that of the German nation, and therefore tried to curb it wherever they could. This worldview, however, was by no means peculiar to Germany, as a comparative European

[2] Jon Lawrence, 'Political History', in Stefan Berger, Heiko Feldner, and Kevin Passmore (eds.), *Writing History: Theory and Practice* (2nd edn. London, 2010), 213–31.

research project on anti-socialism powerfully underlines.[3] Thus at the end of the book, we come back to the beginning: national *Sonderweg* ideas, even if we restrict them to the issue of democratization, are not helpful in understanding the path of German history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Yet, as well as reconsidering aspects of *Sonderweg* ideas, we have undoubtedly learned a great deal from this book about the details of battles for democratization in Saxony between the 1860s and the end of the First World War.

[3] <http://prewaras.eu/author/fmura/>, accessed 30 Sept. 2018.

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BIRTHE KUNDRUS, *'Dieser Krieg ist der große Rassenkrieg': Krieg und Holocaust in Europa* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2018), 336 pp. (paperback) ISBN 978 3 406 67521 8. €18.00

Birthe Kundrus's new synopsis of National Socialist foreign policy, war, and genocide is the latest volume to appear in the series 'The Germans and National Socialism' edited by Nobert Frei. The series offers introductory accounts of aspects of the history of the 'Third Reich' that are informed to a greater or lesser extent by the general scholarly turn towards exploring the elements of popular consensus, participation, and affirmation which underpinned the politics of the regime. Previous volumes include a very readable account of the cultural life of National Socialism by Moritz Föllmer and an outstanding social history of the period by Dietmar Süß.[1]

Each volume opens with a vignette, centred on an image—in Kundrus's case, it is that of a Jewish man staring back at the camera. Behind the Jewish man stands Hans Biebow, the head of the German administration of the Łódź ghetto; behind Biebow stand three unidentifiable members of the Jewish ghetto police. From the outset, constrasting subjectivities are placed at the centre of what is billed as an 'Erfahrungsgeschichte' of the regime.

Yet for all the foregrounding of 'experience' as the object of analysis and the driver of the account, Kundrus never leaves the reader in any doubt that this was a history shaped by an aggressive political and ideological drive that came from the top. Taking Hermann Göring's statement in his speech of October 1942 that 'this war is not the Second World War, this war is the great racial war' (p. 10),[2] she emphasizes from the outset that the National Socialist regime was driving at a brutal war of destruction from the start. In a refreshing statement of the obvious that bears the occasional repeating, she underlines of *Mein Kampf* that 'in 1925 it had formulated a programme whose basic features were not far removed from what the Third Reich was to realize in foreign policy from 1933' (p. 16).[3]

[1] Moritz Föllmer, *'Ein Leben wie im Traum': Kulturgeschichte im Dritten Reich* (Munich, 2016); Dietmar Süß, *'Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer': Die Deutsche Gesellschaft im Dritten Reich* (Munich, 2017).

[2] German original: 'dieser Krieg ist nicht der zweite Weltkrieg, dieser Krieg ist der große Rassenkrieg.'

[3] German original: '1925 hatte die Gefängnisschrift ein Programm formuliert,

This is not to say that Kundrus is simply rehearsing an old-fashioned 'intentionalist' account. Rather, she takes the events of the years 1933 to 1939 to demonstrate how different factors shaped specific outcomes at particular moments. Thus the German withdrawal from the Geneva disarmament talks in 1933 is used to underline the agency of the conservative diplomatic elites in the early phase of the regime; the fact that in the following year Hitler broke with the traditional foreign policy agendas of the Wilhelmstraße is used to underline the difficulty for observers at the time of discerning any obvious pattern to events as they initially unfolded. The Stresa Front fell apart because of the ineptitude of the member powers—a noticeable constant in the narrative is Kundrus's strident critique of British foreign policy—while the remilitarization of the Rhineland showed Hitler's capacity for opportunism, coming as it did at a moment of French governmental paralysis. Later in the 1930s, as Kundrus shows, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia was partly (though not totally) determined by economic ambitions centred on the presence there of prime industrial capacity and considerable foreign currency reserves.

Kundrus thus shows how the situational logics of each particular moment in the wider story were different, and worked to produce their outcomes in slightly different ways, so that each could be explained or rationalized by contemporaries as legitimate on their own terms. They unfolded in a manner that made seeing the bigger picture slightly harder at the time—perhaps—than it is in retrospect. Yet her account is driven, all the same, and as it should be, by the implicit insistence that with National Socialist foreign policy one has to see the wood despite the trees. Moreover, she is clear that foreign policy was underpinned by a broad degree of popular consensus, anchored in resentment of defeat in 1918, aggressive revisionism regarding the Treaty of Versailles, the appeal of German national revival, and a deeper seated nationalist arrogance, in all its variants, towards neighbouring others.

Despite its sometimes unpredictable quality, the regime's foreign policy vision was also clear enough, and intuitively recognizable to those whose eyes were open, for people to know where things would

das in seinen Grundzügen nicht weit entfernt war von dem, was das Dritte Reich ab 1933 aussenpolitisch realisieren sollte.'

almost inevitably lead. It was certainly spelled out clearly enough from the outset to politically active and informed circles in government and administration. What mattered here, as Kundrus underlines, is that for all their occasional scruples, broad sections of the military and civilian elites shared the political agendas of the regime, and did so on the basis of considerable ideological affinities. This did not change as foreign policy began to merge more explicitly with the acting out of the racial vision. Thus when the regime moved towards its more overtly Pan-German expansionist phase with the annexation of Austria, the advent of the *Einsatzgruppen* (death squads) marked a significant, open escalation of anti-Jewish policy.

The real turning point, however, was the outbreak of war in 1939. From the outset—and, indeed, before—it was conceived and planned as a war of racial destruction. As German soldiers swiftly registered during the invasion of Poland, the distinctions between soldiers and civilians that were central to the customary rules of war were no longer to apply. The fact that the first theatre of war was in the east, and that the war was thus initiated against people who were the object of deep-seated nationalist, colonialist, and racist arrogance on the part of many Germans, meant that the moral barriers to indiscriminate, widespread violence were flimsy at best. Kundrus describes vividly how ideological imperatives set at the top, a permissive broader context, and tacit encouragement from local commanders interacted with racist and nationalist mentalities that were widespread among the rank and file to facilitate a swift normalization of excessive violence. The growing realization among ordinary Germans out in the killing fields that there would be no punishment for 'excesses' did more to encourage the dismantling of any remaining inhibitions.

At all times, however, Kundrus is at pains to emphasize the framing agency of the regime itself, and of a substructure populated by a cadre of committed ideologues who drove the war and genocide from within organizations right at the heart of the Nazi polity. The annexation of western Poland created a space in which these actors could model the creation of the racial 'New Order'. Kundrus offers a magisterial overview of the complexities of the unfolding of the occupation and genocide that is underpinned by a clear command of a now voluminous scholarship. But while one of the many strengths of the book is that is gives full treatment to the German occupation of

northern, western, and south-eastern Europe too, Kundrus leaves the reader in no doubt that the territories of Poland and the Soviet Union were where almost all key developments occurred. In the case of the Soviet Union in particular she insists (rightly) that 'even before a single German tank had reached Crimea, a single German plane had bombed Leningrad and the Red Army had responded to the German attacks, the war against the Soviet Union had already started as a war of annihiliation in the imaginations of the Nazi leaders' (p. 141).[4] The escalation of violence was thus not primarily a product of brutalization on the ground after June 1941: 'To this extent the crimes committed by the *Wehrmacht* did not arise out of the combat situation, nor were they deeds that were the responsibility of individual soldiers. These happened anyway. Rather, from the outset the German army conceived of this war as the most serious break with international law—thereby granting carte blanche for murder' (pp. 141–2).[5]

As Kundrus also makes clear, the war against the Soviet Union and the escalation of violence it entailed also had consequences for the persecution of the Jews in the rest of Europe. Here, an image of a more provisional, step-by-step intensification of the persecution emerges. The key moment for Germany's Jews was the ban on their further emigration in October 1941. The embrace of mass murder in the Soviet Union merged with an increasing Europeanization of the practice of deportation; the creation of the Operation Reinhard camps over the winter of 1941–2 produced the infrastructure of murder that would be unleashed on Poland's Jews; as Operation Reinhard wound down in 1943 Auschwitz emerged as the pre-eminent site of mass murder. Yet while all this unfolded in a piecemeal manner, carried out by a central cast of actors and institutions who were feeling their way into the unfolding possibilities at each moment, the parameters

[4] German original: 'noch bevor ein deutscher Panzer die Krim erreicht, ein deutsches Flugzeug Leningrad bombardiert und die Rote Armee auf die deutschen Angriffe reagiert hatte, war in der Vorstellungswelt der NS-Spitze der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion schon als Vernichtungskrieg angelaufen.'

[5] German original: 'Insofern geht es bei den Verbrechen der Wehrmacht nicht um Taten, die der Kampfsituation entsprangen, und auch nicht um Taten, die in der Verantwortung einzelner Soldaten lagen. Diese passierten ohnehin. Vielmehr konzipierte die deutsche Armee diesen Krieg von vornherein als schwersten Bruch mit dem Völkerrecht—und erteilte damit eine Carte blanche zum Morden.'

and shared assumptions were, again, defined clearly by the overarching vision of racial war.

It is in the account of the Holocaust that some of the most compelling eye-witness accounts in the book give texture to the narrative. Throughout, diary extracts provide the perspectives of a variety of observers. Victor Klemperer and good old Luise Solmitz play their obligatory cameo roles, but the range of less well-known voices adds freshness to even the most familiar aspects of the story. Thus Kundrus gives us the voice of a German army adjutant in Kaunus who describes how, as a group of Jews were murdered in public, a crowd gathered that included women who held their children aloft so they could see, or stood on stools for a better view. According to the witness, the scene was accompanied by shouts of 'bravo!'. If, for some, murder provided a spectacle, for others it was a business opportunity. Such was the case with a German sculptor in Riga who sought to appropriate the marble, granite, and stone of the local Jewish cemetery for his needs, helpfully offering 'to cleanse the city of Riga from tasteless Jewish monuments and emblems, and to raze the Jewish cemetries to the ground' (p. 233).[6]

As the war went wrong, the regime doubled down on its commitment to completing its self-imposed historical mission. Indeed, the prospect of defeat only confirmed the sense that Germans were victims of a global conspiracy that needed to be destroyed. Even as defeat loomed, the deportations were thus pursued with a ferocity that could only have been driven by irredeemable hatred. And as the military campaign turned into a desperate retreat, Germans continued to fight. An ingrained hostility towards Bolshevism combined with a knowledge of what Germans had done in the previous three years to provide much of the motivation in the eastern theatre; here, and in the west too, the absence of meaningful alternatives often gave them little choice anyway. Yet even in the autumn of 1944 Germany still controlled much of Europe, and even if the outcome was almost inevitable, the war still had to be won. Sustaining the narrative right to the end, Kundrus gives the same authoritative treatment to the liberation of Europe, the Battle of the Ardennes, the death marches from the camps, and the final maelstrom of violence visited on Germany

[6] German original: 'die Stadt Riga von den geschmacklosen jüdischen Denkmälern und Emblemen zu säubern und die jüdischen Friedhöfe mit der Erde zu ebnen.'

as the *Wehrmacht* collapsed, German cities were razed to the ground by bombing, and the mass movement of refugees began.

Again, these stories have been told before, but Kundrus integrates them with narrative clarity, interpretative balance, and scholarly authority. The study is a model of how a familiar history can be told in a fresh and engaging manner, and shows how new historiographical insights and emphases can be integrated into the account without an excess of revisionism or the gratuitous pursuit of novelty for its own sake. It is thus a model of how to communicate such histories to a non-expert readership in an accessible, reliable, and yet still powerful way.

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ASTRID ZAJDBAND, *German Rabbis in British Exile: From 'Heimat' into the Unknown* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2016), viii + 321 pp. ISBN 978 3 11 046948 6. €79.95. US$112.00. £59.99

The subject of Astrid Zajdband's doctoral dissertation, completed at the University of Sussex, is those German-speaking rabbis who fled Germany to escape Nazi persecution between 1933 and 1939. The second part of its title, 'From "Heimat" into the Unknown', accurately reflects the author's interest in the painful journey of these refugees from initial flight to eventual integration into British society. Unsurprisingly, therefore, much of Zajdband's methodological approach focuses on questions of ethnicity and identity, the idea of cultural transfer, and network analysis.

However, a closer look at the title also reveals one of the main unresolved difficulties of this book. Zajdband argues convincingly in her introduction that 'German rabbis in British exile' should be seen as a discrete group among refugees, with their own specific characteristics, warranting a more explicit analysis of their life in exile. For example, she pays close attention to the way in which rabbis represented a link between religious practice and questions of ethnicity—two areas which are key to understanding German Jewry. She also rightly underlines the difficult duality of their position; rabbis were victims of Nazi persecution, yet at the same time, bore the responsibility for supporting and comforting other Jewish emigrants. But unfortunately, it is never entirely clear whom Zajdband is talking about. The reader is never quite sure whether 'German rabbis' here means only rabbis who were German citizens, or all rabbis who spoke German. This may seem a minor quibble, but in fact, several of the rabbis who appear in her study were born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and studied or worked, at least for some of the time, in an Austrian or Czechoslovakian context, where Jewish communities, especially the more liberal among them, were influenced by different reform traditions. It was not unusual for German-speaking rabbis between the wars to have worked in Germany, Austria, and the German-speaking communities in Czechoslovakia, which leads us to ask what Zajdband actually means when she speaks of a 'German rabbinate'. Clearly, it included *Doktorrabbiner* from the great

Trans. Emily Richards (GHIL).

seminaries in Breslau or Berlin, as well as others entitled to bear a doctoral title or who had served as rabbis to Jewish soldiers at the Front during the First World War. It would have been helpful to have a more explicit and more rounded definition of the 'German rabbinate', which would have added some much-needed depth to Zajdband's subsequent analysis of the cultural transfer that rabbis in the United Kingdom experienced.

This difficulty, however, is closely bound up with the author's methodological approach. Zajdband chooses a traditional structure for her dissertation, with the four main sections preceded by a 'Literaturbericht' and a note on method. The latter is used to explain central concepts such as 'exile' or the idea of 'Jewish leadership' based on the model of the three 'Ketarim' (crowns) developed by Daniel J. Eleazar and others. This model offers a differentiated perspective on the various and changing areas in which rabbis exercised authority or carried out tasks within the remit of their individual communities. Zajdband also comprehensively discusses various aspects of 'ethnicity' and 'identity', giving particular consideration to the process of ethnogenesis. This process, according to Zajdband, was responsible for groups of migrants splitting off into various subgroups based on ethnic and/or linguistic differences; but on the other hand, the eventual reversal of the process helped the refugees to become more integrated in the diverse society of their new country. If one is to believe the author, this was a relatively linear process, offering little room for a multifaceted concept of identity, or for a situative self-view of the actors concerned. This is shown, for example, when Zajdband discusses the fact that most German rabbis were only able to become British citizens after the war, when they were no longer 'German' and were therefore no longer 'caught between two identities' (p. 227). Nationality here is seen not as just one facet of identity but as its focal point—a point of view that the reader is likely to stumble over, given the almost exaggerated weight given to questions of identity and identities in current research.

It is perhaps this somewhat rigid theoretical approach that inhibits Zajdband from fully engaging the reader with her otherwise extremely interesting subject. We learn, for example, that communities in the early 1950s began to reject traditional German-style sermons that were characterized by a learned and 'lofty style' (p. 251). This led to the younger generation of rabbis—who had generally left

Germany for the UK immediately after completing their training—gradually replacing their older, German-speaking colleagues. Zajdband ascribes this to the fact that the younger rabbis, thanks to their skills in English and their military service during the war, knew far more about British society than the older rabbis and therefore, she argues, saw no reason to take up the mantle of their German preaching heritage. Ultimately, so her argument, the British Jewish majority were therefore responsible for the break with this tradition.

But this is not an entirely satisfying argument, as it fails to go into the subject matter in as much depth as one could wish. For example, one could ask whether certain elements of the 'German' preaching style became incorporated into its later English equivalent; a question that cannot be answered without a comparison of different sermons, which would admittedly be extremely difficult to carry out given that most sermons were never written down. The author could also have turned to the members of the communities themselves for help on this point, as it may be assumed that such changes in tradition did not go entirely unnoticed. Finally, it would have been helpful to have even a brief comparative discussion of the situation in the USA, where German-speaking rabbis were present in greater numbers than in the UK.

Overall, however, Zajdband's work contributes many important insights on the continuance of the German-speaking rabbinic tradition in Anglo-American countries, for example, in her discussion of how German-speaking rabbis helped build new communities in Britain and Ireland (chapter 4). She also provides a well-informed overview of rabbinic activity in Germany before 1938 (chapter 1), a detailed description of the experience of flight and exile based on numerous ego documents written by the émigrés themselves or their descendants (chapter 2), and an analysis of the difficulties they encountered starting over in a new country (chapter 3). The period she chooses for her study is also convincing; the book's closure with the death of Leo Baeck, the most important representative of (liberal) German-speaking Jewry, in 1956, makes sense in the context of the author's inclusionist approach, as it gives the work a perspective transcending the war and immediate post-war years.

It is a shame, therefore, that the publishers did not take a little more care with the editing process; the book includes numerous minor errors such as sentences that begin with minuscule letters or

missing punctuation (as on p. 103), and more distressingly (at least for a German reader), the repeated unreflected use of 'Machtergreifung' instead of a more neutral equivalent (e.g. p. 58 and p. 261). A more attentive editor could easily have ironed out these problems. Nonetheless, Zajdband's study is well worth reading. We may hope that it will encourage more readers and researchers to engage with a German(-speaking)/British/Jewish history that can be described, in the best sense, as truly transnational.

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CONFERENCE REPORTS

Movable Goods and Immovable Property: Gender, Law, and Material Culture in Early Modern Europe (1450–1850). Conference held at the German Historical Institute London, 19–21 July 2018. Conveners: Annette C. Cremer (Gießen) and Hannes Ziegler (London).

The relationship between gender and property rights, especially in the context of inheritance, has long been an important issue in social history. Adding aspects of material culture brings a new perspective to the nexus of gender, law, and material objects. This approach can show how our understanding of objects originating from gendered spheres of life relates to perceptions of goods and real estate as movable or immovable, male or female property. These concepts of property are also connected to legal cultures, which determine who is eligible for the right of ownership. The conference brought all these strands together. It covered a long period from the end of the Middle Ages to the mid nineteenth century and contrasted examples drawn from various countries (in Europe and beyond), social strata, and religious minorities. With a focus on the transfer of property, it asked questions about the definition of property and the status of objects, women's agency in terms of property rights, strategies for the transfer of property, and discrepancies between law and social practice. The conference was organized in conjunction with the European network 'Gender Differences in Legal Cultures' and was co-funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the German Historical Institute London.

After a conceptual introduction by Hannes Ziegler (GHIL) and Annette Cremer (Gießen), the first session focused on 'The Value of Immovable Property'. Anna Stuart (Graz) began with a paper on 'Ownership in Early Modern Political Philosophy', in which she discussed Locke's and Rousseau's theories of property. Women, seen as unfit for the public sphere, were excluded from the mutual agreements that defined property. They could only acquire property rights

The full conference programme can be found under 'Events and Conferences' on the GHIL's website <www.ghil.ac.uk>.

with their husbands' permission. Regardless of these philosophers' contemporary perceptions of women, Stuart concluded, not enough attention is paid to inconsistencies in their arguments against female ownership, especially as their political theories are still influential today. Janine Maegraith's (Cambridge) paper, 'Fences and the Meaning of Property', continued the discussion on the definition of property. Presenting her work on the dynamic market in farms and land in sixteenth-century Tyrol, Maegraith argued that women barely participated in this market because of legal restrictions. Women were largely excluded from inheriting land and did not have the same authority as men in relation to economic resources. Fences as cultural objects with symbolic meaning, Maegraith explained, helped to create the idea of property in the first place. They defined property by physically excluding others from using it, just as women were excluded by legal means. Susann Anett Pedersen (Trondheim) explored the practice among noble families of gifting or promising high value goods during a marriage in order to ensure that a surviving spouse was financially secure. Especially in cases where there were no children, a widow might need to defend these marital gifts against her husband's kin. Pedersen argued that in such cases the widow relied on her network of male relatives, or on a new husband, for legal support. In her paper 'Possession and Property in Colonial Brazil: Women and Goods in the Captaincy of Paraíba', Luisa Stella de Oliveira Coutinho Silva (Lisbon) traced the effects of the Portuguese legal system on the property rights of female colonists. Coutinho argued that women in colonial Brazil were able to own and bequeath land, slaves, and other goods. But these rights were the privilege of certain social classes, and were intertwined with concepts of female sexual virtue.

The first day of the conference concluded with a Keynote Lecture delivered by Margareth Lanzinger (Vienna) on 'Movable Goods and Immovable Property: Interrelated Perspectives'. Lanzinger emphasized the ambiguity in the understanding of what was considered movable or immovable. Immovable property symbolized status and could act as a vital source of income. Gender played an important role in legal practices and restrictions regarding its transfer. Nonetheless, norm and practice could diverge and open up space for negotiation. Movable goods were assigned symbolic meaning and gender attributions, which influenced how they were transferred.

This was not limited to goods that were inherited, but also included goods transferred by other practices such as public gifting. Depending on the legal modes and strategies of transfer, the status of objects as movable or immovable was also subject to transformations and conversions, so that movability itself could become an object of negotiation. Lanzinger argued that the legal status of objects was bound to object biographies: disputes, legal procedures, assessments of value, and categorization influenced their status as movable or immovable.

On the second day of the conference, the topic shifted to 'The Value of Movable Goods'. In her paper 'Gender and Household Goods in late Medieval and Early Modern London', Katherine L. French (Michigan) examined how urban gender roles and the gendered connotation of household goods changed drastically in the post-plague inheritance practices of Londoners. French substantiated these claims by pointing to the development of a consumer society and the need to maintain a larger number of household goods on the one hand, and the fifteenth-century economic recession and resulting conservatism on the other. Rebecca Mason (Glasgow) analysed Scottish inheritance law and how it affected surviving spouses in her paper 'Gender, Law, and the Division of Marital Property upon Death in Early Modern Scotland'. Mason showed that in Scotland a husband did not have automatic control of his wife's inheritance. The husband had to comply with the inheritance rights of his wife's kin, although whether the couple had living children was significant. Taking the example of Jamaica, Christine Walker (Singapore) studied inheritance practices in a slave-holding society in which women actively engaged. Slaves were perceived as a movable, female form of property with attached sentimental value. Extremely high mortality rates meant that women were often a family's only surviving heir. Walker observed the practice of connecting generations of women through inheritances, in which slaves were usually the main asset. Ida Fazio (Palermo) concluded the morning session with her paper, 'Women and Movable Goods in a Maritime Border Economy (Aeolian Islands, early Nineteenth Century)', which explored women's relationship with movable goods on the island of Stromboli. Fazio argued that although certain types of work, such as textile production, were gendered (as were the related objects), women took an active part in all areas of the local economy. They

engaged in buying and selling goods, and could inherit boats and tools.

Gábor Bradács (Budapest) opened the third session on 'Gendered Distribution of Wealth' with a paper on the development of female inheritance and female property rights in Hungary between the fifteenth and the early eighteenth centuries. Bradács focused on urban legal spaces which were heavily influenced by Saxon law and citizens' demands for the regulation of female ownership. In her paper 'The "Constrained" or "Self-Limiting Patriarchy": Wives, Household Authority, and Law in Sixteenth-Century Antwerp', Kaat Cappelle (Brussels) showed how women gained extended legal agency by adapting to life in the commercial centre. She presented flexible marriage contracts and a tendency towards husbands and wives writing joint wills as a peculiarity of Antwerp. Cappelle argued that this legal evolution occurred because it benefited the household, even though it was not in the interest of patriarchal structures. In her paper on 'Negotiated Honour: Arrangement of Property in the Marriage Contracts of the Tyolean Nobility in the Early Modern Period', Siglinde Clementi (Bolzano) analysed the strategies employed by the rural aristocracy to construct kinship networks amongst themselves in order to increase family prestige and to provide for wives and widows. Clementi underlined that the marriage portion which the bride received from her family can be seen as a form of premature inheritance. The bride renounced any further claim to parental inheritance, thus keeping the patrilineal inheritance intact. The next two papers traced the significance of the transfer of real estate through women in early modern Italy. Michaël Gasperoni (Paris) shed light on the dowry system in segregated Jewish communities in his paper, 'Diverging Laws, Traditions and Contexts: The Jewish Inheritance in the Italian Ghettos in Early Modern Italy'. In the context of the *jus gazagà,* the right of perpetual possession of real estate, Gasperoni concluded that different social strata used diverging strategies of inheritance. In higher social strata real estate was transferred through the agnatic line; in lower strata more often through female inheritance. Anna Bellavitis (Rouen) focused on the restitution of the dowry a widow could claim after her husband's death in Renaissance Venice. This could be a lengthy and complicated process. Bellavitis observed that even though dowries mostly consisted of movable goods, restitution was often made in immovable goods. This practice was

intended to ensure that the dowry remained in stable investments because of a desire to keep immovable property in the male line.

The second day concluded with another Keynote Lecture, 'The Property, Material Culture, and Identity of Luxury Traders in Eighteenth-Century London', in which Amy Erickson (Cambridge) used a biographical approach to show that independent working women were not an exception but the norm in the early modern metropolis. The husband took ownership of his wife's property and was granted access to the guild of which she was a member. Nevertheless, Erickson showed that marriage and the arrival of children had no effect on women's businesses. A woman's profession was a large part of her identity, competing with the importance of her marriage identity.

Nicoleta Roman (New Europe College/Romania) opened the fourth session on 'Shifting Values' with her paper, 'Starting a Married Life: Women, Goods, and Households in the Wallachian Town of Pitesti in the Mid Nineteenth Century'. Roman explored the dowry system during a period of Westernization in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. She studied dowry registers and found that dowries were divided into categories and their values calculated. Roman argued that the variation of content in the dowries revealed distinctions between social classes and changes in fashion and material culture. The dowry system was also the focus of Exdoxios Doxiadis's (Vancouver) paper 'Stamp Duty and the Transformation of the Dowry in Nineteenth-Century Greece'. The young Greek state was in financial trouble when it imposed a stamp tax on notarial dowry contracts in 1843. As a result, poor couples avoided such contracts, putting the ability of women to defend their property at risk. Furthermore, the forced calculation of the value of the dowry changed perceptions of it, leading to its monetization. On the basis of the last wills and inventories of estates left by the linen weavers of the Westphalian city of Münster in the seventeenth century, Christoph Jeggle (Würzburg) analysed how urban craftspeople distributed their property among their descendants and friends, and also how they invested in religious institutions. Jeggle contrasted the municipal police rules as the legal framework with the actual inheritance strategies and occasional disputes between dependants. In her paper 'Land-Girls of Vidin and Antakya: The Representation of Women in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire', Fatma Gül Karagöz (Istan-

bul) scrutinized the legal right of women in the Ottoman Empire to own, inherit, and sell property, and to defend it in court. Karagöz showed that women appeared in court, with or without a proxy, claiming property or usufruct rights that they had inherited. More often women used their legal agency to appear as plaintiffs in such cases, in an attempt to protect their income. By contrast, in her paper 'A Silent Conflict? How Women Lost Control of their Property among the Middle and Lower Classes (Turin, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries)', Beatrice Zucca Micheletto (Cambridge/ Rouen) emphasized that women in early modern Italy had to give up their right to goods that were legally their property. In her analysis of pawn shop inventories of items that were never redeemed, Zucca observed a strategy to ensure the survival of the household by transforming movable property belonging to women into money. This raises the question of whether the decision to pawn an item had to be taken mutually, or whether it was up to the husband alone.

Participants agreed that the conference shed light on the intense influence of material cultures on gender roles, property laws, and the logics of transferring property. Finally, plans for future conferences of the European network 'Gender Differences in the History of European Legal Cultures', to be held in Vancouver and Vienna, were announced.

James Krull (Bonn) and Karoline Müller (Tübingen)

Living the German Revolution: Expectations, Experiences, Responses. Conference held at the German Historical Institute London, 18–20 October 2018. Conveners: Christopher Dillon (London), Christina von Hodenberg (London), Steven Schouten (Amsterdam), and Kim Wünschmann (Munich).

After four years of First World War centenaries, modern European historians might be forgiven for succumbing to a measure of centennial torpor. Yet in the new historical research and interpretations which these commemorations brought to the fore, one of the seminal events of the war remained somewhat in the shadows. This was the German Revolution of 1918–19, a major historical turning point in which German soldiers and civilians rose up to overthrow the German Empire's political and military leadership. Since the 1960s and 1970s, comprehensive and systematic studies of the Revolution have been comparatively rare, with many analyses situating the events of 1918–19 within the wider history of the ill-fated Weimar Republic. Yet in recent years, as the Revolution's centenary approached, new research has emerged to challenge the dominant narratives about its events, to examine the role of neglected groups and blurred identities, and to bring to life the vitality of revolution itself, looking beyond theorists and professional politicians to the roles of activists, supporters and opponents, partisans, and bystanders.

The aim of this conference, sponsored by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, was to re-evaluate the German Revolution's contested history and memory, focusing on the socio-cultural realm of expectations, experiences, and responses. It sought to explore the subjective dimension of the revolutionary events by examining the practices and agency of ordinary protagonists, and to gauge the Revolution's popular mobilization and societal penetration. With its far-reaching destruction of inherited patterns of authority, the Revolution became for Weimar contemporaries a prism to understand the creation of democratic citizenship and institutions, and a potential model for spreading democracy across Europe. Given the apparent global return of authoritarianism, the conference provided a timely occasion to explore the Revolution's contested legacy for the Weimar republican project.

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The first panel, 'Living at Revolutionary Flashpoints', cast the conference *in medias res*, offering three complementary perspectives on how the Revolution was experienced 'on the ground' in its primary contexts: naval, urban, and rural. Wiebke Wiede (Trier) focused on the naval port of Wilhelmshaven, one of the cradles of the Revolution, as a microcosm of how various social groups at the end of the Kaiserreich reacted to the Revolution and the foundation of the Republic. She traced the way in which socialist revolutionaries returning from penal battalions at the front worked closely with naval crews and workers to subvert the existing social order in November 1918, as well as the legacy of the sailors' revolt for reactionary officers who later went on to join the anti-Republic terrorist group *Organisation Consul*. Christina Lipke (Hamburg) shifted the focus to Hamburg, and illustrated how the institutions of the Revolution's local government sought to maintain at least a superficial resemblance to the cultural manifestations of the outgoing order. She observed that the Revolution was not always marked by overt violence, and illustrated how ordinary Germans soon came to accept the disruptions and restrictions it imposed on them as part of their everyday routines. Last, Christopher Dillon (London) turned to Bavaria as an example of the competing narratives at work in the Revolution's reception, stressing the need to move away from a narrow focus on Munich in accounts of the sheer diversity of the Bavarian experience. He sought to resist traditional narratives that attributed the Bavarian revolution to dilettante intellectuals, focusing on the 'provincial tremors' in Ingolstadt, Erlangen, and Hof at the height of the Spring Offensive that triggered the collapse of regional aristocratic power, and in effect split Bavaria into a mosaic of mini-republics. The discussion centred on the ways in which various German regions tried to absorb demobilized troops returning from the Front, and considered how transgressive appropriations of public space and personal (real or imaginary) narratives of revolutionary experience were used as means to cope with the experience of defeat.

In the second panel, 'Perspectives on Revolutionary Violence', the conference considered how the Revolution's periodic moments of violence were received, both by their participants and in retrospect. Anita Klingler (Edinburgh) traced the continuities in the way left-wing violence was treated and described across Europe, with a comparison between the crushing of the Bavarian Räterepublik in April–

May 1919 and the Battle of George Square in Glasgow in January 1919. In both cases, political authorities deployed modern weaponry in the interests of preserving 'Ruhe und Ordnung' ('peace and order'), but cast themselves in the role of 'liberators', consistently using dehumanizing, antisemitic language to denigrate and delegitimize 'alien' Bolshevik and Sinn Fein tendencies, perceived as 'viehisch' (brutish), among the revolutionary workers. Thomas Blanck (Cologne) drew comparisons between revolutionary Munich and Gabriele d'Annunzio's *Impresa di Fiume* ('Fiume Endeavour') of September 1919, considering whether interwar revolutionary violence became, to a degree, a self-fulfilling prophecy. In contrast to 'bourgeois' representations of these moments as 'carnivalesque', he stressed the uncertainty brought to them by situational factors, such as urban overcrowding, noise, darkness, material needs, the omnipresence of arms, and the frequent deaths of innocent bystanders. Finally, Mark Jones (Dublin) offered an analysis of the Revolution's violent episodes over time, observing that they led to a clear transformation in political culture of what counted as acceptable political violence in transitional periods. He noted the ways in which police behaviour in late 1918 rapidly became more ruthless and brutalized, with the normalization of the use of military tactics against civilians laying the groundwork for the methods by which the Nazis rose to power. The conference moved on to a discussion of the changing partisan claims to ownership over state violence against civilians, including its effects on national and regional identities (such as the erosion of traditional *Reservatrechte*, or reserved rights, by the Reich government), and the counter-revolutionary co-opting of the legacies of violence associated with revolutionary moments.

The conference's keynote address was given by Benjamin Ziemann (Sheffield), who offered several local accounts of the Revolution's events to illustrate the tensions between its multifarious historical 'plot' and its 'emplotment' in both revolutionary memory and historical reception. He stressed the role of the media, especially 'shock cinema', in the Revolution's emplotment, especially regarding the long 'tail' of revolutionary activities that persisted past the Revolution's formal end in 1919, such as the 1920–21 Vogtland uprising under Max Hoelz. The German Revolution, for Ziemann, never followed the tripartite comedy–romance–tragedy emplotment of other revolutions, largely because the brutal end of the Spartacist

uprising precluded all attempts at forming a strong countervailing narrative. Similarly, he observed that the radical promise of the council movement that emerged during the Revolution suffered from its failure to incorporate vital groups within German society, and soon became co-opted by the administrative structures of the late Wilhelmine state in the context of urgent yet pedestrian needs to manage the production, distribution, and consumption of food, coal, and other resources. Ziemann also argued that the Revolution was characterized for the most part by competing male subjectivities, which prompted a lively debate about the erasure of female and other intersectional class and religious subjectivities in historical discussions of the spaces in which the Revolution took place.

On the second day of the conference, the panels focused explicitly on several groups in early twentieth-century German society whose participation in the Revolution had only been indirectly alluded to so far. The third panel, 'Women and the German Revolution', sharpened historical focus on the female protagonists of the Revolution, challenging the pervasive male gendering of its seminal events. Ingrid Sharp (Leeds) recentred the role of women away from being mere passive beneficiaries of male revolutionary activity, arguing that historical narratives of the Revolution must redefine political activity in a way that decouples violence from gendered identities, not to 'overclaim' women's role but to avoid 'editing out' women in a distortionary way. Despite the significant patriarchal barriers standing in the way of women's participation in, for example, the elected councils, over 250 women can be identified who had recognized roles in the Revolution, including socialists such as Toni Sender, Gertrud Völcker, and Hilde Kramer, and pacifists like Anita Augspurg and Lida Gustava Heymann. Corinne Painter (Leeds) built on Sharp's argument to explore women's experience of the events of 1918–19, using examples of how neglected female protagonists learned to deal with the arbitrariness of state power and terror. Writers such as Lola Landau and Cläre Jung, for example, sought actively to cultivate a sense of self as agents who could influence the world and events around them, using themes of love and suffering to craft imagery of women's roles in reaching across borders to form a new world and a new humanity. Matthew Stibbe (Sheffield Hallam) observed that, in many revolutionary narratives, women are 'permitted' to be symbols, sites, or servants of revolution, but never its bona fide agents

unless, like Rosa Luxemburg, they conform to 'the linear stories told by men'. While it was typically only communist literature that stressed female agency in an effort to demarcate itself from liberal bourgeois elements in the Revolution, tensions still remained in the attempts by some communists to relegate women to adjunct roles, and in their reluctance to take seriously emotional responses to revolutionary experiences as legitimate foundations for socialist views. The ensuing conference discussion noted that the partisan affiliation of many of these 'rediscovered' women was either communist (KPD) or independent social-democratic (USPD), which contrasted not only with the patriarchal exclusionism of mainstream social democrats (SPD), but also with German women's wider rejection of both the council movement and their tendency to support reactionary parties (such as the DNVP) in later Weimar-era elections.

In the fourth panel, 'German Jews and the Revolution', the conference turned to Jewish experiences of the Revolution, both through activists' direct links to party-political developments in the early Weimar Republic, and through the perceptions of other Jewish contemporaries experiencing the historical events against the backdrop of the minority's complex 'insider–outsider' identity. Kim Wünschmann (Munich) outlined the way in which the Revolution brought out many different conceptions of Jewishness among German Jews, particularly in relation to their membership of the emergent democratic German state. Often, they were caught between contradictory accusations of being war profiteers and at the same time Bolshevik sympathizers, which led many to internalize the imposed *Judenfrage* as a heuristic through which to re-evaluate their instinctive loyalty to the German nation. Daniel Siemens (Newcastle) stressed that the Revolution was often the object of deep uncertainty and frustrated aspirations among Central European Jews, who had hoped that it would not only bring about democratic transformation but also lead to the recognition and achievement of (political) emancipation. The hopes and fears of Jews in the Revolution were inextricably bound up in the First World War and the *Fronterlebnis*, as well as the divisive 1916 census of Jews that remained unpublished but contributed heavily to the spread of antisemitic stereotypes of cowardice and lack of patriotism. The discussion centred around the efficacy of visual imagery in propounding claims and counter-claims about Jewish identity, mobilized more effectively by antisemitic than anti-antise-

mitic tendencies, as well as around the relative absence of a true 'home' for German Jews in Weimar party politics (with the liberal DDP and DVP typically capturing most Jews' support).

The fifth panel, 'Emotions and the Chronicling of Revolutionary History', explored how the events of the Revolution were experienced by young Germans who were still growing into their political roles within society. Nadine Rossol (Essex) chronicled the experiences of a class of students training to become schoolteachers in the Ruhr area, whose essays about their encounters with the Revolution saw them writing themselves into the local script of revolutionary events as critical commentators, keen observers, or reporters. She noted the particular benefits of using school essays as ego-documents to track the construction of pupils' selfhood and identity, as well as the great variety of hopes and fears already evident at their early age regarding the risks of revolutionary *Pöbelherrschaft* ('mob rule') continuing or being ended by the formation of the Weimar Republic. The discussion focused on the role of teachers with clear political leanings in influencing pupils' political self-formation, and noted the significance of imaginary representations of the Revolution in shaping its legacy for the citizens of the new Republic.

The conference returned to the intersection of politics and religion for its sixth panel, 'The Churches and the Revolution', examining the complex role played by the various Christian denominations and institutions in the transition from Kaiserreich to Republic. Benedikt Brunner (Mainz) examined the way in which Protestant churches sought to leverage the concept of *Volkskirche* ('people's church') to remain socially relevant and build a new identity in the Weimar Republic. Waging a desperate struggle against the feared 'mutilation of the church', Protestant theologians sought to rethink religious organization in a way that aimed to reach all members of German society, bridging confessional boundaries, in order to allow them to cast themselves as revolutionary agents without committing to endorsing the new German state. Ulrike Ehret (Munich), assessed the Catholic response to the Revolution, arguing that the traditions of political Catholicism were instrumental in protecting reactionary elements throughout the Weimar period. She focused especially on 'brown priests', such as Cardinal Michael von Faulhaber, in promoting Catholic support for *völkisch* and Nazi ideologies, and in perpetuating xenophobic and antisemitic tropes about 'foreign writers' and

'Revolutionsjuden', who were accused of turning Germany from a 'Volksstaat' into a 'Judenstaat'. The conference then raised the question of dissident 'free churches' on the fringes of German Christian denominations, noting that the organized *Amtskirchen* ('institutional churches') were often the most effective organizers of counter-revolution in Germany—a fact typically obscured by the more overt actions of reactionary *Freikorps*.

The last day of the conference turned from social to cultural analyses of the Revolution's legacy. In the seventh panel, 'Publishing Houses, Culture, and Education', the focus was on the response of intellectuals and educators to the Revolution's events. Margarete Tiessen (Cambridge) traced the response to the Revolution of a group of highly influential intellectuals associated with the publishing house Samuel Fischer, casting them as a neglected 'other left' whose seminal contributions to post-Revolution Germany are often overlooked in favour of more revolutionary strands. Figures such as Walther Rathenau, Thomas Mann, and Gerhard Hauptmann argued that the Revolution needed an inner German *Geist* to achieve real emancipation, a democratic freedom that transcended the mere desperate 'negative unity' of radical action—a *Geist* that they saw themselves as best placed to articulate. Steven Schouten (Amsterdam) found a similar strain of thought among intellectuals who were influenced by theosophical and anthroposophical traditions of early twentieth-century mysticism, culminating in a commitment to the idea of achieving Germany's social rebirth through a concerted spiritual revolution. In particular, Rudolf Steiner urgently defended the need to save Germany's cultural *Geist* from subordination to political or economic logics, and to cultivate its enlightened formation through new regimens of schooling, medicine, and nutrition. The discussion focused on the ways in which German intellectuals sought to reinvent socialism and denude it of its Marxist associations during the war and interwar period, as well as on how they formulated cross-ideological accounts of democracy—sometimes *Führerdemokratie*—with pedagogical elites as the optimal model for the new Republic.

The eighth panel, 'Revolutionary Ideas and Practices', expanded the conference's intellectual-historical focus to reconnect the Revolution with more contemporary social research. Darrow Schecter (Sussex) argued that the Revolution provides a treasure-trove of hitherto unexplored resources and ideas to inform and renew the con-

temporary Left, especially on questions of democratizing the economy and other areas of society beyond the state. Following the work of Hermann Heller and Hugo Sinzheimer, he argued that modern thought on the Left must recover the concept of the 'social constitution', and especially of the *Wirtschaftsverfassung* ('economic constitution'), in order to move left-wing strategy beyond mere *Machtergreifung* ('seizing power') and achieve a true democratic transition away from the institutions of the *Obrigkeitsstaat* ('authoritarian state'). Andrew Donson (Amherst) provided a critique of the discourse around *Arbeitsunlust* ('reluctance to work'), which circulated among opponents of the new society and culture the Revolution had inaugurated, arguing that the availability of 'free time' was essential to enabling a revolution to take place at all. He focused on the economic reforms instituted in the early Republic, including unrestricted freedom of association, a gradual shift to an eight-hour day, and comparatively generous unemployment support, observing that they were more consequence than cause of a post-war shift in German culture to prioritize private enjoyment over the needs of the country. The conference then discussed the similarities and differences between the reforms spearheaded by the early Republic and analogous models endorsed by radical syndicalism, fascist corporatism, and ordoliberal *Sozialmarktwirtschaft* ('social market economy'), and considered how far the 'laboratory' (Schouten) of the Revolution could be used to inform contemporary democratic responses to economic financialization.

The conference closed with a final roundtable discussion between Anthony McElligott (Limerick), Andrew Donson, Nadine Rossol, and Steven Schouten, which gathered together the essential themes that the conference had considered. Central to these was the timeline of the Revolution, with enduring questions over both its date of origin—from the various 'watershed moments' during the First World War to the formal transfer of power on 9 November 1918—and its later horizon of effects, including, of course, the entire Weimar period, but also the subsequent periods of right-wing and left-wing totalitarianism. While not all the agents of the Revolution were sure of their role in its events, a shared sense of historical momentousness emerges very strongly from ego-documents and other sources of the time, as well as a view of the Revolution as an opportunity for constitutional and intellectual transformation and renewal that had to be

seized. But perhaps the strongest message of the conference was one of plurality—that there was not just one German Revolution, but many concurrent German Revolutions. Of course, this is partly a question of decentring the Revolution, away from Berlin and Munich, away even from the ports and the *Kleinstadt*, to the point at which the Revolution became a free-floating signifier in people's fantasies, far removed from the real experiences of revolutionary action. But, above all, it is a question of recognizing the many identities that were at stake in the Revolution's events and aftermath, the many socialisms and forms of left-wing politics, the many rival masculinities, femininities, and religious identities, which combine to give 1918–19 its complex, contested legacy.

Marius S. Ostrowski (Oxford)

NOTICEBOARD

Scholarships Awarded by the GHIL

Each year the GHIL awards a number of research scholarships to German postgraduate and postdoctoral researchers to enable them to carry out research in Britain, and to British postgraduates for research visits to Germany. The scholarships are generally awarded for a period of up to six months, depending on the requirements of the research project. British applicants will normally be expected to have completed one year of postgraduate research, and be studying German history or Anglo-German relations. Scholarships are advertised on H-Soz-u-Kult and the GHIL's website. Applications, which should include a CV, educational background, list of publications (where appropriate), and an outline of the project, along with a supervisor's reference confirming the relevance of the proposed archival research, should be addressed to Dr Hannes Ziegler, German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ, stipendium@ghil.ac.uk.

During their stay in Britain, German scholars present their projects and the initial results of their research at the GHIL Colloquium. In the first allocation for 2019 the following scholarships were awarded for research on British history, German history, and Anglo-German relations.

Hendrik Baumbach (Marbach), Legitimation und politische Sprache in der ersten Hälfte des 12. Jahrhunderts: Bischöfliche Herrschaft im römisch-deutschen und englischen Königreich im Vergleich
Claudia Berger (Duisburg-Essen), Die 'Zwischenzeit' der Kapkolonie 1902–1910: Politische Imaginationen, Taktiken und Strategien im Transformationszeitraum
Thomas Dorfner (Aachen), Kommerz für den Heiland: Der Handel der Herrnhuter Brüdergemeine in der Atlantischen Welt (1758–1818)
Daniela Egger (Munich), Long-Distance Ship Passages, Emotions, and Mental Health
Stephen Eugene Foose (Marburg), Travelling Passports: The Imperial and National in Movement between England and Jamaica, 1948–1975

Stefanie Freyer (Osnabrück), Deutsch-englische Beziehungen um 1600: England auf den deutschen Reichstagen
Riley Linebaugh (Gießen), Stolen Archives: The Struggle Between Kenya and Great Britain over the Records of Empire
Bastian Linneweh (Göttingen), Die Anatomie eines globalen Marktes im Wandel: Kautschuk 1900–1960
Soheb Ur Rahman Niazi (Berlin), Social Stratification at a Muslim Qasbah: Genealogy and Narrating the Past at the Qasbah Amroha (1878–1940)
Lisa Regazzoni (Frankfurt am Main), Das Denkmal als epistemisches Objekt: Die Erforschung schriftloser Vergangenheit im Europa des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts
Marina Schütz (Munich), Kooperative Konkurrenz in Big Biology: Die Anfänge des Human Genome Project im Labor
Debojit Kumar Thakur (Trier), A History of Economic Thought of Hindu Nationalism: 1923–1993
Liza Weber (London), Documenta and its Double. Germany's Myth of Modernism in Memory and Provenance: From 'Degenerate' to documenta (1937–1955)

Joint Stipendiary Junior Research Fellowship with IAS/UCL

The Institute of Advanced Studies, University College London, and the GHIL award a joint Stipendiary Junior Research Fellowship, tenable for a period of six months. The purpose of the Fellowship is to offer an outstanding early career scholar from a German university the opportunity to pursue independent research in the stimulating intellectual environment of the two host institutions. In 2018/2019 the following Fellowship was awarded:

Nicole Wiederroth (Hamburg), Changing Environment, Changing Perspectives: Processes of Mobility, Transformation, and (Re)Interpretation of Eastern Africa

Postgraduate Students Conference

The GHIL held its twenty-third postgraduate students conference on 10–11 January 2019. The intention was to give postgraduate research students in the UK and Ireland working on German history an opportunity to present their work-in-progress, and to discuss it with other students working in the same or a similar field. The conference opened with a welcome by the Director of the GHIL, Christina von Hodenberg. Over the next one and a half days, twenty-two speakers introduced their projects to an interested and engaged audience. Participants gave a short summary of their work containing general ideas, leading questions, sources, and initial findings, followed by discussion. Information about institutions that give grants for research in Germany was also exchanged. The GHIL can offer support here by facilitating contact with German archives and providing letters of introduction, which may be necessary for students to gain access to archives or specific source collections. In certain cases it may help students to make contact with particular German universities and professors. The conference was preceded by a palaeography course tutored by Dorothea McEwan.

The GHIL is planning to hold the next postgraduate students conference on 9–10 January 2020. For further information, including how to apply, please contact the Secretary, Anita Bellamy, GHIL, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ, abellamy@ghil.ac.uk.

Laura Achtelstetter (Cambridge), Politics and Religion in the Prussian Old Conservative Milieu, 1815–1854
Firdevs Bulut (UCL), Cultural Diplomacy in the UK and Germany: The History and Theory of Two Institutional Models
Alasdair Cameron (KCL), 'How Shall We Sing the Lord's Song in a Strange Land?' The Sing- and Orgelbewegungen and their Continuation and Reception in Post-War East and West German Cultural Memory and Practice
Kate Docking (Kent), Exploring the Everyday Amid Atrocity: Gender and Medicine in Ravensbrück Concentration Camp
Philipp Ebert (Cambridge), Regime Criminality and Transitional Justice in Re-United Germany, 1989–2004
Alexandra Fergen (Oxford), Gender Relations in the West German Magazine *Stern*, 1964–1979

Anastazja Grudnicka (Oxford), Crossing Confessional and Familial Boundaries: The Northern Journey of Archduke Matthias Habsburg (1587)
Michelle Hufschmid (Oxford), The Crusade against the Staufen in Germany, 1239–1268
Charlotte Johann (Cambridge), Friedrich Carl von Savigny and the Politics of Jurisprudence in the Age of Ideology, 1810–1847
Percy Leung (St Andrews), (Un)Patriotic Orchestral Performances: The Concert Programmes of the Berliner Philharmoniker and the London Symphony Orchestra during the First World War
Bethany McNamara-Dale (Oxford), Jurisdictional Conflict and Supranational Order: German Legal Reform and State-Building, 1770–1866
Louis Morris (Oxford), Borderlands and Fatherlands: 'Foreign' Soldiery in the Holy Roman Empire, 1576–1618
Tim Schmalz (Cambridge), The Role of British and Austrian Diplomats in Vienna during the 1930s
Emily Steinhauer (QMUL), From Critical Theorists to Political Actors: Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer's Role in West German Politics
Jan Tattenberg (Oxford), West German Intellectuals and the Utility of Force, 1940–1989
Alice Tofts (Nottingham), Photographs of People who were Victims of Nazi Persecution: Building a Collection; Interrogating its Meaning
Jonathan Triffitt (St Andrews), 'The Age of Divine Right has Simply Passed by': The Fall of Monarchy in Hessen, Bavaria, and Württemberg, 1918–1934
Alex Turchyn (Oxford), Swedish Military Logistics in Occupied Royal Prussia, 1655–1660
Susan Wachowski (Southampton), Jews, East Germany, and the Holocaust: Memory in the GDR from Julius Meyer to Irene Runge
Samantha Winkler (Manchester), Encountering German Socialism and Fascism between the World Wars: The Experience of Humanitarian and Pacifist Intellectuals
Julian Wojtowicz (KCL), 'Freeborn': A Socio-Cultural History of the British Occupation of Austria, 1945–55
Alexander Wulfers (Oxford), The Shift Towards Protectionism in the Weimar Republic and the Political Economy of German Trade Policy

Prize of the German Historical Institute London

The Prize of the German Historical Institute London is awarded annually for an outstanding Ph.D. thesis on German history (submitted to a British or Irish university), British history or the history of the British Empire (submitted to a German university), Anglo-German relations, or an Anglo-German comparative topic. The Prize is 1,000 Euros. Former Prize winners include Arun Kumar, Simon Mee, Marcel Thomas, Benjamin Pope, Mahon Murphy, Chris Knowles, and Helen Whatmore.

To be eligible a thesis must have been submitted to a British, Irish, or German university. Doctoral exams and vivas must have been successfully completed between 1 August 2018 and 31 July 2019. To apply, send one copy of the thesis with

- a one-page abstract
- examiners' reports on the thesis
- a brief CV
- a declaration, if the thesis is on British history or the history of the British Empire, Anglo-German relations, or a comparison between British and German history, that the author will allow it to be considered for publication in one of the Institute's publication series, and that the work will not be published before the judges have reached a final decision
- a supervisor's reference

to reach the Director of the German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ, by **31 July 2019**. Applications and theses may also be emailed as a PDF attachment to: prize(ghi)ghil.ac.uk.

The Prize will be presented on the occasion of the Institute's Annual Lecture on 8 November 2019.

Forthcoming Conferences

Workshop on Medieval Germany. Organized by the GHIL in co-operation with the German Historical Institute Washington, DC, and the German History Society, to be held at the GHIL, 17 May 2019. Conveners: Len Scales (Durham) and Cornelia Linde (GHIL).

This one-day workshop on medieval Germany will provide an opportunity for researchers in the field from the UK, continental Europe, Canada, and the USA to meet in a relaxed and friendly setting and to learn more about each other's work.

From the Ruins of Preservation: A Symposium on Rethinking Heritage through Counter-Archives. Conference co-organized by Rodney Harrison (UCL) and Mirjam Brusius (GHIL), to be held at the GHIL, 11–12 July 2019.

Colonial legacies in heritage preservation have intersected and clashed with local realities since their inception. Heritage sites have often been created by way of processes which segregate them both temporally and geographically from the contemporary world, and the people who live with and amongst them. This might result in restrictions of habitation and cultivation, religious and ritual practice, and the removal of entire local settlements from inside and around natural and cultural heritage sites. Individuals and communities, however, have always had their own ways of preserving and engaging with material and immaterial significances. Objects, places, and landscapes were and are embedded and reactivated in the domains of contemporary life. These realities defy and challenge the disciplinary baggage, canons, and categories as well as prevailing methods, discourses, concepts, and practices of heritage studies, which in many cases have proved unhelpful in engaging such records outside 'the archive' as it is conventionally understood.

The problem of adequately engaging the histories of these intersections has been exacerbated by methodological challenges. Historians have long ignored the gaps and unspoken emotions and bodies in written and visual archival sources. Visual analyses often

lack the methods to engage with different iterations of the diverse and heterogenous agencies of both humans and nonhumans outside the scope of official archives—the locals going about their lives in ancient ruins; the workers who labour on archaeological excavations; those often nameless individuals who serve as human scales next to an excavated building; the local guides who help 'open up' landscapes to preservationists; or the agencies and affordances of forms of material culture themselves. Due to a turn against the forms of authority empowered in conventional archival sources, critical heritage studies have largely denied the usefulness and significance of archives for the study of such non-official forms of heritage preservation, which has led to the de-privileging of historical and visual analysis. This frustration has resulted in a general turning away from such sources by researchers within heritage studies to focus on contemporary issues and their accompanying methods, especially 'oral history' and ethnography. However, this move has frustrated historians who have seen heritage studies, as a field in which the historical contexts of the contemporary phenomena which such scholars study, effectively written out of the picture.

This conference presents a methodological intervention into reductionist preservation histories by developing a new diachronic, more diverse vocabulary and directions for future research in and on this field. Reconstructing new histories and viewpoints in order to re-examine the 'ruins of preservation', it aims to rethink the varied agencies which surround both natural and cultural heritage preservation practices through new conceptual and methodological approaches. Re-engaging such histories is not only important in building a new historical approach to heritage, but will also help researchers to reconceptualize and recontextualize contemporary heritage phenomena. By re-centring the discourse about 'heritage' to examine specific non-state practices through such methods we also seek a more nuanced and effective understanding of how preservation has been determined over time and from different perspectives.

Medieval History Seminar. Organized by the GHIL and the German Historical Institute Washington, DC, to be held at the GHIL, 10–12 October 2019. Conveners: Paul Freedman (Yale), Bernhard Jussen (Frankfurt am Main), Simon MacLean (St Andrews), Ruth Mazo Karras (Dublin), Len Scales (Durham), and Dorothea Weltecke (Frankfurt am Main).

The seminar is designed to bring together Ph.D. candidates and recent Ph.D. recipients (2018) in medieval history from American, Canadian, British, Irish, and German universities for three days of scholarly discussion and collaboration. They will have the opportunity to present their work to their peers as well as to distinguished scholars from both sides of the Atlantic. The Medieval History Seminar will discuss papers from all areas of medieval history. Participation is not limited to historians working on German history or German-speaking regions of Europe. Nor is a particular epoch or methodological approach preferred. The seminar is bi-lingual, and papers and discussions will be conducted both in German and English.

A sortable list of titles acquired by the GHIL Library in recent months is available at:

https://www.ghil.ac.uk/library/collections/recent_acquisitions.html

For an up-to-date list of the GHIL's publications see the Institute's website:

http://www.ghil.ac.uk/publications.html