


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Jutta Braun:

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## *LEARNING FROM THE DICTATORSHIP? SPORT IN DIVIDED AND UNIFIED GERMANY*

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Public debates on Germany's internal unity have, for some time, always come around to the fact that after almost thirty years, many East Germans still feel like second-class citizens.<sup>1</sup> Richard Schröder, former civil rights activist and theologian, contributed to the debate by pointing out that many citizens of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had brought a vague feeling of being second rate with them at the time of unification. This could be seen as a legacy of forty years of permanent competition with the West Germans, who were richer, enjoyed greater freedom, and were internationally more respected.<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps it was this notorious feeling of inferiority in the East-West comparison that, in retrospect, turned the GDR's competitive sport into such a fierce battleground, for it was here—and only here—that the East German dictatorship did better, at least in the medal tables, than its West German counterpart.<sup>3</sup> How much defending GDR success in this field had become a political reflex action is shown by Gregor Gysi's remarks early in the 1990s when, as leader of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), he felt called upon to defend the East German sprinter Katrin Krabbe against accusations of doping. The PDS, successor to the former East German Socialist

Trans. Angela Davies (GHIL).

<sup>1</sup> This was the result of an Allensbach survey in 2009: '42 Prozent der Ostdeutschen fühlen sich als Bürger zweiter Klasse', *Wirtschaftswoche*, 26 Sept. 2009. Possible reasons for this are explored from a literary and sociological point of view by Jana Hensel and Wolfgang Engler, *Wer wir sind: Die Erfahrung, ostdeutsch zu sein* (Berlin, 2018).

<sup>2</sup> Richard Schröder, 'Die Erfindung des Ostdeutschen', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ), 3 Oct. 2018, online at <<https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/pegida-und-chemnitz-was-ist-mit-dem-osten-los-15814890.html>>, accessed 29 Jan. 2019.

<sup>3</sup> Jutta Braun, 'Wettkampf zwischen Ost und West: Sport und Gesellschaft', in Frank Bösch (ed.), *Geteilte Geschichte: Ost- und Westdeutschland 1970–2000* (Göttingen, 2015), 411–48.

Unity Party (SED), declared this accusation a deliberate defamation by the West of the icons of the now defunct 'state of workers and peasants'.<sup>4</sup>

While our knowledge of the realities of East German (and all-German) sport is now considerably more differentiated, opinions on this topic are, surprisingly, hardly less entrenched. When the exhibition 'Sportverräter' opened in the Willy Brandt House in Berlin in 2011 – it travelled to the German Historical Institute London a year later as 'Tracksuit Traitors' – Klaus Huhn, who had been sports editor at the former East German mass-market daily, *Neues Deutschland*, accused the exhibition's academic curators of having ideological motives.<sup>5</sup> And it is not only historical issues that always turn up in the cross-fire of competing interpretations, but also questions relating to the culture of memory. Thus when 'Täve' Schur, the popular East German cyclist and hero of the Ride of Peace (*Friedensfahrt*), was nominated for the Hall of Fame of German Sport in 2016, a week-long controversy ensued in the German media. It ended with the legendary cyclist's exclusion from the Hall of Fame.<sup>6</sup>

The popular triumph of sport is undoubtedly one of the features of the twentieth century.<sup>7</sup> The German example shows clearly what social power sport was able to unfold. Taking a number of selected aspects – national representation, the organization of sport, questions of security and violence in sport, and the culture of memory and processing the past since 1990 – this essay will show the different paths that sport took in East and West Germany, and demonstrate the long-term impact this had on sport in unified Germany.

<sup>4</sup> Jutta Braun, 'Dopen für Deutschland: Die Diskussion im vereinten Sport 1990-1992', in Klaus Latzel and Lutz Niethammer (eds.), *Hormone und Hochleistung: Doping zwischen Ost und West* (Cologne, 2008), 151–70, at 163; 'Hetzjagd soll Erinnerungen an DDR-Sport tilgen', *Neues Deutschland*, 17 Feb. 1992.

<sup>5</sup> Klaus Huhn, 'In der Parteizentrale auf der Flucht: Eine Ausstellungseröffnung', *Junge Welt*, 23 July 2011, online at <<http://www.jungewelt.de/2011/07-23/021.php>>, accessed 30 Jan. 2019.

<sup>6</sup> Christian Spiller, 'Täve Schur: Ein Held wie wir', *Zeit online*, 29 Apr. 2017, online at <<https://www.zeit.de/sport/2017-04/taeve-schur-ddr-hall-of-fame>>, accessed 30 Jan. 2019.

<sup>7</sup> On the terminology see Martin Sabrow and Peter Ulrich Weiß (eds.), *Das Jahrhundert vermessen: Signaturen eines vergangenen Zeitalters* (Göttingen, 2017).

I. *State Representation in the Battle of the Systems*

The Olympic Games, more than any other sporting event, were considered the main stage on which the battle of the systems was enacted during the Cold War. Competition with the 'other Germany' was an additional spur driving both parts of Germany on to strive for success, although its political relevance was very different in the two countries. For the GDR, which notoriously stood out as the loser in any comparison with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), its success in sport presented an extraordinary chance to showcase the achievements of the socialist system and its own profile as an independent 'nation'. This relatively small country with a population of just 17 million was able to accumulate 755 Olympic medals, 768 world championships, and 747 European championships in forty years. After the Munich Olympic Games in 1972 the Cold War in sport developed an increasing consistency and brutality. How impressive the GDR's international standing really was became clear in the 1976 Montreal Olympics, when it overtook not only West Germany in the medal tables as usual, but for the first time also passed the USA. In the 1984 Winter Games in Sarajevo the East German athletes even bested the Soviet athletes, which did not make them universally popular with their big brother.<sup>8</sup>

While East Germany triumphed over West Germany at the Olympics, it was a different story in football. With just one World Cup finals appearance to its name, the GDR could not compare with the success of the West German national team and the Bundesliga. Indeed, the sport and international football events represented a potential security risk for the GDR leadership, as both players and supporters used sporting encounters as a bridge for German-German understanding.<sup>9</sup> The highly successful West German league and national teams had many supporters, especially among the younger generation of East Germans. In the view of the East German

<sup>8</sup> See Hans Joachim Teichler, 'Bruderzwist an der Dopingfront: Als die Sowjetunion der DDR das Handwerk legen wollte', in Hans-Joachim Seppelt and Holger Schück (eds.), *Anklage Kinderdoping: Das Erbe des DDR-Sports* (Berlin, 1999), 299–306.

<sup>9</sup> Jutta Braun, 'The People's Sport? Popular Sport and Fans in the Later Years of the German Democratic Republic', *German History*, 27 (2009), 414–28.

state, however, these members of the 'Wall generation' (*Mauergeneration*) should not have had any intellectual or real ties at all with the class enemy, West Germany.<sup>10</sup>

One of the defining features of sports diplomacy in the twentieth century was the boycott, and the boycotts of the Moscow Olympics in 1980 and the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984 were high points of the Cold War in sport.<sup>11</sup> The two German states were especially affected by this. The debate about a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics was one of the worst conflicts between West German national sport and the federal government. But sports leaders in the GDR also saw themselves as victims, albeit under different circumstances, of the boycott of the Los Angeles games imposed by the Soviet leadership four years later.<sup>12</sup> Beyond Olympic events, boycotts of particular venues were the instruments of a policy of pinpricks in the Cold War. This had an impact on West Berlin as a host city in particular, as the Soviet Union, supported by several Eastern bloc states, repeatedly tried to sabotage events in this 'frontline city'. Thus the Soviet leadership tried to exclude West Berlin from the football World Cup of 1974 – unsuccessfully. The city was, however, prevented from hosting the European Championships of 1988 out of political consideration for the Eastern bloc.<sup>13</sup>

Sport can therefore be regarded as a special instance of unification, as in this case West Germany was structurally prepared to learn from the dictatorship. In one of his first statements after the first free elections for the Volkskammer in the GDR, held on 18 March 1990, the FRG's Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Schäuble, declared that

<sup>10</sup> In the research a distinction is drawn between the old Communists, the 'Aufbau-Generation' born around 1929, and the 'Mauergeneration' born in the GDR. Mary Fulbrook, 'Generationen und Kohorten in der DDR: Protagonisten und Widersacher des DDR-Systems aus der Perspektive biographischer Daten', in Annegret Schüle, Thomas Ahbe, and Rainer Gries (eds.), *Die DDR aus generationengeschichtlicher Perspektive: Eine Inventur* (Leipzig, 2006), 113–30.

<sup>11</sup> On this see most recently Robert Simon Edelman, 'The Russians Are Not Coming! The Soviet Withdrawal from the Games of the XXIII Olympiad', *International Journal of the History of Sport*, 32/1 (2015) 9–36.

<sup>12</sup> Braun, 'Wettkampf', 430.

<sup>13</sup> See Jutta Braun and Hans Joachim Teichler (eds.), *Sportstadt Berlin im Kalten Krieg: Prestigekämpfe und Systemwettstreit* (Berlin, 2006).

the successes of East German sport must be ‘rescued’ for a unified Germany.<sup>14</sup> Here Schäuble found himself in full agreement with the FRG’s sports organizations, which, now that the Berlin Wall had gone, were finally hoping to gain insights into the ‘sports wonderland’ created by the GDR, and to adopt some of its practices. In the euphoric atmosphere of unification, sports policy in the FRG was fixated on the success in the Olympic Games that the GDR had enjoyed for decades. And in 1992, at the Winter Olympics held in Albertville, the unified German team, competing as the Federal Republic of Germany, found itself at the top of the medal tables for the first time. Joining forces with the East German athletes and coaches was regarded as a clear instance of profiting from unification. The renaissance of sports schools for children and young people from the mid 1990s is an example of the adoption of former East Germany’s practices. From this time on, there were constant demands to adopt further elements of the GDR’s methods. And, finally, after the joint German team’s performance at the London Olympics in 2012 was disappointing, a return to the GDR’s approach to talent spotting was debated.<sup>15</sup>

At first glance, sport appears to be one of the few areas in which there was a successful transfer of elites from East to West in the course of German unification. It was not only East German athletes who were a coveted elite in unified Germany, but also their coaches. This presented a marked contrast to the situation in other social and government sectors, where East German staff often lacked the formal qualifications and informal experience to make them attractive to employers.<sup>16</sup>

## II. *Club (Vereins-) Sport versus State Sport*

Sport as a stage for the Cold War has been the subject of a number of detailed political histories,<sup>17</sup> so that research can now concentrate

<sup>14</sup> ‘Schäuble will Erfolg des DDR-Sports retten’, *FAZ*, 22 Mar. 1990.

<sup>15</sup> ‘Birgit Fischer will Sichtungssystem der DDR reanimieren’, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12 Sept. 2012.

<sup>16</sup> Raj Kollmorgen, *Das ungewollte Experiment: Die deutsche Vereinigung als ‘Beitritt’. Gründe, Prozesslogik, Langzeitfolgen* (Magdeburg, 2013), 12.

<sup>17</sup> Special mention should be made of the pioneering work by Uta Andrea

more on a social history approach to the subject. The recapitulation of the many German–German intrigues about flags and the right to participation should not distract us from the fact that two very different sports systems developed in East and West, and that this had major long-term effects. In West Germany, after the Nazi excesses, a club-based sports organization regained a foothold after 1945, while in the East, a hierarchically structured, state-based system of sport driven by the political parties developed.<sup>18</sup> In the East, clubs were no longer free associations (*Vereine*) but replaced by ‘state-organized bodies’,<sup>19</sup> known as *Betriebssportgemeinschaften* (workplace sports communities, BSG). This transformation was not, of course, restricted to sport. Throughout the GDR, associations had to comply with the guidelines of a socialist society, which meant that there was little chance of voluntary membership or autonomy. It was not only football teams, but also allotment-holders and pigeon-fanciers, all those who maintained traditions and culture, who were placed onto a new organizational footing. This put them under strict official, but always also informal, state control.<sup>20</sup> Thus in the East, the impulse towards emancipation represented by German associations was radically curtailed in favour of state direction.

The roots of workplace sport as an activity that was organized around an economic enterprise go back to imperial Germany.<sup>21</sup> Yet in

Balbier, *Kalter Krieg auf der Aschenbahn: Der deutsch-deutsche Sport 1950–1972* (Paderborn, 2006).

<sup>18</sup> On this see Jutta Braun, ‘Sovietization in East German Football’, in ead., René Wiese, Berno Bahro (eds.), for the Sportmuseum Berlin, *Sowjetfußball als politische Macht und kulturelle Kraft im 20. Jahrhundert* (Paderborn, forthcoming 2019), 35–51.

<sup>19</sup> Giselher Spitzer, ‘Die Ersetzung von Vereinen und Verband durch politisch gesteuerte Körperschaften’, in id., Hans Joachim Teichler, and Klaus Reinartz (eds.), *Schlüsseldokumente zum DDR-Sport: Ein sporthistorischer Überblick in Originalquellen* (Aachen, 1998), 15–28, at 15: ‘staatlich organisierte Körperschaften.’

<sup>20</sup> Horst Groschopp, ‘Breitenkultur in Ostdeutschland: Herkunft und Wende – wohin?’, *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 11 (2001), 15–22.

<sup>21</sup> Andreas Luh, *Betriebssport zwischen Arbeitgeberinteressen und Arbeitnehmerbedürfnissen: Eine historische Analyse vom Kaiserreich bis zur Gegenwart* (Aachen, 1998); id., *Chemie und Sport am Rhein: Sport als Bestandteil betrieblicher Sozialpolitik und unternehmerischer Marketingstrategie bei Bayer 1900–1985* (Bochum, 1992); more recently, Jan Kleinmanns, ‘Betriebssport in der Zeit des

the GDR the driving force behind it was no longer the workers or the company owners, but the state, which assumed the role of the main agent and organizer of workplace sport. While this certainly presented a parallel with the Nazi period, it would be wrong to describe the tie between sport and enterprises as a concept that the GDR had adopted from the Nazi period.<sup>22</sup> In fact, by introducing workplace-based sports, the Soviet Occupation Zone, later the young GDR, was obeying a push towards Sovietization that was imposed upon it. The same applied to many other areas of social life. Soviet 'body culture' was the origin of this model, reflected most obviously in the structuring of sports organizations by branches of industry such as 'Tractor' and 'Construction'.<sup>23</sup>

One of the central questions in GDR research has always been to what extent the East German state imitated Soviet structures, or adopted them in a modified form.<sup>24</sup> This has never been systematically investigated for sport, although the field witnessed a profound organizational and cultural transformation. Athletes who wanted to keep the old club traditions going often saw themselves defamed overnight as 'enemies of the new democratic order'. Not only the 'bourgeois' nature of traditional sport was criticized, but also the notion that sport could be 'unpolitical'.<sup>25</sup> It was not only the way the

Nationalsozialismus: Alltagsgeschichtliche Aspekte betrieblicher Gesundheitsführung vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg', in Frank Becker and Ralf Schäfer (eds.), *Sport und Nationalsozialismus* (Göttingen, 2016), 67–84.

<sup>22</sup> This is the argument put forward by Walter M. Iber, Johannes Gießauf, and Harald Knoll, 'Fußball, Macht und Diktatur: Zur Einleitung, in eid. (eds.), *Fußball, Macht und Diktatur: Streiflichter auf den Stand der historischen Forschung* (Innsbruck, 2014), 13–23, at 18.

<sup>23</sup> Jutta Braun and René Wiese (eds.), *Doppelpässe: Wie die Deutschen die Mauer umspielten* (Berlin, 2006), 22.

<sup>24</sup> Balazs Apor and Peter Apor (eds.), *The Sovietization of Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on the Postwar Period* (Washington, 2008); Andreas Hilger, Mike Schmeitzner, and Clemens Vollnhals (eds.), *Sowjetisierung oder Neutralität? Optionen sowjetischer Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland und Österreich 1945–1955* (Göttingen, 2006); Stephan Merl, *Sowjetisierung in Wirtschaft und Landwirtschaft* (Mainz, 2011); Konrad Jarausch and Hannes Siegrist (eds.), *Amerikanisierung und Sowjetisierung in Deutschland 1945–1970* (Frankfurt am Main, 1997).

<sup>25</sup> Anlage 2 zum Protokoll Nr. 15 (des Politbüros) vom 8 Apr. 1949: Betr.: Verbesserung der Arbeit des Deutschen Sportausschusses, Stiftung Archiv der

old clubs worked that was frowned upon, but all the rituals, traditions, and memories that went along with them—the whole field of traditional ‘memorial culture’ typical of football was thus publicly proscribed.<sup>26</sup>

It is not surprising that such a sharp break could not happen without conflict, for in Germany as elsewhere, the role of sports and gymnastics clubs went far beyond organizing physical exercise and sporting competitions. Traditionally, they were also an expression of social localization, for example, by providing space for the development of working-class culture,<sup>27</sup> or a refuge for a ‘conservative milieu’.<sup>28</sup> Clubs also worked at the level of families, the smallest social unit, so that belonging to and supporting a sports club could provide a sense of orientation and meaning that spanned generations.<sup>29</sup> Football clubs in particular were a focus of local identity and regional pride.<sup>30</sup> It was therefore entirely predictable that the new organizational unit, the BSG, promoted by the SED would not meet with unrestrained enthusiasm. And in fact, the club tradition in German sport proved to be extremely tenacious.

Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (hereafter: SAPMO-BArch), DY 30/IV2/2/15.

<sup>26</sup> See Markwart Herzog (ed.), *Memorialkultur im Fußballsport: Medien, Rituale und Praktiken des Erinnerns, Gedenkens und Vergessens* (Stuttgart, 2013).

<sup>27</sup> Eike Stiller (ed.), *Literatur zur Geschichte des Arbeitersports in Deutschland von 1892 bis 2005: Eine Bibliographie* (Berlin, 2006); Hans Joachim Teichler and Gerhard Hauk (eds.), *Illustrierte Geschichte des Arbeitersports* (Berlin, 1987); Christian Wolter, *Arbeiterfußball in Berlin und Brandenburg 1910–1933* (Hildesheim, 2015).

<sup>28</sup> Frank Bösch, *Das konservative Milieu: Vereinskultur und lokale Sammlungspolitik* (Göttingen, 2002), 57–8.

<sup>29</sup> Markwart Herzog, ‘Erinnern, Gedenken und Vergessen im Fußballsport’, in id. (ed.), *Memorialkultur im Fußballsport*, 15–70, at 15–16.

<sup>30</sup> On this see J. Bale, ‘Identität, Identifikation, Image: Der Fußball und seine Verortung im Neuen Europa’, in Siegfried Gehrmann (ed.), *Fußball und Region in Europa: Probleme regionaler Identität und die Bedeutung einer populären Sportart* (Münster, 1999), 281–98. On regional identity see D. Ipsen, ‘Regionale Identität: Überlegungen zum politischen Charakter einer psychosozialen Raumkategorie’, *Raumforschung und Raumordnung*, 51 (1993), 9–18; Europe is now also being more closely scrutinized as the reference point for this sort of regional positioning, see Wolfram Pyta and Nils Havemann, *European Football and Collective Memory* (Basingstoke, 2015).

In 1954 a commission of inquiry of the Central Committee of the SED complained about persistent traces of the old bourgeois spirit in sport. The cultivation of tradition by the first German football champions, VfB Leipzig, was especially picked out as an example to attack.<sup>31</sup> Supporters of the former German champions, Dresdner SC, experienced similar defamation, but with more serious consequences, as the political leadership did not hesitate to subject the supposed enemies of the system to political justice. Thus in December 1958 two leading officials of the sports club Dresden-Friedrichstadt were each sentenced to five and a half years in prison. The judgment listed the main reasons as: 'Illegal preparations for a festival to commemorate the founding of the proscribed Dresden sport club', and 'the so-called cultivation of sporting traditions' on behalf of 'Western organizations'.<sup>32</sup> The propaganda was thus directed not only against the 'old', but explicitly also against Western sport and its forms of organization. This contemptuous attitude, however, was to become ever more difficult for sports leaders in the GDR as—in contrast to the Olympics—football in East Germany fell behind the sport in West Germany and was outshone by it. This applied not only to the world championships of 1954, but also to the successful founding of the Bundesliga in 1963.

At the same time, competitive sport in the GDR was moving ever further from the people. The sports clubs founded in 1954 were designated centres of 'competitive sports production' for all branches of sport, and thus the whole organically grown structure of teams, clubs or enterprises, members and supporters was jettisoned. From now on the elite athletes got on with their training quite separately from the people.<sup>33</sup> This had serious consequences in terms of social grounding. In an internal memo signalling alarm, the GDR's football association in 1964 described the 'cutting off of the masses of football supporters

<sup>31</sup> Bericht der Kommission zur Überprüfung der Arbeit der Demokratischen Sportbewegung, Berlin, 12 Mar. 1954. BA SAPMO DY 30/J IV 2/2 A 347.

<sup>32</sup> Here and for the following see Horst Bartzsch, 'Verbrechen unter dem Deckmantel sportlicher "Traditionen"', *Theorie und Praxis der Körperkultur*, 6 (1959) 484–9.

<sup>33</sup> On the system of sports clubs see René Wiese, 'Erfolge nach Plan: Sportclubs und Kinder- und Jugendsportschulen', in Jutta Braun and Michael Barsuhn (eds.), *Zwischen Erfolgs- und Diktaturgeschichte: Perspektiven der Aufarbeitung des DDR-Sports in Thüringen* (Göttingen, 2015), 146–95, at 146–8.

in the cities' as a crucial disadvantage suffered by the football teams. Their lack of a basis in the social environment was soon seen as a cardinal error: 'When the clubs were established in 1954, one major and decisive factor was not taken into account. The participation of hundreds of thousands of volunteer cadres and passive members in the community was ignored, and they were simply excluded from participating by a single decision.'<sup>34</sup>

Yet these warnings largely sank without trace because for ideological reasons alone, there was no going back. The most that could be conceded was some cosmetic tweaking. Thus the GDR's football association suggested that old club traditions should be at least partly revived, and classic club names such as 'FC' and 'VfB' could be used. In addition, it encouraged the names for sectors of production, such as 'Tractor', to be removed from the names of teams. With the re-establishment of ten football clubs in 1965-66 some of these suggestions were implemented. The traditional abbreviation 'FC' for 'Football Club' was re-introduced so that SC Motor Jena, for example, became FC Carl Zeiss Jena. Some of the industrial designations, such as 'Motor' and 'Empor', also disappeared so that SC Empor Rostock became Hansa Rostock. Only in the case of 'Dynamo', 'Armee', and 'Lokomotive' Leipzig did this component of the name remain. Interviews with contemporaries show that not only fans but also players were delighted with this return to old traditions because the GDR clubs now had names that sounded like those of the successful West German clubs. Thus Hans Georg Moldenhauer, today on the executive committee of the German Football Association (DFB), at the time goalkeeper for Magdeburg, remembers how pleased the players were 'when we heard that 1. FC Magdeburg was being created, because that was a synonym for Western clubs like FC Kaiserslautern. And, of course, we were really happy to be getting away from names with Turbine, Steel, and Empor in them, and were totally surprised that this idea had come up at all.'<sup>35</sup> And in terms of club colours, too, they looked across the internal German border: 'The only thing that we as players could influence was the colour. We had

<sup>34</sup> DFV, Generalsekretariat (Michalski), Gliederung über Probleme des Fußballs in der DDR, 20 May 1964, 1. Entwurf. NOFV-Archiv/Archiv Arbeitsbereich Zeitgeschichte des Sports Potsdam.

<sup>35</sup> Hans Georg Moldenhauer, interviewed by Jutta Braun, 29 Apr. 2008, in Leipzig.

such stupid green and red tracksuits, and we said: couldn't we have a new colour as well as a new name? Schalke was blue and white, and then suddenly we were to be blue–white, although Magdeburg's town colours are green and red.'<sup>36</sup> The reforms of 1965–66, although rather superficial, show how strongly German sport related to its counterpart in a divided country.

A recent research project has examined the seemingly endless restructuring and re-coding of GDR football, which went as far as the politically dictated relocation of whole teams.<sup>37</sup> On the orders of the SED, the army footballers of Vorwärts Leipzig, to take one example, were sent to East Berlin in 1953 in order to strengthen football in the capital. In fact, the result was a successful season with several titles being won. But then the local competition became too strong for the Stasi club BFC Dynamo, and in 1971 the army team had to move on to Frankfurt/Oder.<sup>38</sup> The question arises as to what consequences such drastic interventions had on integration into the region. We must ask whether sport could unfold a similar significance in constituting the emotional field of 'Heimat' – as outlined by Jan Palmowski for the GDR – as it did in West Germany.<sup>39</sup> We must also take into account that in the GDR the promotion of certain Olympic sports meant that new regional sporting traditions were 'invented', while others that had been around for decades were discontinued in order to tailor the sporting landscape to Olympic needs. Thus ice hockey, in which the GDR had enjoyed international success, was wound down, and many players were switched over to speed skating.<sup>40</sup>

The sport played by the security forces and the army was an artificial Soviet import, and those who took part counted as elite athletes

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> The research project on the history of football in the GDR was conducted between 2015 and 2017 by the University of Münster, the Zentrum deutsche Sportgeschichte in Berlin-Brandenburg, and the Centre for Contemporary History (ZZF) Potsdam.

<sup>38</sup> Militärarchiv Freiburg. DVP3-13/14699.

<sup>39</sup> Jan Palmowski, *Inventing a Socialist Nation: Heimat and the Politics of Everyday life in the GDR, 1945–1990* (Cambridge, 2009). Published in German as id., *Die Erfindung der sozialistischen Nation: Heimat und Politik im DDR-Alltag* (Berlin, 2016).

<sup>40</sup> See Jutta Braun, 'Thüringer Sportler in der Diktatur', in ead. and Barsuhn (eds.), *Zwischen Erfolgs- und Diktaturgeschichte, 19–145*, at 39–43.

in many areas. The conditions under which members of these non-civilian sports clubs of the army sports association Vorwärts and the sports association Dynamo trained were such that this organizational import from the Soviet Union resulted in a far-reaching militarization of sport in the GDR, something that was not experienced in this form and to this extent in West Germany.<sup>41</sup> This included training centres and sports schools for children and young people that were described by contemporaries as 'children's barracks'.<sup>42</sup> After the Berlin Wall came down, the Dynamo clubs had a problem with their image as the former sports clubs of the GDR's security forces. But after an interim period as FC Berlin, BFC Dynamo went back to its familiar name from GDR times in 1999. Ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the name was, it seems, associated less with the Stasi taint than with the story of BFC Dynamo's success as GDR champion. Thus 'Dynamo', an element of the Soviet sporting tradition, has found its way into the sporting culture of unified Germany.

But over forty years, two different basic attitudes to sport had entrenched themselves so firmly in the two countries that the consequences could not easily be corrected after 1990. Since the 1950s, and even more from the 1970s, West Germany had widely promoted popular sport. In the GDR, however, despite Walter Ulbricht's well-known dictum 'sport once a week for everyone everywhere',<sup>43</sup> there was a notorious lack of popular sport because of under investment by the state. Yet on the basis of the Unification Act (*Vereinigungsgesetz*) of 21 February 1990, free associations could be established in the GDR again, and this was an important step in the emergence of an East German civil society.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>41</sup> The Bundeswehr's support of sport can be seen as reflecting the militarization of GDR sport.

<sup>42</sup> See the relevant chapter titles and descriptions in Hans-Georg Aschenbach, *Euer Held, Euer Verräter: Mein Leben für den Leistungssport* (Halle, 2012), 21–9.

<sup>43</sup> 'Für jedermann an jedem Ort jede Woche einmal Sport', *Neues Deutschland*, 5 June 1959.

<sup>44</sup> On the emergence of a civil society ('zivilgesellschaftlicher Aufbruch') and the re-differentiation ('Re-Differenzierung') of society in the unification process see Konrad H. Jarausch, 'Kollaps des Kommunismus oder Aufbruch der Zivilgesellschaft? Zur Einordnung der Friedlichen Revolution von 1989', in Eckart Conze, Katharina Gajdukowa, and Sigrid Koch-Baumgarten (eds.), *Die demokratische Revolution 1989 in der DDR* (Cologne, 2009), 25–45.

But forty years of divided German sport have left lasting traces in society. Grassroots sport in Germany is still clearly divided, with a marked difference between East and West. In the *Länder* of old West Germany an average of 32 per cent of the population took part in organized sports in 2013, while in the old East Germany the corresponding figure, at 15 per cent, was less than half. The deeper causes of this asymmetry are controversial and ultimately unexplained. The social turbulence precipitated by the process of unification is one factor that has been mentioned.<sup>45</sup> Yet long-term cultural influences, such as fundamental differences in the club culture of East and West, must also be considered as possible explanations. Thus the fact that ‘passive membership’, in which several family members join a club without all of them taking an active part, while traditional in the West, is still not common in the East, has been suggested as a conceivable explanation.<sup>46</sup>

### III. *Sport in the History of Violence and Security*

Sport and violence have entered into a close and often fatal symbiosis since the nineteenth century.<sup>47</sup> In divided Germany, too, sporting events were often the focus of violence or efforts to prevent it.<sup>48</sup> We must, however, first agree on what manifestations of sport we are talking about: sport as ‘war minus the shooting’ (George Orwell) in relations between states; sport as an organizational structure and

<sup>45</sup> Jürgen Baur and Sebastian Braun (eds.), *Der vereinsorganisierte Sport in Ostdeutschland* (Cologne, 2001), 138, 141; see also eid., *Freiwilliges Engagement und Partizipation in ostdeutschen Sportvereinen: Eine empirische Analyse zum Institutionstransfer* (Cologne, 2000); Jürgen Baur, Uwe Koch, and Stephan Telschow, *Sportvereine im Übergang: Die Vereinslandschaft in Ostdeutschland* (Aachen, 1995).

<sup>46</sup> Findings of the first conference on grassroots sports in the state capital of Potsdam, held at the University of Potsdam, 11 Dec. 2012.

<sup>47</sup> On this see Eric Dunning, ‘Gewalt und Sport’, in Wilhelm Heitmeyer and John L. Hagan (eds.), *Internationales Handbuch der Gewaltforschung* (Wiesbaden, 2002), 1130–52.

<sup>48</sup> Jutta Braun, ‘Vom Troublemaker zum Integrationsstifter? Fußball und Gewaltprävention in Deutschland vor und nach 1989’, *Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History*, 15 (2008), 302–28.

stronghold of structural violence; sport as a spectator event with the notorious ‘third half’ of fan riots; or the brutalization of game moves on the part of athletes, to mention just the main levels of meaning possible. From the twentieth century the national codification of a system of competition,<sup>49</sup> whether in the Olympic Games or international championships, predestined sport to provide the stage for political proxy wars. The GDR, which drew much of its self-confidence from success in elite sport, wanted to see athletes and fighting troops doing their duty as more or less the same thing, and not only symbolically. In 1971 it stated that ‘class struggle on the sporting field’ had reached such a degree that ‘in principle, there is no difference between sport and the military’. All athletes, it went on, were to step up, like ‘GDR soldiers’ and ‘draw the full conclusions in differentiating themselves with hatred from imperialism and its emissaries, even from the athletes of the FRG’.<sup>50</sup> Yet class hatred between West and East German athletes just did not happen.<sup>51</sup> The harsh consequences of this political demarcation advocated by the SED regime, however, were borne not by the West German athletes presented as hostile but—and this is a paradox of the Cold War in sport—by the East German athletes alone, as they were the only ones to whom the SED regime had direct access. They were patronized, controlled, and manipulated by their own state. Violence, which drew its legitimation out of a demarcation from the West and the prevention of contact with the ‘class enemy’, thus resulted in acts of psychological and physical violence directed against the protagonists of the GDR’s own system, the East German athletes. These acts of violence included psychological *Zersetzung* (deliberate disintegration of personalities) and surveillance by the Stasi, forced doping, disciplining and punishment, and social ostracism or imprisonment.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Tobias Werron, *Der Weltsport und sein Publikum: Zur Autonomie und Entstehung des modernen Sports* (Weilerswist, 2010).

<sup>50</sup> Internal paper of the West Division of the Central Committee, 1971, quoted from Jochen Staadt, ‘Die SED und die Olympischen Spiele 1972’, in Klaus Schroeder (ed.), *Geschichte und Transformation des SED-Staates* (Berlin, 1994), 211–32, at 222.

<sup>51</sup> Braun, ‘Thüringer Sportler in der Diktatur’.

<sup>52</sup> It is not clear whether murder should be included, for example, in the case of the footballer Lutz Eigendorf.

While the politically motivated harassment of East German athletes had no equivalent in the West, the story of doping can certainly be seen as a history of abuse in both East and West Germany. There was also pressure in West Germany, although perhaps it was not so direct, to enhance sporting performance in order to succeed.<sup>53</sup> But here, too, the different systems in East and West resulted in an overall distinction. The extent and systematic nature of the secretive state crimes committed by officials and coaches against young East German athletes had no precedent in West Germany.<sup>54</sup>

The criminal extent of doping experiments was addressed in German-German secret talks. After they had exchanged their experience of the devastating effects of anabolic steroids, for instance, sports doctors from East and West at a meeting in West Berlin expressed the hope that 'a convention against the use of anabolic steroids might be drawn up between East and West, something like the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)'.<sup>55</sup> The equivalence between 'supporting means' and weapons expressed here is unusually direct. The weapons in this case fatally turned against their users, as the doctors were clear that the long-term effects on the athletes 'were not foreseeable'.<sup>56</sup>

When there was talk in public of sport and violence during the Cold War, however, the focus was not on the athletes, but on the violent behaviour of fans during and around sporting events. The title of a pioneering 1982 study by the sociologist Gunter A. Pilz on fan culture and violence by fans, for example, is 'Sport and Violence'.<sup>57</sup> In the West this phenomenon was widely perceived in public, by academics, and the sport itself, but in the East it long remained swept under an ideological rug, first because violence was seen as alien to the nature of sport in a socialist society, and second because the right-

<sup>53</sup> On 'systematic doping' in the West see, most recently, Giselher Spitzer, Erik Eggers, Holger J. Schnell, and Yasmin Wisniewska, *Siegen um jeden Preis: Doping in Deutschland. Geschichte, Recht, Ethik 1972-1990* (Göttingen, 2013). This is the report of a research project conducted by the Humboldt University and commissioned by the Federal Institute of Sports Science.

<sup>54</sup> Giselher Spitzer, *Doping in der DDR: Ein historischer Überblick zu einer konspirativen Praxis. Genese, Verantwortung, Gefahren* (Cologne, 1998).

<sup>55</sup> *IM Philatelist*, 23 Mar. 1977 and 30 Mar. 1977. AIM 16572/89.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> Gunter A. Pilz et al., *Sport und Gewalt: Berichte der Projektgruppe 'Sport und Gewalt' des Bundesinstituts für Sportwissenschaft* (Schorndorf, 1982).

wing extremist context of outbreaks of violence was not meant to exist in the East German 'anti-fascist' state.<sup>58</sup>

Beyond the prosecution of violent criminals, the problem remained largely unprocessed in the state-oriented GDR, while in West Germany a number of initiatives emerged. From the 1980s, for instance, 'fan projects' with a social and educational mission were set up, often in conjunction with university departments of sport and social science, and they trained volunteers to work with fans bent on violence. In the Federal Republic security policy experts also got involved. For example, the final report of the Independent Governmental Commission on Preventing and Combatting Violence, presented in 1990, also contained thoughts about violence in football stadiums.<sup>59</sup> And, finally, organized sport early showed itself aware of the danger of xenophobic abuse and attacks by groups of right-wing fans. In 1983, for example, the DFB cast national player Lothar Matthäus as the voice of reason when Germany was playing against Turkey in West Berlin, and radical right-wing fans mobilized against the 'Turkish pack' in the city. In an open letter, the international football player called on German fans not to follow the 'neo-Nazis', pointing out that their Turkish fellow citizens 'were not to blame for unemployment'.<sup>60</sup> While sport, the security forces, and academically sponsored fan projects acted largely independently of each other until 1989, this changed very quickly during the period of transformation after 1990. In the *Kontrollloch* after the collapse of the SED regime,<sup>61</sup> when authority broke down, fan violence in particular escalated to an unprecedented extent in the East. After a policeman shot a hooligan dead, the DFB, concerned at the possibility of incidents, cancelled the Festival of German Football in Leipzig at short notice.

<sup>58</sup> See Jutta Braun and Hans Joachim Teichler, 'Fußballfans im Visier der Staatsmacht', in Hans Joachim Teichler (ed.), *Sport in der DDR: Eigensinn, Konflikte, Trends* (Cologne, 2003), 561–86.

<sup>59</sup> Hans-Dieter Schwind et al. (eds.), *Ursachen, Prävention und Kontrolle von Gewalt: Analysen und Vorschläge der Unabhängigen Regierungskommission zur Verhinderung und Bekämpfung von Gewalt (Gewaltkommission)*, 4 vols. (Berlin 1990).

<sup>60</sup> Braun, 'Vom Troublemaker zum Integrationsstifter?', 312.

<sup>61</sup> Walter Süß, 'Zur Wahrnehmung und Interpretation des Rechtsextremismus in der DDR durch das MfS', in Heinrich Sippel and Walter Süß, *Staatsicherheit und Rechtsextremismus* (Bochum, 1994), 1–105, 111.

This was to have celebrated the organizational unification of football in November 1990.<sup>62</sup> What followed was a broadly based co-operation between fan projects, now extended to East Germany, and organized sport, in order to gain control of the situation in and around the football stadiums. And in 1994 a file 'Gewalttäter Sport' (Violent Offenders Sport) was created as an effective instrument of security policy. Since then, it has repeatedly given data protection activists cause for complaint.<sup>63</sup>

It was not only the perception of violence, but also the understanding of security in the two German states and their sports systems that differed fundamentally. The SED leadership was mainly worried about securing the GDR against Western infiltration and preventing people from fleeing the country (*Republikflucht*). If a figurehead of the socialist system and ideological idol preferred to move to the West and pursue a career in the land of the class enemy, the East German leadership saw this as seriously damaging the GDR's image. This meant that the Stasi had a wide range of duties in the field of sport. From 1971 athletes were watched at training, and their private lives were systematically monitored.<sup>64</sup>

Responses to the situation in the sports stadiums also followed a different logic in the two Germanies. While the GDR's security services and forces of order also had to deal with rioting fans, they saw another type of problem fan as a much greater danger, namely, those who chanted German-German greetings and identified as camp followers of Bundesliga teams or the German national team. In addition to criminalization and political repression, the state resorted to bizarre preventive measures, such as the Ministry of State Security buying up all the tickets in order to prevent unwanted fraternization between Eastern and Western fans at matches.<sup>65</sup> The notion of stadium securi-

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. 317.

<sup>63</sup> Thomas Kehr, *Datei Gewalttäter Sport: Eine Untersuchung der Rechtsgrundlagen des BKAGs unter besonderer Berücksichtigung datenschutzrechtlicher und verfassungsrechtlicher Aspekte* (Baden-Baden, 2015), 47.

<sup>64</sup> Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic (BStU) (ed.), *MfS und Leistungssport: Ein Recherchebericht* (Berlin, 1994), 56–84.

<sup>65</sup> Jutta Braun and René Wiese, 'DDR-Fußball und gesamtdeutsche Identität im Kalten Krieg', *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung*, 30/4 (2005), 191–210.

ty therefore had an extra level of meaning in the GDR,<sup>66</sup> something that was unknown in the Federal Republic and had no basis in unified Germany.

#### IV. *The Culture of Memory and Processing the Past*

Sporting events in East and West Germany generated stories and structures that have entered public consciousness as sites of memory. It is striking how often political horizons of meaning were associated with them, in both divided and unified Germany. They include the ‘miracle of Berne’,<sup>67</sup> ‘Sparwasser’s goal’,<sup>68</sup> and sporting events such as the Ride of Peace in the GDR, and the attempt to stage the Munich Olympics in 1972 as the ‘cheerful Games’ (*heitere Spiele*).<sup>69</sup> Sporting personalities, too, attracted a political charge. This applied to Täve Schur as a personification of the ‘socialist collective spirit’,<sup>70</sup> Fritz Walter as the embodiment of the Economic Miracle, and the boxer Henry Maske in his incarnation as the symbol of united German sport.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>66</sup> Eckart Conze, *Geschichte der Sicherheit: Entwicklung, Themen, Perspektiven* (Göttingen, 2018), 157–9, also points out that different concepts of security applied in the GDR and the FRG, although he focuses mainly on social security.

<sup>67</sup> Peter Kasza, *1954 – Fußball spielt Geschichte: Das Wunder von Bern* (Bonn, 2004).

<sup>68</sup> Martin Sabrow lists Sparwasser’s goal as a site of memory for the DDR. See Christoph Dieckmann, ‘Sparwassers Tor’, in Martin Sabrow (ed.), *Erinnerungsorte der DDR* (Munich, 2009), 351–62. The all-German selection *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte*, however, gives the Bundesliga as the sporting anchor. See Gunter Gebauer, ‘Die Bundesliga’, in Etienne Francois and Hagen Schulze (eds.), *Deutsche Erinnerungsorte: Eine Auswahl* (Munich, 2005), 463–76.

<sup>69</sup> Kay Schiller and Christopher Young, *München 1972: Olympische Spiele im Zeichen des modernen Deutschland* (Göttingen, 2012).

<sup>70</sup> Norbert Rossbach, ‘“Täve”: Der Radsportler Gustav-Adolf Schur’, in Silke Satjukow and Rainer Gries (eds.), *Sozialistische Helden: Eine Kulturgeschichte von Propagandafiguren in Osteuropa und der DDR* (Berlin, 2002), 133–46.

<sup>71</sup> Along with Max Schmeling, in 1990 Henry Maske fronted a poster campaign to promote ‘a public spirit for civic engagement for the creation of inner unity’. He campaigned for German unity with the slogan ‘No sooner was the Berlin Wall opened than we became friends’.

Yet from the point of view of understanding the value systems on which East and West German sports were built, it is instructive to look at those who were excluded. The GDR produced an impressive gallery in this respect. As a rule, these were athletes who did not conform with the system. Their erasure from public memory via a *damnatio memoriae* could take many forms. Thus Jürgen May, star middle-distance runner, was given a lifetime ban after he was involved in advertising for the Western footwear firm Puma and fell out of political favour. He was also removed from *Junge Welt* as the 'Sportsperson of the Year 1965' elected by readers, and subsequently replaced with the runner-up, footballer Peter Ducke. Wolfgang Thüne, gymnast and individual silver medallist in the 1974 world championships, was cut out of team photos after he escaped to the West. The memorial for ski-jumper Hans Georg Aschenbach, erected in his home village of Oberhof, was demolished after his desertion, and the renegade swimmer Jens Peter Berndt was deleted from the record lists. This practice did not stop in East Germany even after the fall of the Berlin Wall. When the swimmer and gold medallist Rica Reinisch co-operated in facing the issue of GDR doping in the 1990s, her picture was removed from her home swimming pool in Dresden.<sup>72</sup> But there were also individuals who broke the unwritten rules in the FRG, such as Toni Schumacher, who revealed doping practices in West German football in his book *Anpfeiff*.<sup>73</sup> Even today, there are only a few former elite athletes in the Federal Republic who openly admit that they participated in performance enhancement in West German sport.

Some East German sports stars, in particular, Katarina Witt, became symbols of *Ostalgie* after 1990,<sup>74</sup> but there was also criticism of the fact that along with many East German trainers and coaches, doping and the taint of Stasi association had found their way into the sporting world of unified Germany.<sup>75</sup> The culture of memory in the

<sup>72</sup> On these examples see Jutta Braun and René Wiese, 'Tracksuit Traitors: Eastern German Top Athletes on the Run', *International Journal of the History of Sport*, 12 (2014), 1519–34. Information given to the author by Rica Reinisch, 29 Mar. 2017.

<sup>73</sup> Harald 'Toni' Schumacher, *Anpfeiff: Enthüllungen über den deutschen Fußball* (Munich, 1987).

<sup>74</sup> From 2003 ice-skating star Katarina Witt hosted the 'GDR-Show' on the German television channel RTL.

<sup>75</sup> 'Trainer in Konfrontation', *Berliner Zeitung*, 10 Dec. 1991; Herbert Fischer-

sporting community of present-day unified Germany is still struggling with the GDR past. While the involvement of elite athletes with the Nazis generally did not prevent their inclusion in the Hall of Fame of German sport, disputes regularly flared up when East German star athletes were nominated. This happened most recently in the summer of 2017, when the controversy about 'Täve' Schur showed just how strong social polarization still is in relation to some of the former idols of the East as role models or diehards.<sup>76</sup>

With regard to structural violence in elite sport, the GDR's experience of dictatorship set new standards. In the 1990s violent crimes committed by the former communist state sports apparatus were being prosecuted by the justice system in the FRG in cases that were unique worldwide.<sup>77</sup> Sport was thus one of the few areas of the GDR past in which history was 'on trial',<sup>78</sup> and various actors were brought to justice. Yet it was not only in the prosecution of perpetrators that the process of facing up to the crimes of GDR sport was innovative; the treatment of the victims also produced something new. The Federal Office of Administration (*Bundesverwaltungsamt*) introduced a new, sports-related category of victim, that of the 'officially recognized victim of doping'. Athletes who had 'unknowingly' been given drugs could be eligible for a one-off compensation payment.<sup>79</sup>

Solms, 'IM Torsten: Der Stasi-Fall des Eislauf-Trainers Ingo Steuer', *Deutschland Archiv*, 2 (2006), 197–200.

<sup>76</sup> The controversy was sparked mainly by Heike Drechsler's alleged past involvement in doping and Gustav-Adolf Schur's remarks playing down the GDR's doping system. 'Täve Schur lebt bis heute sportliche Ideale vor', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 20 Apr. 2017; 'DDR-Radler "Täve" Schur muss draußen bleiben', *FAZ*, 28 Apr. 2017; 'Es braucht keine Ehrenhalle', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 27 Apr. 2017.

<sup>77</sup> On the extent of the doping trials see Klaus Marxen, Gerhard Werle, and Petra Schäfter, *Die Strafverfolgung von DDR-Unrecht: Fakten und Zahlen* (Berlin, 2007). According to this book, charges were laid or an application for a penalty was filed in a total of 38 cases related to doping. A total of 47 convictions resulted in 30 fines and 17 people released on probation. *Ibid.* 28, 43.

<sup>78</sup> Norbert Frei, Dirk van Laak, and Michael Stolleis, *Geschichte vor Gericht: Historiker, Richter und die Suche nach Gerechtigkeit* (Munich, 2000).

<sup>79</sup> This is a category that applies only to former East German athletes, although some West German athletes also see themselves as victims of 'systemic doping' in the Federal Republic.

In addition, a self-help association for victims of doping was set up in 1999. This relatively late date compared with other groups was probably because victims of doping were not, as a rule, victims of political persecution like other victims of SED injustice. On the contrary, many of those affected had, as elite athletes, acted as popular figureheads for the system. In 2018 a fierce debate arose about the justification of their claims, not because they had been used by the political system, but because of their knowing participation in sports fraud.

In this context, a concept used in research also came in for criticism: forced doping. In essence, this suggests that because of their integration into a repressive system, athletes in the GDR were exposed to far greater pressure to take part in these programmes than their Western counterparts. Werner Franke, leading expert in performance-enhancing drugs and one of the strongest critics of drug abuse in sport, initiated the doping trials in 1995 by bringing charges against doctors and sports officials. Regarded as the voice of truth in German sport, he has recently argued that the notion of forced doping should not be allowed to obscure that of individual responsibility.<sup>80</sup> This public discussion was provoked by the case of the Olympic icon Christian Schenk who admitted, after years of denial, that he had voluntarily and knowingly taken performance-enhancing drugs in the GDR, but had nevertheless considered seeking compensation as a 'victim of doping' because of his physical impairment.<sup>81</sup> The value system of the sport in which he is clearly seen as a cheat and thus as a 'perpetrator', here collides with the standards for evaluating injustice in the GDR, under whose terms he could possibly also count as a victim, at least on the basis of his ties to a sports dictatorship.

By 1990 the process of dealing with the past had already developed a strong interactive dynamic between investigating doping in the East and the West. It achieved a vehemence and thoroughness

<sup>80</sup> For Werner Franke's criticisms see 'DDR-Doper sollen keine Entschädigung mehr erhalten', *Spiegel-Online*, 15 Nov. 2018 <<http://www.spiegel.de/sport/sonst/doping-experten-fordern-aenderung-von-dopingopferhilfegesetz-a-1238550.html>>, accessed 4 Feb. 2019. The dossier 'Black Box DOH' that criticizes the policies of the relief association for victims of doping is available online at <[dopingalarm.de](http://dopingalarm.de)>, accessed 24 Jan. 2019.

<sup>81</sup> Christian Schenk and Fred Sellin, *Riss: Mein Leben zwischen Hymne und Hölle* (Munich, 2018).

that was hardly to be found in any other Western, let alone Eastern European state. The GDR's experience under a dictatorship whose doping system had been responsible not only for cheating in sport, but also for causing serious physical damage, resulted in moral indignation that ultimately also directed its critical gaze at current sports policy and its dark sides. The investigation of the failures of the SED dictatorship also led to the values of organized sport in the FRG being questioned. Thus sports associations and the German Olympic Sports Confederation were seriously put out when, in the new millennium, two East German sprinters had their records dating from GDR times and achieved by the use of drugs removed from the now all-German annals of sport.<sup>82</sup> They were calling for the next generation to be given a fair chance instead of being forced to measure themselves against unrealistic records. But by doing this, they were undermining the basic principles of 'higher, faster, further' and the accumulation of medals as the highest goal, even in the old FRG.

#### *V. Conclusion*

The history of division in German sport reveals that far beyond the top-class show battles of the Olympics, the sporting activities of both states were deeply influenced by their contrasting political systems. This applied to the internal organization of sport as either association-based or state-controlled, and has had a lasting impact, both structurally and in terms of the history of mentalities. Yet in the Cold War sport provided a socio-historically relevant bridge of understanding between East and West. Football and its fans, in particular, repeatedly managed 'to play around the Wall'. A unified Germany learned from the GDR's sporting dictatorship in various respects. On the one hand, the doping trials provided a retrospective glimpse into the abyss that opens up when performance maximization is pursued at any cost and without ethical standards. On the other, sports policy-makers were keen to imitate individual functional elements of the GDR sport system.

Only in one respect did they remain closed to a possible insight. Unified Germany, too, continues to follow the internationally accept-

<sup>82</sup> See Braun, 'Thüringer Sportler in der Diktatur', 83–105.

ed logic that successful top-level sport reflects the achievements of the entire community. But that the medal tally is not a reliable indicator of the prosperity, justice, or even freedom of a society – in this respect the GDR experience has provided a very clear historical lesson.

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