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AUTUMN 2003

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Genealogy of the Present: Which History for the Twenty-First Century?
Michael Jeismann is an editor on the *Feuilleton* section of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. His main fields of interest are nationalism, and memory and remembrance. Among his numerous publications are *Das Vaterland der Feinde: Studien zum nationalen Feindbegriff und Selbstverständnis in Deutschland und Frankreich 1792–1918* (1992) and *Auf Wiedersehen gestern: Die deutsche Vergangenheit und die Politik von morgen* (2001).

14 Oct. **PROFESSOR MICHAEL WOLFFSOHN (Munich)**
'The' Germans in the Twentieth Century: Myths and Facts. A New Analytical Tool
Michael Wolffsohn is Professor of Modern History, with a special interest in the history of international relations, at the Universität der Bundeswehr München. He has published widely on Jewish and Middle Eastern history. The sixth edition of his book *Israel: Geschichte, Politik, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft* has just come out. Michael Wolffsohn has received many honours. He appears regularly on television and radio, and writes for newspapers in Germany and abroad.

28 Oct. **PROFESSOR HAROLD JAMES (Princeton)**
Can One Write a European History of the Twentieth Century?
Harold James is Professor of History at Princeton University. His numerous publications include *The German Slump* (1986), *A German Identity 1770–1990* (1989), and *International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods* (1996). A recent work is *The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression* (2001). He has also co-authored a history of the Deutsche Bank, which won the Financial Times Global Business Book of the Year Award in 1996.

(cont.)

Seminars

4 Nov. **DR THOMAS REIMER (Baden-Baden)**
***Meine Schlachtfelder* (1 hour). German-language documentary with introduction in English**
Before his retirement Thomas Reimer was a reporter and editor with the German broadcasting corporation Südwestrundfunk (SWF). As a correspondent he also worked in Vietnam, South America, and Switzerland. In addition, he was Regional Head, Deputy Editor-in-Chief, and from 1998 to 2001 Head Reporter with SWF. His film, *Meine Schlachtfelder*, was broadcast on German television in November 2002.

18 Nov. **DR STEPHAN MALINOWSKI (Berlin)**
From King to Führer: The German Aristocracy and the Nazi Movement
Stephan Malinowski is *Wissenschaftlicher Assistent* at the Friedrich Meinecke Institute of the Free Unviersity of Berlin. His research interests include the German aristocracy during the Kaiserreich and the Weimar Republic, and he is the author of *Vom König zum Führer* (2003). At present he is working on a comparative social and cultural history of the stock exchange crash in Germany and the USA.

Seminars are held at 5 p.m. in the Seminar Room of the GHIL.
Tea is served from 4.30 p.m. in the Common Room, and wine is available after the seminars.

THE 2003 ANNUAL LECTURE

Fact and Fiction: St Patrick's Purgatory and the European Chivalry in the Later Middle Ages

will be given by

PROFESSOR WERNER PARAVICINI (Paris)

on Friday 21 November at 5 p.m.
at the German Historical Institute

SPEAKING OF EUROPE

EUROPE AND THE WEST: OLD AND NEW IDENTITIES[*]

by Ralf Dahrendorf

The main theme of this lecture is a concept, the West. It takes us deep into the history of Europe and America: it is also highly topical in the world after 9/11, that is, after the terrorist attacks on American sites of great symbolic significance which proved the vulnerability of power, indeed, of superpower. Robert Kagan, in his notable essay on 'Paradise and Power', sees 9/11 as a turning point for the West. 'Now, with the threat brought directly to the American soil, overleaping that of America's allies, the paramount issue was that of America's unique suffering and vulnerability, not "the West".' At the same time, 'post-Cold War Europe agreed that the issue was no longer "the West". For Europeans, the issue became "Europe".'

These are bold claims, and while there is some truth to them, I shall argue that they are in essence mistaken. Neither the notion of 'America' nor that of 'Europe' makes any sense without the enveloping concept of 'the West'. I for one remain a Westerner before I am a European, and while some of my American friends may be Americans first, no definition of this identity can ignore that its underlying values are Western.

These are quite personal statements, and I make no apology for building this lecture around my own intellectual and political journey to the West and with it to the constitution of liberty. This lecture is in honour of the German lawyer, publisher, and politician, Gerd Bucerius. I wrote his biography because I was intrigued by the exemplary qualities of the man and his life, having known him for many years. Bucerius was never an unpolitical German, but it was only in

[*] This Lecture, co-sponsored by the German Historical Institute London and ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius, was given by Lord Dahrendorf on 21 May 2003.

1945, at the end of the war, that the then nearly forty-year-old solicitor came into his own as a public figure. As a lawyer untainted by Nazi connections—he had been married to a Jewish woman whom he helped to emigrate and never renounced, which precluded any kind of career beyond his father's law firm—he was given, by the British occupation authorities, the 'licence' to publish what became the leading German liberal weekly, *Die Zeit*. At the same time, he got actively involved in rebuilding democracy in Germany, first as a minister in the Hamburg city government, then as a member of the pre-parliament, the Economic Council (*Wirtschaftsrat*) in 1948, and from 1949 for twelve years as a member of the *Bundestag*.

Bucerius was anything but tribal in his political allegiances. After 1945 he looked around for a political party which suited his preferences and when he joined the CDU, the Christian Democrats, this was in some ways an unlikely decision both for him, the liberal bourgeois, and for someone living in the secular republican city of Hamburg. His reasons reflected a very personal choice; in fact they revealed his Western values. He compared the socialist nationalism of the first post-war Social Democratic leader, Kurt Schumacher, with the views of Konrad Adenauer. 'A man of nationalist leanings [nationaler Mann]?' he wondered about Konrad Adenauer. 'No. This distinguished him from Schumacher. And this is precisely why I wanted to give him my confidence.'

Bucerius supported Adenauer throughout the early years of his government, and notably at the time of the infamous Stalin note of May 1952, which appeared to offer negotiations about German reunification in order to forestall German membership of NATO. This was, Bucerius commented later, the chance to reach a conclusive agreement 'with the West' and dispel the mistrust in a Germany preferring 'to have a go with the East'. Naturally, Bucerius supported the Schuman Plan which led to the setting up of the European Coal and Steel Community. Less typically, he also strongly supported Ludwig Erhard and the principles of the market economy. Thus Bucerius the parliamentarian epitomized the new Germany with its domestic liberalism and its international commitment to both European and transatlantic co-operation, and thus to the European Economic Community and NATO.

My father, a lifelong Social Democrat, had by that time become a somewhat dissident member of his party. He, too, had supported the

liberalizing economic policies of Erhard in the Economic Council, and he had castigated his party for missing a historic opportunity when it voted against the incipient European community in the *Bundestag*. For the next generation—mine, for I was a student of classics and philosophy at Hamburg University in those early years of the Federal Republic—my father's and Bucerius's position had become an almost undisputed assumption. This was the time in which what one might call the 'Russian doll' of alliances developed: open up NATO, and inside you find European union; open up European union, and inside you find Franco–German friendship; and around it all there was the largest doll, the West. The various dolls may not have fitted perfectly, but well enough to provide an identity with the face of liberty.

This was, to be sure, an identity defined against another one which to us seemed of almost equal strength, the East. But for the young German it had a deeper significance. The 1950s were a time in which many of us in Germany asked ourselves: how could the horrible aberration of Nazism have happened in a modern, apparently civilized country? In 1957 I first met Fritz Stern, the German-born American historian, who was to become a lifetime friend. At the time, he added to his splendid dissertation on 'The Politics of Cultural Despair' the moving and incisive essay, 'The Political Consequences of the Unpolitical German'. Its key argument is that in order to understand Germany's ways one had to look not at eccentric minority views which exist everywhere, but at mainstream thinking and notably the prevailing attitude to modernity. One then discovered a German idealism—Stern calls it a 'vulgar idealism'—which was strongly motivated by 'resentment against the West'.

Keystone of this attitude was the praise of culture against politics. Did not Goethe and Schiller in one of their joint *Xenia* say: 'Forming a nation you Germans hope for in vain; form yourselves—and this you can do—more freely therefore into human beings'? The human being versus the citizen—this is part of the idealism which, to quote Fritz Stern again, 'became in fact the rhetoric with which the unpolitical German denounced the mass society, democracy, liberalism, modernity, indeed all the so-called importations from the West'. From the beginning of the First World War such differences took on a more militant tone. In the name of the idealist and nationalist philosopher Fichte, intellectuals argued 'that the German ideals of

culture and personality were far more elevated than the selfish, humdrum ideals and institutions of the West'.

This is not the place to pursue the protracted debate about Germany's historical *Sonderweg*, or separate path, to which I made my own contribution in the book on *Society and Democracy in Germany* in 1965. Like Stern, indeed following him, I contrasted the Anglo–American and the German route to modernity. In the process, a definition of the West emerges; Stern offers it almost incidentally: 'the legal freedom of the person, i.e. his protection from every form of public arbitrariness, his liberation from economic and social disabilities, and his spiritual freedom, i.e. his right to hold, exchange and propagate dissenting beliefs', plus, of course, 'the capstone of the free society—the right to self-government, the erection in other words, of a representative and parliamentary system.'

At this point, a word is in place about America, Tocqueville's America, that is, the United States. In the late 1950s and early 1960s I spent much time in America, two years if one adds it up. The result was, as always, a book which I gave the title, *Enlightenment Applied*. First published in 1963, it is by no means a panegyric of American life, or even American democracy. The memory of the Eisenhower years was still fresh, and thus that of the risks of an authoritarianism which the 'neo-Cons' of our time were by no means the first to inject into the history of liberal America. Despite such aberrations it seemed then, and is in my view still true today, that America represents in some ways the purest version of the West. For like the United States of America, the West is an eighteenth-century creation. It is the great child of the Enlightenment, and nowhere was Enlightenment less encumbered by closed minds and ancient privileges than in the thirteen colonies of England across the waters.

Enlightenment means the belief in the human capacity to exercise reason. It is, in Immanuel Kant's words, the departure from self-inflicted, that is man-made, obstacles to growth and independence. It is the acceptance of uncertainty and the need to progress by trial and error. Perhaps Europeans were always more prone to err, whereas Americans could be relied upon never to cease trying. Among Houdon's gallery of the portrait busts of great Enlightenment figures—Diderot, Rousseau, Voltaire—that of Benjamin Franklin has a characteristic and special place. The man who invented both the Declaration of Independence and the lightning conductor represents the 'can do' version of the

Enlightenment which is America. Where Europeans worry and hesitate and invoke complexity, Americans go in and do what in some ways all believe is needed. The result may be a mess, but it is never the shoulder-shrugging readiness to leave the unacceptable alone.

This is what I mean by applied Enlightenment as against its more—dare I say it?—academic version. Thus there are differences between the European tradition and its American offshoot. But the basic values remain the same, and they are French and English and Scottish and also German in origin as well as American in their real manifestations. They are, in Karl Popper's words, the values of the open society. They are the institutions of democracy and the market economy. They are the confident associations of a civil society which limits the power of the state by its vibrancy. They are the rule of law based on consent rather than revelation. They are the great hope—and in Kant's sense, the moral imperative—of a cosmopolitan world in which all are citizens of one world.

All this is the West as I have come to understand it. So what, then, is Europe? In the early years after the Second World War, from the formation of the Council of Europe through the failed projects of political union to the Schuman Plan and the European Economic Community, the answer was straightforward. There may be more polite ways to put the case, but in essence it was the attempt to contain the historically aberrant Germany in a union of peace and of common interest which remains firmly embedded in the alliance of the West. The process had side effects, many of them desirable. The 'habit of co-operation' praised by Andrew Shonfield in his 1973 Reith Lectures on Europe is not to be underrated. Whereas the organized West, notably NATO, tolerated from time to time members who could hardly be said to subscribe to Western values, the record of the European Union in this regard is flawless, if so far untested.

However, none of this diminished the attractiveness of the West in its transatlantic complexity, nor did it terminally destroy the 'Russian doll' of political institutions. Indeed within these institutions, Europeans readily accepted America's military hegemony even if they occasionally grumbled about cruise missiles and the like. Germans in particular knew that Berlin was safe only as long as Americans were prepared to protect it. When *Ostpolitik* was launched, Willy Brandt as Federal Chancellor went to great lengths to try and keep the United States on board. In the domestic debate short

shrift was made of those who toyed with a return to Germany's 'Eastern vocation' of the past and tried to give the new politics of 'change by closer relations' an anti-Western drift.

Then came 1989. Despite 9/11 and one or two other landmark events like 1968, I count the revolution in Europe which put an end to Communism as the second great historical watershed in my lifetime after the end of Nazism in 1945. And 1989 had a great deal to do with the issues raised in this lecture. No one expressed this more clearly than the unrivalled chronicler of these events, Timothy Garton Ash. 'Does Central Europe Exist?' he asked in one of his memorable pieces. It is certainly no longer where German nationalists like Friedrich Naumann once located *Mitteleuropa*, that is, in the heart of Germany. The united Germany remained a part of the West: it is to Federal Chancellor Kohl's lasting credit that he made sure, in his decisive talks with Gorbachev, that this was accepted in institutional terms as well as in terms of values. For a while, Poles liked to describe their country as Central Europe, thus drawing a line to an Eastern Europe to which they did not want to belong. (Poland had, incidentally, long given this point symbolic expression by abandoning East European and adopting Central European time, two hours apart from the then neighbouring Soviet Union.) Since then, Central Europe has moved even further East, so much so that when Timothy Garton Ash wrote another piece twenty years after the first, entitled 'Where is Central Europe Now?', he found it an elusive idea without geo-political reality. Poland, the key country of the post-Communist world, has emphatically become the West, with the sometimes confusing yet highly desirable result that Germany has at last lost the Eastern option. If Germans look East today they find countries which are if anything more Western than they are. The enlargement of the European Union will in no sense shift the balance of Europe away from the West: in some ways—as the 'letter of the Eight' concerning America and Iraq has shown—the opposite is true. Europe was always Western, but the new Europe of those joining the European Union later turns out to be more deliberately Western than those who were in from the start.

At the same time, the revolution of 1989 has done something paradoxical to the West. By proving the point of its values it has destroyed their institutional reality. Francis Fukuyama's *End of History* is flawed in more ways than one. The Cold War stifled history which only began again after it had ended, with the process of globalization; but the con-

flict between East and West ended soon after 1989. In fact, the old East collapsed almost as silently as Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. Even Russia joined the West, leaving not only Soviet Communism and its Tsarist antecedents, but also Solzhenitsyn's romanticism of the Slavic soul behind. This meant that there was no opponent left for NATO, which promptly proceeded to enlarge itself out of recognition. Softer institutions like the Council of Europe did the same. The 'Russian doll' became a rather hollow toy. With the layer of NATO all but removed, and Franco–German friendship rather brittle, the European Union wobbled uneasily in the shell of the West. What was it all in aid of? What in particular does the new condition mean if one continues to believe in the values of the West, of liberty, and the principles and institutions following from an enlightened view of the world?

Two contemporary authors have produced constructive, or at any rate illuminating, responses to the question, Robert Kagan and Timothy Garton Ash. (Others have also added their pennyworth to the debate, notably some professors of philosophy in France and Italy and Germany, not all of whom have managed to avoid the absurd or the outright ridiculous.) Curiously, Kagan has removed the most widely quoted phrase of his essay on 'Paradise and Power' from the German edition: 'Americans are from Mars, and Europeans are from Venus.' His key thesis remains that the West has split into those who enjoy the luxury of life in the shadow of power, the Europeans, and those who realize that values sometimes require power for their defence even in faraway places about which most know little, the Americans. Kagan's plea for 'a little common understanding' fades before his conclusions such as: 'The United States must sometimes play by the rules of a Hobbesian world, even though in doing so it violates Europe's postmodern norms.' Garton Ash pleads with America to appreciate that common interests with Europe remain, and that Europe is capable of contributing to their advancement. His project is a more united Europe which tackles, along with the United States, the big issues of the contemporary world, beginning with a lasting settlement in the Middle East.

All constructive ideas, and particularly those of Timothy Garton Ash, are welcome, but the obstacles on the way are formidable. In part, these obstacles defy actions by Europeans or, it appears, even Americans. Peace and prosperity in the Middle East—which means, in the first instance, in Israel and Palestine—is a worthy objective

which, if attained, would have ramifications far and wide. Yet a realistic roadmap to that goal remains elusive. In part however, the obstacles are of our own making, indeed they are in our minds as much as in real conditions out there. Europe (for that is what I mean by 'us') needs to re-think what it is about in order to live up to its vocations as a force for promoting a cosmopolitan order of liberty.

This is anticipating the conclusion to which this analysis leads. It has to do with the identity of the new Europe, by which I mean the whole of Europe in its new, post-1989 and post-9/11 mode. For some time now, it has been difficult to answer the question of the *finalitiés Européennes*. This is the language used by the European Convention, and its members have not found it easy to fill it with substance. Why Europe? Why in particular should there be an ever closer union of the democratic countries of Europe? The post-1945 answers of containing Germany and maintaining peace have been overtaken by historical changes. The economic motives of promoting and sustaining growth by a common and eventually a single market have been realized at least in principle. While much remains to be done, there is no fundamental new objective to be defined in this regard. Jacques Delors—arguably the greatest federator of Europe after the post-war Christian Democrats Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi, and Robert Schuman—has achieved what he set out to do.

The resulting vacuum of motivation however has increasingly come to be filled by the surprising, and in my contention unfortunate choice of a new enemy, the United States of America. More and more European politicians and citizens want to build Europe if not explicitly against the United States, then at any rate in order to enable Europe to hold its own, to balance the power of the hegemony. Even the Euro is seen by some as a counterweight to the dollar. Much is made of the need to preserve and enhance the 'European social model' against the inroads of a neo-liberal view invented by Chicago economists and embodied in the 'Washington consensus'. More recently, the popular yet unfocused search for a common European foreign and defence policy has led some to dream of a multi-polar world in which Europe plays an independent role as one of the poles of power. Even the discovery, in the course of the Iraq episode, that the interests of Europeans differ widely, has not discouraged such hopes, especially since some seem to believe that dividing Europe was a conscious objective of American policy.

In my view, a Europe designed to balance the United States will not come about, and more importantly, it should not come about. In the first instance, such a Europe is simply not realistic. In terms of 'hard power' at least, there is no indication whatever of Europe wanting to match America's strength. Even if the military expenditure of European countries is increased massively (which is unlikely) the result will be insignificant compared to the strength of the US military machine. Moreover, a so-called foreign minister for Europe does not make for a genuine foreign policy. France and the United Kingdom will not abandon their veto in the United Nations; and by the time all Europeans have agreed on a common policy, those members with special interests will have taken the necessary action unilaterally. Britain and the Falklands, France and Francophone Africa, indeed Germany and its unification are but some of the more flagrant illustrations.

The more important point, however, is that it would not just be undesirable but contrary to the interests of Europeans to split the West in international politics. There may be, and probably will be, differences between Eastern countries about methods. Kagan may even be right that some of these differences will be due to Europe's comparative weakness in terms of hard power. This will lead Europeans to insist more on 'economic and soft power', on 'international law and international institutions', generally on 'commonly agreed-upon international rules of behaviour'. But none of this can detract from the common interest in defending the liberal order against all aggressors, and more, in spreading its principles to the rest of the world. The more divided the West is, the more vulnerable it becomes, and if it divides itself it has given up the core of its strength.

Since Joseph Nye has introduced the distinction between 'hard' and 'soft power', not just American critics, like Kagan, but Europeans themselves have enjoyed talking about Europe's 'soft' strength. Some have become so enamoured with the notion that they have diagnosed a 'decline in American power' in the face of Europe's 'soft power'.

One must wonder not only what exactly this means but how much of it there is. Economic power is often no more than a statistical figment based on adding up gross national products, whereas the power lies with corporations which, if they have any nationality at all, are just as likely to be American. Moreover, America's magnetism

in the world is undiminished. Even potential terrorists would probably settle for a life in the United States instead of their murderous deeds if they were allowed to immigrate there; in any case, the majority of mankind probably dreams of being American. The reason is the lure of Enlightenment applied, of a liberal order which encourages personal initiative in a climate of opportunity.

Returning to Europe's *finalitiés*, this takes us back to the West and to what Timothy Garton Ash calls 'liberal order'. Europe is not about some vague notion of unification. It would, in fact, destroy its justly praised diversity if it took the objective of an ever closer union too far. Europe is about maintaining Western values and with them the constitution of liberty within its own fortunately ever-widening borders, and about supporting such values elsewhere in the world. The so-called 'Copenhagen criteria' which spell out some institutional preconditions of the liberal order were a good prescription for countries seeking accession to the European Union and showed Europe at its best. With due adjustments to other cultural traditions, the principles underlying these criteria are applicable everywhere. The rule of law, for example, must be a rule of secular law made and changed by the people and not by high priests of any faith. The cultural relativism which is gaining ground at this time is a sign of weakening confidence in the values of the liberal order.

This is one of many reasons why it is important to remember that the values in question are more than European. They are Western, uniting Europe, the United States, and important countries in other parts of the world. In some ways, the OECD, the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development, has become the most plausible institutional representation of the values in question, at least in its own limited range of concern. It includes Japan and Australia as well as Canada and some Latin American countries. Would it be an idea to set up an OPCD, an Organization for Political Co-operation and Development, to help spread and guard the constitution of liberty across the world?

The underlying thesis of this lecture takes me back to the Enlightenment, and notably to Immanuel Kant. Kagan likes to mock 'the Kantian world of perpetual peace'. Had he looked at more than the title of Kant's essay 'On Perpetual Peace', he would have realized that Kant is anything but a proponent of Arcadia. On the contrary, in his other essay, 'Idea for a Universal History With Cosmopolitan

Intent', Kant makes fun of those who dream of an Arcadia in which their existence has no greater value than that of their sheep. Conflict, or in Kant's words, 'antagonism', is endemic in human society, and a source of progress. At the end of the day, such progress might envisage an international order of lively competition and conflict under the law. We have a long way to go to such an order; perhaps we shall never reach it. In the meantime, however, we must act in such a way that the maxims of our actions can be thought of as the principles of a cosmopolitan order. Nothing we do must make the path to this goal more difficult; whatever we do must pave the way to a lawful and liberal order both at home and in the world.

This is, in my submission, what institutional Europe is about. The European Union (or whatever it is going to be called) draws its strength and its meaning from being a step in the right direction. Like the United States and therefore with the United States it points the way to a wider, and ultimately general, acceptance of certain values. If one does not like the word 'Western', one can describe them as those of the liberal order, though they began their career as the values of the West. Do they justify intervention in other parts of the world where such values are systematically violated? I believe they do, though again we must aim for rules which guide and restrain our actions. In any case, the time has come to reassert the values of such an order. Perhaps we need a new West which engages in joint projects of peace and prosperity in freedom.

RALF DAHRENDORF is a member of the House of Lords. Among his recent publications are *Liberal und unabhängig: Gerd Bucerius und seine Zeit* (2002), *Die Krise der Demokratie: Ein Gespräch* (2002), and *Auf der Suche nach einer neuen Ordnung: Eine Politik der Freiheit für das 21. Jahrhundert* (2003).

ARTICLES

REVISING THE 'MYTH' OF A 'CLEAN WEHRMACHT': GENERALS' TRIALS, PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE DYNAMICS OF VERGANGENHEITSBEWÄLTIGUNG IN WEST GERMANY, 1948–60[*]

Alaric Searle

Among one of the most consistent claims made by the organizers and supporters of the *'Wehrmacht* exhibition'[1] has been that the 'myth' of a 'clean *Wehrmacht*' took root in the Federal Republic of Germany in the early 1950s, lasting well into the 1980s, only to have been finally shattered by the exhibition itself in the mid-1990s. Although this thesis has very little to do with the actual content of the exhibition—which examined the role of the *Wehrmacht*, and the army in particular, in co-operating with SS units in the final solution in the Soviet Union, in executions of enemy personnel, and the extermination of countless civilians through the device of declaring them to be partisans—it is has been repeated consistently by a number of historians.[2]

* This article derives from a lecture given at the GHIL on 13 May 2003. As much of the research on which the arguments in this article are based is to be found in A. Searle, *Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949–1959* (Westport, Conn., 2003), readers seeking more extensive references to primary source material are referred to this work.

1 The major themes of the exhibition can be found in H. Heer and K. Naumann (eds.), *Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944* (Hamburg, 1995). The intensity of feeling surrounding the exhibition is captured well in Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung (ed.), *Krieg ist ein Gesellschaftszustand: Reden zur Eröffnung der Ausstellung 'Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944'* (Hamburg, 1998).

2 K. Naumann, 'Die saubere Wehrmacht: Gesellschaftsgeschichte einer Legende', *Mittelweg 36*, 7/4 (1998), pp. 8–18; O. von Wrochem, 'Keine Helden mehr: Die Wehrmachtselite in der öffentliche Auseinandersetzung', in M. T. Greven and O. von Wrochem (eds.), *Der Krieg in der Nachkriegszeit* (Opladen, 2000), pp. 151–65; P. Reichel, ' "Der deutsche Soldat hat seine Ehre nicht ver-

But as there have been no really convincing attempts to justify it on the basis of a thorough examination of primary sources, it seems time to subject this claim to closer scrutiny. This should not be misconstrued as an effort to take issue with the exhibition itself—which has, after all, done much to revive interest in the *Wehrmacht*—but rather as a call to historians to reconsider the issue of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* ('coming to terms with the past') during the 1950s, and many of the unsubstantiated assumptions surrounding its undercurrents and dynamics, particularly those aspects relating to the way in which Germans came to terms with their *military past*.

In seeking to identify trends in public perceptions of the *Wehrmacht*, one route would seem to offer potentially high dividends: the reaction to trials of former generals. In addition to the Nuremberg trials, so far historians have shown some interest in the trials by the British of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring in Venice in 1947 and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein in Hamburg in 1949.[3] However, a series of trials of generals in Federal German courts for the execution of soldiers under their command has been ignored almost completely.[4] In the only two attempts so far to examine the prosecution of former members of the *Wehrmacht* before German courts, not one of the six cases is even mentioned.[5] This seems to be a quite remarkable oversight. Yet, in many ways it merely reflects

loren." Wie in der Nachkriegszeit der Mythos von der sauberen Wehrmacht entstand', *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (hereafter *SZ*), 27 Nov. 2001.

[3] O. von Wrochem, 'Die Auseinandersetzungen mit Wehrmachtsverbrechen im Prozeß gegen den Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 46 (1998), pp. 329–53; D. Bloxham, 'Punishing German Soldiers during the Cold War: the Case of Erich von Manstein', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 32 (1999), pp. 25–45; K. von Lingen, 'Konstruktion von Kriegserinnerung: Der Prozeß gegen Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring vor einem britischen Militärgericht in Venedig (1947) und das Bild vom Krieg in Italien', *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift*, 59 (2000), pp. 435–50.

[4] The exception is Searle, *Wehrmacht Generals*, ch. 7.

[5] R. B. Birn, 'Wehrmacht und Wehrmachtangehörige in den deutschen Nachkriegsprozessen', in R.-D. Müller and H. E. Volkmann (eds.), *Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität* (Munich, 1999), pp. 1081–99; A. Streim, 'Saubere Wehrmacht? Die Verfolgung von Kriegs- und NS-Verbrechen in der Bundesrepublik und der DDR', in Heer and Naumann (eds.), *Vernichtungskrieg*, pp. 569–97.

some of the broader failings of the research over the last decade on *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, not least the lack of attention which has been paid to the effect of trials for National Socialist crimes on public attitudes.[6]

The failure to take account of the generals' trials, some of which were major media events, can be explained on three counts. The first cause lies in the initial direction of research into trials for National Socialist crimes. Much of the early interest in post-war trials was in what they could offer in terms of material for research into the crimes of the Third Reich: the trials were seen only as a source of documentary material.[7] The second reason has been that where historians have sought to examine reactions to post-war trials, the focus has usually been on those proceedings directly involving the Holocaust, or crimes committed specifically by the SS. Moreover, these works have tended to focus more on the 1960s because the assumption has been that only after the 1958 *Ulmer Einsatzgruppenprozeß*, the trial in Ulm of former members of a security task force, did the Federal Republic turn its attention to dealing seriously with the past. Indeed, some historians argue that the first Auschwitz trial in Frankfurt, which began in December 1964, was an even more important landmark.[8] The third reason is the claim in more recent studies that the *Wehrmacht* was 'whitewashed' in the 1950s. The logic behind this research appears to be that since German society was only interested

[6] In a recent volume on trials in Cologne for Nazi crimes containing 15 essays, only one dealt with media reactions, and in a mere seven pages, referencing only secondary literature. See H. Lichtenstein, 'Niemand spricht für die Zeugen: Medien, öffentliches Interesse und NS-Prozesse', in A. Klein and J. Wilhelm (eds.), *NS-Unrecht vor Kölner Gerichten nach 1945* (Cologne, 2003), pp. 158–64.

[7] See here P. Steinbach, 'NS-Prozesse und historische Forschung', in H. Lichtenstein and O. R. Romberg (eds.), *Täter – Opfer – Folgen: Der Holocaust in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Bonn, 1985), pp. 136–53. One of the earliest attempts to make use of trial documents for research into National Socialist crimes, and perhaps still the most successful, is H. Jäger, *Verbrechen unter totalitärer Herrschaft: Studien zur nationalsozialistischen Gewaltkriminalität* (Olten, 1967).

[8] H. Lichtenstein, 'NS-Prozesse: Zum Ende eines Kapitels deutscher Justizgeschichte', in id. and Romberg (eds.), *Täter – Opfer – Folgen*, pp. 114–24; J. Friedrich, *Die kalte Amnestie: NS-Täter in der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt am Main, 1984), pp. 321–412.

in constructing a myth of a 'clean *Wehrmacht*', there can be no point in examining the confrontation with the military past in the 1950s as, quite simply, none took place.[9]

In assessing 'the generals' trials' in the Federal Republic, this article will challenge the thesis that the 'myth' of an honourable *Wehrmacht* dominated perceptions of the military past during the 1950s. It will be argued that some of the 'generals' trials' represented, in fact, an important chapter in the early attempts to come to terms with the National Socialist past. The six individual cases, which involved eight separate trials, saw one field marshal and five generals appear in the witness-box. As they extended from 1948 to 1960, they provide a means of analysing attitudes towards the *Wehrmacht throughout* the 1950s, and thus offer a chance to put the hypothesis of the 'myth of a clean *Wehrmacht*' to the test. The discussion will focus on four areas: first, the need to view these cases as a trial category in their own right; second, the significance of the trial of Theodor Tolsdorff in June 1954; third, the three major trials which took place in the second half of the 1950s; and fourth, the impact of the trials on perceptions of the *Wehrmacht* and the way in which public attitudes can be related to recent research on 'victimization' in West German society.

I. *Trials of* Wehrmacht *Generals, 1948–60: An Overview*

What makes the eight 'generals' trials' particularly instructive for the analysis of changing perceptions is that they extended over three clearly identifiable phases in the development of West German public attitudes towards the war, the National Socialist state, and its armed forces.

The first period in the evolution of post-war opinion towards the *Wehrmacht* ran from the collapse of the Third Reich in May 1945 to the emergence of the rearmament debate in late 1949. In this period there was a form of 'sullen resentment' towards generals in particular. On

[9] Even studies which make some use of primary source material seem marked by a lack of analytical rigour and a strongly polemical style of argument. See here H. Heer, 'Vom Sieg der Geschichte über die Erinnerung: Das Bild der Wehrmacht im kollektiven Bewußtsein der Bundesrepublik' in id., *Tote Zonen: Die Deutsche Wehrmacht an der Ostfront* (Hamburg, 1999), pp. 257–86; D. Bald, J. Klotz, and W. Wette, *Mythos Wehrmacht: Nachkriegsdebatte und Traditionspflege* (Berlin, 2001).

the one hand they were seen as responsible for the 'lost war' yet, on the other, the negative attitude towards them was an early manifestation of a clear rejection of Nazi militarism. None the less, with hunger rife and the major cities in ruins, it is hardly surprising that the first two trials aroused very little interest: the proceedings against *General der Panzertruppe a.D.* Hermann Balck before the Landgericht Stuttgart in May 1948 led to a prison sentence of three years,[10] those against former *Generalmajor* Rudolf Hübner in November 1948 before the Landgericht Munich to sentences totalling ten years.[11]

The second phase, which ran from approximately late 1949 to mid-1954, was dominated by the government's fight for sovereignty, the question of rearmament, and the concomitant campaigns for the release of Germans imprisoned by the Western Allies. The desire to bargain for better conditions for the planned armed forces by refusing to participate until the 'so-called war criminals' were released saw this period marked by an overt aggressiveness towards any suggestion that the crimes of the past needed to be confronted. This period saw two further cases against generals come before the courts. The first, which was heard before the Landgericht Hamburg in January 1953, led to former *Generalmajor* Georg Benthack being pronounced 'not guilty' after two charges of manslaughter had been heard.[12] His case, in keeping with the atmosphere of the time, provoked almost no media interest. The second trial, that of *Generalleutnant a.D.* Theodor Tolsdorff in June 1954, which saw the general sentenced to three and a half years' prison by the Landgericht Traunstein,[13] did by contrast arouse considerable press interest, though it does conform very clear-

[10] III Kls 9/48, verdict, Landgericht (hereafter LG) Stuttgart, 25 May 1948, and, 1 Ss 112/48, decision of Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart, 15 Sept. 1948, in A. L. Rüter-Ehlermann and C. F. Rüter (eds.), *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen: Sammlung deutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945–1966* (Amsterdam, 1968-), ii, pp. 539–49, 550–8.

[11] 1 KLs 143/48 and 1 KLs 152/48, verdict, LG Munich I, 25 Nov. 1948, and, 1 Ss 71/49, decision of Oberlandesgericht Munich, 30 June 1949, in *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen*, iii, pp. 553–68, 569–73.

[12] (50) 18/52, verdict, LG Hamburg, 30 Jan. 1953, in *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen*, x, pp. 295–336.

[13] Institut für Zeitgeschichte (hereafter IfZ), Gt 01.01, Ks 4/53, verdict, LG Traunstein, 23 June 1954.

ly to this phase of public opinion in so far as strong disapproval of the verdict was expressed.

The third phase ran from approximately September 1954 to the end of the rearmament debate in November 1960.[14] It was marked by a remarkable *volte face* in public opinion, a wave of anti-militarism sweeping the country, clearly noticeable in the changed attitudes towards the remaining four trials: that of Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner in Munich in October 1957 (verdict: guilty, four and a half years);[15] the following year the first retrial of Theodor Tolsdorff in September 1958 (case abandoned under the provisions of the Amnesty Law of 1954);[16] then in August 1959 the proceedings against *General der Panzertruppe a.D*. Hasso von Manteuffel in Düsseldorf (verdict: guilty, eighteen months);[17] and, finally, the second retrial of Theodor Tolsdorff, again in Traunstein, in May/June 1960 (verdict: not guilty).[18] The first three were of particular significance for public opinion.

Bearing in mind that all six cases involved prosecutions for illegal executions, four general observations can be made. It is interesting to note that, first of all, the prosecutions were almost exclusively for actual or attempted manslaughter, only one of them, that of Hübner, involving charges of murder and attempted murder, although on these counts he was found not guilty. Second, of the eight trials, only two ended with a verdict of not guilty: Georg Benthack in 1953, and

[14] Within the context of the arguments in this article, it seems appropriate to accept Norman Drummond's claim that the end of the rearmament debate was marked by the SPD conference at Hanover in November 1960, at which the Social Democrats declared the debate to be over. See N. Drummond, *The German Social Democrats in Opposition, 1949–1960: The Case Against Rearmament* (Norman, Okla., 1982), pp. 7, 287.

[15] 3 Ks 10/57, verdict, LG Munich, 15 Oct. 1957, and, 1 StR 51/58, decision of 1. Strafsenat, Bundesgerichtshof, 25 July 1958, in *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen*, xiv, pp. 359–90, 391–9.

[16] Staatsarchiv Munich (hereafter StAM), OLG 306, Ks 4/53 (644/55), verdict, LG Traunstein, 29 Sept. 1958.

[17] 8 Ks 1/59, verdict, LG Düsseldorf, 21 Aug. 1959, and, 2 StR 622/59, decision of 2. Strafsenat, Bundesgerichtshof, 10 March 1960, in *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen*, xvi, pp. 25–41, 42–5.

[18] Ks 4/53, verdict, LG Traunstein, 3 June 1960, in *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen*, xvi, pp. 389–414.

Theodor Tolsdorff in 1960, the latter only as the result of a second retrial. Third, as all these cases centred on execution orders issued by the generals which were carried out on German nationals, serving in the *Wehrmacht*, for military indiscipline—whether mutiny, drunkenness, or failing to open fire on the enemy—they cannot be considered, in a strictly legal sense, to be National Socialist crimes of violence. What made a crime 'National Socialist' was that it took place in an area detached from the main combat zone. Fourth, the fact that the central legal issues were essentially the same in all six cases suggests that they can be approached as a homogeneous group, opening up interesting comparative possibilities. Thus while each of these trials concerned a specific incident or incidents, separated in time and by geographical location, each of them revolved essentially around the same problem in military law, and all of them occurred during the final eighteen months of the war.

The cases all differed from the much more frequent proceedings against junior officers and NCOs for executions quite simply because the generals could not employ the principle of *Befehlsnotstand*. This allowed a junior commander to justify his carrying out of an execution order if he had believed that failure to do so would have led to his own execution.[19] In the generals' trials, this approach did not have any serious legal basis as, in each case, the general gave the order on his own initiative, as the final legal authority of his unit or command area.[20]

However, the generals and their defence lawyers frequently cited Paragraph 124 of the Military Criminal Code, the *Militärstrafgesetzbuch*, this representing the principle of *Befehlsnotrecht*. The relevant passage laid down that:

[19] On this issue, see H. Buchheim, 'Das Problem des sogenannten Befehlsnotstand aus historischer Sicht', in P. Schneider and H. J. Meyer (eds.), *Rechtliche und politische Aspekte der NS-Verbrecherprozesse* (Mainz, 1967), pp. 25–37.

[20] Thus, if one wishes to make use of Herbert Jäger's typologies of Nazi criminality, the orders could be defined as acts of initiative, *Initiativtaten*. However, there are no straightforward answers, and his category of acts governed by orders, *Befehlstaten*, could also be applied (Jäger, *Verbrechen*, pp. 44–75).

> (1) The actions undertaken by the commander in order to prevent a violent attack by his subordinate, or to achieve obedience to his orders in the case of extreme emergency or immediate danger, are not to be regarded as misuse of his authority. (2) This applies also to the eventuality that an officer, in the absence of other means, in order to maintain the necessary obedience, finds himself in the position of having to make use of weapons in order to resist a violent subordinate.[21]

This section of the Military Criminal Code was discussed by the court in each of the cases, except that of Hübner, although in none of them did it achieve any success. The situation provided for here was more that of a disintegration of morale and discipline during a retreat or a battle. None of the executions ordered by generals fitted this description; none of the decisions were made in the midst of a retreat or an engagement with the enemy. In each instance, the court decided that other means more appropriate could have been employed.

None the less, the generals also used specific orders issued by Hitler, Keitel, and Himmler, known collectively as 'catastrophe orders', to justify their decisions. In the case of *Generalmajor* Hübner, he had been appointed in March 1945 as head of a 'flying court martial' by Hitler personally.[22] In the Balck trial, while the court made detailed reference to the increase in severity in the Military Criminal Code in the last two years of the war, such as the *5. Verordnung zur Ergänzung der Kriegssonderstrafrechtsverordnung* of 5 May 1944, it could not be proved whether Balck had received an order directly from Hitler at the end of September 1944, demanding that he use draconian measures to restore discipline.[23] In the Benthack trial, the court accepted that the accused had been issued with an order personally by Hitler in September 1944 permitting him to take any measures he thought fit to maintain discipline. The same order was issued once again on 30 January 1945, a copy of which was available to the court.[24] In the Tolsdorff trial in June 1954, while the court

[21] *H.Dv. 3/1. Militärstrafgesetzbuch II. Kriegssonderstrafgesetzverordnung* (Berlin, 1940), § 124.

[22] 1KLs 143/48 and 1 KLs 152/48, in *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen*, iii, p. 554.

[23] III Kls 9/48, in *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen*, ii, pp. 545–7.

[24] (50) 18/52, in *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen*, x, pp. 309–10.

rejected the applicability of § 124 of the Military Criminal Code to the case out of hand, they took up the question of the 'catastrophe orders', referring to the so-called Keitel order of 18 January 1945, and Himmler's subsequent 'flag order'. In pursuit of the case, the court in Traunstein later spent a considerable time attempting to establish the exact wording of many of these orders.[25] The Keitel order also played a particularly prominent role in the trial of Ferdinand Schörner in October 1957,[26] while in the trial of Hasso von Manteuffel in August 1959 it was the 'Führer Order No. 7' of 24 February 1943 which stood at the centre of the proceedings.[27]

Although it has been argued that these cases did not, strictly speaking, represent instances of National Socialist crimes of violence, the claim by both the accused and many of the military witnesses that the 'catastrophe orders' had been legal, and the reliance on these orders by generals as part of their defence, cast doubts on the claims made by the General Officer Corps that the *Wehrmacht* had been resistant to National Socialist ideology. Moreover, each of the trials contained further potential to arouse negative reactions as, from the experience of the war among *Wehrmacht* veterans, witnessing the execution of a German soldier, or, worse still, a comrade from one's own unit, was among the war's most traumatic experiences. It provoked a combination of outrage, shock, and fear, making it an experience which was never forgotten.[28] Whether and in what way the public, journalists, jurors, or judges reacted to the implications of the details of these cases depended on the particular phase of public opinion in which the respective trial took place. The range of reactions possible depended in turn upon what sort of associations and connotations

[25] IfZ, Gt 01.01, Ks 4/53, 23 June 1954, pp. 21–2; StAM, OLG 306, Oberstaatsanwalt Traunstein to Generalstaatsanwalt Munich, 3 Nov. 1955, the subsequent correspondence, and copies of various orders.

[26] 3 Ks 10/57, in *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen*, xiv, pp. 381–7.

[27] 8 Ks 1/59, in *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen*, xvi, pp. 35–6, 38–41. The exact text of the order is reproduced in 'Um den "Führerbefehl Nr. 7" ', *Soldat im Volk*, 8 (Sept. 1959), p. 2.

[28] E. Mende, *Das verdammte Gewissen: Zeuge der Zeit. Jugend und Zweiter Weltkrieg* (Bergisch Gladbach, 1985), pp. 160–1, reporting on the carrying out of a death sentence in occupied France in early 1941, which 'deeply shocked ... all the soldiers ... . It was the topic of conversation among soldiers for weeks after.'

the trial of a general held at any one point in time. And it is in the reactions they produced that the real significance of 'the generals' trials' lies.

Of course, it should not be forgotten that the remarkable public impact of the Tolsdorff trial in June 1954, the Schörner trial in 1957, the first Tolsdorff retrial of September 1958, and the Manteuffel trial of 1959 was to a considerable extent due to the fame of those on trial. Tolsdorff was, after all, the most highly decorated infantry officer in the *Wehrmacht*, Schörner had been a Field Marshal, while Manteuffel had been not only a leading tank general, but also a member of the *Bundestag* between 1953 and 1957. Thus the sentences which were pronounced against all three, while interesting in terms of the legal aspects of the respective cases, should not be used as a means of measuring the success or failure of the trials. It is not, ultimately, of central importance whether Manteuffel should have received more than eighteen months, or whether four and a half years was too harsh or too lenient a sentence for Field Marshal Schörner. What is significant is that a field marshal could be brought to trial and sentenced, and that a prominent veterans' leader, and former member of parliament, could be convicted. In bringing these cases to trial the Federal legal system opened a window on the behaviour of generals during the war, instigating a public debate on the *Wehrmacht* which was not tarnished with accusations of 'victors' justice'.[29]

During the period 1945 to 1949, attitudes towards the *Wehrmacht* were, on the whole, conditioned by the first shock of the Nuremberg trials, coupled with details from many of the *Spruchkammer* hearings, which also saw generals called to answer for their actions during the war. While there was an initial wave of condemnation of generals, by the end of 1949 Nuremberg was beginning to be seen by many as

[29] Interestingly, a new work on the trials in the 1920s in Leipzig of 'war criminals' makes a similar point, namely that the trials should not be seen as a 'failure' because sentences were too lenient, or too few of the accused were convicted. See G. Hankel, *Die Leipziger Prozesse: Deutsche Kriegsverbrecher und ihre strafrechtliche Verfolgung nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg* (Hamburg, 2003), pp. 15–16. The insight that the significance of trials often lies outside the purely legal aspects is, however, sadly lacking in research on trials after the Second World War.

Siegerjustiz (victors' justice). In the second phase in the evolution of public opinion towards the *Wehrmacht* and its generals, from late 1949 to mid-1954, attitudes were dominated by the public campaign for the release of the 'so-called war criminals', and, because of the drive for rearmament, by numerous politically motivated attempts to portray the German military in a more positive light. Thus it was hardly surprising that the trial of Georg Benthack, which falls squarely within this period, was more or less ignored. In a sense, then, by the time the trial of Theodor Tolsdorff took place, in June 1954, two reactions to trials of generals were possible: either a negative one, which viewed the prosecution of generals as pandering to the Western Allies and damaging to German interests; or one of suspicion towards generals, coupled with anticipation as to what the details of a case might reveal.[30]

II. *The Tolsdorff Trial, June 1954*

In terms of the development of post-war perceptions of the *Wehrmacht* in Western Germany, the first three trials—those against Balck, Hübner, and Benthack—are only significant in so far as they make plain the lack of interest in such cases in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The trial of Theodor Tolsdorff in Traunstein in June 1954, however, represents a departure as it provoked considerable press coverage. Tolsdorff, a former Lieutenant-General, stood accused of manslaughter for having ordered the shooting of an army captain and First World War veteran, Franz Xaver Holzhey.

The interest of many journalists seems to have been awakened for three main reasons. First, Tolsdorff had enjoyed a meteoric career in the *Wehrmacht*: having risen through the ranks after joining the army in 1934, he was promoted to Lieutenant-General in March 1945. He had been wounded fourteen times, and had won the Iron Cross in the Polish Campaign, subsequently receiving the Knight's Cross, with swords, oak leaves, and diamonds, making him the most highly dec-

[30] J. Echternkamp, 'Arbeit am Mythos: Soldatengenerationen der Wehrmacht im Urteil der west- und ostdeutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft', in K. Naumann (ed.), *Nachkrieg in Deutschland* (Hamburg, 2001), pp. 421–43, recognizes that there were two competing views of the *Wehrmacht* in the immediate post-war years, but still emphasizes that in the West there was 'no doubt about the basically honourable nature of the soldier' (p. 442).

orated infantry officer in the army.[31] Second, the incident involving Captain Holzhey had already been immortalized in one of the best-sellers of the early 1950s, Ernst von Salomon's *Der Fragebogen*. In the fictional account, a retired officer living in the Bavarian village of Eisenärzt removed a sign marking a military zone from in front of his house, placing it 20 metres further down the road. Observed by an SS officer, he was arrested and shot.[32] However, it emerged that the incident on which the account was loosely based had not involved an SS officer: the execution order had been given by Tolsdorff, and the Captain had placed a Red Cross sign in the vicinity of a local hospital. Third, the appearance of two prominent military personalities in court as witnesses—Field Marshal Albert Kesselring and former *General der Infanterie* Friedrich Foertsch—was considered eminently newsworthy.

However, contrary to what one might have expected, the court delivered a verdict of guilty, sentencing Tolsdorff to three-and-a-half years' prison for what it saw as a capricious and arbitrary decision to have the Captain shot without having given him a chance to explain himself, or even having bothered to examine his papers. Tolsdorff had argued in court that he had heard a 'flag order' being read and assumed that this gave him the power to shoot those who displayed white flags or neutrality symbols. The fact that Tolsdorff was convicted stands in stark contrast to the atmosphere of the time, made only too clear in the press coverage of the trial. Quite apart from the strong desire of the public prosecutor in Munich for a verdict of guilty to be reached, there may, in fact, have been another factor which influenced the decision of the jurors: the rolling Rs and booming voice of the accused quickly gave away his East Prussian origins, and seem to have offended local Bavarian sensibilities.[33]

None the less, the press reaction to the verdict was disapproving. Where reports offered no specific comment on the sentence, there

[31] Tolsdorff has not been the subject of a biography. 'Die Ruhe selbst: Theodor Tolsdorff', in *Helden der Wehrmacht* (Munich, 2000), pp. 204–205 is a short sketch. Accurate biographical details can be found at Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg i.Br., MSg. 109/10853.

[32] E. von Salomon, *Der Fragebogen* (Hamburg, 1951), p. 442.

[33] See the trial coverage in the *Traunsteiner Wochenblatt*, 22, 23, and 25 June 1954.

was at least the implication that the execution had been justified by the need to continue resistance long enough to allow German units from the east and the south to reach friendly lines, and thus American rather than Russian captivity. Those papers which offered specific comment on the verdict came down almost universally on the side of the general. The non-partisan *Kölner Stadtanzeiger* began its editorial by arguing that while the court had been able to reconstruct the execution, 'the atmosphere of the first days of May 1945 cannot be recreated in a courtroom'. One question which could not be answered by the jurors was: 'What is guilt, what is fate?' While the paper judged the execution to have been wrong, it was the political system which Tolsdorff had fought for that was to blame, not the general. An article in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* asked how nine years later, with the blown bridges now repaired and the destroyed farms rebuilt, the chairman of the court and 'the satisfied and well-fed jurors' could evoke the atmosphere of the final days, the strong implication being that a civilian court was not in a position to pass judgement on military command decisions. To find any criticism at all of the verdict one has to go to the Communist paper, *Freies Volk*, hardly representative even of minority left-wing opinion, which blustered: 'That is Bonn "democracy", when a mass murderer like Kesselring is allowed to appear as a defence witness in every trial of fascist generals.'[34]

The written verdict which was passed on to the *Generalstaatsanwaltschaft* (Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions) in Munich after sentencing, and was thus the product of the deliberations of court employees rather than the jury, shows that the legal officials in Traunstein were only too aware of just how politically charged the decision was. The guilt of the accused was not in question, but it was highlighted that Tolsdorff, 'like the overwhelming majority of the Officer Corps, did not approve of National Socialism and its intention to infiltrate the *Wehrmacht* politically'. While he was described as having become a tool of Hitler, this was the result of his limited outlook and concentration on his purely military duties. Moreover, the

[34] 'Das Urteil von Traunstein', *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, 24 June 1954; ' "In fünf Minuten werden sie erschossen ...": Der Prozeß gegen den ehemaligen Generalleutnant Tolsdorff in Traunstein', *SZ*, 24 June 1954; 'Der Tolsdorff-"Prozeß" ', *Freies Volk*, 25 June 1954.

verdict concluded with the remark that Tolsdorff's action represented one of the few exceptions when the usual rules of chivalry and correctness were broken. It was also noted that the 'good reputation of the German *Wehrmacht* and its correct behaviour during the war' was now being acknowledged once again in the formerly occupied countries.[35]

This is not to say that there was no criticism of the *Wehrmacht* at this time. Newspapers did contain critical comment on trials of former junior officers, while generals were still subject to verbal attacks in articles and editorials. This trial, however, had an unwelcome political dimension because of the pressure which veterans were still exerting on the government. The argument ran that Germans could not be expected to don a uniform in the new armed forces when war veterans, with numerous wounds and as many decorations, were being subjected to legal prosecution for simply having carried out their duty. Veterans also pointed out that trials by German courts could jeopardize the efforts for the release of those former soldiers still in Allied captivity. Likewise, the suggestion that the state prosecutors in Traunstein had been put under pressure to secure a conviction was one which certain veterans' groups were only too happy to make.[36]

Although veterans appeared angered at the court's decision, by June 1954 the emotions surrounding the war criminals issue were not running nearly as high as they had been in 1951 and 1952. In fact, over the following year the atmosphere in Western Germany was to change radically. This can be seen in a report on the decision in June 1955 of the Federal Court of Appeal to overturn the original sentence. The *Traunsteiner Wochenblatt*, which had studiously avoided any criticism of Tolsdorff in June 1954, noted with satisfaction that attempts by the generals' lawyers to have the case transferred to another court had failed. More significantly, the paper remarked dryly that the Appeal Court had 'directed the assize court in Traunstein towards every point and legal provision on the basis of which Tolsdorff's crime could be assessed differently, whether the assessment led to a verdict of not

[35] IfZ, Gt 01.01, Ks 4/53, verdict, LG Traunstein, 23 June 1954, pp. 4, 30.

[36] 'General a.D. vor deutscher Ziviljustiz', *Der Heimkehrer*, 5 July 1954; 'Weisungsgebudene Staatsanwälte? Der Tolsdorff-Prozeß', *Der Fortschritt*, 1 July 1954.

guilty, or to a decision to invoke an amnesty'.[37] These were very different tones to those of June 1954. What had caused the change?

Between September 1954 and February 1955, a veritable wave of anti-military sentiment swept the Federal Republic. The main catalyst appears to have been the rejection of the European Defence Community treaty by the French parliament on 30 August 1954, which sparked the resurgence of anti-rearmament groups. It was further fuelled by regional elections. Popular culture, in particular the novel *08/15* by Hans Hellmuth Kirst, released as a film in September 1954, and the release of the film version of Carl Zuckmayer's successful play, *Des Teufels General*, in February 1955, interacted with more general political developments, sowing the seeds of a new popular political culture which was demonstratively anti-military. Above all, the return to German soil on 30 January 1955 of Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner, reputed to have been one of the most brutal army commanders in the *Wehrmacht*, unleashed a wave of hysteria, numerous press reports appearing on the crimes he was alleged to have committed.[38]

The nature of the change in the climate of public opinion is a most interesting event in the history of the Federal Republic. Although here we are dealing primarily with the reactions to Germany's military past, the change seems to go much deeper and to be of a more fundamental nature than many historians have realized. Hans Ehlert has pointed to the rejection of the European Defence Community treaty by the French parliament as a major factor in the upsurge of anti-military feeling and in rekindling hope among anti-rearmament groups that they might be able to hinder the creation of new armed forces. His conclusions appear to be well buttressed by the evidence of public opinion polls, which identify a clear rise in anti-rearmament—and hence, by implication, anti-military—feeling between September 1954 and February 1955. While he notes the part played by emotions, his analysis concentrates on mainstream political debates and controversies.[39]

[37] 'Urteil gegen General Tolsdorff aufgehoben', *Traunsteiner Wochenblatt*, 9 Sept. 1955.

[38] Searle, *Wehrmacht Generals,* ch. 6; 'Heimkehrer: Schörner. Der laute Kamerad', *Der Spiegel*, 9 Feb. 1955, pp. 11–18.

[39] H. Ehlert, 'Innenpolitische Auseinandersetzungen um die Pariser Verträge und die Wehrverfassung 1954 bis 1956', in Militärgeschichtliches For-

In dealing with attitudes to the past and the strange currents which affect them, historians have, though, generally underestimated the psychological impact of 'non-political events'. It may well be the case that a psychological 'turning point' of some importance was Germany's 3-2 victory over Hungary in the football World Cup Final in Berne on 4 July 1954. The emotions it produced seem to have marked a form of inner release from the oppressive atmosphere of the early 1950s. The aggressive defensiveness of Germans towards the occupying powers and the world at large, based on a feeling that they were permanently being accused of something, was cast off. For the first time since the end of the war Germans felt that it was possible to have pride in themselves. The *Deutsche Michel*, portrayed until this point in caricatures as down-at-the-heel, under-nourished, with bowed head, and cap in hand, before the reproving figure of an Allied occupation official, was now able to walk tall, at least in the world of international sport. Not without good reason was the 3-2 victory subsequently described in quasi-religious terms as the *Wunder von Bern*.[40]

In terms of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* the event is of considerable interest because the feelings of release which the victory caused may well have assisted many Germans in the following months in freeing themselves from their defensive attitude towards the past. With their pride and self-esteem at least partially restored, there was a willingness to start to deal with the events of the war and the crimes of the past themselves. With the new positive perception of their own national identity, the points had been changed within German society. All that was required now was for the anti-rearmament express to speed down the track and veer off in a new direction. At the very least, the victory in Berne acted as a catalyst. If one accepts this thesis, then the Tolsdorff trial of June 1954 represents, as such, the last important event in the second phase of the process of coming to terms with the military past.

schungsamt (ed.), *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956*, iii: *Die NATO-Option* (Munich, 1993), pp. 321–32.

[40] A useful general treatment is Arthur Heinrich, *Tooor! Toor! Tor! 40 Jahre 3:2* (Berlin, 1994). The phrase *Wunder von Bern* only came into usage much later. At the time the victory was referred to as the *Fußball Wunder*.

III. *The Shift in Public Opinion and the Three Major Trials*

The new anti-military attitude among the population, politicians, and in the press which had established itself by early 1955 was not a fleeting phenomenon. It can be seen clearly in the press coverage of the proceedings against Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner in Munich in October 1957, the first retrial of Theodor Tolsdorff in September 1958, and the trial of Hasso von Manteuffel in Düsseldorf in August 1959. The extent of the press coverage was much greater than during the 1954 Tolsdorff trial, and the trials of Schörner and Manteuffel experienced wide coverage in the popular press, turning them into major media events. Given the attention which these three cases generated, it is worth examining each in more detail.

In the case of Ferdinand Schörner,[41] despite the fact that during 1955 he had enjoyed the status of 'Public Enemy No. 1', especially in the illustrated weeklies, the court proceedings represented a new development in attitudes to the *Wehrmacht*: here a Field Marshal was being put on trial by his fellow countrymen. In keeping with his reputation, the reports in the press were suitably critical. Schörner's apparent memory loss in relation to the two cases for which he was being tried was subjected to ridicule, this ridicule being extended to the chief defence witness, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring. While some more conservative newspapers, such as the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, chose not to comment on the sentence of four-and-a-half years, others made the most of the opportunity to attack what they saw as the perfect symbol of a 'Nazi general'. Writing in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Ernst Müller-Meiningen talked of the 'rasping casino tones' of the Field Marshal which had begun 'to grate on civilian nerves'. In another article, punning on the German word 'Brillant', he accused Schörner of having become corrupted by awards, stating that the award of 'diamonds to the Knight's Cross did not make a brilliant Knight' ('Brillanten zum Ritterkreuz noch lange keinen brillanten Ritter ausmachen'). The article was accompanied by a cartoon

[41] There are two biographies of Schörner, both of which make reference to the trial: E. Kern, *Generalfeldmarschall Ferdinand Schörner: Ein deutsches Soldatenschicksal* (Oldendorf, 1976); and R. Kaltenegger, *Schörner: Feldmarschall der letzten Stunde. Biographie* (Munich, 1994).

which showed a hand opening up the Field Marshal's head to reveal a pistol and a pile of iron crosses inside.[42]

But the press coverage did not focus only on the person, one could say the caricature, of Schörner. During the preliminary investigations, and during the trial itself, the role of military judges in the *Wehrmacht* awakened considerable interest. In April 1956 it had emerged that the man in the Ministry of Defence put in charge of gathering evidence against the Field Marshal had actually been a senior military judge at his Army Group Headquarters. It was also reported that four former military judges were not sworn in by the court as witnesses because of suspicion that they had been involved in some of the offences. *Der Spiegel* noted that the four men were now leading civilian court officials in Oldenbourg, Hamburg, Berlin, and Bückeburg. For the more astute observers the trial had directed attention for the first time to the fact that military judges had been able to continue their careers unhindered after the war: 'the military judges of yesterday and at the same time the legal colleagues of today', as the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* put it.[43]

The following year saw the first of two retrials of Theodor Tolsdorff. This trial ended with the case being abandoned under the provisions of the Amnesty Law. Much more significant than the court's decision was the press reaction to the case, in particular the strong criticism of the verdict. Indeed, in the build-up to the trial, and in the reports on the courtroom proceedings, the press coverage differed quite dramatically from that during the first trial in June 1954. There were, in fact, several dimensions to the proceedings which caught journalists' attention.

For one, there were the obvious parallels with another trial being held at the same time in Nuremberg, where a former SS-*Hauptsturmführer*, Heinz Müller, stood accused of manslaughter, likewise for having ordered an execution shortly before the end of the war. His defence was also based on the infamous 'flag order'. While no newspaper went so far as to suggest directly that one of the most highly

[42] ' "Durchhalten" sagte der Marschall und floh', and 'Das Schörner-Urteil', *SZ*, 5/6 and 16 Oct. 1957.

[43] 'Beamte: Des Marschalls Richter', *Der Spiegel*, 25 April 1956, pp. 16–17; 'Justiz: Kriegsrichter. Wer half Schörner?', *Der Spiegel*, 16 Oct. 1957, pp. 22–4; 'Das Schörner-Urteil', *SZ*, 5/6 Oct. 1957.

decorated officers in the *Wehrmacht* was no better than an SS general, the similarities between the two cases were highlighted in some reports, and can only have led many readers to draw this conclusion for themselves.[44]

The obvious implications of the case for contemporary military policy also caught the eye. The fact that Bundeswehr manœuvres were taking place in the Traunstein area at the time of the trial was picked up by many journalists. More than one newspaper mentioned that an observer from the Ministry of Defence was present in the courtroom, as there was apparently interest in employing Tolsdorff in the new armed forces. There seemed to be a remarkable contemporary relevance to a general being tried for manslaughter, while outside the courtroom soldiers of the new armed forces were carrying out manœuvres. The concern was that there was still apparently a very real danger that old *Wehrmacht* commanders would simply take up where they had left off in May 1945.[45]

But perhaps the most striking element in the reporting was the emotional reference to the victim in the case, Franz Xaver Holzhey. It is noticeable that several reports began or concluded with the words which were on Grave No. 314 in the military cemetery on a hill overlooking Eisenärzt, the village where the execution had taken place: 'He died for Eisenärzt.' The *Frankfurter Rundschau*, in describing the soldiers' cemetery where Holzhey was buried, stated that they did not know whether the man who had appointed himself as the 'merciless judge' over an old war hero from the First World had ever been to pay his respects to his victim. 'Probably not', they concluded, 'as the Generalleutnant a.D. ... would be too proud.' *Die Welt*, in an article which used the words on the gravestone as its headline, cited *Landgerichtsdirektor* Schmidt, who told witnesses from Eisenärzt that 'Holzhey put himself in the firing line for you'.[46]

[44] 'Flaggenbefehl kein Geheimnis mehr: Parallel-Prozeß in Nürnberg zum Traunsteiner Verfahren gegen Tolsdorff', *Münchner Merkur*, 26 Sept. 1958; ' "Die Leute extra scharf gemacht": Totschlagprozesse in Traunstein und Nürnberg', *Frankfurter Rundschau* (hereafter *FR*), 25 Sept. 1958; 'Flaggenerlaß hin oder her', *SZ*, 27/28 Sept. 1958.

[45] E.g., 'Der General ließ erschießen und zog ab', *SZ*, 25 Sept. 1958.

[46] ' "In Ordnung gegangen", sagt Kesselring', *SZ*, 25 Sept. 1958; 'Die letzte Tat des "tollen Tolsdorff" ', *FR*, 30 Sept. 1958; 'Er starb für Eisenärzt', *Die Welt*, 26 Sept. 1958.

Even more telling were the reactions to the verdict. The question of Tolsdorff's responsibility for his actions was taken up by several newspapers. An editorial in the *Frankfurter Rundschau* took the court to task for the way in which it had seen the accused's military record as somehow compensating for his actions, and for its failure to decide whether the 'flag order' had been legally binding. In the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Ernst Müller-Meiningen was as blunt as he had been during the Schörner case, remarking sarcastically, 'if it was alright to proclaim an SS-General Simon not guilty, why should one not give General Tolsdorff at least an amnesty'. For the journalist, it seemed that 'one did not want—for military-psychological reasons, so to say—to hurt a "branch" which is making a comeback: the military. What a weak people, who on 3 May 1945, when the "Tolsdorff Case" occurred, did not want to fight resolutely for "Führer und Vaterland".' He accused the court in Traunstein of having 'made everything just a little too easy for itself', and concluded that Tolsdorff's act remained, 'as it was committed on 3 May 1945, straightforward murder'. This editorial was supported visually by a cartoon drawn by Ernst Maria Lang, entitled 'Pilatus Tolsdorff & Co.'. It showed the general washing his hands in a bowl with the word 'Amnesty' on it, which was being held by a kneeling judge wearing a pious expression.[47]

Following the retrial of Tolsdorff, another major case came to court the following year, this time in Düsseldorf, proving to be just as spectacular as the proceedings against Schörner. Former *General der Panzertruppe* Hasso von Manteuffel[48] was charged with having ordered an execution, again without having followed the correct legal procedures. The trial hit the headlines throughout Western Germany because Manteuffel was not considered to be a 'Nazi general', but rather a model citizen of the new republic. One of the first advocates of rearmament, he had also been active as a spokesman for veterans' organizations. Moreover, he had been elected to the German Parliament in 1953 as a member for the Free Democrats, and

[47] 'Irrtum', *FR*, 1 Oct. 1958; 'Am 3. Mai 1945 ...', *SZ*, 1 Oct. 1958.

[48] For biographical details, see J. v. Schaulen, *Hasso von Manteuffel: Panzerkampf im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Berg am See, 1983); and F. W. von Mellenthin, *German Generals of World War II as I Saw Them* (Norman, Okla., 1977), pp. 239–50.

had played a prominent role in security debates as a member of the parliamentary select committee on defence affairs. But in 1957 it emerged that while commanding the 7th Panzer Division on the Russian Front in January 1944 he had ordered a soldier to be shot, overturning the decision of a court martial which had initially sentenced the soldier to two years' prison for failing to open fire on a Russian patrol. It was once again a case of an illegal execution. Once again the court wrestled with the problem of 'catastrophe orders'. In reaching a verdict of guilty, the jury decided on eighteen months' prison.

Even before the trial had begun, some newspapers expressed reservations, the conservative paper *Das Deutsche Wort* writing: 'The question remains whether one can, fifteen years on, from the security of Düsseldorf in summer, assess how a general should have acted in the January days of 1944 on the Eastern Front—under completely different mental and physical conditions.' In the days following the decision, numerous newspapers passed comment on the verdict. On balance, the majority were critical. The *Rheinische Post*, for example, took issue with the court's view that Manteuffel had a responsibility to inform himself of the exact wording of the 'Führer Order No. 7', commenting sarcastically: 'In defensive battles, menial clerks and lawyers were not in demand.' In describing the verdict as 'harsh', it concluded that 'no war can be judged by the standards of peace'. One journalist from a smaller, regional newspaper argued that Manteuffel's action needed to be interpreted as stemming from his feelings of responsibility for the situation at the front and the need to rescue as many men as possible from the advancing Russians. He could not be viewed as a 'Nazi general', and it was argued: 'Nor was he a general who would later have gone into captivity wearing *Lederhosen*.' This last remark was a reference to Schörner, who had been captured by the Americans wearing Bavarian attire.[49]

The claim that Manteuffel had not been a 'Nazi general' and could not be compared to Schörner indicates that the trial had thrown up a critical question, one which had effectively already been posed by the second Tolsdorff trial. Although the debates on the founding of new

[49] 'Nach 15 Jahren: Manteuffel vor Gericht', *Das Deutsche Wort*, 15 Aug. 1959; 'Gericht über den Krieg', *Rheinische Post*, 22 Aug. 1959; 'Befehl aus Verantwortung', *Westfalen-Zeitung*, 22 Aug. 1959.

armed forces in the period 1950–4 had led to the view that only a minority of *Wehrmacht* generals had been supporters of Hitler and the regime, that they were 'Nazi generals', first the Tolsdorff case and then the proceedings against Manteuffel raised the unpleasant thought that perhaps the views of Schörner on military discipline had actually been held by the majority of *Wehrmacht* generals. Even if this question was not posed openly, it could be found between the lines in many reports, particularly during the Manteuffel trial. Despite all the attempts to defend Manteuffel, the genie was now out of the bottle.

Indeed, there were several newspapers which, given their support of the verdict, seemed to have decided that there was not very much difference between Schörner, Tolsdorff, and Manteuffel. The Frankfurt *Abendpost* argued that in the light of the evidence presented, 'no other judgement was possible' because 'even when here it was "only" a question of a single young person ... in the name of humanity, which even in wartime cannot be allowed to disappear, no acquittal could have been passed'. The *Frankfurter Rundschau* was more aggressive: 'What sort of person takes the judgement of a—certainly not squeamish—court martial ... and turns it with the stroke of a pen into a death sentence!' It went on to pose the rhetorical question as to why Manteuffel had not been shot for failing to hold the town of Shepetovka since he had, after all, sought to justify the death sentence by arguing that it needed to be held at all costs.[50]

There was another element in the critical articles which is of importance—the emotional focus on the victim in the case. The *Frankfurter Rundschau* had noted that no one had remembered the soldier's name: 'The general also does not know the name of the man he had shot. But the general knows the "Führer Order No. 7"—and sleeps well.' The *Süddeutsche Zeitung* picked up on the youth of the soldier who had been executed. In an article entitled 'The General and the Soldier', Ernst Müller-Meiningen dramatically portrayed the scene of the execution. The youth of today were criticized for being too violent, yet this soldier had been shot for not being violent

[50] 'Rot angestrichen: Das Urteil', *Abendpost*, 22/23 Aug. 1959; 'Der General schläft gut', *FR*, 22/23 Aug. 1959.

enough. He stood accused of cowardice in the face of the enemy, yet 'he refused to have a blindfold bound around his eyes, and died with astounding composure ... a young man, a child, barely nineteen years old.' And, accusingly, the journalist demanded: 'What is a coward, Herr General?' The attack on Manteuffel was then extended to all generals.[51]

This new found interest in the victim, first identifiable in the Tolsdorff trial of September 1958, may have helped prepare the way mentally for the remarkable success enjoyed by the anti-war film, *Die Brücke*. Released just two months after the Manteuffel verdict, on 22 October 1959, the film portrayed teenage soldiers—ordered to defend an unimportant bridge, some dying in the process—as young victims of war. What seems significant about this milestone in West German popular culture was that its message had already been confirmed in advance as 'historically accurate' by the Manteuffel trial. Thus, by the end of 1960—with Manteuffel's appeal having been rejected by the Federal Court of Appeal, and the second Tolsdorff retrial completed—a process of transformation in public attitudes towards *Wehrmacht* generals, and arguably towards the *Wehrmacht* itself, had taken place. The Tolsdorff trial of 1954, the Schörner trial, the first Tolsdorff retrial, and the Manteuffel trial did not only reflect changing attitudes, they also helped to form them.

IV. *The 'Generals' Trials' and Attitudes to the* Wehrmacht

It is not, of course, being suggested here that the trials were the sole or necessarily the dominant factor in forming perceptions of the *Wehrmacht*, even in the latter half of the 1950s. But the fact that they interacted with other trials, the depictions of officers in films such as *08/15* and *Die Brücke* and, above all, with the debates on rearmament and military reform, makes plain that at the very least they can offer important insights into the dynamics of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in the Adenauer era. Specifically, when all eight 'generals' trials' are considered together, a number of conclusions can be drawn which have an obvious relevance for the issue of the alleged 'myth' of a 'clean *Wehrmacht*', which supposedly achieved an unassailable position in West German society in the 1950s.

[51] 'Der General schläft gut', *FR*, 22/23 Aug. 1959; 'Der General und der Soldat', *SZ*, 24 Aug. 1959.

The first and most obvious is that the trials highlight the remarkable sea-change in public opinion which took place between September 1954 and February 1955. While the first three trials were barely noticed, the Tolsdorff trial did provoke a surprising degree of media coverage. However, the fact that the reactions to the Tolsdorff trial were decidedly negative shows that public opinion had not yet turned the corner. But the anti-military attitudes which could be identified during the Schörner trial of October 1957, the Tolsdorff trial of 1958, and the Manteuffel trial of 1959, indicate that a fundamental shift in attitude towards the military past took place in the late 1950s. The degree of interest which the later trials provoked—reports appearing not just in the quality press but also in popular daily and evening papers—suggests that they not only confirm how strong the change in attitude was, but also that they contributed to it.

Secondly, in the reorientation of attitudes towards the *Wehrmacht* during the second half of the 1950s, the Schörner, Tolsdorff, and Manteuffel trials played a key role precisely because they took place at a time when the number of convictions for National Socialist crimes had sunk to an all-time low.[52] Until now, it has been assumed that there was not much interest in confronting the past in the second half of the decade because the number of trials sank noticeably during this period. This assumption seems, however, to be based on the notion that a 'productive period' in dealing with the past was dependent on an 'adequate number' of cases reaching the courtroom. As the eight 'generals' trials' illustrate, such an interpretation seems to ignore almost completely the role of public opinion, which was much less responsive to the number of trials and more affected by specific and, arguably, spectacular cases. Moreover, as the Schörner, Tolsdorff, and Manteuffel proceedings took place at this time of low legal activity, they did not have to compete for newspaper column space, allowing them to become major media events. Likewise, the fact that these three cases all took place within a year of each other seems to have produced a form of cumulative effect, the scepticism which Schörner's defence strategy provoked being carried over to the Tolsdorff and Manteuffel trials.

Thirdly, the remarkable impact of the trials which took place from 1954 on can only be fully understood if one takes into account the dif-

[52] 'Vorwort', *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen*, i, p. v.

ferent levels at which they functioned, the way in which they fulfilled different psychological needs, and what they revealed about the *Wehrmacht* and its relationship to National Socialism. At one level they seem to have satisfied the desire of many people to work through their own experience of military justice during the final months of the war. They provided an impetus for citizens to identify with the victim, most notably during the second Tolsdorff trial and the Manteuffel case. At another level, they fulfilled a growing need after 1955 for a serious discussion of the complex issue of military justice during the war. Yet at the same time they also led to a debate on the problems of attempting to deal with the past through the courts, specifically the re-emergence of old wartime hierarchies during the proceedings, with all the implications that these held for the impartiality of the courts.[53] A further dimension was their contribution to exposing what seemed to be the real character of the army's commanders. The remarks made by some generals in unguarded moments during the court proceedings created the impression of a mask dropping for a few seconds, presenting a fleeting and shocking glimpse of the true of face of the *Wehrmacht*, apparently revealing the generals' cynical attitude to human life.

Fourthly, the impact of the later trials lay to a great extent in the unspoken assumption that they were somehow representative. The phrase 'the generals' trials' could be found in newspaper articles.[54] This should not be seen as journalistic exaggeration, but more as an indication of the effect they had had on public perceptions. There was the implication in much of the reporting that the generals on trial stood as representatives of the General Officer Corps as a body. By the end of the Manteuffel and Tolsdorff proceedings, a form of military collective guilt thesis had been established, leading not only to deep suspicion and antipathy towards generals, but also to criticism

[53] Considerable controversy was aroused during the Manteuffel trial when the representative of the public prosecutor, *Oberstaatsanwalt* Lünen, addressed the general by his name and not as 'the accused'. The fact that at the beginning of the trial Lünen had greeted Manteuffel with a handshake, and that he had served under him during the war, led to a parliamentary question in the North-Rhine Westphalian *Landtag*. ('Das letzte Wort des Angeklagten', *Rheinische Post*, 22 Aug. 1959; 'Manteuffel und die Sozialdemokraten', *Die Welt*, 28 Oct. 1959.)

[54] E.g., 'Prozesse und kein Ende', *Die Welt*, 11 June 1960.

of the *Wehrmacht* as an organization. The fact that respected frontline generals were appearing in court led to the feeling that the *Wehrmacht* itself was on trial.

These conclusions are quite startling as they directly contradict some of the central assertions of recent research on *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in the 1950s, namely, that German society showed an inability to come to terms with the past during the 1950s; that a usable and sanitized past was created by pressure groups and old élites; that there was a cult of victimization; and that a myth of a clean *Wehrmacht* achieved a hegemonial position in West German society. If such a dramatic turnaround in public attitudes towards the *Wehrmacht* took place, it is legitimate to ask how historians could have missed it. Furthermore, it should be asked whether there were any additional factors which might explain the transformation in public opinion.

At least two factors could be cited to explain the fact that historians have missed this critical sea-change in public attitudes. To begin with, there has been a tendency to transfer the results of research on the early 1950s directly and uncritically to the second half of the decade.[55] This tendency has been exacerbated by the problem that possibly the key standard work, Norbert Frei's *Vergangenheitspolitik*,[56] covers developments only up to the Amnesty Law of 1954. At the same time, there has been a surprising fixation on 'the state', seemingly viewed as the only real force behind the early attempts to come to terms with the National Socialist past. Such an approach naturally leaves public opinion, not least its unpredictability and irrational oscillations, out of the equation.

However, these strange failures of historical research over the last decade do not in themselves fully explain the remarkable transformation in attitudes towards the *Wehrmacht*. Yet, quite apart from the fact that after May 1945 there had not only been voices defending the *Wehrmacht*, but also consistent condemnation of its commanders in

[55] Two recent, and symptomatic, examples are: Echternkamp, 'Arbeit am Mythos'; and N. Gregor, ' "Is he still alive, or long since dead?": Loss, Absence and Remembrance in Nuremberg, 1945–1956', *German History*, 21 (2003), pp. 183–203.

[56] N. Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit* (Munich, 1996).

the press, it should also be borne in mind that the reaction against generals, which became more strident in February 1955, was able to develop the intensity it did because it could draw on previous prejudices and beliefs from the war. After Stalingrad, a clear 'anti-general' attitude established itself within the German psyche, a direct product of Goebbels's propaganda: the generals had been responsible for Stalingrad and other disasters in the East, not the Führer. The longevity of this notion can be seen in the aggressive reception which former *General der Artillerie* Walter von Seydlitz, one of the leading figures in the Soviet-sponsored National Committee 'Free Germany' movement, received upon his return to the Federal Republic in October 1955.[57] But this reactivated Nazi attitude, although it contributed to the momentum of anti-military feeling, gradually became diluted by a greater willingness to confront the past, made possible in part by the attainment of sovereignty and a sense of distance between the present and the events and experiences of the war.

There is, none the less, an obvious objection which can be made to the argument that the 'generals' trials' provide evidence of a deep change in perceptions of the *Wehrmacht* from the mid-1950s onwards. Given that the trials were all for executions of German soldiers, some would argue that this is simply another example of post-war West German attempts to create a political culture of 'victimization'.[58] However, this objection is unconvincing for several reasons. To begin with, the fact that the courts only prosecuted generals for crimes against their own soldiers was, quite apart from unavoidable political considerations, partly a result of Allied laws, which initially forbade German courts from trying cases involving anything other than crimes committed against Germans and stateless citizens.[59] However, the identification with the victim in the later trials represented a clear departure from earlier attitudes for two reasons: first, to iden-

[57] E.g., 'Schweigen Sie, General von Seydlitz', *Schwäbische Rundschau*, 15 Oct. 1955.

[58] For examples of this interpretation, M. L. Hughes, ' "Through no Fault of our Own": West Germans Remember their War Losses', *German History*, 18 (2000), pp. 193–213, and R. G. Moeller, *War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley, 2001).

[59] The final removal of the restrictions imposed by Allied laws took place at the end of August 1951 (Streim, 'Saubere Wehrmacht?', pp. 572–5).

tify with the victim meant taking sides against a former 'state official'; and second, by unleashing intense emotions, it broke the culture of silence and denial which characterized the early 1950s. The implications of accepting the guilt of the generals were considerable, implying at the very least an admission that the *Wehrmacht* did not have a clean record. Moreover, the efforts to create 'victim identity' were undertaken by those who sought to maintain and perpetuate the value system of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, embodied in many ways by the culture and demands of the *Heimkehrerverband*. But the attempt to perpetuate 'victim status' drew much of its political *raison d'être* from the claim that the Allies were treating the Germans unfairly. With the attainment of sovereignty and the release of the last large group of POWs from the USSR in 1955, two of the main planks supporting the feelings of victimization broke away.

To understand the change in perceptions also requires, beyond an awareness of the change in political and societal climate in 1954–5, one to take note of the intensification of criticism which occurred during the Schörner, Tolsdorff, and Manteuffel trials. Cartoons published in newspapers and journals can provide some important insights into decoding the changing connotations and symbols which the trials provoked. One which provides a useful starting point appeared in *Simplicissimus* in February 1955, illustrating the return of Schörner from Russian captivity. The Field Marshal is depicted walking down an alley of damaged trees, lined with veterans in *Wehrmacht* uniforms. Three figures on crutches are visible, one an amputee. In the foreground is the figure of a woman, obviously a widow. From the trees hang a number of empty nooses. Schörner comments that his military police have obviously slipped up. The geographical location is a specific one: somewhere in Czechoslovakia towards the end of the war, where mass hangings were alleged to have taken place on Schörner's orders. The gaunt faces of the soldiers are striking. The *Volksgemeinschaft* and its victims are looking accusingly at the Field Marshal.[60]

Yet when one compares the *Simplicissimus* cartoon with two by Ernst Maria Lang of 1958, the gallows are still present, but seem to

[60] Front cover, *Simplicissimus*, 12 Feb. 1955, cartoon by H. M. Brockmann entitled 'Ave Schörner...', with the caption: 'Na, Kameraden, da scheint meine Feldgendarmerie zum Schluß ja schön versagt zu haben!'

have taken on new connotations. In the first, dated April 1958, a biting comment on the trial of *Waffen-SS General* Max Simon before the Landgericht Nuremberg-Fürth,[61] the door of the court has blown open, and the spectre of Hitler floats in the centre of the courtroom, proclaiming 'I was German law'. Just outside the door are armed figures from the SS and three sets of empty gallows.[62] Here it can be assumed the gallows are references to the hangings carried out by the SS in the final months of the war. However, in the cartoon of Tolsdorff, published four months later, in which a grinning, burly figure in general's uniform is pictured washing his hands in a bowl marked 'Amnesty', numerous gallows can be seen in the background, which has no obvious geographical association. This time corpses are suspended from them.[63]

The Tolsdorff cartoon raises an interesting question. Given that the case for which he was tried involved an execution by firing squad, is the cartoonist referring to the hangings carried out by the SS in the 'final period' of the war on German soil? Or is it possible, given that he served as a soldier himself on the Eastern Front, that he is making a visual reference to the hangings of 'partisans' in the East, with the underlying suggestion that the *Wehrmacht* was involved? Although here we can only speculate, the latter explanation seems more likely. Certainly, whether intended or not, many would have understood the reference. And although it was a subject still too controversial to be discussed in print in 1958, the cartoon is one indication that it was on people's minds. Likewise, it cannot have been too great a jump in logic to consider that if generals had been willing to shoot their own soldiers without any compunction, they were more than likely to have done the same with enemy personnel or civilians in the occupied countries. This visual reference in 1958 to war crimes committed by Germans shows just how far public perceptions had come since 1955.

[61] 1171 Ks 10/57, verdict, LG Nürnberg-Fürth, 23 April 1958, in *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen*, xiv, pp. 699–727.

[62] Cartoon by E. M. Lang entitled 'Spuk in Nürnberg', *SZ*, 26 April 1958, with the caption: 'Ich war das deutsche Recht.'

[63] Cartoon by E. M. Lang entitled 'Pilatus Tolsdorff & Co.', *SZ*, 1 Oct. 1958, with the caption: '... und sie waschen ihre Hände in Unschuld ... .'

V. *Conclusion*

This survey of eight trials of former *Wehrmacht* generals for executions of soldiers under their command, conducted in West German courts between 1948 and 1960, has attempted to show that remarkable differences can be identified in the reactions to trials which took place before July 1954 and those thereafter up to 1960. In the proceedings against Theodor Tolsdorff, there was a dramatic difference between the press coverage in June 1954 and September 1958, although essentially no new details had come to light since the first trial. It has also been suggested that a shift in societal attitudes towards the *Wehrmacht* had begun even earlier than 1957, a process of transformation occurring between September 1954 and February 1955. Thus the evidence of the trials strongly suggests that the thesis of a 'myth of a clean *Wehrmacht*' cannot be applied to the 1950s as a whole. There are grounds for arguing the case for the period 1950 to mid-1954—although the matter is not quite as clear-cut as some historians seem to think—but for the entire decade the thesis seems wide of the mark.

Some might counter that the involvement of the *Wehrmacht* in the Holocaust in the East was not discussed. This is, of course, correct, but it would be a mistake to ignore the parameters of the time. It should be remembered that in the late 1950s public awareness of the full scale of the Holocaust was still in a formative period. Moreover, the British and Americans only began to start returning the 350 tons of captured *Wehrmacht* documents to the Federal Republic in 1959.[64] What is significant is that out an atmosphere of silence and denial, West German society made remarkable progress from 1955 onwards in its confrontation with the *Wehrmacht*'s past, within the limitations of what was then possible. The fact that this was accomplished in part through trials which focused on relatively minor incidents should not be seen as evidence of a failure to take the past seriously. In the Schörner, Tolsdorff, and Manteuffel trials, a microcosm of the war was put under the spotlight which made the problem of the *Wehrmacht*'s disciplinary system, and hence the effect of National

[64] The return of the documents held by the British was completed in 1965, those held by the Americans in 1970. See H. H. Herwig, 'An Introduction to Military Archives in West Germany', *Military Affairs*, 34 (Dec. 1972), pp. 121–4.

Socialist ideology on the military, intelligible and mentally digestible to the ordinary citizen.

The details which emerged during the later proceedings gave the impression that new aspects in the history of the *Wehrmacht* were being brought to light for the first time. The contrast with the previous idealized image of the *Wehrmacht*, and the shortcomings in the legal proceedings, infused much of the newspaper-reading public with a new found cynicism towards the military. The 'generals' trials', therefore, contributed to a process of de-mythologization of the *Wehrmacht* in the second half of the 1950s. This process, however imperfect it may have been in retrospect, is of considerable importance for any broader understanding of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*. It could be argued that the trials provided German society with the opportunity to deal psychologically with one of the traumatic experiences of the war—summary executions. This was in itself an important psychological step before the Holocaust could be seriously confronted. Only when an individual's own traumas had been dealt with, was it then possible for him or her to confront the crimes of the Nazi regime and the question of the guilt of German society.

In debunking the 'myth of a clean *Wehrmacht*', this article has also sought to draw attention to the gaps in much of the research on *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*. It seems remarkable that one of the central assumptions in this field, namely that coming to terms with the past only really began with the *Ulmer Einsatzgruppenprozeß* of April 1958, has not led to any serious primary research into the reactions to this trial. However, even a relatively cursory look at the evidence makes plain that a change in societal values began during the second half of the 1950s. Despite its limitations, the confrontation with Germany's military past at this time was of fundamental significance. When one considers that during the Leipzig trials of 'war accused' (*Kriegsbeschuldigte*) in the 1920s for offences committed during the Great War the German military judicial system effectively came to the conclusion that the term 'war crimes' could not be applied to anyone who had worn a German uniform,[65] one begins to understand precisely to

[65] Hankel, *Die Leipziger Prozesse*, pp. 91–104. Moreover, Hankel shows that in the proceedings against Field Marshal August von Mackensen and *Generalleutnant a.D.* Karl Stenger, the judges made it clear that they did not take accusations of war crimes against high-ranking commanders seriously (pp. 123–42, 295–300).

what extent the 'generals' trials' in the 1950s represented a major turning point in German military and legal history.

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THE COLLAPSE OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC[*]

by Manfred Görtemaker

The experts had it all wrong. Only months before the collapse of the German Democratic Republic most observers insisted that the question facing Germany was no longer reunification, but rather how two states could come to terms with each other within the framework of East–West stability and European security. For instance, the editor of the German weekly *Die Zeit*, Theo Sommer, noted as late as September 1989: 'We are not an inch closer to reunification than a year ago, or five or ten years ago. ... The issue of German unity is not hotter than ever. On the contrary: it is on one of the back burners of world politics, and there is no fire under the pot.'[1] One leading American expert on Germany, James A. McAdams from Princeton University, even maintained that the GDR had built 'authority after the Wall' and was now potentially more stable than the Federal Republic.[2] And Sommer and McAdams were not alone. Indeed, the collapse of the GDR came as a surprise to almost everyone. The question is: What made it happen so quickly? What made it happen at all?

I will argue here that the sudden reunification of Germany was not the result of carefully crafted policies in Bonn, but rather a by-product of the collapse of Soviet-dominated Communism in Eastern Europe and the genuine uprising of the people of East Germany. I will suggest that the revolution was made possible by the restrained policies of Mikhail Gorbachev and the actions of neighbouring Warsaw Pact states, particularly Hungary, and that the fast-moving East German events of 1989 were not 'Germanic' in nature but similar to those in the other East European countries under Soviet domination at the time. And I will make the case, finally, that if East Germany was steamrollered at all by the weight and power of

*This article is based on a lecture given at the GHIL on 6 May 2003.

[1] *Die Zeit*, 29 Sept. 1989.

[2] A. James McAdams, *East Germany and Détente: Building Authority After the Wall* (Cambridge, 1985).

Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, this happened after, not before the liberation from Communist rule.

I. *The Crisis of the Soviet Empire*

More than fourteen years have elapsed since the dramatic scenes of 1989 when history was daily overtaken by events. Much research has been done to clear the picture and come up with explanations. We have gained access to archives and people. We have been able to interview large numbers of policy-makers and eye-witnesses, and have read their personal accounts. And we have established entire research institutes, such as the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung in Potsdam, which deal almost exclusively with the history of the GDR and its final stages—sometimes with surprising results, for instance, when it is maintained, quite seriously, that the GDR was not a dictatorship, but merely a 'durchherrschte Gesellschaft', a 'thoroughly-governed society', and that in the GDR it was Stalinism that had failed, not socialism.

It is fair to say, however, that before 1989 relatively few, especially in the West, were prepared for the collapse of the GDR, and many in the West as well as in the East were unhappy to see it come. This was particularly true in France where there was almost paranoia about a reunified Germany. But uneasiness was widespread—not least in Britain, where Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher would have preferred not to see German reunification at all, and if there was no option, wanted to bring the process under some form of international control. It seems that only the Americans had genuinely come to accept the Federal Republic of Germany unreservedly as a responsible pillar of the democratic West—although today, after the Iraq war, they may no longer be so sure. Yet as early as March 1990 a senior French official noted that the American position was the result only of the fact that 'the Americans are so bad at history and are so naive [as] to believe [that] a people like the Germans can change'.[3]

In order to understand what happened, however, we must look back at history. The GDR came into being only within the framework of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe that was created after the Second World War. Without Soviet support the GDR would not have

[3] John Edwin Mroz, 'Foreword', in Manfred Görtemaker, *Unifying Germany, 1989–1990* (London, 1994), p. viii.

been founded. Without Soviet backing the GDR could not have survived. Throughout its forty years of existence the SED regime never managed to gain legitimacy among a majority of its citizens. Even Markus Wolf admits in his memoirs that the regime was never fully accepted by more than one-third of its people—and usually by many fewer than that.[4] And Wolf should know. He was the long-time head of the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, the GDR's espionage organization within Erich Mielke's Ministry for State Security. By the time the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, a total of 2.7 million citizens had fled the country and were registered in West German refugee camps, about 14 per cent of the GDR's population in 1949.

This is also why the GDR was different from other East European countries and could not afford liberty and freedom from repression. Poland would remain Poland, and Hungary would remain Hungary, even without the Communist regime. But without Soviet-guaranteed Communism in East Germany, the GDR was almost certain to merge with the prosperous, dominant West and would cease to exist as an independent, or at least semi-independent, state. During the Cold War, Soviet backing was never in question. When tensions relaxed and Willy Brandt embarked upon his 'new *Ostpolitik*' at the end of the 1960s, however, the GDR faced the dilemma of weighing up its desire for international recognition and co-operation against the danger of allowing the West to undermine its internal cohesion via the so-called 'exchange of people, information and ideas'.[5] Thus the policy of *détente*, not the previously dangerous East–West conflict, posed the first serious threat to the existence of the GDR.

In this respect it was anything but a coincidence that on the day before the state secretaries Egon Bahr of the West German Chancellery and Michael Kohl of the GDR Council of Ministers initialled the Basic Treaty between the Federal Republic and the GDR on 8 November 1972, the SED Politburo passed a resolution on new principles for agitation and propaganda. Ten days later, on 16–17 November, a major 'agitation conference' was held, with Politburo

[4] For Wolf's views towards the GDR, as seen from his perspective in 1989–90, see Markus Wolf, *In eigenem Auftrag: Bekenntnisse und Einsichten* (Munich, 1991).

[5] For details see Joachim Nawrocki, *Relations Between the Two States in Germany: Trends, Prospects and Limitations* (Stuttgart, 1985).

member Werner Lambertz declaring there was 'no truce at the ideological front but intensified fighting', and that 'peaceful co-existence is not ideological co-existence'.[6] Not surprisingly, the internal state security apparatus, known as the Stasi, was also stepped up. Only now, during the period of *détente*, did the Stasi become an instrument for state-wide control of the GDR people. The budget of the Ministry for State Security, which had amounted to 5.8 billion marks in 1968, increased by 400 per cent to 22.4 billion in 1989. The number of full-time employees rose from 32,900 in 1967 to 81,500 in 1982. The network of Unofficial Informers nearly doubled within the first five years of *détente* alone, from about 100,000 in 1969 to 180,000 in 1975.[7]

From a Western point of view, East German attempts to contain the unwanted by-products of *détente* by a policy of demarcation constituted a violation of the spirit of co-operation. For the West, the increase in personal contacts and the 'special nature' of inner-German relations was a major asset, not a flaw, of the *détente* process. Willy Brandt in particular made great efforts to defend his policy as a means of bridging, rather than widening or deepening, the gap between East and West.[8] Although this was not understood, or was intentionally misinterpreted by many opponents of the 'new *Ostpolitik*' during the ratification debate in the spring of 1972, the establishment of semi-diplomatic relations and the intensification of political, economic, and human contacts with the GDR did not imply a farewell to the idea of German unity and eventual reunification. Instead, it re-opened new possibilities for 'change through *rapprochement*', as Egon Bahr had stated in July 1963 at the Protestant Academy in Tutzing, underlining the policy's dynamic rather than static aspects.[9] The same view was expressed by another architect of

[6] See Manfred Rexin, 'Koexistenz auf deutsch: Aspekte der deutsch-deutschen Beziehungen 1970–1987', in Gert-Joachim Glaessner (ed.), *Die DDR in der Ära Honecker: Politik-Kultur-Gesellschaft* (Opladen, 1988), p. 47.

[7] Jens Gieseke, 'Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (1950–1990)', in Torsten Diedrich, Hans Ehlert, and Rüdiger Wenzel (eds.), *Im Dienste der Partei: Handbuch der bewaffneten Organe der DDR* (Berlin, 1998), pp. 372 ff.

[8] See, e.g., Willy Brandt, *A Peace Policy for Europe* (New York, 1969).

[9] Egon Bahr, 'Wandel durch Annäherung: Ein Diskussionsbeitrag in Tutzing, 15. Juli 1963', in Karsten Schröder, *Egon Bahr: Mit einem Beitrag von Günter Grass* (Rastatt, 1988), pp. 325–30.

the 'new *Ostpolitik*', Peter Bender, who called for 'offensive *détente*' in the title of a book published in 1964.[10]

The question now was whether the dynamic forces of the policy would prevail, leading to a democratic revolution in the GDR and some form of reunification, or whether the East German leadership would be able to contain the unwelcome destabilizing effects of *détente* and transform it into a vehicle for international recognition and domestic prosperity and acceptance. The development of *Ostpolitik*, *détente*, and inner-German relations during the 1970s and 1980s would provide an answer to these questions.

In the early 1970s, the GDR leadership seemed confident that the potentially dangerous implications of accepting the terms of West German *Ostpolitik* could be kept under control. The Soviet government under General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev provided unwavering support, and the benefits of international recognition and economic co-operation with the West were too important to be rejected. Yet there were early signs of increasing social instability toward the end of the decade and in the early 1980s, and they found expression in a number of forms: the expulsion of GDR citizens, notably intellectuals and artists; the formation of grassroots opposition, beginning with the peace movement *Schwerter zu Pflugscharen* (swords into ploughshares) and environmental groups, later focusing around the East German Protestant Church; and the growing number of people asking for exit visas, soon amounting to hundreds of thousands. The SED's enforced expatriation of the satirical balladeer Wolf Biermann in November 1976 set a dangerous precedent. It ended the cultural *Tauwetter* (thaw) of the first half of the decade, during which many intellectuals had hoped for *détente* in both the external relations of the GDR as well as within East Germany itself. But with Biermann's expatriation, the disappointed members of the GDR's cultural élite became more critical of the SED regime. Subsequently, many were themselves expelled and forced to follow Biermann on his voyage to the West.[11]

[10] Peter Bender, *Offensive Entspannung: Möglichkeit für Deutschland* (Cologne, 1964).

[11] Manfred Jäger, 'Das Ende einer Kulturpolitik: Die Fälle Kunze und Biermann', *Deutschland-Archiv*, 9 (1976), pp. 1233–9. See also Klaus Kleinschmidt, 'Das große Schweigen: Zur kulturpolitischen Situation in der DDR nach dem Ausschluß von neun Schriftstellern', *Deutschland-Archiv*, 12 (1979), pp. 899–905.

Others set a precedent of a different kind. On 20 January 1984 six GDR citizens entered the US Embassy in East Berlin, refused to leave and, in a letter to President Reagan, asked for political asylum and protection against the organs of GDR security. After two days of intense negotiations between East German lawyer and Honecker confidant Wolfgang Vogel and representatives of the embassy and the Bonn government, the refugees were allowed to resettle in the Federal Republic. It was only the beginning of a series of attempts by East German citizens to force their way out of the GDR via diplomatic missions. The most prominent example was Ingrid Berg, a niece of GDR Minister President Willi Stoph, who, on 24 February 1984, fled to the West German Embassy in Prague, where fourteen other East Germans had already asked for asylum. In October of the same year the embassy had to be temporarily closed when more than 100 GDR citizens sought refuge there. Similar incidents were reported from Bucharest, Budapest, and Warsaw.[12]

One reason why so many East Germans were desperately trying to leave the GDR was that they had lost all hope of reform in the foreseeable future. According to a survey conducted by the Munich-based communications research institute Infratest and the University of Wuppertal among 2,000 emigrants (*Aussiedler*) from the GDR, the reasons why they had left East Germany were 'a lack of freedom of opinion', 'political repression', or 'limited opportunities to travel'. Economic motives had apparently played only a minor role, although the decision to emigrate was generally the result of several factors.[13]

The frustration of the East German population at the absence of reform in the GDR was increased by examples of change in Poland, Hungary, and even in the Soviet Union itself. The failure of the SED leadership to implement similar reforms contributed significantly to the loss of hope among GDR citizens that finally provided the basis for the East German revolution of 1989. Developments in Poland in particular had a potentially destabilizing effect on the GDR as early as the summer of 1980, when worker unrest escalated in the ship-

[12] See Ernst Martin, *Zwischenbilanz: Deutschlandpolitik der 80er Jahre* (Stuttgart, 1986), pp. 55–7.
[13] Ibid., p. 98.

yards of Gdansk and Gdynia and the Solidarity movement presented a dangerous challenge to the established Communist Party rule.[14] The disturbances in neighbouring Poland shattered the confidence of the GDR leadership and caused many SED functionaries to wonder, for the first time, whether the sense of internal calm that had been imposed on the country during the 1970s could be maintained. Nationwide protest strikes and the organization of independent labour unions by East German workers seemed unlikely but not impossible, although most GDR citizens openly preferred their relative economic security to Polish chaos, Hungarian confusion, and Soviet sloppiness. Yet the leadership in East Berlin took no chances. On 30 October 1980 the SED Politburo decided to end visa-free traffic between the GDR and Poland and to impose strict conditions on travel between the two states. Demarcation to the West was now complemented by delimitation to the East. Within the GDR, Minister of State Security Erich Mielke publicly vowed to increase the activity of security agencies throughout the country. This was necessary, he argued, to combat the 'inhuman and anti-socialist plans and machinations' of the forces of counter-revolution.[15]

But unrest nevertheless spread, and the spillover of Polish reforms into other Eastern European countries became obvious when in Hungary a heated debate began about János Kádár's 'Goulash Communism' and the country's fundamental economic and political goals,[16] and similar discussions started in Czechoslovakia, scene of the Prague Spring of 1968, as well. The GDR's real problems began, however, and the situation changed drastically, when Mikhail Gorbachev became the new General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 10 March 1985. Despite various changes in tactics and political emphasis under Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko, the USSR had been a bastion of Leninist orthodoxy. For the Communist leadership of the GDR, continuity in the nature of Soviet government had meant above all stability. The

[14] Andrzej Fils, 'Crisis and Political Ritual in Postwar Poland', *Problems of Communism*, 37 (May–Aug. 1988), pp. 43–54. See also Jerzy Holzer, '*Solidarität': Die Geschichte einer freien Gewerkschaft in Polen* (Munich, 1985).

[15] *Neues Deutschland*, 17 Oct. 1980.

[16] Rudolf L. Tökés, 'Hungarian Reform Imperatives', *Problems of Communism*, 33 (Sept.–Oct. 1984), pp. 6–8.

conservative Kremlin, afraid of revolutionary change and democratic upheaval, had guaranteed the power of the SED as the ruling force in East Germany through the sheer presence of Soviet troops as well as by the application of psychological pressure and physical force. The 380,000 Soviet troops stationed in East Germany had been directed as much at keeping the SED in power as at providing external security for the Warsaw Pact. As long as Soviet behaviour did not put in doubt the disciplinary function of the Red Army presence—this constantly implied the readiness, if considered necessary, to use force in order to crack down on opposition, as had been the case in the GDR in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968—neither the stability of the GDR nor the existence of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe were seriously at risk.

All of this changed when Gorbachev assumed power, though not overnight. The new Soviet leader did not possess a master plan for reform beyond the catchwords *glasnost* and *perestroika*. His approach was gradually to develop a concept for the transformation of Soviet policy, economy, and society in an ongoing process dependent on challenges that called for improvised action. This was also true with regard to Soviet–East European relations. While Gorbachev seemed to have a general idea—that is, a vision—about urgently needed economic modernization and political reform in the Soviet Union as well as a general readiness to return to *détente* and arms control with the West, his early policies toward the countries of Eastern Europe remained contradictory. Professions of diversity alternated with demands for unity. Yet Gorbachev did little to discourage open debates about political and economic changes. In fact, by refraining from the application of traditional Soviet pressure, he actually encouraged such debates.[17]

In the GDR, Erich Honecker embraced Gorbachev's efforts for a renewal of East–West *détente* but said there was no need for greater openness or economic reform in the GDR.[18] Unlike their East Euro-

[17] See Michail Gorbatschow, *Perestroika: Die zweite russische Revolution. Eine neue Politik für Europa und die Welt* (Munich, 1987), pp. 73–8; Tom G. Palmer, 'Why Socialism Collapsed in Eastern Europe', *Cato Policy Report*, 12/5 (Sept.–Oct. 1990), pp. 6–13.

[18] A. James McAdams, 'The New Logic in Soviet–GDR Relations', *Problems of Communism*, 37 (Sept.–Oct. 1988), p. 51. Honecker later admitted that Gorbachev's new policy came as a great surprise to the East German

pean counterparts, Honecker and the SED leadership reaffirmed their own 'correct course', past and present, and apparently felt no need for reform at all. Honecker insisted that the GDR should not be forced to adopt the Soviet model, but should be allowed to develop socialism 'in the colours of the GDR'. SED Politburo member Kurt Hager, the party's chief ideologist, even stated in an interview with the West German magazine *Der Stern* on 9 April 1987 that 'a policy of imposing the Soviet system on Germany would be wrong, such a policy does not correspond to the current conditions in Germany'. And referring to Gorbachev's vision of a 'Common European Home', Hager added, somewhat sarcastically: 'If your neighbour chooses to re-wallpaper the walls of his house, would you feel obliged to do the same?'[19]

Thus the GDR's self-isolation progressed. After demarcation against the West in the 1970s and delimitation against Poland in 1980, the SED now even isolated itself from the Soviet Union. Yet the growing autism of the leadership contrasted sharply with political developments among the population of the GDR, especially the young people, for whom Gorbachev was not a threat but a symbol of hope. The SED's loss of contact with its own domestic sphere as well as with the surrounding world—including the Soviet Union—was therefore soon to become a major factor in its demise, as an increasing number of East Germans began to ask what hope was left.

The impact of the 'reformist encirclement' of the GDR by the ever increasing moves toward greater democracy and pluralism in Eastern Europe can hardly be overstated. Encouraged by Gorbachev's own attempts at internal reform, the countries there were free to move in entirely new directions when Gorbachev's repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, during his visit to Prague in April 1987, liberated them from the fear of Soviet intervention. Unlike Leonid Brezhnev in 1968, who had crushed the Prague uprising by military force, Gorbachev accepted the idea of diversity and declared: 'We are far from calling on anyone to copy us. Every socialist country has its specific features, and the fraternal parties determine their political line with a view to the national conditions. ... No one has the right to

Communists. See Reinhold Andert and Wolfgang Herzberg, *Der Sturz: Erich Honecker im Kreuzverhör* (Berlin, 1990), p. 61.

[19] Interview with Kurt Hager in *Der Stern*, 9 Apr. 1987. Reprinted in *Neues Deutschland*, 10 Apr. 1987.

claim a special status in the socialist world. The independence of every party, its responsibility to its people, and its right to resolve problems of the country's development in a sovereign way – these are indisputable principles for us.'[20] Renewed confrontation between striking steel mill and shipyard workers and the regime of General Jaruzelski in Poland in April and May 1988, and the ousting of János Kádár in Hungary on 9 May 1988, soon indicated that Gorbachev's friendly words had been well received. His Prague statement amounted to a radicalization of the reform process. By the end of 1988, it remained to be seen just how long the GDR would be able to remain an island of tranquil orthodoxy in a turbulent sea of shifting political, economic, and ideological structures.

II. *The Implosion of the GDR*

By early 1989, the GDR leadership's nervousness about Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost* and *perestroika* and the reform attempts in Eastern Europe was compounded by the problem of growing unrest in East Germany itself. There had been the potential for unrest ever since the beginning of the 'new *Ostpolitik*', which had opened the floodgates for Western ideas and ideals, but for more than a decade the SED regime had proven itself capable of diluting their impact on GDR society through its policy of demarcation, social pacification, and tight security control. When the situation exploded, or rather imploded, in 1989, however, the sudden outburst of dissatisfaction demonstrated with a vengeance that the stability had been no more than superficial, and that the substance of GDR society had long undergone dramatic changes which had been overlooked by Western experts and Eastern politicians alike. The gap between idealistic expectations and the reality of Communist practices became apparent.

Personal and cultural leeway had always been limited; periods of liberalization had usually been brief—if they had occurred at all. Yet the Biermann case now turned out to be a watershed. Those who protested against his expatriation or demonstrated against the lack of intellectual freedom in the GDR and were not expelled, such as Pastor Rainer Eppelmann, began quietly to organize meetings and discussion groups that eventually developed into dissident organizations, such as Neues Forum, founded by, among others, Bärbel

[20] *Pravda*, 11 Apr. 1987.

Bohley, a well-known painter and sculptor, in September 1989. Apart from the rather spectacular and highly visible protests and demonstrations by the peace movement, environmental groups, and articulate intellectuals, however, there were at least two other manifestations of dissent within GDR society which, in 1989, dealt a fatal blow to the SED regime: the issue of *Übersiedler* (resettlers) and the growing flow of refugees, and the intensifying mass demonstrations in an increasing number of East German cities.

The refugee problem had already been an issue for some time. But on 2 May 1989, when the new Hungarian government decided to open its border with Austria, events got out of control. When the SED Politburo met two days later, on 4 May, for a regular meeting and Defence Minister Heinz Kessler passed on 'solid information' he had received from his military attaché in Budapest that the Hungarian government was reducing installations but that border checks would continue, the Politburo members felt relieved and continued their session with a scheduled discussion about the outlook for the potash industry in the GDR.[21] Günter Schabowski, a member of both the SED Central Committee and the Politburo, was present at the meeting on 4 May and later recalled that he had immediately had a hunch about the 'explosive force' that the Hungarian dismantling of the Iron Curtain might have for the GDR. But he, like the other members of the Politburo, had preferred to ignore his forebodings, since General Kessler's spirited explanation had provided a comfortable 'alibi'.[22]

Yet by the spring of 1989, 120,000 East Germans had filed exit applications, and the opening of the Iron Curtain by Hungary on 2 May immediately encouraged others to do the same or, even worse in the view of the GDR government, to go straight to the Federal Republic via Hungary and Austria. On 19 August some 660 GDR citizens used the Pan-European Union's 'picnic' near Sopron on the border between Hungary and Austria for a spectacular escape to the West, while the Hungarian border guards carefully looked the other way and did not intervene.[23] In the SED Politburo, Günter Mittag

[21] Cordt Schnibben, ' "Ich bin das Volk": Wie Erich Honecker und sein Politbüro die Konterrevolution erlebten', *Der Spiegel*, 16 Apr. 1990, p. 73.

[22] Günter Schabowski, *Der Absturz* (Berlin, 1991), p. 221.

[23] It was no coincidence that on 24 August the Hungarian government also agreed to the departure of the 100 GDR refugees in the West German embassy in Budapest. See *Europa-Archiv*, 44 (1989), p. Z165.

accused the Hungarians of 'treachery to socialism'. A GDR deputy foreign minister, sent to Budapest as an SED representative 'to slow things down', returned empty-handed. The Hungarians no longer had control, and they apparently had no intention of regaining it. The *démarche* in Budapest only confirmed the worst. The emissary reported that Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyüla Horn was the 'driving force behind developments', while the military continued to be 'loyal to the expectations of the GDR', but was no longer united.[24]

Honecker therefore ordered Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer to sound out Moscow to find out whether a Warsaw Pact meeting could be arranged to discipline the Hungarians. But Gorbachev declined. The time had passed when a departure from the general line could be corrected by majority pressure. The GDR was alone. Within one month, the number of East Germans who crossed from Hungary to Austria on their way to the Federal Republic climbed to more than 25,000. On 10 October the Ministry for Intra-German Relations in Bonn reported that during the first nine months of 1989 a total of 110,000 East Germans had resettled in the Federal Republic with or without the consent of the GDR authorities. Some 32,500 GDR residents had registered in West German reception centres in September alone.[25]

The opening of the Hungarian–Austrian border contributed decisively to the swelling of the exodus. But the Hungary-to-Austria escape route was not the only one. Thousands of GDR residents who had managed to get to Poland or Czechoslovakia sought refuge in West German embassies in Warsaw and Prague, refusing to leave until the GDR granted them permission to resettle in the Federal Republic, thus further increasing the pressure on the GDR government to implement urgently needed reforms, in fact, to change the nature of the East German system. Even West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher called for such reforms when he stated, in a speech at the United Nations on 27 September 1989: 'The GDR can, under its own conditions, contribute through reforms toward greater openness in Europe, just as the Soviet Union, Poland and Hungary are already doing. Deeply moved, we witness the fate

[24] Schabowski, *Der Absturz*, p. 222; Schnibben, 'Ich bin das Volk', pp. 87–90.
[25] *The Week in Germany* (Press Bulletin), 6 Oct. 1989, p. 1.

of young people who are sorrowfully leaving their homes and their familiar surroundings. Nobody can want that. A policy of reform would open up new prospects in the GDR as in other Central and Eastern European countries. This will encourage the people to stay.'[26]

Yet the exodus of GDR citizens to the West was just one catalyst of change. Public demonstrations against the regime were at least as powerful as the refugee movement in signalling an ever-growing opposition to the SED regime. Such demonstrations had been held regularly on the seventh day of every month since June, drawing attention to the manipulation of local elections on 7 May. In addition, weekly 'Monday demonstrations' began in Leipzig on Monday, 4 September, after some 1,200 people gathered to pray for peace in the Nikolai Church and attempted to march to Market Square in the city centre, chanting demands for freedom of travel and the right of assembly. By early October, the Monday demonstrations had become an established tradition and the focus of opposition in the GDR. The number of participants had grown to about 5,000 on 25 September and as many as 20,000 on 2 October.

Encouraged by the success of the demonstrations and the lack of government response, a number of political organizations were formed: on 26 August the *SPD in the GDR*; on 10 September *New Forum*; on 12 September *Democracy Now*; and on 14 September *Democratic Awakening*.[27] The SED leadership now faced both a refugee problem and an increasingly powerful internal opposition fuelled by mass demonstrations and organized political groupings. The celebration of the GDR's fortieth anniversary on 7 October only underlined the need for substantial change when Gorbachev, who had been invited to attend the festivities, used the opportunity to declare at a meeting with the SED Politburo at Niederschönhausen Castle that time was running out and that 'We have only one choice:

[26] Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 'Speech at the 44th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations', New York, 27 Sept. 1989, in *Statements and Speeches*, 12/20, p. 2. Genscher felt, however, that by refusing reforms the GDR was 'destabilizing and isolating itself', which in effect could lead to a 'de-Europeanization' of its policy: 'If the reform policy surrounding the GDR increasingly expands and spreads, a refusal to reform contains within itself the danger of such a de-Europeanization.' See *Der Spiegel*, 25 Sept. 1989.

[27] Details in *Neue Chronik DDR*, vol. 1, pp. 18–40.

to go forward resolutely.' According to the verbatim protocol, Gorbachev famously stated:

> I think it to be very important not to miss the right time and not to waste an opportunity. ... If we stay behind, life will punish us. ... This is the stage of important decisions. They must be far-reaching decisions, they must be well thought through in order to bear rich fruit. Our experiences and the experiences of Poland and Hungary have convinced us: If the [Communist] party does not respond to life, it will be condemned. We have only one choice: to go forward resolutely; otherwise we shall be beaten by life itself.[28]

For the GDR, it was, in fact, already too late. The resignation of Erich Honecker as General Secretary of the SED on 16 October and his replacement by Egon Krenz did little to ease the tension. The refugee movement and the mass demonstrations continued. On 6 November 500,000 people gathered in Leipzig, 60,000 in Halle, 50,000 in Karl-Marx-Stadt (Dresden), 10,000 in Cottbus, and 25,000 in Schwerin. The following day the entire government of the GDR stepped down, and on 8 November the Politburo also resigned as a group and was replaced by a new leadership that consisted basically of the anti-Honecker elements of the former regime, among them Egon Krenz, Hans Modrow, and Günter Schabowski. Modrow was eventually nominated as the GDR's new Prime Minister.

Within this framework, the opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November, however dramatic and symbolic, constituted no more than one of many steps in the decline and eventual collapse of the GDR.[29] Even the prospect of German reunification, greeted with scenes of joy and exuberance on top of the Wall in front of the Brandenburg Gate, had already been a strong possibility since the

[28] Stenographische Niederschrift des Treffens der Genossen des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees der SED mit dem Generalsekretär des ZK der KPdSU und Vorsitzenden des Obersten Sowjets der UdSSR, Genossen Michail Sergejewitsch Gorbatschow, am Sonnabend, dem 7. Oktober 1989 in Berlin-Niederschönhausen (Verbatim Protocol), 7 Oct. 1989, pp. 9 and 12–13.

[29] For a first-hand account see Egon Krenz (with Hartmut König and Gunter Rettner), *Wenn Mauern fallen: Die Friedliche Revolution – Vorgeschichte, Ablauf, Auswirkungen* (Vienna, 1990).

fundamental changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had begun—even if most observers had not noticed it at the time. Now, after the lifting of the Iron Curtain, however, the world realized that a revolution was in the making and that a new national awareness of the German people was about to be expressed, even if a united Germany still remained a distant prospect. Unification had not been a principle demand of the millions whose demonstrations had forced the SED to its knees, and the process of disentangling the two Germanys from a web of separate alliances and economic systems was going to be a staggering task that could not be completed without great determination, effort, and time.

Yet former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pointed to an already visible future, when, in a *Newsweek* article on 4 December, he cited the nineteenth-century Austrian foreign minister Count Metternich, who once had written: 'Policy is like a play in many acts which unfolds inexorably once the curtain is raised. To declare then that the performance will not go on is an absurdity. The play will be completed either by the actors or by the spectators who mount the stage.'[30] And Kissinger was right. After the structures of the Cold War had been weakened by *détente* and were finally abandoned by the leaders of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself, the GDR had little chance of survival. Hans Modrow was among the first to realize how bad the situation was, particularly in economic terms. In January 1990, he advanced the date for general elections from May to March, arguing that the GDR might no longer exist in May. On 1 February he presented a plan for a German–German confederation, entitled 'For Germany, United Fatherland'.[31] And a few days later, on 6 February, he urged the Federal government in Bonn to come up with a quick solution for a currency union between the two German states, knowing that if the D-Mark did not come to the East Germans, the East Germans would go to the D-Mark.

[30] Henry A. Kissinger, 'Living With the Inevitable', *Newsweek*, 4 Dec. 1989, p. 51.

[31] Statement by the GDR Prime Minister at a press conference on 1 Feb. 1990, to explain his concept of 'Für Deutschland, einig Vaterland', in Hans Modrow, *Aufbruch und Ende* (Hamburg, 1991), Annex 5, pp. 184–5. Modrow admitted in his memoirs that in late January 1990 the need 'to combine the stabilization of the GDR with the gradual unification of the two German states' had become clear to him. Ibid., p. 119.

The astonishing proposals of the East German head of government, put forward within a matter of two weeks, made it clear beyond any doubt that the GDR was no longer able to move on. The SED regime had been able to survive only under the laboratory conditions of the Soviet empire. Now, encircled by reformist states all over Eastern Europe, suffering from open borderlines that allowed East Germans to travel freely, and confronted with Mikhail Gorbachev in the Kremlin, the Communist regime in the GDR no longer had a future. It could not cope with the realities of freedom. It could only surrender and allow its people to unite with the Federal Republic, as most East Germans had wished to do ever since 1945.

III. *The Role of the Federal Republic*

Until late November 1989, the West German government had been extremely careful not to exploit the delicate situation that had developed in the East. In his annual State of the Nation address on 8 November, one day before the Wall was opened, Chancellor Kohl had still declared that the Federal Republic was prepared to support reforms implemented by the new GDR leadership. He called on the GDR's ruling Communist regime to abandon its monopoly on power, permit independent parties, and give binding assurances of free elections. Bonn was willing, Kohl said, to discuss 'a new dimension of economic assistance' to the GDR if the economic system was fundamentally reformed, bureaucratic economic planning was removed, and a free market system was developed.[32]

Even after the opening of the Wall, in another speech to the *Bundestag* on 16 November, Kohl remained reluctant. Instead of indulging in euphoria about the possibilities of German reunification, he only stated the facts of recent inner-German developments in a sober and concise analysis and confirmed that the Federal Republic would 'of course respect any decision that the people in the GDR come to in free self-determination'.[33] All members of the parliament, including the Greens, applauded. A few hours later, however, offi-

[32] Helmut Kohl, 'Policy Declaration on the State of the Nation in a Divided Germany', 8 Nov. 1989, *Bulletin*, 123 (1989), pp. 1,058–9.

[33] 'Erklärung der Bundesregierung zum offiziellen Besuch des Bundeskanzlers in Polen und zur Lage in der DDR.' Statement by Chancellor Kohl to the Bundestag, 16 Nov. 1989, *Bulletin*, 129 (1989), p. 1,108.

cials in Bonn were told by US ambassador Vernon A. Walters: 'I believe in reunification. Whoever speaks out against it, will be swept away politically.'[34] The following day, the government in Bonn received the text of a speech which Gorbachev had made to students in Moscow on 15 November, which also referred to 'reunification'. And, finally, on 21 November, Nikolai Portugalov, a Soviet specialist on Germany, turned up in the Chancellery in Bonn. He presented a hand-written note, hastily translated into German, in which the Soviet government raised specific questions regarding co-operation between the two German states, particularly about reunification, the GDR's accession to the European Community, membership in alliances, and the possibility of a peace treaty. 'As you can see', Portugalov added in a conversation with Horst Teltschik, the Chancellor's foreign policy adviser, 'we are pondering over everything in the German question alternately, even ... the unthinkable.'[35]

Teltschik, naturally, was electrified, as was the West German government. Apparently the Soviet leadership's thoughts on German reunification had proceeded much further than had hitherto been assumed in Bonn—even further than the Federal government had allowed itself to think. Teltschik's responses to the Soviet questions therefore had to be kept evasive and circumspect. But, of course, he immediately informed the Chancellor and arranged for a meeting, which took place in the Chancellery on the night of 23 November. Here Kohl and his advisers decided to develop a concept for the unification process, the famous Ten-Point Plan, which was incorporated in a speech that Kohl would deliver to the Bundestag on 28 November—not in a dramatic new State of the Nation address, but within the scheduled debate on the budget.

Kohl's proposal for a German confederation amounted to a major earthquake. This was, after all, the first time since the 1960s that a German Chancellor was talking in public about the possibility of reunification, saying that 'Reunification, the re-attainment of German

[34] Horst Teltschik, *329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung* (Berlin, 1991), pp. 32–3.

[35] Ibid., p. 43–4. As early as at a meeting with Gorbachev in Moscow on 1 Nov. 1989, Egon Krenz had realized that the Soviet leader 'even then did not attach eternal value to the status quo of the German question'. Krenz, *Wenn Mauern fallen*, p. 150.

state unity,' remained 'the political goal of the Federal government.'[36] With respect to the external aspects of his programme, Kohl added:

> The future of Germany must fit into the future architecture of Europe as a whole. The West has to provide peace-making aid here with its concept for a permanent and just European order of peace. ... The European Community is now required to approach the reform-orientated states in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe with openness and flexibility. ... This of course includes the GDR. The Federal government therefore approves the quick conclusion of a trade and co-operation agreement with the GDR. This would expand and secure the GDR's entry to the Common Market, including the perspectives of 1992.[37]

Not surprisingly, the Chancellor continued to be cautious, trying to avoid anything that could further unsettle the already shaky political balance at the centre of Europe. His concept envisaged only long-term changes and aimed to create a European framework for any steps taken toward German unification. But when he visited the GDR three weeks later and faced the crowds in the ruins of the Frauenkirche in Dresden on 19 December, he quickly realized that the East Germans wanted not long-term, but immediate change, that time was running out quickly, and that nothing short of German reunification would satisfy the demands of the East German people. In fact, the participants in the regular Monday demonstrations had already changed their slogan from 'We are the people' to 'We are one nation' in early December. Kohl himself, who was also affected by the emotions in Dresden, therefore concluded his speech by proclaiming: 'God bless our German fatherland.'[38]

Subsequently, Prime Minister Modrow's proposal 'For Germany, United Fatherland' and his plea for a currency union were welcomed

[36] Zehn-Punkte-Programm zur Überwindung der Teilung Deutschlands und Europas, vorgelegt von Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl in der Haushaltsdebatte des Deutschen Bundestages, 28 Nov. 1989, *Europa-Archiv*, 44 (1989), pp. D732–3.

[37] Ibid., p. D733.

[38] Speech by Chancellor Kohl at the Frauenkirche in Dresden, 19 Dec. 1989, *Bulletin*, 150 (1989), p. 1,262.

by the Bonn government as steps in the right direction. Yet Chancellor Kohl was no longer prepared to respect a government that had not been elected freely by the East German people and decided to wait for the outcome of the elections on 18 March 1990 before continuing to do business with the GDR. And he was certainly pleased when the East German CDU under Lothar de Maizière, with 48.1 per cent of the vote, scored a land-slide victory over the SPD, which received only 21.8 per cent, and the citizen's movements with a disappointing 2.9 per cent.[39]

In reality, of course, it was a victory for Kohl. Early in the campaign, the SPD had taken a commanding lead. A public opinion poll in the first week of February found that if elections were held then, the SPD would win 54 per cent, the PDS (the former Communists) 12 per cent, and the CDU no more than 11 per cent. Then Chancellor Kohl stepped in on 6 February, one day after his government had declared that it had created a cabinet-level Committee on Unity to chart the way toward a single Germany, and one day before Finance Minister Theo Waigel and Economic Minister Helmut Haussmann, as well as the president of the German *Bundesbank*, Otto Pöhl, agreed at a cabinet meeting on 7 February that the Federal Republic should 'immediately' enter into talks with the GDR on the creation of a currency union between the two German states and concurrent economic reform. West German SPD leader Hans-Jochen Vogel quickly realized that this meant an East German race towards 'good money' and even political unification, both of which now seemed to be associated with the East German CDU, backed by the Federal government and Chancellor Kohl. In a debate in the Bundestag on 15 February, Vogel, who like his party colleague Oskar Lafontaine was opposed to a rush toward unification, therefore attacked Kohl's proposed strategy for immediate progress toward monetary union, stating that 'what is at stake here is not the absorption of East Germany or a territory without government'—intimating that this was Kohl's goal.

[39] In the 18 March elections the East German CDU formed the *Alliance for Germany* with the conservative citizens' movement *Democratic Awakening*. But it was obvious from the start that the CDU, backed by its West German sister party and Chancellor Kohl, was the dominant factor in the alliance.

'What we face here,' Vogel declared, 'is uniting with a people that has won its freedom by itself.'[40]

Kohl, on the other hand, gambled on his promise to bring help—after the elections. At his first campaign appearance in the GDR on 20 February, the chancellor listed the aid Bonn had provided for East Germany so far. Speaking to more than 100,000 people in the square in front of the Gothic cathedral of Erfurt, a city of only 220,000 inhabitants, Kohl said that he was not willing to invest several billions more unless it could be guaranteed that this money would reach the people. But, the chancellor continued, thousands of West German business leaders stood poised to bring investment and jobs to East Germany, and once conditions were right they would 'build up a booming country in the shortest of times'. The masses cheered in a sea of West German flags, and when a few hundred leftist demonstrators broke into raucous taunts, throaty chants of 'Reds out! Reds out!' drowned them out.[41]

This picture was repeated several times before 13–14 March, when Kohl made his last two appearances at campaign rallies. He addressed crowds of 100,000 in Cottbus and 300,000 in Leipzig, promising not only additional help in general but, without the prior consent of his cabinet, to convert the savings accounts of small savers at the favourable exchange rate of 1:1 for the East German mark after the currency union took effect on 1 July 1990. Thus Kohl gave the East Germans the impression that his government and his party, unlike the opposition Social Democrats, would live up to their decades-long promises of solidarity with their fellow countrymen in the East. In contrast, Saarland Minister President Oskar Lafontaine, who was named on 19 March by the SPD executive committee as the party's candidate for Chancellor in the *Bundestag* elections scheduled for 2 December 1990, repeatedly appealed for a 'cautious transition' to a currency union with the GDR, which, he said, required 'careful preparation'.[42] Lafontaine also demanded an end to payments to East

[40] 'Insults Fly in Bonn Parliament During Debate on Unification', *New York Times*, 16 Feb. 1990, p. A8.
[41] Serge Schmemann, 'Kohl Stumps as if Germanys Were One', *New York Times*, 21 Feb. 1990, p. A10.
[42] *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 20 Mar. 1990.

German pensioners resettling in the West, the cancellation of all other payments for the accommodation and integration of resettlers, and investment of savings in the GDR which, it could be assumed, he was determined to preserve as an independent state.[43]

Yet it was Kohl's, not Lafontaine's, strategy that would prevail. The Chancellor's last-minute announcement, only five days before the election, of a 1:1 conversion of savings accounts turned out to be crucial in upsetting the predicted outcome. Kohl brought his authority, and the financial power of the Federal Republic, to bear in helping his party win the election. The outcome was a resounding call for quick unification and a market economy, vindicating the persuasive promises of Kohl and his CDU and CSU colleagues, who had told the East Germans that only the Christian Conservatives could provide the money needed to revive the country's suffering economy and to establish a unified Germany without undue delay. In fact, the large vote for the Alliance for Germany or, to be more precise, for the parties backed by the government in Bonn and Chancellor Kohl, was 'in effect a death sentence for the German Democratic Republic and an endorsement of absorption, as quickly as possible, into big, rich West Germany', as Serge Schmemann noted in the *New York Times*.[44]

To cut a long story short, Kohl stepped in very late, only after the GDR was politically as well as economically finished, but when he did, he did so effectively. It would be unfair to say that the Federal Republic pushed the development toward German reunification either too early or too offensively, before the East German people had made up their minds. But after the decision had been taken by the Modrow government as well as by the electorate on 18 March, Chancellor Kohl did not hesitate to take the lead and steer the unification process in the direction in which he wanted it to go.

[43] 'Cabinet Sets Date for Currency Union, Ends Resettlers Benefits', *The Week in Germany*, 23 Mar. 1990, pp. 1–2.

[44] Serge Schmemann, 'Mandate for Unity, as Soon as Possible', *New York Times*, 19 Mar. 1990, p. A1.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

HEALTH, THE PUBLIC, AND SOCIETY IN MODERN GERMAN AND BRITISH HISTORY

by Florentine Fritzen

SIGRID STÖCKEL and ULLA WALTER (eds.), *Prävention im 20. Jahrhundert: Historische Grundlagen und aktuelle Entwicklungen in Deutschland,* Grundlagentexte Gesundheitswissenschaften (Weinheim: Juventa, 2002), 304 pp. ISBN 3 7799 1564 2. EUR 24.00

UDO SCHAGEN and SABINE SCHLEIERMACHER (eds.*), Sozialmedizin, Sozialhygiene und* Public Health*: Konzepte und Visionen zum Verhältnis von Medizin und Gesellschaft in historischer Perspektive,* Berichte und Dokumente zur Zeitgeschichte, 5 (Berlin: Forschungsstelle Zeitgeschichte im Institut für Geschichte der Medizin/Zentrum für Human- und Gesundheitswissenschaften der Berliner Hochschulmedizin, Freie Universität Berlin, 2002), 87 pp. ISSN 1432 3958. EUR 9.00

STEVE STURDY (ed.), *Medicine, Health and the Public Sphere in Britain, 1600–2000*, Studies in the Social History of Medicine, 16 (London: Routledge, 2002), xiv + 290 pp. ISBN 0 415 27906 2. £60.00

ULRIKE LINDNER and MERITH NIEHUSS (eds.), *Ärztinnen – Patientinnen: Frauen im deutschen und britischen Gesundheitswesen des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2002), vii + 268 pp. ISBN 3 412 15701 5. EUR 33.00

DAVID ARMSTRONG, *A New History of Identity: A Sociology of Medical Knowledge* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), x + 213 pp. ISBN 0 333 96892 1. £47.50

What is health? Probably the best known definition of the term and undoubtedly the most popular amongst historians is the WHO's 'state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity',[1] which dates from the

[1] Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by the International Health Conference, New York, 19–22 June 1946, signed

1940s. Whatever other modern answers may be given to this question, most of them share, apart from a normative inclination, yet another fundamental feature: they regard health as a phenomenon closely related to society. Health is seen as a personal as well as a social value. This twofold approach may appear fairly trivial, but has only become commonplace since the 1960s or 1970s (the WHO's definition is an early, if not the first, example of any relevance). The traditional concept of public health, dating from the early twentieth century, had seen dangers to health mainly from nature (sanitary science) and from other individual bodies (personal hygiene and social medicine). In the second half of the twentieth century, this concept was modified as it emerged alongside the new environmentalism, which viewed people's interaction with nature as both the problem and the solution to the issue of public health (Armstrong, *A New History of Identity*, p. 113). As a parallel development, many contemporaries considered every aspect of human existence, especially everyday life, to be increasingly under the observation and control of an expanding medicine. The term 'medicalization' was coined and spread during those years, and some critics, like Ivan Illich, feared that medicine could gain too much power both in society and over individuals.[2] Irving K. Zola's 'medicine as an institution of social control' was the other key concept in this context.[3]

These concerns and criticisms must not be underestimated when looking for the origins of the increased attention paid by historians and other scholars, mainly in the social and political sciences, economics and law,[4] to the whole area of medicine, health, and society from the 1970s. Of course they no longer play such an important role in the present-day historiography of health and medicine. Since the

on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61 states. It came into force on 7 April 1948. The Constitution of the WHO can be viewed online at: www.who.int/governance/en.

[2] Ivan Illich, *Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health* (London, 1974).

[3] Irving K. Zola, 'Medicine as an Institution of Social Control', *Sociological Review*, 20 (1972), pp. 487–504.

[4] Medical science and practice, and the organization of medical care were the domain of doctors well into the 1970s, until finally scholars from the mentioned faculties started to take part in the political, public, and academic debate. Cf. Alfons Labisch, *Homo Hygienicus: Gesundheit und Medizin in der Neuzeit* (Frankfurt am Main, 1992), p. 10.

1960s, when the first, pioneering historical studies concerned with health and its various relations to society were published (most famous among them Foucault's *Naissance de la clinique* of 1963),[5] things have changed completely. Thanks to a large number of case studies we now know much more about health care institutions and their concepts, aims, and everyday work, and about public health and the role of health in social policy.[6] Moreover, the idea of a 'history of the body', a concept almost unknown in German historiography until the 1990s,[7] has finally been adopted in Germany over the last decade. This is in stark contrast to Anglo-American academic discourse, in which the body has been a subject of historical research since shortly after the publication of Foucault's early books. No matter precisely when during the second half of the twentieth century the idea of the historicity of the body was established—earlier in Britain, later in Germany—it has opened not only our eyes to *Blood and Guts* (the title of one of the late Roy Porter's last books),[8] which viscerally references the corporal reality and material of our body, but also our minds to the construction of this very body.

Detailed publications on the political and institutional concepts of health and reflections on the body in historiography, it seems, are enabling historians in the early twenty-first century to move at least one step further than their predecessors. This article will present five new publications which are doing exactly this, but in different ways. Three of them link the history of public health and social medicine to

[5] Michel Foucault, *La naissance de la clinique: Une archéologie du régard médical* (Paris, 1963), published in English as *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archeology of Medical Perception* (London, 1973).

[6] Cf. only Manfred Berg and Geoffrey Cocks (eds.), *Medicine and Modernity: Public Health and Medical Care in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Germany* (Cambridge, hardcover 1997, paperback 2002), and Wolfgang Woelk and Jörg Vögele (eds.), *Geschichte der Gesundheitspolitik in Deutschland: Von der Weimarer Republik bis in die Frühgeschichte der 'doppelten Staatsgründung'* (Berlin, 2002).

[7] Cf. Maren Lorenz, *Leibhaftige Vergangenheit: Einführung in die Körpergeschichte* (Tübingen, 2000), p. 9. As an exception to the rule see also Arthur E. Imhof (ed.), *Der Mensch und sein Körper: Von der Antike bis heute* (Munich, 1983).

[8] Roy Porter, *Blood and Guts: A Short History of Medical Knowledge* (London, 2002).

the present. One edited volume describes historical foundations as well as current developments and includes articles by both historians and health care practitioners (I). The second volume focuses not only on 'concepts' but also on 'visions' (II), and the third examines medicine, health, and the public sphere from 1600 to the present (III). Another publication applies two new perspectives to the already well researched relationship between doctors and patients: sex and gender, as the volume concentrates on women in the health sector, and a comparative approach to the doctor–patient relationship in the British and the German setting (IV). The last book to be discussed here is different from the other four in a number of ways. It is not an edited collection of essays, but tells a coherent story, and is therefore a linguistic and intellectual pleasure to read. It focuses on the major trends in the field, its greatest merit being that it draws conclusions, sums up previously known details, and thus arrives at new insights that segue into an original theory (V).

I

Prevention, an expression used mainly in criminal law until the end of the nineteenth century, gained a new connotation in the early twentieth century. From then on it meant not only the preclusion of crime, but also the attempt to ward off threats and dangers to personal and public health. A collection of essays edited by Sigrid Stöckel and Ulla Walter deals with the formative influences of twentieth-century history on what we understand by the term 'prevention' today. As the editors state in their preface, these influences were epidemiological, socio-political, and socio-cultural. Stöckel and Walter are convinced that although it is not possible literally to 'learn' from history because each historical situation is unique and will never be repeated, the context of a given phenomenon can be grasped with the help of historical analyses. Consequently, they regard prevention as a cultural practice whose contemporary structures are less easily perceived than those belonging to the past, as the latter allow for a certain historical distance. The contributors to the book are mostly historians of medicine, but also include public health scientists and health care practitioners.

The topical approach is certainly legitimate, but for the historian the book's greatest merit is that it embeds the concept of prevention in the broad historical context of social policy and public discourse.

For example, an article dealing with health insurance in the German Empire and the Weimar Republic shows that the orientation of the German insurance system was purely curative and that prevention and prophylaxis were not part of it; another charts the development of health care (*Gesundheitsfürsorge*) from private poor relief to a new profession in the public context of local communities in the early twentieth century; a third describes how the International Hygiene Exhibition in Dresden, whose aim was to propagate 'hygiene as a prevention strategy' (p. 79), attracted more than five million visitors in 1911 with an informative and systematic overview over all imaginable aspects of hygiene, and highly graphic and authentic exhibits like microphotographs of pathogens and waxworks of sexual organs affected by venereal diseases.[9]

The participation of German scientists in the League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO) is the subject of Paul Weindling's contribution to the volume. He demonstrates that the German delegation mirrored the conflicting public health strategies within the organization, some delegates being 'bacteriological' and others welfare-orientated. Germany's membership was politically disputed at home, as Germans were underrepresented and nationalist critics accused the LNHO of working solely for Britain and France. As might be expected, the Germans withdrew in 1933, just when the organization became most dynamic in advancing a programme of social medicine.

Weindling's article is an excellent example of the relevance of the general political context as it relates to concepts of prevention, thus demonstrating the importance of this volume. This is even clearer with regard to the essays on the Third Reich. As Astrid Ley's contribution to the volume reveals, the 1933 sterilization law (*Gesetz zur Verhütung erbkranken Nachwuchses*) replaced humane aid in psychi-

[9] It is doubtful, though, whether the majority of these visitors really learned or wanted to learn much about hygiene and prevention. With reference to the Second Hygiene Exhibition in 1930, the periodical *Das Reformhaus*, edited by the German health food stores, criticized the fact that most people just strolled along the exhibition site, had a glass of wine or beer afterwards, and went back home in order to forget what they had just seen. It was, as the author remarked, the disadvantage of exhibitions such as these that they were not able to inspire people to put into practice what they had learned theoretically. Cf. *Das Reformhaus*, August 1930, pp. 113–18, at p. 117.

atric clinics with the simple registration of potential candidates for sterilization, thus shifting the focus from disease to (the allegedly) diseased. The original aims of prevention, namely the preclusion and avoidance of sickness, were perversely transformed into a scheme for the extermination of sick people.[10]

This made prevention a suspect concept that never attracted much political attention in the Federal Republic and was only hesitantly adopted in its later years. The rise in diseases resulting from modern-day life, plus the newly invented risk factor model (*Risikofaktorenmodell*),[11] which is based on statistical probabilities gained from data such as blood pressure, weight, smoking, and exercise, made prevention an increasingly individualized issue. Mandatory screenings, for example, for cancer, were laid down by law in the 1970s. In 1967, the *Bundeszentrale für gesundheitliche Aufklärung* was established to provide education and information about prevention, especially for children and teenagers. Since the late 1980s, the focus of the institution has been on AIDS prevention, but drugs and sex education have also become important issues.

The articles, most of them well written, are arranged in chronological order, and almost every imaginable topic is covered, except for the later GDR.[12] However, there is an article by Udo Schagen that deals with the Soviet zone and the first years after the foundation of the GDR, revealing that its health care system adopted ideas developed in the Weimar Republic and was thus more German than Soviet. An afterword by the editors provides an overview of prevention in the twentieth century and a short but lucid outlook to the

[10] For a closer understanding of these questions, cf. also Gisela Bock, 'Sterilization and "Medical" Massacres in National Socialist Germany: Ethics, Politics, and the Law', in Berg and Cocks (eds.), *Medicine and Modernity*, pp. 149–72. For the Second World War, cf. now also Winfried Süß, *Der 'Volkskörper' im Krieg: Gesundheitspolitik, Gesundheitsverhältnisse und Krankenmord im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland 1939–1945* (Munich, 2003).

[11] On the concept of risk as a new variant of public health since the 1960s, cf. also Armstrong, *New History of Identity*, pp. 109–16.

[12] This seems to be a general problem. Schagen and Schleiermacher (eds.), *Sozialmedizin, Sozialhygiene und Public Health*, and Woelk and Vögele (eds.), *Geschichte der Gesundheitspolitik in Deutschland* also contain articles about the Soviet zone and the early GDR, but leave out developments in the years immediately after its foundation.

twenty-first century, stressing that 'real human beings in real-life contexts and not genotypes' should be the pivotal point of any future prevention concept.

II

Udo Schagen's and Sabine Schleiermacher's booklet, containing nine relatively short essays (only one of which will be discussed in some detail here), has an aim similar to the book edited by Stöckel and Walter. The editors stress the importance of exchanging research results between historians of science and medicine on the one hand, and public health scientists and *Gesundheitswissenschaftler* on the other; in this manner they hope to gain perspectives not only for future research but also for the new century beyond academia. This aspect of the history of health, as we learn from these two studies, has a tendency to break the boundaries of a closely circumscribed historiography. The essays presented go beyond the practice common amongst historians of telling stories about the past, be they 'discovered' or 'invented'.[13] Some historians of public health, such as the editors of the volumes under review, realize how close their subject is to present-day society, and stress the helpfulness of their historical findings for an understanding of the present and for 'making things better' in the future. In short, they feel that past, present, and visions for the future overlap in the history of public health.

But where is the link between the three? The answer suggested is that it lies in the modern disciplines of Public Health and *Gesundheitswissenschaften* themselves. They seem to connect yesterday, today, and tomorrow in their own existence, as they have their own histories and aims for the future. According to the essay by Dagmar Ellerbrock in the booklet edited by Schagen and Schleiermacher, Public Health or *Gesundheitswissenschaften* as disciplines have developed in Germany since the 1980s and are now offered as courses of study at eight universities. All are orientated towards American Public Health Science, which was established soon after the First World War and defines itself as scientific and interdisciplinary. From the start, it aimed to provide a clear outline of tasks and responsibil-

[13] On the question of whether history is discovered or invented and whether the historian is closer to the novelist or to the scientist, see Armstrong, *New History of Identity*, p. 188.

ities within the field of public health. As Ellerbrock shows, the American occupying forces had tried to implement the US public health model in their zone in 1947, but without success. The US forces explicitly did not want to go back to, or build on, Weimar traditions when reforming German society after the Second World War. From the German point of view, 'public health' was a rather peculiar model that not only sounded strange because it was not translated into German, but also seemed quite different from the German socio-hygienic model developed during the 1920s. This had been connected much more strongly to local government than the universities.

When the lack of orientation that characterized Germany immediately after the war had been overcome, Ellerbrock states, health policy was no longer required as an 'anchor of identity' (p. 64) for a society in distress. American ideas were easily adopted and combined with traditional German structures, for instance, in the close connection between the new Public Health Schools and the regional governments. The turning-point of 1989, however, created a new political context. While the USA still remained the reference point for Public Health Studies, integration into the European context and a specifically German federal tradition with references to the heritage of the Weimar Republic became more important. Generally speaking, this is where historians of public health in Germany now stand. They have a history of their own, and they are part of German history; they epitomize the past, the present, and the future of public health in Germany. Ellerbrock regards the democratic context in which the discipline arose as a specific advantage. She points out that the idea of prevention bears within itself the dangers of radicalization, as unleashed under the Nazis, for example. This, it might be argued, makes the interweaving of past and future in the writing of the history of public health in Germany a vital necessity.

III

In other countries, things seem to be less complicated. The third book under review linking the history of medicine, health, and the public sphere to the present is edited by Steve Sturdy. It deals with these issues in a British context and does so in an unspectacular way (compared with the previously discussed volumes). He chooses a time span from 1600 to the year 2000, which implies a certain continuity in the history of public health. Over the past twenty years, Sturdy

writes at the beginning of his introduction, historians of various fields have done 'a great deal to clarify our understanding of the constitution of the public sphere from past to present' (p. 1), but, he observes, remarkably little has been contributed to this endeavour by historians of medicine. Consequently, the intention of the book is to demonstrate how the history of medicine can add to the understanding of the changing nature of the public sphere.

Referring to the work of Jürgen Habermas, especially his *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962; English 1989), the contributors, attempting to make us rethink its history, describe the public sphere as a 'multiplicity of more-or-less-localized, partial and often transient publics and discourses' (p. 3). The articles concentrate on public–private interactions, the relationship of voluntary institutions to the public sphere, and the points of contact between the state and the public sphere. All the essays in the volume are case studies, but none of them considers the detail to be more important than the whole. They all contribute to a closer understanding of both the abstract (in the sense of ideas) and concrete (in the sense of practical politics) network relationships between institutions, the public, the private sphere, and the state. I will discuss one example from each of the three parts of the book.

Pamela K. Gilbert describes the work of the nineteenth-century housing reformer Octavia Hill as an example of public medicine in private spaces. Gilbert reads the social as a 'hazy demarcation' and a 'buffer zone' between public and private that underwrote efforts to discipline the lives of the poor (p. 44). Hill, active from the 1860s to the end of the century and supported financially and morally by public resources, tried to impose her ideas of middle-class domesticity on the homes of the poor she visited—no wonder that the Fabian propagandist and social reformer Beatrice Webb was not the only person to criticize her for her arrogance. Much of the support Hill received came as a reward for the information she brought back from her excursions into the private lives of the poor. This information helped the bourgeois public to observe and regulate working-class privacy under the guise of charity. The aim of bourgeois intrusiveness was, however, not merely regulation. A national agenda was at stake: to domesticate and socialize the poor would enable them to emerge through the above-mentioned 'buffer zone' into the social body proper. They would thus become bearers of a public and proudly English identity—as we learn from this example, the public can be

produced out of the private, if public and private interact via the social.

An illuminating chapter by David Canton in the second part of the volume deals with voluntary institutions and the public sphere. Its primary focus is the Empire Rheumatism Council (ERC), one of Britain's major disease charities, founded in 1936 to promote research into the rheumatic diseases and renamed the Arthritic and Rheumatism Council for Research (ARC) in 1964. The Council, a relatively closed group dominated by leading clinicians and scientists in the field of rheumatic and arthritic diseases, was 'not a public institution in the Habermasian sense of an open site for all who wished to participate in opinion formation' (p. 145). On the contrary, it was an exclusive and élitist body, and although its members regarded themselves as public figures it also distinguished itself sharply from the public. *Medicine, Health and the Public Sphere* makes clear that voluntary institutions represented only partial publics, which generally conformed poorly with Habermas's ideals of inclusiveness, transparency, and formal equality. But according to Canton, the ERC's portrayals of the public changed substantially between 1936 and 1970. In its foundation year, the members regarded the public as an undifferentiated mass, an emotionally vulnerable entity easily swayed by the press, advertisers, or quacks, ignorant of as well as resistant to science and medicine, and terrified by cancer but apathetic towards rheumatic diseases. But the ERC also depended on the public to organize local fund-raising events, especially after the establishment of the National Health Service (NHS) in 1948, when financial contributions from wealthy businessmen declined. By 1970, the ERC's distrust of the public had waned considerably, and its view of it became much more differentiated. A fragmentation of the public into a diverse range of groups had taken place and portrayals of the public suggested at least signs of enlightenment and rationality. Philanthropic organizations like the ERC/ARC began to see the possibilities that lay in appealing for support to these various groups. The ARC had to face the fact that there were different publics and that it could not help having to relate to some of them.

The failure of vaccination in England and Wales during the second half of the nineteenth century is the topic of a chapter by Logie Barrow which illustrates the complex relationship between the state and the public sphere. The 1853 and 1867 Vaccination Acts required

all parents to have their children vaccinated against smallpox and, under Poor Law statutes, provided a free public vaccination service in designated stations for those who could not afford to have the treatment performed privately. The measures met with resistance from large sections of the public and 'anti-vaccinationism' spread. The practice of arm-to-arm vaccination usually employed in the stations was considered risky by a majority of people, and public vaccination was thus regarded as a second-rate service. Many parents preferred to risk fines or imprisonment to exposing their children to potentially infected people by sitting in a crowded room for hours, waiting for a dangerous treatment. Outbreaks of post-vaccinal diseases and the difficulties encountered by the administration when it tried to enforce vaccination led it to acknowledge in inter-office communication that the system was a failure, and to imply as much in public. Barrow's article describes a process of deterioration that finally led to a new piece of legislation in 1898, allowing parents to register a 'conscientious objection' that exempted their children from compulsory vaccination.[14] The Act of 1898 went far beyond the passage of the 'conscience clause' in seeking to alleviate discriminatory practices of the former system, for instance, by making vaccination at home possible for the poor as well. The failure of the Vaccination Acts shows that public pressure was to a certain extent able to influence the government. This seems to be a general rule that can be derived from *Medicine, Health and the Public Sphere*. It describes how the public sphere grew both more powerful and more differentiated, and developed into a sphere of discourses able to influence the actions of the government and the state. The sections on health and medicine in Sturdy's well assembled book prove to be striking examples of this Habermasian 'structural transformation'.

[14] In Germany, vaccination, though vehemently disputed, was made compulsory in 1874. Cf. *Reichsgesetzblatt* 1874, no. 11, pp. 31–4. A 'conscience clause' (*Gewissensklausel)* was never passed, and reform movements were still campaigning for it in the 1950s. Cf. Florentine Fritzen, 'Spinat-Milch, Krebsvorsorge, Lebensglück: Wissenspopularisierung in der Reformbewegung der 1950er Jahre', in Carsten Kretschmann (ed.), *Wissenspopularisierung: Konzepte der Wissensverbreitung im Wandel* (Berlin, 2003), pp. 361–80, at p. 373.

IV

The photograph on the cover of Ulrike Lindner's and Merith Niehuss's edited volume *Ärztinnen – Patientinnen* is just perfect. It shows two women and a little girl: a mother, a doctor, and a daughter-patient in triadic union, photographed in London in 1930. Both the mother, seated in a wooden chair, and the daughter, sitting on the doctor's lap, look at the figure in white with exactly the same attentive gaze, trusting but still a little preoccupied. The doctor, looking friendly, is obviously talking to the child. The clothes of mother and daughter suggest that they are not poor. Of course, there is room for further interpretation of the scene, but that is not necessary. The three figures in the photograph illustrate the contents of the book only in a very general way, and primarily by negation—they are, above all, not men or boys.

Each figure mirrors a section of the book. The first section is concerned with women doctors and women in other health care professions, the second focuses on motherhood and on the woman as mother in the socio-political discourse, and the third deals with female patients. The volume examines both the German and the British health care system. Naturally, the doctor stands for women as active participants in the system. Mother and daughter do not, however, as one might have expected, represent passive female participants. On the contrary, these two groups are studied with regard to the 'conditions and room for manœuvre of female patients' (p. 2) within these two systems. But in dealing with these questions, the study suffers from the inherent difficulty of writing the patient's history: a lack of adequate and appropriate sources.[15]

The photo is only to a certain extent symbolic, as the oversimplification resulting from the radical condensation of issues is misleading. In contrast to the volume, it presents a closed system excluding men. The title *Ärztinnen – Patientinnen* must not be understood to suggest a mutual relationship; in fact, female doctors and female patients hardly ever meet in the pages of the book. This is regrettable because the

[15] Cf. Johanna Bleker, 'To Benefit the Poor and Advance Medical Science: Hospitals and Hospital Care in Germany, 1820–1870', in Berg and Cocks (eds.), *Medicine and Modernity*, pp. 17–33, at p. 17. For a more optimistic view, see Eberhard Wolff, 'Perspektiven der Patientengeschichtsschreibung', in Norbert Paul and Thomas Schlich (eds.), *Medizingeschichte: Aufgaben, Probleme, Perspektiven* (Frankfurt am Main, 1998), pp. 311–34.

beauty of the photograph arouses a certain desire to find out more about how and why these three people came together in 1930, and what the moment captured by the photograph can tell us in general about the relationship between women doctors and women patients. As *Ärztinnen – Patientinnen* makes clear, however, in most cases the doctors sitting opposite female patients were men. But the book makes up for the disappointed expectations its cover might have raised in many ways, most notably by covering a wide range of topics. Four of the eleven articles are wholly comparative; a fifth, by Paul Weindling, examines mainly German women doctors as refugees in Britain in the 1930s and 1940s; and the remaining six concentrate on German history, some glancing occasionally at the British context.

As Silke Fehlemann and Jörg Vögele reveal in their contribution to the volume, the percentage of women in the health care system in the early twentieth century was significantly higher in Britain than in Germany. This was an effect of the tradition of female honorary posts in housing and health care associations, for example, as health visitors. The authors suggest that the British system was more flexible and less discriminating and controlling than the German system, which was based on a stronger state that regulated more issues. Furthermore, the volume observes a tendency towards equal treatment of every patient in the British health care system, a feature from which women could profit, for example, as expectant mothers or suffering from venereal disease. By contrast, health care benefits in Germany were usually combined with supervision and control. It makes the reader almost suspicious that so many comparisons between the countries end with Britain winning on points.

This is also the case in Flurin Condreau's article. Studying the example of German and English tuberculosis sanatoriums, Condreau pursues the question, hitherto neglected by the social history of medicine, of whether women patients had any specifically 'female' experiences with academic medicine. The higher cost of drugs and treatment for women and the fact that new medical technologies were more often tested on them than on men are examples of discrimination against female patients in Germany. While, as Condreau maintains, in fictional texts such as Thomas Mann's *Tristan* and *Magic Mountain* female figures serve mainly to elucidate the emotions of men during their stay at a health resort, non-fictional texts written by women, such as diaries, bear witness to highly impersonal and some-

times even aggressive behaviour on the part of male doctors. They show that female patients often considered their stay at a sanatorium unpleasant or even, in some cases, unbearable.

Charlotte Augst's topic is the role of women in the parliamentary debates on new reproduction technologies in the House of Commons and the *Bundestag* between 1988 and 1990. They led to a relatively liberal law in Britain and a more prohibitive decision aimed at protecting the family in Germany. Whereas the German Greens and some Social Democrats were generally critical of reproduction technology, feminist members of the Labour Party stressed the importance of female self-determination in dealing with the new technologies. The differences which comparative approaches such as these bring into the open often tell us more about the countries and their politics, attitudes, and mentalities than an examination of a single country would have revealed.

Some of the essays centred on Germany in the volume also disclose interesting information on gender-specific aspects of health care. One example is Cornelie Usborne's contribution, which examines female doctors in the Weimar Republic and demonstrates how these women, the second generation of female doctors in Germany, were caught between the desire to pioneer and set an example for other women in a field dominated by men, and professional and career-related concerns. Not surprisingly, female doctors did not challenge eugenics or doubt the importance of the battle against 'quackery' (though natural and traditional medicine were dominated by women) as they considered both necessary to modernize the health care system and to make medicine more efficient.

Of course, much remains to be done in the field of the history of women in health care systems.[16] More and deeper research than this volume can provide is certainly required. But at any rate, *Ärztinnen – Patientinnen* is a prime example of the usefulness of comparative history. It also makes a good case for gender history that does not focus

[16] For some relatively early work on the history of women in health care, cf. the contributions by Eva Hummel, Alfred Fritschi, Edward Shorter, and Claudia Honegger in Alfons Labisch and Reinhard Spree (eds.), *Medizinische Deutungsmacht im sozialen Wandel des 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhunderts* (Bonn, 1989), and Edward Shorter, *Women's Bodies: A Social History of Women's Encounter with Health, Ill-Health, and Medicine* (New Brunswick, 1982; reprint 1991).

on gender for its own sake or limit itself to feminist purposes, but embeds its findings in the wider context of general social history.

V

David Armstrong is not a historian but a sociologist. His study, however, covers both fields, and beyond. In addition to the two aims of writing a sociology of medical knowledge and a medical history of the last 150 years, he also wants to provide a creation story of Man. Of course, this last intention is, as the author himself observes, the most ambitious of the three. Just as Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859) and *Descent of Man* (1874) refuted and largely replaced the biblical creation narrative in Genesis, Armstrong playfully tries to replace Darwin's theory with his own. Needless to say, he is not a second Erich von Däniken, claiming that extra-terrestrials visited Earth in the remote past and brought us the Spirit.[17] But the assertion with which Armstrong confronts his readers is no less stunning. Man, he suggests, did not exist before the mid-nineteenth century—full stop. His proof is the development of modern medicine, and his method derives from Foucaultian genealogy. Regarding all texts as primary sources and refraining from the quotation of secondary literature, Armstrong lines up medical texts in chronological order. If he uses what is commonly understood by the term secondary literature, he reads it as a mere primary source as well, though admitting that other texts have certainly influenced him. He does not mention intertextuality, but implies it. Armstrong's aim is to find out when particular ideas appeared for the first time. He avoids the term episteme,[18] but this exactly describes his procedure: arranging patterns of knowledge chronologically, and trying to disregard future patterns until their time has come.

[17] For this rather esoteric attempt to disprove Darwin, see only the Swiss author's first book (like most of his books a bestseller which has gone through many editions), Erich von Däniken, *Erinnerungen an die Zukunft: Ungelöste Rätsel der Vergangenheit* (Düsseldorf, 1968), translated into English as *Chariots of the Gods: Unsolved Mysteries of the Past* (New York, 1970).

[18] For Foucault's concept of episteme, i.e. a cognitive scheme which helps to organize knowledge in a certain period of time, cf. Michel Foucault, *Die Ordnung der Dinge: Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften* (Frankfurt am Main, 1971; French edition, 1966), pp. 46–66.

Armstrong's point of departure is Darwin's theory itself. He argues that its very formulation proves that in the middle of the nineteenth century Man started to reflect upon his own existence in a radically new way. Medical texts of the early nineteenth century did not deal with Man but with spaces; in the common practice of quarantine, rooms were closed off, not people. It is not possible to retell entirely Armstrong's breathtaking story of Man and identity, the latter word becoming his term of choice when dealing with questions arising in the second half of the twentieth century. He bases his theory on evidence and his claims on plausibility—just as Darwin did. Each period of time, he tries to make us understand, needs its own creation story to invent Man and human identity anew. Texts are the fossils of postmodernity.

But no matter how interesting these aspects of this most stimulating book, in the context of the relation between health, the public, and society, the second of the volume's above-mentioned aims, namely to tell a story of medical knowledge, must interest us more. Armstrong claims to regard the history of health with the eye of medicine itself, applying, it can be assumed, Foucault's *régard medical*, the 'medical perception' mentioned in the subtitle of the *Birth of the Clinic*. The reader learns a good deal about medical knowledge and medical thinking about body, soul, and mind as it developed from pure anatomy via the discovery of movement (physical culture), social identity (social hygiene), and subjectivity (psychology and psychoanalysis) to the perception of the identity of the individual patient and, later, of the doctor (with the help of medical reflection). On the whole, Armstrong's book is perfect for anyone interested in reading a somewhat different history of medicine—and for anyone who likes postmodern novels.

VI

The history of health has become a well established part of both British and German historiography, and is still growing. In the twenty-first century historians of health are no longer just collecting data in order to understand the basic structures of their respective fields. In this regard, they are profiting from the broad findings of the second half of the twentieth century, and have the material at their disposal. Without this David Armstrong, for instance, could not have played with the components of the subject in such a sovereign man-

ner, forming his new theory out of them. Of course the five volumes discussed above do not represent all the tendencies in the present-day historiography of health. However, certain trends can be derived from them. First, an attempt to cross the classical borders of a closely circumscribed historiography can be observed in some German studies which connect the history of public health to the present and to future concepts. Another trend is that historians of medicine and health have begun to apply special approaches such as those derived from gender history and comparative history to apparently well researched fields like the doctor–patient relationship. Approaches such as these reveal that much remains to be done in the field of the history of health. Another method of organizing the flood of material is to adopt theoretical approaches. The contributors to Sturdy's volume, for example, read the history of public health in accordance with Habermas's *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, while many other historians choose Foucault's thoughts as explicit or implicit guidelines. The fact that the history of health has now 'settled down' has also, however, had the result that much is published in the field. Sometimes too much is published too quickly, and this makes mistakes, repetitions, and redundancies inevitable. The volumes discussed here are all more or less positive exceptions, but they also display a tendency in this direction. It seems that many authors write numerous articles repeating the findings of their Ph.D. theses or of some other publication, neatly geared to the respective title of the book. In this regard, too, the history of health has arrived in the historical establishment.

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BOOK REVIEWS

FRIEDRICH EDELMAYER, *Söldner und Pensionäre: Das Netzwerk Philipps II. im Heiligen Römischen Reich*, Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur der Iberischen und Iberoamerikanischen Länder, 7 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002) ISBN 3 486 56672 5; (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 2002) ISBN 3 7028 0394 7. 318 pp. EURO 44.80

Not many monographs have been written about the relations between Philip II or the Spanish monarchy and the Holy Roman Empire between about 1560 and 1580. The cleverly stage-managed abdication of Philip's father, Charles V, as Holy Roman Emperor, and the accession to this throne of his Austrian brother, King of the Romans Ferdinand I, seemingly put an end to the chapter of German–Spanish union in the sixteenth century. Ferdinand now had to concentrate even more on the political consequences of the Reformation in central Europe, while Philip turned to the daring exploits of the Spanish crown in Europe and abroad—in the increasingly confident Netherlands; in Hispanic America; in the Philippines, named after him in 1543, where he reformed the government around 1570; and in Portugal, which he was also able to unify politically with Spain in 1581 as a result of his first marriage, to Maria of Portugal. Political and diplomatic concerns *vis-à-vis* a familiar Vienna seemingly played little part in this. 'The embassy in Germany gave rise to no complications as, after all, its interests affected the Habsburg family itself', was the assessment of the canonical *Historia de España Menéndez Pidal* (in the volume of 1958).

Yet how can it be explained that in the middle of the sixteenth century the embassy in Vienna had the biggest budget (8,000 ducats) after Rome (12,000 ducats) of all of Spain's European embassies (Paris, 6,000; London, Lisbon, Venice, and Genoa each 4,000)? And how does the close interest of German writers precisely in Philip II correspond to this assumption? Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's classical work *Egmont*, and Friedrich von Schiller's *Don Carlos: Infant von Spanien* still keep the dramatic sixteenth century alive for students and theatre-lovers today. 'Alle Könige/Europens huldigen dem spanschen Namen./Gehen Sie Europens Königen voran. ... Geben Sie Gedanken-

freiheit', Marquis Posa says to Philip II, who, for Schiller, is the ruthless father of Don Carlos. Incidentally, both plays, which should also be read as Enlightened essays on the antagonism between monarchy and republic, were published in 1788, just before the French Revolution.

Friedrich Edelmayer, born 1959, Professor of Modern History in Vienna, has done well to address this hardly researched topic in the book under review. He has a profound knowledge of Spanish–Austrian relations, a subject on which his publications include *Maximilian II., Philipp II. und Reichsitalien: Die Auseinandersetzungen um das Reichslehen Finale in Ligurien* (1988), and he has also edited *Reichstag* documents (for 1543 within the *Wiener Arbeitsstelle Jüngere Reihe* series of the edition *Deutsche Reichstagsakten, Jüngere Reihe*, also published by Oldenbourg in Munich).

In order to get a rough idea of how these rulers conducted politics, and especially foreign policy, we should turn to the lengthy personal instructions which the monarchs gave to their successors, or top politicians (in today's language). Charles V's instructions to his son Philip, dated May 1543, for example, and those of January 1548, and October 1555 (cf. source edition by Alfred Kohler, 1990), but also those which Philip II wrote for Don Juan de Austria in 1568 (cf. Manuel Fernández Alvarez, 1989), and for the Duke of Alcalá (cf. H. G. Koenigsberger, 1972) show how carefully they weighed up and developed the various political fields (economy, taxes, borders, dynasties, confessions, armies, and wars). At the same time, they clarify the monarchs' awareness of their office as a burden, and their endeavours to do justice to its high demands in terms of expertise and ethics: 'wie ein schwer ding es sey, recht und wohl zue regieren ... das du doch vielmehr darauff bedacht sein wollest wie du wohl und gerecht regierst, als das du dich nach grösserem regiment sehnest ... (Charles V to Philip II, 25 Oct. 1555).

Even in the sixteenth century, however, foreign policy was dictated less by ethical demands or the monarch's religious conviction than by political interests and structural givens. The lofty goals of Habsburg foreign policy contrasted strongly with the chances of fulfilling them. Ultimately the lengthy 'political testaments' (Heinz Duchhardt) and the Spanish crown's heavy reliance on mercenaries show how vulnerable political instruments still were, and how insecure the government's grasp of the institutional and thus continuous powers of the executive was.

Edelmayer's study demonstrates this vividly. The personal key texts cited above hardly mention the indirect, personal shaping of politics which is the subject of his investigation. The concept of 'networks' in domestic and foreign policy does indeed offer new perspectives which need to be treated carefully. After referring briefly to the 'technical sciences' from which the term is drawn, the author particularly cites Wolfgang Reinhard (Freiburg) and his masterly works on the Roman oligarchies around 1600 for the approach he takes. 'The concept of the network was therefore selected to describe the multi-layered system of relations between the Spanish king and the most diverse groups of people in the Holy Roman Empire' (p. 30).

According to Edelmayer, the motives for the careful cultivation of this network, which had fixed points in Brussels, Milan, and Vienna, were mainly geographical and strategic. The Empire bordered on the sensitive spots of Hispanic power—the Netherlands and France with its strategic artery between northern Italy, Alsace, and Flanders. It also offered rich opportunities to engage mercenaries for the Spanish armies required on several fronts. Added to this was a foreign policy factor. The dual nature of the Holy Roman Empire with power centres in the princes and the Estates, embodied graphically in the doubled-headed (perhaps even quaternary) eagle on the imperial coat of arms, ensured the Imperial Estates a considerable say in the election of king and Emperor, as well as in the government and the justice system of the Holy Roman Empire. Thus as far as Madrid was concerned, cultivating the members of the Imperial Estates gave it a chance to exert indirect influence on the destiny of Vienna and the Holy Roman Empire.

His historiographical approach means that the author only touches upon the direct connections between Madrid and Vienna, for example, as established by the marriage between Maria of Spain (1528–1603), sister of Philip II, and Maximilian II (1527–76), his cousin and successor on the imperial throne (1564). Nor does Edelmayer discuss in detail the 'Spanish youth' which was a formative experience for Maximilian and then for his sons Rudolph (1552–1612) and Ernst (1553–95). In a different context, however, Edelmayer emphasizes family tradition by pointing out several times that in his 'network' Philip was continuing the system of connections which his father had been able to build up over many years as ruler of the Netherlands and Holy Roman Emperor.

In the core chapters of his study, Edelmayer displays a commanding, impressive knowledge of the documents, especially those held in the archives of Madrid, Vienna, Munich, Simancas, and Bregenz. He presents a range of people who had connections with Madrid as the crucial points where the strands of the net intersected. He artfully separates out and discusses imperial councilllors (chapter 3), Catholic imperial princes (chapter 4), subjects of the Empire as Spanish colonels (chapter 5), Protestant imperial princes (chapter 6), and mercenaries (chapter 7). Madrid used a number of well considered instruments in the diplomatic cultivation of these men: 'good correspondence', visits from ambassadors, accepting godparenthoods, gift-giving, and perhaps most importantly, paying pensions. 'Good correspondence', a new and not very analytical term which the author introduces 'by analogy with the language of the sources', refers to the personal correspondence between Philip II and the respective imperial pensioner concerning family and personal matters. The conclusion, finally (chapter 8), entitled 'Resumen: La red de Felipe II en el Sacro Imperio', offers a summary and explains why the years 1565 to 1580 were selected as the focus of the study.

Adam von Dietrichstein, Vienna's long-serving ambassador to Madrid and an impressive example of a 'good correspondence'; Duke Albrecht V of Bavaria; Jakob Hannibal von Hohenems (relative of Pope Pius IV and of Archbishop Markus Sitticus of Salzburg); Duke Julius of Brunswick—all of these were leaders in the German territories in the late sixteenth century and did, in fact, take part in the high politics of the Empire immediately after the Peace of Augsburg of 1555 established a truce between the Catholic and Protestant powers. Among the most outstanding findings of the book for this reviewer was the discovery of how undogmatically Charles V's son, champion of Catholic Christianity, pursued his (indirect) imperial politics. The section on Spanish pensioners from Brandenburg takes as an example the negotiations between Madrid's ambassador to the Empire and Prince Elector Joachim II plus his son Margrave Johann Georg. It demonstrates how pragmatic and even businesslike were the negotiations between king and imperial prince, Catholic and Protestant, just a few years after the confessional Schmalkaldic war of 1547. One of the main aims of the Spanish side, incidentally, was to prevent William of Orange from recruiting military reinforcements by neutralizing Brandenburg (p. 211), a political goal which the

imperial princes, who were at that time still Lutheran (until 1613) apparently found quite acceptable.

The reader, though, cannot always follow the political outcomes of Spanish clientele and networking techniques. In some cases the meticulous reconstruction of correspondences, negotiations, and positions takes precedence over the task of fitting these stories of court and diplomacy into a wider framework. The price to be paid for the book's main advantage—the concentrated view it offers of political networking and informal techniques of conducting foreign policy—is a certain tendency to one-sidedness, for it will not be possible clearly to assess the (admittedly very broad) research field 'networking and diplomacy' until its results can be correlated systematically with political history and history based on other sources relating the same people and issues. The justified and repeated reference, for example, to the fact that in 1556 Philip II adopted Charles V's network in the Holy Roman Empire, remains one-sided as long as we do not find out how it was damaged, changed, or repaired by the dramatic events in the Netherlands (the regency of the Duke of Alba from 1567) and in the Empire itself, to which they belonged.

Here it would have made sense to contrast the sources predominantly from dynastic and high aristocratic circles which Edelmayer uses, and which have a built-in perspective from the top down, with those from a different social origin. Chapter 2, for example, 'The Image of the Empire in Spain', is strangely bloodless as a result, and does not attain the level of 'imaginology', the investigations of mutual perceptions in the European countries of that period (cf. for example, the studies by Heinz Schilling, Berlin, on mutual perceptions between Spain and Germany in the late sixteenth century—'Dass doch mein liebes Vaterland/Erlöst wird auss der Spanier hand!/Lass uns bleiben bei deinem Wort, stewer des bapsts un Spanier mord !').

The lack of reference to other sources also applies to the origin and scope of the documents: the volume relies more heavily on Spanish sources than on those from the Empire itself (with which the author is highly familiar). Where the two groups of sources overlap, as in Philip II's affiliation with the Empire through his possessions in the Netherlands, Burgundy, and Milan, a contrast would have been especially interesting.

Finally, the author's slight reluctance when it comes to methodological or theoretical reflection is not entirely satisfying. The obliga-

tory reference in the Introduction to Wolfgang Reinhard's essay on client structures and networks in the early modern period is not taken up again or used productively for the case in point. The concept of the network, for example, much more than client structures, presupposes communication between people of almost equal rank. The reader's curiosity about the extent to which the author, who rejects the term 'clientele' for his investigation at the start (p. 30), has also considered the opposite path is not satisfied. To what extent did the numerous and powerful German pensioners exert any influence on the image of the Holy Roman Empire in Madrid, and on Spanish policy toward the Empire?

The advantages of this volume, which thanks to the involvement of two publishers (Oldenbourg Verlag and Verlag für Geschichte und Politik) is very pleasingly presented and largely free of printing errors, include the wealth of perspectives which the leitmotiv opens for the history of the early modern period. It will enrich our historical understanding of foreign policy constellations and conflicts if, in future, we take more account of informal forms of exerting influence such as lobbying. Edelmayer has demonstrated an impressive appetite for work over the last few years, and after reading the 'new Edelmayer' one would like to address the question of pensioners in England at the time of Philip II, once husband of Mary I, or of those in imperial Italy and at the Vatican (Wolfgang Reinhard).

Central European history would also benefit from some network studies. In 1806 a descendant of Charles V, Emperor Francis II (1768–1835), laid down the crown and, at the same time, fearing Napoleon's covetousness, declared the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation defunct. As Emperor Francis I (from 1804), of course, he continued to reside in Vienna, and supported by Prince Metternich (1773–1859) from Koblenz in the Empire, he continued to exert great influence on the destiny of the German Confederation. How he did this deserves our special interest. Austria still saw itself, as opposed to Prussia, as the pre-eminent power in Germany. The practised way in which Vienna employed its ancestral political instruments is well known. But the extent to which the Austrian emperor and the German prince acted informally and continued to extend and use the network which had been carefully spun until 1803/1806 remains to be established.

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FRAUKE GEYKEN, *Gentlemen auf Reisen: Das britische Deutschlandbild im 18. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt/M: Campus, 2002), 357 pp. ISBN 3 593 37130 8. EUR 39.90

A well established interest in images and perceptions of other nations, countries, and peoples exists in historical, and especially in literary, research. Scholars point out that in the eighteenth century Germans developed a special interest in Britain and the British. Influenced by French philosophy, German society formed a view of Britain which could partly be described as eighteenth-century German Anglophilia. Certain attributes of the German image of Britain, such as 'freedom', for example, were based on Enlightenment values. As more attention was paid to life in Britain, its politics, society, culture, and economy, more Germans travelled, especially in the second half of the eighteenth century. They produced a large number of travel accounts, such as travel journals or diaries. This travel literature provided a forum for the discussion of images and perceptions of Britain and the British. But how did British contemporaries see Germany and the Germans? What was the image of Germany in eighteenth-century Britain, especially when the Hanoverian elector, George Louis, became king of England in 1714?

The present study by Frauke Geyken, based on her Ph.D. thesis, asks questions like this. Yet her interest is not merely to add British images and perceptions of the Germans in the eighteenth century to the present store of knowledge. Her intention is to record a corpus of clichés and thus to develop a genealogy of stereotypes. At a second level of analysis, Geyken is particularly interested in the relationship between the British discourse on Germany and the construction of British national self-images. How did the images of Germany and the Germans function in the process of constructing identity? Furthermore, she asks whether a British identity or a notion of Britishness already existed at that time, and if so, what it consisted of. This study thus adds to British historical and literary research, but takes a different approach to the subject. Unlike Paul Langford, who defines 'Englishness' in terms of how others have seen the English and by identifying characteristic features,[1] Geyken reconstructs British

[1] Paul Langford, *Englishness Identified: Manners and Characters 1650–1850* (Oxford, 2000).

national self-images out of the reflections of the British on the Germans.

Geyken's study is based on a wide range of sources and interpretations, which have been catching up with recent discussions of work on Britishness done by Linda Colley, Keith Robbins, and Paul Langford. This book fills a gap. It considers, in addition to the established research field of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the genesis of British images and perceptions of Germany. Geyken's interpretations of the way in which these images were functionalized casts new light on aspects of the emergence and the development of a British national self-image. The study will be of great use to historians and other readers.

The book itself is divided into two parts, reflecting the main issues it addresses: *Bilder* (images) and *Wahrnehmungen* (perceptions). Geyken starts by defining these two terms in relation to theoretical reflections and with special reference to the British case. What pictures did the British have in mind when they thought about Germany and Germans? Who was interested in Germany and for what purpose? What types of texts transmitted knowledge about Germans?

Geyken goes beyond travel literature as a source. This was the most popular literature in eighteenth-century Britain, and reflects the images held by those Britons who were able to read and had the opportunity to travel and to write. She adopts Michael Harbsmeier's (erroneously Habsmeier) approach, set out in 1982 and used ever since by scholars examining the travellers themselves and their mentalities.[2] Another group of sources Geyken uses are encyclopaedias and dictionaries, which take a longer-term perspective and are more detailed and voluminous than travel literature. As a counterpoint to these, Geyken argues, she includes pamphlets and the *Gentleman's Magazine*, which took a short-term perspective and dealt with current events. Geyken's source material shows the images and perceptions of different social groups throughout different periods from the end

[2] Michael Harbsmeier, 'Reisebeschreibungen als mentalitätsgeschichtliche Quellen: Überlegungen zu einer historisch-anthropologischen Untersuchung frühneuzeitlicher deutscher Reisebeschreibungen', in Antoni Maczak and Hans Jürgen Teuteberg (eds.), *Reiseberichte als Quellen europäischer Kulturgeschichte: Aufgaben und Möglichkeiten der historischen Reiseforschung*, Wolfenbüttler Forschungen 21 (Wolfenbüttel, 1982), pp. 1–31.

of the seventeenth century to the nineteenth century. To use all these various sources is an ambitious undertaking.

In the methodological and conceptual sections of the book the author deals with the important discussion of the demand for interdisciplinary research. The study draws on historical research on the eighteenth century by Jeremy Black, John Brewer, and Roy Porter on the one hand, and by Hermann Wellenreuther and Michael Maurer on the other. Geyken includes research by scholars in the field of images and perceptions, in particular, on Germany (*Deutschlandbilder*). Unlike those scholars, however, Geyken is not investigating the distinction between image and reality. Rather, she concentrates on what the texts reveal about their writers. Thus she asks what meaning her sources produced within the broader political, social, and cultural framework. The methodological approach taken by Jürgen Osterhammel in his book *Die Entzauberung Asiens*,[3] also influenced the present study in so far as Osterhammel looks at texts and authors in their cultural context, and asks who travelled and who wrote.

The first part of Geyken's book is descriptive and presents British images of Germany and Germans which provide the background for further analysis. In this attempt to demonstrate what the British knew about Germany, the focus is on travel literature, encyclopaedias, and dictionaries. At the beginning of the eighteenth century only a few British travellers went to particular parts of Germany, such as Westphalia, on their way to Italy. Even after the Hanoverian succession there was still little interest in Germany. Some travellers went to look at King George I's country, curious to see how small it was. It was not until the middle of the century, after Rousseau's ideas about nature had had an impact, that Germany became part of the Grand Tour. Although the route did not change, more attention was paid to Dresden and its king, August the Strong, and from 1740 to Berlin and the young Prussian king, Frederick II. Travellers were attracted by the Rhineland landscape, which became even more popular at the beginning of the nineteenth century. None the less, knowledge of German geography improved only slowly.

The chapter explains the development of British travel and travel literature, and contains many references to travel books in support

[3] Jürgen Osterhammel, *Die Entzauberung Asiens: Europa und die asiatischen Reiche im 18. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 1998).

of the argument that travellers or armchair-travellers had a certain amount of knowledge about Germany before they even started their journeys. Geyken draws upon a wide range of dictionaries and similar sources to identify the information that they added to contemporary knowledge of Germany. She concludes that both sources influenced each other and that they had a strong impact on building up images of Germany. However, the country did not occupy a larger part of the British imagination until the end of the eighteenth century.

This chapter describes how the British saw German topographical and geographical conditions as well as political relations. This produces a group of stereotypes which Geyken categorizes under the following headings: anthropological, social, political, and 'The German as such' ('Der Deutsche an sich'). In this chapter, reference is made to pamphlets as a source. The analysis shows that contradictory stereotypes existed side-by-side. Some had disappeared by the end of the century, such as the stereotype of German alcoholism, while others, such as German militarism, changed their meaning. All of the clichés originated in the period before the eighteenth century. Examples from writers are presented, in particular, descriptions of 'the German' from Tacitus's *Germania*.

The larger, second part of the study is analytical. Geyken addresses the question of how certain aspects of images and perceptions of Germany and the Germans functioned within the framework of the eighteenth century, and investigates the process by which the British self-image was constructed. She concentrates on four different topics: politics, religion, history, and culture. Geyken's approach will be illustrated here by reference to politics. She begins by taking a close look at pamphlets and articles from the *Gentleman's Magazine* in the broader context of discourse analysis. Then she relates particular images of King George I and Hanover to specific circumstances, such as the Hanoverian succession and the Silesian Wars. Geyken points out that at the beginning of the eighteenth century the discussion of the Hanoverian succession was a major issue in British public discourse. While pamphletists and journalists had no particular interest in either George I or in Hanover itself, Geyken can show that Hanover was used to criticize particular political developments in Britain, such as the debate about Hanoverian soldiers in the 1740s, Britain's position between Europe and America, and the question of

a standing army. The personal union between England and Hanover changed the premisses of English politics. This led to fears as expressed in Edmund Waller's statement: 'Hanover robbed us of the benefit of being an island', which is used for the chapter title.

In similar vein, Geyken shows how perceptions of German religion, history, and culture were relevant to the construction and maintenance of a positive national self-image. She demonstrates that images changed and emerged in particular situations. The meaning of the image was dictated by this situation, rather than developed by the accumulation of knowledge over a period of time. It is remarkable to see how pamphletists, for example, wrote about another country, although they were less interested in it than in their own country.

In the final chapter Geyken concludes her interpretations of previous research. Her thoughts on the issue of the emergence of 'Britishness' are noteworthy. In contrast to Eric Evans, Hermann Wellenreuther, and Linda Colley, who date the development of national consciousness to around 1760, the end of the Seven Years War, or the time after 1770, Geyken suggests an earlier date. She argues that the British component in the pamphlets concerning the debate about Hanover in the 1740s is very strong. This argument worked as a 'catalyst for the development of Britishness' (p. 296), for example, in the anti-European position or in the case of religion. By the 1750s the British national self-image had developed certain forms. The basis had been created, even though the loss of the American colonies and the French Revolution led to some shifting of positions.

Frauke Geyken has produced an important book. It will inspire a discussion about the relationship between Britain and Germany. The author contributes the British image of Germany and Germans to the research and surveys the development of *Deutschlandbilder* from the end of the seventeenth century to, in some cases, almost the twentieth century. She points out that British writers expressed many of their self-images by providing a substantial amount of detail, thus gaining awareness of 'Britishness'. Geyken also demonstrates that various texts shaped the emergence of a national self-consciousness. Her book is well-written and generally illuminating. It would have been useful to have a subject and a name index.

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HANS-ULRICH WEHLER, *Nationalismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgen* (Munich: Beck, 2001), 122 pp. ISBN 3 406 44769 4. EUR 7.50

In 1967, Hans-Ulrich Wehler penned a small book, entitled *Das Deutsche Kaiserreich, 1871–1918*, for a series on modern German history. The book initiated an immensely successful assault on German history as it was then practised and known, namely, as intellectual history and as the history of politics, with foreign policy *primus inter pares*. Currently in its eighth edition, this 'youth pamphlet' as he once called it, shaped the writing of German history for the next two decades, until its root assumption, a German *Sonderweg* based on the putative political predominance of the nobility over the middle classes in a period of rapid industrial change, was shown—mainly by Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn—to be mistaken. Much has changed in the intervening years. The ensuing *Sonderweg* debate, as John Dewey would have predicted, was not so much solved as abandoned, and the Bielefeld School, like the *Grand Armée* in the spring of 1812, was both predominant in the field and embattled on too many fronts. Its latest conflict concerned its founding fathers—Theodor Schieder and Werner Conze. As we now know, they worked out plans for massive population displacement in the East during the Second World War and in this capacity participated actively in the deportations of Jews to their death in the Holocaust. Like the literary theorists of deconstruction in the case of Paul de Man, ranking members of the Bielefeld School, Wehler among them, rallied to the qualified defence of their academic mentors. Wehler demanded a historicization of the deeds of Schieder and Conze—diachronically into their good years in the Federal Republic and synchronically with respect to other historians, like Eric Hobsbawm, who also followed allegedly false gods. Wehler, moreover, plausibly argued that no continuity existed between the Bielefeld School and its brown roots in the Nazi past.[1]

The last twenty years have witnessed new areas of emphasis in Bielefeld: concentration on the bourgeoisie as a field of serious study; the discovery in the late 1980s of religion as force in its own right; the reluctant embrace of gender as a category of analysis; and the hesitant, belated, opening to cultural history as an 'enrichment' of social

[1] Interview with Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Der Tagesspiegel*, 8 Dec. 1998.

history. A quieter development has received less attention. In the late 1980s, Hans-Ulrich Wehler turned to a topic close to the heart of his academic mentors: the study of nations and nationalism. He not only directed a stream of dissertations on the subject, but also wrote insightfully about it in his widely acclaimed masterwork: *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*. Wehler has now produced a small volume, a pamphlet he might say, that brings together his reflections on this critical topic.

The book was written with unusual speed and considerable passion. But unlike some of Wehler's polemical essays, which are often quick to dismiss innovation, this book is based on serious thought and wide reading. It is an exceptional work, and easily the best very short book on nationalism. Despite its brevity, and precisely because of Wehler's status, it is important to consider its assumptions critically and not glide over them in an elegant skate-slide of praise.

Wehler starts with the *annus mirabilis* of 1983, in which Ernest Gellner published *Nations and Nationalism*, Eric Hobsbawm (along with Terrence Ranger) edited *The Invention of Tradition*, and Benedict Anderson wrote *Imagined Communities*. Wehler is critical of each. He concurs with Gellner's dictum that nationalists make nations, not the reverse, but contends that Gellner's more controversial postulate—that the nation represents an answer to the homogenizing demands of an industrializing society—cannot be true, as nationalists existed before the beginning of industrialization. He is equally critical of Hobsbawm's notion of 'invented traditions'. Early nationalists, Wehler maintains, did not merely conjure the cultural material of the nation but moulded and shaped something already there. Cultural construction yes, but not wholly—this seems to be Wehler's eminently sensible, if not especially novel, position. While the concept of invented traditions has certainly been generalized, it should nevertheless be noted that the book, *The Invention of Tradition*, and Hobsbawm's particular contribution to it, represents less a theory of nationalism than an empirical analysis of select cultural practices of (mainly) official nationalism. Benedict Anderson represents a more serious challenge, particularly since *Imagined Communities* was perhaps the most widely cited work of Anglo-American social theory in the 1990s and a touchstone of the cultural turn.

Anderson situated nationalism primarily in the realm of culture, not politics or society; he thus emphasized the political salience of

poems and novels, and in the second edition, maps and the culturally constructed censuses. Military battles, railways, and iron foundries fared less well. In Anderson's dexterous hands, nationalism emerged not as an inevitable product of the transition to capitalism (though there was some of this in his reflections on print culture), or as the legitimizing ideology of the bourgeoisie, but rather as a culturally constructed belief system, more akin to the great religious systems than to political ideologies like liberalism. The latter point was especially important, as it fortified an argument that nationalism was about something more than just politics.

Wehler, who once scoffed at cultural history if it pretended to be anything more than a baroque curlicue adorning the solid pillar of social history, embraces Anderson's text as a work that significantly advances our understanding of nationalism. He also chastises traditional historians of nationalism, like Otto Dann, who seemed to be on vacation during the 'miraculous year'. But Wehler draws a battle line. Anderson's theory has a blind spot for 'real historical' structures, which are not linguistic in nature, 'such as the experience of war and revolution' (p. 10).

If in life the devil resides in the details, in theory it often rests on a word. Wehler is far too well-read to have missed the debate about 'experience', especially as it turned—in the Anglo-Saxon world—on its usage in E. P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class*. Thompson, who intuited the problem, argued that the working class arose as the result of the common experience of exploitation, but in both the structure of his masterpiece, and in revealing formulations, he understood that 'the working class did not rise like the sun at an appointed time', but 'was present at its own making'.[2] An idea—liberty—shaped the experience of exploitation; culture preceded, or at least co-existed with, the event; in the beginning there was the word. Wehler simply passes this point by, and for the purpose of discussion, we should as well. His main interest is in tying the new history of nationalism to a social history of politics—bringing it to the ground, his ground, as it were. The attempt makes the book original and full of unresolved tensions. For historians of nationalism, it is a roadmap through the uncharted land between the Weber of Parsons and the Weber of Geertz, along byways staked out in large measure

[2] E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (London, 1963), p. 9.

by Hans Kohn, from whom the idea of nationalism as secular messianism comes, and John Breuilly, the most insistent voice arguing that nationalism has always been, and still remains, a political phenomenon.

Wehler follows this road. Nationalism, he argues, 'emerged as the answer to structural crises of early modern western societies and their once all-encompassing world views' (p. 17). In the abstract, this is plausible, but the same might be said of either liberalism or conservatism. It is also relevant that Wehler situates the emergence of nationalism centrally in the west, and ignores the criticism levelled at Benedict Anderson for advancing the same claim. Wehler's argument is more specific, and interesting. The emergence of nationalism was 'in its core a political phenomenon in the struggle for rule and legitimation' (p. 18), and it began with a revolution: that of the Dutch in 1581.

The revolt of the Dutch constituted the first successful rebellion of a peripheral land against a centralized imperial power. A 'pioneer society' powered by merchant capital, the Dutch developed 'a proud self-image' (*ein stolzes Selbstbewusstsein*), which 'already betrayed elements of a future nationalism' (p. 19). Wehler, unfortunately, desists from adducing evidence for the claim, or even telling us exactly how a proud self-image foreshadows an emerging nationalism (for certainly the Dutch were not the first citizens to evince a proud self-image). Still, the point must surely be that this self-image (a) is in opposition to an imperial power, the Spanish Habsburgs under Philip II; (b) suggests a way in which the Dutch were special (as modern, cosmopolitan capitalists); and (c) is tied up with religious opposition—in this case Dutch Calvinism against Counter-Reformation Catholicism.

Wehler stretches the model to cover successive revolutions in the Atlantic World: the English Revolt between 1642 and 1659, which rendered England temporarily into a 'pioneer society', and the American Revolution. The English Revolt, we are informed, drew its *élan* from the Republican traditions and from the egalitarian sentiments of the Levellers and Diggers. It also conforms to Wehler's model—liberation from monarchical dominance, sense of one's own special mission, and religious piety coupled with anti-Catholicism. Wehler already refers to this as nationalism ('dieser Nationalismus' p. 20), though the scholarly literature by no means supports his view

without reserve.[3] If the English model assumes a minor role in Wehler's narrative, the same cannot be said of the USA. The American Revolution started as a tax revolt, but it nevertheless quickly assumed the political dimensions of proto-nationalism: it represented a challenge to an imperial power; it drew its emotional force from a mixture of republicanism and sense of divine mission, and, if not anti-Catholic, it nevertheless manifested a distinct aversion to the religious hegemony of the established Anglican church. Wehler is careful to emphasize the religious dimension, but the case for nationalism is less clear—partly because difference was not defined in ethnic terms, partly because the discursive justification for home rule was cast in a gendered, enlightened idiom of human rights: 'that all men (not all Americans!) have the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.' Jefferson's language is all the more striking because a nation-based language of liberty already existed in the rights discourse of 'free-born Englishmen'.

From the start nationalism dressed itself in the garments of Clio. It preferred roots to rules, metaphors of depth to images of light, and it more often appealed to the ear—Herder's lyre—than to the eye. Wehler does not mention the Counter-Enlightenment in his discussion of the late eighteenth century. In a famous essay entitled 'Two Concepts of Liberty', Isaiah Berlin distinguished between negative and positive liberty: the first kind belonged to the tradition of Jefferson, and called for liberty from the intrusions of one's own tyrannical government; while the second kind referred to the right of a group—religious, ethnic, or national—to determine its own way of life. Positive liberty, the second way of understanding liberty, fuelled the Counter-Enlightenment revolt, with Vico and Herder its most prominent exponents. Wehler does not mention either (Herder only in connection with an aside about Liah Greenfeld's admittedly problematic narration of German nationalism from Herder to the Holocaust). Consequently, it remains unclear why early forms of political nationalism arose in the Atlantic world but the most intricate expression of cultural nationalism should flower in central

[3] For the complexities of this problem, see John Morrill, 'The British Problem *c.* 1534–1707', in Brendan Bradshaw and John Morrill (eds.), *The British Problem* c. *1534–1707: State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago* (London, 1996).

Europe, more precisely in Köngisberg and Riga, on the periphery of the Enlightened world. In Wehler's scheme, history moves from west to east, the latter imitating the former; the Counter-Enlightenment is not a force in its own right.

The thesis works for Germany only if either of the following two conditions holds. Either the pre-1790s discussion of the nation between German *Aufklärer* is taken to be relatively unimportant for the subsequent development of German nationalism, or the British and the American Revolutions primarily influenced that discussion. The case for the influence of the American Revolution is well documented. Wehler himself claims that more than 3,000 German titles were devoted to the American Revolution in the years 1770 to 1790. Yet Horst Dippel, who not only counted but also read many of these titles, argues that republicanism, not independence, sparked so much interest in the Americas. What attracted the German *Aufklärer*, then, was not so much the intrinsic value of the nation itself as the perception that the American Revolution 'proved that the liberal ideas of the Enlightenment might be put into practice'.[4] The case for France can only be made in the 1790s, though obviously the influence of the *Philosophes*, in particular Rousseau, cannot be ignored in this context. The decisive question, then, concerns the politicization of German nationalism. Most commentators, including Wehler, agree that this took place in the first decade of the nineteenth century. On what categories, then, does this nationalism turn? What are its sources? And where does its emotional *élan* come from?

The answer should be—*pace* Wehler—the experience of war and foreign rule. But Wehler, one might argue, chooses the wrong war: there is now a considerable literature that places the beginning of a new discourse of German nationalism not during the Wars of Liberation but in the midst of the Seven Years War. This discourse had little to do with religious revolt or overcoming the ever-present crises of modernity—it had to do, instead, with Prussian expansion, military power, and external threats. The 'fatherland discourse', Hans-Martin Blitz has recently argued, already evinced many of the xenophobic and masculine-heroic attitudes we typically associate with the latter phases of nationalism. It is true that in history some-

[4] Horst Dippel, *Germany and the American Revolution, 1770–1800* (Wiesbaden, 1976), pp. 335, 103.

thing always precedes something else, but in this case, the periodization has consequences for Wehler's central argument, namely, that the constructivists have overlooked those 'real historical' structures 'such as the experience of war and revolution' (p. 10). It is at least arguable that Thomas Abbt and Johann Wilhelm Ludwig Gleim had already aestheticized the 'experience' of war in the 1760s. They thus rendered war as something that bound a community (albeit not yet a national community) together; it was no longer simply a scourge visited upon the innocent or the retribution of the Lord on the fallen. This paradigmatic shift, however hesitant, combined with subsequent discussions, like the national spirit debate of the mid-1760s, and the poetry of *Sturm und Drang*, shaped the way German intellectuals 'experienced' the two greatest 'real events' of the age: the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars.

This is not to dismiss the hard materiality of revolutionary violence and the suffering brought about by Napoleon's wars, nor to downplay the obvious ways in which people with guns can change history and force others to submit to their will. But as Clifford Geertz always insisted, cultural history 'does not make the world go away, it brings it into view'.[5] *Mutatis mutandis*, nationalism was not a reaction to the real but a political doctrine that structured how the real was perceived and acted upon; it is at once a model of and for the world. The Napoleonic Wars, which for Wehler must be counted as one of those real structures, illustrate, in fact, the point. Nationalist myths portray them as popular wars of liberation, yet the vast majority of German troops—in Prussia, roughly 90 per cent—were regular soldiers, not volunteers.[6] Not the sheer fact of the war, but the discursive constructions of the German nationalists—most conspicuously Ernst Moritz Arndt's bloody-mindedness and Fichte's radical identity politics—structured the war so that it became a significant chapter in the emergence of German nationalism, especially in the north, and in contradistinction to Austria, equally affected by war's grim realities.

[5] Clifford Geertz, *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology* (New York, 1983), p. 183.

[6] Horst Carl, 'Der Mythos der Befreiungskriege: Die "martialische Nation" im Zeitalter der Revolutions- und Befreiungskriege 1792–1815', in Dieter Langewiesche and Georg Schmidt (eds.), *Föderative Nation* (Munich, 2000), pp. 73–6. Wolfram Siemann, *Vom Staatenbund zum Nationalstaat: Deutschland 1806–1871* (Munich, 1995), p. 307.

There is much in this pithy volume that protagonists on both sides of the cultural turn can agree upon: the importance of different kinds of nationalist contexts (here ideal types), the centrality of carrier groups who are increasingly organized into clubs and associations, and the importance of cultural work. Thus for Wehler railways are important, but not more than the dictionaries that helped standardize language, the book trade that multiplied the impact of cultural labour, and the rise of literacy, which ensured nationalism increasing social depth.

More open to question is his location of these factors exclusively in the west of the long nineteenth century. The argument cascades down like an avalanche. Only in the west were there consolidated states that drew legitimacy from established ethnicities. Only in the west could revolutionary crises of modernization call forth a nationalistic utopia based on popular sovereignty and self-determination. Only in the west did nation and religion converge in a secular messianism. And only the west possessed a public sphere, highly influenced by a capitalist market economy, in which nationalist intellectuals organized in associations. Finally, only in the west was it plausible for nationalist intellectuals to seize state power and remake politics in a new key. In this narration, subsequent nationalist movements in the Third World are essentially imported wares. Perhaps this is true, but it has all the strategic subtlety of the otherwise brilliant Hannibal dragging his elephants across the Alps before marching on Rome. More precisely, it renders irrelevant the local contexts of nationalism, and how these contexts shaped national movements. Yet it is precisely on this point that subaltern studies have enriched not only what we know, but also how we conceptualize this knowledge. Partha Chatterjee, for example, has argued that colonial nationalism developed not in identity but in opposition to western forms of nationalism, granting the west the material but not the spiritual domain.[7] In fact, the discipline of colonial history, at least since Robinson and Gallagher, is predicated on the notion that one cannot write it from the perspective of the metropolitan centres alone. It follows that one must develop a conceptual framework that conceives

[7] Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* (London, 1986). See also his *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, 1993).

of nationalism in the Third World as something other than merely 'transfer nationalism'.

Wehler considers two cases of nationalism more specifically: the USA and Germany. The first should not detain us long. The eight pages Wehler devotes to the USA centre on the insight—old, obvious, simple, and not altogether false—that a strong missionary impulse fuels American nationalism. Wehler also argues that there is an American tradition of externalizing evil, which helps us understand why there is a Holocaust memorial in Washington and not a monument to slavery. As with Goldhagen's thesis, one just does not know where to start, except to be crestfallen about the evident influence of Peter Novick on German intellectuals.

Let us move on, as Wehler's thoughts on German nationalism are of immensely greater complexity, and consider two aspects of his narration. The first concerns religion. For Wehler, German nationalism, like its American counterpart, derives its force from religion, and indeed nationalism as such counts as a 'political religion', with all that this implies for its messianic, sacral, and symbolic characteristics.[8] The argument would have been sharper had he discerned its specifically denominational contours, for German nationalism self-evidently assumed different patterns among Protestant intellectuals than among Catholic or Jewish thinkers. The second aspect concerns Wehler's emphasis on the Janus-faced nature of early nineteenth-century nationalism, its mixture of participatory and exclusionary rhetoric. The argument exists in uneasy tension with his claim that 'taken as a whole', German nationalism remained a liberal reform movement until 1871. After 1871, the radicalization of German nationalism occurred in the main under the auspices of conservatives, who, in their familiar way, retreated to nationalist positions in order to combat the overwhelming pressure of modernization and the ongoing crises that beleaguered them.

Really, however, one cannot have it both ways. If nationalism was exclusionary at the start (and Wehler is right on this point), its subsequent history cannot be narrated as an odyssey from left to right, liberal to conservative, opened to closed. Wehler sees the problem,

[8] One senses that this thesis allows Wehler to consider nationalism as a kind of false consciousness, much as the term 'invented' allowed Hobsbawm to consider nationalism an aberration.

and towards the end of the book points out that exclusionary tendencies, directed particularly at Jews, had always inhered in German nationalism (p.100). But the narrative works otherwise, for it is still beholden, like a ship that has not cut its last frayed lines to an old mooring, to a schema that plots nationalism as initially progressive, which it was, and therefore open, which it was not.

The book closes with an impassioned argument for recognition of the non-nationalist achievements of modern states—a programme of democracy, the rule of law, social security, and an economic system checked by environmental concerns. Wehler believes that in the long run these achievements will outlast the forces of nationalism. 'The longer that peace lasts and the more stable the programme becomes, the more the socially integrative, politically legitimizing power of nationalism will diminish' (p. 115). One prays that he is right.

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ANDREAS W. DAUM, *Wissenschaftspopularisierung im 19. Jahrhundert: Bürgerliche Kultur, naturwissenschaftliche Bildung und die deutsche Öffentlichkeit, 1848–1914* (2nd edn.; Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002), xii + 619 pp. ISBN 3 486 56551 6. EUR 59.80

For a long time 'German popular science' seemed almost a contradiction in terms. Historians of science studied disciplines in relation to state and economy, and overwhelmingly in the universities. While no survey of science in the German lands was complete without a mention of the relatively well-worked topics of 'vulgar' materialism and *Darwinismus*, a venerable view compared German efforts at popularization unfavourably with the British example. Meanwhile, general historians' research on *Bürger* and *Bürgerlichkeit* tended to leave natural scientists and science out. Such, by and large, was the situation that Andreas Daum encountered and sought to change. His book, first published in 1998 and now issued in a paperback that includes a short new preface and an additional bibliography, provides a huge weight of evidence for the liveliness and variety of science popularization in Germany and for the view that natural science was an essential component of German middle-class culture. It is a major achievement: a revised doctoral dissertation that is already the standard work in the field.

Daum's survey is organized into seven systematic chapters. The first offers a *Begriffsgeschichte* of *Popularität*, *Popularisierung* and *Populärwissenschaft*, and the second sketches the history of science in the secondary schools. Chapter 3 is about associational culture, not just the *Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte*, the peripatetic national forum that was the model for the British Association for the Advancement of Science, but also, and crucially, the fine network of local *Naturvereine*. Especially original is Daum's recovery of the societies founded from 1859 in memory of the universal scholar, traveller and *Kosmos*-author Alexander von Humboldt. The following chapter traces the tradition of natural science as organized world view to liberal Protestants and Catholics, the *Lichtfreunde* and *Deutschkatholiken*, around 1848. Importantly, for the early twentieth century Daum gives the religious and conservative attempts to promote their own versions of science equal billing with the propaganda of their better-known opponents in the Monist League. Chapters 5 and 6 investigate the literary market for science, and the challenges and strategies of

popularization. This involves extending Alfred Kelly's sceptical view of the accessibility to lay readers of, for example, the *gemeinverständliche Werke* of the Darwinist prophet Ernst Haeckel. They were significant, nevertheless, but perhaps mainly for their illustrations, as sources for writers who produced the genuine bestsellers, and because they were studied simultaneously by professors of zoology. The most successful authors, Daum emphasizes, were by the end of the century painting a harmonious picture, in which nature was re-enchanted and natural science reconciled with literary culture, that was a far cry from the harshly polarizing polemics of the militant freethinkers. The last chapter arranges the very various popularizers into types.

Daum concludes that what was special about Germany was not any lack of lay cultivation of science or any general contempt among German scholars for the work of communicating with wider publics. Indeed, there was even more going on than we are shown here, where the focus is on natural history, rather than, for example, medical advice; the analysis is of printed words, and to a lesser extent lectures, at the expense of other media; and Social Democracy appears largely as a threat. Yet the point is made. What was peculiar about Germany, Daum argues, was the tension between civic activities and the uniquely strong system of state-sponsored scientific research. The political meanings of popularization after 1848 and in the late-nineteenth-century crisis of the *Bildungsbürgertum* were distinctive too.

This is an immensely informative book. The systematic structure inevitably cuts many of the connections through which science changed, and means that earlier events are often introduced primarily as precursors of later controversies. But it very clearly brings together and organizes an impressive diversity of materials. With the numerous useful tables, a biographical appendix and an extensive bibliography, this is an invaluable reference work. It is also already, as Daum intended, helping historians to move on. Two general challenges strike me as standing out: to place the science described here with respect to other aspects of bourgeois culture, and to develop the potentially radical implications for the history of knowledge of this widespread participation in science.

The case for the importance of natural science in bourgeois culture could be refined by exploring cultural activities more widely, and asking how these sciences figured (and what counted as science). For

example, how did the activities, memberships and political roles of the *Naturvereine* relate to those of the other institutions in a town? How were the works that Daum discusses read in different communities? For Britain, James Secord's *Victorian Sensation* (Chicago, 2000) now demonstrates the state of the art in reception studies. How did reading go along with visiting zoos, panopticons, and hygiene exhibitions, or using such inventions as the clinical thermometer, by the end of the nineteenth century a regular item in middle-class homes? Such questions shift the perspective from those for whom the natural sciences were clearly central to the roles they played in other lives.

Daum discusses critiques of the conventional view of science popularization as the diffusion of knowledge down a gradient of truth, but defends his use of the term over a more neutral alternative like 'expository science'. 'Popularization' does fairly describe the self-understanding of many of his actors, but its use still reinforces the dominant view. It remains too easy to see autonomous processes of professionalization and specialization as simply calling forth a demand for popular science to fill a gap between professors and people. In this framework it is also too hard to see how the works discussed made a difference to academic science. Ludwik Fleck's study, *Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache*, first published in 1935 and rediscovered in the last few decades, is helpful in pointing to a more dialectical approach, as well as to the practices of making knowledge. Fleck distinguished between 'esoteric' and 'exoteric' circles of science, but insisted on the importance of the latter as a repository of simplicity and generality on which, especially outside their own narrow areas of expertise, researching scientists have continually relied.

To explore the relations and distinctions between natural science and other cultural products, and between popular and specialist science, it will be necessary to analyse far more specifically how claims to knowledge were pressed and meanings made. Then we shall see by what means the apparently stable boundaries were created, maintained—and broken down. Thanks to Andreas Daum's survey, historians are already beginning to approach such challenges with much greater confidence. And because these studies will need at first to focus more closely, his book will surely remain the one indispensable work in the field for many years to come.

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MARK S. MICALE and PAUL LERNER (eds.), *Traumatic Pasts: History, Psychiatry, and Trauma in the Modern Age, 1870–1930* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), xiv + 316 pp. ISBN 0 521 58365 9. £40.00 $US 59.95

Since 1870 not only the past has been traumatic. The present is traumatic too, and there are no indications that traumatic events will decrease or even vanish in the future. On the contrary, as streams of globalization and fundamentalism interact, different cultures seem to clash as never before. New, ultramodern technologies and communications contrast with atavistic ways of dealing with conflict which generate new forms of conventional warfare, terrorism, and violence. A scientific, technologically supported civilization and public welfare on the one hand, and manifestations of inhumanity on the other have exposed mankind to a gruelling test of incompatibilities that human beings can neither explain nor bear. These incompatibilities used to occur only regionally, but they spread out to involve the entire world public, perhaps because general questions of human rights (often concrete interests) are touched upon, perhaps because the whole of mankind faces imminent danger. A feeling of global helplessness increases against the optimistic myth of unlimited chances. Traumatic experience expands both individually and collectively.

While 11 September 2001 was a unique example of collective traumatization, Bruno Bettelheim described individual trauma after his experience of concentration camp imprisonment: 'We are in an extreme situation if we are catapulted into a position where our old adaptive mechanisms no longer help and some of them even endanger our life instead of protecting it as before. In this situation we are deprived of all our defence systems and we are thrown back so far that we must develop new attitudes in response to the situation, new ways of life, and new ideals. ... If we speak about the disastrous consequences of concentration camp imprisonment, we must always keep in mind that this experience was so traumatic that the integration of the grown-up personality was either completely or largely disturbed. ... Each trauma proves that the integration reached so far cannot give adequate protection.'[1]

[1] Bruno Bettelheim, *Erziehung zum Überleben: Zur Psychologie der Extremsituation* (2nd edn.; Munich, 1985), pp. 20 and 37.

We find the term 'trauma' used in different contexts in psychology, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis. In 1980 the American Psychiatric Association (APA) defined trauma for the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM) and the *International Classification of Diagnoses* (ICD) as heavily stressful events or an extremely threatening or catastrophic situation (rapid or persisting for a longer time) which would cause deep despair in almost anybody. As psychotraumatology gained in importance, the psycho-medical literature on trauma grew, especially about Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

Only a few of the many publications about trauma can be mentioned in relation to the book under review. A basic contribution to the issues was edited by Bessel van der Kolk, Alexander C. McFarlane, and Lars Weisaeth under the title *Traumatic Stress – The Effects of Overwhelming Experience on Mind, Body and Society* (New York, 1996). In it, internationally acknowledged trauma experts provide a comprehensive summary of the current state of knowledge about psychotraumatology and a guide to future clinicians and researchers which has been acclaimed as the 'gold standard reference for many years to come' (Judith L. Herman, MD).

The authors who have contributed to *Traumatic Stress* are all psychological or psychiatric trauma experts. One essay in the book is devoted to how the issues of psychotraumatology have been conceptualized historically over the past century and a half. The troubled relationship of the psychiatric profession with the idea that reality can profoundly and permanently alter people's psychology and biology is examined. In the preface we read: 'Mirroring the intrusions, confusion and the disbelief of victims whose lives are suddenly shattered by traumatic experiences, the psychiatric profession has periodically been fascinated by trauma, followed by stubborn disbelief about the relevance of patient's stories. Psychiatry has periodically suffered from marked amnesias, in which well-established knowledge was abruptly forgotten and the psychological impact of overwhelming experiences was ascribed to constitutional or intrapsychic factors alone. From the earliest involvement of psychiatry with traumatised patients, there have been vehement arguments.'

In *Traumatic Pasts* all these arguments are at least touched upon, and most are competently discussed not by psychiatrists but by historians. They address questions such as: is the aetiology of trauma

patients' complaints organic or psychological? Is trauma the event itself or its subjective interpretation? Does trauma itself cause the disorder, or do pre-existing vulnerabilities? Are these patients morally weak malingerers, or do they suffer from an involuntary disintegration of the capacity to take charge? Should they ignore it and go on with their lives?

Jonathan Shay's *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character* (New York, 1995), holds a special place among the psychotraumatological literature. Shay is a psychiatrist who cared for American Vietnam veterans suffering from PTSD. He examined Homer's *Iliad* in the light of his experiences, and found amazing analogies with the complaints of traumatized Vietnam veterans. Shay notes two recent and by no means universally accepted (in the field of psychotraumatology) phenomena, 'the berserk state' and the 'betrayal of "what's right" ' in the aetiology of chronic post-traumatic stress disorder after combat.

Of course, the historian's view includes more of the (historical) contexts of life than the psychiatric view. The interaction between the two disciplines, history and psychiatry, may be compared with the interaction between two eyes, each giving a monocular view of what goes on and, together, providing a binocular, in depth-view.

The Canadian historian Edward Shorter has published a number of popular, interdisciplinary books, one on the history of psychosomatic illness,[2] and a survey of 200 years of psychiatric theory and practice.[3] In connection with these a publication by a German historian, Joachim Radkau, could be mentioned: *Das Zeitalter der Nervosität: Deutschland zwischen Bismarck und Hitler* (Munich, 1998). Psychotraumatology and its history are considered in more or less detail in these books. In principal they suffer from the disadvantage that from the historical point of view (Shorter and Radkau) psychotraumatology appears only as a (psychiatric) subspeciality, or vice versa, from the psychiatric point of view (van der Kolk *et al*.) historical issues appear only as subspeciality. This gap in traumatology and history has now been filled by *Traumatic Pasts.*

[2] *From Paralysis to Fatigue: A History of Psychosomatic Illness in the Modern Era* (New York, 1992).

[3] *A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac (*New York, 1997).

The book itself is a handsome hardback whose jacket shows a well-known picture of a queue of gassed British First World War casualties stepping through the bodies of dead comrades, led by a medical orderly. About 300 pages long, the book contains contributions by twelve authors including a profound and comprehensive introduction by the editors (Mark S. Micale and Paul Lerner), and is subdivided into four parts. The editors also contribute an article each to part 3. Notes on contributors, an index, and footnotes are appended.

Given the special meaning which trauma has acquired since the 1930s as a result of the cataclysms of the Holocaust and the Second World War, it could be asked why *Traumatic Pasts* is limited to the period from 1870 to 1930. One answer might be that to face the new and spectacular dimension of trauma in the more recent past would run the risk of earlier historical but nevertheless important aspects of trauma disappearing from scientific attention and discourse. It is one great merit of *Traumatic Pasts,* therefore, that it concentrates on just that half-century from 1870 to 1930, the period that witnessed the emergence of technological modernity in parallel to the formation of the first organized and systematized means of studying its consequences on the human psyche. The simultaneous emergence of these two phenomena was, the editors of the book argue, far from coincidental.

Obviously, intensely distressful emotional and physical experiences have always occurred, but in the sixty years covered by *Traumatic Pasts,* psychological trauma acquired the status of a disease entity with a technical terminology, theories of causation, and classification and therapeutic systems as well as medico-legal standing and governmental recognition. These two modern trajectories, write the editors, occurred in a parallel and often self-reinforcing manner; together they gave birth to the medical and cultural engagement with mental trauma.

Each essay in the book elaborates a distinct point within the intersection of these two modern trajectories. Taken together they cover the overlapping political, cultural, medical, and military approaches to mental trauma. As mentioned above, the volume is subdivided into four parts: (1) the spread of railways during the last quarter of the nineteenth century; (2) the introduction of accident insurance and the early welfare state starting in the 1880s; (3) the rise of psycholog-

ical psychiatry around the turn of the century; and (4) and the First World War and its social and cultural aftermath.

Seen from the standpoint of a century of space travel, 'intelligent' missiles etc., it may seem ridiculous to find an old-fashioned technology such as the railway described as an icon of technological modernity recurrently associated with shock and trauma. In fact, the discussion of trauma, its causes and pathology, started in connection with railway accidents and the symptoms displayed by people involved in them, not only in Britain as described in the first part of *Traumatic Pasts* (chapter 2 by R. Harrison), but also in German-speaking central Europe. The discussions and disputes have not been resolved to the present day. Similar debates were brewing beyond Britain. E. Caplan shows in chapter 3 that the origins, nature, and evolution of post-traumatic symptom formations also engaged North American doctors during the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

In the second part (chapters 4 and 5) W. Schäffner and G. A. Eghigian look at the contexts of work, accidents, and trauma in the early welfare state. They take special note of circumstances in Germany where, on the heels of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's pioneering compulsory insurance legislation of the 1880s, the Imperial Insurance Office recognized the existence of 'traumatic neuroses' (*traumatische Neurosen*) in 1889. Thus post-accident nervous symptoms became eligible for benefits under the terms of the new workers' compensation legislation, a series of measures implemented to undercut the revolutionary potential of the growing Social Democratic movement. This marks the front-line of the never ending and fundamental conflict about mental trauma in which the individual interests of victims collide with official, governmental, or financial interests. P. Lerner's contribution, 'From Traumatic Neurosis to Male Hysteria: The Decline and Fall of Hermann Oppenheim, 1889–1919' (chapter 7), continues the description of this conflict in the third part.

Part 3, 'Theorising Trauma' must, of course, include Jean-Martin Charcot and *les névroses traumatiques*. In his essay, 'From Medicine to Culture in French Trauma Theory of the Late Nineteenth Century', M. S. Micale shows how the charismatic Parisian neurologist captured world-wide attention with his work on victims of railway and work-place accidents. In dozens of published case histories in the 1870s and 1880s, Charcot publicized the new diagnosis category 'traumatic hysteria' (*hystérie traumatique*).

In addition to the mental effects of accidents, war, and catastrophes, another of the theoretical roots of trauma is to be found in the psychology of sexuality. L. Cardyn considers the construction of female sexual trauma in his essay, 'Turn-of-the-Century American Mental Medicine' (chapter 8, part 3). While medical writings about rape, particularly marital rape and genital abuse, including self-mutilation, offered empirical evidence of widespread sexualized violence against women, these harrowing case stories, Cardyn concludes, were not separately theorized in the American medical literature of that time. Beyond all the epoch-making impulses which resulted from psychoanalysis, the modern psychology of sexual trauma promises new and perhaps revolutionary insights into psychopathology, for example, the pathogenesis of borderline-syndrome and other mental disorders.

Military psychiatry undoubtedly had a similar impact. As progress in surgery was said to derive from the battlefield, the same could be said of progress in psychotraumatology. Part four of *Traumatic Pasts* looks at 'Shock, Trauma, and Psychiatry in the First World War' in four remarkable essays (by P. Leese, B. Bianchi, M. Roudebush, and C. Cox). The nexus of trauma, psychiatry, and modernity that lies at the centre of this book is nowhere dramatized more sharply than in the Great War. The issue of compensation for mental war traumata became a touchstone for the discussion of all questions associated with trauma. On the other hand, war, the 'father of everything', is history 'written in blood', as B. van der Kolk has said.

Traumatic Pasts illustrates the great analytical advantages of a comparative approach in terms of both time and culture. To be sure, scholars must remain sensitive to what is distinctive about particular types of trauma—accident trauma, rape trauma, war trauma—with their radically different contexts. One conclusion to be drawn from reading *Traumatic Pasts* is that it is worth exploring more closely the psycho-plastic influences of life contexts on human biological and mental qualities. None the less, a perusal of the book as a whole reveals countless interconnections; in ways that have not previously been appreciated, civilian and military episodes in the history of trauma continually overlap. The book's primary goals are to provide a generous sample of the best new historical scholarship on trauma; to indicate the empirical, analytical, and methodological scope of this work; and to present some of the conceptual and methodological issues inherent in writing about the subject.

All these goals are achieved in a readable style which, with one possible exception, will appeal to a general readership beyond trauma experts. The editors and authors provide an enormous apparatus of footnotes, sometimes covering more than three-quarters of a page. Even the scientifically-trained reader could find it difficult to take in all the fascinating facts and information accumulated in the volume. Neither this small disadvantage nor the price should prevent an interested public from using the book. A translation into German is desirable.

JÜRGEN PH. FURTWÄNGLER has had a long and distinguished career as a military psychiatrist. On his retirement in 2000, he was head of the department of neurology and psychiatry at the *Bundeswehr* hospital in Hamburg. He has published widely on stress, suicidology, addiction, youth violence, trans-generational problems, and psychotraumatology, and has worked on anthropological aspects of the psycho-social significance of the Other for the image of humanity in Western culture.

CLARENCE LUSANE, *Hitler's Black Victims: The Historical Experience of Afro-Germans, European Blacks, Africans and African Americans in the Nazi Era,* Crosscurrents in African American History (New York: Routledge, 2002), viii + 312 pp. ISBN 0 415 93121 5. £65.00

In 2000, Hans J. Massaquoi's autobiography *Neger, Neger, Schornsteinfeger!* (in English: *Destined to Witness*) became a best-seller in Germany. While the book covers Massaquoi's whole life, the part in which he describes his youth as an Afro-German in Hamburg during the Nazi period is especially intriguing. He endured racial slurs and faced dangerous moments, but at the same time lived a relatively normal life and went to work daily. One of the most dangerous incidents occurred when a hostile crowd mistook him for a downed American pilot after a bombing raid in the autumn of 1944, a situation in which his local dialect and a German policeman saved him. The fact that he was on several occasions protected by his German compatriots may have contributed to the huge success of Massaquoi's book. Despite being the child of an absent African father and a German mother, Massaquoi did not suffer the same degree of systematic persecution as the members of the Jewish community in Nazi Germany or, after the war had started, as the Jews in the occupied territories.

In *Hitler's Black Victims*, Clarence Lusane tries to dispel the impression that Massaquoi's case is a typical one. Afro-Germans, European Blacks, Africans and African Americans, Lusane argues, were targeted by the Nazis as a group because of their racial background. They were as much victims of the Nazi Holocaust as other 'racialized oppressed groups' (p. 7), for example Jews and Gypsies, and therefore entitled to compensation from the German government. According to Lusane, members of the black community in Germany are critical of Massaquoi's book because it 'does not address the policies and political nature of antiblackness among the Nazis in a systematic way', and this 'serves to undermine the the [sic] argument for recognition of a collective assault and for compensation' (pp. 36–7).

Lusane's book is an attempt to set the record straight by writing blacks back into the history of the Holocaust from which they—according to him—have been excluded in the past. The author wants to 'excavate the nature and significance of "blackness" and "anti-

blackness" in Germany and the occupied lands in the periods preceding and constituting the Nazi era. This also includes identifying the oppositional praxis and resistance on the part of black Germans and other people of African descent trapped under Nazism, as well as the discourse and engagement regarding these issues from other parts of the black diaspora, including African Americans' (p. 5). Lusane aims not only to deconstruct what he calls the 'hegemonic discourse of the Nazi era that, for the most part, has written out or downplayed the presence of antiblackness and Negrophobia'. He also wants to reconstruct the changing, unevenly applied, and often contradictory nature of the Nazi racial agenda, to expand knowledge of the black diaspora in Europe, to 'reconceptualize our framework on racism', and to 'examine the roots of contemporary European racism through the prism of the black experience under Nazism' (all quotations pp. 6–8). For a book of 265 pages of main text, this is an ambitious project.

Hitler's Black Victims consists of four parts. The first is entitled 'Beyond a White German Past' and contains the introduction as well as a chapter on 'The Structuring of Black Marginality in Nazi Germany'. In Part II the author goes back to 'Blackness before Hitler' to discuss, for example, the German colonial experience in Africa, including the genocide of the Hereros, and the presence of people of African descent in Germany before 1933, with special emphasis on black troops during the French occupation of the Rhineland after the First World War. The third part, which forms the core of the book, deals with 'Blacks and Nazism', including the daily life of blacks in Nazi Germany, the sterilization of Afro-Germans after 1933, the fate of blacks in Nazi camps, and how Nazi propaganda addressed and used the issue of blackness. Other chapters deal with jazz, black athletes, and the various forms of resistance by people of African descent to the Nazi regime. The last part, 'Black Skins, German Masks', addresses the issues of racism and blackness in contemporary Europe and especially Germany. It is followed by an appendix consisting of an English translation of the 1935 Nuremberg Laws, endnotes, a bibliography, and index.

Hitler's Black Victims is to a very large degree based on published books and articles, most of them in English. Nevertheless, the author, who teaches at American University in Washington, DC, claims that the history of blacks in Germany, especially during the Nazi period,

is a 'relatively uncharted land' (p. 14). This is a curious statement, considering the number of publications he uses in his work. In fact, his bibliography has significant gaps. Peter Martin's work on the treatment of black prisoners-of-war (POWs) by the German armed forces, for example, is missing, as is the same author's *Schwarze Teufel, edle Mohren: Afrika in Bewußtsein und Geschichte der Deutschen* (1993) and the volume by David McBride, Leroy Hopkins, and C. Aisha Blackshire-Belay, *Crosscurrents: African Americans, Africa, and Germany in the Modern World* (1998). Likewise missing is the article by Johnpeter Horst Grill and Robert L. Jenkins, 'The Nazis and the American South in the 1930s: A Mirror Image?', published in the *Journal of Southern History* (1992), to name only a few important studies Lusane did not use.

The title *Hitler's Black Victims* suggests a focus on those blacks who actually lived under Nazi rule, but Lusane's interest in the history of white racism and the worldwide black diaspora causes him to make extensive and sometimes lengthy digressions. A topic as broad as the experience of blacks in the Nazi era requires conceptualization, but to go back as far as the Native Americans Christopher Columbus brought to Spain from America (p. 59) is to somehow overplay it. As another example, he also recounts in detail the already well-known fate of the 'Hottentot Venus', Sarah Bartmann, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, although she never entered Germany (pp. 57–9). Lusane's rather fierce criticism of Adam Hochschild for his portrait of Edmund Morel in *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa* (1999) maybe deserved, but is out of place (pp. 69–77). Another distracting feature is Lusane's tendency to provide as much biographical detail as possible on most black men or women he mentions. The African American Lonnie Lawrence Dennis, for example, does not rank among Hitler's black victims by any stretch of the imagination, but his life is retold over almost three pages (pp. 122–4). The musician Valaida Snow receives even more attention, although almost nothing is known about her eighteen months in a German internment camp (pp. 165–72). The story of the rest of her life, the history and significance of female jazz musicians in general, and the fact that two compilations of Snow's work are still for sale on the internet, do not contribute much to the main topic of Lusane's book.

The book clearly suffers from a lack of organization. Historiographical questions, for example, are discussed in the introduction as

well as in the first chapter. On several occasions, the author makes seemingly contradictory statements. He writes that the African population in the German colonies never accepted German rule, but that the Hereros tried for more than twenty years to live peacefully with the Germans (p. 49). He argues that 'very little has been written' by black soldiers on their experience in German captivity (p. 147), but informs the reader six pages later that 'many of the black British POWs have written about their experiences' (p. 153). He asserts that the *Reichskulturkammer* never issued 'sweeping restrictions banning jazz outright', but the reader learns a few lines down that its supreme head, Joseph Goebbels, issued a ban on 'all foreign, non-Aryan music, including jazz' in 1937 (p. 202).

Also distracting are the numerous typographical errors and incorrect spellings of German expressions, like 'Schwartz Deutsch' (p. 12), 'Ficsher' (p. 50), 'Volkschuen' (p. 61), 'NSDDP' instead of NSDAP (p. 79), 'Neunengamme' instead of Neuengamme (p. 164), 'Afro-Deutsch Fraülein' (p. 261), 'Swing-Heines' (p. 204), and '*Der Stumer*' instead of—presumably—*Der Stürmer* (p. 226). 'One of the most respected scholarly presses publishing today', as Lusane describes Routledge (p. viii) should have done better.

Corresponding with this, the author displays a certain carelessness with facts. Again, a few examples will have to suffice. The German population, for example, was nowhere near 250 million in 1932 (p. 98), and *Das Schwarze Korps* is first described as 'the official organ of the Gestapo' (p. 104), but later correctly identified as the newspaper of the SS (of which the Gestapo was a part). Sarah Bartmann died in 1816, not 1825 (p. 59). The German POWs at MacDill Field Base Hospital in Tampa did not demand and achieve the segregation of the hospital mess halls in January 1945 (p. 152). It was the American POW Camp Commander who disapproved of the Germans coming into contact with African Americans in the hospital's kitchen and mess hall. He initiated the opening of a second mess for (white) officers and civilians, while black and white patients continued to eat together in another hall. The concentration camp Neuengamme was not originally a regular prison, but a regular prison was built on its site three years after the Second World War. In addition, there were no 'daily killings by gassing' in 'showers' in this camp (p. 164), although 448 Soviet POWs were murdered in arrest cells by gassing on two occasions. The *Kristallnacht* pogroms

took place in 1938, not 1937 (p. 201). And, finally, German Chancellor Schröder and German President Rau did not 'ban' the National Democratic Party (NPD); they cannot do this under the German Basic Law (p. 263). Rather, a coalition of the major German parties has asked the German Supreme Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*) to do so, unsuccessfully so far because it has been revealed that many of the NPD's leadership were on the payroll of the German domestic intelligence service.

On other issues, the reader would like to have more information, or at least a footnote. Less than a page, for example, is given to two Afro-Germans who, in interviews with other researchers, claimed to have been members of the Hitler Youth (pp. 111–12). One of them also served in the German Army, a claim also made by a third Afro-German man. No more information is provided other than that one of them served on the Eastern Front and was taken prisoner by the Soviets. It is almost incomprehensible that Lusane does not make any attempt to check these or other sensational claims, such as, for example the story that Hitler had dinner with an African American exchange student in 1932 (p. 95). Another example is Lusane's assertion that the Afro-German jazz musician William MacAllen was given a yearly pension of 60,000 DM in the early 1960s by the German government 'as compensation for racial discrimination he suffered during the Nazi time'. Although this was a substantial amount of money (equivalent to about 212,000 DM in 2002) and MacAllen spent most of the Nazi period outside Germany, Lusane is content to state that it is 'unknown what specific instances of racism MacAllen had had to endure' (p. 199). Equally deserving of critical verification is the assertion that a well-know German fighter-pilot and—according to Lusane—swing lover 'was able to influence Hitler who then pressured Goebbels to make German radio music more swinging' (p. 203).

In addition, a number of Lusane's interpretations and remarks are questionable. His reference to the Neanderthal remains found near Düsseldorf in 1856 as proof of an early African presence in Europe does not require much comment (p. 54). The statement that the European powers went after African land 'like schoolchildren fighting over stolen candy' might be a nice turn of phrase, although it does not really capture the nature of European imperialism, but to argue that the acquisition of a few colonies in Africa critically benefited the

German economy and 'contributed greatly' to the country's industrialization is more than debatable (p. 45). To accuse the German boxer Max Schmeling of a 'solid legacy of contributions to Nazism' (p. 219) is a gross misrepresentation, and at one point, Lusane himself comes dangerously close to accepting the popular Nazi explanation for their anti-Semitism when he writes: 'Unlike Jews, who worked in a number of sectors where their presence was felt economically, Blacks did not and could not dominate any economic area' (p. 30).

The author's casualness with facts and language becomes especially problematic when he addresses the status of blacks under Nazi rule. Lusane makes a number of unsustainable statements, for example, that racial segregation in America 'foreshadowed the segregation that Jews and racial minorities would face under Nazism' (p. 89) and that it is 'clear that Hitler used the Jim Crow segregation statutes as his model for defining Jews in the Third Reich' (p. 105). As he knows himself, the Nazis did not have to go so far afield to find inspiration for discrimination against Jews. In addition, to link the discrimination of blacks in the American South with the treatment of Jews in Germany is deeply flawed. Unlike German Jews, African Americans were still citizens of their country. They had thriving communities, newspapers, and allies who supported them in building the foundations of a successful civil rights movement at the very same time as European Jews were being sent to the extermination camps. The Nazi policy against the Jewish population was clearly much more devastating than the discrimination against African Americans in the South (p. 185), and at one point, Lusane himself concedes that American blacks were well aware of this (p. 147).

In his effort to present blacks in general as victims of the Holocaust, the author is occasionally less than precise in his use of key-terms. Afro-Germans had to work for the Nazi war effort like everybody else, but to call them 'forced laborers' (pp. 110, 115) is to blur important distinctions between the obligation to work and forced labour. If he has any evidence that a disproportionate number of blacks ended up in Nazi forced labour camps, he does not present it. The forced sterilization of the descendants of black occupation soldiers in the Rhineland and other Afro-Germans was a brutal crime and traumatized its victims, but to call it a 'slow holocaust' and a 'program of slow extermination' (p. 141) creates the erroneous impression that almost all people of African descent in Germany

were affected by it. While the author acknowledges the fundamental differences between concentration, POW, and internment camps, he nevertheless mixes them up. Given the general level of brutality in most Nazi camps, this might appear to be an academic distinction, but when we discover that Evelyn Anderson Hayman was able to receive food, coffee, lipstick, perfume, and face powder in what Lusane calls a 'concentration camp' near Liebenau, the necessity to differentiate her experiences from those of other concentration camp inmates becomes obvious (p. 158). Later in the book, the author writes about the 'purgatory of the concentration camps' and that 'Black and Jewish jazz artists were among those in the camps', but then gives the example of a black trumpeter who was arrested in 1940 and held in an internment camp in France where, according to his own claim, he 'was not mistreated nor did he witness any race prejudice' (p. 209). Likewise, Jean Marcel Nicholas, who did spend some time in concentration camps because he spied for the Allies, also reported that he was not treated worse than others because of his complexion (p. 239). The only racism Cy Grant, a black pilot in the British Royal Air Force, encountered in his POW camp was from a fellow American prisoner, not from the German guards (p. 153). Other people of African descent were persecuted because they were active in the Labour Movement (pp. 87, 235), and a number of black—as well as white—soldiers became victims of German war crimes (p. 153–5). Indeed, the reader of *Hitler's Black Victims* is often left with the distinct impression that Massaquoi's experience during the Nazi period was not that unique at all, and that simply being black did not (yet) automatically single one out for persecution, mistreatment, or murder.

In conclusion, *Hitler's Black Victims* makes a disappointing and at times even annoying read. For a very long time, the fate of blacks under Nazi rule has indeed not received the attention it deserves. Because the Nazis treated people of African descent very differently depending on time, place, and their respective nationality, much research still needs to be done. *Hitler's Black Victims* could have made an important contribution to filling the gaps, but as Lusane himself comments, some books on the history of blacks in Nazi Germany are 'poorly written, badly researched, and nothing short of exploitative' (p. 272, n. 19). With its numerous flaws and catchy title, printed in silver letters on a black cover (the colour scheme of SS uniforms), his

own book can be counted among them. It can only be hoped that *Hitler's Black Victims* will at least be successful in promoting its political agenda. There can be little doubt that the vast majority of Germans still automatically regard people of African descent as 'foreigners' in the Federal Republic. Partly as a result of this, anti-black sentiment and violence are still a problem in Germany, despite all efforts over the past decade to counter the rising tide of xenophobia. Nor can it be denied that many blacks have a right to financial compensation for their suffering under Nazi rule. If Lusane's work can raise awareness of these issues in Germany and abroad, it would still have some worth.

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MARIAN MALET and ANTHONY GRENVILLE (eds.), *Changing Countries: The Experience and Achievement of German-Speaking Exiles from Hitler in Britain, from 1933 to Today* (London: Libris, 2002), xx + 259 pp. ISBN 1 870352 36X. £29.95

Hitler's 'seizure of power' in January 1933 prompted wide-scale emigration from Germany for political and, increasingly, racial reasons. What was, at the beginning, merely a trickle turned into a stream within months. By the time war broke out over 78,000 refugees were living in Britain (excluding children who had come with their parents). These were mainly Germans but there were also quite substantial numbers of Austrians and Czechs—in other words, more than 78,000 individuals whose lives had been completely changed by the ruthless acts of a despicable dictator. Britain had suddenly become what A. J. Sherman has aptly described as an 'island refuge', certainly not an idyllic and comfortable place with plenty of opportunities. However, for refugees who, in too many cases, had narrowly escaped persecution and even death, Britain represented a 'land of hope and glory' in a very real sense.

Nevertheless, Britain was not an easy place to reach for the thousands from Continental Europe struggling to land on its shores, nor was it a very welcoming one as far as the government in London was concerned. In April 1933 Whitehall granted temporary asylum to refugees from Central Europe with great reluctance, following urgent pleas by the leaders of the country's Jewish community. The authorities repeatedly let it be known that they considered Britain to be a country of transit only, certainly not of permanent settlement. After all, who was going to support the newcomers, most of whom had been unable to bring with them sufficient means for their livelihood? This was a reasonable question since the vast majority of the refugees arrived with only the notorious ten Reichmarks in their pockets that every emigrant had been allowed to export from Nazi Germany since 1934. As one emigrant who settled in Britain reminisces in *Changing Countries*, before they left Breslau in Silesia his mother 'went on a sort of spending spree, because we obviously had some money which she couldn't take out of Germany and she decided to buy things—she didn't know how poor or otherwise we would be in London. She bought things she thought would be saleable in England. For instance, she bought two portable manual typewriters

and a big Singer sewing-machine and quite a lot of things she wouldn't normally have bought, really to get rid of the money, to invest the money in goods' (pp. 66–7). Startled Londoners watched refugees arriving in the summer wearing brand new fur coats.

It is certainly a happy coincidence that the ever fascinating field of exile studies has seen the recent publication of two new books that complement one another in their methodological approach to the subject. Both, in their own way, are appraisals of the achievements of these refugees in the 1930s. In *The Hitler Emigrés: The Cultural Impact on Britain of Refugees from Nazism* (London: Chatto & Windus, 2002), Daniel Snowman analyses the emigration from Central Europe in its totality. He aspires to evaluate the remarkable tenacity and adaptability of people whose sudden arrival in a foreign land and culture hardly seemed conducive to worldly success. However, they succeeded against all the odds. Consequently, Snowman focuses on the likes of Sir Claus Moser, Sir Ernst Gombrich, Sir Rudolf Peierls, Lord Weidenfeld, Sir Nikolaus Pevsner and Anna Freud. This is, without doubt, an acceptable and legitimate approach, enabling a wider readership to appreciate the amazing influx and lasting impact of talent, expertise, and professionalism that Britain, without realizing it at the time, experienced after January 1933.

In *Changing Countries*, on the other hand, the editors Marian Malet and Anthony Grenville have chosen to tackle the issue from the opposite end. They too mention famous names, as do the authors of the various chapters in the volume. However, they are clearly more concerned with the 'grassroots' of emigration and the many difficulties of life in exile: the traumatic experiences of uprooting and forced transferral to a foreign country, the often painful process of adaptation and assimilation in the host country, and finally the coming to terms with life after 1945 when the extent and murderous consequences of the Nazi death machine had become fully apparent. Thereafter those who were fortunate enough to escape persecution and the Holocaust were confronted with the brutal reality of loss and, in many cases, the ongoing uncertainty as to what had happened to family members after deportation, often still unknown to the survivors today.

Malet and Grenville's *Changing Countries* is the outcome of an oral history project which began in 1994. They and their collaborators used a set of prepared questions to interview thirty-four former

refugees from a wide range of backgrounds who, after more than sixty years in Britain, were willing to talk about their lives, memories, and personal views. Their ages at the time the project started ranged from sixty-five to ninety, the women (23) outnumbering the men (11). Editors and authors make it clear that their selection is the result of personal contacts and recommendations, and therefore by no means a systematic representation of a remarkable group of people that is now rapidly decreasing in numbers. The recorded material is arranged under certain aspects, broadly following chronological order, and then used to analyse the life experience of the 'Continental Britons' from 1933 to the present. Thus there are chapters on 'Family Background before Emigration' (Anthony Grenville), on 'Departure and Arrival' (Marian Malet), 'Everyday Life in Prewar and Wartime Britain' (Stefan Howald), 'Internment' (Jennifer Taylor), 'Life as an "Enemy Alien" ' (Stefan Howald), 'Religion' (Anthony Grenville), 'Relations with the "Heimat" ' (Charmian Brinson), and 'Postwar: The Challenges of Settling Down' (Marietta Bearman and Erna Woodgate). These rather general chapters are further structured. Each of them deals with essential, sometimes seemingly banal, aspects of the ordinary refugees' lives, which in works such as Daniel Snowman's are almost totally ignored. Such aspects are, for instance, patterns of residence, social contacts and leisure, why England was chosen for emigration in any individual case, employment and standard of living, coping with English and the English way of life, and food and cooking.

In retrospect, all the thirty-four interviewees surmounted the numerous difficulties they faced in Britain after being forced to leave home, and led a fulfilled life in their adopted country. As a number of authors in *Changing Countries* point out, their loyalty as British citizens had, since their arrival, never been in doubt. They were and are today immensely grateful to a country that saved their lives and offered them generous hospitality and a 'second chance'. But, assimilation and integration into British society notwithstanding, practically all of them still have scars which, even after nearly seventy years, have not completely healed. 'I am not an Englishwoman', states one interviewee from Austria, 'I don't think I am. On the other hand, I am not an Austrian either. I am not a Jewess either because my religion doesn't come into it. I am a bit in the middle of nowhere' (pp. 243–4). Another interviewee confessed: 'I call myself British. I

would never call myself English. You can't become English' (p. 244). This is a view shared by almost all the former refugees. Even in later life they still have the feeling that they are different and have 'no true homeland' (p. 245). The absence of a strong sense of belonging or, for that matter, having a split identity can, on the other hand, also be seen positively. Some of the interviewees emphasize the advantages gained from the different cultures that play a part in their lives. And one former refugee, tongue-in-cheek, admitted that she does not mind standing above narrow patriotic sentiments. She likes to quote Sir Peter Ustinov's statement: 'I am happy to say that my foot does not start tapping at any national anthem' (p. 245).

Changing Countries offers detailed and illuminating insights into the experience and feelings of people who turned out to be, as Jean Medawar and David Pyke have aptly put it, 'Hitler's gift to Britain'. The contributors to this carefully edited volume analyse a unique story in depth and in detail, cleverly interspersing their analyses with excerpts from the interviews. There are inevitably minor shortcomings. Editors and authors do not, for instance, point out slight distortions or the occasional statement tainted by hindsight ('I remember saying at the beginning of the war—I was only eleven—"Now the Jews have had it in Europe" ' (p. 191). Berlin's university should not be called the 'Humboldt University' when referring to it in the years before 1949. And why are the findings of Marion Berghahn's pioneering study *Continental Britons: German-Jewish Refugees from Nazi Germany* (1988) 'by now due for revision'? Why was she, 'a scholarly outsider', not always 'able to capture the complexities of the integration of a group of German-speaking Jews into their new British environment' (p. viii)? However, in spite of such imprecisions, *Changing Countries* is a most interesting and readable book, a well-balanced scholarly work which will also appeal to a general readership. It is a moving testimony of human suffering and endurance, of courage and optimism shown by people who were cruelly thrown into a situation of utter hopelessness and despair. Moreover, *Changing Countries* celebrates, in a similar way to Daniel Snowman's work, the splendid achievements of a group of men, women, and children who had to overcome the traumas not only of flight and exile, but also of the unspeakable crimes committed against their kith and kin.

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YVONNE KIPP, *Eden, Adenauer und die deutsche Frage: Britische Deutschlandpolitik im internationalen Spannungsfeld 1951–1957* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2002), 441 pp. ISBN 3 506 77525 1. EURO 51.60

In recent years Anglo–German relations in the post-war era have been the focus of considerable scholarly attention. Three episodes have attracted particular interest: Mrs Thatcher's unabashed reluctance to welcome German unification, 1989–1990, the notoriously bad relationship between Adenauer and Macmillan during and after the Berlin crisis, 1958–1963, and the abortive attempts by Winston Churchill to overcome European division by means of high-level meetings with Stalin and his successors, 1951–1954. It is fair to say that British policy did not arouse positive responses in Germany in any of these cases, although Churchill's personal prestige remained high in Bonn. Yvonne Kipp has chosen to make a detailed study of the relationship between Adenauer and Anthony Eden, who was British Foreign Secretary from 1951 until Churchill's resignation in April 1955, when Eden himself became Prime Minister. His period of national leadership was relatively brief; in January 1957, overcome by ill health and the failure of his attempt to recover the Suez Canal from President Nasser of Egypt, he was forced to relinquish office and was replaced by Harold Macmillan.

Nevertheless, Eden played an important part in Anglo–German relations, both as Foreign Secretary and as Prime Minister. After the collapse of the European Defence Community scheme in the summer of 1954, his tireless diplomacy enabled the Federal Republic to become a full member of the NATO alliance, thereby gaining its sovereignty and emerging from its subordinate status as an occupied country. Its NATO allies pledged themselves to support German efforts at reunification in peace and freedom. All this was fully in line with the policies of Adenauer, and the British government was absolutely clear that it regarded him as a highly reliable German leader. Yet for some reason there remained a current of distrust between Bonn and London. Why was this?

There is no doubt that Eden himself sincerely wished to see Germany reunited. This was not because he harboured particularly warm feelings towards the Germans. On the contrary, he feared that, so long as Germany remained divided, the Federal Republic might be vulnerable to a nationalist backlash once *der Alte* was no longer in

charge. The West Germans might then be tempted to seek arrangements with the Soviet Union, thereby undermining the security of Western Europe. This was a fear that haunted the British Foreign Office during the first half of the 1950s. Eden therefore did all he could to build Germany up as a respected member of the NATO alliance, and to stress British loyalty to the cause of unification. But at the same time he wanted to try to leave open the possibility of improving relations between the Western powers and the Soviet Union, believing that only by meeting the justifiable security needs of the Russians could the West hope to obtain their agreement to unification on Western terms.

Eden was aware that the chances of achieving this objective were remote, but he was eager not to close the door on the possibility that by practical 'small steps' the tension between Moscow and the West might be relaxed. He did not see this as incompatible with his loyal commitment to the objective of unification. He sometimes upset his American and German colleagues by seeming rather too willing to conciliate the Soviet leadership. His invitation to Bulganin and Khrushchev to talks in London in April 1956 was an example of an initiative which created uneasiness in Bonn and Washington. Yet Eden went out of his way to reassure the West Germans that he was not leaving them in the lurch, keeping them informed on a daily basis about the nature of the talks and entertaining Foreign Minister von Brentano immediately after the Soviet visit to brief him on what had happened—a courtesy extended to neither the Americans nor the French.

Adenauer, for his part, appreciated Eden's help for the Federal Republic *vis-à-vis* the French, in particular, but he was unhappy about Eden's apparent willingness to negotiate with the Soviet Union because he feared that an arrangement which would suit the security needs of the British and the Russians would solidify the *status quo* in Europe, thus rendering German reunification impossible. In fact, Eden did nothing to which Adenauer could seriously object, but suspicions about British intentions in Bonn were never dispelled.

Kipp is scrupulously fair to both Adenauer and Eden in her analysis of their attitudes towards one another. Her work is based on a formidable array of archival material in Britain and Germany, including official records and collections of private papers. However, she inclines to a view common among German historians that British

governments in this period were too slow to give up pretensions to global power and thereby missed their chance to involve themselves in schemes for European integration. Eden was certainly no exception to this rule, but it should be remembered that, until 1957, the European project was a young and rather feeble plant that had few attractions for the British. More than half of Britain's trade was with the world outside Europe. Britain's Commonwealth gave it commercial and financial advantages. Its political and military obligations could not simply be abandoned. Viewed from London, Bonn seemed rather parochial in its concerns.

It therefore seems slightly unsatisfactory to blame Anglo–German tensions on the misguided global aspirations of the British. After all, the French managed to gain German confidence even before the advent of de Gaulle as President, and they had no intention of relinquishing their colonial empire. Nor did they regard themselves as a negligible quantity in world affairs. It would also be unfair to attribute difficulties between Bonn and London to Adenauer's notorious scepticism towards foreign statesmen. Adenauer appreciated the help he got from London even when he was uneasy about British overtures to Moscow. The British seemed a good deal more trustworthy than the French and only slightly less reliable than the Americans, although Adenauer knew that the power of the latter was indispensable for West German survival.

Perhaps in her concentration on high politics Kipp has tended to neglect some of the more mundane questions that might be asked about Anglo–German relations in this period. One of these relates to the role of the respective foreign offices in creating an atmosphere of trust—or alternatively of suspicion—between their governments. Kipp provides us with much interesting material about this, although she does not draw many conclusions from it.

So far as the British were concerned, there was obviously a good deal of residual anti-German feeling, even though the commitment to integrating Germany into the Western alliance was wholehearted, since it was in British interests. However, by no means all British diplomats shared Eden's commitment to unification; Gladwyn Jebb, the ambassador in Paris, even referred to German division as a 'happy situation' for Britain. Ivone Kirkpatrick, the senior diplomat in charge of the Foreign Office, was by no means enthusiastically pro-German, but he knew the Federal Republic from the inside and was

firmly supportive of Adenauer. On the other hand, the British ambassador in Bonn during Eden's period of office, Hoyer Millar, was less enthusiastic. After the Paris Treaties had come into force in 1955 and West Germany had achieved sovereignty, Hoyer Millar warned London that the Germans would soon start playing off the USSR against the West. He saw the increasing efforts by the Bonn government to open a dialogue with Moscow as an illustration of this tendency. Yet Eden himself showed little anxiety when Adenauer actually travelled to Moscow in September 1955. The British Foreign Office rightly calculated that the German Chancellor might make some progress over the question of German prisoners-of-war in the Soviet Union, but that he would not obtain any concessions over German unification. Ambassador Hayter in Moscow was told to demonstrate trust in Adenauer and to treat him as the leader of a sovereign state. When Adenauer duly agreed to open diplomatic relations with Moscow, despite having achieved no progress on the unification issue, Ambassador Hayter wrote a critical report on the German negotiations, claiming that the Chancellor had given up his 'most treasured' card for nothing and had shown 'pusillanimous amiability' towards his Soviet hosts. Hayter's views were not shared in London. When the American Ambassador in Moscow, Charles Bohlen, complained that Adenauer had been guilty of appeasement towards the Russian leadership, Eden minuted contemptuously: 'Bohlen is unbalanced. He appeased Russians strenuously at Jalta.'

So far as the *Auswärtiges Amt* in Bonn was concerned, more research is evidently needed, but there are indications that anti-British resentments were often not far below the surface and that they informed some of the advice that Adenauer was receiving. It is worth bearing in mind that by the time the *Auswärtiges Amt* was re-established, the Cold War was well under way and the de-Nazification policies of the Allied powers had been seriously discredited. Many of the senior diplomatic staff had worked for the Third Reich. Although their personal commitment to Nazism may have been only skin deep, their attitudes had been conditioned in an atmosphere of powerful nationalist revisionism. It would have been extraordinary if some of them had not resented Britain's role in encompassing the collapse of their former aspirations.

The first German Foreign Minister, Heinrich von Brentano, and such powerful figures as Walter Hallstein, permanent State Secretary

in the *Auswärtiges Amt*, and Herbert Blankenhorn, who directed its Political Department, were often more hawkish than Adenauer over such matters as the priority to be given to national unification. In the autumn of 1955 Blankenhorn, for example, shocked the British Foreign Office by suggesting that at the forthcoming Geneva Conference the West should consider accepting the Soviet offer of a united, neutral Germany. Ivone Kirkpatrick noted: 'Blankenhorn's attitude brings home to us how much we owe to the Chancellor [Adenauer] for his robust outlook and how great our difficulties will be when he goes.' The position of the *Auswärtiges Amt* was that any discussion of European security had to be linked to progress towards German unification, and it regarded Eden's willingness to probe the Russians about the possibility of mutual disarmament arrangements with disfavour. In November 1955 von Herwarth, the German ambassador in London, told a British colleague: 'If the Prime Minister had told Bulganin and Khrushchev that unless Soviet Russia changed her policy the Allies would drop the H Bomb, then the Russians would gradually have abandoned their position. Once we [the British] had told them we would not drop the bomb ... the Russians knew that they could go ahead with their policy and we would not stop them. We had in fact lost the only threat which would succeed.'

This sort of language was unlikely to impress the British Foreign Office. Nor was it enthusiastic about the Hallstein doctrine, designed to prevent other states establishing relations with the GDR. Although perfectly willing to recognize the Federal Republic as the only true representative of the German nation, British officialdom was sceptical about the practicability of pretending that the Ulbricht regime simply did not exist. Some form of *de facto* arrangements would have to be made with it if German division lasted for any length of time.

It was also noticeable that the *Auswärtiges Amt* did not seem particularly interested in attempts by the British to create warmer relations between the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom. When Brentano visited London at the end of April 1956 the British made a number of suggestions for improving public attitudes in both countries and for creating co-operation and confidence. But the *Auswärtiges Amt* reacted without enthusiasm, despite the proddings of Ambassador von Herwarth in London. How far this affected the course of Anglo–German relations it is impossible to say, especially because serious difficulties of a less avoidable kind were to emerge

during Macmillan's premiership. Nevertheless, institutional suspicions and resentments did not help to create a basis of trust.

These observations should not, however, detract from Yvonne Kipp's achievement in scrupulously unravelling a period in Anglo–German relations which laid the foundations for the permanent commitment of the Federal Republic to NATO and its acceptance as a respected partner in that alliance.

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KONRAD H. JARAUSCH and MICHAEL GEYER, *Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 380 pp. ISBN 0 691 05936 5. $18.95. £13.95 (paperback). ISBN 0 691 05935 7. $65.00. £45.00 (hardback)

There is a new cosmopolitanism in the air. The old concept has not only been rediscovered but reinvented for the global age. Many writers now maintain that cosmopolitanism is no longer a dream but has become social reality, and that it is increasing the nation-state that is a figment of our imagination. This intellectual stance has begun to shape the writing of history, and this book is a monumental attempt to employ it to rewrite the history of Germany.

For the authors, cosmopolitan history is the history of multiplicities. And their attempt to write a cosmopolitan history of twentieth-century Germany is above all an attempt to escape the central dichotomy that has until now defined that history and its historiography. Since there are few nations whose recent history seems at first (and even second) glance so ineradicably marked by nationalism, Germany appears to offer a perfect limit case for this approach. One might say, if you can do it here, you can do it anywhere. If the history of Germany can successfully and fruitfully be cosmopolitanized, than so can the history of any country.

Conversely, Germany may be exactly the bridge too far that shows the limits of this approach. The new cosmopolitan perspective is, in its own way, just as normative as the national one. Nationalists create absolutes out of relatives; cosmopolitans seek to relativize all absolutes. And in the case of German history, there seem at first sight to be some absolutes and uniquenesses that suffer from being relativized, and that lose some of their truth in the process.

As a summation of the last few decades of historical research on Germany, this book is an unqualified success. Both authors are scholars of the first rank, and the footnotes alone are worth the price of admission. But as an attempt to synthesize these new counter-narratives into a theoretical counter-framework, I think the book has to be accounted a noble failure, one that has much to teach us about this new approach. It turns out there are some confusions in its basic postulates that need to be resolved.

To start with, does it make sense to talk about writing a cosmopolitan history of Germany? 'The German problem is no more', so the

authors. They try to find answers to their own questions about how the 'children of the rubble' have turned into successful members of a civil society. The book *Shattered Past* explores this tension between the experience of the second half of the twentieth century and the memory of the first half. It moves between the experiences of destruction on the one hand and of the 'good life' on the other. German history has no choice but to move between these poles. The book investigates various historical master-narratives and methodologies and tries to come to terms with the variations of political and social histories, explaining at the same time why postmodern theory does not have a foothold in German historiography (it seems impossible to talk about the dangers of the tradition of the Enlightenment in the wake of German history itself), but had an impact when looking at 'representations' and 'symbolic power'.

Does not that force you by definition to take the national point of view, to structure history around the outlines of a nation-state? (Or, in this case, two nation- states.) By taking the viewpoint of its excluded, you may be writing it from inside out. By taking a comparative perspective, you may be looking at it from the outside in. But neither comparative nor multi-cultural history in itself transcends the national framework. They simply give it an inside and outside and display it from many angles. The authors suggest seven major themes for the deciphering of the German past: war, genocide and extermination; dictatorship and democracy; Germany in Europe or Europe in Germany; mobility and migration; national identities; gender history; and consumption.

In this sense the authors try to redefine and reinvent the Humanities for a global world. This is a double challenge: first to discover and criticize how history is still a prisoner of the nation-state and gives birth to a historically mistaken national imagination; and secondly, to redefine trans-nationally the basic theoretical concepts and units of empirical research like politics, society, identity, state, history, class, law, democracy, community, solidarity, justice, mobility, military, household etc. in a cosmopolitan perspective. This calls for a paradigm shift. And the authors attempt nothing less. Thus in the first part of the book, they analyse critically the master narratives of the historical profession, like the master paradigm of them all, the national one. They illustrate its rise and fall, offer alternatives (like the cultural turn), and provide a very good map for anyone interest-

ed in the subject. In subsequent chapters, they take on the collapse of the national master-narrative and look at 'counter-narratives': Marxism and its intellectual decline accompanied by the decline of the GDR. In their search for alternatives, they ponder familiar terrain with their demand for a closer scrutiny of minorities of language, religion, and race. At the same time they seem to be rather unhappy with the flourishing of German Jewish history, which they see as the result of 'philiopietist philanthropy and post-Holocaust guilt'. Given their rather open and cosmopolitan ponderings, this seems more than an unconscious slip. Thus they never consider the possibility that Jewish history or the history of various Jewries could provide just that desired exploding of the nation-state paradigm. Looking at the trans-national, trans-territorial, urbane, mobile, and textual character of Jewish life-worlds could provide that new historical paradigm with some empirical specificity, as was suggested in a recent book by Dan Diner.[1] A pondering of this Jewish perspective would give much more strength to their chapter on 'Modernization and German Exceptionalism'. The authors reject a teleological fixation on 1933, believing that it 'produces a misleading picture of developmental linearity', suggesting instead the appreciation of other trajectories such as labour struggles, periodic religious revivals, consumption, and other social processes.

Next is the question of the central dichotomy of modern German history, the one the authors explicitly want most to overcome, the division between the Nazi period and everything that came after. If we grant for argument's sake that we could transcend the perspective of the nation-state, the question then becomes: could we explain this once we got there? Normally Germany is regarded as having suffered nationalism to the nth degree. How can this be explained outside the perspective of the nation-state? And if the Germany of today is very different from the Germany of before—something the authors emphasize—then how can one escape the schema of before and after?

The authors' solution to both these problems is certainly elegant enough. The Holocaust and the rise of the Nazis have frequently been explained in terms of Germany's exceptional national development. The authors seek to turn this on its head. They take the Holocaust out of the framework of the German nation and reset it

[1] *Gedächtniszeiten: Über Jüdische und andere Geschichten* (Munich, 2003).

into the context of modernity. By this means, Germany ceases to be the exception to the standard path of European national development and becomes instead the exemplification of a common modernity. The Second World War was not a disaster suffered by Germany alone. It was a disaster suffered by all of Europe, and one which was prepared by all of Europe in the war before. Germany was simply its epicentre, as it was the epicentre of accelerating industrial development and efficiency and the stress they placed on society. As for the 'After period', it was also not simply the aftermath for Germany, but a new phase for all of Europe. It was the beginning of the European Union, which marked the start of a new phase in modernity, a cosmopolitan rather than a nation-state modernity. And once again, they would argue, Germany was at its centre. It was ahead of the others in its incorporation into transnational organizations. It was the most committed to building an international law to replace the law of the jungle that had previously regulated the interaction between states. And it was the most eager of nations to submit to this new and transformative second-order social contract.

By these means, the before and after of the Nazi period become absorbed into the before and after of the Second World War, which is the before and after of an inflection point in modernity. And then this inflection point is shaded and graded until it becomes more of a continuous process, since, if Europe and the world are heading towards a cosmopolitan future, it was not something that happened all at once. Different levels of society started changing at different times and in different rhythms. True inflection points exist only on graphs. The idea is an abstraction and a symbol for a much broader process of continuous change.

So what is wrong with this picture? Well, to start with, fascism can only exemplify modernity if Germany exemplifies modernity. But is that true? The conventional picture has been that Germany and Italy and Japan were all exceptions to the normal path of modern development, and all deviated in similar ways. They all developed late, both as nations and as national economies. The conventional wisdom has been that this accelerated development caused more stresses than if it had happened more slowly; national pride was aggrieved by what was perceived as a disadvantaged position about to be set in stone; and democratic institutions and political culture never had time to set in the national character before they were washed away in

a flood of nationalism. That is, of course, a huge simplification of an enormous debate. But the fact remains that Germany is not generally considered the rule of modernity, but rather its exception.

So how can the authors invert all of that and make Germany modernity's focal point? This argument is more implicit than explicit, and so far as I can tell, it derives from a back formation of their cosmopolitan perspective. Like many proponents of the new cosmopolitan perspective, the authors conceive of modernity as falling roughly into two phases. First is a nation-centred stage that began with the French Revolution. And second is a cosmopolitan stage, the arcs of which begin at many different times after the Second World War. On this view, these various trends have recently begun to converge on to a visibly different path of economic and cultural development, where the nation-state is beginning to recede behind the increasing transnational reality of our social, economic, and cultural life.

If one accepts this rough division of modernity into nation-state-centred phase and non-nation-state-centred phase, it seems to go without saying that the exemplars of the first stage must be the countries that are the most nationalist. Once the nation-state has been identified as the central defining feature of the first modernity, it simply does not compute that the most nationalist countries on the historical stage—the most ethnically defined, the most willing to sacrifice for national greatness—should both be exceptions. They must be the rule because they define the rule.

This, however, brings out a deep problem with this entire way of thinking. There is much to be said for the idea that when thinkers, actors, and almost everyone in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries used the word 'society', what they really meant was 'the nation-state', and usually the one they were living in at the time. I personally agree strongly with the authors in thinking that to return to the more concrete idea of the nation-state deepens our understanding of modernity and modern thought.

But to deepen is one thing, and to turn inside out is another. If we identify the most nationalist states as the most modern, then not only do the exceptions become the rule, but the rules become the exception. Under this view, the two countries generally considered to exemplify modernity are transformed into weird outliers. Because it is an immigrant nation, the USA has had one of the least ethnic con-

ceptions of its national identity. And Britain on the eve of the Second World War was the world's largest empire. It consisted (as it still does today) of multiple nationalities, even on its home islands. Looked at closely, neither can be said to exemplify the ethnically homogenous nation-state. Does that mean they are the ones that least exemplified modernity?

Something clearly seems wrong here. I am not saying that you cannot understand the world in these terms. But you cannot call what you are describing 'modernity'. This is not deepening a framework, this is turning it inside out and calling black white. There may be intellectual results that might justify constructing such a model, but it would have to be called something else. I think what has happened here is that the authors have made a fruitful mistake. They have pushed an idea further than anyone else has before, and they have discovered its inherent limitations as it turns into its opposite. This is the sort of result that sends one back to an inspection of basic principles. The idea of dividing modernity into nation-state-centred and non-nation-state-centred phases may still be a good one. I personally think it is. But the relation between the two sets of principles clearly needs a great deal more work.

Admittedly, this is a very abstract level at which to engage with a book of history. But I think it is the only level at which one can clearly ask the question: 'Can modernity explain the Holocaust?' and give a clear answer: no. The Holocaust was the exception to modernity, not the rule, and it can only be satisfactorily explained by the exceptionality of Germany. One might well object that this makes one of the central events of the twentieth century into an exception, and I would agree. But I do not think this is a problem that has to be solved so much as faced up to. I am in complete agreement with the authors that one of the main problems with the received framework of modernity is its implicit evolutionary determinism, and that this is something we have to overcome. And I think the best way to overcome it is to realize just how huge was the role that contingency and conjuncture played in determining the course of recent world history—that it was short-lived exceptions, not dominant historical trends, which redrew the map of the world in ways we are still living out today.

This, then, brings us to the present and future of Germany, and to the authors' picture of Germany as an exemplification of the cosmo-

politan state. As with all future-orientated perspectives, only time can tell, of course. But the recent debate over Iraq before and after the war in 2003, raises some doubts, at least in my mind, as to whether Germany's readiness to submit to cosmopolitanism was not also an exception rather than a rule, and that we are now seeing the first glimmerings of its reversal—of the re-emergence of Germany's 'normal' national assertiveness.

It may well be that the entire history of Germany from the Second World War to recently was an exception, the exception called the Cold War. It may perhaps appear in retrospect to be an exceptional state—a long historical conjuncture—in which Germany was the exceptional country, cut in half by the borders of two contiguous military empires. And like all empires, these structures were inherently cosmopolitan in their structures, no matter how nationalist they were in their feelings, so that Germany, at the focal point of this world, appeared almost the anti-state. But with the end of that world, and the end of that division, it is destined to grow back into 'normality'—a normality that for Germany would be greatest exception of all.

The good thing about the highly abstract nature of the framework of this book is that overthrowing it does not remove much of the book's very real value. For anyone who wants the most up-to-the minute and high-powered précis of German historiography, this is the book to read. Feminism, cultural history, the enormous effort of rethinking the parallel histories of the two adjacent states back into a contemporaneous unity—it is all there. This is a book that has something to teach everyone who studies Germany history. And it is a book that will make you think.

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CONFERENCE REPORT

The Third Way in the Age of the Cold War. Conference of the German Historical Institute London and the Institut für Zeitgeschichte, held at the Berlin branch of the IfZ on 4–5 July 2003.

From the end of the Second World War right up to the process of reunification it often looked as if the division of Germany and Europe could only be overcome by 'neutralizing' the central power. Attempts were made both by the Germans and the powers responsible for Germany as a whole to explore the political possibilities of neutralization, and thereby arrive at a new peace-time order for Europe. Why did these plans fail? After all, there were plenty of examples to show that not every country strictly had to belong to one side or the other in the East–West conflict. In 1948 Tito's Yugoslavia broke away from the Soviet sphere of power. Finland was tolerated as a non-Communist state even though it was a direct neighbour of the Soviet Union. In 1955 Austria regained territorial integrity and national sovereignty as a neutral state. In the same year the world became aware of a non-aligned movement emerging mainly from former colonies in Asia and Africa and demonstrating independence of both military blocs.

The GHIL and the IfZ Munich-Berlin chose this phenomenon of 'Third Ways in the Age of the Cold War' as the topic of a conference held on 4 and 5 July 2003 at the Berlin branch of the IfZ. Hitherto there have not been many comparative studies on plans for neutralization during the Cold War. The same applies to systematic analyses of the attitudes and interests of those people, groups, and states that tried to resist (or indeed successfully resisted) integration into either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. In some respects, therefore, the conference was on new thematic territory. There were three main complexes of topics, each dealt with in a session of the conference: the German proponents of neutralization; attempts at and experiences of neutralization in other countries; and the neutralization of Germany in the context of four-power responsibility.

In his key-note speech Anthony Nicholls (Oxford) emphasized that the year 1945 marked a caesura as regards the Germans' foreign

political orientations. Admittedly, traditional models of German diplomacy played a greater role in the concepts of the German neutralists than, for instance, in Adenauer's revolutionary policy of Western integration. It would, however, be wrong to look back at Bismarck's or Stresemann's foreign policy and describe it as 'neutralist'. According to Nicholls, applying the term 'neutralism' to Bismarck's highly complex system of European alliances could be extremely misleading. An independent policy of changing alliances, as pursued by Bismarck, should not, he said, be confused with neutralism. If anything, the British position of splendid isolation could more appropriately be described as neutralism. Stressing the historical and conceptual differences between 'isolationism', 'neutralism', 'disengagement', and 'non-alignment', Nicholls provoked a terminological discussion that was to recur in all the following sessions.

The first session dealt with the concepts of those politicians and intellectuals in the Federal Republic and the GDR who hoped to bring about German unity by way of neutralization. Udo Wengst (Munich) showed that Adenauer's policy of Western integration did not enjoy universal support even in the ranks of the CDU and FDP. Wengst put forward the thesis that it was not just a few individuals who opposed Adenauer's policy. In fact many influential politicians representing considerable sections of both parties had their doubts as to whether Adenauer's policy would bring about reunification. What status reunified Germany should have in their alternative to the Chancellor's concept was never entirely clear. But the ultimate goal, Wengst said, was always an independent Germany, not tied into either defensive alliance, in other words, a neutral Germany.

In his paper on the SPD and neutralism in the 1950s August Leugers-Scherzberg (Essen) demonstrated the great difficulties the German Social Democrats had with concepts of neutralism. At the beginning and end of the long 1950s the SPD leadership, fearing Communist subversion, had excluded those with neutralist tendencies from the party. At first, he said, this affected those who questioned the option of a Western state; not long afterwards it also included those who opposed remilitarization for pacifist-neutralist reasons. In the early 1960s, he went on, those sessions of the party that questioned Western integration were then driven out. In between, however, the party leadership was itself suspected of supporting neutralization: in its attitude to the Stalin Note, the EEC

Treaty, NATO entry, and its proposals at the Geneva Conferences, culminating in the 1959 *Deutschlandplan*.

In his overview of concepts of neutralism in the West German protest movements Alexander Gallus (Chemnitz) put forward the view that the real significance of national neutralism in the Federal Republic was that it failed. The neutralists' weakness, he said, was proof that the Federal Republic really had made a radical break with anti-Western third ways. Based on an analysis of public opinion polls covering four decades Gallus explained that this development was far from being predestined. Alternatives to the Western option were attractive to large parts of the West German population. Finally he examined key patterns of argumentation common to many neutralist groupings, for example, recourse to traditional ideas from the period before 1945, recognizing the Soviet Union's legitimate security interests, or the distinction between military and cultural integration into the West.

Dominik Geppert (London) dealt with ideas of a third way in the other part of Germany. The neutralist concept of the revisionist opposition in the GDR, the focal point of his paper, had, he said, a dual objective. On the one hand it would have helped to regain territorial integrity and national sovereignty for Germany. On the other hand it should also help to improve socialism in practice by recalling true Marxist–Leninist doctrine. Geppert underlined how much the ideas of pro-neutralist GDR intellectuals such as Wolfgang Harich, Robert Havemann, Rudolf Bahro, and Hermann von Berg had in common. In analysing the respective situations they found themselves in, they all perceived a change in the world-political climate and at the same time a radical challenge to orthodox ideologies. As they saw things the main pillar of the unity movement should be an alliance between the progressive forces in East and West, led by a small avant-garde. Unification itself, Geppert said, was often conceived of as a phased process, geared more towards the Federal Republic being annexed to the GDR rather than the other way round.

In the second session attention turned to various examples of neutrality that was actually tried out, and failed plans for neutrality, beyond Germany. In his paper on neutrality and plans for neutralization in central Europe Michael Gehler (Innsbruck) put forward the thesis that there was a direct link between Austria's successful neutrality and Hungary's failed attempt at national liberation in the autumn of 1956, when Imre Nagy had sought neutrality 'along

Austrian lines'. According to Gehler developments in Hungary, and indeed the Polish Rapacki Plan of the following year, showed the potentially destabilising effects of plans for neutralization in central Europe at that time. It should not, however, be forgotten, he added, that the die had already been cast for all these ideas about central and eastern Europe with the failure to neutralize Germany between 1945 and 1955. The integration of the Federal Republic into the West influenced the fate of its neighbours in the centre and east of the continent to such a degree that little chance for neutrality remained.

In his paper on Nehru's India and the movement for non-alignment Jürgen Lütt (Berlin) demonstrated that neutrality and non-alignment were not confined to Europe, and that an analysis of concepts of neutrality during the Cold War must also include interests and attitudes beyond Europe. Lütt showed that the motives and ideas used by Nehru to set the movement for non-alignment in motion, and to legitimize it, originated in the Indian struggle for independence and in his own life-history. Nehru, he said, tried to demonstrate 'Asian solidarity', especially with Communist China. Lütt ultimately ascribed the failure of the movement to Nehru's policy. When he occupied the Portuguese colony of Goa by force of arms in 1961 and it came to war between India and China in 1962, the principles of non-alignment were clearly contradicted. With Nehru's death in 1964 the non-aligned had lost their driving force.

Using the example of the Finnish initiative for a security conference in May 1969 Kimmo Rentola (Helsinki) analysed the mixture of relationships of dependency and skilfully manipulated room for manœuvre that determined the policy of a neutral state under bipolar conditions. According to Rentola the motives of Finland and the Soviet Union were more complex than has hitherto been assumed. As far as the Finns were concerned the point of the conference initiative was to solidify the *status quo* in Europe, which was in the interests of both Finland and the Soviet Union. Apart from that they also wanted security against Soviet pressure and greater freedom of action. This, he said, was noted in the Soviet Union and badly received. There it was feared that the attraction of neutrality as enjoyed by the Finns could increase in Eastern Europe, thereby undermining Soviet hegemony. In 1971, however, those forces in Moscow prevailed which thought the opportunities presented by the idea of a conference were greater than its potential risks.

The third and final session dealt with the attitudes of the four victorious powers to the idea of a unified neutral Germany in the decades after 1945. Rolf Steininger (Innsbruck) demonstrated the frame of reference in which the German Question was discussed during the occupation years 1945 to 1949. On the one hand the problem of securing the world against 70 million Germans had to be solved. On the other hand there was the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, which increasingly influenced the victorious powers when considering the German Question. Against this backdrop Steininger analysed the inception and failure of three concepts that would have solved the German Question not by division, but in a way agreed by the Allies: the solution envisaged by US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in 1945 and 1946, and the plans developed independently of one another during the Berlin Blockade by Britain's General Sir Brian Robertson and the American diplomat George F. Kennan.

In his paper on the attitude of the Western powers to German neutralization between 1949 and 1955 Hermann Graml (Munich) looked more closely at an issue already touched upon by Gehler and Steininger: why the solution found for Austria—territorial integrity and national sovereignty in return for neutrality—was not applied to Germany. Graml gave three reasons why, from the summer of 1946, prevention of German neutrality gained the status of an axiom amongst the Western powers. First, they did not wish to allow any possibility of an extension of Soviet power in central Europe, and at the same time believed that Europe would be impossible to defend without West Germany. Secondly, West Germany's financial contribution to the Europe's economic reconstruction was vital. Thirdly, neutralization would have meant German reunification and this was undesirable from the point of view of the Western powers because of the potential power of a reunified Germany and the risks that Germany would resume its policy of vacillating between the blocs.

In his commentary on Graml's paper Gerhard Wettig (Kommen) described the Soviet attitude towards West German neutralists. From Moscow's point of view neutralism had to be judged by the criterion of 'historical progress', which was geared towards establishing socialism. According to this, all Communists must take the side of the socialist camp. Things looked different with regard to the Soviet attitude towards forces in the West that were not tied to Moscow. A neu-

tralist orientation could initially have distanced these forces from the Western camp, and then brought about a change of political fronts that could shift the balance of power in favour of the Soviet Union. According to Wettig, Stalin's assessment of such a likelihood was crucial, especially as regards his Note of 10 March 1952.

Roger Morgan (London) looked at the continuities and discontinuities in the Western Allies' attitude to the German Question during the period of *détente*, using the example of the American and British reactions to the Brandt–Scheel government's new *Ostpolitik* after 1969. Washington and London did, indeed, welcome the Federal Republic's more flexible attitude. But at the same time there were fears that the dynamics of *Ostpolitik* might undermine the US and British position in Berlin and their rights in Germany as a whole. The long-term fear was that if Bonn became increasingly dependent upon Moscow the integration of the Federal Republic into the West might be replaced by a more neutral orientation.

US and British fears were nothing compared to those of France, where the possibility of a reunified and non-aligned Germany was perceived as a 'nightmare', as Georges-Henri Soutou explained in his paper on the French attitude between 1952 and 1990. During the Cold War, he said, two possibilities were seriously considered in Paris: first the 'dual security' solution—protection from both the Soviet Union and Germany by means of the long-term division of Germany—the preferred option of the Fourth Republic and Presidents Georges Pompidou and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing; secondly the solution of a tamed Germany within a new European security system dominated by Paris and Moscow. This, according to Soutou, was de Gaulle's solution. Francois Mitterand, he said, wavered between these two main options, and this wavering explained his attitude at the time of reunification.

In the concluding paper Christian Hacke (Bonn) put forward the thesis that the idea of a neutral reunified Germany failed in 1989–90 because of the new power constellation in Germany, in Europe, and in the world. In the two-plus-four negotiations it played only a subordinate role. Admittedly, the Soviet side was quite keen on the idea of a neutral unified Germany and promoted this idea. But the Soviet Union lacked the power and room for manœuvre to push it through. For on the Western side Germany's integration into the West and membership of NATO had never, at any time, been open to discussion.

The starting point for the discussions in all three sessions was mainly the need for greater terminological exactitude since insufficient distinction had been made between non-alignment, neutrality, neutralism, and third way—both in the discussions at the time and in current research. One basic problem was that the terms used by historians today were often used by contemporaries in a combative sense, either to defame political opponents, or to give their own position a more positive slant. Moreover, Adenauer's positive statements about Austrian neutrality were used to demonstrate the extent to which deliberate public utterances could deviate from privately stated much more sceptical views, and therefore how important it was to distinguish carefully between proclaimed policy and actual motives.

There was also general agreement about the need to deal with neutrality and neutralism at an abstract conceptual level, but also to analyse them in specific national contexts and within the framework of contemporary international politics. In the second session in particular it became clear how much the policies of neutral states, and thus the concrete manifestation of neutrality, was influenced by the interests of the particular state in question. Erhard Busek pointed out that the term 'Finlandization' was practically regarded as an insult in the West, while in countries like Hungary or Czechoslovakia it had far more positive connotations. According to Gehler it was for the neutral states themselves to decide what was 'neutral'. Steininger went a step further when he maintained that during the Cold War the neutral states were seldom really 'neutral', as illustrated by Vienna's voting behaviour in the United Nations or Austria's politico-cultural leanings towards the West.

The question of the relationship between foreign policy orientation on one hand and concepts of socio-political order, basic ideological tendencies, and patterns of collective perception and behaviour on the other played an important role in the discussions. Busek saw a connection between the Austrian mentality of muddling through and Austria's neutrality. Geppert emphasized that the revisionist intellectuals in the GDR were seeking a third way not only between the military blocs but also between Stalinism and capitalism. Gehler pointed out that neutrality as a mark of distinction—such as in the case of Austria, Finland, and Ireland—was an effective means of protection against overpowering neighbours.

As regards the German Question the extent to which representatives of neutralist positions were politically marginalized was stressed once again—in the Federal Republic and even more so in the GDR. Yet it also became clear that the prospect of German neutralization continued to be regarded as a real threat by supporters of Western integration until well into the 1950s. The Western powers' fears that a neutralization of Germany could, in the medium term, lead to *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union and to Germany once again swinging back and forth between the blocs were not confined to the 1950s, but flared up every now and again later as well. In this context Hagen Schulze and Gottfried Niedhart stressed the importance of examining the historical clichés in the minds of politicians and diplomats—the 'Rapallo syndrome', for example. Busek underlined this by pointing out the extent to which memory of the *Anschluß* in 1938 influenced the attitude of Austrian politicians towards Germany, thereby also indirectly leaving its mark on Austria's 'perpetual neutrality'.

All in all it became clear that more intensive examination of the 'Third Ways' between the blocs can produce new insights into the nature of the Cold War. Concepts of neutrality, both successful and unsuccessful, are important clues to the room for manœuvre which politicians had within a bi-polar world order.

The GHIL plans to publish the conference proceedings.

Dominik Geppert (GHIL)

NOTICEBOARD

Research Seminar

The GHIL regularly organizes a research seminar at which recipients of grants from the Institute, Fellows of the GHIL, and other scholars report on the progress of their work. Any postgraduate or postdoctoral researchers who are interested in the subjects are welcome to attend. As a general rule, the language of the papers and discussion is German.

The following papers will be given this term. Further meetings may also be arranged. Future dates will be announced on each occasion, and are available from the GHIL. For further information, contact Professor Lothar Kettenacker on 020 7309 2050. Please note that meetings begin promptly at 4 p.m.

11 Nov. Tobias Wolfhardt
Wissenschaft als koloniale Selbstinszenierung: Aneignung und Abgrenzung im Prozess der empirischen Erforschung Indiens ca. 1757–1820

25 Nov. Philippa Söldenwagner
Koloniale Identitäten: Europäer in Deutsch-Ostafrika ca. 1885–1914

As a matter of interest to readers, we record the following papers which were given before the publication date of this *Bulletin*.

30 Sept. Alexander Achtiani-Asl
Die britische Expansion in Indien 1818–1856: Ein Beitrag zur Imperialismusforschung

21 Oct. Dr Sven Oliver Müller
Macht der Musik, Musik der Macht: Das Musikleben in London und Berlin im 19. Jahrhundert

Institute of Historical Research and GHIL Seminar

Dr Ulrike Lindner (Munich) will speak on 'Public Health Service versus Insurance System: The Implementation of Health Policies in West Germany and Great Britain after World War II' on Thursday, 6 November at 5 p.m. at the GHIL.

Book Launch

On 5 December 2003 the German Historical Institute will be hosting a book launch for two volumes in its German series published by Oldenbourg Verlag in Munich, *Ehrbare Spekulanten: Stadtverfassung, Wirtschaft und Politik in der City of London (1688–1900)* by Andreas Fahrmeir, and *A Passion for Privacy: Untersuchungen zur Genese der bürgerlichen Privatsphäre in London, 1660–1800* by Christoph Heyl. Two prominent British historians will present the books in the presence of the authors. The event will take place at the Institute from 3 p.m. to 5 p.m. Further information is available from the Secretary, 020 7309 2023, who should also be contacted if you would like to attend.

Postgraduate Students' Conference

On 8–9 January 2004 the German Historical Institute London is holding its eighth annual conference for postgraduate research students in the UK and Ireland working on German history, Anglo-German relations, or comparative topics. The intention is to give Ph.D. students an opportunity to present their work in progress and to discuss it with other students working in the same field. It is hoped that the exchange of ideas and methods will be fruitful for all participants. The Institute will meet travel expenses up to a standard rail fare within the UK (special arrangements for students from Ireland), and also arrange and pay for student accommodation, when necessary, for those who live outside London. For further information please contact the Secretary on 020 7309 2023.

Noticeboard

Royal Historical Society Lecture

Professor John Breuilly (University of Birmingham) will speak on 'Modernisation as Social Evolution: The German Case' at the German Historical Institute on Friday 23 January 2004 at 5 p.m. The President and Council of the Royal Historical Society welcome all to attend and join them for drinks after the meeting.

Geschichtswissenschaft und Buchhandel in der Krisenspirale? Eine Inspektion des Feldes im deutsch-britischen Vergleich

This conference, organized jointly by the GHIL and the University of Trier, will be held on 5–6 March 2004 at the Studienzentrum Karl-Marx-Haus in Trier. Historians and publishers from Britain and Germany will discuss historical and recent problems of publishing scholarly and popular books in the field of history.

Political Languages in the Age of Extremes (1930s–1970s)

This conference, to be held at the GHIL on 26–27 March 2004 will give a new impetus to comparative research on the relation between language and politics in the short twentieth century. Participants are historians, linguists, and political scientists from Britain, the USA, Canada, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and Italy. They are invited to explore the ways in which different political regimes, dictatorships as well as democracies, were upheld or challenged by certain modes of speech or writing. Topics to be discussed will include the functioning of propaganda, forms of policing the use of language, expressions of subjectivity and dissent, and ideological disputes about certain concepts and terms of political discourse.

For further information please contact: Prof. Dr. Willibald Steinmetz, Universität Bielefeld, Fakultät für Geschichtswissenschaft, Postfach 10 01 31, 33501 Bielefeld, GERMANY
wsteinme@geschichte.uni-bielefeld.de

Cartoons as a Source for Historians

On 7–8 May 2004 the German Historical Institute London will run a workshop on 'Cartoons as a Source for Historians'. The workshop will bring together people from Britain, Germany, Austria, and other countries who have worked with cartoons in different contexts. The aim is to discuss what information can be gathered from this special type of source and how this information can be transmitted to different audiences. The workshop will consist of three panels: using cartoons while teaching at a university; presenting cartoons in a museum; and using cartoons in research projects. The participants will represent different academic disciplines and the language will be English. For more information contact Matthias Reiß at the GHIL (reiss@ghil.ac.uk).

LIBRARY NEWS

Recent Acquisitions

This list contains a selection of recent publications in German and English, primarily on German history, acquired by the Library of the GHIL in the past year.

Abelshauser, Werner (ed.), *Die BASF: Eine Unternehmensgeschichte* (Munich: Beck, 2002)

Akermann, Manfred, *Die Staufer: Ein europäisches Herrschergeschlecht* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003)

Allen, Michael Thad, *The Business of Genocide: The SS, Slave Labor, and the Concentration Camps* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2002)

Ambrose, Tom, *Hitler's Loss: What Britain and America Gained from Europe's Cultural Exiles* (London: Owen, 2001)

Bajohr, Frank, *Parvenüs und Profiteure: Korruption in der NS-Zeit*, Veröffentlichungen der Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer, 2001)

Bajohr, Stefan, *Lass dich nicht mit den Bengels ein! Sexualität, Geburtenregelung und Geschlechtsmoral im Braunschweiger Arbeitermilieu 1900 bis 1933*, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Soziale Bewegungen. Schriftenreihe A: Darstellungen, 15 (Essen: Klartext-Verlag, 2001)

Barker, Peter, *Slavs in Germany: The Sorbian Minority and the German State Since 1945*, Studies in German Thought and History, 20 (Lewiston, N.Y.: Mellen, 2000)

Benz, Ute and Wolfgang Benz (eds.), *Deutschland, deine Kinder: Zur Prägung von Feindbildern in Ost und West* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2001)

Bollinger, Stefan and Fritz Vilmar (eds.), *Die DDR war anders: Kritische Würdigung ihrer wichtigen sozialkulturellen Einrichtungen* (Berlin: edition ost, 2002)

Buchner, Bernd, *Um nationale und republikanische Identität: Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der Kampf um die politischen Symbole in der Weimarer Republik*, Politik- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte, 57 (Bonn: Dietz, 2001)

Burkardt, Johannes, *Das Reformationsjahrhundert: Deutsche Geschichte zwischen Medienrevolution und Institutionenbildung 1517–1617* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2002)

Cesarani, David and Paul A. Levine (eds.), *'Bystanders' to the Holocaust: A Re-evaluation* (London: Cass, 2002)

Chickering, Roger and Stig Förster (eds.), *Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–1918*, Publications of the German Historical Institute Washington, D.C. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)

Cohen, Maynard M., *A Stand Against Tyranny: Norway's Physicians and the Nazis* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000)

Corni, Gustavo, *Hitler's Ghettos: Voices from the Beleaguered Society 1939–1944*, trans. Nicola Rudge Iannelli (London: Arnold, 2002)

Croxton, Derek and Anuschka Tischer, *The Peace of Westphalia: A Historical Dictionary* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2002)

Dirlmeier, Ulf, Gerhard Fouquet, and Bernd Fuhrmann, *Europa im Spätmittelalter: 1215–1378* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003)

Dixon, C. Scott, *The Reformation in Germany*, Historical Association Studies (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002)

Döring, Martin, *'Parlamentarischer Arm der Bewegung': Die Nationalsozialisten im Reichstag der Weimarer Republik*, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, 130 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2001)

Ebenfeld, Stefan, *Geschichte nach Plan? Die Instrumentalisierung der Geschichtswissenschaft in der DDR am Beispiel des Museums für Deutsche Geschichte in Berlin (1950 bis 1955)* (Marburg: Tectum Verlag, 2001)

Ehrenpreis, Stefan and Ute Lotz-Heumann, *Reformation und konfessionelles Zeitalter: Heinz Schilling zum 60. Geburtstag*, Kontroversen um die Geschichte (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002)

Elsaesser, Thomas and Michael Wedel (eds.), *Kino der Kaiserzeit: Zwischen Tradition und Moderne* (Munich: edition text + kritik, 2002)

Engeln, Ralf, *Uransklaven oder Sonnensucher? Die Sowjetische AG Wismut in der SBZ/DDR 1946–1953*, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Soziale Bewegungen. Schriftenreihe A: Darstellungen, 19 (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2001)

Erbar, Ralph (ed.), *Quellen zu den deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1919–1963*, Freiherr vom Stein-Gedächtnisausgabe, D 6 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003)

Essner, Cornelia, *Die 'Nürnberger Gesetze' oder Die Verwaltung des Rassenwahns: 1933–1945* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002)

Feldman, Gerald D., *Allianz and the German Insurance Business, 1933–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)

Feuchtwanger, Edgar Josef, *Bismarck* (London: Routledge, 2002)

Franz, Eckhart G. (ed.), *Logen-Archive: Akten und Druckschriften der Freimaurer- und B'nai B'rith-Logen im Bereich des vormaligen Großherzogtums bzw. Volksstaats Hessen im Hessischen Staatsarchiv Darmstadt, im Geheimen Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin, in der Universitätsbibliothek Poznan und in der Deutschen Freimaurer-Bibliothek Berlin*, Repertorien des Hessischen Staatsarchivs Darmstadt, 47 (Darmstadt: Hessisches Staatsarchiv, 2003)

Fricke, Karl Wilhelm and Silke Klewin, *Bautzen II. Sonderhaftanstalt unter MfS-Kontrolle 1956 bis 1989. Bericht und Dokumentation*, Schriftenreihe der Stiftung Sächsische Gedenkstätten zur Erinnerung an die Opfer politischer Gewaltherrschaft, 8 (2nd revised edn.; Leipzig: Kiepenheuer, 2002)

Froh, Klaus and Rüdiger Wenzke, *Die Generale und Admirale der NVA: Ein biographisches Handbuch*, Forschungen zur DDR-Gesellschaft (4th edn.; Berlin: Links, 2000)

Fuchs, Franz and Peter Schmid (eds.), *Kaiser Arnolf: Das ostfränkische Reich am Ende des 9. Jahrhunderts. Regensburger Kolloquium 9.–11.12.1999*, Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte, Beiheft B 19 (Munich: Beck, 2002)

Gailus, Manfred, *Protestantismus und Nationalsozialismus: Studien zur nationalsozialistischen Durchdringung des protestantischen Sozialmilieus in Berlin*, Industrielle Welt, 61 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2001)

Gall, Lothar (ed.), *Otto von Bismarck und die Parteien*, Otto-von-Bismarck-Stiftung, 3 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2001)

Gantet, Claire, *La paix de Westphalie (1648): Une histoire sociale, 17.–18. siècles*, Ouvrage publié avec le soutien de la Mission Historique Française en Allemagne (Paris: Belin, 2001)

Ganzer, Klaus and Bruno Steimer (eds.), *Lexikon der Reformationszeit* (Freiburg: Herder, 2002)

Gehrke, Bernd and Renate Hürtgen (eds.), *Der betriebliche Aufbruch im Herbst 1989: Die unbekannte Seite der DDR-Revolution. Diskussion, Analysen, Dokumente. Protokoll einer Tagung von Betriebsaktivist/innen. Analysen zum Widerstand in DDR-Betrieben und zur 'Betriebswende'. Dokumente von Belegschaftsinitiativen und Bürgerbewegungen* (2nd revised edn.; Berlin: Bildungswerk Berlin der Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 2001)

Giese, Daniel, *Die SED und ihre Armee: Die NVA zwischen Politisierung und Professionalismus 1956–1965*, Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 85 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002)

Gieseke, Jens, *Mielke-Konzern: Die Geschichte der Stasi 1945–1990* (2nd edn.; Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001)

Gilbert, Martin, *Never Again: A History of the Holocaust* (London: HarperCollins in ass. with the Imperial War Museum, 2000)

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Gildea, Robert, *Marianne in Chains: In Search of the German Occupation 1940–1945* (London: Macmillan, 2002)

Gotthard, Axel, *Das Alte Reich: 1495–1806* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003)

Goullet, Monique and Martin Heinzelmann (eds.), *La réécriture hagiographique dans l'occident médiéval: Transformations formelles et idéologiques*, Francia, Beiheft 58 (Ostfildern: Thorbecke, 2003)

Goyard, Paul, *100 Zeichnungen aus dem Konzentrationslager Buchenwald*, ed. Volkhard Knigge with Sonja Staar for the Stiftung Gedenkstätten Buchenwald und Mittelbau-Dora (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2002)

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Gramley, Hedda, *Propheten des deutschen Nationalismus: Theologen, Historiker und Nationalökonomen 1848–1880* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus Verlag, 2001)

Grünbaum, Robert, *Jenseits des Alltags: Die Schriftsteller der DDR und die Revolution von 1989/90*, Extremismus und Demokratie, 5 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002)

Grzesinski, Albert, *Im Kampf um die deutsche Republik: Erinnerungen eines Sozialdemokraten*, ed. Eberhard Kolb, Schriftenreihe der Stiftung Reichspräsident-Friedrich-Ebert-Gedenkstätte, 9 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001)

Hagemann, Karen, *'Mannlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre': Nation, Militär und Geschlecht zur Zeit der Antinapoleonischen Kriege Preußens*, Krieg in der Geschichte, 8 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002)

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Hausmann, Frank-Rutger with the assistance of Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (eds.), *Die Rolle der Geisteswissenschaften im Dritten Reich 1933-1945*, Schriften des Historischen Kollegs. Kolloquien, 53 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002)

Haustein, Jörg, *Liberal-katholische Publizistik im späten Kaiserreich: Das 'Neue Jahrhundert' und die Krausgesellschaft*, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, 80 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001)

Hermann, Armin, *Und trotzdem Brüder: Die deutsch-deutsche Geschichte der Firma Carl Zeiss* (Munich, Zürich: Piper, 2002)

Herms, Michael, *Hinter den Linien: Westarbeit der FDJ 1945–1956*, Die Freie Deutsche Jugend, 8 (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2001)

Herrmann, Ulrich (ed.), *Protestierende Jugend: Jugendopposition und politischer Protest in der deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte*, Materialien zur historischen Jugendforschung (Weinheim: Juventa Verlag, 2002)

Hessen, Rainer von (ed.), *Victoria Kaiserin Friedrich: Mission und Schicksal einer englischen Prinzessin in Deutschland* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus Verlag, 2002)

Hoffend, Andrea, *'Mut zur Verantwortung': Hermann Müller. Parteivorsitzender und Reichskanzler aus Mannheim*, Kleine Schriften des Stadtarchivs Mannheim, 17 (Mannheim: v. Brandt, 2001)

Hollmann, Michael (ed.), *Besatzungszeit, Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Deutsche Demokratische Republik (1945–1969): Akten und persönliche Quellen*, Quellenkunde zur deutschen Geschichte der Neuzeit von 1500 bis zur Gegenwart, 7 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2001)

Hölscher, Christoph, *NS-Verfolgte im 'antifaschistischen Staat': Vereinnahmung und Ausgrenzung in der ostdeutschen Wiedergutmachung, 1945–1989* (Berlin: Metropol, 2002)

Holzweißig, Gunter, *Die schärfste Waffe der Partei: Eine Mediengeschichte der DDR* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2002)

Horne, John and Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2001)

Hübsch, Reinhard (ed.), *'Hört die Signale!': Die Deutschlandpolitik von KPD/SED und SPD 1945–1970*, Studien des Forschungsverbundes SED-Staat an der Freien Universität Berlin (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002)

James, Harold and Jakob Tanner (eds.), *Enterprise in the Period of Fascism in Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002)

Jellonnek, Burkhard and Rüdiger Lautmann (eds.), *Nationalsozialistischer Terror gegen Homosexuelle: Verdrängt und ungesühnt* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002)

Junge, Traudl, with the assistance of Melissa Müller, *Bis zur letzten Stunde: Hitlers Sekretärin erzählt ihr Leben* (6th edn.; Munich: Claassen, 2002)

Kaiser, Wolf (ed.), *Täter im Vernichtungskrieg: Der Überfall auf die Sowjetunion und der Völkermord an den Juden* (Berlin: Propyläen, 2002)

Kassim, Mahmoud, *Die diplomatischen Beziehungen Deutschlands zu Ägypten 1919–1936*, Studien zur Zeitgeschichte des Nahen Ostens und Nordafrikas, 6 (Münster: Lit-Verlag, 2000)

Kieffer, Fritz, *Judenverfolgung in Deutschland – eine innere Angelegenheit? Internationale Reaktionen auf die Flüchtlingsproblematik 1933–1939*, Historische Mitteilungen, Beiheft 44 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002)

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Kirsten, Holm, *'Weimar im Banne des Führers': Die Besuche Adolf Hitlers 1925–1940* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2001)

Kitchen, Martin, *The German Offensives of 1918: Battles and Campaigns* (Stroud: Tempus, 2001)

Klee, Ernst, *Deutsche Medizin im Dritten Reich: Karrieren vor und nach 1945* (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer, 2001)

Knabe, Hubertus, *Der diskrete Charme der DDR: Stasi und Westmedien* (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 2001)

Kohl, Ulrike, *Die Präsidenten der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft im Nationalsozialismus: Max Planck, Carl Bosch und Albert Vögler zwischen Wissenschaft und Macht*, Pallas Athene, 5 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002)

Könnemann, Erwin and Gerhard Schulze (eds.), *Der Kapp-Lüttwitz-Ludendorff-Putsch: Dokumente* (Munich: Olzog, 2002)

Kowalczuk, Ilko-Sascha (ed.), *Freiheit und Öffentlichkeit: Politischer Samisdat in der DDR 1985–1989. Eine Dokumentation*, Schriftenreihe des Robert-Havemann-Archivs, 7 (Berlin: Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft, 2002)

Krüger, Kersten, *Die landesständische Verfassung*, Enzyklopädie deutscher Geschichte, 67 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003)

Kruk, Herman, *The Last Days of the Jerusalem of Lithuania: Chronicles from the Vilna Ghetto and the Camps, 1939–1944*, ed. and introd. Benjamin Harshav; trans. Barbara Harshav, Yivo Institute for Jewish Research (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002)

Kukowski, Martin, *Die Chemnitzer Auto Union AG und die 'Demokratisierung' der Wirtschaft in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone von 1945 bis 1948*, Beiträge zur Unternehmensgeschichte, 15 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2003)

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Leitz, Christian, *Nazi Germany and Neutral Europe during the Second World* War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000)

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LeRoy Ladurie, Emmanuel with the assistance of Jean-François Fitou, *Saint-Simon and the Court of Louis XIV*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2001)

Löffler, Sigrid, *Wer sagt uns, was wir lesen sollen? Die Bücherflut, die Kritik und der literarische Kanon*, Bithell Memorial Lectures, 2002 (London: Institute of Germanic Studies, 2003)

Lopes, Anne and Gary Roth, *Men's Feminism: August Bebel and the German Socialist Movement* (Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books, 2000)

Löwe, Teresa, *Der Politiker Eduard Bernstein: Eine Untersuchung zu seinem politischen Wirken in der Frühphase der Weimarer Republik (1918–1924),* Gesprächskreis Geschichte, 40 (Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Historisches Forschungszentrum, 2000)

Lusane, Clarence, *Hitler's Black Victims: The Historical Experiences of Afro-Germans, European Blacks, Africans, and African Americans in the Nazi Era*, Crosscurrents in African American History (New York: Routledge, 2003)

Mackensen, Rainer (ed.), *Bevölkerungslehre und Bevölkerungspolitik vor 1933: Arbeitstagung der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Bevölkerungswissenschaft und der Johann Peter Süßmilch-Gesellschaft für Demographie mit Unterstützung des Max-Planck-Instituts für demographische Forschung, Rostock* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2002)

Mai, Uwe, *'Rasse und Raum': Agrarpolitik, Sozial- und Raumplanung im NS-Staat* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002)

Major, Patrick and Jonathan Osmond (eds.), *The Workers' and Peasants' State: Communism and Society in East Germany under Ulbricht 1945–71* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002)

Manz, Günter, Ekkehard Sachse, and Gunnar Winkler (eds.), *Sozialpolitik in der DDR: Ziele und Wirklichkeit* (Berlin: Trafo Verlag, 2001)

Markus, Sandra, *Bilanzieren und Sinn stiften: Erinnerungen von Unternehmern im 20. Jahrhundert*, Studien zur Geschichte des Alltags, 20 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002)

Marxen, Klaus and Gerhard Werle (eds.), *Strafjustiz und DDR-Unrecht: Dokumentation*, 3 vols. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2000-2002)

Mertens, Lothar (ed.), *Soziale Ungleichheit in der DDR: Zu einem tabuisierten Strukturmerkmal der SED-Diktatur*, Schriftenreihe der Gesellschaft für Deutschlandforschung, 82 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002)

Michael, Robert and Karin Doerr, *Nazi-Deutsch, Nazi German: An English Lexicon of the Language of the Third Reich*, foreword Paul Rose (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2002)

Minkenberg, Michael and Ulrich Willems (eds.), *Politik und Religion*, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonderheft 33 (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2003)

Moeller, Robert Gardiner, *War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001)

Mollnau, Marcus, *Die Bodenrechtsentwicklung in der SBZ/DDR anhand der Akten des Zentralen Parteiarchivs der SED*, Berliner Juristische Universitätsschriften; Grundlagen des Rechts, 15 (Berlin: Berlin-Verlag, 2001)

Mommsen, Hans, *Auschwitz, 17. Juli 1942: Der Weg zur europäischen 'Endlösung der Judenfrage'* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2002)

Morsey, Rudolf and Hans Elmar Onnau, *Görres-Gesellschaft und NS-Diktatur: Die Geschichte der Görres-Gesellschaft 1932/33 bis zum Verbot 1941* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002)

Müller, Jörg Jochen (ed.), *Germanistik und deutsche Nation, 1806–1848: Zur Konstitution bürgerlichen Bewusstseins* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2000)

Mußgnug, Dorothee, *Alliierte Militärmissionen in Deutschland 1946–1990*, Zeitgeschichtliche Forschungen, 9 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001)

Nicosia, Francis R. and Jonathan Huener (eds.), *Medicine and Medical Ethics in Nazi Germany: Origins, Practices, Legacies* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2002)

Pabst, Andrea, Catharina Schultheiß *et al*. (ed.), *Wir sind das Volk? Ostdeutsche Bürgerrechtsbewegungen und die Wende* (Tübingen: Attempto Verlag, 2001)

Patzelt, Werner J. and Roland Schirmer (eds.), *Die Volkskammer der DDR: Sozialistischer Parlamentarismus in Theorie und Praxis* (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002)

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