German Historical Institute London

Bulletin

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SEMINARS AT THE GHIL
AUTUMN 2004

9 Nov. **PROFESSOR STEFAN BERGER (Glamorgan)**
Remaking National Histories in France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy, 1945 to the Present

Stefan Berger is Professor of Modern and Contemporary History and Co-Director of the Centre for Border Studies at the University of Glamorgan. His main research interests are German and West European history since 1800, labour history, historiography, and historical theory. His latest book is *Inventing the Nation: Germany* (2004), and he is currently working on a project on 'Britain and the GDR, 1949–1989', funded by the British Academy.

30 Nov. **PROFESSOR KAREN HAGEMANN (Glamorgan)**
Citizens and Soldiers: Masculinities in Politics and War in the Period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars

Karen Hagemann is Professor of History and Co-Director of the Centre for Border Studies at the University of Glamorgan, Wales. Her research interests focus on modern German and European history and gender history from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. Her most recent books in the fields of the history of the military, war, and the nation include *Manly Valour and German Honour: The Nation, Military, and Gender during the Period of Prussia's Anti-Napoleonic Wars* (2002) and *Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History* (2004).

7 Dec. **DR THOMAS BRECHENMACHER (Rome)**
Pope Pius XI, Eugenio Pacelli, and the Persecution of Jews in Germany, 1933 to 1938: New Vatican Sources

Thomas Brechenmacher has been *Wissenschaftlicher Assistent* at the University of the Armed Forces in Munich since 1999. His research interests include the history of political Catholicism and the Papal States, and the history of the Jews in Europe. Since February 2003 he has been working on documents from the Pontificate of Pope Pius XI, recently released by the Vatican Archives, for the Kommission für Zeitgeschichte in Bonn and the German Historical Institute in Rome.

Seminars

14 Dec. **PATRICK BAHNERS (Frankfurt/Main)**

Macaulay's Machiavellian Moment: 1827 and the Whig Interpretation of History

Patrick Bahners has been an editor on the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* since 1989, and chief editor of the *Feuilleton* section since 2001. One of his main interests is British and German historiography in the nineteenth century. At present he is writing a commentary on Jacob Burckhardt's lectures on the age of the Counter-Reformation for a new edition of Burckhardt's works.

Seminars are held at 5 p.m. in the Seminar Room of the GHIL.
Tea is served from 4.30 p.m. in the Common Room, and wine is available after the seminars.

THE 2004 ANNUAL LECTURE

Always good neighbours—never good friends?
Britain, Germany, and Europe 1949–2001

will be given by

PROFESSOR A. J. NICHOLLS
Emeritus Fellow, St Antony's College, Oxford

on Friday, 5 November, at 5 p.m.
at the German Historical Institute

SPEAKING OF EUROPE

CHANNEL CROSSING
*COMMON EUROPEAN TASKS AND CHALLENGES**

by Richard von Weizsäcker

My first experience of Channel crossing was in 1937. At that time Nazi Germany was an ever growing European threat. The mood in Britain *vis-à-vis* Germans was more than strained. My host, a country doctor in Wiltshire, was advised by his neighbours that he would, as usual, be very welcome with his family for holiday tea parties, but only without that seventeen-year-old boy from Germany. He felt, however, that hospitality to a young foreigner, wherever he comes from, took priority over the danger of a temporary alienation from good old neighbours.

Ten years passed. We all know the course of history. Then, after the war, Robert Birley, Director of Education in the British Zone and later headmaster of Eton College, and Lilo Milchsack, wife of a prominent Düsseldorf businessman, created the Königswinter Conferences, something unique in European bilateral relations. British habits of political debate and parliamentary encounter had more influence on the atmosphere of a newly emerging second democracy on German soil than any kind of American so-called re-education or French Gaullism. The Germans, on the other hand, were heading for a Channel-crossing Europe. Among my friends and generational colleagues there was no doubt whatsoever that Europe could not come into being without Britain. We had difficulty in understanding the deeply rooted sense of British distance from Europe. Even less could we anticipate an exclusion of Britain by France, its long-standing partner, in 1963. Against all the odds, dur-

ing a very different period of history, such feelings survived strongly during the last half century. In the long run, I hope, they may prove not to be condemned to complete irrelevance.

But is it madness to believe in a pro-European Channel crossing right now? At present, Europe is at a historical crossroads. Within a few days the EU will be enlarged from fifteen to twenty-five members. Will this make the Channel narrower or wider? And what about the draft of a European constitution? Is this not going to solidify the famous fog in Channel, whose main *raison d'être* is to isolate the Continent? Is Britain to become a strong European co-leader, or just a looker-on, legally inside, but mentally outside? How is the key question in a referendum going to be formulated? 'The UK in or out of Europe?' Let me try, for a moment, to get away from media headlines and to deal with our present challenges, not with enthusiasm or pessimism, but rather more soberly.

The EU is heading for its largest expansion ever, by seventy-five million people and one third of its territory, but only five per cent of the present GDP. In other words, a large part of Europe with low living standards and widespread unemployment will join us. Originally, a one-by-one regatta method for the process of enlargement was intended. It would have been highly preferable economically, but proved to be politically unattainable. The new entity looks overloaded and fragile. In the meantime, however, most of the new members have been working hard to transform their former COMECON economies so that they comply with the rules and habits of the EU. They have had to cope with some 80,000 pages of our *acquis communautaire*, the EU's body of treaties, laws, and regulations which binds all the member states together. Some of the new members have gone through a daring process of hard economic exposure to market conditions. You may have heard about the Polish Minister Leszek Balcerowicz who has been proposed for the Nobel Prize in Economics because of his success in transforming a 'fish soup into a goldfish bowl'. Simultaneously, some of the old EU members, especially the larger ones such as France and Germany, Italy and Spain, are struggling less successfully, suffering from jams in their domestic, economic, and social reforms. In the UK at present we are witnessing a growing debate on economic migrants. In Germany the focus is on the emigration of entrepreneurs who are leaving the coun-

try in order to find places for investment with lower job costs. Jacques Delors, former President of the European Commission, predicted that it will be at least two decades before an enlarged Europe has learned to stand and move. Once more, we need an enormous amount of conviction and patience.

We are obsessed by our daily difficulties which look insurmountable. But from the outset, European co-operation and integration had to be seen in a long-term, historical perspective. So far, the turning points have been 1945 and 1989. The first, in 1945, was at the end of what General de Gaulle called the 'thirty years war of our century'. Since then the EU has emerged over more than four decades as a firm European peace order, dreamt of by generations, but unprecedented at any time in Europe or any other continent world-wide.

There seems to be a strong tendency in some countries, including Britain, to perceive the EU of fifteen or twenty-five members as a large free trade area. At present it may appear as though it does not represent much more than a unique economic entity—a single market with an integrated foreign trade policy, common rules for competition and so on, and a common currency in twelve member states. This is in itself a historical achievement to be found nowhere else around the globe. But in reality it is much more. From the start its intention was political. It started with Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands coming together in the European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1952 in order to prevent the countries of Western Europe from ever making preparations for war against each other again. *Rapprochement* and even reconciliation between France and Germany were the first priorities to benefit both countries. A victim at the start, France emerged as one of the victorious powers of the Second World War, but without being accepted by its partners across the Channel and the Atlantic. France therefore sought new ways of finding a significant voice for itself in global affairs. It asked for, and received, the leading role among the first six community partners in order to use it as a tailwind, acting in the name of Europe but remaining sufficiently French in its perception.

For the Germans, community membership was the first step towards international re-admission. The 1919 Paris Peace Treaties had not ended, but rather re-invigorated, discord on the Continent. We may recall the assessment of the Versailles Treaty by a prominent

member of the British delegation, Lord Keynes, who said that the treaty was born 'without nobility, without morality, without intellect'. But forty years later, lessons from century-long nationalistic outrages and crimes had been learned. A transnational *rapprochement* developed swiftly under the pressing influence of the emerging Cold War and the Iron Curtain dividing Europe and Germany. The vision of Jean Monnet, Winston Churchill, and, in fact, also of the Marshall Plan could materialize only in the West.

But their vision survived up to 1989, the second European turning point: the end of the Cold War. It led to the present process of enlargement. None of the fifteen old members were opposed. But among them there are substantially different hopes and apprehensions *vis-à-vis* this development and its impact on a common European future. Most new members belong to Central Europe. Their tragedy in the post-war period was, in the words of Milan Kundera, to belong culturally to the West, politically to the East, and geographically to the centre. Now it is the aim of these new member countries to harmonize their policy with their culture and geography. Long before 9/11 and the Iraq war their aim was partnership in Euro–Atlantic institutions. In the light of their experiences under Soviet dictatorship, their first demand was for security. Democracy, the market economy, and prosperity were empty words without security. NATO had priority ahead of the EU. This was their transatlantic option. It required a certain amount of political courage because it is not automatically very popular at home; nor does it necessarily correlate with their future interests. Their long-term economic and political outlook envisages Europe rather than the USA.

All this has been embedded in global events since 2001. Immediately after 9/11 all NATO partners pledged full solidarity with the USA under Article V of the NATO treaty. US Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz went from the Pentagon to Brussels and thanked them, but pointed out that their solidarity was not needed. Alliances of the willing came into being. Germany assumed a leading role in participation against the Taliban and terrorists in Afghanistan. But France and Germany did not believe that all means short of war had been exhausted against the dangers posed by Iraq. France was prepared to veto an Iraq war mandate by the Security Council. In addition, an ominous notion of a Paris–Berlin–Moscow axis led to clear-cut divisions in Europe. The famous open letter of 30 January

Speaking of Europe

2003 from eight European leaders, 'United we stand', a Spanish–British initiative, was signed by Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest without informing the European Presidency and Commission. 'The medium is the message', we were told when we discovered the letter in our newspapers. Europe no longer seemed to exist. US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld was satisfied. The war started.

In the meantime Europe is undergoing a learning process. The conflict among Europeans over Iraq proved to be a very heavy burden. A rift between the Europeans would be a catastrophe. The Iraqi people have been liberated from a cruel and criminal dictator, but an ongoing debate as to whether, after the military defeat of Saddam Hussein, the world is a better place, as the White House claimed and continues to maintain, serves nobody. We all share responsibility for consequences in Iraq and beyond. We are all united in resisting terrorism. It is different from a war waged and ended by a treaty. We have to protect our highly vulnerable technical structures of life, our principles. We have to demonstrate our resolve by fighting hard and mercilessly, by close co-operation, by maintaining a steadfast posture on our basic values and our rule of law without specific anti-enemy penal systems like Guantanamo Bay. Appeasement will lead nowhere. But a common effort not only to fight terrorism, but also to deal with conditions which produce terrorism, is of paramount importance.

So far the Europeans seem to agree in principle. But to what extent are they really willing and able to act together? Institutions that work well can help immensely. I intend to deal with them at the end of this lecture because we need first to understand the interests and challenges which the Europeans really share, whether they like it or not. I shall mention a few in addition to our alliance against terrorism.

(a) Europe is still unable to provide sufficient peace and stability on its own continent, in the first place in the Balkans. The decade immediately after the end of the Cold War was marked by violence and disintegration in the former Yugoslavia. But the EU was too divided and too weak to protect human life, to prevent further 'ethnic cleansing', and to introduce, step by step, the rule of law, human rights, and democratic structures in south-eastern Europe. Instead, the leading initiatives came from the USA, which intervened in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Once more, transatlantic partnership proved to be strong. In order to maintain and to improve it, Europeans will have to become fully responsible for a peaceful future in the Balkans. In 1999 the EU Council put an end to the Kosovo war by a mandate of the Security Council. In the meantime, the EU has achieved a successful strategic operation in Macedonia with the help of NATO. It is the common task of the EU to envisage, in a long-term perspective, the inclusion of the Balkan states in its treaties. After the present enlargement, Romania and Bulgaria will be the next two nations to join the EU. Thereafter Croatia may find comparable means to join somewhat ahead of the other western Balkan states. A very, very long path lies ahead. We all know the immense difficulties of settling border disputes, clarifying the status of Kosovo, coping with a widespread system of organized crime, and overcoming unemployment and poverty. But it is our task as Europeans to carry responsibility for the further development of the Balkans. This will ease some burdens and strengthen our partnership.

(b) The future of the Balkans is also closely linked with a European task *par excellence*, namely, to improve relations with the Islamic world. There are more than 1.5 billion Muslims of very different types in Europe. Large Islamic communities exist in Britain and Germany, in Spain and Italy, and there are even bigger ones in France. In Bosnia-Herzegovina Europe experienced extremely heavy confrontations with Muslims. But to the extent that these confrontations included some Islamic radicalism, this was not the cause of, but the reaction to, violence against them. As far as radical revolutionary Muslim groupings exist, they are a threat in the first place to Europe rather than to the USA. It is one of the most important common European interests to build peaceful bridges with the Muslim world. This is where the EU should soon find agreement on opening negotiations with Turkey about possible Turkish membership in the fairly distant future. Where is our credibility in supporting America's priority of promoting democracy in the Muslim world if we do not venture every support for the present strong Turkish government, which is democratically elected and based on an Islamic political party?

(c) Europeans will not be able to resolve the ever more dangerous tension between Israel and the Palestinians. Nevertheless, a European voice is necessary. We remain committed to the Road Map to

Peace leading to a full and guaranteed recognition of Israel as well as an independent Palestinian state. This cannot be achieved by arrangement with one side alone. Both sides have to participate in every step forward. Successful resistance to any kind of terrorism is of paramount urgency. Yet the assassination of Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin and his successor, Rantisi, this spring will produce not more security for the people in Israel, but an enormous increase in popular support for Hamas and a greater new danger of terrorism. In a year of presidential elections, the USA will produce little reaction to such developments. All the more it is our European task to speak up clearly if our common effort in fighting terrorism is to be taken seriously. The Middle East Quartet (the EU, USA, Russia, and the UN) has to be activated. An exchange of prisoners of war between the two sides is not a large contribution, but it does show that we can assist both sides, as was recently achieved by the German Foreign Minister. The results of the unofficial Geneva negotiations between Israel and Palestine are to receive strong common European support.

(d) We no longer want to quarrel about Iraq. Saddam Hussein was a terrible dictator, but it is an insult to Arab culture to see him as representing its values. On the contrary, Saddam killed thousands of pious Muslim believers. The Iraq war is not a war of religion. Its consequences should not be regarded as a clash of civilizations if we behave reasonably in terms of democratic missionary work in the Arab world. The long-term future of Iraq will not be fought out between East and West, but between Shiites, Sunnites, Kurds, Arabs, Baath Party followers, and democrats.

(e) In this year's G8 summit a strategy for the Greater Middle East tops the agenda. It could develop into a test case for a constructive multilateral approach, and multilateralism is our common European aim. Co-operation should be based in the first place on proposals coming from the region itself and on the United Nations' development programme, including education, health, women's rights, the environment, and free trade instead of a purely G8 or G7 Western invention, mainly as a support for Egyptian and Israeli industry. A Middle Eastern organ for the distribution of means would be helpful, like the one known to the Europeans at the time of Marshall Aid. A strong European voice is required. The EU member states are the Middle East's largest trade partners and by far the biggest providers of development assistance.

(f) Another European task is linked to Iran. Iran is not only a dangerous, but also a highly endangered, place. The country is far from having what a free and tolerant democracy requires. At the same time this old, large, and cultured nation is isolated, belonging neither to the Arabs, nor to the subcontinent, nor to the newly independent former Soviet provinces. It is surrounded by nuclear weaponry from Russia, Pakistan, India, Israel, and the occupation forces in Iraq. Iranian efforts for self-preservation have a security and an economic side. It is our European task actively to combine the two. This means strict control by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna of the Iranian use of nuclear material and, at the same time, re-opening negotiations on EU–Iran economic relations, rather than the US alternative of forcing the UN Security Council to take resolutions linked with new sanctions against Tehran. The visit of the three European Foreign Ministers from London, Paris, and Berlin in October 2003 was an extremely important step, but not the last one to be taken in that direction.

(g) I cannot possibly deal with all the global challenges that the Europeans share. However, there will be a large degree of conformity among EU members, including most of the new members, from the outset. This applies to questions such as: stimulating world trade negotiations, mainly by invigorating EU attempts to reform agriculture in order to avoid another failure like the Word Trade Organization (WTO) Cancun meeting in 2003; the Kyoto protocol on greenhouse gas emissions, where Putin's signature might be an incentive for the EU to facilitate future Russian membership in the WTO; the International Criminal Court; coping with the threat of reduced oil production and rising oil prices because of a dollar which has been devalued by one third over two years and is a disadvantage to the OPEC countries, linked to America's ever-mounting budget and trade deficits, financed for how long and by whom?

In my view Europe is confronted with an overwhelming collection of tasks and challenges which are uniting rather than divisive. They will encourage, or even force, EU member states to co-operate, not just spontaneously as cases arise, but in a well prepared, organized, and to a certain extent even institutionalized form. I return once more to the constitutional process. Does the draft for an EU constitution endanger British sovereignty? Under the Irish presidency the EU will try to agree on a constitutional treaty. An unprecedented piece of work has been submitted by a convention with well over a hun-

dred representatives from the governments and parliaments of fifteen member states, plus accession countries, plus the European Parliament and Commission—a *de facto* constituent assembly.

But is there a European *demos*? Do we have a European polity in mind in order to find compromises for the draft of the convention? At present we all share a lack of transparency, legitimacy, and democracy within the EU. There is a sense of confusion about who should do what in a Europe divided up into EU level, member state level, and regional level. Recently I met a high-ranking British official, and we talked about relations between Bavaria and Prussia. He demonstrated sympathy for the subject by declaring that he felt at home in Wales and in Europe.

There is widespread difficulty in understanding how the EU works. When people are asked about their political priorities and where Europe should act, the main areas named everywhere are pretty much the same: internal and external security; prosperity; and the environment. If we really want to achieve these objectives, we need a Europe which, particularly after enlargement, remains, or rather, becomes, capable of making decisions. In this light a number of points are important. (1) Strengthening the European Parliament and implementing co-decision-making as a matter of principle. We would have liked to give the European Parliament a clear right to choose the President of the Commission. Why should that parliament not have the right to decide about money spent, for instance, on the common agricultural policy? (2) More qualified majority voting in the Council. This includes transparent, effective, and democratic voting rules which reflect the dual character of the EU as a union of states and a union of citizens. This requires double majorities. (3) Finally, to give a common foreign and security policy a more solid basis and working level by having a European Foreign Minister and a European diplomatic service.

The development of a truly common European foreign and security policy will involve a long historical process, and nobody should have any illusions about this. The Iraq war has been the most relevant case in point. Very different positions were taken in Europe. Member states did not really attempt any co-ordination among themselves first in Brussels. Instead some rushed to the support of the USA and like-minded members of the Security Council. There were also huge controversies about the right approach among the people

inside most member states. In the long run, genuine European structures for a common European policy will be indispensable. But it is not, in the first place, common institutions that will teach us to speak with one voice, but our setbacks, our lamentable lack of influence so long as we remain many voiced. A growing recognition of its unavoidable common interests will teach Europe to find common positions, and, later on, to agree on relevant common institutions.

On the way, one should not overlook a great deal of consensus which exists in important areas of the common foreign and security policy, such as joint actions in the Balkans, Africa, Afghanistan, and the visit of the three foreign ministers in Tehran last autumn. Europe's tasks will not be restricted to soft power challenges. No political influence will be relevant, no voice will be listened to without capabilities for implementation. A common European defence capability is not a new endeavour. In the 1950s a first attempt was made to organize a common European defence, which was finally prevented not in London but in Paris. Against this background it is somewhat bizarre, in my view, that a modest attempt at a European security and defence policy with 60,000 troops available for crisis management should create controversy in Britain. The EU is assuming a strategic dimension. This requires capabilities in the area of security policy. It supplements the existing transatlantic security structures by creating a strong and credible scope for action. It closes a gap in transatlantic communications. It will contribute to a strengthened partnership both for common action and for a helpful and loyal division of labour. The EU has successfully achieved its first two military operations, in Macedonia with the help of NATO, as mentioned above, and in the Congo, in response to a request from the United Nations. We will now have markedly to increase our hardpower and softpower responsibility in south-eastern Europe. The European Armament Agency will be viable by this summer.

Some weeks ago there was a meeting of the British, French, and German leaders in Berlin. Some regarded this event with considerable suspicion, wondering whether it was an emergent European directorate of the Big Three. Nothing of the kind! It was not a bungle by the Three, as Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian Prime Minister, described it, but a necessary step towards overcoming a bungling Europe. Britain is Europe's leading Atlanticist, tempering tendencies in Paris to go it alone. There can be no common defence policy with-

out Britain, no progress inside Europe without French–German co-operation, and no outlook for British objectives in Europe without the two. Little will be achieved in the EU unless the three biggest European economies see eye to eye.

But there is no threat of a new core Europe emerging. Any attempt to prescribe to other EU members what they should do would fail. In Poland, someone mentioned a new Yalta. Nothing could be further from the truth. On the contrary, it will soon be worth including Poland in active plans for a common foreign policy, including an invitation for Poland to join the Three. The time for a core Europe has passed. This idea originated partly under the influence of the Cold War and partly under the impression that a reform of the European institutions might fail. In the meantime, enlargement is taking place. It is to be hoped that a constitution will be adopted. Larger regional and global challenges have acquired an increasingly dominant role. A core Europe with a greater decision-making capacity would be unable to meet those challenges and to organize other members of the union in a kind of backyard.

However, the draft of the constitutional treaty provides for intensified co-operation in the field of non-military and structural tasks. The meeting of the Three is nothing but an attempt to help Brussels with proposals and compromises which are required for both an enlarging and a deepening union—initiatives to encourage programmes to tackle unemployment, social security, and health care, and to create an improved business environment along the lines of the Lisbon agenda four years ago. Our tasks, our challenges, and our interests are forcing a European strategic dimension upon us. The meeting of the Three was a helpful contribution towards achieving this aim. It was a meeting unbound by treaty obligations, a search for flexible and open voluntary co-operation. It is just one step towards agreeing upon a European responsibility to build an international consensus for a legitimate and humane world order.

As for our ability to act together, we still have a long way to go. But Europe can and must assume responsibility as one of the great centres on earth. The globalizing world is our strictest teacher. The way in which Europe has learned from history so far is a miracle, possibly the most exciting one on the globe, but not without the unique British characteristic uniting pragmatism and courage. For the future, my confidence prevails.

RICHARD VON WEIZSÄCKER was President of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1984 to 1994. He also held office as Governing Mayor of West Berlin (1981–1984) and was a long-standing Member of the German Parliament (1969–1981). Among his many publications are *Die deutsche Geschichte geht weiter* (1983), *Von Deutschland nach Europa* (1991), and *Drei Mal Stunde Null? 1949–1969–1989* (2001).

ARTICLE

THE IDEOLOGY OF SELF-DESTRUCTION
HITLER AND THE CHOREOGRAPHY OF DEFEAT[*]

by Bernd Wegner

In August 1918, less than three months before the First World War came to an end, the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, explained to his War Cabinet, why, according to the latest intelligence assessments, Germany was likely to keep on fighting for a number of years. Almost exactly twenty-five years later, in September 1943 (shortly after Italy's surrender), the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, trying to avoid a comparably embarrassing misjudgement, came to the following conclusion in its final report:

> We may see the defection of the rest of Germany's European Allies and, even before the end of this year, convince the German people and military leaders that a continuation of the war is more to be feared than the consequences of inevitable defeat. With the German people no longer willing to endure useless bloodshed and destruction, and the military leaders convinced of the futility of resistance there might be, as in Italy, some sudden change of regime to prepare the way for a request for an armistice.[1]

The fact that the two assessments mentioned here both proved to be fundamentally wrong seems to support the view held by many

[1] War Cabinet/Joint Sub-Commitee, 'Probabilities of a German Collapse', J. I. C. (43) 367 Final of 9. 9. 1943, p. 3/no. 11 (National Archives, Washington D.C.: ABC 381 Germany, 29. 1. 1943, Sec. 1-A).

historians that intelligence, at least at times of war, tends, as a rule, to be wrong.[2] Although this view might be popular in the light of the current debate on the background to the Iraq war, things are not so simple in the case of Germany in 1943. British intelligence experts were terribly wrong in what they predicted in September 1943, but their situation analysis, upon which their prediction had been based, was perfectly correct. Both German and international historiography of the last two decades has shown them to have been right in their assessment that Germany's war effort was doomed to fail and that Germany's defeat was almost inevitable.[3] The main reasons for Germany's hopeless situation in 1943 may be summarized as follows.[4]

(1) Since December 1941 the war had changed fundamentally in character. While the large-scale Soviet winter campaign demonstrated the definite breakdown of Germany's *Blitzkrieg* strategy, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor redefined the framework of Hitler's war. What had so far been a European war, limited in time and space, now became a long-term global conflict for which Germany was totally unprepared.

(2) In the late summer of 1942 Hitler's second campaign against Russia, known as Operation Blue, also failed. For Germany this meant not only a serious military setback, whose most spectacular consequences the *Wehrmacht* was to suffer at Stalingrad, but also a major strategic defeat. By failing to bring the Soviet Union's economic resources (especially the Caucasian oil fields) under its control, Germany lost the ability to fight a long, all-out war against the Anglo–American sea powers. At the same time Stalingrad marked the end of a process of shrinking options for the achievement of victory in the East. In fact, from late 1942 no-one in Germany, not even Hitler himself, knew how to bring this war to a successful conclusion. German warfare over the next two and a half years was characterized

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[2] Cf., e.g., Ernest R. May (ed.), '*Knowing One's Enemies': Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars* (Princeton, 1984).

[3] For a somewhat different view cf. Richard Overy, *Why the Allies Won* (London, 1995).

[4] The following paragraphs outline a number of the central findings of the research I undertook while working on the series, edited by the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, *Germany and the Second World War,* vol. 6 (Oxford, 2001) and vol. 8 (forthcoming).

by a complete lack of grand strategy, which was increasingly replaced by the sheer will to keep on fighting.

(3) In 1943 Germany for the first time suffered simultaneous defeats on different fronts. In May, Germany lost North Africa, while at the same time German U-boat warfare in the Atlantic crumbled. Two months later, the Allied invasion of Sicily forced Hitler to stop his offensive against the Kursk pocket (it was to be his final one) and to withdraw forces from the East. The 'continental fortress' of German-dominated Europe now came under attack from various directions. At the same time intensified bombing by the Allied air forces made the Germans aware that their fortress lacked a roof.

(4) This situation considerably exacerbated shortages of manpower, arms, and ammunition. In consequence, there was a persistent and increasingly bitter struggle for manpower between the *Wehrmacht*, the armaments industry, and local administrative organs—a struggle that could never be settled. Despite an impressive increase in industrial output, Germany at no time managed to make up the lead held by the Allied powers. On the whole, Germany proved far less successful in implementing 'total war' measures at home than did either Britain or the Soviet Union.[5]

(5) Nazi Germany never managed to form a multilateral alliance of powers, bound together either by common values or by long-term common interest. In fact, Germany and its allies did not even have a common enemy. While Soviet Russia, for example, was the main enemy of both totalitarian Germany and democratic Finland, it maintained a neutrality agreement with Germany's most powerful ally, Japan. Hungary and Romania, both allies of Germany, regarded each other as the main enemy. Moreover, for various reasons, Germany never treated its allies as partners, but merely as auxiliaries. Consequently, the alliance of the Axis powers began to disintegrate at the very moment when Germany's military might began to falter. In 1943 and 1944 it almost fell apart completely.

In addition to these five developments, whose impact on Germany's war situation was more or less obvious to contemporaries, a number of other factors could be mentioned, which, in a less obvious way, contributed to Germany's disaster. In this respect the

[5] For a detailed analysis cf. the contributions by Bernhard R. Kroener and Rolf-Dieter Müller in *Germany and the Second World War,* vol. 5 (Oxford, 2001–2003).

most important seems to me to be the nature of the strategic decision-making process in Germany. The *Führerprinzip* upon which it was mainly based, no doubt had certain advantages. In easily comprehensible situations, it allowed the dictator to make quick decisions and thus to take his enemy by surprise. In the context of a highly complex global war, however, the *Führerprinzip* proved to be totally inadequate. In contrast to Britain, where the committee system prevailed, in Germany after 1941 strategic decisions were never systematically prepared. Rather, they were the more or less arbitrary result of the experts' competition for Hitler's favour.

British intelligence in 1943, however, was not only correct in its assessment of Germany's desperate war situation. It also rightly assumed that an increasing number of Germans—ordinary people as well as military leaders and party officials—had begun to realize that final victory was practically unattainable. In this context the German defeat at Stalingrad, while not a turning point of the war itself, became a turning point with respect to perceptions of the war. 'Defeatism' now became popular. Graffiti on the façades of houses in Berlin and Vienna reminded people of the year 1918. In its weekly report on the mood of the German people in May 1943 the SS Security Service concluded that a growing number of industrialists, home front officers, and members of the educated bourgeoisie seemed prepared to compromise in order to bring the war to an end.[6] Even among the highest ranking officials, a large number of generals, diplomats, and functionaries would have welcomed some kind of political initiative to explore the conditions for peace in 1943, and even more in 1944. Among those who advocated a separate peace either with Britain or with Soviet Russia were, for example, the generals Fromm and Milch, Fellgiebel and Canaris, Rundstedt and Rommel, and General Heusinger, Chief of the Army High Command Operations Department. Among diplomats and politicians Weizsäcker and Ribbentrop, Speer and even Goebbels should be mentioned, among others.[7] Also, most of Germany's allies, in particular, Italy

[6] Heinz Boberach (ed.), *Meldungen aus dem Reich 1938–1945: Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS*, vol. 13, no. 363, 1 March 1943–no. 386, 30 May 1943 (Herrsching, 1984), p. 5,215.

[7] For individual references see Wegner, 'Hitler, der Zweite Weltkrieg und die Choreographie des Untergangs', pp. 494 f.

and Japan, tried to persuade the German *Führer* to end the war by political rather than military means.[8]

Given this general background, the obvious question to ask is why Germany made no serious political attempt to bring to an end a war which it could no longer hope to win? To be sure, there had been repeated talks between emissaries of the various powers in Stockholm and other neutral capitals. Conducted at the lowest possible level, these talks, however, were at best tolerated by Hitler, but never encouraged.[9] There is no hint whatsoever that the German dictator had any serious interest in such exploratory discussions. Not even within the inner circle of Hitler's headquarters had the question of a separate peace ever been officially discussed; at most, it was touched upon in private conversation. In fact, a proper forum in which fundamental questions of war and peace could have been discussed did not even exist. Cabinet meetings had long since ceased to take place; nothing like a Chiefs of Staff Committee existed, and the daily situation analysis (*Lagebesprechung*) was almost exclusively devoted to military operations. In this way Hitler managed repeatedly to avoid any unpleasant debate on important matters of principle. Supported by Bormann and Keitel, Hitler kept himself artificially isolated and thus guaranteed his monopoly of the decision-making process. Perhaps Hitler's influence on the course of the war diminished to the degree that this war became a global one. There is no doubt, however, that when it would end depended on the dictator's personal will more than on anything else.

This inevitably leads us to ask why Hitler insisted on fighting to the very last minute. The demand for unconditional surrender, put forward by the Western Allies at the Casablanca Conference, does not play a prominent role in this context. Neither Hitler himself nor his environment paid much attention to it.[10] This changed only when they discovered how well the slogan of unconditional surrender fitted into German propaganda.

[8] Cf., for a summary, Joseph Schröder, *Bestrebungen zur Eliminierung der Ostfront, 1941–1943* (Göttingen, 1985).

[9] For details cf. Ingeborg Fleischhauer, *Die Chance des Sonderfriedens: Deutsch-Sowjetische Geheimgespräche 1941–1945* (Berlin, 1986).

[10] Cf. also Lothar Gruchmann, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg: Kriegführung und Politik* (Munich, 1974), p. 344.

If it was not the Allied demand for unconditional surrender, what was it that made Hitler carry on with a war that he had no chance of winning, but which was to cost Germany casualties and devastation on an unprecedented scale?[11] Historiography, of course, offers different answers to our question. What most have in common is the assumption that Hitler, sticking obsessively to his original war aims, remained convinced at least until early 1945 that final victory (*Endsieg*) could be achieved if there was a strong enough will never to give up fighting. According to this view, Hitler was, above all, a fanatical ideologist who, at least in his later years, increasingly refused to accept the realities of war. It is the main purpose of this article to challenge this view, and to offer an alternative interpretation.

My objections to the perception of Hitler as a strategist out of touch with reality are threefold. First, if we see Hitler in the way outlined above, a number of crucial questions remains unanswered. If we assume that it was Hitler's belief in final victory that kept him fighting, we cannot explain, for example, his behaviour on the eve of his death. By that time at the latest he had realized that his cause was lost, and that any further resistance would be futile. None the less, in his 'political testament' (drafted only the day before he committed suicide), the dictator bound his military commanders to use all available means to strengthen the fighting spirit of their soldiers.[12]

Another example of such inconsistency: according to most historians, Hitler's belief in final victory was based, among other things, on his hope that the Allied coalition would crumble before the end of the war. If this was what he hoped, why did he not make any serious political attempt to increase the frictions that undoubtedly existed between the Western powers and the Soviet Union? An encouraging response to the peace-feelers repeatedly put out by Moscow might have achieved a great deal.

[11] Of a total of 5.3 million German soldiers killed during the Second World War, no fewer than 3.3 million died in 1944 and 1945. This means that during the final 18 months of the conflict there were almost twice as many casualties as during its first four years; cf. Rüdiger Overmans, *Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Munich, 1999), p. 266, table 53.

[12] *Hitlers politisches Testament*, quoted from Percy E. Schramm (ed.), *Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab)* (Frankfurt am Main, 1961), vol. 4, p. 1,968.

Secondly, the notion of Hitler as a dictator fixated by his own dream of final victory does not correspond to the picture that has evolved in the course of my own research. If we believe what German generals said after the war, then Hitler's ideological dogmatism made him more and more unable to grasp the military and strategic realities of war. As a warlord he appears fanatical, but professionally incompetent. While this might be right to some degree with respect to tactical and operational warfare, it is certainly wrong with regard to grand strategy. On the contrary, Hitler on the whole had a much better understanding of the requirements of modern industrial warfare than the vast majority of his military advisers. There are many examples that demonstrate his rational and far-sighted understanding of strategic developments. As early as January 1942 he reckoned with the possibility that the USA would be the only real winner of a global war.[13] Only a few weeks after the Allied invasion of North Africa, Hitler calculated that Germany would lose the African theatre, and that Italy might sooner or later withdraw from the war (as it in fact did eight months later).[14] Similarly, Hitler was under no illusions as to the attempts made by most of Germany's other allies to withdraw. Even during the final phase of his rule, the dictator demonstrated a remarkable far-sightedness, as this quotation from the 'Bormann dictations' of 2 April 1945 shows:

> Between the defeat of the Reich and the rise of nationalist movements in Asia, Africa and perhaps also in South America there will be only two powers in the world that can face each other on the basis of equal strength: the USA and Soviet Russia. The laws of history and of geography dictate that these two colossuses will test their strength, whether militarily, or just economically and ideologically. The same laws dictate that these two powers must be enemies of an independent Europe.[15]

[13] Adolf Hitler, *Monologe im Führerhauptquartier 1941–1944: Die Aufzeichnungen Heinrich Heims*, ed. Werner Jochmann (Hamburg, 1980), p. 199.

[14] Elke Fröhlich (ed.), *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels: Sämtliche Fragmente* (Munich, 1987–95), part II, vol. 7, p. 176 (23 Jan. 1943); Nicolaus von Below, *Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937–1945* (Mainz, 1980), p. 334.

[15] *Hitlers politisches Testament: Die Bormann-Diktate vom Februar und April 1945* (Hamburg, 1981), p. 124.

Certainly, these were not the words of a fool who is out of touch with the world around him.

My third objection to the assumption that Hitler was too foolish to recognize Germany's hopeless strategic situation is based on the sources. Doubtless there are many documents that seem to reveal Hitler's unshakeable belief in final victory. In countless speeches, proclamations, and orders the dictator expressed his optimism and justified it by reference to Germany's alleged defence superiority and the efficiency of future weapons, or by speculating on the fragility of both the Soviet regime and the Allied coalition. These sources,[16] however, have not always been critically studied. These documents are usually quoted as if they were personal confessions expressing the dictator's real opinion, without taking their context into account. However, according to the testimony of many people who worked with him on a daily basis, Hitler as a rule used his words as weapons and only rarely expressed his views naturally. The *Führer*, as he saw himself, wanted to motivate and encourage people, especially in desperate situations. Like a company commander—a comparison which he favoured—he always knew what to do and could never admit his own helplessness.[17] On closer inspection, therefore, many contradictions emerge in Hitler's comments on the current situation. While celebrating the cult of pure will in public, in private conversation he maintained that numbers, not will power, have ultimately counted in history.[18] Similarly, Hitler's oft-proclaimed hope of splitting up the Allied coalition can be matched with opposing statements.[19] As they

[16] Individual references can be found in Wegner, 'Hitler, der Zweite Weltkrieg und die Choreographie des Untergangs', pp. 499 f.

[17] Andreas Hillgruber (ed.), *Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei Hitler: Vertrauliche Aufzeichnungen über Unterredungen mit Vertretern des Auslandes 1942–1944* (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), p. 379 (16 March 1944). Characteristic of the attitude described here is another order of Hitler's, dated 25 November 1944, which instructs troops who have been cut off from the main body to continue fighting so long as there is a single soldier, regardless of rank, who insists on fighting and is prepared to take on the leadership. Cf. Andreas Kunz, 'Die Wehrmacht in der Agonie der Nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft 1944/45', in Jörg Hillmann and John Zimmermann (eds.), *Kriegsende 1945 in Deutschland* (Munich, 2002), p. 110.

[18] Hitler, *Monologe im Führerhauptquartier*, p. 354.

[19] Cf. *Hitlers politisches Testament: Die Bormann-Diktate*, pp. 120 f. (2 April 1945).

show, the idea of a global conspiracy by world Jewry made the dictator believe that Germany's enemies would not lay down their arms before the Nazi regime was crushed.

Having outlined my main objections to the mainstream interpretation of Hitler's role during the later years of the Second World War, I should now like to offer an alternative interpretation. Admittedly, it is not absolutely new, but it seems to me to be much more convincing. It assumes that Hitler had early realized that final victory was out of reach. According to General Jodl's testimony immediately after the war, the first indications of such a pessimistic situation assessment came as early as November 1941.[20] During the months that followed, hope and despair alternated before it became clear to Hitler in the late summer of 1942 (probably during the first week of September), that the *Blitzkrieg* strategy had definitely failed.[21] From that time on, as mentioned above, Germany had no 'grand strategy'. What is usually called *Haltestrategie*, or a strategy of defence, was, in reality, defence without strategy, for it was not based on a realistic plan for regaining the military initiative. Hitler himself unintentionally admitted as much when he let slip: 'I have been muddling through from month to month!'[22] The very last comprehensive strategic memorandum of the whole war, submitted by the *Wehrmacht* High Command and expressing Hitler's own ideas, is dated 10 December 1942.[23] Its only strategic message was: 'let us try to gain time!' But it gave no indication as to why time should be gained. There was simply no concept. Eleven months later, in November 1943, General Jodl gave an overall assessment of Germany's strategic

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[20] Cf. entries in Generaloberst Halder, *Kriegstagebuch: Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939–1942*, ed. Arbeitskreis für Wehrforschung, vol. 3 (Stuttgart, 1964), p. 295 (19 Nov. 1942) and in Schramm (ed.), *Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht*, vol. 4, pp. 1,501 (13 May 1945) and 1,503 (15 May 1945).

[21] Cf. my detailed justification of this view, given in 'The War against the Soviet Union 1942–1943', in *Germany and the Second World War,* vol. 6, pp. 841–1,215, at 1,048 ff.

[22] Werner Rahn and Gerhard Schreiber (eds.), *Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung*, part A, vol. 47 (July 1943) (Berlin, 1994), pp. 635-A, note 90.

[23] The memorandum is reproduced in Jürgen Förster, 'Strategische Überlegungen des Wehrmachtführungsstabes für das Jahr 1943', *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen*, 13 (1973), pp. 95–107.

situation while speaking to *Gauleiter*. Having done his best to disillusion his audience, Hitler's top military adviser justified his persistent optimism in words that seem bizarre from a professional soldier. Jodl said that he was convinced 'that we will triumph in the end, because we have to triumph. For otherwise, world history would have lost its meaning.'[24]

We now come to the point at which the British intelligence assessment quoted above was wrong. It underestimated the degree to which Hitler was determined constantly to radicalize 'his' war to the point of almost complete self-destruction. Nor did the British expect that he could make the Germans follow him down that path. In retrospect, the reasons for Hitler's determination have become clearer. In this context we must first consider the strong interdependence between war and genocide. On the one hand, war was the indispensable cover under which the 'final solution' was carried out. This means that the 'War against European Jewry', regarded by Hitler as his real historical mission, could be brought to a 'successful' conclusion only as long as the military war continued. On the other hand, mass destruction early attained a scale that would have been a serious obstacle to any diplomatic solution to the war. By December 1941, when it became clear that 'Barbarossa' had failed, about half a million people had already been murdered. War, in Hitler's view, had become a matter of life and death. Goebbels, summing up a conversation with Göring, later put it thus. Göring, he said, is 'fully aware of what would threaten us all were we to weaken in this war ... On the Jewish question in particular we are so committed that there is no escape for us at all. And that is good. Experience shows that a movement and a *Volk* that have burned their bridges fight much more unconditionally than those who still have the chance of retreat.'[25] Hitler, after Stalingrad, repeatedly expressed himself in almost identical phrases.[26]

If military victory in the traditional sense could no longer be achieved, moral victory could. We should bear in mind that for Hitler

[24] Quoted from Schramm (ed.), *Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht,* vol. 4, p. 1,562 (7 Nov. 1943).

[25] Fröhlich (ed.), *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, part II, vol. 7, p. 454 (2 March 1943).

[26] Cf., e.g., Hillgruber (ed.), *Staatsmänner und Diplomaten,* p. 233 (16 Apr. 1943).

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the shame of '1918' was not military defeat as such, but the disgrace-
ful way in which it was suffered. He was determined that the experi-
ence of 1918 would not be repeated. This time, Germans should walk
upright towards the precipice. Defending themselves to their last
breath, they would accept defeat in a way that would make all later
generations admire them. In this sense, Stalingrad became a practice
run for greater things to come. Once German defeat on the Volga
river could no longer be concealed, German propaganda made no
effort to trivialize its scale. On the contrary, the sufferings of the Sixth
Army were celebrated as a powerful heroic drama in classical style,
comparable only to ancient Greek tragedies or the Nibelungen saga.
The dead were transformed into heroes, sorrow into pride, defeat
into victory.[27] This was to be the model for the later collective
destruction of Germany as a whole. Or, as Goebbels put it: 'If we
have to leave, we'll close the door behind us with a slam that all the
world will hear.'[28]

This was not merely propaganda. German warfare in the last two
years of the war was characterized by growing radicalization in
almost all respects. 'Scorched earth' tactics were used far beyond
what could be justified as military necessity, finally culminating in a
concept of almost complete self-destruction, as the Nero Orders of
March 1945 demonstrate.[29] These orders prescribed that the scorched
earth principle should also be applied on German territory. They
were not, as has often been suggested, an act of desperation, but the
climax of a calculated 'strategy'. As early as six months previously, in
September 1944, we read in a leader of the *Völkischer Beobachter*, initi-
ated by Hitler himself: 'No German blade shall feed the enemy; no
German mouth shall impart information; no German hand shall offer
help. The enemy should find every little bridge destroyed, every
road blocked—nothing but death, destruction and hate will await

[27] On this see most recently Bernd Wegner, 'Der Mythos "Stalingrad" ', in
Gerd Krumeich and Susanne Brandt (eds.), *Schlachtenmythen: Ereignis —
Erzählung — Erinnerung* (Cologne, 2003), pp. 183–97.
[28] Thus Goebbels early in 1945, quoted from Helmut Heiber, *Joseph Goebbels*,
trans. John K. Dickinson (London, 1973; original German edn. Berlin, 1962),
p. 343.
[29] Reproduced in Martin Moll (ed.), *'Führer-Erlasse' 1939–1945* (Stuttgart,
1997), pp. 486 f. (document 394).

him.'[30] In the same spirit, while taking the oath from the men of the East Prussian *Volkssturm* a few weeks later in October 1944, Heinrich Himmler called on the German people to transform the homeland, under threat by the enemy, into a 'field of live landmines'.[31]

Of course, the ideology of self-destruction upon which Hitler's words and deeds was based had a long tradition in large parts of Europe (and, as we painfully realize today, also in non-European cultures). In Germany it had been stimulated particularly by political romanticism in the period of the anti-Napoleonic wars, the Wars of Liberation. Poets of those years (such as Schenkendorf, Arndt, and Körner), actively involved in the struggle against French occupation, at times literally longed for death. When Hitler, on the eve of war, confessed that in his youth he had often sung Theodor Körner's songs 'with a heart full of belief',[32] he was thinking of verses such as those in which the poet, seeing himself 'as a martyr for the holy German cause', declared himself prepared 'rapturously to throw away young lives' in a 'joyously bold consecration of death': 'Your heart beats high, your oaks grow tall, / what do you care about the piles of corpses? / Plant the flag of freedom high on them!'[33]

Even more obvious is the reference to Clausewitz, whose works Hitler knew very well. Characteristically, it was not *On War*, that fascinated Hitler most, but the *Confessions*, which a hot-blooded Clausewitz had written in 1812. The first part reads as follows:

> I believe and declare that a people should value nothing more highly than the dignity and freedom of its existence; that it should defend these to the last drop of blood; that it has no holier duty to fulfil; no higher law to obey; that the shame of a cowardly submission can never be erased; that this drop of poison in the blood of a people is passed on to its descendants and will lame and undermine the strength of future genera-

[30] Quoted from Albert Speer, *Erinnerungen* (Frankfurt am Main, 1999), p. 412.
[31] Quoted from Kunz, 'Die Wehrmacht', p. 105.
[32] Brigitte Hamann, *Hitler's Vienna: A Dictator's Apprenticeship*, trans. Thomas Thornton (New York, 1999; original German edn. Munich, 1996), p. 14.
[33] The quotations are from Theodor Körner's poems 'Die Eichen' (1810), and 'Aufruf' (1813). Not surprisingly, we also find Goebbels quoting Körner in his notorious 'total war' speech.

> tions; that honour can only be lost once; ... that even the loss of freedom after an honourable and bloody battle secures the rebirth of the people and is the seed of life from which, one day, a new tree will strike firm root; I declare to this world and to posterity that I consider the false wisdom that wants to withdraw from danger to be the most pernicious sentiment that fear and anxiety can instil ... that I would be only too happy to find a glorious death in the magnificent fight for the freedom and dignity of the fatherland![34]

This long passage is reproduced here because Hitler himself repeatedly quoted it, probably more often than any other book, especially at the beginning and towards the end of his political career. I have even found it attached to the service record books (*Wehrpass*) of German soldiers. Of particular interest in our context is that we also find references to Clausewitz's *Confessions* in Hitler's very last radio message to Stalingrad as well as in his 'political testament'. There is no doubt that he identified closely with Clausewitz's words.

Of course, other nineteenth-century romantic characters played a significant part in forming Hitler's ideology of self-destruction. In this respect, the operas of Richard Wagner should be mentioned, and in particular, two central figures from them. In *Rienzi* Hitler admired the tragic Roman tribune who was ultimately betrayed by his own people, while the figure of Siegfried fascinated him because of the wonderful mystery of the dying hero.

What had been fantasy in the nineteenth century became reality in the twentieth. During and after the First World War, the desire for self-sacrifice and self-destruction was strongly stimulated by mass propaganda. 'The precious thing about German loyalty', as the *Germanist* Gustav Roethe, for example, put it in 1915, 'is the unconditional commitment of the whole person without haggling, considering, or wavering, that holds out to the last, even if the earth should split asunder as a result.'[35] Writers such as Ernst Jünger went even

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[34] Carl von Clausewitz, *Politische Schriften und Briefe*, ed. Hans Rothfels (Munich, 1922), pp. 85 f.

[35] Quoted from Peter Krüger, 'Etzels Halle und Stalingrad: Die Rede Görings vom 30.1.1943', in Joachim Heinzle and Anneliese Waldschmidt (eds.), *Die Nibelungen: Ein deutscher Wahn, ein deutscher Alptraum* (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), p. 165.

further and celebrated the warrior who relished blowing himself up with a hand grenade, seeing it as a sensible act of freedom.[36] For the protagonists of 'heroic nihilism' the essential thing about war was not its outcome (victory or defeat), but the way in which it was fought. Fighting and dying (in battle) had become ends in themselves. It was the heroic gesture that mattered. As a consequence, an army bishop expressed his hope of educating German youth to enjoy dying more, to become 'sterbefreudiger'.[37] The Hitler Youth did just that. One of its slogans was: 'We are born to die for Germany!'[38]

Even military professionals were not immune to a self-destructive code of honour. Thus, for example, the order for a final offensive, given to the German High Sea Fleet in October 1918, cannot be explained adequately without reference to the idea of collective self-sacrifice.[39] The same applies to the scuttling of the fleet at Scapa Flow eight months later.[40] At the same time, even the highest ranking German commanders, such as Hindenburg, recommended rejecting the Versailles Treaty and resuming the war, even at the cost of complete disintegration of the German Reich.[41]

Although things did not work out that way, the ideology as such persisted. In an official military handbook, published in 1936, we read, for example: 'Even an attack without hope of victory, attack purely for its own sake, can be justified as a last desperate deed that

[36] Cf. Armin Mohler, *Die konservative Revolution in Deutschland 1918–1932: Ein Handbuch* (Darmstadt, 1989), p. 126.

[37] Feldbischof Dohrmann, quoted from René Schilling, 'Die "Helden der Wehrmacht"—Konstruktion und Rezeption', in Rolf-Dieter Müller and Hans-Erich Volkmann (eds.), *Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität* (Munich, 1999), p. 557.

[38] Cf. Philip Baker, *Youth Led by Youth: Some Aspects of the Hitlerjugend* (London, 1989), p. 26.

[39] Cf. most recently Gerhard P. Groß, 'Eine Frage der Ehre? Die Marineführung und der letzte Flottenvorstoß 1918', in Gerhard P. Groß and Jörg Duppler (eds.), *Kriegsende 1918: Ereignis, Wirkung, Nachwirkung* (Munich, 1999), pp. 349–65.

[40] Cf. most recently Andreas Krause, *Scapa Flow: Die Selbstversenkung der Wilhelminischen Flotte* (Berlin, 1999).

[41] Cf. the evidence cited by Gotthard Breit, *Das Staats- und Gesellschaftsbild deutscher Generäle beider Weltkriege im Spiegel ihrer Memoiren* (Boppard, 1973), pp. 109 f.

leads to heroic death instead of shameful capitulation.'[42] As we see, the ideology of self-sacrifice and self-destruction was not invented by Hitler. Rather, it had been deeply rooted among large sections of the German bourgeoisie since the First World War, at the latest. Its main purpose was to give meaning to suffering which would otherwise have appeared meaningless. Once again, it was Ernst Jünger who seems to have grasped the spirit of his generation best when, in his main work, *Der Arbeiter*, he wrote: 'Happiness and fulfilment of man in its deepest form involve self-sacrifice. The highest form of leadership consists in setting goals worth of it.'[43]

Hitler, it seems, knew better than anyone how to make use of such an ideology. For him, the choreography of collective self-annihilation was not senseless bloodshed, but a prerequisite for Germany's resurrection. It was, so to speak, the second-best solution. If short-term military victory was out of reach, long-term historical victory could still be achieved. In *Mein Kampf* Hitler had distinguished between ordinary politicians on the one hand, and the 'marathon runners of history', as he put it, on the other.[44] The more his own rule drew to an end, the more the dictator identified with the latter. The 'marathon man' was the visionary, misjudged by his own time, and yet prepared to fight for his ideas even without hope of victory. He would be defeated, for he demanded the impossible, but for the same reason he would be loved by the Goddess of Destiny. Consequently, Hitler indicated repeatedly during the final months of his life that even visions of the horror still to come would not 'take away his unwavering belief in the future of the German *Volk*'. 'The more we suffer, the more strikingly will the everlasting Reich rise again!' It was a 'law of nature in these cruel times ... that only those white *Völker* who are able to hold out to the end and who keep their courage to fight to the death even without hope have any prospect of surviving and achieving a new flowering.'[45] And again, on the day before his death, he dictated the following sentence to Bormann, referring back to

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[42] *Handbuch der Neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften*, vol. 1: *Wehrpolitik und Kriegführung* (Berlin, 1936), p. 212.

[43] Ernst Jünger, *Der Arbeiter: Herrschaft und Gestalt* (Hamburg, 1932), p. 71.

[44] Cf. Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (Munich, 1933), p. 232.

[45] *Hitlers politisches Testament: Die Bormann-Diktate,* pp. 121 and 125 (2 Apr. 1945).

Clausewitz: 'Out of the sacrifice of our soldiers and out of my own close ties with them unto death, the seed will one day germinate in German history one way or another, and give rise to a glorious rebirth of the National Socialist movement, and thus to the realization of a true racial community *(Volksgemeinschaft)*.'[46]

Thus it was not Social Darwinism that ultimately prevailed, but *völkisch* romanticism. It has been the aim of this article to show that the notion of self-destruction formed a decisive part of this ideological amalgam—a part, in fact, as indispensable as the notion of war itself.

[46] Cf. Schramm (ed.), *Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht*, vol. 4, p. 1,668.

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RAINER BRAUN and JOACHIM WILD (eds.), *Bayern ohne Klöster? Die Säkularisation 1802/03 und die Folgen: Eine Ausstellung des Bayerischen Hauptstaatsarchiv*s, Ausstellungskataloge der Staatlichen Archive Bayerns, 45 (2nd edn; Munich: Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, 2003), 539 pp. ISBN 3 921635 70 5. ISSN 0932 5042.

ALOIS SCHMID (ed.), *Die Säkularisation in Bayern 1803: Kulturbruch oder Modernisierung?*, Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte, Reihe B, Beiheft 23 (Munich: Beck, 2003), xiv + 398 pp. ISBN 3 406 10664 1. EUR 22.00

DIETER KUDORFER (ed.), *Lebendiges Büchererbe: Säkularisation, Mediatisierung und die Bayerische Staatsbibliothek. Ausstellung der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek*, Ausstellungskataloge, 74 (Bayerische Staatsbibliothek: Munich, 2003), 239 pp. ISBN 3 9807702 3 0. EUR 15.00

ROLF DECOT (ed.), *Säkularisation der Reichskirche 1803: Aspekte kirchlichen Umbruchs*, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für europäische Geschichte Mainz, Abteilung für Abendländische Religionsgeschichte, Beiheft 55 (Mainz: von Zabern, 2002), ix + 169 pp. ISBN 3 8053 2490 7. EUR 29.80

During the year 2003 a remarkable number of exhibitions was mounted, and books published, in Germany to mark the bicentenary of the great secularization associated with the *Reichsdeputationshaupt-schluß* (henceforward RDHS). It seems that two main motives inspired these productions. The first is *nostalgie de l'abbaye*, a sentiment naturally strong in the parts of Germany that remained Catholic during the Reformation and hence are strewn with sumptuous church buildings from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many of them originally monastic. The second is the readiness of the regional governments established in these areas after the Second World War — almost exactly half a century ago — to celebrate the redistribution of lands brought about by the RDHS, which ranks as the single most important stage in the creation of the middle-sized compact states from which the modern *Länder* derive their names and inherit most of their territory.

These two motives of course yield conflicting approaches which are reflected in some of the titles: *Alte Klöster: Neue Herren*; *Kloster-sturm und Fürstenrevolution*; *Kulturbruch oder Modernisierung*? Since nostalgia for the old regime and approval for what replaced it are both present, the subject has been treated in a balanced way. And the concern with both 'before' and 'after' has led to some very broad discussions — so broad, in fact, that the medieval *Reichskirche* and the twenty-first century Church receive consideration; as do music, literature, liturgy, and theology as well as *Realpolitik*, social impact, and economic development. Further, most of the works here reviewed have something to say on the overarching issue of the end of the Holy Roman Empire.

By far the widest-ranging thematically — though concentrating only on Baden-Württemberg — is the beautifully produced, three-volume collection *Alte Klöster: Neue Herren*. The first volume is the catalogue of the vast and splendid exhibition held in the former Premonstratensian monastery at Schussenried, with valuable introductory essays, while the second and the third (described as 2.1 and 2.2) consist of nearly a hundred scholarly articles. Among the hundreds of mostly coloured illustrations in the catalogue, in addition to those of the expected buildings and plans, sacred pictures, vestments, ornaments, relics etc., are some excellent and well researched maps showing monasteries and pilgrimage sites, many portraits of abbots, monks, and abbesses, caricatures against monks, the stun-

ning table silver from Neresheim, and a striking group on the Church and the monastic revival of the nineteenth century.

The second and third volumes, nearly as lavishly illustrated as the catalogue, contain so many articles that it is quite impossible to list, let alone discuss, them all. But the editors have ensured that each of them has something to say which is backed up by a serious set of references, often including archives and always at least the German-language secondary literature. Many of them are the work of already well known and distinguished scholars. Volume 2.1 covers the background to the secularization and the actual process. A good group of papers explains the position before 1800, including the role of the abbots and abbesses who made up the still influential Swabian *Reichsprälatenkollegium* (Armgard Gräfin von Reden-Dohna) and the suppressions of monasteries carried out by Joseph II (Ute Ströbele). The latter piece shows how varied the emperor's intentions could be—he discouraged many suppressions in this province late in his reign—and how unexpected the results sometimes were—among the 'purely contemplative' Swabian houses dissolved in 1782 all but one were nunneries. It also draws attention, as many articles do, to the difficulties inherent in the term 'secularization'. By one strict definition Joseph's suppressions do not qualify as secularizations because the property or yield remained dedicated to religious purposes. Other articles show that hostility to ecclesiastical states and monasteries was growing and that some monks and nuns were disaffected, partly through having imbibed Enlightened attitudes. But it is acknowledged that many monasteries were observant and as flourishing as they had ever been.

A fascinating section on architecture, art, and music follows, particularly interesting on the significance of the neo-classical design of St Blasien (Marcus Würmseher), on the deliberate recruitment of musicians to be monks, on their repertoire and their importance in monastic theatre (Georg Günther, Berthold Büchele). In this, as in the next section on theology, the figure of Martin Gerbert, abbot of St Blasien, towers over the scene. A series of articles, introduced by Winfried Müller, deals with the fate of the lands of the bishoprics of Constance, Basle, Strasburg and Speyer. Later, the *Deutsche Orden* and the lands of the Evangelical Church are considered.

Volume 2.2 deals with further aspects of mediatization and with the effects of the RDHS. It devotes considerable space to the secular

institutions which were downgraded, but not suppressed, in the political re-organization of the Empire. The first nine articles are concerned with the abolition of the independence of most imperial cities. Beginning with an overview by Rolf Kiessling, many of these studies are archivally based and, taken together, form an important and original contribution to nineteenth-century German social and economic history. The next ten essays on the fate of imperial knights, counts, and princes include several detailed studies, particularly of the Hohenzollern and Waldburg families, which illuminate another relatively unfamiliar transition. In the final section the effects of the RDHS are looked at from several points of view: piety and church practice; the fate of the monastic buildings and their inmates; artistic development; and economic change. The range is exceptional: there are admirable articles, for example, on pilgrimages (Ingo Gabor), organs (Ulrich Höflacher) and church music (Hans-Bruno Ernst, Erno Seifriz, Michael Kaufmann), on dispensaries (Wolfgang Caesar), and on the disposal of monastic archives and libraries (Robert Kretzschmar, Magda Fischer).

Although some good general articles have been included, the main achievement of this impressive collection is to provide a mass of detailed studies which will inform others' syntheses. Because the authors are concentrating on events and attitudes within Germany, some of them try to explain too much from this standpoint. There is tension between the evidence that monasticism was losing support and *élan* and the acknowledgment that, right down to 1803, many monasteries were in good shape. Ultimately, though, the tension was not resolved by domestic factors, but by the impact of French armies, Napoleon, Talleyrand, and the policy of Russia. One might wish for rather more on the effects of mediatization, of the destruction of the crazy patchwork-quilt of political boundaries so skilfully depicted in the maps, leading to the creation of fewer, larger, and more concentrated political units which then in 1806 became fully sovereign with the removal of imperial suzerainty. But, overall, it is an extraordinary achievement to have put together this immense collection to meet a deadline. The general level of the contributions is high, and much of the work is original. These volumes carry the study of nearly the whole range of issues associated with the RDHS on to a new plane.

North Rhine-Westphalia contributed to the *Ausstellungswelle* an exhibition in Dortmund entitled *Klostersturm und Fürstenrevolution*,

with the subtitle: 'State and Church between Rhine and Weser 1794–1803.' The catalogue is cunningly organized to accommodate nearly thirty short but informative articles which follow the order of the exhibition and each include relevant illustrations. The topics have been imaginatively selected. For example, monastic industrial enterprises are intelligently surveyed in a few pages by Wilfried Reininghaus, who uncovers the surprising fact that foundations for canons and canonesses were especially rich in mills. Several individual monasteries are studied in detail, together with the cathedral chapter and the *Clemenshospital* of Münster, three houses of Dominican nuns, and the Estates of the bishopric of Paderborn. Corvey, its suppression and its library are obvious choices; less so, the picture gallery in Düsseldorf and the place of monks and nuns in Gothic novels (a lively piece by Matthias Pötsch). One chapter (Barbara Schildt-Specker) deals with the earlier French secularizations on the left bank of the Rhine, and the next (Uwe Zuber) shows the significance of the RDHS and Napoleonic rule for 'the beginnings of modern statehood in Westphalia'. A final entertaining chapter by Axel Koppetsch surveys the historiography of the subject—a topic to which I shall return.

Bavaria's two main contributions to the books under review have a less innovative air than those from Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia. One, *Bayern ohne Klöster?* is produced by the Bavarian Central State Archives in Munich, the other is a *Beiheft* of the *Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte*, straightforwardly entitled *Die Säkularisation in Bayern 1803*, but adorned with the provocative subtitle: *Kulturbruch oder Modernisierung?*

The first, *Bayern ohne Klöster?* is a combination of exhibition catalogue and essay collection. Clearly the exhibition was essentially based on the huge holdings of relevant material in the Munich archive, but many additional items had been loaned to it. The catalogue entries are authoritative, and some less obvious aspects receive useful treatment. The value of both the exhibition and the articles is enhanced by the close interrelation between them. For example, a most interesting section of the exhibition is devoted to the monastic breweries before and after secularization, down to the present day, and is complemented by an article on the theme by Gerhard Führmetz. The same applies to the monastic woodland seized by the state (Elisabeth Weinberger) and to the revival of monasticism under king

Ludwig I (Laurentius Koch). As Winfried Müller remarks in his general article on the secularization, it comes as a surprise that Bavaria, with its vibrant traditional Catholicism, should have been in the van of monastic suppressions under Max IV Joseph and Montgelas, and it appears much less remarkable that Ludwig should have devoted so much energy and so many resources to re-establishing the Orders. A truly striking contrast is presented by two maps showing a small scattering of monasteries in 1800—it would not seem quite so small if the whole map were reproduced—and a high density in 1900. The figures given in the text are: at the beginning of the nineteenth century, nearly 400 houses in 235 places; at the end, 1,040 in 482 places. This is one of the points at which a reader will wish also to have at hand the excellent exhibition catalogue of 1991, *Glanz und Ende der alten Klöster: Säkularisation im bayerischen Oberland 1803*, which is a reference point for the contributors of 2003. Other valuable sections and articles concern the effect of the secularization on schools—disruptive and damaging at first—and the (rather muted) reactions to it of the people (Walter Pötzl). It was one of the significant but less commonly mentioned reasons for hostility to monasteries, and to the Church as a whole, that their untouchable property stood squarely in the way of urban improvement. Here the development of Munich after 1803 is interestingly illustrated and discussed from this angle. One clear benefit of the secularization was that monastic buildings—spacious, well-built, and often recent—could be applied to new purposes, like the Jesuit house given to the Bavarian Academy; another was that less useful edifices could be sold off and/or knocked down; and a third, that the substantial pockets of urban monastic lands were now available at discretion.

Bavaria's monasteries have been studied more deeply than most. Yet Joachim Wild, the director of the State Archives, declines in his article to pronounce on the question of how much the state benefited financially from the suppressions, rightly saying that a full study has never been made. Winfried Müller is less cautious. He is inclined to increase the accepted estimates, which depended on the assumption that the debts, pensions, and obligations shouldered by the government almost balanced the gains it made. He makes the powerful, scarcely noticed point that the huge revenues received by the monasteries from their peasants, at least 600,000 florins a year, fell to the state. Both authors say, no doubt with justice, that other effects were

more important than mere financial advantage. None of the obvious benefits accruing, however—immense gain of territory and of royal property, including vast forests, buildings, books, archives, and artistic treasures; abolition of most enclaves and many privileges; control of education, Church organization, and appointments; in 1806 the removal of imperial interference—were derived from monastic suppressions alone. But the other institutions targeted in 1803, such as the prince-bishoprics, are not here considered. The focus is strictly on monasteries.

The most closely connected essay in the volume *Die Säkularisation in Bayern* is Eberhard Weis's newly revised version of his magisterial article of 1983 on the suppression of the monasteries. His main changes of emphasis are to assign a greater and better defined role to Montgelas; to re-emphasize the primacy of his and the government's financial motives; and to play down still further the actual impact of the suppressions on state revenue, agricultural change, and industrial development. Several of the articles in the volume cover some of the same ground. Among them, Manfred Weitlauff is especially interesting on Pope Pius VI's readiness to assist Bavaria's policies, and Katharina Weigand on the fiercely divided judgements on the secularization among past historians—partly accounted for, as she insists, by the use of the term to describe both the elimination of ecclesiastical states and the seizure of church property within states.

A third Bavarian contribution of specialist interest, but beautifully and accessibly presented, is *Lebendiges Büchererbe*, on the State Library's huge acquisitions from monastic libraries, chiefly in 1802–03. It prints copies of contemporary and subsequent accounts by librarians, describes and illustrates some of the most important volumes, and appraises the role before the suppressions of outstanding monastic libraries such as that of the Augustinian house of Polling and the Benedictine monastery of St Emmeram in Regensburg.

It remains to consider an austere volume, without illustrations and not associated with an exhibition, produced by the Institute for European History in Mainz. After the usual discussion of the concept 'secularization' follows a fiery chapter by Karl Otmar von Aretin. He emphatically denies that the German Catholic Church at the end of the eighteenth century was in terminal decay. On the contrary, monasteries in particular were flourishing. He ascribes the origins of the secularization to the desire of the Pope to end the 'national' ten-

dencies of the German Church as, with the aid of Napoleon, he had already re-established the French Church on a non-Gallican footing. 'With the RDHS of 1803' he writes,

> over 50 per cent of the Catholic population came under the rule of Protestant princes. The Catholic universities were dissolved, the rich Catholic educational facilities of the monasteries squandered. Between 1803 and the re-organization of the Church in Germany in the 1820s there were no bishops in Germany, and among other things no confirmations were carried out. The secularization was the greatest catastrophe that has ever struck German Catholicism (p. 30).

This view contrasts with the opinion of Rudolf Vierhaus, cited by Joachim Schmiedl later in the book, 'that the secularization did no irreparable harm in the long run to the Church and religious life' (p. 105). Not a ringing endorsement.

All the historiographical articles in these volumes take Alfons M. Scheglmann's remorseless defence of every Bavarian monastery in all its aspects in his multi-volume *Geschichte der Säkularisation im rechtsrheinischen Bayern*, published between 1903 and 1908, as the high point of conservative or reactionary writing on the subject. It is quite obviously unreasonable. But is Aretin equally so? Why, in the thousands of pages of the books under review, does no one but Aretin mention the fate of the Catholic universities or the dearth of bishops and almost no one refer to the transfer of Catholic subjects to Protestant rule? There is no full discussion of the change in the nature of the German church after 1803, or of the loss of social welfare provision with the dissolution of the monasteries. Is Katharina Weigand perhaps right in suggesting that 'the creed of modernization has led to a kind of taboo on any criticism of princely secularization'?

It is another feature of all these volumes that they pay little attention to events, influences, and comparisons outside Germany, and almost no attention to any non-German literature. On the second point, the only English-language work to be seriously considered in the whole set of books is Matthew Gregory Lewis's novel *The Monk* (in translation), written even before the RDHS and first published in 1796. So far as the first point is concerned, there is, of course, mention of the example of the French Revolution and of the influence of

Napoleon, French armies, and (occasionally) Russian mediation. The case of Joseph II is often referred to, though the sequence and development of his monastic policy and the number of his suppressions would have been less often misrepresented if the work of P. G. M. Dickson had been read. But there is scarcely an allusion to the position that was stabilized after Joseph's death in the Austrian Monarchy, with more than half of the old monasteries intact, a position which would surely afford a worthwhile comparison with Germany. The Austrian case suggests that a compromise solution might have been found, if German princes had not been so rapacious, to the problems undoubtedly raised by excessive numbers of monasteries. What Napoleon did in Italy, as compared with what he allowed to be done in Germany, seems nowhere to be mentioned, but surely this comparison, too, is of interest and would throw up worthwhile distinctions—for example, that female Orders caring for the sick and teaching children were not suppressed south of the Alps. There does seem to be an unwillingness among historians of 1803 to look outside Germany either for historical writing or historical influences.

It would be wholly unjust, though, to end on a critical note. The bicentenary has produced a splendid series of catalogues and collections of articles, no doubt many more than it has been possible to review here. Several of them are beautiful books and major research contributions. All of them contain much that is illuminating, penetrating, and original. Not only do we now know much more about 1803, but we are also in a far better position to understand both the old world in which the propertied monasteries thrived and the new world in which they had no place.

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JEWISH REFUGEES AND HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL WAR

by Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann

VICKI CARON, *Uneasy Asylum: France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis, 1933–1942* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), xi + 605 pp. ISBN 0 8047 4377 0. £22.95 (paperback)

FRITZ KIEFFER, *Judenverfolgung in Deutschland—eine innere Ange-legenheit? Internationale Reaktionen auf die Flüchtlingsproblematik 1933–1939*, Historische Mitteilungen, Beiheft 44 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002), 520 pp. ISBN 3 515 08025 2. EUR 100.00

MARCIA REYNDERS RISTAINO, *Port of Last Resort: The Diaspora Communities of Shanghai* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), xviii + 369 pp. ISBN 0 8047 3840 8. £45.95 (hardback)

RUTH GAY, *Safe Among the Germans: Liberated Jews after World War II* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), xiv + 347 pp. ISBN 0 300 09271 7. $29.95. £22.50

ARIEH J. KOCHAVI, *Post-Holocaust Politics: Britain, the United States, and Jewish Refugees, 1945–1948* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), xiii + 377 pp. ISBN 0 8078 2620 0. $45.00. £37.50

In her seminal study of the origins of totalitarianism, written in the wake of the Second World War, Hannah Arendt advanced a trench-ant critique of the idea of human rights. At a time when hundreds of thousands of German Jews like herself were being persecuted and driven into exile, and were most in need of protection, it had become apparent, according to Arendt, that the Western democracies believed in human rights only on paper. They did not, however, provide papers such as passports or visas that would have guaranteed legal protection and refuge. Deprived of their German citizenship by the Nazis, these stateless refugees faced a compassionless bureaucracy that, more than anything else, wanted to get rid of them as soon as possible. Having just escaped from the German concentration camps, the refugees suddenly found themselves stuck in French internment camps. 'Contemporary history has created a new kind of human being', Arendt noted with characteristic passion and sarcasm, 'the

kind that are put in concentration camps by their foes and in internment camps by their friends.' As a stateless person, Arendt herself had no political rights for eighteen long years before she finally became a naturalized American citizen in 1951. This experience undoubtedly left its mark on her political theory. In a world of nation-states, only a state can guarantee rights. When people lose their citizenship and are expelled by their native country they become a 'living corpse' excluded from humanity at large. Their humanity does not guarantee stateless refugees any rights, not even that of mere existence. As a result, Arendt argues, 'the very phrase "human rights" became for all concerned—victims, persecutors, and onlookers alike—the evidence of hopeless idealism or fumbling, feeble-minded hypocrisy'.[1] The fact that after the Great War, and in particular from the 1930s on, statelessness became a mass phenomenon and that stateless people were 'the most symptomatic group in contemporary politics', could only be understood, according to Arendt, in the context of the decline of the nation-state and the rhetorical nature of human rights.

Arendt's critique of human rights, set out in chapter 9 of *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, is still relevant today. In fact, that chapter has become one of the key texts in the ever-growing literature on the political theory of human rights, in which she is often cited in support of the idea that human rights should not remain lofty ideals but include 'a right to rights'. However, in the light of recent historical literature on the subject, Arendt's thesis that the fate of stateless refugees at times of global war and genocide is a result of human rights hypocrisy now seems less convincing. For one thing, the language of individual human rights did not gain currency in international law before the mid-1940s. Its employment by emerging institutions such as the United Nations was, in fact, a reaction to the refugee crisis of the 1930s and 1940s. Significantly, after Versailles, international law paid much more attention to protecting the rights of ethnic minorities within nation-states.

Moreover, contrary to Arendt's argument in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, the nation-state was hardly in decline after the Great War.

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[1] Hannah Arendt, 'We Refugees', *Menorah Journal*, 31 (January 1943), p. 70; ead., *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1985), ch. 9: 'The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man', p. 269. See Marie-Claire Caloz-Tschopp, *Les sans-État dans la philosophie d'Hannah Arendt: Les humains superflus, le droit d'avoir des droits et la citoyenneté* (Lausanne, 2000).

In fact, it was the collapse of the multinational Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman Empires, and 'Versailles's love affair with the nation-state', to borrow Mark Mazower's apt phrase, that brought about the new phenomenon of statelessness in the first place. Deprivation of citizenship, internment, and expulsion were practices of nation-states. The enforcement of the nation-state as a model of political order in the successor states of these empires gave the question of national belonging political weight, and ultimately opened the Pandora's box of 'ethnic cleansing'.[2] Consequently, the principle of national sovereignty was by no means incompatible with the rise of totalitarian regimes that pursued policies aiming for far-reaching racial or social 'purification' and 'homogenization' of the body politic. Because Western democracies were themselves constituted as nation-states and the League of Nations was preoccupied with the question of minority rights, they both failed dismally to address the unprecedented refugee crisis after the Great War. As a consequence, they also failed to come to the rescue of those who faced the deadliest dangers in the 1930s and 1940s: Central and Eastern European Jews.

I

In her study *Uneasy Asylum: France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis,* Vicki Caron admirably shows how the issue of asylum for Jewish refugees gave rise to bitter political conflicts and led to a decline of the juridical norms and values of civil society in a Western democracy. After the Nazi rise to power in 1933, France became the most important country of refuge for German Jews, even though access to asylum was severely restricted in 1934–5 and 1937–8. Caron reconstructs the twisted road that led to the full-scale German occupation of France and the first deportations of Jews to the Eastern European death camps in 1942. According to Caron, three forces shaped the French political struggles over Jewish refugees: the government, public opinion (especially of the middle classes), and the native Jewish community.

The French government faced increasing pressure from organized interest groups that, at a time of economic depression, viewed refugees as undesirable competition—an argument to which even the

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[2] Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York, 1999), pp. 42, 51; Norman Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe* (Cambridge, 2001).

leftist government of the Popular Front proved susceptible. Furthermore, once the Nazi regime began to pursue more aggressive foreign and anti-Semitic policies in the late 1930s, the Daladier government wanted at all costs to avoid letting the refugee issue increase the likelihood of war with Germany. The assassination of the German diplomat Ernst von Rath by the young Jewish refugee Herschel Grynszpan in November 1938 seemed to confirm these fears. For the *deux Frances*, which had struggled with each other since 1789, the battle lines were now drawn around the refugee question and, ultimately, the 'Jewish question'.

As a result, public debates on Jewish refugees determined French refugee policy. The protest of the French middle classes against immigration, according to Caron, was therefore the second factor in the hardening of French refugee policy—a policy that ultimately led to internment camps. The extreme right, in particular, excited and exploited middle-class concerns about the immigration of Jewish doctors, lawyers, merchants, and tradesmen. In response to growing international tensions and increasing pressure from Nazi Germany, French public opinion, which up to that point had been responsive to a liberal immigration policy, changed. Even parts of the French-Jewish community, the third political force that Caron describes, voiced concern about the impact of German-Jewish immigration and favoured exclusionary policies. Yet even on this contentious issue, Caron's meticulous, decade-long investigation provides a more nuanced interpretation. For concurrent with Jewish support for exclusionary immigration policies, a liberal faction of the Jewish community strongly and successfully supported Jewish refugees (especially during the government of the Popular Front). At the end of the 1930s various Jewish refugee relief organizations began to collaborate to find alternative escape routes and to help establish the settlement of Jews in rural France or the colonies. These attempts, and, ultimately, the republican tradition of asylum collapsed only when internal and foreign political pressures became insurmountable. Accusations of diffidence levelled at Jewish community leaders by Arendt and, later, others, therefore distort the historical record.

Caron not only refines our understanding of French refugee policy of the 1930s, but challenges traditional views of the relationship between Vichy and anti-Semitism. In contrast to other historians who have interpreted anti-Semitism under the Vichy regime as part of a

long tradition of French xenophobia, Caron stresses Vichy's radical break with previous struggles over the refugee question and French political culture.[3] For her, the Third Republic's dramatic military defeat played a far larger role than xenophobic traditions. To Caron, contingency — not continuity — is the key concept for explaining the fate of both Jewish refugees and French Jewry generally after 1940.

Although the study does not address the issue explicitly, Caron's book suggests that we can only understand the repression of refugees and stateless people in a country with one of the longest traditions of political asylum by taking international politics into account. Nazi Germany deliberately used Jewish refugees as a means of challenging the values and legal norms of liberal democracies. Given the economic depression and the political radicalism that grew out of it, most countries of refuge viewed immigrants as a potential threat. At the same time, contemporary international law gave Western democracies no lever against a nation-state that deprived its citizens of their civil rights unless they belonged to a national minority. The concept of national sovereignty that was at the heart of the Versailles vision of international law left refugees in a potentially deadly no-win situation. Inside Germany, the Nazis could deprive German Jews of their civic rights to the point where they lost their German citizenship upon emigration; outside the borders of the Reich, however, there was no international law that could have provided basic human rights and offered protection.

It is precisely this logic of power politics that Fritz Kieffer's *Judenverfolgung in Deutschland — eine innere Angelegenheit?* fails to address in what is otherwise a very instructive study of the diffident reactions of Western democracies to the Nazi persecution of Jews. His main concern is whether a solution to another pressing refugee-related problem could have been found: the transfer of Jewish capital from the Reich to foreign countries. According to Kieffer, this

[3] See esp. Gérard Noiriel, *Le Creuset français: Histoire de l'immigration* (Paris, 1988), and id., *Réfugiés et sans papiers: La Republique face au droit d'asile XIXe–XXe siècle* (Paris, 1998); and, a more nuanced work, Patrick Weil, *Qu'est ce qu'un français? Histoire de la nationalité française depuis la Révolution* (Paris, 2002). For comparison see Dieter Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen: Die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Göttingen, 2001).

would have made more countries willing to accept greater numbers of refugees. Until the beginning of the Second World War, the Nazi leadership was obsessed with driving as many Jews as possible out of the country. Given the lack of foreign currency in the Reich, it proved impossible to transfer the assets of emigrants to a country of refuge. Other solutions such as the Haavara Agreement of 1933, which provided for the assets of emigrants to Palestine to be exchanged for German exports to Palestine, and Max Warburg's suggestion of 1935 for emigration to be financed by Jewish capital, failed to materialize. Kieffer attributes these failures not only to the inflexible policies of the Western democracies, but also to the impact of the organized Jewish boycott of German products. The boycott movement was strong enough to prevent the sale of German transfer goods outside Palestine, but was too weak to restrain the Nazi persecution of Jews. The equally implicit and, in the end, questionable argument of Kieffer's study is that attempts to rescue German Jews through emigration failed because of foreign protests against German anti-Semitism.

Kieffer's study, therefore, should be read as an addition to the rich scholarship on the question of why the Western democracies could not prevent the Holocaust. Kieffer focuses on one aspect — the transfer of Jewish capital to potential countries of refuge — and only briefly touches on others, such as, for example, why international law provided no protection for the refugees. In light of the refugees' plight and exhausted by the quarrels at the League of Nations, James G. McDonald, the First High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany, stepped down in 1935. In his letter of resignation he demanded that German Jews be given the legal status of a national minority. Only in this way, McDonald argued, could Germany be held accountable to the international community (a line of argument quite similar to recent discussions about UN humanitarian interventions in former Yugoslavia). As the famous case of the May 1933 Bernheim petition shows, German Jews could be protected by international law only if they were regarded as a national minority. Because of the German–Polish Geneva Convention of 1922, in which both countries agreed to respect minority rights and submit to the judgement of the League of Nations in case of violations, the anti-Jewish laws of the Nazi regime had to be suspended in Upper Silesia. In 1937, however, the treaty expired and Germany and Poland decided to ignore the

League of Nations. This example suggests that, ultimately, numerous factors combined to create a deadly trap for the refugees, not least among which were an international law dominated by the principle of national sovereignty and the internal political struggles in Western democracies so ably described by Caron. The fate of German Jewry depended on more than money.

II

The most pressing problem for Jewish refugees was to find any place of refuge at all. The city of Shanghai, a territory that lay outside the international system of nation-states, offered such a place. Since the mid-nineteenth century Shanghai had been a commercial outpost of Britain, the United States, France, and, later, Japan. The military presence of these colonial powers guaranteed Shanghai's peculiar legal status and limited China's national sovereignty. During the first half of the twentieth century Shanghai became a 'port of last resort' for European refugees. Only there did immigration not depend on state documents. Marcia Reynders Ristaino takes up this subject in *Port of Last Resort*, her illuminating account of the Jewish and Slavic diaspora communities of Shanghai.

When German and Central European Jews arrived in Shanghai in the 1930s, the city was already hosting 30,000 Slavic refugees who had fled the collapsing Russian Empire during and after the Great War. More than 6,000 of these were Jews who had fled the pogroms. Others had been members of the White Guards who had not only fought against the Red Army during the Civil War, but had themselves initiated those very pogroms. Stripped of their citizenship in 1921 by the Soviet Union, all Russian emigrants became stateless—the same fate that German-Jewish emigrants met at the hands of the Nazis twenty years later. That these two groups shared the same fate was one of the many surreal details typical of this Age of Extremes.

In the 1930s, approximately 18,000 German and Central European Jews went to Shanghai. They travelled by the Trans-Siberian Railway or arrived on boats from Italy. Deprived of any material means, they found themselves in a bewildering environment: an International Settlement, ruled by the British and Americans, a French concession, a Japanese dominion, and quarters inhabited by Chinese, who were often refugees themselves from other parts of China. In many ways, Shanghai resembled post-Second World War Berlin, a city also char-

acterized by its peculiar status in international law. Shanghai, too, was a topsy-turvy city of refugees, multi-national political agents, urban crime, prostitution, espionage, and various currencies; a catastrophic city, simultaneously marked by warfare and an ongoing struggle to rebuild community life.[4] The European refugees belonged to the 'other Shanghai', those deprived of political representation and civil rights, even if they were privileged in comparison with the even poorer Chinese population.

Things changed after Pearl Harbor and the beginning of global war. Not only was Shanghai closed off as a port of rescue for European refugees, but the Japanese occupation in 1941 shuffled the cards by suspending the International Settlement (though sparing the French concession since Vichy France was formally an ally). In an ironic turn of events, the British and Americans who had earlier been in charge of refugee issues were now interned (and later forced to wear identifying armbands in public), whereas the Slavic and European refugees were left mostly to themselves. In 1943, the peculiar legal status of Shanghai came to an end when the Japanese transferred the city, including the former French concession, to a Chinese puppet regime. Shanghai has been under Chinese sovereignty ever since.

One of the most interesting aspects of Ristaino's highly readable book is the discussion of the Japanese treatment of Shanghai's Jewish refugees from Nazi Europe. Before the beginning of the Second World War, Ristaino argues, anti-Semitism was never an important force in Shanghai public life; even the Japanese military government tended to pursue its own Pan-Asian agenda rather than Nazi racial policies. The memory of American loans to Japan, which had been arranged by the Jewish banker Jacob H. Schiff in 1904–5, continued to figure prominently in the minds of those Japanese politicians who were hoping to use what they imagined to be the strong influence and considerable financial resources of Jews to strengthen Japan's imperial project.

These hopes turned out to be illusory. In February 1943 the Imperial Japanese Army decided to establish a 'designated area' (*shitei*

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[4] See, e.g., Frederic Wakeman Jr., *The Shanghai Badlands: Wartime Terrorism and Urban Crime, 1937–1941* (Cambridge, 1996); Bernard Wasserstein, *Secret War in Shanghai: Treachery, Subversion, and Collaboration in the Second World War* (London, 1998).

chiku) for those stateless refugees who had arrived in Shanghai after 1937. Without exception, German and Central European Jews were forced into this area, turning it into a fully fledged ghetto, though still a far cry from the ghettoes of Nazi Europe. The stateless Russians, including the Jews among them, did not have to move into the designated area. The very term 'Jew', in fact, did not appear in the official proclamation of the occupiers, indicating that the Japanese were interested not in implementing Nazi racial policy but in pursuing their own war aims.

Despite the harsh ghetto conditions, the Jewish community was able to govern itself and continue its own cultural and religious life. It was thus well prepared for the day when the Japanese were forced to transfer control of the city to American troops. Many Russians accepted an offer by the Soviet Union to return to their homeland, a decision that ended disastrously for some. The majority of Jews, however, wanted to emigrate to the USA as soon as possible. Despite the many difficulties and dramatic obstructions, most of them managed to emigrate to the USA, Latin America, or Israel after 1948. When the Communists gained control of the city in 1949, few Jews remained in Shanghai. The city now was part of Communist China and ceased to be an international space.

III

En route back to their native countries, millions of refugees crisscrossed the catastrophic landscape of Europe after the end of what Raymond Aron has called the 'new' Thirty Years War. However rigorously the borders of the new Europe were drawn, most refugees still belonged to a nation-state that offered protection and citizenship. United Nations relief organizations could provide no permanent safe haven of their own, but only assist refugees in their attempt to repatriate. Most Europeans who were expelled, persecuted, or imprisoned by the Nazis were able to return to their homelands, but this was not true for liberated Central and Eastern European Jews. When Polish Jews who had survived the concentration camps and death marches returned to their native country, they faced new pogroms, instigated by local anti-Semites. In Kielce, a city that had been home to 20,000 Jews before the Second World War, 45 of the 200 to 250 remaining Jewish inhabitants were killed in a pogrom on 4 July 1946. The Kielce pogrom convinced the Communist government to

support Jews actively in their attempt to leave Poland. With the destruction of European Jewry by Nazi Germany and the expulsion of ethnic Germans after the war, this policy transformed the multi-national landscape of Eastern Central Europe into an ethnically almost entirely homogeneous Polish nation-state.

Occupied Germany, of all places, became the place of refuge for Eastern European Jewry between 1945 and 1948. This is the bitter irony to which Ruth Gay alludes in the title of her study *Safe Among the Germans*. One of the strengths of this eminently readable book is the sensitivity with which Gay treats the paradox of Jewish life amidst a society emerging from Nazism. About two-thirds of the half a million Jews of pre-war Germany were able to emigrate before the war. Of those who remained, 170,000, were killed by the Nazis, leaving approximately 15,000 German Jews to experience the end of the war in their native country. Only a few of the German-Jewish emigrants returned, among them 500 Berlin Jews who had fled to Shanghai and had found their way back to their native city. All German Jews who survived the Holocaust faced this fundamental either–or: they had either to sever all ties with their country of birth, or live among the perpetrators of the Holocaust.

As Gay reminds us, Jewish Displaced Persons (DPs) from Eastern Europe faced an entirely different situation.[5] From 1945 to 1948, the zones of Germany and Austria occupied by the Western Allies were a transit space for 275,000 Eastern European Jewish refugees in their passage between the experience of death and destruction and their hopes for a new life. The DP camps boasted the highest birth rates in the world and witnessed a seemingly unlikely flourishing of Yiddish culture and religion, giving the lie, as Gay poignantly remarks, to Adorno's dictum that there could be no poetry after Auschwitz. A small number of Eastern European DPs from the camps joined the

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[5] For a more detailed account, see Angelika Königseder and Juliane Wetzel, *Lebensmut im Wartesaal: Die jüdischen DPs (Displaced Persons) im Nachkriegs-deutschland* (Frankfurt am Main, 1994); and Zeev W. Mankowitz, *Life Between Memory and Hope: The Survivors of the Holocaust in Occupied Germany* (Cambridge, 2002); Atina Grossmann, 'Trauma, Memory and Motherhood: Germans and Jewish Displaced Persons in Post-Nazi Germany 1945–1949', in Richard Bessel and Dirk Schumann (eds.), *Life after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe during the 1940s and 1950s* (New York, 2003), pp. 93–128.

even smaller number of German Jews to form a new Jewish community in Germany. Gay traces the unique story of this community from the first years of the Cold War to the present, with a local focus on Berlin.

To Zionists, of course, Jewish life in post-Holocaust Germany constituted a particular provocation after the founding of the Jewish nation-state in 1948. Never again would Jews experience defencelessness and a total lack of rights. Never again would Jewish refugees be displaced in a world of nation-states. The establishment of a Jewish state appeared to be the logical consequence of the bitter experience of lawlessness in the age of genocidal warfare. In his meticulous analysis primarily of files from the National Archives/Public Record Office in Kew, *Post-Holocaust Politics*, Arieh J. Kochavi explains why British foreign policy failed to respond to this new situation and provides a welcome addition to the literature on Britain's diffident immigration policies before, during, and after the Nazi era.[6] Whereas all other parties involved, especially the Zionists, Americans, and Soviets, ably and successfully pursued their own political imperatives after 1945, British foreign policy in the late 1940s was a failure that, for various reasons, in the end left Britain without an empire.

Why did the Soviet Union and its newly founded satellite states tolerate the illegal emigration of Holocaust survivors into DP camps in the British and American zones, and later into Palestine? The answer, according to Kochavi, is that Communist countries were pursuing two objectives that resembled the Nazi foreign policy of the 1930s: to purify ethnically the body politic and to put pressure on their international adversaries. In the USA, policies toward Jewish DPs were informed by domestic considerations. The Truman government continued to enforce national quotas that allowed the immigration of approximately 400,000 European DPs. As a result of the national quotas, however, the vast majority of these immigrants were Balts, Ukrainians, or ethnic Germans; only 80,000 were Eastern European Jews. Capitol Hill would never have agreed to immigration policies more favourable to Jewish Holocaust survivors—a criti-

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[6] See, most recently, Tony Kushner and Katharine Knox, *Refugees in an Age of Genocide* (London, 1999); Louise London, *Whitehall and the Jews, 1933–1948: British Immigration Policy and the Holocaust* (Cambridge, 2000).

cal aspect Kochavi fails to explore in depth. At the same time, however, the Democratic Party sought the support of American Zionists for the impending presidential elections. To the Truman administration, the best way to pacify both Congress and American Zionists was to invite Jewish refugees to American DP camps in Germany and Austria, and indirectly to support Jewish emigration to Palestine.

Because the US and continental European governments in East and West allowed Zionists free play, the British were unable to stop either the Brichah (the flight of Eastern European Jews in DP camps) or the Ha'apala movement (the illegal immigration into Palestine). The Brichah and Ha'apala movements were more effective for the Zionist cause than terrorist attacks on the British mandate troops in Palestine because they ultimately won the support of the international community. Illegal ship passages, organized by the Zionists, took tens of thousands of refugees to Palestine, even if more than seventy per cent of them were turned back and deported to Cyprus. Things came to a head in 1947 during the dramatic Exodus affair. The British lost the moral credit they had gained fighting Nazi Germany when they turned back by force a ship with several thousand Holocaust survivors that had reached the shores of Palestine. By clinging to its long-standing policy to separate strictly the future fate of European Jewry from the Palestine question, Whitehall misread the changing post-war political and moral landscape. Britain's former allies now pursued their own power interests in the Cold War. And, its eyes opened by the media coverage of the plight of Jewish DPs, public opinion in the liberal Western democracies increasingly sympathized with the Zionists' desire for their own nation-state.

Kochavi's study is a welcome reminder that the Holocaust occupied a less central position in post-war political imagination than we have come to attribute to it today.[7] To gain a historical understanding of British policy towards Jewish DPs, therefore, it might have been more appropriate to explore Whitehall's general response to the plight of refugees in post-war Europe and to compare this with its response to the Jewish refugees. A similar argument could be made with regard to Vicki Caron's interpretation of French immigration policies in the 1930s. However nuanced and detailed these two stud-

[7] See Pieter Lagrou, 'Victims of Genocide and National Memory', *Past and Present*, 154 (1997), pp. 181–222.

ies are, they would have gained by placing their findings within a broader history of European refugees in the first half of the twentieth century. Even twenty years after its publication, Michael Marrus's magisterial study *The Unwanted* remains the only work on the subject that investigates the fate of Jewish refugees within a larger context.[8] At the same time we also lack more studies that are simultaneously as detailed and synthetic as that by Marcia Reynders Ristaino on refugees in Shanghai, which could enable us to understand the shared history of forced migration beyond the boundaries of national history.

<div align="center">IV</div>

In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights included the right to a nationality, to asylum, and to leave and return to one's native country. At first glance, it seems that the declaration reflects the lessons which the international community drew from the experiences of genocidal warfare. The League of Nations' focus on minority rights in the inter-war period was widely regarded as a failure. In the wake of the Second World War, the very term 'human rights', which placed unprecedented stress on individual rights, gained currency in international politics but provided even less protection against forced migration than the League's minorities policy had done.[9] Human rights were not legally binding, but merely a moral declaration. In fact, that human rights not be legally binding was a condition for the Great Powers' participation in the deliberations in the first place. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, founded in 1951, could, under its statutes, provide only humanitarian relief and no legal protection. It was still the case that only citizenship could guarantee basic human rights. In this respect, Hannah Arendt's trenchant critique of human rights rhetoric applies much more accurately to the post-war situation. The establishment of supra-national institutions such as the United Nations did not weaken the power of nation-states. Globally, the nation-state as a political

[8] Michael Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1985).

[9] A. W. Brian Simpson, *Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention* (Oxford, 2001), p. 9; Mark Mazower, 'The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950', *Historical Journal*, 47 (2004), pp. 379–98.

model had its golden age only after the last colonial empires had disintegrated.[10] After the two world wars and before the labour migration of the late 1950s, European nation-states were ethnically homogenous to an unprecedented degree. Simultaneously, wherever sovereign nation-states were founded in the wake of war—be it in the Middle East, India, Asia or Africa—'unwanted people' were again deprived of all their rights and forced into exile. However fractured and unstable the fiction of the nation-state, after 1948 it became a political reality and affected the lives of most people on the planet.[11] Historians are now faced with a paradox: twentieth-century global history turns out to have been dominated by the principle of the nation-state to a much greater degree than previously assumed. Yet, at the same time, we will not come to terms with the 'century of refugees' unless we traverse the boundaries of national history.

[10] Jürgen Osterhammel, 'Der europäische Nationalstaat des 20. Jahrhunderts: Eine globalhistorische Annäherung', in id., *Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats: Studien zu Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich* (Göttingen, 2001), p. 338.
[11] Michael Geyer, 'The Century as History: Between Cataclysm and Civility', in Konrad Jarausch and Michael Geyer, *Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories* (Princeton, 2003), p. 352.

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VICTIMS OF BOMBING AND RETALIATION

by Nicholas Stargardt

The bombing of large numbers of civilians in German cities during the Second World War was intended to bring great suffering. And it did. It brought death, disfigurement, loss of home and belongings, psychological disorientation, and paralysing terror to those on whom the bombs fell. After the bomber stream had left and the all clear sounded, people faced thousands of small fires, the ever present threat that the flames would leap from house to house, jumping across streets and uniting into a general conflagration. And from Rostock to Darmstadt, Hamburg to Paderborn, Hildesheim to Würzburg, Pforzheim to Dresden these general fires turned into fire storms, the intense heat sucking in the surrounding air until hurricane-force winds took hold, acting as a giant bellows to the flames. Trees, objects, people disappeared into the storm. Asphalt melted, trapping many of those trying to flee. Those who had stayed in their cellars risked dying from asphyxiation, the intense heat turning their refuges into ovens where, reduced of all water and fat, their corpses shrank to the size of dolls and were carried out in buckets by the clean-up squads who later found them.

Under the flight paths of the squadrons, the wail of air raid sirens interrupted sleep. Families stumbled down the stairs into over-crowded and claustrophobic cellars full of dust and the smell of fear. Knowing that these nights of helpless, passive waiting would have to be repeated again and again without let up spread exhaustion and nervous strain, turning some people in on themselves, stimulating others to fits of exuberance at having survived. Small wonder that so many war children in the Ruhr identified the air raid siren as their earliest and most powerful memory.

Jörg Friedrich's achievement in *Der Brand* has been to tell this tale

of death and destruction with a rare plasticity and vividness. Intercutting places and individuals' experiences he recreates the dance of death of the German cities. He intentionally repeats the same motifs as they appeared in different places to build up a comprehensible sense of the scale of the destruction. It is the urban equivalent of visiting hundreds of scenes of mass murder. And this is also Friedrich's intention: the repetition of horrific scenes which invariably follow the same sequence is built into the architecture of his book.

For much of the post-war period, the subject of Allied bombing of German cities was virtually unmentioned in West Germany. In the East, it formed part of imagery of the Cold War, where photos of the Dresden inferno of February 1945 served to persuade unwilling young men of the need to play their part in defending the country against the Anglo–American threat. In the early 1950s, the CDU put up electoral posters of 'Asiatic'-looking Soviet soldiers to win voters in the Federal Republic. Tales of Russian rape spread to areas like the Ruhr, which had, in fact, never seen a Red Army soldier but had been massively bombed by the country's new-found Anglo–American allies, while the air war was quietly consigned to a void in official public memory. The bombing of German civilians lived on only in local memories, from which it was gradually rescued in the 1980s and 1990s by a local literature about *Heimat* which saw such notable works as Margarete Dörr's *Frauenerfahrungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg*.[1]

As with Antony Beevor's revelations about the mass rape of German women at the end of the war, or Günther Grass's re-telling of the sinking of the *Wilhelm Gustloff*, so too with Jörg Friedrich's account of the bombing of German cities—the real work of historical discovery had actually already been done by others. But just as the German media was not ready for a full public discussion when feminists like Helke Sander and Barbara Johr opened the subject of mass rape in *BeFreier und Befreite*, so 1990 was an inopportune moment for the veteran GDR military historian Olaf Groehler to publish his magisterial *Bombenkrieg gegen Deutschland*, the culmination of a lifetime's study. Groehler's book rapidly went out of print. As the Federal Republic signed formal peace treaties with its Eastern neighbours,

[1] Margarete Dörr, *'Wer die Zeit nicht miterlebt hat…': Frauenerfahrungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg und in den Jahren danach*, 3 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1998); see also Winfried G. Sebald, *Luftkrieg und Literatur* (Frankfurt am Main, 2001).

laying both the war and the Cold War to rest, virtually the entire East German academic establishment was sacked and replaced by Westerners.[2]

The recent literary successes of Beevor, Grass, and Friedrich in writing about these topics have coincided with a time after Bosnia when the Federal Government is freer and more confident to make its own decisions about military as well as foreign policy than at any period since it was founded. In taking a principled position against American plans to wage war against Iraq, the Federal government can count on war not being popular in Germany — and with good reason. We should all listen hard to the experience of those who have been bombed. Their voices have been silent for too long.

Friedrich wants us to think about the bombing war as a species of mass murder. To this effect he lays claim to the vocabulary of Allied 'Terrorangriffe', 'Massaker', 'Vernichtung', and, in his climactic conclusion, to 'Die größte Bücherverbrennung aller Zeiten'. Whilst the first three terms were all deployed by Goebbels's propaganda during the war to describe the bombing, the last, of course, seeks to show that the Allies far exceeded the Nazis' book-burning ceremonies. The notions are deployed obliquely, dropped into the pulsing thrust of the prose and left to settle in the reader's mind, absorbed as the natural terms in which to give shape to the rush of emotionally and sensorially over-charged images. In his public utterances since, Friedrich has inflated this language further, turning the asphyxiating gases in the cellars into 'gas chambers' and the allied bomber fleets into 'Einsatzgruppen'.

Friedrich's war is a war between British and American planes and the German people. And he is at pains to delineate Churchill at his most vengeful and vindictive, effectively a war criminal whose prime object was to kill as many Germans as possible. At the time the 'Blitz' was at its height, the RAF concentrated most of its effort on dropping leaflets on Germany. Serious planning for mass bombing of German cities only began in 1942. Both regimes had started out from the assumption that bombing could win a war, a view both thought was

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[2] Anthony Beevor, *Berlin: The Downfall 1945* (London, 2002); Günther Grass, *Im Krebsgang* (Göttingen, 2002); Helke Sander and Barbara Johr (eds.), *BeFreier und Befreite: Krieg, Vergewaltigungen, Kinder* (Munich, 1992); Olaf Groehler, *Bombenkrieg gegen Deutschland* (Berlin, 1990).

on the verge of being fulfilled following the fire-storm in Hamburg in the summer of 1943. Only the unsustainable rise in bomber losses over Berlin and Nuremberg in March 1944 persuaded the RAF otherwise. This is not to say that retaliation played no part in British planning: Churchill's unfulfilled wish, in 1944, to drop poison gas in retaliation for the V-1 and V-2 rocket attacks on Britain would suggest otherwise. But this was not the sole or even the main purpose.

There was another, and perhaps more important, goal of the bombing in the British war effort. It served as a proxy for a second front. During 1941 and 1942, Britain had experienced nothing but defeats and was in no position to honour its promises to the Soviet Union to open a second front. But even leaving this complex and mistrustful alliance aside, at home Churchill desperately needed something to show for two and a half years of a war which had brought the humiliations of Dunkirk, the horrors of the 'Blitz', and defeat by the Japanese in Singapore and Burma. Retaliation against German cities on the scale Harris had in mind when he pledged 'They have sown the wind and shall reap the whirlwind' answered defeatism and the Conservative lobby for a separate peace with Germany. Bombing was popular at home. Vengeance, it was rapidly forgotten after 1945, was also part of the mass psychology of total war in Britain. But even this was tempered. Destroying cities was all very well, but the government was deeply worried about public reactions to the number of dead after the attack on Hamburg.

The bombing war was more than a matter of the automated massacre of unarmed civilians from a height at which the air crews could not see the people they were killing. It was also a war between armed forces, between *Flak* artillery and planes, between night fighters and heavy bombers, between scientists, planners, and, ultimately, the war industries of both countries. To take but one example, the *Luftwaffe*'s power was broken by the bombing war and as a result, it could no longer support ground troops in the way that this 'flying artillery' had done so successfully in the first half of the war. This had serious implications for the rapidity of Allied movement in the last year of the war on both the Eastern and the Western fronts.

Friedrich's war is so engrossing because it is so exclusively focused on one thing, the bombing of German civilians in the cities. There are virtually no *Flak* guns, no squadrons of night fighters. There is no German war of aggression and occupation. There is no Eastern front.

There are no Jews; there is no Holocaust. There are not even any for-
eign slave labourers in the Reich itself, although by 1944 there were
7.5 million of them, accounting for 20 per cent of the population of
Berlin alone, and it was they who had to do so much of the danger-
ous work of cleaning up and defusing bombs after the raids. Just
occasionally they appear in the photos of Friedrich's beautifully pro-
duced picture book on the bombing war, *Brandstätten*, but even here
the overwhelming impression is of death, destruction, and the sud-
den usefulness and vitality of the Nazi mass organizations in helping
to feed and clothe bombed-out civilians. In his writing, the cityscape
is an entirely German one of *Heimat*.

Of course, Friedrich is not ignorant of these things he omits. He
has himself worked on the *Encyclopedia of the Holocaust*.[3] His very
choice of terms, such as 'massacres' and 'annihilation', implies com-
parison with the Holocaust. As such they also carry strong echoes of
the 1950s, saturated with both the language of Goebbels's wartime
propaganda and post-war feelings of resentment. The ten to twelve
million German expellees from Eastern Europe, the still uncounted
numbers of German women raped at the end of the war, and the half
million people killed by the bombing had been excluded from the
crimes against humanity being publicized at the Nuremberg trials.
Germans who felt strongly about these issues were prone, for their
part, to dismiss Nuremberg, in the phrase of the time, as mere 'vic-
tors' justice'. From the 1950s, this vocabulary became dormant but
remained available. In the 1980s, Ernst Nolte deployed the anti-
Soviet atrocity motifs to relativize the Holocaust, and now Jörg
Friedrich seizes on the language of the Holocaust to find equiva-
lences in the bombing of German civilians.

These equivalences may re-emerge in their pristine post-war form
because of the very silence, because the bombing has not been dis-
cussed fully in public. But they also do not really address German suf-
fering in its own right. It is as if individual suffering is only evoked in
order to alter the scales of historical guilt, as if different kinds of
human carnage can be collected, measured, allocated, and then writ-
ten off against each other like a rescheduling of financial debts.

The Allies may have decided to retaliate for the German bombing
of Polish, Dutch, and British cities with as massive an onslaught on

[3] Israel Gutman (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Holocaust*, 4 vols. (New York, 1990).

German civilian populations as possible, but killing civilians was not their central strategic priority: they were still trying to defeat Germany. The Jews made to dig their own mass graves in the Ukraine and Lithuania, and 'processed' through the gas chambers of Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, and Auschwitz, do not have any equivalent on the scales of German suffering. And, even if there had been an equivalent, what would such a balance sheet have told us about the experience of being bombed?

There is a danger here not only of trivializing and relativizing the Holocaust, but also of trivializing and falsifying the experience of wartime bombing, by rushing to wrap it in the ubiquitous language of innocent suffering and passive martyrdom. The Jews may have posed a monstrous armed threat, *the* enemy of the war, to Nazi ideologues, but they were in fact—and felt themselves to be at the time— helpless, unarmed victims, abandoned to their fate. Did German civilians feel like the Jews?

Of central importance to the way we understand public attitudes in Germany to the bombing is the question of passivity and helplessness. It was one thing to feel passive and helpless in a cellar as the houses above shook and collapsed during a bombing raid. It was quite another to feel that Germany was *helpless*. This did not come until the *Luftwaffe*, the *Flak* and the *Wehrmacht* had been defeated. For civilians in the cities and small towns which fell prey to Allied bombing this moment did not arrive until the autumn of 1944 and the winter and spring of 1945. And it was during this last phase of the war that the bombing became most severe, the loss of human life greatest, and the Nazi regime began, for the first time since 1934, to terrorize its own population into continuing the war until the very end. But, for the crucial middle phase of the war, from the attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 through to the D-day landings three years later, the German population as a whole did not feel helpless in the face of British and American bombing, even though it was precisely in this period that the Western Allies attached greatest strategic importance to it.

The language of helpless and passive moral suffering, which so easily lends itself to the motifs of Christian martyrology, redemption, and national reconstruction, came only with the collapse of the Third Reich. It was only then that German 'victimhood' attained the status of a popular myth for understanding how the German people had

been misled by Nazi propaganda and destroyed by a perverse combination of Nazi extremists and Allied terror against defenceless civilians. This was the *vox populi* of Friedrich's childhood and so it may not be so surprising that it should now infuse his history of bombing. But for most of the bombing war, the German population knew that its government still commanded massive military and strategic capability and expected it to take action, to retaliate every bit as much as the majority of the British population expected retaliation against German cities for 'the Blitz'. Victims, yes: and the twin meanings which the word *Opfer* carries in German, of sacrifice and victim, were invoked as never before, but, during the war, they were invoked as a call to arms.

It is well known that Goebbels responded to the German defeat at Stalingrad by giving propaganda an increasingly shrill and pessimistic content, using the mass graves of Polish officers shot at Katyn and Vinnitsa to impress upon the population at home the atrocities which 'Judeo-Bolshevism' would inflict if it could. As RAF bombing of the Ruhr began in March 1943, Goebbels launched a parallel propaganda campaign about the 'new weapons' that would enable the Reich to retaliate against Britain. The fire-bombing of Hamburg in the last week of July not only killed 35,000 to 41,000 people and left 900,000 homeless. It also created a mood of panic which spread through both the Nazi regime and the population at large. The propaganda about 'retaliation' grew in intensity in order to channel widespread feelings of fear into a common reaction of hatred. But the Security Police reports on public opinion began to register high levels of anxiety about how Germany was going to win the war and when the promised retaliation was actually going to come.

On 8 November 1943, the eve of the twentieth anniversary of Hitler's *putsch* attempt, the radio carried one of the last broadcasts to the German people by their *Führer*. By this time, he was the only major figure whose reputation remained untarnished and who could still command public belief. The streets emptied to listen to the broadcast of his speech at 8.15 p.m. People were looking for reassurance, most importantly for confirmation that England really would be knocked out of the war by the new miracle weapons, or at least that some tangible revenge was on the way. They leapt on his rather vague threat of a strike against Britain with joy and relief. 'If the *Führer* says that, then I believe it. Tommy will get his deserts', one SD

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agent reported. Or, as another eavesdropper for the Security Police noted down: 'A promise from the mouth of the *Führer* is worth more than all the declarations in the press, radio and meetings of the Party.'[4]

Ten days later the RAF opened its five-month bombing campaign against Berlin, the high point of Arthur Harris's plan to force Germany to capitulate by 1 April 1944. And within seven weeks of Hitler's broadcast, whatever temporary hope his words had given had evaporated under the tonnage of high explosive and incendiary bombs, and the news of a third freezing Christmas for the soldiers bivouacked on the Eastern Front. A new rash of political jokes began to alarm the secret police agents who wrote them down in late December 1943. One ran:

> Dr Goebbels has been bombed out in Berlin. He rescues two suitcases and brings them onto the street and goes back into the house to hunt for other things. When he comes out again, both suitcases have been stolen. Dr Goebbels is very upset, weeps and rails: when asked what was so valuable in the suitcases, he replies: 'In the one was Retaliation and in the other Final Victory!'[5]

Although the German rockets were duly named 'V' for 'Vergeltung' (retaliation), by the time the first V-1 hit southern England on 17 June 1944, whatever hope had been placed in them had evaporated. The D-day landings had already taken place and the *Wehrmacht* was being pushed back across Belorussia in the East.

It is easy to take the failure of Goebbels's 'retaliation' propaganda as a rejection of Nazi war propaganda altogether. This would be a mistake. Retaliation eventually disappointed principally because it failed to materialize. Instead, the strains of war became more evident and social solidarity began to crumble from within. Cities which had already been bombed turned bitterly against those which had been

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[4] See Marlis Steinert, *Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen: Stimmungen und Haltung der deutschen Bevölkerung im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Dusseldorf, 1970), p. 422; Heinz Boberach (ed.), *Meldungen aus dem Reich 1938–1945: Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS,* vol. 15, 11 Nov. 1943 (Herrsching, 1984), pp. 5,987–9.

[5] Steinert, *Hitlers Krieg*, p. 433; Boberach (ed.), *Meldungen aus dem Reich*, vol. 15, 27 Dec. 1943, p. 6,187.

spared; workers in the Ruhr wishing the planes on to Berlin in 1943; Berliners telling friends in Dresden in 1944 that they should feel what it was like for once themselves. As evacuees found themselves set against the resident population, the bombed out against those forced to take them in, apathy, exhaustion, and preoccupation with one's own problems increasingly overwhelmed any sense of wider social responsibility. From this point of view Nazi propaganda about the ideal of self-sacrifice and the solidarity of the *Volksgemeinschaft* must have rung as hollow as did talk about the 'Wunderwaffe' and the 'Endsieg'. By contrast, those slogans which demanded nothing more than what the civilian population could not avoid doing, 'Durchhalten' under the 'Terrorangriffe', appear frequently in personal letters and diaries.

After bombing raids, people came to depend on their immediate neighbours to protect their property from random theft, as those who told the joke about Goebbels's suitcases knew well. But even though they knew that anyone was liable to steal their property, they looked with the greatest suspicion on those deployed in punitive brigades to defuse unexploded bombs and clean up after air raids. Alexei Antonovich Kutko was a prisoner in Neuengamme concentration camp sent out to Hamburg after the RAF raids: 'When Hamburg was bombed, prisoners were sent to Hamburg to clear up. And if a prisoner was caught taking a packet of matches or a piece of cheese, then he would be hanged on the parade ground. The whole camp was lined up in formation—and he was hanged.'[6] This was not just an SS and police activity. During the last few months of the war, as the Allied armies closed in on the heartland of the Third Reich and as British and American bombers caused as much destruction as they had in the previous four years put together, both the sense of desperation and the quest for vengeance intensified further. The merest suspicion of looting after air raids became a licence for murder. On 14 October 1944, the Duisburg *Volkssturm* stood a 'suspicious-looking' Russian working in a clean-up squad against a wall in the street and shot him, because they had been told that some Russian POWs had been eating jam in the basement of a demolished house nearby.[7]

[6] Alexei Antonovich Kutko, interview, Sept. 1993, in Herbert Diercks (ed.), *Verschleppt nach Deutschland! Jungendliche Häftlinge des KZ Neuengamme aus der Sowjetunion erinnern sich* (Bremen, 2000), p. 67.

[7] Fritz Bauer and Karl Dietrich Bracher (eds.), *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen: Sammlung deutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen*

Review Articles

One of the problems Goebbels had encountered in anti-British propaganda from 1938 onwards had been the strength of the Anglophilia of the 1920s and the early years of Nazi rule. English continued to be taught in German schools and Shakespeare to be performed more than any other playwright. Goebbels's solution to the natural limits of anti-English feeling was to attack not the nation but its class system: George Orwell's essays had the distinction of being used for war propaganda by both sides.[8]

At the centre of the campaign against British and American 'plutocracy' lay the image of the Jew, the single and unitary image of all Nazi propaganda in the last two years of the war. As Goebbels moved towards pessimistic and atrocity-based propaganda in the spring of 1943, so 70 to 80 per cent of radio broadcasts were devoted to the Jewish question, Jewish guilt in causing the war, and the fate awaiting Germany should the Jews take revenge. Both Katyn and the bombing became fused in this over-arching epithet of the 'Jewish war'.[9]

This may not have made people particularly vindictive to those few individual Jews they still knew. Victor Klemperer could hardly have survived in Dresden without the many individual acts of kindness shown him in the factory where he worked. On his way across the city, it was quite different as he ran the gauntlet of young boys, old men, housewives, and soldiers on leave. But news of bombing raids also cut across individual relationships and made people think about the abstract 'Jewish enemy' who had caused so much suffering. The nice foreman, a fellow veteran of the First World War, who had sympathized with Klemperer on 12 March 1944 for having lost his academic job just because he was Jewish, a week later turned to the idea of Jewish 'billionaires' as he cast about helplessly to give Klemperer a reason for the latest, senseless American bombing of Hamburg.[10]

1945–1966, vol. 6 (Amsterdam, 1971), Verdict, Duisburg Provincial Court, 14 June 1950, no. 219.

[8] Gerwin Strobl, *The Germanic Isle: Nazi Perceptions of Britain* (Cambridge, 2000), p. 152.

[9] David Bankier, 'German Public Awareness of the Final Solution', in David Cesarani (ed.), *The Final Solution: Origins and Implementation* (London, 1994), p. 220.

[10] Victor Klemperer, *To the Bitter End: The Diaries of Victor Klemperer, 1942–45* (London, 1999), 12 and 19 March 1944, pp. 289 and 291.

Later on, as he wrote the *LTI*, Klemperer would make a great deal of incidents like these to explain how the notion of the war as a 'Jewish war' was absorbed into the common sense of everyday life and repeated by those who were not Nazis, or were even highly critical of the regime. By February 1945, Victor Klemperer was one of the few remaining Jews in Dresden. As the fire-storm ignited, even this most law-abiding of German professors realized that unless he ripped off his yellow star and began to pretend to be a bombed-out Aryan, he would almost certainly be casually killed on the street were he lucky enough to survive the air raids themselves.[11]

A string of unsolicited letters to Goebbels survives from mid-1944, advising the regime to use Jews as human shields within German cities—even after they had in fact been deported—and to publish the numbers of Jews killed afterwards. Irma J., who called on Goebbels, 'on behalf of all German women and mothers and the families of those living here in the Reich', to 'have 20 Jews hanged for every German killed in the place where our defenceless and priceless German people have been murdered in bestial and cowardly fashion by the terror-flyers', also confessed to her feeling of helplessness in Berlin: 'We have no other weapon available.' K. von N. took the same view, adding that this form of 'retaliation' against the Allies had the 'additional advantage of not putting our pilots at risk'. 'You should see', he opined, 'how quickly the terror will cease!'

The sense of helplessness and vulnerability fuelling this murderous rage is perhaps most evident in another letter from Berlin, which Georg R. wrote on 1 June 1944. Headed

I am receiving my letters poste restante, because in the meantime I have been burned out once and bombed out twice.

Second part of my proposal of 4.6.43:
No extermination of the German People
and of Germany
but rather
the complete extermination of the Jews

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[11] Victor Klemperer, *The Language of the Third Reich: LTI — Lingua Tertii Imperii. A Philologist's Notebook* (London, 2000), pp. 172–81.

Georg R.'s letter reminded the *Reichsminister* of his communication of a year earlier. But he no longer wanted to expel all the Jews from Germany's allied countries. Instead he proclaimed: 'I propose that we should announce with an *ad hoc* plebiscite that, with immediate effect, we are not going to attack any towns or cities in England any more and hence the enemies may also no longer attack our towns and cities. ... Should the enemies none the less dare to attack even a single one of our towns or cities..., then we shall have 10,000 or 20,000 or 30,000 Jews shot without mercy.'[12]

The deeper point here is that the 'Jewish war' could be accepted even by those who wanted no such revenge on the Jews. In Munich, Essen, Hamburg, and Kiel, voices were overheard blaming the Allied bombing on the Nazis' treatment of the Jews. By 2 September 1943, the *Stuttgarter NS-Kurier* felt that it had publicly to rebut the argument that world Jewry would not have fought Germany had it not so radically solved the Jewish question.[13] Since 1941, Hitler's prophecy about the destruction of the Jews had conveyed an abstract sense of the murders for which private news of mass shootings provided all too specific details. But even these critical and unhappy citizens, who found what they did know of the Holocaust deeply abhorrent, had assimilated and made their own the deeper assumption that the Allied war effort was indeed being directed by, or on behalf of, the Jews. For them too, Germany had become a 'Schicksalsgemeinschaft' of people tied to one another willy-nilly because all bridges behind them had been burned. Even as they feared the death penalties increasingly being meted out for defeatist talk in the present, so, too, they feared the future punishment it was said defeat was bound to bring.

* * *

By the time its political structures had collapsed on 8 May 1945, much of Nazism's racial and moral ordering had been imprinted deeply upon German society, down to the quite personal ways in which people who did not particularly favour the regime expressed their notions about crime, sexuality, war guilt, black-marketeering,

[12] All of these letters in Bundesarchiv, R55, 571; my translations.
[13] Cited in Bankier, 'German Public Awareness of the Final Solution', p. 222.

Russian 'hordes', and foreign 'Displaced Persons'. Although the regime had set out from the beginning to transform the values and loyalties of its citizens, it was not its successes but its failures which played the decisive part in this process. While Hitler had basked in a miraculous glow after the *Anschluß* with Austria and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia at Munich, many Germans had looked disapprovingly at the violence and destruction of the November pogrom against the Jews which followed.

The moral brutalization of German society came out of events which undermined confidence in official news, political slogans, the Nazi party, its national leaders, and, eventually, Adolf Hitler himself. It was in the mud of the Eastern Front and the rubble of the German cities that German society was Nazified and brutalized in its moral values as never before. It was only now that the apocalyptic predictions—the 'everything or nothing' alternatives—of Nazi rhetoric began to fit events and be taken deadly seriously by large sections of the population. Precisely as the Nazi regime became less popular, so elements of its moral and racial framework seeped into popular consciousness, as people waited for air raid sirens and news of casualties from the front.

This may not have been the world Nazi leaders had wanted to create. They no more wanted to have Slavic 'sub-humans' living and working in Germany than they desired that German cities be razed. But it was a world almost ideally suited to imprinting a Nazi mindset through the texture of daily living, through the mixture of public slogans and private desires, of family stratagems and official regulations. And it was in the new apocalyptic world of the German cities— the very terrain on which Nazism had been weakest in the 1930s— that the casual brutality Nazism had encouraged against the 'racially inferior' would take on mass proportions.

This did not stop the hollowing out of society from within, the loosening of bonds of solidarity and trust, which would make Germans in defeat predominantly preoccupied with their own problems. Such hatreds were part and parcel of this process. Hating Jews and Russian slave workers did not bring respite from bombing or escalating military losses. By the last stages of the war, they were no more than an ersatz for an enemy who could no longer be reached. We need to think about their role here because German city-dwellers were not living in a mono-cultural society. They were not unin-

formed about the mass murder of the Jews and they were not unconcerned about the war in the East, with its starvation and 'scorched earth' policies towards Soviet civilians.

We live in a culture saturated with redemptive messages about suffering. Whether it is the history of black slavery in the United States, or survivors of the Holocaust, the Hollywood version of history invites us to see ourselves in the undeserved sufferings of others. When we do so we all too instinctively impute *our* feelings and moral values to them. It is much harder to recreate *their* emotions and ways of seeing things. If we really want to understand the historical dimensions of suffering, then we should avoid facile ideas of innocence, martyrdom, and redemption and look terror and pain, grief and rage in the face. Jörg Friedrich has done half of this, but precisely because he reduces his focus only to the bombing itself, his image is a half-image which turns suffering into pathos.

If there is a contemporary message here, then it is that even in those circumstances when air power *can* be strategically decisive—as atomic bombs forced Japan to capitulate in August 1945—it is not possible to bomb a population into love and virtue. Quite the opposite.

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BOOK REVIEWS

KARL SCHLÖGEL, *Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit: Über Zivilisations-geschichte und Geopolitik* (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2003), 567 pp. ISBN 3 446 20381 8. EUR 25.90

History, we know, is about chronology, about the way events follow one upon another. Consequently, Clio's first instinct is to think dia-chronically. Her method is simple, powerful, and beguiling; it pre-supposes that a thing that happened after something else could not have caused it, and that to situate something in time can go a long way to explaining its meaning.

Karl Schlögel, the prominent German historian of Russian mod-ernism, and author of a series of finely wrought books explicating the cultural histories of cities, towns, and the landscapes of Eastern Europe, has penned a beautifully written, thought-provoking, cul-turally panoramic work suggesting that our obsession with time has come at the expense of a sense of place and of synchrony. The price, he argues, has been very high: a narrowed vision of the traces of the past, a myopic view of how history happens in and across spaces, an occluded understanding of the history of human contact, a blunted sense of geography, and a constricted conceptual apparatus for understanding both roots and routes. Against these shortcomings, weaknesses of textual hermeneutics more generally, Schlögel argues that we should sharpen our sight, use our eyes attentively, and see history in space. His is thus an argument for the spatial turn, which he sees as deriving from the work of Henri Lefebvre and Anglo–American urban studies. In this sense, *Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit* is not a programmatically original work, as the author would surely concede — though in Germany it is, along with Jürgen Osterhammel's *Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats*, the most ambitious attempt to reinstate geography and a sense of place into the historio-graphical mainstream.[1] As in art, however, programmes are not everything, and what is wonderful about this book is the author's

[1] Jürgen Osterhammel, *Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats: Studien zu Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich* (Göttingen, 2001).

ocular agility, the surprising connections he makes, the range of his vision (we find ourselves immersed in histories ranging from Moscow to Berlin, Vienna to Paris, London to Los Angeles), and the jewel-cutting quality of his arresting prose.

Style is the man, Buffon famously wrote, and with Schlögel one feels the friction of a writing style that rubs because it is more than mere decoration, garnish on a finished dish—it is, in fact, a way of truth-telling. His prose of short sentences and soft, natural cadences evokes a Central and East European world that will disappear unless we watch closely. There is nostalgia here as well as critical reflection: both Diaghilev's magical, highly eroticized, cosmopolitan Europe, and the stone, wood and barbed wire remnants of Birkenau. There is also narrative, though not grand narrative: sentences have lost their Hemingwayesque sense of self-confidence; paragraphs do not build tension slowly, culminating in a pointedly original argument; chapters are often short, sometimes of medium length, never long. And they usually start with an observation, on how train schedules represent closely choreographed movement, for example; and from there they proceed to the heart of the real—the precise description of when transports of Jews began, how long they took, and where they went.

Schlögel is not interested in the abstract. He has instead sketched a series of Dutch miniatures, even if they are incomplete in detail. They are pictures of history drawn from unusual documents. From American highways to European pavements, from the Portolan maps of Portugese sailors to the sketches delineating the territories of Los Angeles gangsters, we are treated to a series of visual traces which Schlögel reads as history. Some of the readings are moving, as when he recreates the traumatic history of mid-century Berlin through its telephone and address books, including the Jewish Address Book of 1931. Some are entreaties to historians to take travel more seriously, as when he discusses the Baedeker guide books as a literary genre. Some readings rise to methodological reflection on what historians do, as when he tours the cemeteries of Europe, shaded places of trans-generational contemplation. In the cemeteries of Wroclaw and Vilnius, Czernowitz and Berlin-Tegel, the cataclysmic mixing of peoples in war, and the worlds now lost, are etched in stone. Although accosted by weeds, the stones nevertheless remain documents of European civilization after a century in ruins.

Schlögel begins his book, which is not strictly chronologically ordered, in an earlier era, with the more optimistic vision of Alexander von Humboldt. The theme of exploration, made possible by maps and charts, constitutes the main thread binding the first third of the book together; this part is followed by a series of studies on how mapping helped Euro-Americans to conquer space and civilizations, whether the ancient provinces of France in the age of Louis XIV, North America in the age of Jefferson, or India falling under British domination. Schlögel follows the secondary literature quite closely, and these parts of the book are intended to communicate English and French secondary literature to a German-speaking audience. In the third part, the silhouette of Schlögel as the *flaneur* of twentieth-century ruins emerges with clearer contours. The allusion to Walter Benjamin is not misplaced. He is Schlögel's model, and Schlögel suggests historians take seriously what Benjamin attempted in the *Passagen-Werk (*historical montage, not explaining in a historicist sense but seeing the nineteenth century through the material physiognomy of Paris*)*.

The *flaneur* is not the first image most historians would choose for themselves, for it also suggests lack of depth. And in fairness, it is true that one sometimes wishes for more depth in this work, and a sharper sense of the historiographical problems at hand. Histories—of cartography, for example—are sketched with such hasty brush strokes that they do not stick in the mind. Authors of secondary literature are not always given their due. And genuinely new insights—something which an assiduous historian could not find buried in a learned journal—are infrequent. To put it in terms of literary study—we are closer to Susan Sontag than to Erich Auerbach.

Although *Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit* is not aimed just at professional historians, it nevertheless has a lot to say to us. At the very least, it is the most elegant and accessible introduction to the spatial turn in any language that I know.

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VALENTIN GROEBNER, *Ungestalten: Die visuelle Kultur der Gewalt im Mittelalter* (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2003), 208 pp. ISBN 3 446 20373 7. EUR 17.90

There are plenty of good reasons not to judge books by their covers, but just occasionally the temptation cannot, and maybe should not, be resisted. For what meets the eye on first encountering Valentin Groebner's arresting and provocative extended essay?[1] It is Grünewald's Isenheim Christ, though not as we might think we know him. No body is seen, only a nailed and blood-drenched right hand, fingers splayed in agony, the rough and knotty cross behind. Yet we know at once what we are looking at—and that, of course, is part of the point. Christ himself has been physically obliterated, turned into a Groebnerian *Ungestalt*, a literally faceless terror; yet, drawing on our own resources of knowledge and imagination, we 'see' him none the less. What else do we see? Little beyond sleek, cool black, within which, we notice, the title word itself has been subjected to a knowing visual *Verunstaltung*. Something very smart indeed is clearly afoot here, in this study of 'the visual culture of violence in the Middle Ages'. But is it all just a little *too* smart? Is pre-modern bloodshed really the proper occasion for such a streetwise piece of postmodernist eye-candy? Are we about to be taken on an intellectual journey, we wonder nervously, or merely made complicit in a clever game of semiotics? The reader—or at least this reader—therefore opens the volume already on guard: black may be a seemly colour for a serious book on a grave historical subject; *noir*, surely, is not.

The reader perhaps also wonders how a pocket-sized volume of just over two hundred pages can possibly do justice to such a vast theme. The European Middle Ages produced, as everyone knows, an immense quantity and variety of visual images of violence, many— whether evoking the triumphs of Alexander, Caesar, or Arthur of Britain, Jerusalem falling to the crusaders, or the superhuman feats of contemporary chivalric paragons—of a frankly celebratory kind. The school texts in which most people have their first serious encounter with the Middle Ages used to be filled with them. Nearly all of these sanguinary images, we quickly learn, will fall outside Groebner's purview. Instead, he will track down portrayals of a special kind of

[1] Quotations are from the German edition; all translations are my own.

medieval violence—what he calls 'extreme violence' (*extreme Gewalt*). So just what is it that renders some violent acts more 'extreme' than others? The social status, religion, ethnicity, special vulnerability, or even sheer number, of the victims? The peculiar injustice, illegality, or notoriety of certain bloody deeds, for contemporaries or for us? The shock which they delivered to the fabric of medieval society? In an age of wars great and small, of burning villages and towns, crusades, pogroms and massacres, of insurrections and their bloody suppression, there ought to be no shortage of candidates—nor, at a time when the Slaughter of the Innocents could supply a narrative staple for religious art, any want of visual representations.

Again, however, Groebner's concern is more specific. For him, what qualifies some acts as 'extreme' is their association with the concealment, blurring, or outright obliteration of personal identity, with processes of masking, disfiguring or defacing—with the creation, in short, of *Ungestalten*. He would argue, in fact, that this anonymizing process is inherent in the very act of representing violent deeds—deeds done to others—in visual form. Framed thus, as Groebner is wont to frame his utterances, as a lapidary general proposition, it seems unconvincing: violent images in medieval art frequently aimed not to erase individual identities, but to fashion them, authenticate them, and render them manifest, and thus memorable—and that means the identities of the crushed, the dishonoured, and the infamous, hardly less than the glorious or the vindicated. Here again, however, the author will take up position on more particular ground, of his own choosing, through a series of specialized, interlinked case studies. The reader is first introduced to the complex and contested visual language of urban power and faction (chapter 2), and to the symbolically charged facial disfigurements wrought on sexual transgressors in late medieval Nuremberg (chapter 3). Attention then switches to the sanguinary and unstable symbolic repertoire of late gothic religious art and drama (chapter 4). Finally, we are plunged into the semiotic nightmare world of the Swiss urban commune at war (chapter 5).

It is through this, very concrete and specific, body of material that Groebner roots his broad and ambitious theorizing in the evidential soil of past times. It is perhaps worth noting here that, despite the broad panorama conjured up by the book's title, his findings do not really address 'the Middle Ages' as such, but speak instead to an

assemblage of incidents and phenomena culled overwhelmingly from the south German, Swiss, and (to a lesser degree) north Italian towns of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. A reason for focusing on this late, urbanized world is, we learn, its fertility, when compared with the preceding medieval millennium, in the particular *kinds* of violent representation, written and visual, which Groebner proposes to exploit. So how far, one naturally wonders, are the sources upon which his thesis draws specific to the time and the place of their making—and, by extension, how fit to sustain the broad, general insights that he wishes to put forward? Georges Duby is among those who have judged the graphic depiction of ('extreme'?) physical suffering to be a distinctively *late* medieval cultural trait.

What excites Groebner in his sources is the way in which their various representations of ('extreme') violence tended to fashion unpersons, drained of identity; and yet, he insists, they were at the same time crafted in such a way as to impel the spectator to supply what was absent, to fit faces to the faceless spectres, drawing on his or her own imaginative fund of horror. Medieval portrayals of violence functioned, he explains, 'like any good present-day motion picture or advertisement, ... in that material images and accounts of the *Ungestalt* conjured up in the heads of the public other, immaterial images that the observers knew from elsewhere, and recalled' (pp. 16–17). The ambiguous, confused, and contested meanings which resulted are at the heart of the book. But with whose meanings, exactly, are we dealing here—Groebner's own, or those of his medieval subjects? For this is no mere sober-sided piece of dry academic fare. 'American gangster movies and reports from the Yugoslav civil war will concern us', the reader is assured, 'as also will photographic exhibitions and campaigns for tidy inner cities' (p. 11). Along the way, there will be several name-checks for Quentin Tarantino, and Hong Kong action-movie director John Woo will also earn a mention. 'Such lateral connections', he truthfully observes, 'are not exactly axiomatic in German-language [or English-language!] books about the Middle Ages' (p. 11). Groebner's preferred angle of approach to these *Querverbindungen* is not the conventional one, either: 'Let us try starting out from these present-day violent images when we deal with representations of the horrific and the deformed (*Ungestalt*) at the end of the Middle Ages', he recommends (p. 23). 'After all, this

Medienszenerie at the start of the twenty-first century forms the deter-mining background whenever we look back at the historical materi-al' (pp. 23-4).

Does it? Still more importantly, *should* it? It seems, first of all, somewhat rash to assume that 'we' necessarily all have an identical relationship with the violent visual culture of 'our' own day (the character and dimensions of which are in any case perhaps less fixed, and more subjective, than Groebner allows), or that 'we' will all read the written and visual records of the Middle Ages through it in a sin-gle, standardized fashion. It is one thing to recognize that historical writing is always, in a sense, shaped by the cultural milieu within which it is made, another to reduce historians to mere weather-vanes, twisting helplessly before the capricious gusts of pop fashion and the morning's headlines. Anyone studying the culture and perceptive modes of a past society will naturally aim to do more than that, and must strive to understand the cultural artefacts of past times through the eyes of those who made them, lived with them, and interpreted them. Groebner makes a thought-provoking case when he argues that violent images worked on the perception in essentially similar ways, and demanded from the viewer comparable mental and imag-inative responses, in the Middle Ages and today. But we cannot, surely, rest there. A study of pre-modern perceptive practices would be fruitless, indeed misleading, unless accompanied by careful inves-tigation of the contemporary meanings ascribed to the images in question, the cultural (and, in many instances, specifically religious) impulses which led to their consumption, and the social milieu in which they were experienced. It is hard, too, to see how such a study can avoid examining the larger place of the visual in pre-modern society and culture. We will wish to discover, in short, not only how medieval people's responses to portrayals of 'extreme' violence resembled 'ours', but also, perhaps still more urgently, how they *dif-fered*.

How well does Groebner's startling viewpoint equip him to sup-ply these things? Early on in the book, he recollects what it was that led him to his chosen theme: 'Particular motifs of the *Ungestalt* as [signifying] absolute horror, which I encountered in texts and images of the twentieth century, seemed to me strangely familiar' (p. 13). But, as Groebner himself is at pains to remind us, appearances can be deceptive. Horror, like pain, has contexts in time, from which it

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should not be lightly abstracted. The 'terror' registered by a cardinal's secretary on encountering the monumental, gory wayside crucifixes of southern Germany in the early sixteenth century will have been in important ways different from that induced in consumers of news images of mutilated corpses at the end of the twentieth. There is a danger that the frame through which Groebner has chosen to inspect his remote images of violation ('and some of them are really revolting', p. 38) will telescope that indispensable space in time. When he reflects that 'the wounded body in the contemporary, media-induced, culture of fear has to be located in an exotic Elsewhere in order to appear a terrible-fascinating image' (p. 21), what surely strikes the medievalist is above all the gulf which is opened up between contemporary values and those of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries — where we can encounter St Sebastian transfixed with arrows against a deliberately homely sub-Alpine backdrop of lakes and green hills. Groebner's frame looks quintessentially modern — or post-modern — in its construction. Masked, shadowy, or dehumanized assailants, disfigured or wilfully anonymized victims, the shocking inversion of the quotidian, the brutal paraphernalia of graphic personal obliteration — such staples of the slasher movie (as of Groebner's book) appear to bespeak a distinctly contemporary, rather solipsistic, sensibility, one in which ultimate horror resides in personal invisibility, 'facelessness', equated with the extinction of self. Purveyed as popular entertainment, the appeal of such motifs seems, in addition, to be attuned specifically to the sated ennui of thoroughly ordered and pacified western societies, in which violence itself is (in historical perspective) rare, veiled, 'abnormal', and thus taboo — hence the voyeuristic frisson of its controlled, tantalizing televisual unmasking. For that reason, invoking the neurotic bourgeois fears spawned by the enigmatic 'tags' left behind by nocturnal graffiti artists in the micro-regulated contemporary European (Swiss!) city (pp. 39–41) seems an ill-suited preface to the account which follows (chapter 2), of shadowy forms and shady deeds in the dangerous world of the late medieval town. If there was an entertainment for which the imperilled fifteenth-century burgher had little need, it was surely Hollywood-style 'fear as fun' (p. 21).

Even when Groebner gets down, in his final chapter, to examining what must be the most familiar site of medieval violence — the battlefield — the shade of contemporary western priorities is not far

distant: 'extreme' is that behaviour which dissolves or destroys *personal* identity. The soldier cunningly donning enemy dress to gain advantage is no less *ungestalt* than the mutilated battlefield corpse. Groebner sternly rebukes mere 'comforting' (p. 141) attempts to rationalize, and thus 'short-circuit', reports of medieval and modern violence. And his own narrative is certainly well larded with the stomach-turning, as we watch Swiss soldiers grease their boots with the body fat of the butchered mayor of Zurich, after tearing out his living heart. Indeed, we might wonder for a moment whether Groebner's manner of assembling his materials does not occasionally risk making the reader a gawping spectator at precisely the sort of cabinet of ('medieval') monstrosities that he so vehemently condemns elsewhere (pp. 27–34). Instances of *Raub und Brand* were, after all, for medieval people, scarcely less deplorable even when not accompanied by the sickening examples of cannibalism and the gratuitous violation of the dead listed here. Yet, for all the author's taste for gruesome sub-headings—'Slashed Bellies, Severed Fingers', 'Belly Fat and Salad'— violence as such emerges as less central to his concerns than we might suppose. In the end, Groebner's own approach, too, is apt, in a way, to sap the battlefield of its horrors, since his battles are at heart games of semiotic atrocity—struggles of contending *signs*. They are, above all, events in which recognition, labelling, ordering, and categorizing (by means of colours, emblems, and devices) became crucial—at the time, but also subsequently, in the recollections of victors and vanquished. His battlefield *Ungestalten* attest the fundamental subjectivity, as well as the urgency, of those tasks, but reveal also what imperfect—slippery, contestable— tools visual symbols represented for their accomplishment.

A concern with signs, recognition, and authentication, and with the complex relationship in visual culture between the seen and the unseen, represents the strongest thematic current in this volume, permeating every chapter—from the contests of public signs and covert deeds in the late medieval town (chapter 2), via the visible, violent inscription on the human body of concealed moral infractions (chapter 3) and the troubling ambiguities revealed in representations of the suffering Christ (chapter 4), to the treacherous symbolic realm of the battlefield (chapter 5). This matrix of studies and approaches gains a fresh significance when we note that Groebner has also been engaged in researching the history of the passport. Here is another topic

which raises urgent questions about the problematical relationships between power and the ascription of personal identity, and between authentication and the mass multiplication of visual images: *is* seeing really believing? It is also a topic which highlights the crucial importance of the late medieval or early Renaissance period, in which most of the material for this book originates—and in which, too, the history of the passport begins. From this perspective, the bloody history of southern Germany and northern Italy at the end of the Middle Ages takes on new meaning. The problem, taking Groebner's standpoint, is no longer so much, as it often has been in other studies, the proliferation of violence, as the uncontrolled multiplication of *signs*. If blood matters much for him, that is above all because blood *authenticates*—not just Christ's blood, ever staining in effigy the hands of his enemies, but also the blood-red insignia which betray nocturnal intruders on the street, or hostile armies on the battlefield. At the end of the Middle Ages, the urgent task of authentication, in which secular and spiritual authorities were engaged, had become simultaneously more feasible—in an age of increasingly intrusive, bureaucratic government—and more problematical, as visual signs luxuriated, in number and variety, particularly in the towns: through the commercialization of the visual arts, the dissemination of printed texts and images, the growth of popular religious drama, and the mass production of insignia, armorials, and badges of all kinds.

It is beyond question that Groebner's approach holds out bold and stimulating insights into political and social mentalities at the end of the Middle Ages. Some of these are displayed especially strikingly in chapter 2, where he, in effect, sketches the outlines of a new history of late medieval urban political culture—one which replaces the familiar picture of public life and broadly 'progressive' developments in government under the law with an account emphasizing secrecy, concealment, spies, denunciations, and the behind-the-scenes manipulation of symbols of power and violence by regimes and their opponents alike. There is much in Groebner's book that is original, engrossing, even exhilarating, and the specialized chapters rest upon the deft and confident synthesis and re-evaluation of a remarkable range and variety of sources. But the book also, inevitably, leaves a good deal unsaid about how violence was envisaged by medieval Europeans. Nor does it wholly succeed in transcending its roots in four originally separate, though thematically

related, pieces, around which an attempt has been made to construct a bold, over-arching interpretative structure. For this reader at least, Groebner's detailed thematic chapters carry, individually and collectively, considerably more conviction than do the more general reflections on past and present visualizations of violence with which the work begins and closes. But if this is in some ways a flawed book, it is also an ambitious, exciting, important and—on the whole—highly readable one, which deserves, and will surely enjoy, a wide readership.

By way of a coda, it is maybe not without interest to note that a book which began by inscribing its own *Verunstaltung* ends, appropriately enough, with an act of veiled textual disfigurement—at least if one turns to the recent English-language translation.[2] There, it transpires, Groebner's two-page polemic against 'the American war against Iraq', with which he draws his original, German-language, essay towards its close (pp. 170–2), has been excised. But whose was the hidden hand wielding the mutilating knife? When a book wears its conscience as insistently on its sleeve as this one does, and is as avowedly concerned to bring violent past and violent present into mutually illuminating dialogue (and this review is being typed, well over a year after Iraq's 'liberation', with a new breed of *Ungestalten*— mirror-shaded GIs, hooded, mutilated, and systematically dehumanized 'interrogation' victims—stalking the western media), we surely should be told. For after all, 'the Middle Ages always take place in the researcher's own present—where else?' (p. 11).

[2] Valentin Groebner, *Defaced: The Visual Culture of Violence in the Late Middle Ages,* trans. Pamela Selwyn (New York: Zone Books, 2004), 199 pp. ISBN 1 890951 37 4. £16.95.

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MICHAEL KAISER and ANDREAS PEČAR (eds.), *Der zweite Mann im Staat: Oberste Amtsträger und Favoriten im Umkreis der Reichsfürsten in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung, Beiheft 32 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2003), 363 pp. ISBN 3 428 11116 8. ISSN 0931 5268. EUR 48.80

ANETTE BAUMANN, PETER OESTMANN, STEPHAN WENDE-HORST, and SIEGRID WESTPHAL (eds.), *Reichspersonal: Funktionsträger von Kaiser und Reich,* Quellen und Forschungen zur höchsten Gerichtsbarkeit im Alten Reich, 46 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004), vii + 406 pp. ISBN 3 412 18303 2. EUR 44.90

Who ran the early modern state? There was a time when most scholars would have identified monarchs as the key controlling figures. Over the last few decades, however, there has been a significant turn away from any notion of an absolutist state and a growing interest in other individuals and groups who participated in the political process. The nobility and the Estates generally are now recognized as key players. More recently, attention has focused on the favourite or first minister: figures such as Richelieu and Mazarin, Olivares and Lerma, Essex and Buckingham, who occupied that crucial space between ruler and ruled.

Even during their own lifetimes their careers were often the subject of fascinated commentary. Their frequently dramatic falls from grace and tragic ends have provided both writers and scholars with rich material. What is different about the more modern studies is the attempt to define the role that such figures played in the development of the state. Indeed, it has been suggested that the very existence of a favourite is in itself an indicator of evolving statehood. As political decision-making drifted away from the Estates, the favourite played a key mediating role until the emergence of ministers and bureaucratic regimes in the eighteenth century diminished the potential of figures defined only by their proximity to the monarch.

One of the problems of the discussion that has been generated principally by scholars such as John Elliott, Lawrence Brockliss, Joseph Bergin, and Ronald Asch is that it focuses on a relatively small number of major figures. Generalizations about the characteristics of the favourite and his role in the development of the early modern state might become firmer if they were based on a larger sample. Hence Michael Kaiser and Andreas Pečar are surely right to suggest

that the Holy Roman Empire offers an invaluable field for comparative study. In the plethora of small German courts, the range of possible examples is legion and the potential variations endless. At the same time, however, questions inevitably arise about the extent to which conditions in a small German court are really comparable with those in the major monarchies. Above all, there is the question about the nature of statehood in the early modern Reich, especially in relation to the suggestion that the Reich itself was a state. These issues are intriguingly elaborated in a further volume, edited by Annette Baumann, Peter Oestmann, Stephan Wendehorst, and Siegrid Westphal, that is dedicated to the personnel of the Reich.

Kaiser's and Pečar's volume undoubtedly broadens the range both geographically and chronologically. By focusing on the general category of the 'zweiter Mann' or 'second in command' they are able to extend the typology significantly and to include an extraordinarily wide cast of characters. Influence and immediate proximity to the ruler was the main criterion. Yet that could be characteristic of clergy, political ministers, courtiers, military leaders, or, indeed, mistresses. Equally important was the context in which such an individual operated. A relationship of trust between a ruler and a favoured individual was often crucial at times when efforts were being made to limit or reduce the power of the Estates, or when the protection of dynastic interests could not be entrusted to the councils of state. An essay by Alexander Jendorff on Hartmut von Kronberg of Mainz (d. 1591) emphasizes, by contrast, that although he was the Elector's brother-in-law and enjoyed his trust, he was not a favourite in the conventional sense. Rather, he mediated between Elector, cathedral chapter, and Imperial Knights, placing regional stability above all family and, indeed, confessional considerations.

The 'zweiter Mann' could be a leading official or office-holder directly appointed to exercise wide-ranging functions, a court favourite, or an exceptional individual able to wield influence far beyond his specific area of competence by virtue of the fact that he enjoyed the trust of the ruler. A 'zweiter Mann' might be qualified by legal knowledge, administrative expertise, or simply by a high degree of personal competence, especially in the much discussed but not easily specified noble or courtly virtues, or *savoir faire*. The 'zweiter Mann' could equally be a woman in the case of a mistress who came to play a significant political role. It is one of the virtues of this

volume that it rescues mistresses (specifically Countess Cosel of Saxony and Christina Wilhelmine von Grävenitz of Württemberg) from the moralizing sexual stereotyping of nineteenth-century histo-riography.

Two further categories add additional contours. Some figures such as Wallenstein (Christoph Kampmann) and Joseph Süß Oppen-heimer (Peter Wilson) only became recognized, or rather excoriated, as favourites after their fall from power. This reflects, Kaiser and Pečar suggest, the negative image of the favourite or first minister in the contemporary literature. Indeed, throughout the 'classic' age of the favourite from the sixteenth to the early eighteenth century, Tacitus's image of Lucius Aelius Sejanus, favourite of Emperor Tiberius and prefect of the praetorian guard, served as an explanato-ry stereotype, especially when it came to the abject demise of a hated figure.

Secondly, the reforming ministers of the second half of the eigh-teenth and early nineteenth century, represented here by Kaunitz (Franz A. J. Szabo) and Montgelas (Walter Demel), seem to represent a distinctly new type. Like their predecessors in the role of 'zweiter Mann' they exercised power by virtue of (often multiple) ministerial office. Yet they were in no sense old-style favourites, but rather fore-runners of the kind of nineteenth-century chief minister exemplified by Bismarck.

The German situation was, of course, different from that of the major monarchies. Only Austria really approached them in size and significance. Furthermore the framework of the Reich provided opportunities not available elsewhere. One aspiration of many lead-ing figures in the service of a German prince was to use that ruler's influence and intercession to acquire an Imperial title of nobility, which could further bolster a position built up with influence, money, and lands. A career blocked in one territory could be re-sumed in another, or even translated into service with the Emperor himself. Ferdinand von Plettenberg, for example, as Marcus Leifeld explains, was the favourite and chief adviser of Clement August of Cologne from 1721 to about 1733, during which time he accumulated vast wealth, was elevated to the dignity of an Imperial Count (1724), and admitted to the Order of the Golden Fleece (1732). When he fell out of favour with the Elector, he entered the Emperor's service as Imperial plenipotentiary to the Lower Rhine–Westphalian Circle and

then secured appointment as Imperial ambassador to the Papacy (an office he was, however, unable to take up before his death in 1737). None of that, however, spared others from the dire fate of a fallen favourite, such as Countess Cosel whose fall from grace at the court of Augustus the Strong was the prelude to forty-nine years of imprisonment.

The sheer variety of individual cases frustrates any clear conclusions. That, however, is the strength of this volume. It takes a debate that has been largely focused on a few western European examples and demonstrates how the much wider range of German cases can be used productively to extend the typology and broaden the chronological range. The European context is outlined by Ronald Asch in the kind of concise yet wide-ranging comparative essay at which he excels. The chronological range is suggested by examples taken from the sixteenth century (Hartmut XIII von Kronberg and Wilhelm von Jocher) to the early nineteenth century (Montgelas). Three clusters of essays devoted respectively to Bavaria, Brandenburg, and Austria allow insights into the evolution of agents of political influence within specific regional institutional contexts.

Kaiser's and Pečar's volume does not include an essay on the 'zweiter Mann im Alten Reich', as Peter Claus Hartmann has styled the Reich's Archchancellor, Director of the Electoral College, and Elector of Mainz. And while he is not directly dealt with in the collection edited by Baumann, Oestmann, Wendehorst, and Westphal, he is in a sense a constant presence in their volume. Their question is simple. Did the Reich ever develop anything that might be described as a 'personnel'?

As the editors rightly point out, the traditional focus on the development of state structures at the territorial level, notably in Prussia, has probably inhibited the serious treatment of the Reich in this respect. On the other hand, the more recent attempts, notably by Georg Schmidt, to understand the Reich as a state naturally prompt questions about who exactly represented 'Kaiser und Reich' on the ground. Who managed their affairs or executed the decisions made in their name? If there was such a group, did it have common characteristics? Did it develop a sense of itself as a 'functional élite'? Did it embody an Imperial ethos? Did it cumulatively help to develop an awareness or consciousness of the Reich among its inhabitants? Many studies have examined the significance of the Emperor's clien-

tele for the early modern Reich. By contrast, almost nothing has been written about those who worked for or in the various institutions that were developed from the 1490s onwards.

It is difficult even to define clearly exactly who should be included in such a group. Among those whom Baumann and her colleagues suggest should be *excluded* are the holders of Imperial Arch Offices (*Erzämter*) and the Hereditary Offices (*Erbämter*), the individual Imperial Estates (ruling counts, princes etc.), dignitaries of the Imperial Church, those who held offices at court, the Imperial villages and monasteries, and Imperial Knights. Simply including anyone whose office or job title enjoyed the prefix *Reichs-* would obviously be casting the net too wide. Hence Habsburg functionaries whose area of competence was in reality confined to the hereditary lands cannot be counted. Nor can the legion of those who used the title 'kaiserlich Wirklich Geheimer Rat' be included: many, like Goethe's father, simply bought it; others, such as the captains and councillors of the association of Franconian Knights, were granted the privilege in perpetuity by Charles VI.

Clear definitions are rendered difficult at this stage owing to the almost complete lack of previous research into this kind of area. One of the few exceptions has been Christine Roll's study of the second *Reichsregiment*,[1] which, among other things, attempted to identify the ethos and 'corporate identity' of its members. The current volume seeks to extend the questions that Roll asked and also builds on the major research projects that have been devoted in recent years to the *Reichskammergericht* and, to a lesser extent, the *Reichshofrat*. As the editors suggest, the state system of the Reich was in many ways defined by the 'dynamic interplay between imperial prerogatives, the imperial office of supreme judge and the functions of the Imperial Estates'. The various functionaries of the two leading judicial institutions thus played a key role in allowing that system to function. They were 'imperial personnel' in the sense that they were in their various ways agents of that composite entity 'Kaiser und Reich'.

Almost all the contributions to this intriguing and important volume break new ground. Wolfgang Burgdorf starts with an elegant analysis of the *peregrinatio academica* of the eighteenth-century Imperial lawyers. This included not only legal study, for Protestants

[1] Christine Roll, *Das Zweite Reichsregiment 1521–1530* (Cologne, 1996).

at Halle or Göttingen, for Catholics at Würzburg, Freiburg, or Vienna, but also periods of 'work experience' at Wetzlar, Regensburg, Vienna, or the seat of a Circle Assembly such as Ulm. The latter in particular provided common experiences and generated professional networks that proved invaluable for the individual's later career.

The following contributions examine particular groups. Eva Ortlieb profiles the Imperial commissioners of the *Reichshofrat*. These were generally prominent regional figures, often leading princes, such as the Elector of Mainz who, in the reign of Ferdinand III, received no fewer than seventy-four commissions, to whom the resolution of some 10 per cent of the court's cases were delegated. From the 1570s, many of them in turn further delegated the real work of a commission to 'subdelegates'. These were generally recruited from the pool of legally trained territorial officials and their periods of 'temporary Imperial service' often proved to be a stepping stone to a permanent position at the *Reichshofrat*.

Even more novel is Gernot Peter Obersteiner's substantial study of the *Reichshoffiskal* or procurator fiscal at the *Reichshofrat*. The office has medieval origins but in its 'classic' early modern form it developed in the late sixteenth century in response to an urgent need to improve tax revenues at a time when the *Reichskammergericht*, which had its own Imperial prosecutor, was becoming increasingly paralysed by confessional issues. The sphere of competence of the *Reichshoffiskal* from the 1580s included the Italian vassals. But in the late seventeenth century a renewed financial crisis led to the creation of a parallel office for the Italian territories, where the procurators worked, often uneasily, in tandem with the Imperial plenipotentiaries until the dissolution of the Reich. Obersteiner analyses recruitment, training, and professional experience and also indicates something of the significance of these procurators who brought between twenty and thirty cases a year to the *Reichshofrat*.

Stefan Ehrenpreis deals with another dimension of the *Reichshofrat*, namely the *Reichshofratsagenten*, the lawyers who represented the various parties at the court. Some were permanent representatives of the Estates; some were specially commissioned for specific cases by clients who could afford it; others simply belonged to a 'pool' of lawyers attached to the court who dealt with any case that came their way. By and large, all were legally trained non-nobles, whose pro-

fessional expertise also included knowledge of the scene in Vienna and the ability to place bribes effectively as well as to present written submissions to the court.

A second group of five essays is devoted to a range of functionaries who were attached, some formally and others more loosely, to the *Reichskammergericht*. Anette Baumann examines the lawyers who worked at the court and shows how they competed for lucrative clients. Like their colleagues at the *Reichshofrat*, their expertise lay in their inside experience of the system as well as in legal knowledge. In contravention of the formal rules, they often sought to establish exactly which judge would be responsible for deciding which case and to influence the outcome of a case by publishing relevant material while it was still pending. Karl Welker and Nils Jörn present contrasting portraits of two judges. Johann Wilhelm Riedesel zu Eisenbach seems to have been a model of independent judgement and Christian moral probity, just the sort of judge, Welker suggests, that the early nineteenth-century liberal movement demanded. Christian Nettelbladt's career, by contrast, ended in ignominy. He was one of a series of nominees to the court of the Swedish crown, a right that was assiduously exercised between 1648 and 1806. His thirty-one year career as a judge came to an abrupt end in 1774 when he was dismissed following a recommendation of the visitation deputation and confronted with over 460 counts of corruption, bribery, and other instances of dereliction of duty.

Perhaps even more fascinating still are two studies of the development of the office of *Reichskammergericht* court messenger from the mid-sixteenth century to 1806. They represented the face of Imperial justice on the ground, serving summons and delivering verdicts. Court messengers may not have been civil servants in any modern sense. Even their silver badge of office seems to have been their own private property, as the Austrians found out in 1806 when they tried to recover the badges in order to prevent their possible fraudulent use after the Reich was dissolved. Yet over the long term, it seems the office acquired both a distinct 'public' profile and an authority that preserved its holders from the kind of random violence and rejection of Imperial authority that characterized the experience of some sixteenth-century couriers.

A final group of essays provides some rather different perspectives. Christine Pflüger examines how between 1552 and 1556/58

King Ferdinand used commissary councillors as a means of constituting and stabilizing royal power, in some instances even enhancing their status by giving them plenipotentiary powers. In some ways they even exceeded the role that Armin Kohnle describes for the envoys who, with increasing regularity, represented the princes at the *Reichstag* from the 1520s onwards. The presence of such territorial envoys at sessions, without the power of independent and immediate decision, tended to inhibit the speedy dispatch of business through the practice of 'Hintersichbringen', the obligation to refer everything back to the ruling prince. Stephan Wendehorst draws attention to another form of participation in the Imperial system with some stimulating reflections on the role of the Imperial notaries in the legal system. They were both essential to the day-to-day functioning of the legal system and agents who contributed to the creation of an Imperial 'Rechtsraum' or judicial region in the documents they sealed and oaths they verified. By contrast, John Flood discusses one office, the poet laureateship, that did not develop in the early modern period: despite promising medieval developments (Petrach was crowned in Rome in 1341) and grand plans in the reign of Maximilian I, Flood suggests, the office became increasingly meaningless thereafter.

That may well be right, but Flood's comment that 'after 1648 individual princes and imperial cities less and less pursued common interests' also illustrates a difference between his attitude to the Reich and that of the editors. Some other contributors also seem to be lukewarm (Welker) or overtly critical (Eric-Oliver Mader) with regard to any idea that the Reich was anything like a state in the sense that Georg Schmidt has suggested. The editors, and most of the other contributors, however, demonstrate clearly that much vital evidence has been overlooked precisely because of the deeply entrenched territorial state bias in German historiography.

It may sometimes be tiresome to find the Prussian-German historiographical tradition constantly invoked to explain why the Reich has been consistently underestimated, yet one or two of the contributions to this volume underline the continuing need to do so. To claim, as Mader appears to, that the idea of the Reich as something approaching a state system falls because we are dealing not with 'Personal des Reichs' but rather with 'Diener von Kaiser und Reich zugleich' seems contrary in the extreme. As the editors suggest, a

functional approach to the question of definitions would reveal large numbers of individuals like the Imperial Commissioners who sometimes, some occasionally and some regularly, acted as Imperial functionaries. That they also, or even primarily, served as territorial agents does not necessarily disqualify them as Imperial agents. It merely reflected the interplay between various levels of government—Imperial, Circle, territorial/local—that was characteristic of the early modern Reich.

Certainly the term 'Reichspersonal' that the editors have adopted is eye-catching and provocative. Yet it is also extremely thought-provoking in the way that it draws attention to a stratum of German society that grew in significance during the early modern period. It was created by the reforms that crystallized from the late fifteenth century and helped evolve and stabilize the Reich over the next three centuries. There is little prospect that further research on the hitherto virtually unknown office of the *Reichshofratstürwärter* will enhance our understanding of much at all. We do, however, need to know much more about those who worked in the Imperial courts, the various branches of the administration, the Circles, and many others. That in turn might provide a key to a better understanding of how the Reich was perceived by its inhabitants and of how awareness or consciousness of the Reich might have evolved during the early modern period.

Both volumes shed new light on subjects that are often thought to be either old hat in the case of the territorial courts or non-existent in the case of the Imperial personnel. Each will undoubtedly stimulate much further investigation. The combination of both the Imperial and the territorial strands will significantly enhance our understanding of the early modern German state system.

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WOLFGANG BEHRINGER, *Im Zeichen des Merkur: Reichspost und Kommunikationsrevolution in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, 189 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), 861 pp. ISBN 3 525 35187 9. EUR 114.00

'The introduction of regular scheduled transport in Europe began in the late 1620s. The initiative came from France. . . . In 1683 a post coach network began to be developed in Electoral Saxony. . . . In 1686 the first coach went from Frankfurt via Würzburg to Nuremberg' (pp. 438, 450). What looks, at least on such evidence, like a belated representative of the factual–anecdotal 'old cultural history' of the late nineteenth century turns out to be a flagship of its current and entirely 'new' incarnation. *Im Zeichen des Merkur* is a 'big' book in every sense of the word: it covers almost 900 pages, dissects mountains of primary and secondary sources, presents masses of new data, and offers a string of weighty conclusions. To digest such a monumental piece of research requires considerable time and effort, but it is a worthwhile investment.

Educated at the universities of Munich and Bonn, Wolfgang Behringer obtained his first chair at York, but recently returned to German academia to succeed Richard van Dülmen as Professor of Early Modern History at Saarbrücken. He is best known in Britain for a number of seminal studies on the socio-economic context of the European witchhunt, but has a much broader track record. Previous publications range from *Der Traum des Fliegens*: *Zwischen Mythos und Technik* (1991) and *Shaman of Oberstdorf: Chonrad Stoeckhlin and the Phantoms of the Night* (German version 1994; English version 1998) to model company histories of the *Löwenbräu* and *Spaten* breweries in his native Bavaria.

Prompted by the ascendancy of the internet to investigate the emergence of earlier information networks, the author sets out to write a new history of pre-modern communications. His main interests are not so much senders, receivers, or contents, but the channels or media used to transport people and information. The primary focus of this book is the development of one particular organization, the German *Reichspost* (Imperial post), from the sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries, yet always with a view to its wider social and cultural implications. Behringer thus concentrates on the allegedly static era before the so-called 'acceleration' of history (Reinhard

Koselleck) conventionally associated with the modern age. The empirical basis for his argument consists of an entire 'ocean of sources' (p. 47). In addition to his core repository, the *Fürstliches Zentralarchiv Thurn und Taxis* in Regensburg, and numerous central and local archives throughout continental Europe, Behringer draws on a wide range of printed materials. Principal genres include charters, correspondence, and administrative records relating to the *Reichspost*, but also contemporary legal tracts (*Reichspublicistik*), atlases, travel literature, and guides. Furthermore, serial records such as station registers, timetables, and accounts allow a substantial amount of quantification.

After a first section dedicated to existing scholarship, research questions, and documentary evidence, the main argument is structured in three parts. The second section covers the origins and development of the *Reichspost*, from first traces just before 1500—and an initial emphasis on the transport of messages by post-riders—to the organization's official period of existence from 1597 to 1806 (the end of the old empire) and the gradual build-up of parallel/rival territorial services in the German principalities. The third section deals with subsequent innovations building on the new infrastructure, particularly the periodical press (a passage focusing on the early 1600s) and the establishment of *Fahrposten* (that is, stage coach facilities for passenger transport, particularly from the later seventeenth century). The fourth section offers an extensive summary of the early modern 'communication revolution', followed by a series of appendices, including a chronology, bibliography, lists of illustrations and a laudably detailed index. To facilitate geographical orientation—and as a special treat—readers are offered a thirty-three-page reproduction of the entire map of postal routes through the Holy Roman Empire as compiled by Johann Jacob von Bors and Franz Joseph Heger and published under the title *Neue und vollständige Postkarte durch ganz Deutschland* in 1764. By that date, the density of provision, for instance, around cities such as Strasburg and Augsburg in the southwest of the Empire, appears impressive indeed. Less fortunate is the choice of an author-date system for the footnotes, which turns the reading of this book into an orgy of page-turning between main text and bibliography, especially as the number of references verges on the excessive. The latter, no doubt, owes much to the book's origins as a German *Habilitation* or second doctorate.

Only a fraction of the many insights conveyed by the book can be sketched here. The second section identifies the first explicit reference to the term 'post' in the German lands in December 1490 among the records of Maximilian's Innsbruck administration (p. 59). Right from the start riders were under great time pressure as handover details had to be meticulously recorded. In contrast to earlier messenger lines, the new postal service—contracted out to the Italian Tassi dynasty—was much more systematically organized. Key principles such as the apportionment of space through fixed stations (*positae stationes*, the semantic roots of the term 'post') and the division of labour between riders allowed non-stop journeys from starting-point to destination. The existence of a dense network of inns and entrepreneurial publicans—happy to turn into postmasters—facilitated the establishment of the network, which Behringer compares to a modern 'franchising' system (p. 72). By the 1530s, two preconditions for a whole avalanche of subsequent transformations were in place: the service was regular and open to the public. Perceptions of time and space changed accordingly as administrative and commercial business became focused on the days of outgoing post, while travellers accepted significant detours and longer distances to benefit from safer roads with better infrastructure.

The emergence of a 'travel science' (*ars apodemica*) in the 1570s marks another milestone, as does the proliferation of travel aids and guides around 1600 (the author is a little vague about typological distinctions within this heterogeneous genre). Services expanded dramatically after the institutionalization of the *Reichspost* as an Imperial prerogative in 1597. Improvements owed much to the 'communication genius' Johannes von den Birghden († 1654), postmaster in Frankfurt, who pioneered the use of posters and timetables, but also to enhanced demand for up-to-date information during the Thirty Years War. From the late 1640s, German states like Electoral Brandenburg and Saxony—but not Bavaria—as well as the Swiss city republic of Berne, developed independent postal systems, a trend reinforced by the recognition of territorial sovereignty in the Peace of Westphalia. State formation and postal developments now evolved in close interaction. Legal and institutional tracts debated the constitutional implications of the new system, while post ordinances increasingly read like 'documents of the early Enlightenment' (p. 295). Services were to be based on general principles such as justice,

equality, and human dignity, with no special privileges for social élites.

The third section summarizes a series of seventeenth-century media revolutions. The emergence of the periodical press, which symbolized the victory of the 'new' (current affairs) over the 'old' (established knowledge, as recorded in books), depended directly on postal infrastructure. Behringer's meticulous survey of early news gathering, news 'agents', and news distribution leading to the 'invention' of the weekly newspaper (by the printer Johann Carolus of Strasburg in September 1605, p. 349) will be of great interest to communication historians. Periodicals nurtured more informed political discourse among their readers and thus the 'emergence of a public opinion in the modern sense' (p. 380). A few decades later, the European travel experience was equally transformed by the emergence of regular stage coach services (privately organized in England, but linked to the official postal networks in Germany). Behringer finds the earliest example in Kassel in 1649 (p. 442) and argues that the greater accessibility, reliability, and predictability of services democratized travel. This was a gradual process, however, as substantial areas remained without regular passenger transport until well into the eighteenth century. The final chapters feature new research on developments in cartography and road-building, fields in which France played a prominent role. By the end of the *ancien régime*, the Imperial post had evolved from a feudal institution into a provider of services with a distinctly 'modern' business mentality.

Despite the book's length, of course, the argument cannot be exhaustive. Behringer himself points to the genesis of the early franchising system, the intricacies of territorial post networks, the huge numbers of private transport facilities, and the systematic study of sources such as post visitation records as areas meriting further study. But what are the overall conclusions in the fourth section? They fall into three categories, relating to a) the specific achievements of the *Reichspost*; b) wider socio-cultural repercussions; and c) implications for current scholarly debates. With regard to the organization of postal services, Behringer emphasizes regularity, reliability, and growing speed (through apportionment of space) as fundamental innovations. What distinguished the Imperial service from postal systems in other civilizations was its private, commercial nature; what was new compared with medieval times was the principle of

general accessibility. In the second category of findings, the new infrastructure is credited with fostering basic components of 'western' mentality such as discipline, rationality, and equality (in terms of the treatment of customers) as well as new conceptualizations of space (reflected in maps and travel guides) and chronology (timetables demanding more exact measurements): 'Essential categories of modernity were thus created in the medium of the organized communications system' (p. 670). Furthermore, subsequent innovations such as the periodical press—associated in turn with a series of major repercussions—would have been unthinkable without the availability of regular channels of distribution. Thirdly, with regard to historiographical debates, Behringer proposes some major reassessments. The dating of key structural transformations, usually associated with the time of bourgeois ascendancy and industrialization, should be moved back into the *early* modern period, which deserves to be recognized as a distinct era of communication history. Between 1500 and 1800, but particularly in the course of the seventeenth century, Europe experienced a series of media revolutions culminating in an early modern 'communication revolution'. The roots of the political public sphere, in turn, should not be sought in élite milieux such as salons and coffee houses, but in the 'public accessibility' of communication services, with key changes occurring in the *earlier* rather than the later half of the early modern period (pp. 672, 681).

If the book is 'big', then so too are its celebrity targets. In addition to Jürgen Habermas's *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (German version 1962; English version 1989), Elisabeth L. Eisenstein's *Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (1983) receives censure for being too narrowly focused and unaware of the principal 'agent of change', that is, innovations in postal infrastructure. Postmodernists, too, are dismissed as 'unhelpful' when it comes to practical historical work (p. 25). At this point, perhaps, it should be said that Behringer does not suffer fools gladly. In an initially refreshing manner, he passes frank judgement on the works of fellow academics. After a while, however, the tone becomes a little irritating. Few scholars, among them Werner Sombart, pass muster, while countless others face scathing attacks. Some random examples may illustrate the point: 'The sections on communication systems in standard social and economic histories reveal a lack of any profound understanding of systematic connections, or contain a shameful number of errors (p.

26); '[The claim that early publishers never edited news] is complete-
ly untenable and is based—to put it bluntly—on inadequate source
criticism' (p. 369); 'At this point Habermas is extremely vague, and
one does not really know whether he is referring to the sixteenth cen-
tury, the early or the late seventeenth century ... For Habermas it all
seems to be the same anyway' (p. 435, n. 537); '[Foucault's influence
is evident] in the disappointing book by [Johannes] Burckhardt' (p.
643, n. 4); 'Recently the amnesia [of research] is assuming grotesque
forms' (p. 682, n. 183). Do we need such a litany of past under-
achievement? Behringer is so obviously going beyond existing schol-
arship that he could have let his research do the talking.

The German *Habilitation*, of which this book is an outstanding
example, has well known advantages and disadvantages. On the one
hand, it forces historians to develop expertise in more than one
field—something Behringer demonstrates almost beyond saturation
(the bibliography covers eighty-eight pages, including more than 'a
pinch of sociology, media theory, social anthropology, geography,
and psychology of perception', p. 25). On the other hand, there is an
implicit expectation that such works should be not merely good and
useful, but also exhaustive and revolutionary, with findings of
preferably global significance. Candidates—facing scrutiny by an
interdisciplinary faculty of eminent scholars—feel under pressure to
challenge paradigms, redirect scholarship, and stress the pioneering
nature of the conclusions they are defending (which explains some of
the point-scoring just reported). *Im Zeichen des Merkur* is no exception
to this rule: it claims that exciting things happened much earlier than
we all thought, and that the root causes of historical developments
were neither princes, intellectuals, armies, nor confessions, but the
good old post coaches so often overlooked in visits to traffic muse-
ums. This communication revolution, we are assured, was 'the moth-
er of all communication revolutions' (p. 42). Subsequent media
breakthroughs simply repeated its patterns.

Will such dramatic findings stand up? Do they not exaggerate the
technological and organizational roots of modernization? Behringer
steps on enough toes in this book to secure both publicity and inten-
sive debate of his conclusions, but he should be able to stand his
ground. The argument is well substantiated, particularly with regard
to the *Reichspost* proper, and the more general conclusions point in
the right direction. Habermas's concept of the public sphere, of

course, has long been the object of scholarly reassessment, with works such as Andreas Würgler's *Unruhen und Öffentlichkeit: Städtische und ländliche Protestbewegungen im 18. Jahrhundert* (1995) and David Zaret's *Origins of Democratic Culture: Printing, Petitions and the Public Sphere in Early Modern England* (2000) highlighting earlier and alternative sources of sustained public discourse. Furthermore, Behringer's emphasis on the desire for faster communications and changing spatial perceptions echoes other indications of the 'modernity' of pre-industrial Europe, for example, its highly developed commercial infrastructure, growing consumer power, and evidence for 'advanced' concepts such as leisure. While stressing the far-reaching implications of his research, the author (briefly) accepts that no one medium alone should be held responsible for fundamental change and that each needs to be contextualized as a 'social construct' (p. 23). The relative significance of the postal revolution compared with rival breakthroughs associated with printing, science, and military affairs remains to be decided, as does the question of how exactly other media fit into the picture presented here. Nevertheless, scholars will no doubt place much greater emphasis on communication infrastructure in future explanations of historical change.

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GEOFFREY WAWRO, *The Franco–Prussian War: The German Conquest of France 1870–1871* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), xvi + 327 pp. ISBN 0 521 58436 1. £25.00 ($35.00).

German historians who have become enthusiastic about the value of the 'new military history' may scratch their heads in bemusement on picking up *The Franco–Prussian War*. There are no new methodologies or terminological debates to be found in its pages, nor are there any really new interpretations of the conflict. This book is a straightforward military–political history of the war. It provides a solid overview of the unfolding events, with the emphasis very much on the major military encounters. It is also a clear reminder that military history still needs lively and well researched accounts of wars and campaigns. The appearance of the first major history in English of the Franco–Prussian war since Michael Howard's standard work, first published in 1961,[1] does, though, prompt the reader to compare the two volumes. Indeed, it is only when one refers back to Howard's study that the significance of Wawro's book becomes fully apparent.

The fact that military historians largely ignored this war in the second half of the twentieth century can be explained by the abundance of publications which appeared before 1914—indeed, Howard himself noted that a bibliography printed in 1898 listed some 7,000 titles.[2] But it is interesting that at the same time he admitted that his book, with the exception of 'a little documentary material in the *Archives de l'Armée* at Vincennes bearing upon French diplomatic and military preparations for the war, ... is based entirely upon printed sources'. Even more noteworthy is the further admission that he simply could not bring himself to look through the European military periodicals for the period from 1870 to 1914. He points out that had he sifted their contents, 'much important material would thereby have become available, and that this book is the poorer because my spirit quailed before the task'.[3]

Of course, this is not to suggest that there were somehow major deficiencies in Michael Howard's work. His book has, after all, remained the standard account in English for some forty odd years.

[1] Michael Howard, *The Franco–Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870–1871* (London, 1961).
[2] Ibid., p. vii.   [3] Ibid., pp. 457–8.

While his book is similar in a number of respects, what Wawro has done is to provide a history of the war which exploits to the full the available archive material. With consummate skill he has woven together diplomatic developments before and during the war, the decisions and motives of the key political and military figures on both sides, and military operations with detailed accounts of the fighting in the different battles. In doing so, he has employed not only published documents, diaries, and memoirs, but also material from the French Army and Navy archives at Vincennes, the *Haus-Hof- und Staatsarchiv* in Vienna, the military archives in Munich and Dresden, the US National Archives in Washington DC, and the National Archives/Public Record Office, Kew. Rather than trying to consult all the military journals, Wawro is content to make use—very effectively as it turns out—of the *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, which continually provides informed and balanced commentary by contemporary observers watching from the side-lines.

Of the twelve chapters in Wawro's book, the fourth to the eleventh concentrate on the advances and retreats, the manœuvring armies, and, of course, all the major battles. The build-up to the war is, none the less, very competently presented. The first chapter examines the causes of the war in twenty-five pages, making good use of diplomatic correspondence. The second compares the two contestants on the eve of the conflict, examining the relative strengths of the two armies, the effects of the most important military reforms, the general state of morale, the training, the tactics and the weaponry of both armies. This chapter demonstrates Wawro's ability to enliven already well known facts. In discussing the introduction of the French breech-loading rifle in 1866, he recounts a test in which the corpse of a middle-aged man was fired into from various ranges. Bones were smashed, veins and arteries crushed, while the exit wounds were considerably greater than the entry wounds. The bullets had cut straight through the body and two mattresses to which it had been attached, and had then bored themselves deep into a wall. Such information brings home the *Chassepot's* capabilities much better than the dry observation that it represented a significant improvement in infantry capabilities. The third chapter covers the mobilization of both armies.

With the exception of the twelfth and final chapter on the making of the peace, the remainder of the book contains an account of the

course of the operations and well executed portraits of all the major battles. The reader is taken from Wissembourg and Spicheren in August 1870 to Froeschwiller, Mars-la-Tour, and Sedan, then to the siege of Paris, the Battle of Le Mans, and the French capitulation. Part of the value of this book is that the movements of hundreds of thousands of troops are explained clearly, while the battles are brought to life through the diary and memoir material the author exploits. This material frequently brings out the truly horrible nature of the slaughter which took place on the majority of the battlefields.

In the description of the Battle of Wissembourg, the reader learns that the French troops firing the *mitrailleuse* did not traverse their fire across the battlefield; 'rather they tended to fix on a single man and pump thirty balls into him, leaving nothing behind but two shoes and stumps' (p. 99). At Froeschwiller a Bavarian captain observed a crazed, red-faced infantryman stamping through the woods hunting 'coloured' troops. When he found a wounded Algerian—the Germans thought that Algerian troops shot the wounded, or gouged out the eyes of prisoners—'the Bavarian would press the muzzle of his rifle against the man's head and blow his brains out' (pp. 130–1). There are frequent references to the appalling effects of artillery fire on the massed ranks of the infantry during a battle. The scenes on battlefields after the fighting had come to a close are also recounted. The day after Gravelotte, Prussian infantry spent the day burying their dead and transporting the wounded to makeshift hospitals. The work of filling mass graves with 9,000 decomposing corpses was indelibly branded on to the memories of those who had to carry out the task, one German officer recalling later: 'The battles, the shooting, the freezing winter bivouacs: all those things I've long since forgotten, but not the interment of the dead at St. Privat; that was so ghastly that it *still* wakes me in the middle of the night' (p. 186).

What is striking is that these and various other observations on the horrors of combat all have a remarkable twentieth-century ring to them. Their impact is increased by the illustrations—with the exception of three photographs, all from paintings and lithographs completed after the conflict and reflecting a largely 'heroic' view of the fighting—which contrast starkly with the descriptions presented by the participants. A reading of the book does in fact suggest that our historical perception of wars and mass killing is perhaps much more strongly influenced by visual images than we would like to believe.

In the hands of Wawro, the slaughter and destruction in 1870–71 suddenly does not seem so far from the First World War, the only difference being that the battles were over much more quickly and with fewer casualties. Yet in relation to the battle at Königgrätz only four years previously, the difference is dramatic.

The 'modernity' of the fighting is underscored by examples of the 'empty battlefield'. At Wissembourg on 4 August 1870, '[m]ost of the Bavarians and Prussians, hacking their way through the vineyards, recalled never even seeing the French; they merely heard them, and fired at their rifle flashes' (p. 100). And, despite their at times clumsy and bull-like tactics, the Prussians often prevailed quite simply because their artillery and its tactics were superior to those of the French. Indeed, despite all the tactical and operational mistakes French commanders made, it could be argued that victory went to the Germans merely because they had industrialized their arms production more effectively.

Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that, quite apart from their tactical inflexibility, if the French had a weaker strategic hand, they played it with breathtaking incompetence. Reading Wawro's book one is astonished once again by Marshal Achille Bazaine's bizarre behaviour, most notably while holed up in the fortress complex at Metz, which to-day still defies a satisfying—or, at the very least, rational—explanation. Yet Wawro also successfully banishes any illusions of overwhelming German military superiority or prowess. He makes clear, for example, that the first battlefield performances of Bavarian troops were not particularly impressive: equipment was discarded as they marched; there was little or no discipline under fire; they were unwilling to attack with the bayonet; and four or five infantrymen could often be observed assisting one wounded comrade towards the rear. And, even if the Prussians were more determined and dogged than their southern German allies, they often indulged in senseless frontal attacks.

In addition to its highly readable style, another merit of *The Franco–Prussian War* is that its author has managed to pack so much material into the 314 pages of text without ever slackening the pace of his narrative. There are several pages on the role of seapower in the war, as well as a number of references to German executions of anyone they suspected of *franc-tireur* activities. The looting and plunder carried out by the German troops as they marched through

France is not forgotten either. In addition to the illustrations, there are also thirteen maps.

The fact that a book on a war which now lies over 130 years in the past, and on which thousands of volumes have already been published, can reinvigorate and enhance our understanding of this conflict through a judicious use of archival and published contemporary material may seem a little surprising. However, a comparison of Wawro's book not only with Michael Howard's study but also with one of the last major German-language books to be published on the subject, an essay collection entitled *Entscheidung 1870*,[4] makes clear that Wawro has written not only an extremely good book, but one which will quickly take its place as the standard single-volume account. Military historians and doctoral students will certainly not want to dispense with Michael Howard's *Franco–Prussian War*, but university teachers will probably prefer to recommend Wawro's book to their undergraduates. Geoffrey Wawro is to be congratulated on his *Franco–Prussian War*. It deserves to be in the library of everyone interested in German, French, and European military history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

[4] Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), *Entscheidung 1870: Der deutsch–französische Krieg* (Stuttgart, 1970).

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PAUL JULIAN WEINDLING, *Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe 1890–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), xxi + 463 pp. ISBN 0 19 820691 7 £55.00

According to Francis Bacon, there are books that should be tasted, others that should be swallowed, and few that should be chewed and digested. These latter, one would like to add, are the ones that have had such a lasting impact on the state of our knowledge that they nourish any further thinking and writing on the subject. This applies more to Paul Weindling's book under review here than to almost any other study in the history of medicine published in recent decades. Weindling's truly fundamental work explains the basis of early twentieth-century medical thinking, shaped by notions of hygiene, which, elevated by the Nazis to the position of a leading science, provided the essential foundations of probably the greatest crime of the modern period. The Holocaust cannot be understood without taking into account the way of thinking of a discipline which so radically redefined the vocabulary of hygiene, fear of epidemics, extermination of parasites, and chemical-technical annihilation that they could easily be perverted not only into metaphors, but also into instruments of extermination, once German medicine had willingly opened itself to such a perversion.

The point of departure is the reaction, in both medical and health policy circles, to the threat of typhus epidemics on the eastern frontiers of the German Reich around the First World War. *Typhus exanthematicus*, more commonly known in Germany as *Fleckfieber*, was undoubtedly one of the most significant infectious diseases threatening and seriously affecting both armies in the field and occupying forces throughout all four years of the war, and especially in the east. Typhus, a typical wartime epidemic, is caused by the micro-organism *Rickettsia Prowazeki*, which can be transmitted between humans only by lice. The disease follows an acute course, is frequently lethal if untreated, but if survived, confers immunity.

The epidemiology of the disease was known at the beginning of the war. Initially, thinking followed the usual rational patterns of taking action against the parasite. The role of the louse was crucial, and the war within the war was still directed exclusively against it. Considerations of cultural and social anthropology were, to start with, largely marginal, although the boundaries were already

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porous, as references to 'Polish' and 'Russian' lice demonstrate, as though nationality could be ascribed to the creatures. The call for 'the focus of infection to be identified and destroyed' in accordance with the 'real purpose of quarantine' also attracts attention, although it could, perhaps, simply be a lack of linguistic clarity.

This is no longer the case with, to take just one example, Richard Otto (1872–1952), hygiene adviser in the east during the war, and thereafter *Geheimer Medizinalrat* and chief medical officer of the reserves in Berlin. Otto's war against typhus in the occupied east explicitly included the Jewish population, which he identified as the main carrier group. Otto saw the 'big cities with their large, poor, and dirty Jewish population' as the 'principal focus of the epidemic', and he stressed the 'racially' determined resistance of the Jewish population. 'In Poland, for example', he writes, 'only 6.4 per cent of the Jewish population who had the illness died, while among the general population, 13.4 per cent of those who developed the illness succumbed.' The Jewish population, therefore, along with prostitutes, prison inmates, and beggars attracted the special attention of the epidemic hygienist, from the point of view of prevention as well as health education. In addition to the usual epidemic hygiene measures, Otto's programme also included direct intervention in the cultural autonomy of the identified main focus of the infection, such as, for example, 'closing Jewish religious schools and houses of prayer'. Epidemic squads looked for sick people who had been hidden, and supervised delousing procedures, during which men and boys had all their hair removed, while women and girls generally had only their heads shaved. While living quarters were deloused, the people who lived there were transferred to quarantine stations.

If any resistance was encountered to these measures, those who were unwilling to comply were arrested and forcibly cleaned. 'Lists were kept of flats and people', Otto reports, 'who, after a first sanitation, were soon found to be dirty and infested with lice again. They were forcibly sanitized or deloused every week until a change was achieved.' 'Forced sanitations' of this sort were undertaken, for example, in Bialystok by the German and in Lublin by the Austro-Hungarian administrations. In Lithuania, Otto reports, between January and August 1918 'a total of 19,000 flats in 1,670 places was sanitized. In the process, about 3,500 people with typhus and suspected typhus were discovered, almost exclusively Jews. A good

6,000 people were placed in quarantine.' 'The more the impression was gained that the people concerned were clean, and were training other people to be clean, the more liberally were the restrictions on quarantine administered.' Weindling impressively demonstrates that behind such 'successes' lay education campaigns ranging from the ingratiating inclusion of the Jewish population as a 'clean people' to brutal forced delousing.

The campaign against typhus was classically perceived as a war against lice and a cleansing and disciplining of the—predominantly Jewish—civilian population (a radicalization of measures to combat the disease, directed against allegedly 'racially inferior' people; typhus as a 'Jewish sickness', as 'Jewish fever'). To these were added, in the case of Otto, a new level of perception, namely, an attempt to cure the disease using serum and chemicals, something which so far had been possible under laboratory conditions only in animal experiments. 'The discovery that guinea pigs and certain species of monkey were susceptible to infection with typhus', wrote Otto, 'allowed researchers significantly to expand our knowledge of the nature of the disease by means of experimental investigations even before the war.' The logical conclusion of this statement is not spelled out, but it is clear that Otto interpreted the world war as a continuation, on a gigantic scale, of animal experiments by the observation of human populations, and, as will become apparent, also by experiments on humans. Such experiments were conducted from 1917 and included protective inoculation and attempted therapy with serum derived from convalescents, which was administered to members of epidemic squads and POWs. No positive results, however, were achieved.

Yet the First World War merely opened up the scenario of annihilation which, under Nazi rule, was to culminate in the systematic genocide of the European Jews and other 'parasites', according to the metaphor used by the criminals. Zyklon-B, developed immediately after the First World War as a delousing agent and long prefigured during the war, was its chemical–technical instrument. Its aim was a radical cleansing and sanitation of the occupied areas in the Russian east within the context of the *Generalplan Ost* and the *Seuchenplan Ost*. Based on radical anti-Semitic thinking which held human beings in contempt, its outcome was systematic genocide. Weindling graphically demonstrates the path leading from the obliteration of the pathogen to the obliteration of the human vector, with all its dramat-

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ic consequences. In the process, the essential facets of the incomprehensible are soberly and factually reconstructed, making the reader shudder.

This book already ranks as one of Weindling's major works. It is meticulously researched in international archives, brilliantly written, and, after a long maturation process, makes an essential contribution to our understanding of the horror that has had such a lasting impact on our present. The Soviet Nobel Prize winner Mikhail Sholokov once remarked that speed is necessary for catching fleas, but not for writing books. Weindling has taken his time in producing this excellent work, and we should allow ourselves time, in Bacon's sense, to chew it thoroughly and digest it.

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The 1963 visit of US President John F. Kennedy to West Germany, and especially to West Berlin, was an exceptional moment in transatlantic diplomatic relations, even in the general history of diplomatic relations and political spectacle. To communicate the extraordinary nature of this diplomatic visit, its significance, its background, intent, and effect therefore requires a new kind of diplomatic history, and this is what Andreas Daum provides with *Kennedy in Berlin*. If, however, the moment examined was exceptional, one hopes that the methodology Daum deploys in this book will be more broadly used. In this study of transatlantic relations focusing on 'street politics, emotionalization, and theatricalization', the author draws on techniques that have recently proven effective in social historical studies from the history of everyday life to popular cultural history to history of emotion. The result is a wonderfully evocative study of a pivotal point in the history of West Germany and West Berlin, of the Cold War, and of West German–American relations.

Exploiting the same metaphor of a theatrical staging that his subjects themselves employed in setting up successive diplomatic visits, Daum offers the 'backdrop' to the shining spectacle of 23–26 June 1963: from the 1949 Air Lift and American General Lucius Clay's 1950 presentation of the Freedom Bell to hang in West Berlin's new city hall to the playing out of the early, 'old' Cold War scenario, that is, Dwight D. Eisenhower's and John Foster Dulles's interactions with Adenauer, and with West Berlin Mayors Ernst Reuter and Otto Suhr. We see likewise the spectre of Adenauer's and Charles de Gaulle's historic appearance at Reims Cathedral—emotionally fulfilling, but at the same time illustrative of the two veteran politicians' advancing age and stilted public style. Daum depicts for us, too, the more direct 'opening acts' of the 1963 spectacle: the 1961 visit of new US Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson, and the following year of John Kennedy's brother and Attorney General Robert Kennedy. We also see the competing staging of Khrushchev's visit to East Berlin, a pale imitation of John Kennedy's performance a few days earlier, and, finally, the replay of John Kennedy's visit through film, memory, and other means, after the president's assassination only five months

later. In each of these cases, Daum provides the range of subtexts, the webs of meanings, the intents of various politicians and interests, media and direct popular response alongside these various events, which all sought to draw from existing symbolisms and create new ones. As Daum demonstrates, Johnson's visit to West Berlin in 1961, only weeks after the erection of the Berlin Wall, was primarily to warn new West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt, who had visited the new president in the White House five months earlier. Brandt, Johnson admonished, had better quit his plaintive and embarrassing de-mands that the USA respond more forcefully and publicly to the erection of the Berlin Wall. Adenauer, in turn, hoped to use the occa-sion to jockey for position against Brandt for the new US president's ear. But what the public saw was the 'Johnson effect'—an 'electrify-ing' 'engineering of politics' that, if only symbolically, at least accom-plished what Brandt had demanded: attention to the significance of the Wall, evidence that West Berlin still held its vital place for Americans, even as the population now left the isolated 'half city' in droves. De Gaulle's carefully planned visit to West Germany of the following year could scarcely compete in popular reception with Robert Kennedy's visit to West Berlin, thereby signalizing from below the diminution of Adenauer's (Western) 'European' vision that sought to exclude the USA (and with it NATO) from the picture, politically, militarily, economically, culturally, and otherwise.

Thus Johnson's and Robert Kennedy's visits set the stage for John Kennedy's trip in summer 1963, a trip possibly more carefully script-ed and choreographed than any in political history, as Daum demon-strates. The densely overlaid symbolism of every planned stop, inter-action, communication, and stance spoke volumes about American and West German relations—indeed, far more than its planners could have dreamed, and often more than they wanted. From the beginning, audiences responded to the difference in relations between Kennedy and Adenauer on the one hand, and Kennedy and Brandt on the other. 'The Old One' appeared only more physically debilitated next to the young, handsome, and charismatic Kennedy, while Brandt seemed to glow in the reflected light, his characteristics far better matching those of the US president. While Adenauer exhib-ited discomfort with the sheer exuberance and mass of the extraordi-nary crowds in West Germany and all the more in West Berlin, as individuals hung from flag poles and trees, shouting 'Ken-Ne-Dy,'

Brandt and Kennedy were far more comfortable with this mass adulation. They seemed to drink it all in, if with some amazement, finding this perfect fulfilment of a principle of 'see and be seen'. Indeed, if Daum demonstrates that this was a transitional moment for West German politics, he might have emphasized still more explicitly what it meant for West Germans and West Berliners now to be 'allowed' to demonstrate such 'political emotion' as another aspect of 'overcoming' the Nazi past. The visit to the Free University, to Rathaus Schöneberg, and not least to the Ku'damm all reflected in positive fashion that West Berlin was an 'American' city. The visit to the Wall—one of stark emotion for the president himself—was complemented by a visit to the Plötzensee Memorial to victims of the failed July Plot against Hitler, making the well-played Cold War link between Nazi and DDR regimes.

But not all went as everyone had planned. Kennedy's emotionally saturated talk at Rathaus Schöneberg ran far from his scripted speech, expressing his horror at the East German regime at precisely the point at which Brandt had planned to try to normalize East–West relations, a precursor to his later *Ostpolitik*. This was an ironic turnabout of just two years earlier, when Brandt had felt the US leaders had failed to acknowledge the significance of the Wall. At the same time, to a far greater degree than could ever have been imagined, Kennedy convinced the West Berlin crowd—and, via live coverage, West Germans, and Americans—of the unbreakable bonds between America and West Berlin, of a *Vergemeinschaftung* that far transcended close diplomatic relations by any contemporary understanding. His utterance 'ich bin ein Berliner' (which Daum carefully parses historically in an excursus that suggests Kennedy's own role in the ungrammatical and charming conceit) reflected his identification, and those of Americans, with West Berliners, a rhetorical accomplishment that, though unmatched by any particular political acts, treaties, or policies, left West Berliners in a 'mass fantasy' of epic and lasting proportions.

It is certainly difficult at this point in history to imagine the joy of a population occupied by American forces on hearing of Americans' intent to stay with them and not desert them, but Daum makes this moment comprehensible at every level—for the moment at least. In certain respects, it remains difficult to understand why these few words, unaccompanied as they were by significant action, were per-

ceived to be as meaningful as they were, despite Daum's careful emotional excavation. Why did the figure of Kennedy himself draw a quasi-religious response, as the author describes in his account of 'Kennedy relics'? This is not particularly Daum's fault. It is not clear that historians have adequately accounted for Kennedy's 'star' status even among American audiences, beyond his handsome youth in an era of burgeoning youth culture. Daum gets closer than most others, including his mention of Kennedy as a symbol of hope. That West Berliners sought emblems of hope and optimism makes good sense, as does—and Daum might have discussed this further—West Berliners' and West Germans' own identification with Americans, their prosperity, and their then apparently successful and respected cultural and political hegemony. Both clearly reflected longtime German interests at some level. This study covers remarkable territory in compact form. It has been claimed in the last decade in some circles that diplomatic and formal political history has died a long, slow death. If Daum's exciting, colourful, and thought-provoking study is any indication of the subdiscipline's direction, then the death knells are a very long way off.

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CONFERENCE REPORTS

Political Cartoons as Historical Sources. Conference of the German Historical Institute London, held at the GHIL on 7–8 May 2004.

Historians like to use political cartoons. Cartoons seem able to sum up, illustrate, or comment on an argument, a historical event, or the spirit of a whole period better than any other type of source. This is why political cartoons often grace the pages of school textbooks, academic articles, and monographs, or are reproduced on the dust jackets of books, arousing the curiosity of potential readers. But what value do political cartoons have as an independent source, beyond their contribution as illustrations? Under what conditions are they collected, conserved, and displayed in museums and other institutions? What information can be gleaned from them in the context of historical research projects, and how can political cartoons be used in teaching? These were the questions addressed by a conference attended by scholars from a number of European countries and held at the German Historical Institute London on 7 and 8 May 2004. After a welcome by Hagen Schulze, Director of the GHIL, and a brief introduction by Matthias Reiss, who conceived and organized the conference, Sheila O'Connell (London) from the British Museum's Department of Prints and Drawings chaired the first session on 'Museums and Research Institutions'.

Anita O'Brien (London) from the Cartoon Art Trust Museum started by discussing the opportunities offered by, as well as the problems associated with, visiting an exhibition of political cartoons. As the director of a small, privately financed museum in the British capital, O'Brien emphasized the competition for people's free time offered by other activities, and the need to make a museum visit attractive. She suggested, among other things, providing visitors with the means to decipher cartoons for themselves, keeping exhibitions on a reasonable scale, not overloading the drawings with content, and presenting additional material from their historical context. In his paper, Hans Joachim Neyer (Hanover) admitted that the *Wilhelm-Busch-Museum – Deutsches Museum für Karikatur und kritische Grafik* profited from the limited leisure activities on offer in Hanover. Although the museum

he heads receives a public subsidy, as a private institution it is also financially dependent on the success of its exhibitions. According to Neyer, the aim of the museum is to entertain the public, not to educate it. His museum therefore treats cartoons not as documents, but as works of art, and the policy governing its collections and exhibitions concentrates on the artistic nature of the work. Lack of funds means that the Wilhelm Busch Museum, like the Cartoon Art Trust, depends on traditional means (catalogues, accompanying texts, text display boards, and guided tours) to provide the necessary background information. Antje Neuner-Warthorst (Freiburg) then reported on the planned exhibition of the work of Walter Trier.

While the Wilhelm Busch Museum hopes to make its holdings available online within the foreseeable future, the Centre for the Study of Cartoons and Caricature at the University of Kent in Canterbury already has 120,000 cartoons available on the internet to 16,500 registered users. According to Nicholas Hiley, the Centre's director, the entire collection will be accessible in this form within the next few years. He gave an accout of, among other things, the problem of copyright and the Centre's most recent project, digitalizing about 85,000 pages from nineteenth-century magazines (*Punch*, *Judy* etc.) in order to preserve the cartoons in their context. In the discussion that followed, Sheila O'Connell reported from the British Museum, Tim Benson (Hertfordshire) from the Political Cartoon Society, and Severin Heinisch (Krems) from the Austrian cartoon museum.

The session on 'Cartoons in Research Projects' was divided into two parts. In the first, chaired by Colin Seymour-Ure (Canterbury), Stefanie Schneider (Bochum) and Torsten Riotte (Cambridge and London) dealt with depictions of nations and countries. In her paper, 'Michel meets John and Jonathan: National Symbols in Nineteenth-Century Political Cartoons and the Study of International Relations', Schneider argued that recurrent themes in cartoons can provide information about mutual perceptions of nations, on which foreign policy decisions may be based. She illustrated this by reference to British and American cartoons about relations between Germany, Britain, and the USA in the nineteenth century, which expressed sentiments such as kinship, dislike, love, and friendship. Schneider concentrated especially on the presentation of nations as (male) national figures, (female) idealizations, or animals, and used examples to explore relations between these personifications.

Riotte, by contrast, in his paper entitled 'The Electorate of Han-
over in British Political Caricature, 1792–1815' concentrated on the
changing presentations of the Hanoverian horse. According to Riotte,
British cartoonists often used this to mark the differences between
British and Hanoverian interests, and to criticize the Crown's stake in
the Electorate. After the turn of the century, when the monarchy lost
its potential for controversy and became a vehicle for the develop-
ment of a national identity, the white horse disappeared from anti-
government cartoons. From now on, Hanover was identified in writ-
ing in the cartoons, and presented as a part of Britain, while George
III was transformed into the English national figure John Bull. Riotte
emphasized that both processes were closely linked with this partic-
ular king's character and destiny, and thus pointed to a connection
between art and the real world.

In the second part of this session, chaired by Ursula E. Koch
(Munich), Bernhard Fulda (Cambridge) and Janusz Kazmierczak
(Poznan) looked at Nazi and Stalinist cartoons. Fulda spoke on 'Hans
Schweitzer: A Cartoonist in the Weimar Republic'. Working under
the pseudonym of Mjölnir, Schweitzer, a close friend of Goebbels,
became the most important graphic artist of National Socialism. At
the same time, however, Schweitzer also worked for the Hugenberg
press, publishing as 'S', so that Fulda could describe him as the most
influential cartoonist of the Weimar Republic. Schweitzer's draw-
ings, Fulda said, varied according to which newspaper they were
intended for, but also had common features which he elucidated by
discussing many examples. Fulda finished by pointing out, among
other things, that including a large number of illustrations presents
an obstacle in the publishing of research results. This leads to a seri-
ous problem of communication for historians who, like Fulda him-
self, for example, work on the visual dimension of the Weimar peri-
od, asking how this dimension can be made accessible.

In his paper, 'Stalinist Cartooning: From Churchill's Cigar to Cul-
tural History', Kazmierczak analysed Polish newspapers from the
Stalinist period. As a theoretical model, he used the ideas which
Raymond Williams developed in *The Long Revolution* (1961) for the
analysis of cultures. Kazmierczak began by making a number of
observations on the role of cartoons in historical research and other
disciplines before discussing Poland's culture during the Stalinist
period in the context of relations between cartoons and other areas of

the Stalinist 'whole organization' (Williams). The speaker concentrated on the key categories put forward by Williams, such as, for example, 'selective tradition', the interplay between political and social history and cultural institutions, social character, and the 'structure of feeling'.

The following day, Harald Husemann (Osnabrück), Oliver Näpel (Münster), and Vic Gatrell (Essex) spoke in the session on 'The Use of Cartoons in Teaching', chaired by Dietrich Grünewald (Koblenz). Husemann emphasized the character of cartoons as a contemporary historical source which, in his view, is as authentic as diaries and letters. As statements that make a point, newspaper cartoons can initiate discussion in the classroom. However, Husemann suggested, they need to be collected and decoded in a textual context. Also necessary is a knowledge of the relevant iconology. Näpel also emphasized the value of cartoons for problem-orientated teaching, including drawings from Antiquity to the present day in his discussion. Like Husemann, he sees them as a means of investigating and making conscious images of Self and Other. In addition, working with cartoons encourages a critical engagement with sources and helps students to develop competence in handling the media. Thus in Näpel's view, their use in teaching is not only legitimate, but also necessary. Teachers, to be sure, must take account of how closely cartoons relate to their present and ensure, for example, that slanderous cartoons are recognized as such by students. The limited teaching time at German schools makes complex cartoons unsuitable, he suggested, while offensive cartoons and those with sexual contents are, in his experience, also inappropriate for use in schools.

Vic Gatrell had a number of the latter to offer because the eighteenth century, as he pointed out, did not cultivate 'polite humour'. Like Husemann, Gatrell began by describing how, via a number of detours, he arrived at the study of cartoons, for which he has never had any formal training. Gatrell also described cartoons as texts, but emphasized the artistic value of drawings from the early modern period, while he regards later newspaper cartoons as pale and boring by comparison. At a time when not so many pictures were available, these relatively expensive drawings were collected and treated as treasures. Today they offer historians information about politics, attitudes, manners, and many other areas. Gatrell then reported on the course, 'The Politics of Laughter: English Satirical Prints from Hogarth to Cruikshank', which he taught at Cambridge from 2000 to

2003. He emphasized the large amounts of extra reading which the students had had to do.

Each panel was followed by detailed and sometimes heated discussions. The first session was dominated by issues relating to copyright, digitalization, improving co-operation between institutions, and, above all, finance. Many institutions have to spend a considerable proportion of their time raising money. None the less, there is usually not enough money for educational projects, and sponsors are reluctant to provide funds for technical or structural improvements. Occasionally, the point of collecting and exhibiting cartoons in general is questioned, as Hiley, for example, was able to report from first-hand experience. The discussion following the session on research projects, by contrast, focused on other questions. Among the issues discussed were what limits there were on the value of cartoons as sources, and what sort of knowledge could be gained by studying them. Do cartoons merely reflect the *Zeitgeist*, or do they also shape it? A further point of discussion was the significance of biographical information about the cartoonists for an understanding of their work. Can high quality cartoons be created under a totalitarian regime? To what extent does the use of cartoons in research represent an obstacle to publication because of the costs involved, and how can this situation be overcome? The discussion following the session on teaching considered, among other things, whether including too many cartoons as 'historical junk food' trivializes history. At the same time, many points from previous discussions were taken up again, such as the connection between the media, mass market, and cartoons, the role of humour, the significance of chronology, and the problem that cartoons are often not recognized as an art form.

In his closing commentary Peter Catterall (London) summed up the aspects discussed throughout the conference and referred to the points which, in his opinion, had received too little attention. These included, for example, the question of what cartoons set out to achieve, and how one can find out more about their audience and their dissemination. However, it was not the aim of the conference to provide conclusive answers to these and other questions. Rather, its purpose was to highlight problems and gaps in the research, and to put established theories and methods to an expert audience for discussion. As there has not been a conference of this sort before, many of the participants met for the first time, and discussed opportunities

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for co-operation. It is to be hoped that these projects will contribute towards further establishing political cartoons as a historical source.

Matthias Reiss (GHIL)

Luxury and Integration: Material Court Culture in Western Europe, Twelfth to Eighteenth Centuries. International conference held by the German Historical Institute London in co-operation with the German Historical Institute Paris and the Free University of Berlin, with additional sponsorship by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung für Wissenschaftsförderung, at Cumberland Lodge, Windsor, 1–4 July 2004.

The aim of this conference was to examine the integration of power from a cultural historical perspective and to understand pomp at court—often criticized by contemporary observers—in terms of its function (prodigality as investment) and dysfunction (prodigality as waste) both inside and outside the particular political and social unit under consideration. The event took its title from Werner Sombart's *Luxus und Kapitalismus* (2nd edn., 1922); our common intention was to revisit the seemingly irrational with an eye to its sometimes unexpectedly rational consequences.

In Latin Christian Europe, the links that existed between royal, princely, and aristocratic courts furthered acculturation and cultural transfer from the end of late Antiquity onwards. For the medieval and early modern periods far-reaching effects can be observed, whether attributable to the exchange of envoys and gifts, travel, marital links, the acquisition of art, or to material compensation for services of all kinds (one term under which such forms of exchange may be subsumed is 'patronage' in its widest sense). It thus becomes possible to observe and describe culturally determined power strategies calculated to have an impact on the interior structure of the group in question as well as on its environment: court culture and the representation of wealth and power were essentially a means of achieving political integration through social integration.

Research on these areas has hitherto been somewhat heterogeneous in regard to both the particular subjects and periods under investigation, and the methods applied. We still lack comprehensive, interdisciplinary studies which explore the problem of integration through material culture in detail and analyse the extant sources closely enough to arrive at findings that can serve as the basis for synchronic and diachronic comparisons. With regard to the roles of permanent and ephemeral buildings, wages and pensions, clothing and jewellery, tapestries and pictures, books and instruments etc., and the ever increasing need for expenditure felt by those present at court,

we know more about the late medieval and early modern periods. Nevertheless, what has been missing so far even here is a perspective which allows us to deal with all these isolated aspects in the wider context of how power systems were maintained. In other words, it remains necessary to bridge the gap between the history of art and the history of power.

The aim of the conference was to 'take stock' regarding these questions and to encourage future co-operation in research on material culture, with 'power', 'service and compensation', 'consumption', 'gift culture', and 'the perception of the other' as themes of special interest. It is hoped that in the long run this will allow us to focus more on the lesser known level below that of political and diplomatic relations.

An innovative format was chosen for this conference (to good effect, as was commonly felt). It was divided into four sessions comprising between four and six speakers each. Instead of speakers presenting their papers themselves, however, the respective section chairs summarized and presented their findings. The speakers were then given an opportunity to clarify their positions both in direct response to these summaries and in the course of the ensuing general discussion (only in the first session was it necessary to revert to the traditional format because of the chair's last-minute cancellation). To give participants the opportunity to prepare for the discussions, all papers were made available through the GHIL's website before the conference.

In his introductory lecture, 'Hofkultur—Probleme und Perspektiven', Joachim Ehlers (Berlin) gave an overview of the state of knowledge about the position of the court in the political, social, cultural, and economic structure of the High Middle Ages. He emphasized the practical significance of the deliberate creation of a courtly milieu, identified shortcomings in previous research, and indicated directions that future research might take. The first session, 'Communal Action: Between Service, Feast, and Leisure', looked not only at how the elevated courtly way of life was organized, but also at how it was experienced. In his paper on 'Hofämter und Hofkultur an Fürstenhöfen des Hochmittelalters' Werner Rösener (Gießen) discussed the development and functionalization of court culture at a number of specific princely courts in the Holy Roman Empire during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, concentrating in particular on

court offices and court festivals. In the High Middle Ages, he summed up, this cultural form was concentrated on the person of the ruler and served primarily as a vehicle for his self-presentation and to increase his prestige among the circle of his social equals. In addition, the princely court and its cultural forms, which were shaped by the culture of the knights, served to bring together vassals and *Ministeriale* from different areas. The increased integration and centralization of rule to which this contributed compensated for the decentralized power structures of the High Middle Ages. Court offices served two main purposes: they could meet the practical needs of the court administration, or they could have representative functions. For a long time, the royal court provided the model for court organization and knightly cultural forms at the German princely courts of the High Middle Ages. By contrast, the Polish-Lithuanian elective monarchy, established in 1572, had only moderate financial resources and did not allow for a strong central power. Under these conditions, the election and coronation ceremonies at the beginning of each new reign, as well as the ceremonies surrounding the burial of the previous ruler, were of crucial importance and integrated the whole of society, as Almut Bues (Warsaw) emphasized in her paper, entitled 'Ie manque de couleurs & d'imagination pour y bien reüssir. The Integrative Power and Political Use of Festival in an Elective Monarchy: Poland-Lithuania in the Sixteenth Century'. The keeping of these ancient dynastic traditions served to give Poland-Lithuania's elective monarchy the fiction of legitimacy, continuity, and stability.

In her paper 'Les cours hors la cour: les manifestations du luxe aristocratique dans le royaume de Louis XIV', Katia Béguin (Paris) expressly opposed the 'Versaillo-centrism' which dominates French research on the court. She spoke about the residences of the high aristocracy that surrounded the royal court like satellites in the second half of the seventeenth century. These did not, she suggested, represent mere fall-back positions for a politically emasculated aristocracy. Although their presumed advantages over Versailles were celebrated, along with the wealth, taste, and creativity of the lord of the manor, with the assistance of a festive culture that was specific to these aristocratic seats, they did not express political opposition to the monarch. Rather, these were deliberate attempts to enhance the prestige of one's own residence in the eyes of a foreign and domestic public, in open competition with one's social equals. Wolfgang Wüst

(Erlangen-Nuremberg), however, speaking on 'Luxus oder Spar-zwang? Höfisches Leben im frühmodernen süddeutschen Kleinstaat: Ansbach-Bayreuth (Hohenzollern) und Augsburg-Dillingen (Bischöfe) im Vergleich', cast doubt on the notion that a luxurious lifestyle, enormous material expenditure, and the performance of complicated ceremonial were the only things furthering civilization. He put up for discussion the idea that a lack of luxury might sometimes have pro-duced integrative incentives. At the smaller and middling courts a shortage of resources and the associated pressures to be thrifty could reduce the social barriers between the court in the narrow sense—those who had free access to the ruler—and the court in the wider sense. Scholars so far, he suggested, have not taken enough account of improvisation at court which encouraged communication, or of co-operation between the residence, town, and country which con-served resources.

Forms of payment used within and between courts were the sub-ject of the second session: 'Between Dotation, Salary, Symbolic and Real Capital.' The virtue of generosity (*largesse*) was the thematic core of Frédérique Lachau's (Paris) paper on 'The Gift in the Culture of the Court, with Special Reference to England and France, Twelfth to Thirteenth Centuries'. Chronicles and courtly romances, but also the files produced by the English royal court administration provide insights into how this specifically courtly behavioural norm was translated into practice. Lachaud discussed the leitmotivs in the con-temporary normative discourse about gift-giving as social practice, demonstrated that they derived from the philosophical literature of Antiquity and the religious-didactic literature of the High Middle Ages, and emphasized, in conclusion, that courtly-secular writers and clerical authors held strongly contrasting views of the essence and the limits of *largesse*. In their paper entitled 'A Waste of Money? On the Social Function of Luxury Consumption', Ulf-Christian Ewert (Chemnitz) and Jan Hirschbiegel (Kiel) showed that the production of luxury, ostentatious consumption, and gift-giving at the late medieval court should be considered as profitable investments which allowed princes to establish and maintain a balanced social system of personal relationships enabling them to exert power. Furthermore, they argued that although efficient in maintaining the social order at court, luxury consumption was, in a sense, a rational but presumably non-efficient strategy with respect to competition for status and pres-

tige. In her paper on ' "Weder Fisch noch Fleisch" —wenn alle Gaben zwischen symbolischem und realem Kapital schwanken', Beatrix Bastl (Vienna) looked at the qualities of the specifically aristocratic belief system, and at the associated accumulation of symbolic and real capital. Attempts were made in the early modern period to create a balance between the economic power of the various aristocratic families through marriage contracts and wills in particular. Exclusively aesthetic or craft-based criteria alone cannot do justice to the state-sponsored art of the modern and Baroque periods, as Hans Ottomeyer (Berlin) pointed out in his paper, 'Bernstein und Politik— Staatsgeschenke des preußischen Hofes bis 1713'. In it he looked at the use of objects of art as diplomatic gifts in Prussia's contacts with Russia, Austria, Denmark, and France in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Amber was the most suitable material for a state gift intended to signal legitimate territorial claims. Only the Prussian monarch could own amber, and in legal terms it was directly linked with his sovereignty.

Anyone who wanted to achieve anything within the court system and initiated material transactions for this purpose had to find a balance between what was necessary and what was possible. One extreme consisted of all the normative expectations of the 'public', in particular, the 'selective, qualified public consisting of the men of power, without whom no prince could achieve anything' (Werner Paravicini). The other extreme consisted of the available material and cultural resources. In the third session, 'Expenditure: Between Economics and Honour', luxury and its intended effect were examined from the point of view of practical good sense. Traditionally, there has been more interest in the income of English kings of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries than in their expenditure. In 'The Kings of England and their Neighbours in the Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries', John Gillingham (Brighton) looked at the Crown's expenditure between the Norman Conquest and the early 1220s, with special emphasis on the second half of this period. In conclusion, he pointed out that while the English administrative files contain much information about royal expenditure, they reveal little about the tensions between economy and honour. Whether a ruler used his money wisely or wasted it was a matter of opinion, and a topic for contemporary comment. The maintenance of a lavish court alone was no guarantee of political success. In his paper on 'Luxus

und Verschwendung am päpstlichen Hof in Avignon und der Aus-
bruch des Großen Abendländischen Schismas', Stefan Weiß (Augs-
burg/Paris) looked at the background to the 1378 schism in terms of
the politics of finance (or rather, luxury). Weiß's main argument was
that Curial luxury had a destabilizing impact in the crisis of 1378. The
schism was not primarily the outcome of a fundamental conflict
about the Church constitution or about the Pope as an individual.
Rather, Weiß argued, it arose out of financial quarrels about whether,
and to what extent, the income of popes as well as cardinals should
be used to support a luxurious lifestyle. Futhermore, Weiß estab-
lished that at one level luxury could, in fact, be a force for integration.
Their lavish income and luxurious lifestyle allowed members of the
Curia and cardinals to enjoy relatively the best administration, jus-
tice, and diplomacy of their times. By contrast, luxury had a negative
impact at the level of Catholic Christianity to the extent that the legit-
imacy of the Curia was increasingly undermined.

Whereas in the papers by Gillingham and Weiß the ruler himself
was in the foreground, Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger's (Münster) contri-
bution on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 'Zur moralischen
Ökonomie des Schenkens bei Hofe', concentrated more on structures
and reciprocal relationships. She looked at handbooks of ceremonial,
advice given to envoys, and court diaries to see how contemporaries
classified gifts at court, what distinctions were made, what different
effects were ascribed to the various types of gift, what values, rules,
and behavioural norms were explicitly or implicitly associated with
them, and finally, whether significant changes can be detected in the
period under investigation. In her paper she distinguished between
two types of gift-giving relationship: the exchange of gifts between
the prince and his court, and gift-giving in diplomatic relations
between courts. In his paper, 'Der Preis des Erfolgs: Die Hofchargen
von Versailles zwischen Verschuldung und Patrimonialisierung
(1661–1789)', Leonhard Horowski (Berlin) looked at the material pre-
conditions for the acquisition of court offices under the *ancien régime*.
As in the preceding paper, structures were the main subject of inves-
tigation, and Horowski used specific case studies to illustrate them.
Unlike the two contributions on the Middle Ages in this session, the
examples used by Horowski related not to the ruler as an individual,
but to particular aristocratic office-holders at court. Horowski looked
especially at the specific features of the Versailles system, which dif-

fered from that of other countries and other periods in its system of proprietary office-holding and with regard to the relatively small number of court offices which, however, required a permanent presence and were appointments for life. This also reveals a tendency towards the patrimonial treatment of court offices, regarded almost as family property, with the result that the main roles in the system of court politics were always taken by the same few families.

Did luxury at court in fact make a successful contribution to integrating systems of rule? This was the main question addressed in the fourth and final session, 'Results: Power Systems between Success and Failure'. Caspar Ehlers (Göttingen) looked at the significance of material court culture for Germany's peripatetic kingship in the High Middle Ages in his paper: 'Procedens in magna gloria cum quadrigis plurimis auro argentoque onustis: Reisekönigtum und materielle Hofkultur im 12./13. Jahrhundert.' Dividing his paper into three parts devoted respectively to spaces for action (e.g. mobility v. immobility), the quality of actions (e.g. public v. private), and material court culture (e.g. moveable v. immoveable), Ehlers examined the conditions governing the development of material court culture and thus the chances of integration by means of courtly luxury. He established that the 'immaterial side of the material' was more important for a peripatetic kingship than for settled rulers, that the respective host had a strong influence, and, finally, that the role of the Church in the development of court culture should not be underestimated. In his contribution on 'Fürstliche Höfe im spätmittelalterlichen Reich zwischen Erfolg und Mißerfolg', Karl-Heinz Spieß (Greifswald) was able to establish, despite a dearth of sources and previous research, that gift-giving among princes (e.g. wedding clothes, silver dishes, portraits) enhanced the closed nature of their group, whereas aristocratic courtiers were as a rule paid in money and clothing. For the latter group, the social capital gained by being granted a mark of princely favour, such as inclusion in the local Order of Chivalry, or by physical proximity to the prince, was more important. The maintenance of the family line and the social 'quality' of those assembled at court ranked above material luxury in the princes' hierarchy of values. The princes were such a closed social group that material poverty always resulted in only a relative loss of significance that could be compensated for politically. Material court culture as a medium of integration was thus of limited importance.

Conference Reports

Malcolm Vale (Oxford), who included the Iberian as well as the English Middle Ages in his presentation on 'Power and its Representation in later Medieval Courts, Fourteenth to Fifteenth Centuries', argued that there was a continuity between the medieval and the early modern princely court. He thus clearly disagreed with such classics of the cultural history of the court as Burckhardt, Huizinga, Elias, and Maravall. On the basis of detailed discussions of court music, music performed at mealtimes at court, and table manners he demonstrated how civilized the demands of courtly society were as early as in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Thus he argued that the distinction between medieval household and Renaissance court was both artificial and inappropriate. The origins of the civilizing role of the court, he suggested, were already to be found among the Carolingians and Ottonians. However, Vale constantly referred to that fact that codes were drawn up not least because courts were anything but 'civilized'; they were also the setting for brutal violence. Nicolas Le Roux (Paris), speaking on 'Luxe et pouvoir en temps de crise: Dépenses et consommations à la cour des derniers Valois', explained that Henry III of France in particular tried to use courtly luxury as an instrument to strengthen the power of the Crown. As an exemplary microcosm, the court was intended to provide the framework for royal self-representation and the king, by repressing aristocratic patronage-brokering, was to appear as the sole source of all grace. To keep a brilliant court included providing lavish hospitality and gifts for the representatives of foreign powers, as well as holding court festivals designed to maintain a close connection between Crown and aristocracy.

Ronald Asch (Freiburg), speaking on 'Höfische Politik, monarchische Selbstdarstellung und politische Kultur in England im 17. Jahrhundert', concluded that in early modern England courtly extravagance had no noticeable success; from the start it was doubtful whether the English court at that time could be regarded as an instrument of political integration or even merely of monarchical self-representation. It was not really worth maintaining an extensive royal household when there was a shortage of money, Asch argued, because the English aristocracy was never politically, socially, and culturally as dependent on the royal court as was the case elsewhere. Luxury had an integrative effect only through cultural investment in works of art, ceremonies, spectacles, and festivals. Asch then investi-

gated its deliberate development for a particular purpose under Elisabeth I, James I, Charles I, and Charles II. Jeroen Duindam's (Utrecht) findings on size, ceremonial and everyday life, and power relations at the early modern courts of Versailles and Vienna suggested a negative answer to the question posed at the outset about the politically integrative effect of pomp at court. In his paper on 'Honorary Service, Family Networks, Power Systems at Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Courts, especially Bourbon and Habsburg', Duindam deconstructed a number of approaches and arguments in the older research on the court. Just as courts were not gilded cages for the aristocracy, monarchs were not always in a position to use ceremonial for political manipulation. Aristocrats were attracted to the court because court offices conferred prestige and chances for material gain. Duindam also queried the argument that a shift from personal to bureaucratic rule took place in the eighteenth century. Among other things, he pointed out, the system of factions and favourites continued to exist. Duindam's comparison of the courts of Vienna and Versailles concentrated on five points: high household offices, honorary offices, pensions, access to court life, and literary and artistic self-representations of the court. In his report on this session, Wolfgang Reinhard (Freiburg) pointed out that on the basis of these four papers, courtly luxury could be seen as having only modest, partial success as a medium of integration; it served the self-representation of the ruler and helped to ensure that the élites shared in the 'fruits of power'. The limited integrative function of courtly luxury consisted more in maintaining a state of integration than in creating one. Reinhard suggested that any latent or unintended effects of courtly luxury also need to be investigated.

In his conclusion, Werner Paravicini (Paris) reminded us of the question originally addressed by the conference and of the terminology and procedures used for the purpose. The findings, which differed considerably according to time and place, were presented in the context of twelve problem areas. Finally, suggestions for future research were made, from the problems posed by the sources to the difficulties of understanding princely power.

The intention is to publish the conference proceedings.

Karsten Ploeger (GHIL)

NOTICEBOARD

Research Seminar

The GHIL regularly organizes a research seminar at which recipients of grants from the Institute, Fellows of the GHIL, and other scholars report on the progress of their work. Any postgraduate or postdoctoral researchers who are interested in the subjects are welcome to attend. In general, the language of the papers and discussion is German.

The following papers will be given this term. Further meetings may also be arranged. Future dates will be announced on each occasion, and are available from the GHIL. For further information, contact Dr Dominik Geppert on 020 7309 2016. Please note that meetings begin promptly at 4 p.m.

2 Nov.   David Meeres
         Policing 'Wayward' Youth: Law, Society and Criminal Youths in Berlin, 1940–1952
16 Nov. Fabian Klose
         Menschenrechte und Dekolonisation: Universale Rechte im Schatten der Auflösung der europäischen Kolonialreiche
23 Nov. Anna-Maria Menge
         The Hindenburg Myth as a Political and Cultural Phenomenon of the First World War

As a matter of interest to readers, we record the following papers which were given before the publication date of this *Bulletin*.

19 Oct. Marc Hieronimus
         Krankheit und Tod 1918/19: Eine vergleichende Studie zum Umgang mit der Spanischen Grippe in Frankreich, England und dem Deutschen Reich
26 Oct. Frank Peter
         Vom Anti-Kolonialismus zum ethischen Islam? Eine Untersuchung des Wandels islamistischer Ideologien in Großbritannien am Beispiel der 'Islamic Foundation' in Leicester

Postgraduate Students' Conference

On 13–14 January 2005 the German Historical Institute London will hold its ninth annual conference for postgraduate research students in the UK and Ireland working on German history, Anglo–German relations, or comparative topics. The intention is to give Ph.D. students an opportunity to present their work in progress and to discuss it with other students working in the same field. It is hoped that the exchange of ideas and methods will be fruitful for all participants. The Institute will meet travel expenses up to a standard rail fare within the UK (special arrangements for students from Ireland), and also arrange and pay for student accommodation, when necessary, for those who live outside London. For further information please contact the Secretary on 020 7309 2023.

Demonstration Marches of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries in a Comparative Historical Perspective

This international colloquium, arranged by the German Historical Institute, will be held on 25 and 26 February 2005 at the Institute's premises.

Organized demonstrations have long been part of the established repertoire of political debate and the expression of will. Recognizing the significance of demonstrations, historians have in recent years increasingly looked at this form of political protest. The conference will build on their work. It will compare organized, large-scale demonstrations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and conclude with a panel discussion on protest in the twenty-first century. The full programme is availabe at: http://www.ghil.ac.uk/ConferenceReiss2.html If you are interested in participating, please contact Matthias Reiss at the GHIL: reiss@ghil.ac.uk

Noticeboard

Teaching World History

This conference, convened by Eckhardt Fuchs (University of Mannheim), Karen Oslund (German Historical Institute Washington), and Benedikt Stuchtey (German Historical Institute London), will be held at the GHI in Washington on 4–6 March 2005.

Over the past three decades, world history has become an acknowledged subdiscipline of history, especially in the USA where there are professorships in world history, and journals, scholarly organizations, and conferences devoted to it. In Europe, by contrast, with few exceptions historians have so far been reluctant to approach this topic so that, for example, world history plays only a marginal role within history curricula at universities.

'Teaching World History' is the third in a series of conferences that have been organized jointly by the German Historical Institutes in London and Washington. Proceedings of the two previous conferences have been published as *Across Cultural Borders: Historiography in Global Perspective* (2002), and *Writing World History, 1800–2000* (2003). The forthcoming conference will take an international comparative perspective and concentrate on problems that arise in teaching world history and writing its textbooks, developing teaching methods, defining its main topics, drawing up curricula, establishing the scholarly and political relevance of the subject, conceptualizing world history and its goals, and discussing questions of periodization.

For further information please contact Bärbel Thomas: B.Thomas@ghi-dc.org

Krieg und Frieden im kollektiven Bewußtsein: Das alte Europa 1900–1950

This international conference, organized by the German Historical Institute London, will be held at the Evangelische Akademie in Meißen from 31 March to 3 April 2005.

Recent political events have shown that war as a political device, and, indeed, in general linguistic usage, is by no means as discredited in Britain as it is on the Continent. The GHIL will investigate the reasons behind this phenomenon at an international conference which will examine public perceptions of the two world wars in Europe. Although the conference itself will be a closed event, the topic will also be the theme of a public panel discussion to be held at the Katholische Akademie in Dresden on the Saturday evening.

At the moment four sessions are envisaged: (1) An examination of the period before 1914. What was the purpose of the Hague Peace Conferences? Why did the outbreak of war in 1914 seem to have an uplifting effect—and was this really the case? (2) The period of coming to terms with the events of the war after 1918. Above all it will be asked here why there was a lack of intellectual demilitarization in Germany and Italy during this period. (3) The dialectic between, first, disillusionment with war and determination to go to war in Britain and, secondly, between systematic preparation for war and lack of enthusiasm for it in Germany in the run-up to the Second World War. (4) The final section will examine the various reactions to the Second World War amongst victors and vanquished. Why did the period between 1914 and 1945 so thoroughly discredit war as a political device in Europe, while at the same time facilitating the transition to the Cold War? Did the first half of the twentieth century in Europe bring about a fundamental change of consciousness in favour of institutional resolution of conflicts? All four sections will take account of the mood of the people, the Zeitgeist, rather than present a discussion of governmental politics.

For further information please contact: Professor Lothar Kettenacker: lkettenacker@ghil.ac.uk

Noticeboard

German History Society

The German History Society's next AGM will take place on 4 December 2004 at the German Historical Institute. The theme of the one-day conference is 'Authority and Resistance in German History'. Speakers will include Jane Caplan, Thomas Lindenberger, Michael Rowe, and Bernd Weisbrod.

The Fourth Annual German History Public Lecture will be given by Richard Overy on the nature of dictatorship with special reference to Hitler and Stalin. It will be held at University College London on 3 December at 7 p.m. For further information please contact Dr Mark Hewitson, Department of German, University College London (m.hewitson@ucl.ac.uk).

Lothar Kettenacker's Retirement

After more than thirty years at the German Historical Institute London, Professor Lothar Kettenacker, who has been the Institute's deputy director since 1975, retired at the end of June. In an address held at the farewell party and reproduced here in translation, Professor Hagen Schulze paid tribute to Lothar Kettenacker's services to the Institute.

I shall speak in German to bid our friend and colleague Lothar Kettenacker adieu. We should not take this for granted—really, I should address you in Bavarian on this occasion, my friend, in honour both of your Bavarian background and the world to which you are now returning. But if I did, the many non-Bavarians present would be perplexed—and so would I. So I will speak German, and others will speak in English, a *rite de passage* which is most appropriate for you, Herr Kettenacker. After all, since the mid-1960s you have lived in England as one of those German historians who valued the

freer atmosphere of British higher education above the security offered by the German university system—I am thinking, for example, also of Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann and Volker Berghahn. Your years of study at Oxford and Frankfurt, your familiarity even at that time with Anglo–German relations, your contacts with many British historians, in short, your great gift for seeing the German and the British worlds together, led you to the task which grew into your life's work: the founding and shaping of the German Historical Institute in London.

It all began very modestly. The German–British Group of Historians, whose aim was to establish a historical institute in the British capital, asked you to head a London base in 1971. In your own words, it was 'a small and inconspicuous office in Chancery Lane, the nucleus of what was later to become the Institute', and it consisted of just two rooms. It was tough work, repeatedly under threat by political and budgetary setbacks, and for a long time it was not clear whether the planned institute could really be established under these circumstances. Many distinguished British and German historians offered their support, from Geoffrey Dickens to Francis Carsten, from Gerhard A. Ritter to Erich Angermann. But in retrospect, we can say: without Kettenacker, no GHIL. The GHIL, the third German historical institute abroad after the prototypes set up in Rome and Paris, was finally officially inaugurated in 1976.

If the GHIL today enjoys an excellent academic reputation in Britain, Germany, and beyond, this is largely thanks to Lothar Kettenacker. Since 1976 it has been true that directors come and go, but the deputy director stays. He knows the Institute inside out, effortlessly navigates both the British and the German academic worlds, and prevents mistakes on the part of directors who, to some extent are—and perhaps have to be—dilettantes. In short, the deputy director is the calm at the eye of the storm. Lothar Kettenacker was responsible for conceiving and organizing conferences which attracted a great deal of attention, and not just among academics. I shall mention only the conference on the policy of appeasement in the 1930s, and the now legendary conference on the Nazi *Führerstaat*, held at Cumberland Lodge, which gave rise to a fundamental debate on the structure of the Nazi regime. A large number of his influential publications in both English and German, notable for their scholarship as much as for their elegance of style in both languages, also

enhanced the GHIL's reputation. In addition, Lothar Kettenacker long had responsibility for the Institute's publication series which, under his aegis, developed into a leading forum for German research on British history. He also became an expert much sought-after by the British and the German media when the historical peculiarities of either country needed explanation. His regular appearances on the BBC, and his recent contributions to the discussion of the *Bomben-krieg*, which publishers and journals solicited from him as an established expert, testify to this role.

Lothar Kettenacker also worked tirelessly for a lively exchange between the German and the British academic communities away from the large stages of academia and the media. He selected many generations of postgraduate and postdoctoral students to receive grants, and guided their first steps on the still unknown territory of British history. At the same time, he systematically developed the Institute's Library to become a central attraction for British historians and students of Germany. Without his selfless commitment at so many levels, Anglo–British co-operation in the area of academic and cultural exchange would be much poorer.

What will we do without Lothar Kettenacker? There is some comfort in the fact that his successor, Benedikt Stuchtey, is a colleague with an outstanding record of academic and administrative achievement. As each of us knows, working with him is a pleasure. And after all, who knows better than historians that turning points are not always quite what they seem. Lothar Kettenacker will undoubtedly call in now and then, and we are already looking forward to his visits. But for the Institute, its staff, and its director, not meeting Lothar Kettenacker in the corridors almost every day, not being able to seek his advice or talk about what is new on the Anglo–German scene will be a great loss. Without you, Herr Kettenacker, the Institute will be a very different place. But for a long time to come, we will see 17 Bloomsbury Square as an Anglo–German *lieu de mémoire*, whose significance is closely intertwined with Lothar Kettenacker.

New Deputy Director

On 1 July 2004 Dr Benedikt Stuchtey was appointed deputy director of the German Historical Institute London. He studied in Münster, Freiburg, and Trinity College Dublin. Currently he is preparing a major study of anti-colonialism in the twentieth century in a comparative perspective. Among his publications are *W.E.H. Lecky (1838–1903): Historisches Denken und politisches Urteilen eines anglo-irischen Gelehrten* (1997), and he has edited (with Peter Wende) *British and German Historiography, 1750–1950: Traditions, Perceptions, and Transfers* (2000), (with Eckhardt Fuchs), *Across Cultural Borders: Historiography in Global Perspective* (2002), *Writing World History, 1800–2000* (2003), and *Science across the European Empires, 1800–1950* (forthcoming 2005). He was a member of the editorial committee of *European Review of History. Revue Européenne d'Histoire* (1993–2004), and from 1997 to 2004 was also editor of the *Bulletin of the GHIL*. Since 2002 he has been a member of the editorial board of *Storia della Storiografia. History of Historiography*.

Wolfgang J. Mommsen
5 November 1930–11 August 2004

Wolfgang Mommsen, a formidable intellectual, a dynamic player in the field of academic politics, and probably the best-known German historian in the Anglo-Saxon world, has died of a heart attack while swimming in the Baltic Sea off the island of Usedom at the age of 73. This was the tragic and abrupt ending of a glittering academic career which had been guided throughout by the inspiring figure of the sociologist Max Weber, and set on track by his teacher at the University of Cologne, the outstanding historian Theodor Schieder.

Like Weber and Schieder, Mommsen developed into a scholar distinguished by liberality, an unusually wide horizon, and an amazing array of interests which is mirrored in the impressive range and quantity of his published work. Mommsen wrote on modern German and British history, on European imperialism, the history of ideas, the work and politics of Max Weber, on problems of theory and

methodology, and historiography. More recently, he had discovered the somewhat hazy field of cultural history, and had become immersed in the preparation of a modern Max Weber edition. The fact that this huge and difficult project is now progressing steadily is essentially due to Mommsen's unflagging energy, ingenuity, and perseverance. Never in his life did he shy away from a real challenge, and never since his student days at Marburg, Cologne, and Leeds did he miss a chance to intervene in a scholarly or, indeed, political debate. No matter what the subject on the agenda, Mommsen was always able to enliven a discussion and make his point, either with momentous arguments or witty asides. In scholarly or public debate Mommsen was perhaps at his best, possessing a quick wit and sharp mind, a combative temperament and, at times, unconventional views and manners. Some of his colleagues might frown at his unconcealed enjoyment of controversy and rhetoric, but audiences in Germany and abroad, and particularly his many devoted students, appreciated it. Mommsen had enormous flair, and he could convey the impression that academic scholarship and intellectual brilliance are not necessarily restricted to libraries, archives, and learned meetings. On the contrary, sprinkled with some cosmopolitanism and provocation as was Mommsen's way, he was able to demonstrate that a scholar's views can intrigue a wider public and give it the idea that they can have an influence on everyone's life and thinking.

After reading history, politics, philosophy, and art history in Marburg, where he was born as the son of the historian Wilhelm Mommsen, and Cologne, Mommsen spent the academic year 1958/59 at the University of Leeds on a British Council scholarship and a short spell as visiting assistant professor at Cornell University in 1961. Back in Cologne he worked with Theodor Schieder and prepared his *Habilitation* (1967) until he was appointed to a chair of Medieval and Modern History at the new University of Düsseldorf in 1968. He retained this position until his retirement in 1996.

Soon after being appointed to that university Mommsen became passionately involved in the plans of a small group of German and British historians and archivists who aimed to establish a German Historical Institute in London on the model of the older ones in Rome and Paris. When the London Institute was eventually founded in April 1976 under the interim director Paul Kluke, not much persuasion was needed to lure Mommsen to London to become the

Institute's first full-time director. He stayed there from August 1977 to July 1985. However, a third term of a further two or three years, which Mommsen himself would have welcomed, contravened the rules of the Institute. Nevertheless, Mommsen has to be considered the founding father of the Institute. He developed its structure and various activities, put its financial framework on a firm footing, invited numerous guest speakers, organized international conferences and workshops, set in motion a constant stream of publications and, certainly not his least success, persuaded the Volkswagen Foundation to acquire the magnificent building on the corner of Great Russell Street and Bloomsbury Square which has housed the Institute since 1982. In short, Mommsen provided intellectual leadership in quite an exceptional way—as a prolific scholar, an innovative director, and indefatigable speaker on many occasions and at various places all over the United Kingdom and Ireland. His extraordinary achievements during his term of office still shape the Institute today. To everyone who met Mommsen in those exciting years of a rapidly expanding Institute it was immediately obvious that he enjoyed his job and, even more so, loved the country in which he had the good fortune to live and work. In his own words, the years in London were, in many respects, 'my best time'. Supported by his wife Sabine he was a great host. Both were bridge-builders in the true sense of the word. They left London in 1985 much to the regret of their many friends in this country.

On his return to Germany, new challenges, not always pleasant ones, waited for Mommsen. Apart from his academic teaching in Düsseldorf, he travelled extensively and lectured at universities and research institutes overseas. His trips to Britain, where he never ceased to be popular, were frequent and for him always a sort of coming home. His literary output now concentrated increasingly on the ill-fated history of Imperial Germany, its society, politics, and culture. His book, *1848: Die ungewollte Revolution* (1998) celebrated Germany's first efforts to create a parliamentary democracy and a modern nation-state. From 1988 to 1992, in the critical years of German unification, he was honoured by being elected President of the Association of German Historians. In this capacity, he engaged, with tact and prudence, in the evaluation and integration, if at all possible, of former GDR historians into the academic life of united Germany.

Mommsen was by no means an easy man to work with. Opportunism was not his cup of tea. To the members of the Institute

he was a demanding boss who hated negligence and time-wasting. Occasionally he seemed arrogant and aloof. He had his rows, of course, and could give younger researchers at the Institute a rough time indeed. However, Mommsen never bore a grudge, and he showed a big heart and unlimited compassion whenever anyone was in trouble. Undoubtedly, there were people who found his temperament and restlessness strenuous and his eloquence overpowering. But hardly anyone could ignore the attractive sides of his outstanding personality—his remarkable resolution in pursuing his scholarly ambitions, his defiance *vis-à-vis* bureaucratic obstinacy, his magnanimity in supporting students and young colleagues, and his inexhaustible goodwill generously offered to anyone who sought his advice or help. Wolfgang Mommsen was certainly respected by everyone who had a chance to meet him. And even more than that: he was admired and loved by many.

Peter Alter

LIBRARY NEWS

Timothy Reuter Library

In 2003 the library received one of the largest bequests in its history. After the premature death of Professor Timothy Reuter (1947–2002) his wife Georgina donated his entire scholarly library to the Institute.

Timothy Reuter was one of the most influential historians of medieval Europe in the United Kingdom. Born in England into a family with strong German links (his grand-father Ernst was a famous Mayor of Berlin after the Second World War), he started his distinguished career at the University of Exeter where he taught for ten years before joining the Monumenta Germaniae Historica, the well-known medieval research institute in Munich, in the early 1980s. During his time in Munich he not only published (with Gabriel Silagi) a five-volume concordance to the *Decretum Gratianum*, but also pioneered the use of computers in editing medieval texts. In 1994 he returned to England to take up the chair of medieval history at the University of Southampton.

Concentrating his research on the early and high Middle Ages Timothy Reuter published extensively on German and English political and ecclesiastical history, the social history of warfare, the modern historiography of medieval Europe, bishops and bishoprics, and the nobility and ritual. He edited the third volume of the *New Cambridge Medieval History* (1999) and wrote the standard text book on *Germany in the Early Middle Ages* (1991). Passionate about making medieval texts available to modern readers, he translated *The Annals of Fulda* and was one of the general editors of *Oxford Medieval Texts*. He also undertook to translate publications by German medieval historians into English, thus establishing himself as a crucial communicator between both scholarly communities.

Already during his student days at the universities of Cambridge and Oxford and a stay at the Institut für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung in Vienna in the late 1960s he started collecting books on his chosen subjects. Over the years he assembled a library which must have been one of the best private libraries on medieval history

in England. It was a stroke of luck for the Institute that its library was chosen as the final destination for the books.

Of the almost 2,000 volumes in the Reuter collection, about 1,400 have been included in the GHI Library. They cover all important aspects of the history of the early and high Middle Ages, be they political, constitutional, economic, social, cultural, or religious. There are books on feudalism, the crusades, monasticism, the Vikings, medieval towns and villages, princely government, warfare, the world of learning, book illumination, and medieval records. German and English history are equally well represented. In addition, studies on the history of France and the Papacy as well as—to a smaller degree—Spain, the city republics of Italy, Scandinavia, and the Eastern European territories are to be found, demonstrating the wide range of Timothy Reuter's interests.

Although classical studies such as Percy Ernst Schramm's *Kaiser, Rom und Renovatio*, Karl Hampe's *Herrschergestalten des deutschen Mittelalters*, and Julius Ficker's *Forschungen zur Reichs- und Rechtsgeschichte Italiens* form an important part of the bequest, the largest section consists of modern scholarly works, giving an almost complete overview of the most important trends in medieval historiography over the last thirty years, including questions of methodology and—especially postmodern—theory. Furthermore, special collections within the library mirror Timothy Reuter's main areas of research: a series of studies on the world of Wibald of Stavelot, the twelfth-century abbot of the monastery of Stavelot and Corvey, whose letter-book he was preparing for publication, and a number of books on the application of computers to the study of the past are cases in point. At the core of the collection, however, is a wide range of sources in the original Latin as well as in English and German translations. A long series of *Oxford Medieval Texts* and countless editions of imperial, papal, or princely diplomas, annals, chronicles, letters, and necrologs published by the Monumenta Germaniae Historica figure prominently among the bequest.

Thanks to the donation of Timothy Reuter's collection the Institute now possesses an excellent reference library on medieval European history. It is to be hoped that scholars will make use of the books as Timothy Reuter would have wished.

Michael Schaich (GHIL)

Recent Acquisitions

This list contains a selection of recent publications in German and English, primarily on German history, acquired by the Library of the GHIL in the past year.

Aldenhoff-Hübinger, Rita, *Agrarpolitik und Protektionismus: Deutschland und Frankreich im Vergleich 1879–1914*, Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, 155 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002)

Allen, Mitchell and Michael Hughes (eds.), *German Parliamentary Debates, 1848–1933*, Studies in Modern European History, 42 (New York: Lang, 2003)

Angelike, Karin, *Louis-Francois Mettra: Ein französischer Zeitungsverleger in Köln (1770–1800)*, Rheinisches Archiv, 145 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2002)

Aretin, Karl Otmar von, *Franckenstein: Eine politische Karriere zwischen Bismarck und Ludwig II.* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2003)

Arsenschek, Robert, *Der Kampf um die Wahlfreiheit im Kaiserreich: Zur parlamentarischen Wahlprüfung und politischen Realität der Reichstagswahlen 1871–1914*, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, 136 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2003)

Badura, Peter and Horst Dreier (eds.), *Festschrift 50 Jahre Bundesverfassungsgericht*, 2 vols. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001)

Barck, Simone and Inge Münz-Koenen with the assistance of Gabriele Gast (eds.), *Im Dialog mit Werner Mittenzwei: Beiträge und Materialien zu einer Kulturgeschichte der DDR*, Abhandlungen der Leibniz-Sozietät, 3 (Berlin: Trafo Verlag, 2002)

Baring, Arnulf, *Kanzler, Krisen, Koalitionen* (Berlin: Siedler, 2002)

Bauer, Theresia, *Blockpartei und Agrarrevolution von oben: Die Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutschlands 1948–1963*, Studien zur Zeitgeschichte, 64 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003)

Bauerkämper, Arnd (ed.), *Britain and the GDR: Relations and Perceptions in a Divided World*, Veröffentlichungen Arbeitskreis Deutsche England-Forschung, 48 (Berlin: Philo Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002)

Beales, Derek, *Prosperity and Plunder: European Catholic Monasteries in the Age of Revolution, 1650–1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

Becher, Matthias, *Charlemagne*, trans. David S. Bachrach (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003)

Becker, Winfried, Günter Buchstab, *et al.* (eds.), *Lexikon der Christlichen Demokratie in Deutschland* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002)

Behrens, Alexander, *Johannes R. Becher: Eine politische Biographie* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2003)

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