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SEMINARS AT THE GHIL AUTUMN 2005

- 4 Oct. **PROFESSOR JOACHIM EHLERS (FU Berlin)**
The Medieval Roman Empire and the National Monarchies
Joachim Ehlers was Professor of Medieval History at the Free University of Berlin until his retirement in 2001. His research interests cover the early and high Middle Ages in Europe, the history of France, and comparative European social and intellectual history. He has authored and edited numerous publications, including *Deutschland und der Westen Europas im Mittelalter* (2002) and *Das westliche Europa* (2004).
- 11 Oct. **PROFESSOR ALEIDA ASSMANN (Constance)**
Limits of Understanding: Generational Identities in Recent German Family Novels
Aleida Assmann has been Professor of English Literature and Literary Theory at the University of Constance since 1993. She has researched and published in the fields of history of media, literary anthropology, and cultural memory. Recent publications are *Erinnerungsräume: Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses* (2003) and *Positionen der Kulturanthropologie* (2004).
- 18 Oct. **PROFESSOR PAUL NOLTE (FU Berlin)**
The Public and the Private: Changes and Challenges in Twentieth-Century Germany
Paul Nolte has been Professor of Modern History and International Contemporary History at the Free University of Berlin since July 2005. His major research interests are German social history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, German intellectual history, American social and cultural history, and the theory of history and historiography. Among his most recent publications is *Generation Reform – Jenseits der blockierten Republik* (2004).

(cont.)

Seminars

6 Dec. **PROFESSOR ANDREAS GESTRICH (Trier)**
The Dignity of the Poor: Historical Reflections on a Modern Concept

Andreas Gestrich has been Professor of Modern History at the University of Trier since 1997. His research interests range from the social history of childhood, youth, and family, historical socialization research, anthropology, and peace research to the history of the media, the social history of religion, migration research, and the history of poverty. Andreas Gestrich heads the *Sonderforschungsbereich* 'Fremdheit und Armut', and is the author or editor of many publications, including *Inklusion / Exklusion: Studien zu Fremdheit und Armut von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart* (2004).

Seminars are held at 5 p.m. in the Seminar Room of the GHIL.
Tea is served from 4.30 p.m. in the Common Room, and wine is available after the seminars.

THE 2005 ANNUAL LECTURE

Europe, the West, and the 'Civilizing Mission'

will be given by

PROFESSOR JÜRGEN OSTERHAMMEL
University of Constance

on Friday, 11 November, at 5 p.m.
at the German Historical Institute.

SPEAKING OF EUROPE

*THE SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT AND THE EUROPEAN IDEA OF FREEDOM**

by Bronislaw Geremek

In 2005, after the historic expansion of the European Union on 1 May 2004, and amidst debates on its further enlargement, Europe is more than ever before seeking to define its identity. This question of identity cannot be answered simply in terms of geographical borders; that would mean referring to quite arbitrary judgements.

In the eighteenth century, the tsar commanded Vasily Nikitich Tatishchev (1686–1750), his court geographer, to map the boundary between the European and Asian parts of the Russian empire. Tatishchev drew the demarcation line in the Urals, establishing that natural barrier as Europe's eastern border. What Tatishchev of our times could rise to the task of defining today's boundaries? The maps spread out on tables that were a staple feature of great international conferences and the decisive role of geographical consultations are a thing of the past (the Dayton Peace Conference of 2000 relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina is the exception that proves the rule). The European Commission in Brussels does not, as far as I know, have its court geographer, and therefore it is obvious that Europe can be defined much more in terms of axiology than geography. This European axiology seems to concern first and foremost our vision of the future, but it is also inseparably linked with the history of European civilization in the course of which a core of shared values and a shared collective European memory were formed. I see this 'shared European memory'—a concept which I consider to be of great significance—more as an objective to be achieved than as the description of a current reality. For the terms 'Europeans' and 'European citizenship' to become meaningful, it is not enough to

* This lecture, the third in the German Historical Institute's series Speaking of Europe, was given on 22 April 2005 at the Institute of Directors, London.

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refer only to ethnic issues or legal conditions. It is also necessary to become aware of the processes and events that have shaped Europe. The story of Europe must be told, the story of its creative spirit, its idea of the rule of law, its dedication to values, and especially of the European affirmation of liberty. It is a long story, which began in the Middle Ages with the abolition of serfdom and the establishment of cities, and which continues, with its ups and downs, until the present day. In this history 1989, the year which brought the end of the division of Europe, of the Cold War, and of the Berlin Wall, has a special place. It was Poland that launched that wonderful awakening of liberty. That is what I would like to speak of here, in the firm belief that remembrance of that *annus mirabilis* should constitute a key component of a shared European memory.

During Prague's Velvet Revolution in the autumn of 1989, a slogan that was meant to hearten the people appeared on posters and walls. It said: 'Poland—ten years, Hungary—ten months, German Democratic Republic—ten weeks, Czechoslovakia—ten days.' I fully understand the pride that my friends in Prague conveyed with that slogan, but I would like to point out that Central Europe's road to freedom, what we like to call our return to Europe, was actually a long march, punctuated by the Berlin events of 1953, the revolts in Poznan in June 1956 and in Budapest in October of that same year, the quashed hopes of the Prague Spring in 1968, and the mass strikes in Poland in 1970, 1976, and 1980. These historical episodes and this movement cannot be spoken of as merely 'dissident' activity, which in the mighty Soviet empire expressed a desperate opposition to the Communist regime, because both the Budapest uprising, and the Prague struggle for 'socialism with a human face' were backed by political plans and designs. But the series of revolts in Poland in particular was marked by that distinct striving for the self-organization of a civic society, if not in opposition to the Communist regime, then at any rate outside its framework and its structures. The Gdansk strikes and the birth of Solidarity a quarter of a century ago fully expressed this non-violent struggle for bread and freedom.

Yet again, it was the workers who rose up against a regime that supposedly represented the working class, and against the country's ruling party, which called itself a workers' party. On 14 August 1980, the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk went on strike, soon followed by Poland's other shipyards. Lech Walesa, a young worker who had

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been involved with the illegal opposition movement for several years, became the leader of the strike. The direct reasons for the work stoppage were economic, but the Twenty-One Demands presented by the Inter-Factory Strike Committee to the Polish government included legalization of trade unions, the right to strike, freedom of speech, and the introduction of economic reforms. This movement of solidarity initially spread along the Baltic coast, and then throughout the entire country. Farmers provided the workers locked up in the shipyards with food; the intelligentsia offered moral support. The workers, whom Marx had described as having no fatherland, became the advocates of the national cause, taking up the then-popular song, 'Let Poland be Poland'. The call for solidarity was not a call to arms, proposing, in place of the class struggle promoted by official ideology, the solidarity of a nation thirsting for freedom, the solidarity of men and women of all classes, and the solidarity of the defenceless against the power of the police, the army, and the Soviet forces stationed in Poland. On the huge front gate of the striking Gdansk shipyard, directly above the sign that said Lenin Shipyard, the workers hung a picture of Pope John Paul II. One year earlier, at a huge mass rally in the centre of Warsaw, the Polish Pope had spoken the famous words 'Be not afraid', which resonated so strongly with his countrymen.

I will not recount the entire epic of the Polish August of 1980 here. The films of Andrzej Wajda, books like Timothy Garton Ash's *The Polish Revolution*,¹ leaflets, and song lyrics tell the story better than I ever could. But I would like to share my memories of those ten days I spent in the Gdansk shipyard, of the unforgettable atmosphere of freedom, and the joy of regained liberty. Twenty-five years later I found the same moral climate, the same spontaneity, courage, and determination in Kiev, among the Ukrainians gathered in the now famous Independence Square. Perhaps the answer to the question about the boundaries of Europe is that they are demarcated by this love of freedom and respect for human dignity.

On 31 August 1980, in Gdansk, an agreement was signed between the workers and the government. This was an unprecedented pact between the Communist regime and the people that made it possible

¹ Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, 1980-82* (London, 1983).

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to establish a trade union with 10 million members. As a result, for 500 days, Poland was the only country in the Soviet bloc in which private ownership of land was restored and the Catholic Church was the dominant spiritual authority, and which also had an organized civil society. On 13 December 1981 the government imposed martial law – aimed against its own citizens. The Soviet plan to suppress the movement for freedom was thus implemented by Polish hands, at the cost of tens of people killed and tens of thousands interned, jailed, and persecuted.

Encoded within that movement born in Poland was information about the true nature of the Communist system, and about the strength of the resistance to it. Since the August strikes Western journalists had remained in Poland, informing not just the public of their own countries, but also Poles – through Radio Free Europe ('Who let in the journalists?!' party dignitaries famously asked). Some European politicians accepted the imposition of martial law as unavoidable, a solution that made it possible to avoid open conflict between East and West. The reaction of a certain minister of foreign affairs – 'we shall, of course, do nothing' – reflected the attitude of many European governments. European public opinion, however, was affected by events in Poland and expressed support for the Poles: the distinctive Solidarity badge created a truly European public space. And it was the same throughout the 'other Europe', from the Urals to the shores of the Baltic Sea. Only recently, a letter written by a Romanian worker to the first Solidarity congress in 1981 was discovered. Juliusz Filip paid a high price for this letter – in his country he was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment for 'anti-socialist activities'. The Gdansk congress, answering this letter, issued a message to the workers of Eastern Europe, calling upon them to reclaim their right to liberty. At the time this was a dangerous move, one that crossed the thin red line of safety, but today, a quarter of a century later, it can be deemed one of the founding acts of European solidarity.

The de-legalization of the mass movement of Solidarity was followed by a period of underground operations and resistance to repression. For a time, the military dictatorship was able to improve economic conditions and temporarily placate the people by exploiting feelings of powerlessness, discouragement, and resignation. The government tried to prop up its position by arguing that there was no

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domestic political alternative and hinting at the danger of foreign intervention, citing the examples of Budapest and Prague, but reality showed the falsehood of those arguments. The Soviet Union, militarily and morally exhausted by the war in Afghanistan, was absorbed with its own internal problems. After Gorbachev came to power, it undertook internal reforms (*perestroika* and *glasnost*); intervention in Poland therefore seemed improbable. On the other hand, the activities of the underground Solidarity, and the creation of a 'parallel circulation' of ideas and information, organized through a widespread network of illegal print shops, made people believe that a political alternative was available after all. In 1976, Jacek Kuron, one of the greatest opposition leaders, famously said after protesters in Radom set fire to the local party committee: 'Don't burn the committees, set up your own instead.' In the 1980s these words became reality.

Public opinion polls conducted by state institutions showed society's growing dissatisfaction with the planned economy: in 1988 support for the market economy and a private sector reached 73 per cent. Almost half of the respondents favoured legalizing the political opposition movement. The fact that the Communist regime lacked democratic legitimacy was obvious, and a political alternative was coming within reach.

Let us pause here for a moment to recall a very simple truth: we sometimes see history as predetermined, simply because we know the eventual outcome of events. We know now that 1989 brought the fall of Communism in Europe and shook the foundations of the Soviet empire. One could be excused for thinking that this was historical justice, a result of the logic of history, but even the most incorrigible optimists, the staunchest adherents of Master Pangloss, would have to admit that it did not necessarily have to come to pass in 1989, but could have happened perhaps five, fifteen, or even thirty years later. The legacy of the Bolshevik Revolution, which today nobody wants to claim, could have survived until its centenary. If we were to indulge in guesswork, in 'what if' historiography, we could safely state that if that revolution of liberty had not espoused a total rejection of the violence and confrontation that could have led to a conflict between East and West, history might have been quite different. It was not the diplomats' caution but the self-limiting wisdom of nations that led to the miracle of 1989.

Let us now return to our story without, however, completely

abandoning the digression about the nature of history. In 1988, after a series of strikes, Poland's Communist government realized that it would be unable to control the situation without resorting to violence. The regime had certainly been weakened, partly by its attempts at liberalization: de Tocqueville rightly noted that when authoritarian regimes try to improve themselves, they prepare their own demise. The regime could always have turned its back on liberalization; it could have attempted to introduce a market economy without democratization, to expand economic freedom while suppressing political liberty. On 13 December 1981, Polish Communists made a choice, resorting to armed violence against the people and rejecting political dialogue with Solidarity. They did this in order to retain full power and to be able to realize the interests and implement the plans of the Soviet union. In 1989 they made a different choice: they understood that there was another way to safeguard some of their interests and that it was no longer enough to offer short-term concessions which did not change the nature of the system and could later be withdrawn, as had happened in Soviet Russia in 1921 with the New Economic Policy (NEP). I am willing to acknowledge that in 1989 the Polish Communist leaders served their country well; perhaps it was even their conscious choice. At the end of 1989 one of them told me that his world had just crumbled into ruins: the Soviet Union, which he saw as his second motherland, was falling apart; Marxism-Leninism, which was his religion, had become outdated and discredited; and the working class, whose representative he had thought he was, had turned its back on him and his party, giving its allegiance to Solidarity and the Catholic Church. I do not subscribe to the belief that the imposition of martial law in December 1981 saved Poland from Soviet military intervention, or that it was a lesser evil, because evil is what it was. In 1989 the Communists co-operated in creating conditions necessary to enable a peaceful transition to democracy and supported a negotiated revolution in the national interest. For that, they deserve at least the benefit of the doubt.

At the beginning of the 1980s, in a poll conducted among university students in Poland under martial law, only 4 per cent replied 'yes' to the question: 'Would you like the whole world to have socialism like in Poland?' Sociologists who analysed Poland's situation at that time believe that the social conflict had become a conflict of values rather than a conflict of interests, to quote Edmund Wnuk-

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Lipinski.² In that conflict, Solidarity stood for a programme of national independence, democracy, and freedom, diametrically opposed to the Communist system. With such polarization, it was difficult to imagine any political process that would make it possible to avoid confrontation, and that could be implemented by way of negotiation, curbing radical attitudes.

The Communist government wanted at all costs to avoid awarding Solidarity the status of partner, since this would mean admitting the failure of the military operation of 13 December. They also rejected the idea of trade union pluralism, and thus of legalizing Solidarity, while at the same time agreeing to a certain type of political pluralism. First and foremost, attempts were made to convince the Catholic Church to create a kind of Christian labour union and take responsibility for it, or at the very least, to accept co-responsibility for the country's political situation, either directly or through lay political representation. The church categorically rejected these suggestions and stood by its position that the only significant negotiating partner was Solidarity. The government responded by suggesting that a national compromise be found in round-table negotiations with the participation of non-governmental organizations, but excluding Solidarity. Finally, however, the regime had to agree to negotiate with the people, on the condition that the regime designated the people's representatives. This programme was sometimes called 'battle and agreement' – battle against the democratic opposition and every manifestation of social or political pluralism, and agreement with the regime's appointees. This was a sign not only of hostility toward Solidarity, but also that the government was shutting itself within the philosophy of a Communist monopoly of power. As late as the autumn of 1988, the 'workers' party' plenum rejected any possibility of pluralism, and General Jaruzelski spoke against initiating dialogue with anybody who questioned the legal and constitutional order. Finally, it was the state of the national economy that forced the regime to make the necessary concessions.

For its part, Solidarity was developing various strategies for action, ranging from radical plans to overthrow the regime to scenarios, based on *realpolitik*, of co-operation with the reforming wing

² Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski, 'Deprywacje społeczne a konflikty interesów i wartości', *Polacy '90* (Warsaw, 1991).

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of the ruling party. The unassailable position and moral authority of Lech Walesa guaranteed the movement's cohesion, the unity of its underground and semi-legal structures and, most importantly, its representative character as the only organization that had the right to speak for the people. The amnesty of 1986, which freed political prisoners, made it possible to seek a political solution. The reinstatement of trade union pluralism, and thus the re-legalization of Solidarity, was considered a fundamental prerequisite for any negotiations. The slogan of the day was: 'There is no freedom without solidarity.' Determination on this point was unshakeable and not unlike that shown by the Communists who, although they accepted a certain political liberalization, steadfastly refused to concede trade union pluralism. Since 1987, Solidarity had been preparing an anti-crisis programme intended to ensure popular support for economic reforms to be introduced jointly by the government and the trade union. This can be considered the starting point of an organic and evolutionary transformation in which the public sphere controlled by the Communist Party was to be limited to defence and foreign policy, while freedom would become the dominant principle of economic and social life. The key to this vision of the future was the creation of a civil society. This was less utopian than it seems at first glance, since it was predicated on the belief that freedom is infectious, and that once shown, it creates its own mechanisms of expansion. However, in order to avoid any threat of brutal confrontation between the two opposing blocs, a certain self-limitation of ambitions was necessary. The need for structural change, both in the economy and in politics, was becoming imperative, but it was even more important first to ensure agreement between the people and the government so that the revolution could be non-revolutionary, and so that democracy, introduced by non-democratic means, could become legitimated and secure. To refer to *The Hedgehog and the Fox*, Sir Isaiah Berlin's interpretation of Archilochus,³ I would say that *they* were like the fox who knows many things, and *we* were like the hedgehog who knows one big thing. That one thing was freedom.

The televised debate between Alfred Miodowicz, head of the official trade union federation and member of the Politburo, and Lech

³ Isaiah Berlin, *The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History* (New York, 1953).

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Walesa, which took place on 30 November 1988, was supposed to achieve what Communist propaganda had never managed, namely, to destroy the Walesa myth and make the Solidarity leader look ridiculous. The scheme backfired: it was Walesa who emerged as the hands-down victor of that duel. He triumphantly re-entered Poland's political scene, garnering the support of 64 per cent of Poles, while 73 per cent agreed that Solidarity should be legalized. Several days later, Walesa's visit to Paris on the invitation of François Mitterrand confirmed the stature he had achieved in Europe and gave him an opportunity to present his political programme.

On 6 February 1989, fifty-six people—representatives of the regime, the democratic opposition, two trade union federations, and several independent intellectuals—faced each other around the Round Table. Both during the preparations for the Round Table and during the negotiations themselves, representatives of the Catholic Church played a fundamental role as observers, mediators, and witnesses. In reality, the Round Table gathering brought together two opposing camps, hostile and distrustful towards each other. The minimum level of mutual trust necessary for the negotiations to take place, and all the more so for them to be concluded successfully, could be guaranteed only by the Church.

The two months of Round Table negotiations, up to the very last moment when the final agreement was signed on 5 April 1989, were a time of unceasing confrontation between two extreme and frequently diametrically opposed positions. It was a situation without precedent. Facing each other were the *ancien régime* and the advocates of change; the representatives of an authoritarian regime and of a civil society; a regime aware of the fact that it was a usurper and a society aware of its legitimacy. This momentous confrontation did not take place in the streets or on the barricades, but at a negotiating table, and involved those who not so long ago had left prison cells, and those who had put them there. Under such conditions, the search for compromise was obviously not an easy task. At times it seemed impossible. On both sides, the idea of compromise evoked fierce opposition. None the less, in the course of negotiations, the argument of national interest came to the fore, and this is what made a compromise agreement possible.

At the beginning, the key issue was recognition of the principle of trade union pluralism and the legalization of Solidarity. To every-

body's surprise, the moment the decision was made, the intensity of the issue all but disappeared. The main concessions negotiated at the Round Table were political in nature. When the Communists agreed to hold parliamentary elections, which were scheduled for 4 June 1989, they intended to retain if not a monopoly of power, then at least political dominance. The agreement stated that only 35 per cent of the seats in the Sejm—the lower house of parliament—would be awarded on the basis of a free vote, the rest being reserved for the Communists and their satellite parties. Only the composition of the Senate was to be decided entirely in free elections, but at that time, that chamber had no real political power. The short time left for the election campaign seemed to offer an advantage to the ruling regime, which had at its disposal a disciplined nation-wide party structure, a compliant media, and unlimited financial resources. However, the government's calculations proved to be entirely false. Solidarity's election campaign concentrated on the symbolic figure of Lech Walesa, the undisputed national leader, and was conducted by 'civic committees' which sprang up spontaneously in cities, towns, and even villages. The people were united in their opposition to the government, which allowed them to make a simple choice between 'Us' and 'Them', eliminating the need to resort to political parties.

The success of the opposition and the defeat of the Communists was overwhelming. The entire 35 per cent of the seats in the Sejm to be awarded by free vote went to Solidarity. The Communists did not manage to win a single seat in the Senate, while in the Sejm their dominance proved illusory, since their satellite parties abandoned ship immediately. The first government did include some Communist ministers, in particular, of defence and the interior—Poland remained a member of the Warsaw Pact—but it was headed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a Catholic intellectual and a representative of Solidarity. The die had been cast.

The Communist regime in Poland fell without a single shot being fired, without a single shop window being broken, without any acts of violence, without bloodshed. Peaceful transformation snowballed across the region: in Budapest a Round Table modelled on Poland's was organized; the Velvet Revolution overthrew the government in Czechoslovakia; and the Berlin Wall finally came down. For a time, the corpse of Communism continued to poison the political climate. The new government made every conceivable type of mistake; the

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people began to feel disappointed; the transformation brought many painful experiences. But the changes were definitive and irreversible.

As it happened, the events of 1989 took place 200 years after the French Revolution, concurrently with a wave of intense debates on the phenomenon of revolution. This gives rise to a question: should the events that took place in Central Europe be called a revolution? François Furet decided against such a description.⁴ Not so Ralf Dahrendorf who did not hesitate to entitle his essay on Poland in 1989 *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe*,⁵ following Edmund Burke. He very rightly noted that it was a revolution against the existing system and a starting point for a new one. It was not, however, a movement focusing exclusively on the past; in other words, it was not an attempt at restoration. It was, instead, an anti-totalitarian revolution, able to rally the people to its cause; a revolution in the name of shared values rooted in religious heritage; a revolution of liberty which brought back freedom of expression and association. It had a vision of the future, and this vision was the creation of a civil society which was able to organize itself outside the structures of the state. Today, when Europe is preparing to adopt its constitution, it is extremely important to remember that freedom revolution which, in the name of human dignity, dealt a death blow to Communism.

⁴ François Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1999).

⁵ Ralf Dahrendorf, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: In a Letter Intended to Have Been Sent to a Gentleman in Warsaw* (New York, 1990).

BRONISLAW GEREMEK was Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland from 1997 to 2000. He has been a Member of the European Parliament since 2004, and he has also held chairs of history at the University of Warsaw and at the Collège de France in Paris. Among his many publications are *The Margins of Society in Late Medieval Paris* (Cambridge, 1987), *Poverty: A History* (Oxford, 1994), and *The Common Roots of Europe* (Cambridge, 1996).

ARTICLE

POPE PIUS XI, EUGENIO PACELLI, AND THE PERSECUTION OF THE JEWS IN NAZI GERMANY, 1933-1939: NEW SOURCES FROM THE VATICAN ARCHIVES*

Thomas Brechenmacher

In February 2003 the Vatican Archives released files from the Pontificate of Pope Pius XI (1922-39) which deal with the policy of the Holy See regarding Germany.¹ This is the first time that the Vatican's attitude towards Nazism and the persecution of the Jews in Germany up to 1939 can be reconstructed from primary sources. In this article I shall be looking at two central aspects of this topic in the light of the new sources: the political course set by the Holy See in response to the onset of the persecution of the Jews in 1933; and the way in which the Holy Office dealt with Nazi racist and anti-Semitic

* This article is based on a lecture given at the GHIL on 7 December 2004. The author thanks Mrs Jane Rafferty for kindly translating the text into English. Abbreviations used in the text: AAS: Acta Apostolicae Sedis, Vatican City, 1 (1908)- ; ACDF: Archivio della Congregazione per la Dottrina della Fede (Archive of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Vatican City); Acta Congr. Gen.: Acta Congregationis Generalis (Documents of the General Congregation of the Holy Office, Vatican City); AA.EE.SS.: Archivio della Congregazione per gli Affari Ecclesiastici Straordinari (Archive of the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, Vatican City); ANM: Archivio della Nunziatura di Monaco (Baviera) (Archive of the Papal Nuncio to Munich, Vatican City); R. V.: Rerum Variarum; S. O.: Sanctum Officium (Holy Office).

¹ For an overview see now also Thomas Brechenmacher, 'Teufelspakt, Selbsterhaltung, universale Mission? Leitlinien und Spielräume der Politik des Heiligen Stuhls gegenüber dem nationalsozialistischen Deutschland (1933-1939), im Lichte neu zugänglicher vatikanischer Akten', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 280 (2005), pp. 591-645; Gerhard Besier and Francesca Piombo, *Der Heilige Stuhl und Hitler-Deutschland: Die Faszination des Totalitären* (Munich, 2004).

Article

ideology in dogmatic terms, and the genesis of the stances taken by individual Popes on anti-Semitism up to 1938.²

The first wave of anti-Semitic violence in Germany after the Nazi seizure of power already attracted the attention of the Holy See. The boycott of Jewish businesses in Germany from 1 to 3 April 1933 caused people from all over the world, from the most diverse population groups and occupations, to call on Pope Pius XI or his Cardinal Secretary of State to help the Jews being oppressed in Germany. One Rabbi from New York sent a telegram to the Pope; another, from Vienna, reminded him of the relationship he had had with Ratti since 1907, in order to lend greater weight to his request.³ And even from Germany a nun, Dr Edith Stein, who had converted from the Jewish faith, wrote: 'For weeks we have witnessed deeds here in Germany that pour scorn on any sort of justice or humanity. For years the Nazi leaders have preached hatred of the Jews. And now that they are in government the seeds of hatred have borne fruit. I am convinced that this is a general phenomenon that will have many more victims. For weeks not only Jews but thousands of faithful Catholics in Germany have been hoping that the Church of Christ will raise its voice.'⁴

The accuracy of Edith Stein's predictions was to be horribly confirmed by her personal fate. This is one of the main reasons why reading her letter continues to move and disturb. Edith Stein's letter is forever bound up with the key questions in the issue of the Church and the Jews in the twentieth century. Could the Church, or, more particularly, Popes Pius XI and Pius XII (1939-58) have alleviated, or even prevented, the fate of Edith Stein and that of millions of Jews and others persecuted for racist or ideological reasons? The Church has been accused of 'keeping quiet' – how should we judge this atti-

² On the relationship between Popes and the Jews in general see now Thomas Brechenmacher, *Der Vatikan und die Juden: Geschichte einer unheiligen Beziehung vom 16. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich, 2005).

³ Telegram from Rabbi William Margolis, New York, 21 Apr. 1933; AA.EE.SS, Germania, Pos. 643, fasc. 158, fol. 27r; Rabbi Arthur Zacharias Schwarz to Pius XI, Vienna, 9 Apr. 1933, *ibid.*, fol. 29r-30r; and Schwarz to Pacelli, 9 Apr. 1933, *ibid.*, fol. 31r; further requests *ibid.*, fol. 42r-126r.

⁴ Edith Stein to Pius XI, Münster, no date, with an accompanying letter from Abbot Raphael Walzer, Beuron, 12 Apr. 1933; AA.EE.SS, Germania, Pos. 643, fasc. 158, fol. 15r-17r.

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tude? What motivated those responsible in the Vatican? Did anti-Semitism within the Church play a part in its reluctance to take a stand?

Pius XI's repeated rejection of racial anti-Semitism must have moved many people to appeal to him. But did not this hope in the power of the Church as a moral authority also tend to idealize the Holy See's scope for action and the actual opportunities it had to influence the terrorist regime in Germany? Did it not overestimate the importance that Vatican policy could, or indeed wished to, attach to 'protecting the Jews'? As in previous centuries the sober, possibly sobering, truth is that 'Jewish policy' was a marginal aspect of the Catholic Church's spectrum of concerns—though the events of the following year were to push it somewhat nearer to the centre.

I The Holy See's Historical-Political Situation in 1933

Until just four years before the Nazi revolution in Germany the Holy See's main political-diplomatic concern was to redefine its territorial basis, lost when the Papal States came to an end. This existential question that had been ongoing since 1870 was resolved in February 1929 when the Lateran Treaties were concluded with the fascist Kingdom of Italy. The founding of the Vatican state meant that the Holy See had returned to the international community of nations as a subject of international law. Attached to the Lateran state treaty was a concordat, which regulated the rights and duties of the Catholic Church in the Italian state. The Vatican negotiators were particularly successful in that they managed to include recognition of Catholicism as Italy's only state religion in the treaty. In return the Church—in order to stay true to its 'mission of peace', its 'moral and spiritual power'—committed itself to neutrality in foreign affairs.⁵ What the Pope regarded as respectful recognition as a 'power above the powers' was interpreted by the Italian dictator more as a sort of political immobilization. Any contravention of the commitment to neutrality could automatically be seen as a violation of the treaty.

⁵ 'Trattato e Concordato con l'Italia', 11 Feb. 1929, in Angelo Mercati (ed.), *Raccolta di Concordati su Materie ecclesiastiche tra la Santa Sede e le Autorità Civili*, vol. 2: 1915-1954 (Vatican City, 1954), pp. 84-103; here 'Trattato', Art. 24.

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This clause undoubtedly caused papal policy to take a benevolent attitude towards Mussolini's regime and, after 1933, possibly also towards the Nazi regime in Germany which ultimately became Italy's ally.

The relationship between the newly-founded Vatican state and Germany also changed in those years as a result of the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. As in the Soviet Union and Italy, a totalitarian regime became established in Germany whose aim was not only to subjugate all religious life, but also to wipe it out. There was no place for religion in the Nazi state since National Socialism was itself, as the Jesuit Friedrich Muckermann stated in autumn 1934, a religion.⁶

This situation, so different from the state of affairs during the Weimar Republic, caused unrest in the Vatican. The liberal-Protestant German democracy was a far cry from the *Curia's* ideal type of state, but the Holy See's policy towards Germany between 1919 and 1933 can still be regarded as a success—and mainly a success for one man: Eugenio Pacelli, a nuncio since 1917, first in Munich and from 1924 in Berlin. Pacelli did not see his role as nuncio as involving merely being Rome's representative and executive arm. On the contrary, he regarded himself as an active diplomat with clear political aims. To almost the same degree as Pius XI he supported the notion of a Roman Catholic world church, organized as a hierarchy, in which the will of Rome would be done, even by its most far-flung members. Eugenio Pacelli was a specialist, perhaps *the* specialist of his day, in those treaties that regulated religious life in the individual states, and, above all, in Rome's role in formulating them. The first high point of Pacelli's career as a member of Rome's Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs came in June 1914 in the shape of the concordat with the Kingdom of Serbia. While he was a nuncio in Germany, concordats with Bavaria (1924-5), Prussia (1929), and Baden (1932-3) followed. A concordat with the whole German Empire, which the imperial government had requested several times during the 1920s, no longer seemed necessary, given this favourable state of affairs.

⁶ Friedrich Muckermann's report on the ideology of National Socialism, no date [Oct./Nov. 1934], sent to the Vatican Secretariat of State by Giovanni Panico, Saarbrücken, 16 Nov. 1934; AA.EE.SS., Germania, Pos. 666, fasc. 221, fol. 3rv; 5r-10r, here fol. 5r.

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The Nazi dictatorship threatened to sweep away this entire framework of treaties, built up over years, and to start a new *Kulturkampf* against the Catholic Church. And a *Kulturkampf* was precisely what the politicians in the *Curia* feared most when they thought of Germany. At the height of the German *Kulturkampf* during the Bismarck era bishops were arrested and expelled, episcopates were left vacant, hundreds of parishes were unoccupied, and pastoral care and Catholic associations were virtually non-existent in large parts of the country. In order to avoid a repetition of this as a result of renewed confrontation between Church and state in Germany, the Holy See was prepared to make concessions, especially since alarming reports from all over the German Empire about restrictions on Church life started to pour in as soon as the Nazis seized power.⁷ Yet in his government statement of 23 March 1933 Hitler intoned that the Christian confessions were an essential basis of the new state; he was willing to enter into wide-ranging collaboration and would respect the rights of the churches.⁸ The German bishops also wanted to demonstrate willingness to co-operate with the new 'Reich'. They therefore withdrew their declaration of August 1932 in which they had stated that Catholicism and National Socialism were basically incompatible and had forbidden Catholics to join the NSDAP.⁹

This withdrawal was, of course, too precipitous, as the Chairman of the Fulda Bishops' Conference, Adolf Cardinal Bertram from Breslau, soon recognized. As he wrote to Pacelli on 18 April: 'The spiritual leaders of the dioceses of Germany have taken Reich Chancellor Hitler's conciliatory declaration as the opportunity to formulate their position *vis-à-vis* the National Socialist movement in such a way that, without giving up our fundamental principles,

⁷ Relevant documents in AA.EE.SS., Baviera, Pos. 161, fasc. 9; Pos. 188, fasc. 32; Pos. 189, fasc. 33; Pos. 190, fasc. 34; ANM, busta 418, fasc. 3/4, and the corresponding reports from the nuncio in Berlin, Cesare Orsenigo, in AA.EE.SS., Pos. 643, fasc. 157.

⁸ Cf. Orsenigo to Pacelli, Berlin, 24 Mar. 1933; AA.EE.SS., Germania, Pos. 645, fasc. 162, fol. 11r-12r; this report is also printed in Ludwig Volk (ed.), *Kirchliche Akten über die Reichskonkordatsverhandlungen 1933* (Mainz, 1969), pp. 3-5.

⁹ Announcement by the German bishops, 28 Mar. 1933, in Bernhard Stasiewski (ed.), *Akten deutscher Bischöfe über die Lage der Kirche 1933-1945*, vol. 1: 1933-1934 (Mainz, 1968), pp. 30-2.

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peaceful relations with the new government will be possible. But all dangers are far from over.' The bishop saw a danger not only to Catholic civil servants but also, above all, to the basis of Catholic life in Germany, the associations. 'A large part of our responsibility relates to these associations, which embrace the whole of Germany. The new government is not well-disposed towards these organizations, and wants National Socialist organizations to rule supreme. This would largely drive the Catholic movement out of public life and back into the sacristy.'¹⁰

When the German government's offer of a concordat with the Holy See arrived in Rome, Pacelli had virtually no choice. An agreement under international law seemed to be the only thing that would guarantee the continued existence of autonomous Church life in Germany, especially since the end of political parties was already in sight, including the political representative of German Catholicism, the Centre Party, and its sister party, the Bavarian People's Party. Pacelli was not, of course, so naive as to believe that Hitler would adhere to all the paragraphs in the concordat; but he expressed the hope that at least the German dictator 'would not contravene every article at once'.¹¹

The concordat between the Holy See and the German Reich of 20 July 1933 was supposed to be the legal bastion of the Catholic Church in Germany, a bastion which the Nazis could not penetrate. At no time, however, did Vatican policy ever seriously consider using, or indeed forming a pact with, the 'lesser evil' of Nazi Germany, in order to check the 'greater evil', Soviet Communism. To be sure, Hitler's anti-Bolshevik statements appealed to Pius XI for a while,¹²

¹⁰ Bertram to Pacelli, Breslau, 18 Apr. 1933; AA.EE.SS. Germania, Pos. 621, fasc. 140, fol. 16r-17v, quotation at 16v/17r.

¹¹ Report from the British chargé d'affaires at the Papal States, Ivone Kirkpatrick, to Robert Vansittart, Foreign Office, concerning a conversation with Pacelli, Rome, 19 Aug. 1933; reprinted in the original and in German translation in Ludwig Volk, *Das Reichskonkordat vom 20. Juli 1933: Von den Ansätzen in der Weimarer Republik bis zur Ratifizierung am 10. September 1933* (Mainz, 1972), pp. 250-2, at p. 252.

¹² The following statements by Pius XI are known: 'Hitler is the first and the only one to speak openly against the Bolsheviks. Up to now, the Pope has been the only one.' Audience of 4 Mar. 1933, quoted from the documents in the Secretariat of State, *ibid.*, p. 64, n. 24; similarly, on 13 Mar. 1933 in the

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and without doubt at the beginning of the 1930s Communism was regarded as the greater danger.¹³ But this initial sympathy for National Socialist anti-Bolshevism soon died away as it rapidly became clear that National Socialism and Soviet Communism were, in essence, just variants of an atheist-totalitarian ideology.¹⁴ 'Of an anti-Catholic character' had been one of the first impressions of the new 'Nazionalisti' that Nuncio Pacelli had conveyed to Rome in his

Papal Consistory: 'None the less, until most recently, the voice of the Roman Pope was the only one raised to draw attention to the serious threats posed to Christian culture among almost all peoples.' AAS 25 (1933), pp. 106-23, quoted *ibid.*, p. 65, n. 26. This statement by Pius XI is generally regarded in light of the interpretation offered by Cardinal Faulhaber; see *ibid.*, pp. 64-6. However, Faulhaber, too, conceded that in contrast to the quick and sometimes sharply expressed words of the Pope, papal diplomats and Pacelli in particular acted 'cleverly and with restraint' in relation to the Nazis; Faulhaber's notes, 20 Apr. 1933, in Ludwig Volk (ed.), *Akten Kardinal Michael von Faulhabers*, vol. 1: 1917-1934 (Mainz, 1975), pp. 714-15.

¹³ Details in Brechenmacher, 'Teufelspakt, Selbsterhaltung, universale Mission?', p. 606, n. 37.

¹⁴ As early as September 1930 Nuncio Orsenigo had described the Nazis' anti-Communism as a double-edged sword: 'Their programme does not yet inspire confidence; however, it deserves attention because of the decisive and sometimes violent opposition which it voices to Communism, and, as a consequence, to the expanding Soviet system; but this opposition is founded not on religious principles, but simply on nationalism.' (Orsenigo to Pacelli, 16 Sept. 1930; AA.EE.SS., Germania, Pos. 605-6, fasc. 117, fol. 18r-19v). A reflection of this assessment can be found as late as 1933, when Pius XI explained to Faulhaber in an audience on 10 Mar. 1933: 'Hitler: what I liked was that he was the first statesman to speak out against Bolshevism. "For political reasons".' Faulhaber's notes on an audience with Pius XI, Rome, 10 Mar. 1933, in Volk (ed.), *Akten Kardinal Michael von Faulhabers*, vol. 1, pp. 659-62, at p. 660. The Pope was also aware that Hitler's anti-Bolshevism was different from that of the Church. In October 1932, when the Nazi party (NSDAP) and the German Communist Party (KPD) co-operated in the Prussian House of Deputies, Orsenigo believed he had seen how quickly National Socialism itself could turn in the direction of Bolshevism; Orsenigo to Pacelli, Berlin, 11 Oct. 1932; AA.EE.SS., Germania, Pos. 604, fasc. 113, fol. 29r-31r. This view corresponds to that expressed by Bertram in April 1936, namely, that National Socialism itself is nothing but Bolshevism; Bertram to Pacelli, Breslau, 21 Apr. 1936; AA.EE.SS., Germania, Pos. 695, fasc. 267, fol. 66r-69v; quoted in detail by Brechenmacher, 'Teufelspakt, Selbsterhaltung, universale Mission?', pp. 605-7.

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report on the Hitler-Ludendorff Putsch on 14 November 1923.¹⁵ Eleven years later Pius XI asserted that one could not 'talk of the spirit of this movement'. 'It is a massive materialism.' Such a movement, he said, could never be a partner, only ever an opponent. The Pope concluded: 'We do not believe that an understanding is possible.'¹⁶

Like anti-Catholicism, Pacelli had already come across the anti-Semitism of Hitler's party during his time in Munich. In a sermon for All Saints' Day on 4 November 1923 Bishop Faulhaber had spoken out against the anti-Semitic smear campaign and violence that had been spreading out of control in Munich for years. In response, the National Socialist press had launched a massive campaign against the Cardinal. Pacelli reported on acts of violence committed by demonstrators, stirred up by the Nazis, against the archbishop's Ordinariate and the person of the Cardinal, 'who had condemned the persecution of the Jews'.¹⁷ In April 1924 he took up the theme again and established a synthesis that was to have serious consequences. The organs of the extreme Right were beginning to lump Judaism and the Holy See together, pushing them into the role of Germany's main enemy. To quote the *Großdeutsche Zeitung*: 'We must be a free people. But un-German powers, the Jew and Rome, hold sway in the country.'¹⁸

This remark must have irritated Pacelli in many respects and its importance for the Holy See's policy towards the Jews after 1933 can hardly be over-estimated. The Church found that a nationalistic-materialistic movement had put it in the same boat as Judaism, whose mission of salvation it had long-since considered obsolete since its own selection for the task, and which it basically regarded as inferior. It found itself mentioned in the same context as Judaism, whose process of emancipation in the previous century the Church, with its defensive battle against modernity, had often seen as the root of much evil. Pius XI and Pacelli were of sufficient intellectual stature to understand this coalition with the Jews imposed upon them from outside and to deal with it politically. But both of them, without

¹⁵ Pacelli to Cardinal Secretary of State Gasparri, Munich, 14 Nov. 1923; ANM 396, fasc. 7, fol. 6r-7v.

¹⁶ Alois C. Hudal, *Römische Tagebücher: Lebensbeichte eines alten Bischofs* (Graz, 1976), pp. 118-19.

¹⁷ Pacelli to Gasparri, Munich, 14 Nov. 1923; ANM 396, fasc. 7, fol. 6r-7v.

¹⁸ Pacelli to Gasparri, Munich, 25 Apr. 1924; ANM 396, fasc. 7, fol. 75r-76v.

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being openly anti-Semitic, were so rooted in traditional doctrine, by no means free of anti-Semitism, that this unwanted coalition was uncomfortable and to be resisted—a resistance undoubtedly responsible, at least in part, for some of the hesitation after 1933. First and foremost—and this was something that Church politicians could immediately understand—the new role of joint enemy ascribed to Judaism and Papacy meant that the Nazis' fight against the Jews could turn into a fight against the Church at any time. The threat to the Jews was inseparably linked with a threat to the Church. The chance of extricating itself from this unwanted coalition for the sake of its own existence must have been tempting indeed.

The first and most important measure for sustaining Church life in Germany, the concordat, failed. The Nazis openly disregarded the agreement. They had no intention of permitting a 'non-political' Church life in Germany after political Catholicism in the form of the parties had been excluded. The massive infringements by Nazi organizations and governmental authorities even against those Catholic associations and organizations that the concordat should actually have protected continued during the negotiations, and once the treaty had been concluded went on as before. This was a situation beyond anything the *Curia* had ever experienced. Regardless of all negotiations, the Nazis embarked upon the very *Kulturkampf* that the *Curia* wished to avoid at all costs. The legal basis of the concordat, fought for with such effort, turned out to be worthless. It is essential to understand this background if we are to pass judgement on the Holy See's attitude to the persecution of the Jews in Germany after 1933.

II *Setting a Course in April 1933*

On 4 April 1933, immediately after Jewish businesses had been boycotted in Germany and at least a week before Edith Stein's letter reached the Vatican, Pacelli sent a telegram to Nuncio Orsenigo in Berlin requesting that the possibility of intervening against 'anti-Semitic excesses' in Germany be looked into.¹⁹ The reasons for this

¹⁹ Pacelli to Orsenigo, Vatican City, 4 Apr. 1933; AA.EE.SS., Germania, Pos. 643, fasc. 158, fol. 4r.

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request to the nuncio are striking: 'It is traditional for the Holy See to carry its universal mission of peace and love to all people, regardless of class or religion and, where necessary, for its charitable establishments to intervene.' Pacelli was introducing a new political motive that went beyond normal diplomatic guidelines. In Germany an existential threat was emerging to a non-Catholic section of the population whose representatives had turned to the Holy See for help. The head of Vatican policy recognized the legitimacy of this appeal for help; he saw it as part of the Church's 'universal' mission, not only for its own believers, but for all people. Pacelli realized the extent to which the persecution of the Jews had changed the task of the Catholic Church. In his instruction to Orsenigo a new dimension was reached that went far beyond the traditional goal of 'mere' representation of interests and self-preservation.

However, this new dimension could not be fulfilled, indeed could not even be considered, except in conjunction with the old agenda. In terms of Nazi Germany, what scope still remained for achieving the 'universal mission'? Was not a completely new policy needed and – assuming that clarity had existed about such a policy – with what consequences for the Church in Germany? For the population group directly under threat was that very group, the Jews, which the Nazis had forced together with the Church in the role of arch-enemy.

On 8 April Orsenigo informed Pacelli that the state of affairs had changed. 'Since yesterday the fight against the Jews has taken on governmental character. Intervention by the Holy See would now amount to a protest against a German law.'²⁰ The nuncio was referring to the law passed on the previous day, the *Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums*, which legalized the dismissal of Jewish and Catholic civil servants. In other words, it made discrimination against Jews and Catholics official government policy. Now an official protest by the nuncio could be rejected all the more easily as 'interference in internal affairs'. This was to be avoided, not least in order to protect the status of the Vatican envoy to the German Reich. On 8 April it seemed more necessary than ever to reach agreement with the German episcopate on how to proceed. In the same telegram Orsenigo then let it be known that the bishop of Berlin

²⁰ Orsenigo to Pacelli, Berlin, 8 Apr. 1933; AA.EE.SS., Germania, Pos. 643, fasc. 158, fol. 5r.

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would try to make the German government responsive to the wishes of the Catholic Church, inspired as they were by the *carita univ-ersale*.²¹ On 9 April the German daily press published a statement by the bishops of Cologne, Paderborn, and Osnabrück, in which they expressed their extreme concern about the fate of all Germans affected by the law. The bishops saw 'with deepest sorrow and distress, that the days of national uprising had also become, for many loyal citizens including conscientious civil servants, days of the deepest and most bitter suffering that is quite undeserved'.²² Orsenigo felt that the expression 'loyal citizens' 'could also be a reference to the Jews'. He said that although there were many exceptions that made the law less harsh, this did not change the fact that 'the whole government approves of the anti-Semitic principle', and 'that this will unfortunately stand as a despicable blemish on the first pages of the history of National Socialism – which is not without its merits'.²³

However, Pacelli in Rome saw the situation in a slightly different light. He had tried to respond to the appeals received from the Jewish camp and to take the initiative. It was clear to him that the persecution of the Jews in Nazi Germany was a challenge to the policy of the Holy See. The *Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums* had reduced the scope for diplomatic action of the Pope's representative in Germany; at the same time a new *Kulturkampf* against the Catholic Church was becoming more threatening by the day. It was this last observation that Pacelli must have felt was confirmed by a letter from Cardinal Faulhaber of 10 April. The Munich Archbishop tried to explain the German episcopate's attitude and once again took up the Nazis' enemy package: Jews/Catholics. 'At the moment we bishops are asked the question why the Catholic Church, as so often in its history, does not step in on behalf of the Jews. This is not possible at the moment because the fight against the Jews would also become a fight against the Catholics and because the Jews can help themselves, as the quick breaking of the boycott shows.'²⁴ This assessment contains

²¹ Ibid.

²² Announcement made by Schulte, Klein, and Berning, Cologne, 9 Apr. 1933; printed in Stasiewski (ed.), *Akten deutscher Bischöfe*, vol. 1, p. 51.

²³ Orsenigo to Pacelli, Berlin, 11 Apr. 1933; AA.EE.SS., Germania, Pos. 643, fasc. 158, fol. 6r.

²⁴ Faulhaber to Pacelli, Munich, 10 Apr. 1933; AA.EE.SS., Germania, Pos. 643,

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two errors that were to have serious consequences: first, that the Jews could manage on their own; and secondly, that Church intervention on behalf of the Jews would mean that Nazi rage was completely transferred to the Church or, to put it the other way round: non-intervention in the Jewish question would make the leaders in Germany more favourably disposed towards the Church. The opposite was the case: the *Kulturkampf* against the Church was in full swing, regardless of whether it intervened for the Jews or not.

To what extent Faulhaber's two errors were immediately recognizable either in Munich or Rome is open to discussion. But in any case that letter by the Munich Archbishop of 10 April provides an important key to understanding the *molto delicato* with which, two weeks later, Under-Secretary of State Giuseppe Pizzardo advised against taking a stand on behalf of the Jews.²⁵ Public intervention against the anti-Jewish excesses clearly seemed extremely tricky to the Vatican Secretary of State because the Catholic Church's own position in Germany was so acutely in danger. None the less, by means of silent diplomacy, Pacelli took the initiative twice in April. Of course, when Vice Chancellor von Papen arrived in Rome on 9 April the offer of a concordat was the main topic of conversation. There are, however, also hints that during the receptions Vatican politicians made some critical remarks about the persecution of the Jews in Germany.²⁶ Toward the end of the month Pacelli recommended to a representative of Berlin's Jewish community that he speak to the nuncio. Orsenigo's lengthy report on the encounter creates an ambivalent impression. Orsenigo assured the Jewish politician that 'everything possible' had already been done to make the persecution of the Jews less severe, and also that in future, 'according to the principles of Christian and universal brotherly love', no effort would be spared. However, no practical help was offered. The suggestion that Jewish pupils, excluded from state schools by the *Gesetz*

fasc. 158, fol. 11rv. This letter is not printed in Volk (ed.), *Akten Kardinal Michael von Faulhabers*, vol. 1; an extract can be found in Stasiewski (ed.), *Akten deutscher Bischöfe*, vol. 1, p. 54, n. 1.

²⁵ Memorandum by Pizzardo, 26 Apr. 1933; AA.EE.SS., Germania, Pos. 643, fasc. 158, fol. 32r.

²⁶ Cf. Giovanni Sale, *Hitler, la Santa Sede e gli Ebrei: Con documenti dell'Archivio Segreto Vaticano* (Milan, 2004), p. 107.

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gegen Überfüllung von deutschen Schulen und Hochschulen, should be allowed to attend private Catholic schools was rejected by Orsenigo. This, he said, would contravene the principle of the confessional school, which the Church had always stood by, 'and still does today, even in Germany'. 'The Church upholds this point of view sure in the knowledge that no one would see anti-Semitism in the rejection of this request.' The Jewish representative also suggested that endangered Jewish hospitals be taken over by the Church. Orsenigo pointed him towards the Knights of St John and the association of charitable organizations. None the less, Orsenigo summed up as follows: 'The gentleman took his leave and was satisfied.'²⁷ Pacelli thanked him for his report and said that he was pleased that the conversation had ended so well.²⁸

This smooth, indeed, apparently cynical, rejection of the Jewish politician concealed helplessness, hesitation, and fear. Previous initiatives, 'even by the highest-ranked personalities', the nuncio added, had not led to any success at all. 'Removal of the Semitic element from society moves on apace here, and appeals for moderation certainly have been made.'²⁹ Orsenigo was referring here to recent visits by the German episcopate to Göring, von Papen, and Hitler, during which nothing was achieved but mollification and didactic monologues from the Chancellor.³⁰ The sword of Damocles hanging over the Catholic confessional schools was all too visible; removing this danger was to become an ongoing topic in the – unsuccessful – negotiations between Church and state in the time to come. It would undoubtedly have been a more decent thing to do for Orsenigo to have told his Jewish visitor the real reason why he refused to allow Jewish pupils in to the Catholic schools, instead of hiding behind educational principles: Jewish pupils in private Catholic schools would merely have hastened their demise. Much the same applied to

²⁷ Orsenigo to Pacelli, Berlin, 28 Apr. 1933; AA.EE.SS., Germania, Pos. 643, fasc. 158, fol. 33r-34r.

²⁸ Pacelli to Orsenigo, Vatican City, 19 May 1933; *ibid.*, fol. 35r.

²⁹ Orsenigo to Pacelli, 28 Apr. 1933; AA.EE.SS., Germania, Pos. 643, fasc. 158, fol. 33r-34r.

³⁰ Cf. Orsenigo to Pacelli, Berlin, 8 May 1933; AA.EE.SS. Germania, Pos. 643, fasc. 157, fol. 107r-108v, and the minutes of the meeting of diocesan representatives in Berlin, 25-26 Apr. 1933, in Stasiewski (ed.), *Akten deutscher Bischöfe*, vol. 1, pp. 87-103, esp. pp. 101-2.

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the request for Jewish hospitals to become Catholic: neither the Knights of St John nor the charitable associations had either the means or the political scope. Practical application of the 'principles of Catholic and universal brotherly love' had already proved to be a serious problem by April 1933. Unable to cope, the nuncio resorted to clichés and the Secretary of State's office, pre-occupied with the Church's own struggle and the concordat, pronounced itself satisfied with Orsenigo's report.

The Holy See's hopes rested on the concordat. If the Pope had taken a stand in favour of the Jews before it was signed and ratified, so the reasoning went, this whole treaty could have been endangered, indeed, may have collapsed. In this context the way in which Pacelli dealt with a press article in September 1933 stating that Pius XI had publicly condemned Nazi persecution of the Jews is characteristic of his diplomacy. On 1 September, ten days before ratification of the concordat, the *Jewish Chronicle* announced: 'Pope condemns Anti-Semitism. The Pope has expressed his concern about reports of continuing persecution of the Jews in Germany. He said that such persecution exposed a lack of civilisation in such a famous people ... The Arian races, he declared, had no right to feel superior to the Semites.'³¹ The Holy See neither confirmed nor denied the report. Whether, and under what circumstances, Pius XI may or may not have said such things in 1933 is unclear. Pacelli attributed the statement to an 'indiscretion', which suggests that Pius may indeed have said something of the sort in private. But apart from that, the Pope's attitude had been well known anyway, ever since he had condemned anti-Semitism in a decree of the Holy Office in 1928.³² What was crucial about the episode in September 1933 was that Pacelli not only did nothing to deny the report but also agreed to its unauthorized dis-

³¹ *Jewish Chronicle*, 1 Sept. 1933; AA.EE.SS., Pos. 643, fasc. 158, fol. 48r, and the editor, J. M. Rich, to Pacelli, London, 8 Sept. 1933, with a request to acknowledge receipt; *ibid.*, fol. 47r. There is no record of a reply to this request.

³² Decree of the Holy Office, 28 Mar. 1928, in AAS 20 (1928), pp. 103-4; cf. also Brechenmacher, *Der Vatikan und die Juden*, pp. 154-63; and Hubert Wolf, "'Pro perfidis Judaeis": Die "Amici Israel" und ihr Antrag auf eine Reform der Karfreitagsfürbitte für die Juden (1928). Oder: Bemerkungen zum Thema katholische Kirche und Antisemitismus', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 279 (2004), pp. 611-58.

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semination. On 21 September he wrote to Pizzardo: 'I was not displeased by the United Press's indiscretion about the Jews; it is good to let the world know that the Holy See has taken up the question.'³³ Pacelli's main concern was the 'how'. He did not hesitate to use this opportunity to convey important information about the Holy See's attitude towards persecution of the Jews, without provoking diplomatic difficulties with the German Reich in the lead-up to ratification of the concordat.

III *The Dogmatic Examination of Nazi Ideology*

When the Nazis seized power in Germany it was inevitable that their ideological premisses would be examined by the Vatican to see whether they could be reconciled with Christian principles. The Holy Office and its extended arm, the Index congregation, were generally responsible for such issues. A formal announcement usually preceded the opening of an enquiry. However dubious the role of Bishop Alois Hudal, the ambitious rector of the German national foundation in Rome, Santa Maria dell' Anima, may have been in later years, he certainly deserves credit for one thing during the early phase of National Socialism: he pointed out the need for a dogmatic examination and thus forced the issue into the hands of the Holy Office.

On 7 October 1934 Hudal, who was one of the Holy Office's expert consultants, wrote to the congregation secretary Donato Sbarretti. He suggested that 'the three modern heresies: radical nationalism, race and blood as the basis of religion, and the totalitarian state be [condemned] in solemn form by the Holy See', either by an encyclical or by a new syllabus.³⁴ At this stage one of the main ideological works of National Socialism, Alfred Rosenberg's *Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, had already been placed on the index of forbidden

³³ Pacelli to Pizzardo, [Rorschach], 21 Sept. 1933; AA.EE.SS., Baviera, Pos. 190, fasc. 34.

³⁴ ACDF, S.O. 3373/34 [R.V. 1934, n. 29]: 'Germaniae—De Razzismo, Naturalismo, Totalitarismo, Comunismo Damnandis vel non, per solemnem actum pontificium' [Busta speciale], fasc.1, no. 3, pp. 1-5; printed, with a different date, in Hudal, *Römische Tagebücher*, pp. 122-6.

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books.³⁵ But for Hudal this was just a first step. Like the Jesuit Muckermann, he wanted the dangerous potential of National Socialism as a political religion to be recognized and attacked. 'It is false to assert that National Socialism is just a political party, like fascism, for example, claims to be, and that it has nothing to do with religion. Apart from that it is wrong, as many say, that it just involves a few radical elements without any influence on the education of party members. According to this doctrine, the Christian religion is an Oriental-Semitic product, an alien body in the Nordic race which therefore seeks to form a new religion, stemming from its own race.'³⁶

What Hudal was informing the Holy Office of here, intensified by his experiences during a fairly lengthy trip to Germany, he had already told the Secretary of State's office in the late summer of the previous year. There he had already demanded that the Holy See, in appropriate form—preferably by means of a papal letter—should show the public the insurmountable gulf between the principles of National Socialism and those of the Church, in order to avoid giving the impression that the Church, in signing the concordat, had recognized Nazi ideology.³⁷ Unlike the letter to Sbarretti, the memorandum of late summer 1933 deals with anti-Semitism, using the phrase 'Teoria della razza', in keeping with the linguistic usage of the time. According to Hudal, blood and race could not in any way be the criteria for organizing human societies. 'The Church knows no racial prejudices. If it recognizes the basic natural principles of race and nationality, then not for physiological reasons, but for far more lofty spiritual ones.' 'Belonging to a race means to a Christian first and foremost spiritual and cultural community. The Church does not hate anyone; rather it prays for everyone, especially for the people of Israel, even though they bear the guilt for having murdered God. This year one of the greatest persecutions of the Jews in history is tak-

³⁵ Decree of the Holy Office, 9 Feb. 1934, published by the *Osservatore Romano*, 14 Feb. 1934; ACDF, S.O. 4304/33i (1).

³⁶ Hudal to Sbarretti, 7 Oct. 1934 (see n. 34), pp. 3–4.

³⁷ Report: 'S. Sede e Nazionalsocialismo', 4 pp., typescript, Italian, no date or authorship acknowledged [after 15 Aug. 1933]; all stylistic and external features (e.g. typewriter face) suggest that Hudal was the author; AA.EE.SS., Pos. 143, fasc. 160, fol. 11r–15r, esp. 15r.

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ing place. Many Jews have become insecure because of the events in Germany. Such insecurity often leads to re-consideration. Perhaps a word from the Holy Father against the persecution of the Jews might open many hearts to the name of Christ which have so far been closed to him.³⁸

The memorandum referred to the well-known theological argument that the Jews had murdered God. This was a dangerous game, since association of this sort could easily give the impression that the persecution of the Jews was just another in a long line of 'punishments' imposed on the Jews by God. But what was undoubtedly communicated to many Catholics in terms of vulgar theology did not correspond to the doctrine prevailing in Rome. Here the line of *carita universale* propagated by Pacelli held sway. None the less, it is still significant how strongly the memorandum continued to emphasize the idea of conversion. No one in the Vatican had any doubts about this 'certainty': the Jews could only be saved by turning to Christianity. The hand of the Pope, extended to the Jews in their time of need, should save the former people of God not only from physical, but, above, all from spiritual, peril. In essence, papal policy towards Jews was still a policy of conversion.

By November 1934 at the latest the Pope, the Secretary of State's office, and the Holy Office were, or would be, adequately informed about the principles of Nazi ideology by the reports of Hudal, Muckermann, and others. It was only to be expected, as Hudal suggested, that the Pope should order a statement to be prepared; this task was given to two Jesuit fathers.

Thus a farce began to take its course in the Holy Office which was to confirm in a most depressing way all the warnings, all Muckermann's criticism of the behaviour of the bishops and of the Holy See: 'There was no unity of action. A word from a bishop here and there does not achieve much. They should all speak at the same time, and all say the same thing, if possible from all the pulpits. There is no modern method. Everything is done far too slowly, far too falteringly. While the opponent is working exceptionally quickly, the Church's apparatus is exceptionally cumbersome.'³⁹ The Holy Office began to work in the same way as it had done for hundreds of years,

³⁸ Ibid., fol. 12r/13r.

³⁹ Muckermann's report (see n. 6), fol. 8r.

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just as if the questions to be decided upon were far removed from any present-day relevance.

None the less, just over six months later the Jesuit fathers had completed their task and had put together a catalogue of the main errors of nationalism, racism and totalitarianism. On this basis, from May 1935 onwards, the congregation could 'in the usual way', start on an 'initial examination'.⁴⁰ The procedure was that three expert consultants would be commissioned to assess the Jesuits' paper independently. This took another year. By April 1936 the three assessments were ready, amongst them that of Domenico Tardini, later a cardinal and Pius XII's secretary of state. Tardini's report, in particular, gave the whole enterprise a push in a different direction: should not the Pope, in the form of a major syllabus, condemn all the errors of the twentieth century together? Undoubtedly, one such error was Communism. So a new commission started to go over all the work done so far again, adding remarks about Communism.⁴¹ By October 1936 – now in great haste – it had put together an extended collection of false theses about 'racism, nationalism, Communism, and totalitarianism'. Two years after work had started, a draft decree of the Holy Office on the heresies of the epoch was ready. This draft condemned as part of the 'misguided cult of race': 1) the doctrine of a qualitative hierarchy of human races, 2) the doctrine of 'blood' as the bearer of racial quality, and, connected with this, 3) all measures for 'retaining purity of blood', and, 4) for the further development of the race by the cult of the body, finally, 5) the notion of race-specific religions, and, connected with this, 6) all measures designed to exclude Christianity from public life as a non race-specific religion. In conclusion the draft rejected 7) the doctrine of racial instinct as 'first source and highest rule of the whole legal system', and 8) that of 'the struggle for selection' and the 'right of the fittest'.⁴²

⁴⁰ ACDF, S.O. 3373/34 [R.V. 1934, n. 29], fasc. 1, no. 3, p. 27; reprint of 'Elenchus Propositionum de Nationalismo, Stirpis Cultu, Totalismo', in Peter Godman, *Der Vatikan und Hitler: Die geheimen Archive* (Munich, 2004), pp. 252–75; English version: *Hitler and the Vatican* (New York, 2004).

⁴¹ ACDF, S.O. 3373/34 [R.V. 1934, n. 29], fasc. 2, no. 5.

⁴² ACDF, S.O. 3373/34 [R.V. 1934, n. 29], fasc. 4, no. 13: 'Rassismo, nazionalismo, comunismo, totalitarismo'; theses reprinted in Godman, *Der Vatikan und Hitler*, pp. 276–81.

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Anti-Semitism was not explicitly mentioned. It constantly appeared as a special case of racism and was understood as such. What is more, this corresponded to the logic of the Church's own perception: it was not aware of any shared guilt as regards anti-Semitism as a racist doctrine. But the first steps towards reflection on religious anti-Judaism had at least been taken. As the commentary on the draft decree stated: 'The differences between the races should not be exaggerated in such a way as to deny the unity of the human race established in the Revelation. It should never be forgotten that the law of love and justice applies to all races and that the Semitic race should not, under any circumstances, be excluded from this'.⁴³

However, the syllabus, worked on so thoroughly and so laboriously, was never issued in the form of a Holy Office decree. In November 1936 the congregation postponed the matter 'for an indefinite period', although the commission of enquiry was supposed to carry on working.⁴⁴ The reasons for this decision are laid down in the minutes of the meeting of 18 November. The Cardinals had come to the conclusion that 'in the present bitter conflict of ideas and forces, and in view of the great moral and social dangers', the Pope himself, not the Holy Office, should speak. The head of the Roman Catholic Church should confront the errors of the age with the central doctrines of Catholicism 'in a factual, positive, objective way'. But there should be no syllabus of theses to be condemned. Such lists—were the Cardinals still thinking about the repercussions of Pius IX's (1846–78) syllabus of 1864, condemning many ideas of the period such as rationalism, socialism, and freedom of religion as errors?—'were always difficult, stimulated discussions, provoked contradiction'. But if there were cogent reasons why it was not appropriate for the Pope to speak, then the Holy Office would have to keep quiet as well.⁴⁵

To be sure, within the Holy Office there were differences of opinion as to tactical aspects, and also about concrete issues, namely,

⁴³ ACDF, S.O. 3373/34 [R.V. 1934, n. 29], fasc. 4, no. 12, p. 16 (Schema Decreti, §17).

⁴⁴ Feria IV, 18 Nov. 1936; Acta Congr. Gen., S.O. 1936.

⁴⁵ S.O. Feria IV—18 Nov. 1936; ACDF, S.O. 187/1937 [R.V. 1938, n. 1]: 'Parigi—Comunismo. Circa il Movimento della stampa cattolica francese di tendenza democratica per la collaborazione con i comunisti ("Mano tesa")', vol. 2, fol. 139rv.

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whether Nazism, fascism, Communism, and racism should be condemned together or individually, and in which order. The suggestion that the syllabus of theses to be condemned should be abandoned, to avoid 'difficulties with the governments', was already there in the draft decree.⁴⁶ But none of the Eminences in the Holy Office was in favour of total silence. On the contrary: 'It is inconceivable that in the eyes of the world, in the eyes of the faithful, and also in the eyes of history, in view of such errors and such major deviations from the true doctrine of the Holy Church total silence on the part of the Church's Highest Authority could be justified when an authoritative word is wanted in so many quarters and is asked for.'⁴⁷ The Holy Office therefore extended an invitation to the Pope. Pius XI accepted and declared in the audience of 19 November that he would 'personally undertake something'.⁴⁸ At the same time the Pope confirmed the Holy Office's vote of 18 November – possibly under the influence of the Spanish Civil War – that a brief instruction on Communism should be prepared.

The session of the congregation on 18 November and the audience on 19 November set the course for the two encyclicals 'Mit brennender Sorge' and 'Divini Redemptoris'. The Holy Office, to which Pacelli also belonged, and the Pope had found a track to run on. Only the syllabus was 'postponed for an indefinite period', but not the question of whether they should speak out or not. News from Germany coming through at the same time also supported the idea of an encyclical. Since 19 August 1936 the Pope had had a request from the German bishops, in the form of a pastoral letter describing the situation of the Church in Germany, that he should make his position clear. This request more or less amounted to a demand that he condemn the Nazi regime publicly and *ex cathedra* now that all attempts by the bishops to uphold the concordat by conversations with representatives of the German government had failed. Even Cardinal Faulhaber's visit to Hitler on the Obersalzberg on 4 November 1936 could do nothing to change this. On 21 December Pacelli sent invitations to bishops Bertram, Faulhaber, Schulte,

⁴⁶ ACDF, S.O. 3373/34 [R.V. 1934, n. 29], fasc. 4, no. 12, p. 6 ('Schema Decreti').

⁴⁷ S.O. Feria IV, 18 Nov. 1936; ACDF, S.O. 187/1937 [R.V. 1938, n. 1] (see n. 45), fol. 139v.

⁴⁸ Feria V, 19 Nov. 1936; Acta Congr. Gen., S.O. 1936.

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Preysing, and Galen. In the new year things started to speed up. The Pope, the Secretary of State, and the bishops were working on the encyclical 'Mit brennender Sorge'. On 21 March 1937, Palm Sunday, it was read from the pulpits in Germany. Two days earlier, on 19 March, the encyclical 'Divini Redemptoris' had been promulgated.⁴⁹ Thus both the totalitarianisms – Nazism and Communism – had been condemned. But what had happened with racism?

Firstly, the encyclical 'Mit brennender Sorge' itself took up the subject of racism, and indeed in roughly as much detail as envisaged in the draft syllabus of October 1936. The encyclical rejected any attempt to make state, people, and race absolute. The principle of 'what is right is what is good for the people', it said, would lead to a perpetual state of war between the different nations and would disregard each individual person's God-given right to live their own life. 'None but superficial minds could stumble into concepts of a national God, of a national religion, or attempt to lock within the frontiers of a single people, within the narrow limits of a single race, God, the creator of the universe.' Divine revelation 'admits no substitutes or arbitrary alternatives such as certain leaders today pretend to draw from the so-called myth of race and blood'. Bearers of true, divine revelation were, in particular, the chosen race of the Old Testament: the Jews. 'Whoever wishes to see banished from Church and school the Biblical history and the wise doctrines of the Old Testament blasphemes the word of God.'⁵⁰

In terms of content, the two encyclicals of spring 1937 were not different from the draft presented by the Holy Office, though they differed in form: not a decree with an appendix of theses to be condemned, but a papal letter. Independent of this the congregation continued to work on a syllabus on racism. Those aspects of the racism problem not dealt with in 'Mit brennender Sorge' should receive attention 'in an appropriate place'.⁵¹ Secretary Sbarretti stressed that

⁴⁹ Evidence for this paragraph in Brechenmacher, 'Teufelspakt, Selbsterhaltung, universale Mission?', pp. 635–6.

⁵⁰ Encyclical 'Mit brennender Sorge', in Dieter Albrecht (ed.), *Der Notenwechsel zwischen dem Heiligen Stuhl und der deutschen Reichsregierung*, vol. 1: *Von der Ratifizierung des Reichskonkordats bis zur Enzyklika 'Mit brennender Sorge'* (Mainz, 1965), pp. 410, 411–12, 414, 415, 430.

⁵¹ ACDF, S.O. 3373/34 [R.V. 1934, n. 29], fasc. 4, no. 18 ('De "Rassismo"', Apr. 1937).

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'since the encyclical on the situation of Catholicism in Germany' there was 'no longer any reason not to address the issue of racism'.⁵² This meant that in the eyes of the Vatican the confrontation with Nazism had reached a level where no further hesitation was necessary.

And yet, the Eminences did hesitate again in June, because the position of the Church in Germany had been giving rise to even greater concern since the encyclical. After the encyclical had been read from the pulpits a wave of arrests, house searches, confiscations, and expropriations flooded the German church. For a second time, therefore, the Holy Office postponed the syllabus on *Comunismo e razzismo* 'for an indefinite period'.⁵³ Pius XI defended this decision by saying that 'in view of the difficult situation' we should wait, and 'take up the inquiry again' when the present storm has died down.⁵⁴ And during the 'period of respite' between the summer and autumn of 1937, the Holy Office did indeed draft a new initiative, this time with the aim of 'confronting the anti-Christian movement' of Nazism with a major offensive of world Catholicism. The Holy Office called for Catholics of all nations to join in. Led by nuncios, delegates, and bishops, large-scale courses and congresses should be held, and articles published that would 'explain and reject' Nazi theories—of which anti-Semitism was one. 'Concrete facts should also be presented to give a practical demonstration of the terrible consequences of applying these theories to both individuals and society as a whole.'⁵⁵ In December 1937 Sbarretti sent Giuseppe Graneris, a priest who worked in the Holy Office, to Munich with the text of the appeal, to see what Faulhaber thought of it. But he was not in favour. The danger to the Church in Germany, whose existence was severely threatened not only by political persecution and financial pressure, but also by trials for indecency against priests and monks staged for propa-

⁵² ACDF, S.O. 3373/34 [R.V. 1934, n. 29], fasc. 4, no. 19 ('Comunismo e Razzismo', May 1937).

⁵³ Feria IV, 2 Jun. 1937; Acta Congr. Gen., S.O. 1937.

⁵⁴ Ex. Aud. Ssmi Feria IV loco Vae, 4 Jun. 1937; Acta Congr. Gen., S.O. 1937.

⁵⁵ Draft of an international Holy Office initiative against National Socialism, no date [early Dec. 1937]; S.O. Feria IV, 18 Nov. 1936; ACDF, S.O. 187/1937 [R.V. 1938, n. 1], vol. 2, fol. 141-2; letter from the Holy Office Notary, Dalpiaz, to an unnamed cardinal, 9 Dec. 1937: the final text of the instruction submitted; *ibid.*, fol. 140r.

ganda purposes, was, he said, incalculable.⁵⁶ The Holy Office, Secretary of State Pacelli, and the Pope, who was undoubtedly informed, took Faulhaber's arguments seriously and withdrew the initiative—a decision that was to have serious consequences for the fate of the syllabus on racism.

Both the Holy Office and the Pope wanted racism to be condemned more than had already been done in 'Mit brennender Sorge'. Secretary Sbarretti had stated his opinion quite clearly in April 1937. At the end of March 1938 the assembly of expert consultants once more forcefully demanded publication of the October 1936 draft, in order to underpin the 'condemnation of Nazism and Communism' expressed in the encyclicals.⁵⁷ The Pope went along with this demand, at least the part that referred to racism. On 13 April 1938 a rescript was issued by the papal educational congregation calling on all Catholic universities and faculties to fight against the 'highly dangerous' false racist doctrine.⁵⁸ The *Osservatore Romano* published the text of this syllabus on racism on 3 May, the day on which Hitler arrived in Rome for a state visit.⁵⁹ The eight theses to be condemned were almost literally the same as those in the draft presented to the Holy Office by the commission of enquiry in October 1936.

Why was the 'syllabus on racism' issued not as a decree from the Holy Office, but as a rescript from a more lowly authority, the educational congregation? Fundamental dissent between Pope and Holy Office is hardly likely given the clear votes of the secretary and the consultants; on the other hand, it seems possible that individual cardinals were in favour of further cautious delay. One motive for such

⁵⁶ Graneris's notes on two meetings with Faulhaber, Rome, 2 Jan. 1938; ACDF, S.O. 187/1937 [R.V. 1938, n. 1], vol. 2, fol. 124r-125v.

⁵⁷ Feria II, 28 Mar. 1938; Acta Congr. Gen., S.O. 1938; cf. *ibid.* Feria V, 7 Apr. 1938.

⁵⁸ Ludwig Volk (ed.), *Akten deutscher Bischöfe über die Lage der Kirche 1933-1945*, vol. 4: 1936-1939 (Mainz, 1981), p. 506; also reproduced in Konrad Repgen, *Judenpogrom, Rassenideologie und katholische Kirche* (Cologne, 1988), pp. 21-2; Anton Rauscher (ed.), *Wider den Rassismus: Entwurf einer nicht erschienenen Enzyklika (1938): Texte aus dem Nachlaß von Gustav Gundlach SJ* (Paderborn, 2001), pp. 60-1; and Godman, *Der Vatikan und Hitler*, pp. 312-15.

⁵⁹ Rauscher (ed.), *Wider den Rassismus*, p. 61. On Pius XI's reaction to Hitler's visit to Rome cf. Brechenmacher, 'Teufelspakt, Selbsterhaltung, universale Mission?', pp. 638-40.

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delay could have been the position of the Church in Germany, which had already led to the offensive of autumn 1937 being abandoned. In the situation of spring 1938 the 'syllabus on racism' seems like a compromise between the desire for peace and the pressure for revolt. It met Sbarretti's demands—in part: the racism theses were condemned, but not by the Holy Office, 'only' by the educational congregation. It also went along with the consultants' vote—in part: the whole degree was not issued, only those parts dealing with racism. Nothing more was said about Nazism or Communism.

But Pius XI's anger was growing; he was showing himself to be increasingly prepared for open conflict with fascist Italy. In June he commissioned an American Jesuit, John LaFarge, to prepare the text of another encyclical which was to deal in depth with nationalism and racism as a sort of critique of modern culture. At the end of September LaFarge presented German, English, and French versions of an encyclical 'Societatis Unio' or 'Unity of the Human Race' to the *General Curia* of the Jesuits in Rome. Along with LaFarge and the French father Gustave Desbuquois, the German Jesuit Gustav Gundlach had formulated a large part of it.

Following on from general remarks about racism, the concluding paragraphs of the draft texts dealt explicitly with the Church's attitude to the Jews in historical perspective. Despite certain differences in emphasis they all adhered to a differentiation between anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism, naturally in a way that would have been totally counter-productive had the encyclical been published. For although the drafts did condemn racist anti-Semitism along with racism in general, they still insisted on a 'social segregation', a 'deep, essentially immovable boundary' that separated Jews and Christians because of what had happened in the Bible—the Jews' rejection of Christ.⁶⁰ 'The line that the Church has always taken in dealing with the People of Israel has always been determined by the basic princi-

⁶⁰ The German version (Gundlach's draft) is printed in Rauscher (ed.), *Wider den Rassismus*, pp. 64–167; the French version, which differs in some parts, is printed in Georges Passelecq and Bernard Suchecky, *Die unterschlagene Enzyklika: Der Vatikan und die Judenverfolgung* (Munich, 1997), pp. 193–288; concordance in Rauscher (ed.), *Wider den Rassismus*, pp. 168–70; the quotations are taken from Gundlach's draft, *ibid.*, p. 161; for corresponding passages in the French version see Passelecq and Suchecky, *Die unterschlagene Enzyklika*, pp. 261, 266.

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ple of preventing Christians and Jews from having damaging influence on one another.⁶¹ The fascist and Nazi propaganda machine would certainly have been able to twist words such as these from the mouth of the Pope.

Perhaps the clumsiness of three learned, but essentially other-worldly theologians was one of the reasons why the encyclical 'Societatis Unio' was first delayed and eventually disappeared in the archives. There were certainly also non-theological, purely political reasons why the encyclical was not issued: the Munich Agreement of autumn 1938 strengthened the position of Hitler and Mussolini. At the same time the conflict with fascist Italy over racial legislation intensified to such a degree that the consequences of an encyclical could no longer be calculated. The commitment to neutrality contained in the Lateran Treaty continued unchanged, not to mention the fact that the Vatican was economically dependent on the Italian state. Ultimately, was an encyclical on racism really so important? After all, the two previous papal letters and the educational congregation's rescript had already adequately formulated the Holy See's dogmatic position on this subject. A few days after he was elected in March 1939, Pius XII appears to have buried 'Societatis Unio' once and for all. There is nothing in the sources to reveal the details of this process. But if Pacelli read the drafts, then he, too, must have realized the problems involved in the theological statements about the Jews. Although he undoubtedly agreed with this theology himself, it would have been counter-productive in terms of his political-diplomatic aims in early 1939.

On 14 July 1938 the 'Manifesto of Racial Researchers' heralded a change in Italy's policy towards the Jews. 'It is time that the Italians freely confess to racism. The Jews are not part of the Italian race.'⁶² In the *Osservatore Romano* Pius XI asked why Italy felt it necessary to imitate Germany. Racism was barbarism.⁶³ While a storm broke out

⁶¹ Gundlach's draft, Rauscher (ed.), *Wider den Rassismus*, p. 165; on the whole, the French text seems more considered and theologically advanced, but it does not deviate from the basic position formulated by Gundlach; cf. Passelecq and Suchecky, *Die unterschlagene Enzyklika*, pp. 260-73.

⁶² 'Il fascismo e i problemi della razza', theses 7 and 9, quoted from Michele Sarfatti, *Mussolini contro gli ebrei: Cronaca dell'elaborazione delle leggi del 1938* (Turin, 1994), pp. 18-20, at p. 19.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-3.

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in the Nazi-compliant German press about this statement,⁶⁴ the Italian Foreign Minister, Galeazzo Ciano, summoned the nuncio to warn him. If the Pope carried on like this, he said, a clash was inevitable.⁶⁵ At the beginning of August, Ciano felt that the Pope was beginning to 'climb down' on the racial issue, but he was wrong.⁶⁶ On 5 September 1938 the first Italian racial law excluded all Jewish pupils, teachers, and lecturers from state schools and colleges. The next day Pius XI pronounced that anti-Semitism could not be reconciled with the basic tenets of Christianity. 'Anti-Semitism is unacceptable. In the spiritual sense we are Semites.'⁶⁷ The Pope's statement was occasioned by an audience for Belgian pilgrims; but it was clearly provoked by the Italian law, signed by the King.

Anyone who thinks that the suppression of the Holy Office decree meant silence on the part of Pius XI,⁶⁸ misinterprets the whole development since the encyclical 'Mit brennender Sorge'. The Pope's statements on racism and anti-Semitism were clear and unambiguous. There is a continuous line running from the Holy Office decree of 1928 containing the Pope's condemnation of anti-Semitism to the speech to the Belgian pilgrims in September 1938. Along with the Pope, the Holy See's leading politicians rejected the totalitarian ideologies of the twentieth century, including racist anti-Semitism, in their entirety, regardless of slight differences in emphasis on individual issues. Also there was no discernible attempt, apart from purely tactical considerations, to make one totalitarian ideology more significant than another, for example, to be more lenient towards Nazism in order to preserve its role as a bulwark against Communism. On the contrary, National Socialism and Communism, the consultors of the Holy Office stated at the end of March 1938, worked 'with the same methods, the same aims, and went hand in hand against the church'.⁶⁹

⁶⁴ On 2 Aug. 1938 Nuncio Orsenigo sent a dossier with relevant German press cuttings; AA.EE.SS., Germania, Pos. 739-41, fasc. 355.

⁶⁵ Galeazzo Ciano, *Diario 1937-1938* (Bologna, 1948), p. 216.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

⁶⁷ *Documentation Catholique*, 39 (1938), p. 1460.

⁶⁸ E.g., Godman, *Der Vatikan und Hitler*, p. 155.

⁶⁹ FERIA II, 28 Mar. 1938; Acta Congr. Gen., S.O. 1938.

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On the other hand, it should be asked whether, given the situation in Germany, the official Vatican statements from spring 1937 onwards were not too late, and too hesitant. If we are looking for a scandal in the history of the Holy See's dogmatic examination of Nazi ideology, then it is not in the fact that Hitler's *Mein Kampf* was not placed on the index, nor that the Holy Office did not itself speak out, but that this authority wasted two years in endless, learned discussions and scholastic nit-picking, while in Germany the persecution of the Jews was getting worse by the month. Here the structural shortcomings that had already brought down the Papal state were coming into play again. Friedrich Muckermann's diagnosis that the apparatus of the *Curia* lacked modernity and striking force hit the nail on the head. Of course, in all its essentials the Vatican's cautious approach towards Germany corresponded with the decisions of early 1933, which were guided by a strategic, traditional concept of diplomacy. A break with Germany, and indeed with Italy, was carefully avoided to the last. Concern about the survival of Church life in Germany dominated Rome's actions; everything else was of secondary importance. But even here the Church proved not to be of the same calibre as its opponent, since it clung far too long to the hope that sooner or later the Nazis would come back to Christian values, would respect concordats, and take note of encyclicals. When in autumn 1937 this hope finally evaporated and the Holy Office, with its international campaign against Nazism, signalled that it was ready for the final break, doubts on the part of the bishops in Germany – certainly not unfounded – led Vatican policy back on to the old track.

Was it too late when, at the end of 1936, Pope and Holy Office finally decided to go for an encyclical? Was it really necessary for another year to go by before the condemnations of Nazism and Communism followed the 'syllabus on racism'? Could the entire syllabus from the Holy Office have curbed the havoc being wreaked by the Nazis in Germany? Or would it simply have added more fuel to the fire, and with what consequences for the Church in Germany? Questions such as these also exercised the minds of those responsible in the Vatican; definite answers were, and remain, difficult to find.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

SOLDIERS INTO CITIZENS: 'WEHRMACHT' OFFICERS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1945-1960)

Kerstin von Lingen

JAY LOCKENOUR, *Soldiers as Citizens: Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1955*, Studies in War, Society and the Military (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), xii + 255 pp. ISBN 0 8032 2940 2. \$55.00

ALARIC SEARLE, *Wehrmacht Generals, West German Society, and the Debate on Rearmament, 1949-1959* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 344 pp. ISBN 0 275 97968 7. £45.99

BERT-OLIVER MANIG, *Die Politik der Ehre: Die Rehabilitierung der Berufssoldaten in der frühen Bundesrepublik*, Veröffentlichungen des Zeitgeschichtlichen Arbeitskreises Niedersachsen, 22 (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2004), 640 pp. ISBN 3 89244 658 X. EUR 48.00

In recent years, historians have been paying more attention to the veterans' associations and the chances they had to exert political influence, in particular, on the rearmament debate of the 1950s. At the same time, the German public has become more interested in its own suffering, focusing especially on the bombing of German towns, population displacements, and wartime captivity. Research on *Wehrmacht* soldiers is located in a field of tension between war crimes trials and the discourse of victimization. The politics of their representatives and the ways they found back into civilian life after 1945 have been in the foreground of interest. At the beginning of June this year, Manfred Messerschmidt published a newspaper article under the rather pointed title 'Soldat, Bürger, Kämpfer' (soldier, citizen, fighter), in which he outlined three stations on the long march from *Wehrmacht* soldier to citizen in no-man's-land who, because of ma-

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terial hardship, joined with like-minded people and became a fighter for his own cause in the new state.¹

Interest in the question of how rearmament and the re-establishment of the *Bundeswehr* in 1956 were possible, thus permitting individuals to return to military service, placed the soldiers' associations and lobby groups, and their opportunities to translate their aims into concrete action, among the important research themes relating to the history of the Federal Republic some time ago. There are well-founded analyses of the subject of veterans dating from the 1960s.² Since the 1980s Georg Meyer has published a number of important contributions in this area.³ His studies, and those by other historians, made a contribution by making inroads into the archive material, investigating the nature and extent of the employment found by ex-soldiers,⁴ while the problem of continuity, that is, the question of whether incriminated individuals were accepted into the Federal Republic's new armed forces, and what influence they had on society, could only be touched upon.⁵ The most recent studies, however, make clear that the debate in the early 1950s about the pensions

¹ Manfred Messerschmidt, 'Soldat, Bürger, Kämpfer: Bis heute haben die Streitkräfte der Bundesrepublik ein ambivalentes Verhältnis zum Erbe von Reichswehr und Wehrmacht', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 7 June 2005.

² Krafft Freiherr Schenck zu Schweinsberg, 'Die Soldatenverbände in der Bundesrepublik', in Georg Picht (ed.), *Studien zur politischen und gesellschaftlichen Situation der Bundeswehr* (Witten, 1965), vol. 1, pp. 96-177; Klaus Peter Tauber, *Beyond Eagle and Swastika: German Nationalism since 1945* (Middletown, Conn., 1967).

³ Georg Meyer, 'Zur Situation der deutschen militärischen Führungsschicht im Vorfeld des westdeutschen Verteidigungsbeitrages 1945-1950/51', in Roland G. Foerster et al. (eds.), *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956*, vol. 1: *Von der Kapitulation bis zum Plevan-Plan* (Munich, 1982), pp. 577-736; Georg Meyer, 'Soldaten ohne Armee: Berufssoldaten im Kampf um Standesehre und Versorgung', in Martin Broszat, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, and Hans Woller (eds.), *Von Stalingrad zur Währungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland* (Munich, 1988), pp. 683-750.

⁴ Cf. the excellent survey by Dieter Krüger, *Das Amt Blank: Die schwierige Gründung des Bundesministeriums für Verteidigung* (Freiburg, 1993); Detlev Bald, 'Alte Kameraden: Offizierskader in der Bundeswehr', in Ursula Breymayer (ed.), *Willensmenschen: Über deutsche Offiziere* (Frankfurt, 1999), pp. 50-64.

⁵ Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die Ära Adenauer: Gründerjahre der Republik 1949-1957* (Stuttgart, 1981); id., 'Die ausgebliebene Katastrophe: Eine Problemskizze

which were being demanded by ex-*Wehrmacht* soldiers acted as a catalyst for a wider veterans' movement. Groups of veterans were politically mobilized for the first time as a result, and continued to be active in associations even after their material demands had largely been met. Thus from 1949 at the latest, when Adenauer founded the new state, the veterans' objectives, which had originally been limited to lobbying for better treatment, changed in scope. The veterans' associations were now interested in a 'politics of honour' looking back to the past.

The debate about the military legacy, the uses to which military traditions should be put, and the crimes denied by the *Wehrmacht*, summed up in the slogan of the 'clean *Wehrmacht*', has accompanied the political culture of the Federal Republic from its inception to the present day—of course, at varying intensities and with varying degrees of success. Since reunification and the stimulation of the discussion of war crimes committed by the *Wehrmacht*,⁶ there has been greater public interest than ever before in recent German military history. And scholars, too, have returned to this issue with new questions and approaches.⁷ The studies under review here supplement

zur Geschichte der Bundesrepublik', in Hermann Rudolph (ed.), *Den Staat denken: Theodor Eschenburg zum Fünfundachtzigsten* (Berlin, 1993), pp. 151–74, at pp. 152 f.; Peter Reichel, 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung als Problem unserer politischen Kultur: Einstellungen zum Dritten Reich und seine Folgen', in Jürgen Weber and Peter Steinbach (eds.), *Vergangenheitsbewältigung durch Strafoerfahren? NS-Prozesse in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Munich, 1984), pp. 145–63; Klaus Naumann, 'Integration und Eigensinn: Die Sicherheitseliten der frühen Bundesrepublik zwischen Kriegs- und Friedenskultur', in Thomas Kühne (ed.), *Von der Kriegskultur zur Friedenskultur? Zum Mentalitätswandel in Deutschland seit 1945* (Münster, 2000), pp. 202–18.

⁶ Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann (eds.), *Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941–1944* (Hamburg, 1995); Thomas Kühne, 'Der nationalsozialistische Vernichtungskrieg und die "ganz normalen" Deutschen: Forschungsprobleme und Forschungstendenzen der Gesellschaftsgeschichte des Zweiten Weltkriegs', part 1, *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 39 (1999), pp. 580–663.

⁷ Thomas Kühne, 'Die Viktimisierungsfalle: Wehrmachtverbrechen, Geschichtswissenschaft und symbolische Ordnung des Militärs', in Michael Greven and Oliver von Wrochem (eds.), *Der Krieg in der Nachkriegszeit: Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Politik und Gesellschaft der Bundesrepublik* (Opladen, 2000), pp. 183–96.

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and carry this process forward. They concentrate on the significance of the veterans' participation in the Federal Republic's political discourse,⁸ and their renunciation of the previous regime. Ultimately, therefore, they provide an assessment of the democratic basis of Adenauer's first period of government. All three authors examine the integration of former career soldiers in the political and military institutions of the Federal Republic, and establish whether a professional group which supported Hitler's rule has been transformed into a reliably democratic institution.

The crucial factor in the integration, and occasional rehabilitation, of ex-*Wehrmacht* soldiers was the political framework. Norbert Frei coined the term *Vergangenheitspolitik* for this political process, which was composed of the elements of amnesty, integration, and setting boundaries.⁹ *Vergangenheitspolitik* refers to the political process by which the new West German society tried to deal with the legacies of the Third Reich. Most recently, interest has focused especially on the connection between how the legal system dealt with these issues and the changes which this policy underwent during the Cold War. In this context, Allied policy is of particular importance. Not only did the Allies dictate the first and therefore most influential decisions in respect, for example, of the payment of pensions, but they also conducted trials of officers and prescribed a political framework which survived at least until the new state was founded in 1949. Those ex-*Wehrmacht* soldiers with specific interests to pursue undoubtedly came together for the first time during the occupation period, thus setting the points for the later veterans' policy. In order to understand the problem, it is essential at this point to distinguish between various groups among the veterans, for the political effects of the campaigns of, for example, the Verband Deutscher Soldaten, can be presented as a contrast to the 'failures' of reformers such as Count Baudissin, or of individual campaigners for reform, such as Leo Geyr

⁸ See also Alaric Searle, 'Veterans' Associations and Political Radicalism in West Germany, 1951-1954: A Case Study of the Traditionsgemeinschaft Großdeutschland', *Canadian Journal of History*, 34 (1999), pp. 221-48.

⁹ Norbert Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit* (Munich, 1996), p. 14. Frei was initially referring to this phenomenon in Germany, but on the basis of his useful definition the concept has since been expanded to a wider context.

von Schweppenburg. But here the three authors in question differ markedly in their interpretations.

The definition of veterans' policy has two aspects, both of which are worth analysing in detail. This term refers not only to the policies made for the benefit of veterans, but also to the lobbying and public relations campaigns which this group conducted on its own behalf. We cannot speak of a 'policy' before the foundation of the Federal Republic, but this should not obscure the fact that measures were taken for or against the veterans before this time, and that even before the associations were founded in 1949, informal groups came together with the aim of making their concerns known to a wider public. It is therefore sensible to divide the subject into four phases: the first deals with the period from 1945 to 1949, when war-damage was removed; the second phase lasted from 1949 to 1953, the point at which Adenauer's government was politically consolidated by the signing of the General Treaty (*Deutschlandvertrag, Generalvertrag*); the third phase, lasting until 1956 and perhaps the most political, was characterized by the creation of new armed forces and the associated nominal solution of the problem of war criminals; and the final phase encompasses the decline and political marginalization of the veterans' associations from 1956.

Over the last decade or so, a number of interesting studies on soldiers' associations and veterans' politics have been published, largely based on relatively new archival material. These works, in particular, those by Jörg Echternkamp and Thomas Kühne, contribute to political history, but also to the history of mentalities, determined by concepts such as 'experience', 'remembrance', and 'memory'.¹⁰ Against this background, Searle and Lockenour offer a useful service

¹⁰ Jörg Echternkamp, 'Mit dem Krieg seinen Frieden schließen: Wehrmacht und Weltkrieg in der Veteranenkultur 1945-1960', in Kühne (ed.), *Von der Kriegskultur zur Friedenskultur?*, pp. 78-93; Jörg Echternkamp, 'Wut auf die Wehrmacht? Vom Bild der deutschen Soldaten in der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit', in Rolf-Dieter Müller and Hans-Erich Volkmann (eds.), *Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität* (Munich, 1999), pp. 1058-80; Jörg Echternkamp, 'Nationalismus in der deutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft 1945-1960', in id. and Sven Oliver Müller (eds.), *Die Politik der Nation: Deutscher Nationalismus in Krieg und Krisen 1760-1960* (Munich, 2002), pp. 219-46; Thomas Kühne, 'Zwischen Vernichtungskrieg und Freizeitgesellschaft: Die Veteranenkultur in Deutschland (1945-1995)', in Klaus Naumann (ed.),

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in that they locate the veterans within the political landscape of the early Federal Republic, and, for the first time, draw clear distinctions between the various levels of veterans' circles, with their different interests and opportunities to exert political influence. Manig, on the other hand, has written an important and detailed study of association politics and the various fields of political lobbying. The studies differ considerably not only in scope and methodology, but also in their analyses and conclusions. These differences are dictated not least by the types of sources they draw upon, and the period of time they cover.

By asking how successfully the ex-soldiers were integrated into the Bonn Republic in the period 1945 to 1956, Lockenour is able to draw conclusions concerning the stability of this democracy. He divides the veterans' associations into victims' associations, 'tradition' associations, and soldiers' associations with a clear political interest in political questions, and provides a useful survey of the period 1945 to 1955. His main point is to demonstrate the growing acceptance of the veterans and thus their successful integration in Adenauer's republic. Certainly, he draws his conclusions mainly from sources relating to the group of generals, from their papers and association publications, and generalizes from these to make statements relating to the situation of all soldiers, which sometimes creates the impression of foreshortening. In addition, the author himself frequently goes beyond his own period of investigation and traces later developments, drawing, for example, on publications such as that of the 'tradition' association Großdeutschland into the 1960s. Lockenour's use of source material written by soldiers' associations is problematic, however, because he takes the statements made there at face value, for example, relating to their difficult economic situation even after the amendment to Article 131 of the Basic Law, which reserved a certain number of official positions for wartime public sector employees. Incidentally, the American James Diehl, author of an

Nachkrieg in Deutschland (Hamburg, 2001), pp. 90-113; Thomas Kühne, 'Zwischen Männerbund und Volksgemeinschaft: Hitlers Soldaten und der Mythos der Kameradschaft', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 38 (1998), pp. 165-89; id., 'Kameradschaft-"das Beste im Leben des Mannes": Die deutschen Soldaten des Zweiten Weltkriegs in erfahrungs- und geschlechtergeschichtlicher Perspektive', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 22 (1996), pp. 504-29.

earlier study on the German veterans, the first English-language investigation of the subject, also relied on a very similar body of source material.¹¹

As the title of his book makes clear, Searle's study of the years 1949 to 1959 concentrates on the role of the *Wehrmacht* generals in the rearmament debate and on their position in the political discourse of the Federal Republic of Germany. On the basis of a typology, he pinpoints when an officer was promoted to the rank of general. Searle further examines the role of individual protagonists in the major military controversies of the early post-war period: the debate concerning the 20 July conspirators; the debate on the wearing of decorations; and, finally, the debate on military reform, which concerned the new philosophy of the armed forces, the principle of the 'citizen in uniform'. On the basis of these questions, conclusions can be drawn concerning the role of participating officers in the process of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (coming to terms with the past), and on the willingness of generals for reform. Searle also provides new research insights in his analysis of the trials of generals for war crimes in German courts in the late 1950s, which achieved massive public exposure. According to Searle, the public's negative attitude shows that there can be no question of an undifferentiated rehabilitation of the *Wehrmacht*.

Manig, by contrast, argues that the rehabilitation of career soldiers in the early Federal Republic was successful. He investigates the extent to which the political parties and the organs of government in the Federal Republic opposed, or even encouraged, nationalistic tendencies within the veterans' movement; asks what influence was exerted by the occupying powers; examines the economic, social, and psychological factors involved; and looks at the process of integration. It is not clear, however, why Manig stops his investigation in 1953, instead of continuing until 1956. After the ratification of the General Treaty in 1953, in particular, the soldiers' groups pursued a noticeable and effective policy, as many of the demands made in the CDU and FDP party manifestos show. Yet Manig has succeeded in producing a pioneering study for the period up to 1953, and offers completely new insights into the penetration of the CDU by veterans,

¹¹ James M. Diehl, *The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1993).

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and its responses to the demands of soldiers among the voting population. Previously, it had been assumed that soldiers' circles networked mainly with the FDP in the 1950s.¹²

However, any investigation of veterans' culture in the Federal Republic must start by looking at the immediate post-war period, when those involved felt that they were constantly being 'defamed'. It must treat topics such as the experience of total defeat, pensions, war crimes trials, and the public discourse of guilt, the legal aspects of which are of particular significance. In recent years, many studies of war crimes trials have been published, and these must be regarded as the starting point of any analysis of veterans' policy. After all, it was often in the context of these trials that the first lobby groups working for a rehabilitation of the soldiers made their appearance.¹³ Only then is it possible to examine the various strands of influence, demands, and forms of organization in respect of Germany's possible rearmament against the background of the foreign policy tensions of the Cold War. And finally, it will be necessary to look at the specific 'policy of honour' implicated in the problem of war criminals and its solution. When they achieved their long-term objective of having all war criminals released, the soldiers' associations had, as it were, made themselves redundant. Internal differences emerged more clearly, and resulted in the political marginalization of the associations.

¹² Dietrich Wagner, *FDP und Wiederbewaffnung: Die wehrpolitische Orientierung der Liberalen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949–1955* (Boppard, 1978).

¹³ Donald Bloxham, *Genocide on Trial: War Crime Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and Memory* (Oxford, 2001); Peter Maguire, *Law and War: An American Story* (New York, 2001); Joachim Staron, *Fosse Ardeatine und Marzabotto: Deutsche Kriegsverbrechen und Resistenza* (Paderborn, 2002); Michele Battini, *Peccati di Memoria: La mancata Norimberga italiana* (Rome, 2003); Kerstin von Lingen, *Kesselrings letzte Schlacht. Kriegsverbrecherprozesse, Veteranenpolitik und Wiederbewaffnung: Der Fall Kesselring* (Paderborn, 2004); Claudia Moisel, *Frankreich und die deutschen Kriegsverbrecher: Politik und Praxis der Straferfolgung nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Göttingen, 2004); Hinke Piersma, *De drie van Breda: Duitse oorlogsmisdadigers in Nederlandse gevangenschap, 1945–1989* (Amsterdam, 2005).

I *Problems of Providing for the Veterans and War Crimes Trials: 'Defamation' 1945–49*

In 1945, after complete defeat and millions of war dead, it initially seemed that anything military would be discredited for years. Lockenour emphasizes the double defeat which the lost war signified for soldiers, a professional one and a material one. Many former career soldiers left the internment camps, where 'automatic arrest' had placed them, into a hopeless situation in which they were forbidden to exercise their profession and unemployment was rife. Even the simplest workshops did not want to employ a 'militarist' because they feared difficulties with the occupiers or harboured their own resentments. Manig comments: 'Social degradation and delegitimization were direct consequences of a national catastrophe for which the military leadership had to take joint responsibility. Social degradation and delegitimization, however, are not to be confused with discrimination and defamation, two slogans which soon shaped the group identity of the career soldiers, and would bring it back to life' (p. 585).

Criminal proceedings, in particular, the Nuremberg trials, contributed to the social rejection of career officers, and to their feeling of being 'defamed'. Although the judges did not have access to anything like the details known today, the Nuremberg trials demonstrated clearly to a majority of the German people that Hitler's *Wehrmacht* had been involved in planning and executing a war of aggression, in which certain units were not only witnesses but also perpetrators of, or responsible for, crimes that had been committed behind the front line.¹⁴ Yet after the formal acquittal of the general staff in 1946, the view spread through the general public that while the *Wehrmacht* had been misused, it had, apart from individual wrongdoers, remained essentially 'decent'.¹⁵ This myth of the 'clean

¹⁴ Wolfram Wette, 'Fall 12: Der OKW-Prozess', in Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.), *Der Nationalsozialismus vor Gericht: Die alliierten Prozesse gegen Kriegsverbrecher und Soldaten 1943–1952* (Frankfurt/Main, 1999), pp. 199–212, at p. 202.

¹⁵ Wolfram Wette, 'Das Bild der Wehrmacht-Elite nach 1945', in Gerd R. Ueberschär (ed.), *Hitlers militärische Elite*, vol. 2 (Darmstadt, 1998), pp. 293–308, at p. 294; Manfred Messerschmidt, 'Vorwärtsverteidigung. Die "Denkschrift der Generale" für den Nürnberger Gerichtshof', in Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann (eds.), *Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1945* (Hamburg, 1995), pp. 531–50.

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Wehrmacht' must be considered the first building block of the later consensus upon which the Federal Republic was founded. This potential was immediately recognized by the veterans, mostly by those who were to be found around the defence lawyers. The war crimes trials were, therefore, the first platform for a veterans' policy to benefit those who had taken part in the war and whose aim was to create meaning for the former soldiers.

After the shock of the Nuremberg military tribunal and the conviction of the two highest-ranking German officers in the Armed Forces High Command (OKW), Keitel and Jodl, we can see that under the leadership of the defence individual officers separated themselves, as it were, from their real wartime experiences,¹⁶ and closed ranks to fight for social rehabilitation. They did all they could to distance the *Wehrmacht* intellectually from the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime. Moreover, the new slogan of 'restoring honour' was associated with the idea that the *Wehrmacht* had not lost its honour as a result of the way in which it had conducted itself during the war; rather, it was claimed, the Allies had taken away the *Wehrmacht's* honour through the criminal convictions of representative leaders, and by imposing humiliating collective measures and deliberate social degradation.

Manig's chapters surveying career officers in the Nazi state, the measures taken by the Allies (de-Nazification, de-militarization), and the social position of career officers after 1945 are highly informative. Lockenour, too, describes this phase of exclusion and material hardship vividly, although the suspicion sometimes arises that he has read too many of the associational publications, such as *Der Notweg*, and taken them at face value. In his introductory chapter Searle, by contrast, pays more attention to the experiential impact of Zero Hour, and examines how the officer corps dealt with defeat, criminal prosecutions, and the post-war period, shaped by their personal experiences as prisoners-of-war or defendants, Allied measures, and the acceptance of political realities such as the division of Germany and the East-West conflict.

As Lockenour shows, however, in 1945 there was a fundamental difference compared with the aftermath of the First World War: sol-

¹⁶ On the loss of reality cf. Wolfram Wette, *Die Wehrmacht: Feindbilder, Vernichtungskrieg, Legenden* (Frankfurt/Main, 2002), p. 192.

diers interned by the Allies and initially kept distant from the nation-building process were less able to hatch intrigues, and simply had to come to terms with the situation. Many individuals who wanted to put themselves in the service of their country again and were eager to wipe out the disgrace of the lost war by personal commitment, wrote letters to the newspapers and took part in public debates in the first years of the republic. 'Serving the people rather than undermining the state became the goal of career soldiers and their organizations, which is a marked contrast with the 1920s' (Lockenour, p. 183).

II '*Vergangenheitspolitik*' up to 1949

If the first veterans' meetings were dominated by questions of providing for their members, from as early as 1947 backroom deliberations were taking place about Germany making a military contribution in the Cold War, and once the Federal Republic was founded, these were conducted in public. The fate of men such as Field Marshal Albert Kesselring who, along with Erich von Manstein, was the figurehead of the veterans' associations, came to symbolize the triad of personal humiliation, war crimes trials, and political networking among interested circles.

As the president of three of the veterans' associations, Kesselring was to have some influence on the fate of the Federal Republic in the 1950s. He continued in his pre-war views, which had changed little, and made himself a pioneer when, for the last time, he gave his soldiers intellectual guidance and left them in no doubt that what was required after 1945 was nothing less than historical rehabilitation. Shortly after the end of the war, he had noted in his diary that what counted now was to win at least the last, historical crusade so that millions of ex-soldiers could have the chance to find some sense in the war effort, at least in retrospect.¹⁷ They had assembled for the 'last battle in Italy', which would have to be won. After the lost war, the planned campaign of rehabilitation was intended to give the

¹⁷ Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg, N 750 (Kesselring Papers), vol. 2: 'Londoner Tagebuch' (containing reflections on his task as a 'historical personality') and vol. 3: 'Prozesstagebuch Kesselring', entry of 9 Feb. 1947: 'Der Kampf beginnt'.

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Wehrmacht at least a moral victory. He thus coined the motto which applied not only to his war crimes trial of 1947, which ended in a death sentence and was commuted shortly thereafter to life imprisonment, but also to the later campaign for a pardon when he was in the British military prison in Werl, from where he was released in 1952. But in the end it was only international involvement and the formation of a war criminals' lobby that had the desired effect: political pressure was created through the issue of war criminals, and Adenauer and the Allies could not ignore it.

The trial of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein in 1949 showed clearly that the political intentions of the Western Allies had changed from wanting to punish war criminals to a desire to reintegrate Germany into the community of nations and post-war alliances.¹⁸ The press reported in a way favourable to the offender about the 'political show trial', and the debate about drawing a line under the German past and the Allied trials began to gather momentum.¹⁹ The campaign for the release of Albert Kesselring, which was conducted from 1950 and achieved success in October 1952, also demonstrated how much pressure the war criminals' lobby could exert when it acted together.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the veterans represented only a small percentage of the powerful war criminals' lobby. In the analysis of Kesselring's case, it becomes clear that the veterans had links with many other social, church, and professional groups, institutions, and associations (such as, for example, the Heidelberger Juristenkreis founded by the defence lawyers at the Nuremberg Trials, and the Zentrale Rechtsschutzstelle des Bundesjustizministe-

¹⁸ Donald Bloxham, 'Punishing German Soldiers during the Cold War: The Case of Erich von Manstein', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 33/4 (1999), pp. 25-45; J. H. Hoffman, 'German Field Marshals as War Criminals? A British Embarrassment', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 23 (1988), pp. 17-35; Oliver von Wrochem, 'Die Auseinandersetzung mit Wehrmachtverbrechen im Prozeß gegen den Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein 1949', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 4 (1998), pp. 329-53; id., 'Rehabilitation oder Strafverfolgung: Kriegsverbrecherprozeß gegen Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein im Widerstreit britischer Interessen', *Mittelweg* 36, 6/3 (1997), pp. 26-36.

¹⁹ Lingen, *Kesselrings letzte Schlacht*, pp. 180-8; Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik*, p. 159.

riums). In most of these cases, no genuine identification with military concerns could be established; rather, self-interest or moral considerations were exploited.²⁰ Journalists and politicians abroad,²¹ especially in the USA and Britain, were in many ways targeted and fed with specific information.²² This made it possible for the foreign lobbyists to build up their influence and to exert pressure on the governments of the USA, Britain, and Germany by means of parliamentary initiatives (for example, Lord Maurice Hankey's petitions for debates in the House of Lords; Senator William Langer's resolutions in the US Congress).

III *Political Influence and the Politics of the Association Movement after 1949*

The interest of the Western Allies in war crimes gave the whole issue great political weight in Germany, and it became one of the major topics of debate after the Federal Republic was founded in 1949.²³ In the course of the public debate, the veterans' associations managed semantically to merge the prisoners-of-war who were still incarcerated and those who had been legally convicted as war criminals into a single group, and to demand, without differentiation, 'freedom for all those convicted because of the war'. Thus they transformed this group into a vehicle for their demand for the rehabilitation of the

²⁰ Frei states that there was a fluid boundary between 'apologists, the stubborn, and those who asked for mercy from Christian conviction or for humanitarian reasons'. Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik*, p. 217.

²¹ Alaric Searle, 'A Very Special Relationship: Basil Liddell Hart, Wehrmacht Generals and the Debate on West German Rearmament, 1945-1953', *War in History*, 5/3 (1998), pp. 327-57.

²² Lingen, *Kesselrings letzte Schlacht*, ch. 4: 'Die Politisierung der Kriegsverbrecherfrage' and ch. 5: 'Freiheit für Kesselring', esp. pp. 249 ff.

²³ Roland G. Foerster, 'Innenpolitische Aspekte der Sicherheit Westdeutschlands 1947-1950', in id. et al. (eds.), *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945-1956*, vol. 1, pp. 403-576; Norbert Wiggershaus, 'Die Entscheidung für einen westdeutschen Verteidigungsbeitrag 1950', *ibid.*, pp. 325-402; Hans-Erich Volkmann, 'Die innenpolitische Dimension Adenauerscher Sicherheitspolitik in der EVG-Phase', in Lutz Köllner et al. (eds.), *Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik*, vol. 2: *Die EVG-Phase* (Munich, 1990), pp. 235-604.

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Wehrmacht. We must, however, distinguish between the political implications of this question, in particular with regard to German domestic politics and Adenauer's attitude, and the internal debates within the veterans' associations concerning the creation of a military heritage.

Amnesty and integration were an essential guarantee of internal stability in the early years of the Federal Republic, whose attractiveness increased with its economic expansion, and permanently secured the loyalty of the old élites. Not least in response to Allied pressure, a basic anti-Nazi consensus had emerged in the Federal Republic. In this context Adenauer adopted an expedient optimism for his own purposes. In addition to dealing with the impact of domestic crises on foreign policy, he was generally interested in making possible the integration of a large number of potential electoral supporters.

On the basis of this mixture of motives, Adenauer applied to the Allied High Commissioners as early as 1950 for a new German army to be set up, and for all those 'convicted because of the war' to be released. This caused enormous anxieties on the part of the French, in particular.²⁴ Manig establishes the existence of this interplay between the Federal Republic's foreign policy interests, and concessions to the former career soldiers and their institutional integration, but rejects the political price of this deal as too high. Yet the process of German reintegration in exchange for giving up war crimes trials was irreversible, and remained the priority of Allied policy.

Adenauer also favoured giving the issue of war crimes greater priority for party political reasons. Ultimately, by claiming that the number of real criminals in the army had been 'extraordinarily small', he gave his official sanction to the notion that 'war crimes had been a marginal phenomenon in the mass army'. The rehabilitation of the soldiers' honour, a point which Eisenhower made emphatically, although, admittedly, at a time of enormous political pressure during the Korean War, superficially appears as a *scandalous* alliance of expediency in post-war society. After all, it paved the way for public repression of large parts of the Nazi war. Of course, it is sometimes forgotten that these 'declarations of honour' were countered by embarrassing public appearances by association functionaries, or by

²⁴ Moisel, *Frankreich und die deutschen Kriegsverbrecher*, pp. 128 ff.

individual militarist politicians from the officer corps who looked to the past as Searle and Manig point out. Yet it is undeniable that in the early 1950s the representatives of officers' interests, in interviews and memoirs, not only established the idea of a 'clean *Wehrmacht*', but cemented it.²⁵ In detailed studies, Thomas Kühne has pointed especially to the myth of comradeship as a normative power, which, also after 1945, contributed to the proliferation of this image.²⁶

In order to obtain the consent of the *Bundestag*, and thus the voters, for the planned rearmament, a discussion about the role of the military had to be held in the new German state. Given the success story of German rearmament, it is often forgotten that this debate deeply polarized society in the Federal Republic, and that soldiers were among the critics of a new German army.²⁷ Therefore an investigation of the internal structure and debates within the various groupings which presented themselves as the veterans' mouthpieces is especially significant. Since the foundation of the Federal Republic, they had positioned themselves in public, and to some extent also in the party political landscape. Such an investigation is necessary in order to allow anything to be said about the homogeneity of the veterans' groups, and about those who were interested in the rehabilitation of the soldiers.

Particularly illuminating and in part highly surprising is Searle's analysis of the interconnections between the Amt Blank (predecessor of the Federal Ministry of Defence), the Control Group, and the Organisation Gehlen (predecessor of the Federal Intelligence Service). A central opinion-forming role was taken by men such as

²⁵ Klaus Naumann, 'Nachkrieg als militärische Daseinsform: Kriegsprägungen in drei Offiziersgenerationen der Bundeswehr', in id. (ed.), *Nachkrieg in Deutschland* (Hamburg, 2001), pp. 444–72; Friedrich Gerstenberger, 'Strategische Erinnerungen: Die Memoiren deutscher Offiziere', in Heer and Naumann (eds.), *Vernichtungskrieg*, pp. 620–33.

²⁶ Thomas Kühne, 'Zwischen Männerbund und Volksgemeinschaft: Hitlers Soldaten und der Mythos der Kameradschaft', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 38 (1998), pp. 165–89. Cf. also id., *Mythos der Kameradschaft und die deutschen Soldaten des II. Weltkriegs* (forthcoming); and id., 'Kameradschaft – "das Beste im Leben des Mannes" '.

²⁷ Michael Geyer, 'Der Kalte Krieg, die Deutschen und die Angst: Die westdeutsche Opposition gegen die Wiederbewaffnung und Kernwaffen', in Naumann (ed.), *Nachkrieg in Deutschland*, pp. 267–318, at pp. 274 ff.

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Gottfried Hansen, who later led the Verband Deutscher Soldaten, and the former generals Hans Speidel and Adolf Heusinger, who acted as unofficial advisers to Adenauer and served as a connection between veterans and politics.²⁸ Adenauer had long-serving officers, secluded in the Himmerod monastery in the Eifel, draw up a blueprint for the internal structure and philosophy of the future armed forces, and they were also given the chance to articulate demands for the rehabilitation of career soldiers.²⁹

Yet the ideas for reform that accompanied the development of the *Bundeswehr* cast doubt on the validity of the military heritage. The confrontation with the role of the military in the war turned out to be more difficult than expected. Klaus Naumann has pointed out that the legacy of total war has had a more lasting impact on German society than has generally been assumed so far.³⁰ Many officers had never considered the possibility that fundamental military virtues such as bravery, doing one's duty, and discipline could also be used for immoral and criminal aims, let alone accepted that violations of international law had taken place on the German side. Most officers were not prepared publicly to think beyond their oath to Hitler, which silenced any pangs of conscience, and the resulting relationship of unconditional obligation.

The success of the veterans' organizations at least in the lobby work relating to the 'so-called war criminals' in 1951 and 1952 must not blind us to the fact that there was a time of reflection among officers' circles during the immediate post-war period. The knowledge that they had served a criminal cause resulted in many adopting a new position—but only in private, as Lockenour and Searle show. The external impact was quite different: veterans' associations and politicians were in favour of well-known military leaders taking the lead in the debate on rearmament, and pushing ahead the 'politics of honour' for the benefit of the *Wehrmacht*.

²⁸ Georg Meyer, *Adolf Heusinger: Dienst eines deutschen Soldaten 1915–1964* (Hamburg, 2001).

²⁹ Hans-Jürgen Rautenberg and Norbert Wiggershaus, 'Die "Himmeroder Denkschrift" vom Oktober 1950: Politische und militärische Überlegungen für einen Beitrag der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zur westeuropäischen Verteidigung', *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen*, 21 (1977), pp. 135–206.

³⁰ Naumann (ed.), *Nachkrieg in Deutschland*, p. 21.

Thus, as Searle has shown, the conclusions which the military leadership élite drew from the lost war are crucial for an assessment of the stability of social structures in the early phase of the Federal Republic of Germany. Although many were thankful to Theodor Heuss for his unconditional championing of old soldiers, his opinion that after a few victorious campaigns, the 'bleeding to death of an overstretched army' could not constitute a *tradition* remained incomprehensible to them. According to Heuss, in clear contrast to the prevailing opinion among soldiers' circles, tradition could only grow out of civil courage and resistance: 'This army found its martyrs in the soldiers of 20 July, whose revolt might have hoped to spare the fatherland from total devastation—with their failure, their dying, a core of the army's inner tradition of decency, of chivalry towards the defeated, was also destroyed.'³¹

The notion that the men of 20 July, whom Kesselring and many of his comrades continued to regard as 'traitors to the fatherland', could be presented to the young army as role models was adamantly rejected. Consequently, all three studies place particular emphasis on the 20 July plot. The notion of a military duty of allegiance, upon which there had been general agreement up to that time, had obviously broken apart on 20 July 1944,³² and the discussion between 'oath breakers' and 'oath keepers' revealed the lack of common yardsticks. Here too, as all three studies show, various lines of interpretation overlapped to produce a negative picture as a whole. Searle demonstrates that there was never anything like a uniform opinion on this question among the generals as a group. Lockenour comes to the conclusion that the course taken by the debate concerning 20 July shows how much chance dictated the agenda. He suggests that a coincidence between the domestic goals of the political parties, those of the veterans, and public expectations finally produced valid linguistic prescriptions. In addition to conservative 'oath keepers', as Lockenour stresses, anti-Communist considerations led to a rejection of the assassination attempt, which allegedly accelerated the Soviet

³¹ Theodor Heuss, 'Soldatentum in unserer Zeit', speech held on 12 Mar. 1959, published in Theodor Heuss, *Politiker und Publizist: Aufsätze und Reden*, ed. Martin Vogt (Tübingen, 1984), pp. 488–99, at p. 495.

³² Peter Steinbach, 'Widerstand und Wehrmacht', in Müller and Volkmann (eds.), *Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität*, pp. 1,150–70.

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advance and thus the loss of the eastern part of the country. From this point of view, rejection of the assassination attempt counted as a rejection of the division of Germany.

Yet passionate debates also flared up on issues such as what the new armed forces should be called, and the wearing of medals, clearly reflecting the officers' expectations. Formalities such as uniforms and medals, as well as forms and conventions, and the role of the soldiers formerly in the Waffen-SS,³³ who, for a number of reasons, were unable to integrate into democratic society, as Manig outlines, provided opportunities for heated debates. Many did not want to admit that the military tradition as a whole had become brittle and dubious during the Third Reich, when the military had hardly dared to protest at increasingly ideological warfare. Manig, however, goes too far when, referring to the unsuccessful integration of the Waffen-SS, which was unable to take part in such discussions on account of group cohesion, he generalizes: 'The rehabilitation of career soldiers, as the example of the HIAG [association of veterans of the Waffen-SS] shows, was, from 1951, always also a rehabilitation of Nazis' (p. 584).

IV *Marginalization after 1956*

By focusing on the issue of war crimes, the veterans' associations faced problems of legitimacy once they had achieved their material goal of making adequate provision for former *Wehrmacht* officers, and the war crimes issue had been resolved. In addition to squabbles within the associations, the causes and course of which are traced by Lockenour and Manig, the latter following them at least until 1953, it was the generals' trials at the end of the 1950s in particular which contributed to the dismantling of the *Wehrmacht* myth. These trials, in which individual generals were indicted for crimes against German soldiers during the final phase of the war, served two purposes. Their primary goal was to uncover crimes, but they also served to encourage social distancing from those who still refused to take note of the cruel side of Nazi Germany's war.

³³ D. Clay Large, 'Reckoning Without the Past: the HIAG of the Waffen-SS and the Politics of Rehabilitation in the Bonn Republic, 1950-1961', *Journal of Modern History*, 59 (1987), pp. 79-113.

Unlike the Nuremberg Trials and the war crimes' trials of the late 1940s, the trials which were held from 1957 involved for the first time a perception and public discussion of the crimes, and therefore had a demonstrable impact on the consciousness of society. The press coverage of the trials makes clear that the consensus of the immediate post-war period, according to which German officers were unjustly persecuted by the victors, was broken. One factor which contributed to this was that the press reported widely how the former military icons compromised themselves as military experts before the courts. More clearly than any Allied propaganda could do, the ex-officers themselves often demonstrated the continued existence of a Nazi ideology of war which ruled them out from military service for the new state.

The fact that crimes against German soldiers in the last days of the war had taken place clearly demonstrated the fanaticism of certain officers and made it possible for the German people to show empathy with other victims in a way which they had previously been unable to do. Searle's analysis of the various proceedings, in particular, those against Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner, feared by his own soldiers as 'bloody Ferdinand', the Manteuffel trial, and the three Toltsdorff trials, allows the conclusion that the process of social rehabilitation of these officers, which had been largely complete, was now reversed by the officers themselves. This had far-reaching consequences for the way in which the officer corps perceived itself, and for its social acceptance. In the generals' trials, the veterans' associations, which had aims to do with rehabilitation and *Vergangenheitspolitik*, encountered a new critical public which, in contrast to 1945, now demanded to know the 'truth' about the war in court. As a result, as Searle shows, the myth of the 'clean *Wehrmacht*' was not unrefuted,³⁴ although it survived, at least in the public memory, until well into the 1990s.

How soldiers had behaved in the final weeks of the war was also of great significance for the personnel policies of the *Bundeswehr*, particularly in relation to the first appointments to higher positions.

³⁴ See also Alaric Searle, 'Revising the "Myth" of a "Clean *Wehrmacht*": Generals' Trials, Public Opinion, and the Dynamics of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in West Germany, 1948-60', *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London*, 25/2 (Nov. 2003), pp. 17-48.

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Future soldiers had to be examined by the *Personalgutachterausschuß* (personnel screening committee). In a reversal of the verdicts of 1945, now public opinion agreed that displaying civil courage, preventing unnecessary destruction, and saving the lives of their own soldiers was considered exemplary behaviour. Towards the end of the 1950s a consensus emerged, in contrast to many of the positions adopted in the immediate post-war period, that the behaviour of higher commanders in the final year of the war was unacceptable and new models of military behaviour needed to be sought. Anyone who, after 1950, still defended the senseless sacrifices of the last days of the war had either not understood the new value system that had established itself, or refused to acknowledge the real nature of the war.

V Conclusion

To draw these various threads together, it can be said by way of conclusion that all three studies show in detail how narrow was the real opportunity veterans' associations and soldiers' representatives had to exert influence on some of the most important political issues affecting rearmament, especially on debates peaking between 1951 and 1952, during the 'Yes and No movement', or within the social struggle for soldiers' pensions. Yet the three authors come to different conclusions regarding the homogeneity of the group under investigation. It is therefore indispensable to define exactly the group, that is, the officers in question, before discussing their relation to rehabilitation and integration, the two terms that today seem to characterize veterans' policy in Germany.

No homogenous group of veterans with a clearly defined influence can, in general, be detected, even if the point of departure for post-war development was similar. In this context an observation made by Lockenour is important. He points out that the internment of *Wehrmacht* soldiers in Allied prisons, intended to impose social isolation, provided the best conditions for the veterans to organize. In fact, it turned a professional association into an interest group. It is often overlooked, however, that even this initial collective movement was not homogeneous. Many officers who were interested in a fight for adequate social provision, that is, pensions, could not be integrated into the newly founded veterans' associations which, after 1949,

worked in the area of *Vergangenheitspolitik* and defended the 'politics of honour'. Manig emphasizes the controversies around General Johannes Frießner, while Searle takes as his examples the disputes between Baudissin and Heusinger, and the attitude of Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg, who consistently distanced himself from the associations, but whose private papers, now held by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich, testify to harsh criticism and internal fighting.

The political conditions under which the 'politics of honour' could be defended at all are central to any assessment of the success of the veterans' associations. Adenauer, the veterans' associations, and the Allies concluded a form of truce when it came to certain issues affecting the political treatment of the past. All three studies convincingly demonstrate that Adenauer was not an omnipotent puppeteer pulling strings in the background, but that he was caught up in network of political relationships and reacted to different political expectations and represented the party political interests of the CDU. The Allies, by contrast, were pursuing foreign policy interests with the aim of integrating West Germany into the military bloc system of the 1950s.

Although the veterans' associations had many institutional successes after 1949, a number of qualifications need to be made, as Lockenour points out. The Verband Deutscher Soldaten owed its success to political developments during the Cold War, which made a pragmatic foreign policy seem more important than punishing each individual officer for war crimes, and which conferred something like prestige, if not elite status, on the group of generals planning for rearmament. This result considerably reduces the significance of veterans' associations and the political influence of their spokesmen. Nor must we lose sight of the fact that very few of the re-employed officers had any real political influence. Despite all the interest politics being visibly pursued, there can be no question of a soldiers' 'state within the state', as was the case after the First World War.

Ultimately, therefore, the term 'rehabilitation' is inappropriate as a comprehensive characterization of the 'politics of honour'. Rehabilitation has a number of facets which cannot be regarded in isolation from each other. A purely mechanistic view which equates re-employment with rehabilitation, as Manig sometimes seems to suggest, is ultimately inadequate. The fact of re-employment initially tells us something about the state of majorities on the personnel

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screening committee and the distribution of seats in parliament, that is, about the political interests of the others, but not about the position of power of the Verband Deutscher Soldaten, for example.

The question of rehabilitation, therefore, can be answered only inadequately on the basis of sources drawn from party or association history. The analysis of the effect of newspaper articles and editorials on the generals' trials, as undertaken by Searle, by contrast, offers more direct access to the concept of rehabilitation and to the question of to what extent the pre-1945 social status of officer could, or could not, be achieved again. For it was the aim of the former military élite to recapture the social standing which the German military had enjoyed up to 1945, despite military defeat, and to regain political power. This aim was not fully achieved. And any degree of success which had been achieved was reversed by the generals' trials in the second half of the 1950s.

The influence exerted by veterans' associations on politics points to a further aspect: at stake were interpretations, myths, and images, and the memory of the war which had just been lost – in other words, the Federal Republic's culture of remembrance. For the integration of the soldiers, a 'declaration of honour' and a positive view of their service to the defunct state were of great significance for the development of a generally valid form of remembrance. This does not mean, however, that the rest of West German society accepted this assessment.

The catchphrase 'rehabilitation' is often taken as evidence of the integration of *Wehrmacht* officers and the success of their *Vergangenheitspolitik*. Thus the history of the veterans' associations, and the verdict on the success of integration, contains the answer to the question of the stability of Adenauer's post-war democracy and the loyalty of the old functional élites which found a place in it. The internal disagreements between individual groups on questions of rearmament and its implementation meant that democratic structures established themselves in the officers' corps as well, so that Searle and Lockenour find a far-reaching integration and identification with the new state among former career soldiers. The original unanimity among officers, who were united in their purpose of achieving better material provision, however, as all three authors show, was lost by 1954 in the heated debates about the new armed forces; at issue was finding a common position on how to confront their own past.

Soldiers into Citizens

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BENJAMIN ARNOLD, *Power and Property in Medieval Germany: Economic and Social Change c. 900–1300* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), xi + 200 pp. ISBN 0 19 927221 2. £45.00

Benjamin Arnold, until his recent retirement Professor of Medieval History at the University of Reading, counts as one of Britain's foremost experts on medieval Germany. He is best known for his book *Count and Bishop in Medieval Germany*,¹ and his trilogy on the functioning of ruling élites in the medieval German Empire, published between 1985 and 1997.²

Inspired by this work, his latest book focuses on economic and social change in medieval German society. The book is divided into five chapters. The first sets the scene, describing the social, economic, and legal legacy of the Carolingian age. Pointing to the economic advances made under the Ottonians, the population increase, and the growth of urban communities, Arnold portrays eleventh-century Germany as comparatively rich; its social structure was, as one would expect, far more complex than contemporary models suggested (for example, the division into three distinct orders). The second chapter deals with 'Peasants, Lords and their Resources', and describes manorial organization, the living conditions of the peasants, their social and legal status, and how the internal and external colonization of land could improve their situation. Having also looked at peasants' protests as a response to the various forms of rural oppression, Arnold is none the less left with the 'chilling impression of joyless lives lived by the hundred thousand' (p. 74). In chapter three he turns to the assets of the German crown, the greatest single landholder until the fourteenth century. During the *Interregnum* (1250–73), the crown suffered considerable losses. In trying to

¹ Benjamin Arnold, *Count and Bishop in Medieval Germany: A Study of Regional Power, 1100–1350* (Philadelphia, 1991).

² Benjamin Arnold, *German Knighthood, 1050–1300* (Oxford, 1985); id., *Princes and Territory in Medieval Germany* (Cambridge, 1991); id., *Medieval Germany, 500–1300: A Political Interpretation* (Basingstoke, 1997).

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recover them King Rudolf of Habsburg, elected in 1273, employed three methods, which, according to Arnold, were to set guidelines for the royal fiscal policy for the rest of the Middle Ages: first, the recovery of lost property through legal action; secondly, the extension of the ruling dynasty's holdings by obtaining new territories within the Empire; and thirdly, the exploitation of the financial power of the royal towns by taxation or pledging.

The world of the medieval German town is at the centre of the fourth chapter, entitled 'The Urban Milieu and Civic Status'. While pre-1100 towns were 'relatively weak in their political relation to the crown, the Church and the secular aristocracy', the towns after 1100 'constituted a powerful economic and social force' (p. 117). Exposed to crime, war, fire, and fatal diseases, towns were dangerous places to live in; yet, promising economic success and enhanced social and legal status, they continuously attracted people from rural areas. Depending on their size and economic power, towns could play different political roles. The majority of towns were small and remained under the control of the local territorial prince. These towns often functioned as administrative, military, and economic centres and thus strengthened territorial rule. A number of towns, however, grew large and achieved (semi-)autonomous status. In order to pursue their economic and political interests they occasionally organized themselves in leagues, the *Hansa* being the most successful of them. Finally, in his fifth chapter, 'Property, Piety, and Castles', Arnold looks at castles recycled as monasteries in order to analyse 'the authority of monastic prayer as an agent of economic power and social change' (p. 151). He comes to the conclusion that the conversion of castles into monasteries by German aristocrats in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries was closely connected with the reform movement, but that it soon became outmoded because of the reform's emphasis on the separation of sacred and secular.

This short book is well written and presents its arguments clearly. Its purpose is clearly to provide a synthesis rather than to study each theme in detail or to spark controversy over particular issues. Familiar as he is with the sources and the literature,³ Arnold achieves this aim almost effortlessly. Occasionally, however, the balance does

³ References are kept to a reasonable minimum. In ch. 3, the omission of Carlrichard Brühl's fundamental study on the king's economic resources is

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not seem quite right. When dealing with the assets of the crown between 900 and 1300, 28 out of a total of 41 pages are spent on discussing the date and purpose of the *Tafelgüterverzeichnis*. No doubt this is a document of great importance, and Arnold provides some interesting, though not compelling, arguments for ascribing its content to the eleventh century and for dating its compilation to the period 1169 to 1174. Yet considering that neither these findings, nor their wider implications concerning, for example, Salian record-making and keeping, radically alter our understanding of the extent and administration of the crown assets under the Salian and Staufener rulers, this discussion occupies too prominent a place in this chapter and should perhaps have been published separately. A comparable problem occurs in chapter five. Arnold's approach to recycled castles is intriguing. Yet, as he observes himself, this was 'essentially a provincial phenomenon' (p. 168) which did not occur in great numbers. The question arises, therefore, whether a more general look at endowment patterns of ecclesiastical institutions would not have been more useful for his purpose.

Overall, Arnold's latest book is a useful introduction to economic and social change in Germany in the central Middle Ages. To the researcher, it outlines past achievements and future challenges, and, perhaps even more importantly, it is well suited to attracting English students to medieval German history.

is none the less surprising. Carlsruhards Brühl, *Fodrum, Gistum, Servitium Regis: Studien zu den wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen des Königtums im Frankenreich und in den fränkischen Nachfolgestaaten Deutschland, Frankreich und Italien vom 6. bis zur Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts* (Cologne, 1968).

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CLARISSA CAMPBELL ORR (ed.), *Queenship in Europe 1660–1815: The Role of the Consort* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), xvii + 419 pp. ISBN 0 521 81422 7. £60.00 (\$100.00)

During the past decade the literature on women at the European courts has grown rapidly. *Queenship in Europe 1660–1815* is a welcome addition to this expanding field of research and it appears as a natural extension of Clarissa Campbell Orr's previous volume entitled *Queenship in Britain, 1660–1837* (2002).

Queenship in Europe consists of a fine introduction by the editor and fourteen essays on various consorts and/or mistresses. After a brief overview of the volume, this review will focus on Campbell Orr's introduction and a few selected papers that exemplify the strengths of the collection and reveal some of the difficulties that arise when court history is combined with gender history.

In the first essay, Robert Oresko traces the life of the powerful Maria Giovanna Battista of Savoy-Nemours (1644–1724) with an emphasis on her regency and her extensive building projects. The Swedish court is the subject of two essays: Lis Granlund's account of Queen Hedwig Eleonora (1636–1715) as builder and collector during her fifty-five-year-long widowhood and Marc Serge Rivière's paper on Louisa Ulrica (1720–82), the Prussian princess who married Adolf Frederick (ruled 1751–71). Rivière pays particular attention to the ways in which Louisa Ulrica was described in the reports of the French ambassadors in Sweden, and thereby highlights the potential of this category of sources. The French court is also the focus of two articles: Mark Bryant's insightful and well-researched analysis of Mme de Maintenon's (1635–1719) complex role as mistress at the French court of Louis XIV and John Rogister's account of the rather unexpected career of Marie Leszczyńska (1703–68, married to Louis XV) as Queen of France.

In their jointly authored article, Charles W. Ingrao and Andrew L. Thomas examine the dynastic ambitions of three Imperial consorts in Vienna: Eleonore of Pfalz-Neuburg (1665–1720, married to Leopold I), Wilhelmine Amalia of Braunschweig-Lüneburg (1673–1742, married to Joseph I), and Elisabeth Christine of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel (1691–1750, married to Charles VI). Considerations of the women's dynastic ambitions are supplemented with interesting observations on how the *Pietas Austriaca* conditioned and gendered

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the queens' patronage. In another contribution, Lindsey Hughes recounts the rise of Ekaterina Alekseevna as Catherine I of Russia (c. 1684–1727), the second wife of Peter the Great and ruling Empress (*imperatritsa* or *tsesareva*) upon his death in 1725. Hughes argues convincingly that the gender constructions of eighteenth-century Russia simultaneously empowered and restricted Catherine. In Charles C. Noel's analysis of the consorts at the Spanish court during the first half of the eighteenth century—Marie Louise Gabrielle of Savoy (1701–14, first wife of Philip V), Elizabeth Farnese (1714–46, second wife of Philip V), and María Bárbara of Braganza (1746–58, married to Ferdinand VI)—he rightly stresses that the 'Spanish empire was a family business' and shows how the three queens were deeply involved in the government of the territories. According to Noel, the Spanish monarchy of the eighteenth century was characterized by a 'feminisation and domestication of politics' (p. 155).

The princely courts of the territorial princes in the Holy Roman Empire are examined in three essays: Peter Wilson's brilliant comparison of the position of two consorts and a mistress at the court of Württemberg (1674–1757); Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly's analysis of the role of religion in the lives of two Saxon-Polish consorts during the first half of the eighteenth century; and Thomas Biskup's reassessment of Queen Elisabeth Christine of Prussia (1715–97), wife of Frederick II 'the Great'.

Andrew Hanham and Clarissa Campbell Orr both focus on the House of Hanover and examine how the dynastic union of Hanover and Great Britain challenged the monarchy and tied the English court closer to the Continent. The two essays supplement each other well. Andrew Hanham first shows how Caroline of Brandenburg-Ansbach (1683–1737, married to George II) played a prominent part in the 'anglicisation' of the dynasty that was necessary for its success in newly acquired Great Britain. Subsequently, Clarissa Campbell Orr emphasizes how the vast dynastic network of Queen Charlotte of Great Britain and Electress of Hanover, born Princess of Mecklenburg-Strelitz (1744–1818, married to Georg III) and her usage of this network brought the English court into contact with the distinctly Protestant and learned culture of the northern European courts.

In the final chapter, Michael Bregnsbo examines the agency of the female consorts within the structures of Danish absolutism in the late eighteenth century. The central figures in his paper are the British-

born Louisa (1724–51, first wife of Frederik V), Juliana Maria (1729–96, born Duchess of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel and second wife of Frederik V), and, finally, another English-born princess, Caroline Mathilda (1751–75, married to Christian VII).

As this brief overview suggests, the cohesion of the volume derives not simply from the obvious and numerous thematic parallels between the contributions such as the political role of the queens, their activities as patrons of art, architecture, and literature, and the importance of their dynastic networks. These main themes are also supplemented by the dynastic links that tied several of the key figures within the papers together.

In her introduction Clarissa Campbell Orr first outlines the geographical and thematic scope of the volume. She then discusses some of the characteristics of the position of the queen consort and the ways in which this figure can be used as a vehicle for subjecting the Baroque court and our current understanding of this institution to a critical re-examination. Campbell Orr rightly argues that '[l]ooking at the court through the lens of queenship' brings increased attention to its dynastic dimension and polycentric nature. Dealing with the well-known, but problematic, dichotomy of formal versus informal power (power and authority), Campbell Orr also touches upon some of the common oversimplifications in the understanding of women at the courts. She stresses that 'family life' at the courts should by no means be equated with a private sphere (as the nineteenth-century historiography tended to do). On the basis of the contributions in this volume, Campbell Orr concludes that female consorts 'were able to obtain considerable political power' (p. 8) and delineates various other fields within which these women could exercise power ('culture, religion, manners, and morals', p. 9). Finally, she stresses the importance of women's dynastic capital to both rulers and consorts.

Peter Wilson's analysis of the consort and *maitresse* at the court of Württemberg during the government of Duke Eberhard Ludwig (1676–1733, Duke from 1693) and Duke Carl Alexander (1684–1737, Duke from 1733) is an exemplary contribution to the book. Informed by the extensive work that has been carried out by German gender historians and his own research, he defines a thoughtful approach and a carefully considered terminology that is consistently applied in his analysis. Wilson sets out to examine 'the interplay between the agency of personal character and the structure of Imperial politics' (p. 221).

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After a brief introduction to the position of women within the Holy Roman Empire and of the female consort within the Baroque court, he shows how Duchess Johanne Elisabeth of Württemberg (1680–1757, born Duchess of Baden-Durlach) responded to her husband's bigamous marriage to Christina Wilhelmina von Grävenitz (1686–1744). The comparison of Eberhard Ludwig's two wives enables Wilson to specify the differences between the consort who held an office with defined rights and duties and the mistress whose power depended exclusively on the Duke's personal favour. Finally, in the third section of his essay, Wilson demonstrates how the consort of the next generation, Maria Auguste (1706–56, born Princess of Thurn und Taxis, married to Duke Carl Alexander), upon her husband's death in 1737, successfully—in spite of fierce resistance from the Privy Council—asserted her right to participate in the regency for her son and managed to provide for her children according to her own wishes. Wilson's approach enables him to show how the three women recognized the limits and possibilities of their given situation. Whether they achieved the desired goals or not, the women skillfully pursued their interests with the resources at their disposal. In addition, by emphasizing that both women and men were constrained by the surrounding structures, he demonstrates that only some limitations were gender specific.

The one aspect to which Wilson grants less attention is religion. In contrast to her predecessor and the majority of the population in Württemberg, Maria Auguste was Catholic and the implications of her confession are touched upon only in passing. The potential significance of the Duchess's personal beliefs is highlighted by Helen Watanabe-O'Kelly's essay in which she compares the lives of the Lutheran Christiane Eberhardine (1671–1727) and the Catholic Maria Josepha (1699–1757) with a view to revealing the implications of their confessions. Because 'the public display of piety was one of the foremost duties of a consort' (p. 252), their personal beliefs were highly political matters and the different confessions of Saxony and Poland meant that the consorts' religion had considerable implications for the position they could obtain within the two territories. She thereby shows that religion could not only limit, but also empower, the women. The same point is emphasized both by Lindsey Hughes, and Ingraio and Thomas.

Two recurring problems can be identified in the volume, and both

result from the challenges associated with combining court and gender history. In the context of the European courts and the ruling dynasties, rank and gender competed as structuring forces. At times the prevailing gender-order overruled rank (and excluded women from certain domains of the court) but, as several contributors demonstrate, this was far from a general rule. However, departing from the conventional belief that women—including queens—were excluded from the dynamics of power and politics, several authors hesitate to draw the conclusions of their findings in full. Charles C. Noel demonstrates that the Spanish consorts yielded extensive power, but nevertheless concludes that ‘their power lay ... in the husbands’ ill health and character’ (p. 180). Although he adds the queens’ personal skills and determination as explanatory factors, this is a rather cautious conclusion to an otherwise convincing and well-documented analysis, and it seems to reflect the traditional historiography more than Noel’s own findings. Ingrao and Thomas close their insightful paper on the empresses-consort with a similar retreat: ‘their [the queens’] primary role ... was to adorn and represent the dynasty into which they had married’ (p. 127). Finally, Lindsey Hughes reduces Catherine I of Russia to a creation of Peter the Great, rather than summarizing the numerous ways in which she has revealed that Catherine’s agency was a force to be reckoned with. In these conclusions, gender appears as an oversimplified determinant and the significance of rank is underestimated. In order to move beyond the view that *active* queenship was an exception that requires explanation, rank and gender have to be considered as central constituents of the *habitus* and as equally important categories that interacted in complex ways.

Another problem relates to the definition of, and adherence to, queenship, or even queens, as the object of investigation, and the ways in which queenship can be studied. New questions require new sources and/or new readings of the sources that have been consulted by scholars with other questions in mind. Hence, if queenship is to be analysed, it is not sufficient to re-examine the existing literature. Both Thomas Biskup and Michael Bregnsbo begin their contributions with thoughtful and critical assessments of the traditional historiography. However, in the remainder of their papers, the queens appear as little more than extensions of their husbands and, rather than using gender as a tool of inquiry, the queens are situated in relation

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to the well-known chronologies. These two papers are developed almost exclusively on the basis of secondary literature, and this results in a partial reproduction of the implicitly gendered focuses that structure the narratives of the traditional historiography.

The questions raised in *Queenship in Europe* and the contributions to the volume emphasize both the challenges and the potential inherent in combining court and gender history. Overall the volume offers a varied impression of queenship at the Baroque courts, and most contributions show that explicit considerations of gender can significantly enhance our understanding of both court culture and politics. These noteworthy achievements will doubtlessly stimulate further research.

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SEBASTIAN KÜSTER, *Vier Monarchien – Vier Öffentlichkeiten: Kommunikation um die Schlacht bei Dettingen, Herrschaft und soziale Systeme in der Frühen Neuzeit*, 6 (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004), 560 pp. ISBN 3 8258 7773 6. EUR 45.90

At first glance Sebastian Küster's decision to devote so much time and effort to the study of the public impact of the Battle of Dettingen might seem a little odd. Within the broader military and strategic context of the War of the Austrian Succession, Dettingen had little impact. Indeed, if it is remembered at all today, it is because it was the last occasion on which a ruling British monarch led his troops into battle. Devotees of the music of George Frederick Handel might also link the name to the infrequently-performed and seldom-recorded *Te Deum* which Handel wrote to commemorate the occasion. Yet Küster has uncovered a rich vein of material in his study of Dettingen, and his book contains a wealth of detail and some cogent analysis. Dettingen is, in other words, a means to explore the broader nature of communication and the public in the eighteenth century.

Unsurprisingly, given the book's origins in a Göttingen dissertation supervised by Hermann Wellenreuther, Küster begins by setting up the parameters of discussion, dealing with historiography, and explaining his approach to the nature of the public sphere. One of the reasons for focusing on Dettingen is that the sources exist to study reactions to it in four different territories—the eponymous four monarchies of the title (although one, Hanover, was an electorate at this point). The battle, fought on 27 June 1743, was a confrontation between the French, led by Marshall Noailles, and the Pragmatic Army (so-called because of its avowed aim of defending the Pragmatic Sanction, which Charles VI had designed to allow Maria Theresa's succession to all his dominions) of Austrian, Hanoverian, and British troops which George II, the British king and Hanoverian elector, had decided to command in person. Küster is not really interested in the battle as event but in the ways in which the publics in Austria, Hanover, France, and Britain reacted to it. What did they know about the fighting, and when? How did they get their information? What does this tell us about the nature of the public and communication in the various territories under discussion? By approaching these questions in a comparative way, Küster aims to undermine simplistic accounts of the rise of the public sphere and to

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challenge the linkage of Enlightenment, the public sphere, and bourgeois society associated with the work of Jürgen Habermas. As Küster admits, he is not the first, and certainly will not be the last, to challenge the Habermasian account. Instead, he seeks to build on the work of both Wellenreuther and Andreas Gestrich to offer a more nuanced account of what it might mean to talk about 'the public' in this period.¹

Having briefly discussed the battle's relationship to the War of the Austrian Succession and sketched the events of the battle itself in chapter two (at only fifteen pages, the shortest chapter of the work by some distance), Küster then adopts the pattern which dominates the bulk of the book. A chapter on the conditions that affected communications and the public in one of the four territories under discussion is followed by one on the specific reactions to Dettingen.

Austria is considered first. Küster emphasizes the continuing importance of manuscript newsletters for spreading information, although, in contrast with France and Britain, it is difficult to be more precise about the impact of such newsletters because virtually no examples survive. Although there was an official (printed) newspaper (*Wienerisches Diarium*), press culture, as such, in Austria was relatively underdeveloped. Censorship was strict in theory but much more difficult to enforce in practice. The existence of 'lost and found' requests in contemporary newspapers provides some qualitative evidence about the nature of the readership of the Austrian press. However, Küster is keen to stress the importance of economic conditions for the development of the Austrian press, in common with the other territories under discussion.

Küster's discussion of Austrian reaction to Dettingen reveals a number of interesting points. Accounts of the battle tended to ignore the role played by French tactical errors in the eventual outcome. Yet the *Diarium* was not simply a propaganda vehicle, as its account allowed readers to infer that George II was to blame for some of the

¹ Hermann Wellenreuther, 'Das Spanische Reich in der englischen Diskussion während des Siebenjährigen Krieges: Überlegungen zum Habermas'schen Begriff der "Bürgerlichen Öffentlichkeit"', in Felix Becker (ed.), *Iberische Welten: Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Günter Kahle* (Cologne, 1994), 723–58; Andreas Gestrich, *Absolutismus und Öffentlichkeit: Politische Kommunikation in Deutschland zu Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen, 1994).

Public Impact of the Battle of Dettingen

supply problems suffered by the Pragmatic Army. In addition to information in printed media, Küster shows the importance for the Austrian authorities of church services in commemorating the battle. The generally rather muted reaction to Dettingen is explained by the fact that it was not seen primarily as an Austrian victory (only about a third of the troops were Austrian). Küster also identifies two sorts of publics: a *Volksöffentlichkeit*, the primary audience for the church services and essentially recipients of communication from the Austrian authorities; and a more sophisticated and active 'Court public', who were the intended audience for the small number of tracts published to celebrate Dettingen.

If means of communication were underdeveloped in Austria, this was even more the case in Hanover. There was not even an official newspaper until 1750. It was difficult for news to spread fast because of the control exercised by the Hanoverian authorities, although the situation was a little better in Göttingen, where censorship was devolved to the deans of the university faculties. That said, of the four territories considered, Hanover had the least developed market for books. Coffeehouse culture, so important for Enlightened sociability, was not much in evidence either.

Hanoverian reaction to Dettingen was predominantly controlled by central authorities. Although there were some celebrations a week after the battle, much of the official response had to wait until George's return to Hanover in October 1743. Little in the accounts of the battle that appeared explained either why the battle had taken place or what the results of it had been. Instead, there was a tendency to play up George's personal leadership and bravery and his role as a good *Landesvater*. Many of the tracts, poems, and sermons written in response to Dettingen can be traced back to authors closely connected to, or directly employed by, the Hanoverian authorities. George was in many ways the 'Alpha and Omega' for the Hanoverian public, simultaneously originator and recipient of public utterance on Dettingen (p. 191). Although Küster does not put it in such terms, the Habermasian shift away from representational culture to the dominance of the public sphere, bourgeois or otherwise, had yet to take place in Hanover.

Whereas the nature of communication and the press in Hanover (and, to a lesser extent, Austria) has received little scholarly attention, work on the French press is legion and Küster can do little more than

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summarize, albeit succinctly and accurately, the existing literature. That said, Küster's discussion of some of the *Nouvelles à la main* he examined in the French archives indicates the extent to which his work represents a critical examination of secondary literature in the light of his own primary research.

Interestingly, when news of Dettingen first reached Paris, it was thought that the battle had been a French victory. Küster shows how the French authorities stopped the post and tried to maintain their version of events, although, as time went on, this became more difficult to sustain. The situation in France was made more complex by the existence of an extensive Francophone press published outside French borders and, consequently, not subject to French censorship. While such a press was potentially more independent than that within France, Küster believes that the economic motivation of the need to sell copy militated against such a press becoming an important source of criticism of either the French state or monarchy. While probably true in this particular case, it is less clear whether this was more generally so.

Küster's discussion of the British press is, again, well executed. He stresses the importance of manuscript newsletters, even in Britain, but also shows the sophisticated nature of the market for news. His discussion of British reactions to Dettingen is the longest of all the territories considered, probably because the sources are most extensive. It was also in Britain that the impact of Dettingen was most important. Küster identifies two phases of reception. The initial public reaction was very positive—bells were rung and the public rejoiced at the news. However, concern grew over the summer at the seeming inactivity of the Pragmatic Army and the lack of efforts to press home the fruits of the victory at Dettingen. By October, and the start of the parliamentary session, a row had exploded both about George's perceived favouritism towards his Hanoverian troops at Dettingen (epitomized by wearing a Hanoverian, as opposed to British, sash), and about the conduct of politics more generally. Küster again stresses the importance of economic motivations for authors and publishers of pamphlets in the ensuing debate about Dettingen, but also rightly recognizes that Dettingen had become part of a larger debate about politics and diplomacy. The then Secretary of State for the Northern Department, Carteret, was widely perceived as being too 'German' in his inclinations and Dettingen

also coincided with a struggle between Carteret and his intra-governmental rivals, the Pelhams, for control of the British ministry. High political instability was one of the reasons why Dettingen was used in the way that it was—it was part of an argument about the undesirability of the personal union between Britain and Hanover that could be used by Carteret's detractors.

Finally, Küster compares the four territories specifically. He argues that there were different types of publics in each case. From the point of view of communication, it was important whether rulers recognized the ruled as partners in a communicative process, and how different groups sought to influence each other. This sort of analysis is far more instructive than simplistic descriptions of absolutism. After all, Austria, France, and Hanover could all nominally be described as 'absolutist', but they each contained very different conceptions of what it meant to be a 'public'. Hanover exhibited the strongest degree of control over information. The ruling class was more united than in the Habsburg lands and it was easier to exercise control. In many ways reactions to Dettingen were most similar in France and Britain and this indicates the gap between constitutional theory, particularly in relation to censorship, and reality.

Küster has produced a history of communication and the public sphere in the early eighteenth century of a high order. The comparative scope of his work is impressive; many would have been satisfied with comparing two territories, rather than the four discussed here. It is unfortunate that Küster's discussion of Habermas was unable to take account of Tim Blanning's *The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture*, which engages with similar shortcomings in Habermas but on a broader canvas and in a slightly different comparative context (Britain, France, and Prussia, as opposed to Austria).² It is also slightly frustrating that Küster waits until his final chapter to engage explicitly in sustained comparison. All his material is interesting and engaging but the rigid demarcation of dealing with each territory in turn means that it is not until 450 pages into the text that all are discussed together. Küster's work suggests that communications and the public were most developed in Britain and least developed in Hanover. Yet the fact that the same person ruled these territories

² T. C. W. Blanning, *The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture: Old Regime Europe 1660–1789* (Oxford, 2002).

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surely demands more discussion than it receives. That said, the work shows how much of more general relevance and importance can be gained from a well-chosen microstudy.

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ERIK GRIMMER-SOLEM, *The Rise of Historical Economics and Social Reform in Germany 1864–1894*, Oxford Historical Monographs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), xiv + 338 pp. ISBN 0 19 926041 9. £55.00

So much has already been written about the rise and the academic and political significance of the Historical School of German political economy during the second half of the nineteenth century, generally associated with the names of Gustav Schmoller and Lujo Brentano, that at first glance one wonders whether another study can really produce anything new. The second glance, however, shows that Grimmer-Solem has written a thorough account based on unpublished sources, some of which have not been used before. His aim is nothing less than to produce a positive re-assessment of the academic, social, and political activities of this school of political economy, which was centred on the personality and work of Gustav Schmoller (1838–1917). The study's approach is dictated by the question from which it starts, namely, 'how it was that Schmoller and his colleagues responded to the social tensions in Prussia–Germany and what the implications of this response were' (p. 14).

The author's intention, as he notes straight away, is to provide a necessary and thorough-going corrective to current misconceptions about the Historical School, which can largely be traced back to the rival neo-liberal school of economics represented by Friedrich August von Hayek. To anticipate, Grimmer-Solem's thesis, which he supports at great length in the course of his study, is

that, viewed in its context, historical economics represented a subtle, timely, and effective empirical alternative to classical economics. Schmoller and his colleagues were guided by a critical epistemology that was coherent, sophisticated, and informed of the latest developments in other scientific disciplines and philosophy. . . . The historical economist's empirical and problem-oriented approach bore fruit not only as social policy addressing specific social questions but also generated a large body of social knowledge and an enduring set of questions that incisively grappled with the fundamental structures, processes, and dilemmas of an evolving, complex division of labour and its supporting institutions (pp. 15–16).

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The structure of the study, divided into three main sections, is clear and makes sense in terms of the subject. Part I investigates the 'Structures' of the Historical School. By tackling, investigating, and refuting numerous misconceptions, the author is able to develop his own, largely convincing, definition. The core of this school was formed by a small group of closely related German economists who worked both historically and empirically at the same time: Gustav Schmoller, Georg Friedrich Knapp, Lujo Brentano, and Adolf Held. They resembled each other not only in the academic approach they adopted, but also in their common goal of influencing the public, and thus also politics, in a moderate, social reformist direction. In the author's own words:

Using history as a critical and analytical tool and combining it with statistics, they sought practical solutions to economic and social problems and to advance projects of social reform by disseminating social and economic information for their colleagues, the general public, bureaucratic officials, and governments (p. 34).

Grimmer-Solem already makes a striking discovery in this first part. He is able to document for the first time, based on remarkably good evidence, the outstanding significance of the Berlin statistician, Ernst Engel (1821–96) as teacher, inspirer, and sponsor of the leading members of the Historical School of political economy. Those who have read Brentano's memoirs, of course, are aware of this,¹ but Engel's role as a statistician with an explicitly social reformist political agenda, who attracted Bismarck's attention and displeasure as early as the 1860s, was practically unknown. It is almost impossible to overestimate the influence exerted by Engels as director of the royal Prussian statistical bureau in Berlin and as editor of the journal *Zeitschrift des Königlich Preußischen Statistischen Bureaus*, which was politically and academically important, on the development of the main ideas, and the academic and political activities of Schmoller, Brentano, Knapp, and other colleagues. (Incidentally, a study devoted to Engel himself, who is hardly known outside the narrowest pro-

¹ See Lujo Brentano, *Mein Leben im Kampf um die soziale Entwicklung Deutschlands* (Jena, 1931), pp. 40 ff.

fessional circles, by Grimmer-Solem on the basis of the material he has collected, would be very welcome.)

The rest of the first part is devoted to what would today be called academic and political 'networking' by the Historical School. It traces their promotions within the academic hierarchy of their discipline, the struggles they had to win, and the resistance which they had to overcome (not only academic, but also political and economic). It looks at their publishers (especially Carl Geibel of Duncker & Humblot) and the journals in which they published, and finally, at their organizational basis in the *Verein für Sozialpolitik*, which was founded in 1872 and later became famous and influential. It also examines their contacts with political decision-makers and institutions which soon emerged. The sections on their various academic careers, career patterns, and career strategies, however, suffer from the fact that the author did not consult the relevant files of the Prussian Culture Ministry, which contain a great deal of information on precisely this topic. The author's reference to Schmoller's well-known close contacts with Friedrich Althoff, who was highly influential and almost omnipotent in the matter of senior academic appointments (but not until the 1890s) are inadequate in this context.

In Part II, 'Context, Ideas, and Methods', Grimmer-Solem shows how strongly the issues which Schmoller and his colleagues addressed from the 1860s and early 1870s on were orientated towards their own time. In other words, he demonstrates how much they saw their academic work as also contributing to the solution of the central economic and social questions and problems of the present. Their interest in the social misery which increased rapidly from the *Gründerjahre* of the early 1870s, in the consequences of rapid population growth, in the housing problem, which was extremely serious in Germany, and Prussia in particular, and in the apparently slow 'disappearance' of the middle classes, all demanded a convincing new foundation for the subject of economics. The material, that is, the empirical basis, had to deliver statistics which, next to history, became the most important aid to this new scientific economics. In addition, they not only took note of the general social movements of the period, such as the labour movement which was slowly forming in Germany at this time and the social organizations which already existed abroad (for example, the English labour guilds which Brentano investigated and described in detail) but also, where possi-

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ble, researched and analysed them. Rather too briefly, by contrast, the author evokes the intellectual context within which the emergence of the Historical School must be understood. Grimmer-Solem refers not only to the well-known works of Lorenz von Stein and Friedrich Engels, published before 1848, but also to authors and journalists such as Victor Aimé Huber, Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, Carl Rodbertus, and Hermann Wagener, as well as to somewhat later luminaries such as Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch, Rudolf Gneist, and Otto Gierke.

Large sections of the second part are devoted to the theoretical foundations of this new economic thinking. Referring to Fichte's influence on Schmoller, for example, Grimmer-Solem attempts to refute the accusation that the Historical School lacked a theoretical basis. He even speaks of 'reintegrating moral philosophy into economics' (p. 136) and compares, not totally incontestably, the significance of Fichte's ethic for Schmoller with Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* of 1759 for the understanding of his *Wealth of Nations* of 1776. More convincing, however, is the author's refutation of the predominant cliché of the 'Borussianism' of Schmoller and his colleagues. As Grimmer-Solem points out, none of them were Prussian by birth. All came from western and southern Germany: 'By all accounts, Schmoller and his colleagues were more Gallic and Mediterranean than Teutonic in their manners and appearance' (p. 162) – probably a slight exaggeration. Grimmer-Solem suggests that their partiality for Prussia, and here the author is certainly right, can be explained by the fact that they saw the state of Prussia as a pioneer of social and political modernity in Germany. In other words, it was the sort of state that, ever since the time of Frederick Wilhelm I (1713–40), had always managed to reform from the inside out at times of crisis, and thus to renew itself politically and socially in a peaceful, that is, non-revolutionary way. The School's social and economic history studies, especially as initiated by Schmoller in his *Acta Borussica*, were intended to investigate this central historical process more closely. And on the basis of the findings thus gained, an important political message was to be conveyed to contemporary Germans: 'economic changes demanded timely social and political reforms best initiated by enlightened rulers and implemented by an educated, impartial bureaucracy to prevent class rule and its resultant ills' (p. 168).

In the third and largest part of the book, entitled 'Policy', the author finally reconstructs the protracted and, at first, thorny, rise of

Schmoller and his colleagues through the ranks of the subject of political economy to its peak. The author expertly describes the details of the many quarrels which the circle of scholars around the *Verein für Sozialpolitik* had to survive on several fronts simultaneously. They had to defend themselves against the accusation, made by a number of influential contemporaries, such as their liberal rival Heinrich B. Oppenheim and the historian Heinrich von Treitschke, that they were *Kathedersozialisten* ('socialists of the chair'), that is, merely academic patrons of socialism. They also had to defend themselves against early socialist theorists such as Ferdinand Lassalle, for example, whose ideas they rejected as too simple and empirically unfounded, and, finally, against the representatives of a socially orientated conservatism, such as Hermann Wagener, for example, with whom the scholars around Schmoller were not happy to be lumped together. The author knowledgeably and precisely describes the relationship—intense and tense in equal measure—between Schmoller and Brentano, in particular, and contemporary German liberalism, which represented their intellectual roots. Similarly, he presents the differences between them and other colleagues who, to the present day, are still generally reckoned to belong to the Historical School, such as Adolph Wagner.

Especially interesting and exciting is another section, devoted to the period from 1880, in which Grimmer-Solem traces the political influence of the *Kathedersozialisten*, as they were known in Germany.² He shows how closely these economists followed and studied every significant aspect of social and political developments in Germany, and how well-informed they were, both empirically and statistically. In addition to other periodicals, the *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich*, which appeared in two large volumes every year and was later known as *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, was important for this, even beyond 1894. Although he was involved in politically important advisory institutions, such as the Prussian

² Unfortunately the author has missed an important new study on this topic by Wilfried Rudloff, 'Politikberater und opinion-leader? Der Einfluß von Staatswissenschaftlern und Versicherungsexperten auf die Entstehung der Invaliditäts- und Altersversicherung', in Stefan Fisch and Ulrike Haerendel (eds.), *Geschichte und Gegenwart der Rentenversicherung in Deutschland: Beiträge zur Entstehung, Entwicklung und vergleichenden Einordnung der Alterssicherheit im Sozialstaat* (Berlin, 2000), pp. 93–119.

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Staatsrat (and from 1899 he was also a member of the Prussian upper house), Schmoller was by no means an uncritical eulogist of contemporary economic and social policy. On the contrary, he severely criticized many aspects of the politics of those years, such as defective factory legislation, for example. Despite his deep admiration for Bismarck and his work, Schmoller clearly demonstrated the limitations of the 'iron Chancellor's' thinking and practice on social policy issues as late as 1898, as Grimmer-Solem correctly points out.³

Largely in agreement both with earlier opinion and more recent German research, the author establishes that the influence of the Historical School of political economy on the social policy of the late Bismarck years, that is, the 1880s, while not insignificant, must be characterized as indirect and mediated.⁴ On the whole, the author sums up, there is little doubt

that the historical economists had an important, albeit indirect, influence on the development of worker insurance in the 1880s and worker protection laws in the early 1890s. By fighting against public and official ignorance and indifference, by making innovative suggestions on the reform of worker insurance and influencing key officials involved in drafting and amending the legislation, by continually demanding through *Verein* investigations, conferences, petitions, and journal articles a reform of sickness funds, a combination of self-help and state help, an expansion of industrial liability for accidents, factory inspection, and workplace regulations, they reached an audience which extended to the very top of government (pp. 222-3).

³ These highly revealing comments, which are characteristic of Schmoller's intellectual honesty, can be read in Gustav Schmoller, *Charakterbilder* (Munich, 1913), pp. 54 f.

⁴ Thus Friedrich Meinecke, 'Drei Generationen deutscher Gelehrtenpolitik', in id., *Werke*, vol. ix: *Brandenburg – Preußen – Deutschland*, ed. Eberhard Kessel (Stuttgart 1979), p. 489 already noted about the group of scholars around Schmoller: 'They worked primarily as advisers to the government and as trainers for the civil service, and their influence on the political parties and wider educated circles established itself only gradually, but then to a considerable extent.'

And this alone was no mean achievement, especially when we remember that a very small group of scholars was behind all these activities.

Somewhat shorter, by contrast, are the sections which deal with Schmoller's and Knapp's criticisms of contemporary developments in agriculture, in particular, the agrarian question, which was becoming economically acute, and the Prussian government's policy for Poland during the late years of the Kaiserreich. And Grimmer-Solem reconstructs the famous *Methodenstreit*, the dispute over economic method which Schmoller conducted with his Viennese colleague and rival, Carl Menger, from the 1880s, rather too much from the perspective of his privileged protagonist, Schmoller. However, he also corrects a number of distortions by later members of the Austrian School of political economy – a school which celebrated Menger as its precursor – such as Friedrich August von Hayek. So far, the 'conservative' Schmoller has generally been presented, in derogatory fashion, as diametrically opposed to the 'liberal' Menger, but Grimmer-Solem simply reverses this attribution. This is not totally convincing, although he does correct the image of Menger as an allegedly genuinely *laissez-faire* liberal on several points. And there has never been any serious doubt about the liberal political credentials of Schmoller, a native of Württemberg,⁵ although politically influential pamphleteers later felt they could place him in the company of Karl Marx.⁶

What was the main reason for the Historical School's temporary but very clear predominance over its rivals within the discipline? And does it still have any significance today? Grimmer-Solem provides lucid answers to these questions. He sees the School's main significance as lying in its uncompromisingly practical orientation towards the present, in its strict concern, expressed in both theory and practice, not to seek refuge in the sphere of 'pure academia', but to make an important contribution towards overcoming the main economic and social problems of the present day. Its genuinely his-

⁵ On this, Meinecke records a revealing memory: 'His [Schmoller's] political views were permanently coloured by south German liberalism and an understanding of democratic aspirations.' Meinecke, 'Drei Generationen deutscher Gelehrtenpolitik', p. 487.

⁶ E.g., Friedrich August (von) Hayek, *Der Weg zur Knechtschaft* (Erlenbach, 1945; first published 1944), p. 41.

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torical orientation was never an end in itself, but always subordinate to the main aim. The adherents of the School tried to influence political decision-makers in various ways by making empirical data available, and, building on this, by providing precise analyses of the existing economic and social situation. Their aim was not to intervene actively in politics, but to act as political advisers by making available reliable expert knowledge. The tradition in which they placed themselves was that of the Prussian reforming state, and the future social model to which they aspired corresponded pretty closely to the 'levelled-out middle-class society'⁷ that was realized only much later, in post-1949 West Germany. Grimmer-Solem's study ends by presenting the elements of Schmoller's, Knapp's, Brentano's, Held's, and their colleagues' far-reaching efforts to initiate social reform by generating and transmitting empirically and theoretically sound expert knowledge on social issues.

Without wishing to detract from the author's achievement in any way, there are, of course, a number of shortcomings to be registered, in addition to the fact that some research has been overlooked.⁸ The author does not locate the history of the Historical School within the contemporary political or intra-disciplinary context in any comprehensive way; at best, he does this sporadically. Thus, for example, Grimmer-Solem does not mention the name of Eugen Dühring, who was ousted by the University of Berlin despite outstanding academic achievements, although his writings were an important feature in the contemporary landscape of discussion within the economic sciences. Nor is the question of the real influence exerted on the group

⁷ Unfortunately Grimmer-Solem does not point out that the concept of a 'nivellierte Mittelstandsgesellschaft', which was coined by Helmut Schelsky in 1953 and is almost proverbial in Germany today, was drawn from the jargon of modern sociology. Helmut Schelsky, *Wandlungen der deutschen Familie in der Gegenwart* (Dortmund, 1953), p. 218.

⁸ To mention just two examples: first, Grimmer-Solem's argument that Schmoller's efforts were completely neglected (see p. 6) is refuted by Günter Schmolders's important account of Schmoller's academic approach in *Geschichte der Volkswirtschaftslehre* (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1962), pp. 64–72; secondly, to take a more recent example, see Hans-Christof Kraus, 'Lujó Brentano (1844–1931) – Nationalökonom und bürgerlicher Sozialreformer', in Bernd Heidenreich (ed.), *Geist und Macht: Die Brentanos* (Wiesbaden, 2000), pp. 131–58; see also above, note 2.

of scholars around Schmoller by social conservative writers and politicians such as Carl Rodbertus, Hermann Wagener, or Rudolph Meyer (who is not mentioned at all) discussed to any extent, perhaps because a closer look might have undermined the author's thesis that Schmoller's circle was genuinely social liberal? In precisely this context, Grimmer-Solem strongly emphasizes the theoretical distance, which doubtless existed, between Gustav Schmoller and the more conservative Adolph Wagner, while their co-operation (the two taught contemporaneously at the University of Berlin for decades) in the field of science policy and, from time to time, social policy, is largely underexposed. And finally, the author casts only a brief and very general glance at developments after 1894. The fact that Brentano and Schmoller did not reach the height of their academic fame and political influence until around 1900 or later is ignored, not to mention the continuation of their academic approach in the work of their most important students, to name only Heinrich Herkner, Moritz Julius Bonn, and Werner Sombart.

None the less, Grimmer-Solem's study represents a significant and important achievement, especially when we remember that the Anglo-American cultural and language area has tended to hold a negative image of the Historical School of German political economy. This new publication has permanently corrected this image; to some extent, we can even speak of historical rehabilitation. In 1962 Günter Schmölders justifiably pointed out: 'The lasting achievement of the Schmoller School was its *closeness to time and reality*, which is inimical to over-hasty generalizations; in this respect, economic theory today can still learn a great deal from Schmoller.'⁹ This insight is not only supported by Erik Grimmer-Solem in his new work, but clearly expanded on a sound and convincing basis when he says: 'Schmoller and his colleagues thereby contributed fundamentally to what has proven to be an enduring understanding of the relationship between economy and society in the West' (p. 16). There is nothing further to add to this.

⁹ Schmölders, *Geschichte der Volkswirtschaftslehre*, p. 70.

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JÖRG SPÄTER, *Vansittart: Britische Debatten über Deutsche und Nazis, 1902–1945*, *Moderne Zeit. Neue Forschungen zur Gesellschafts- und Kulturgeschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, 4 (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2003), 495 pp. ISBN 3 89244 692 X. EUR 46.00

Robert Vansittart, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office from 1930 to 1937, author of *Black Record: Germans Past and Present* and other anti-German publications during the war years, was one of the most controversial figures in the history of Anglo-German relations. In fact, he is more notorious in Germany than in Britain; there he is seen not only as one of the key architects of hard-line British and Allied policies towards Germany, but as a bogey-man figure whose hostility to Germany was racist in inspiration. One of the objectives of Jörg Später's study is to correct such misconceptions about a man who 'in the German memory is a metaphor and not a real politician or publicist' (p. 9).¹ However, the author also aims to use Vansittart and the controversies he provoked as a way of illuminating a number of central issues affecting both Britain and Germany during the first half of the twentieth century.

For Britain, the issue was the correct response to the challenges posed for a declining world power by the rise of new powers, notably the perception of a growing threat from Germany, by the crisis of Liberalism and the rise of totalitarianism on the Continent, and by the failure to achieve a stable international order after the First World War. These questions were not simply discussed within the Foreign Office or among politicians, but engaged the British élites and intelligentsia, notably historians of modern Europe. But the author also uses the response to Vansittart and 'Vansittartism' by the SPD exiles in Britain as a window into their reactions to the challenge to their socialist world view posed by the failure of Weimar and the triumph of Nazism. In particular, 'Vansittartism' raised the questions of the relationship of the German people to Nazism, of whether there was a 'German problem', and of their attitude to the SPD's role in German politics since 1914.

An obvious starting point is the question: what made Vansittart anti-German? Was his anti-German attitude a consequence of his

¹ All translations of quotations from Später's book are by Jeremy Noakes.

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position as a British diplomat who began his career in the first decade of the twentieth century? Or was his attitude typical of Englishmen of his generation and background (landed gentry), part of a more general shift from traditional Francophobia to a new Germanophobia? Or were more personal factors involved?

Später places the main emphasis on Vansittart's period as a junior official in the Foreign Office in the years preceding the First World War, when he came under the wing of its head, Sir Eyre Crowe. Born to a German mother, married to a German, and educated in Düsseldorf and Berlin, Crowe had an intimate knowledge of Germany and had concluded that it posed a growing threat. Clearly this experience was crucial for shaping Vansittart's view of Britain's diplomatic position *vis-à-vis* Germany. Given the balance-of-power doctrine under the 'unspoken assumption' of a world governed by the *Machtpolitik* of major powers (an assumption recently reinforced by Social Darwinist notions), and given the actions of the German government during these years, it was not surprising that Eyre's analysis should appear only too plausible to a young British diplomat.

However, the visceral quality of Vansittart's anti-German views (it was, after all, as early as 1907 that he conceived the description 'butcher bird' to describe Germany) suggests that personal feelings were also involved, and, indeed, Vansittart was a man of strong emotions. His personal experiences of Germany were uniformly negative. A brief period spent at a crammer in Hamburg while a teenager coincided with the Boer War and he found himself subjected to verbal abuse and chicanery by both staff and pupils. A few years later, in Bad Homburg, he was challenged to a duel by a tennis opponent, and his negative comments about the crude customs and chauvinism of German students in his later writings suggest that he had already formed an unfavourable impression of Germans even before he joined the Foreign Office. Significantly, he also spent time in Paris in his youth around the turn of the century when Anglo-French relations were still fraught in the aftermath of the Fashoda Crisis. Yet, although he deplored the anti-Semitism which had surfaced during the Dreyfus Affair, he clearly felt much more at home in France. 'My francophilia', he wrote, 'started simply because the French were kinder than the Germans ... the Germans enchanted both by their Army and their brash Kaiser were also so pleased with

themselves that sympathy was impossible.² He also preferred the easygoing charm of pre-war Austria, where he became friendly with Hofmannsthal, Wassermann, and Schnitzler.

Vansittart's personal animosity towards Germany was then greatly intensified by two experiences from the years 1914 to 1918: the death of his beloved brother Arnold in combat and his work in the Foreign Office section dealing with the treatment of British POWs in Germany, where he deplored what he considered the brutal behaviour of their captors. Moreover, his developing hostility to Germany was also underpinned by a wide reading of German literature. Thus, his frequent references in his polemical writings of the years 1939 to 1945 to German authors who themselves criticized German culture and attitudes include not only the 'usual suspects', such as Heine and Nietzsche, but also less well-known writers such as Ludwig Börne.

Although Vansittart had already developed a strongly negative view of Germany by 1918, he did not allow it to interfere with his views on Germany's place in the international order during the Weimar years. He had no illusions about Germany's determination to revise the Versailles peace settlement and restore its position as a great power, and, on his appointment as Permanent Under-Secretary in 1930, he produced a remarkably accurate assessment of Germany's ambitions. However, he considered the Versailles peace settlement 'a bad treaty' that 'went too far', and was sharply critical of France's hard-line policy towards Germany during the 1920s; he even defended Germany's attempt to secure a customs union with Austria in 1931, seeing it as the potential start of a European federation.

It was the Nazi take-over in 1933 that transformed Vansittart's view of the situation, for it seemed to confirm all his worst impressions of Germany and the Germans. From now onwards, he provided his political superiors with repeated warnings of the new regime's drive to war. Später does not devote much space to Vansittart's role in British foreign policy in the 1930s, since the book's focus lies elsewhere and the topic has been well covered in the extensive literature on appeasement. Vansittart has been criticized by some historians who argue that, given Britain's weakness in the mid-1930s, Vansittart's hard-line attitude did not represent a serious alternative;

² Robert Gilbert Vansittart, *The Mist Procession: The Autobiography of Lord Vansittart* (London, 1958), p. 29.

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indeed, that his policy of trying to buy time by negotiating while rearming was essentially the same as that pursued by the Baldwin and Chamberlain governments. Indeed, Vansittart, too, was prepared to appease Nazi Germany by offering British colonial territory. The difference was, of course, that, unlike the committed appeasers, he had no illusions about 'the nature of the beast', as he put it. However, the stream of warning memoranda that flowed from his pen merely irritated his political superiors, who did not wish to be disabused. Moreover, the style of his memoranda, long-winded, dogmatic, ornate, allusive, 'dancing literary hornpipes',³ as his rival, Deputy Under-Secretary Alexander Cadogan, put it, tended to confirm his image as a somewhat eccentric troublemaker.

Some writers have argued that the outbreak of war in 1939 marked a sharp break in Vansittart's career to the extent that there are two Vansittarts: the pre-war Vansittart, a respectable Foreign Office official, albeit one with strong views about the German threat, and the Second World War Vansittart, a fanatical and bigoted propagandist, who stooped to using racist rhetoric. Später rightly rejects such a crude interpretation and provides an admirably judicious assessment of Vansittart's war-time activities. While it is true that Vansittart's role changed from that of foreign policy adviser to the government, albeit since 1938 a marginalized one, into a public polemicist and propagandist, his view of Germany and Germans had not fundamentally altered. What had changed was the fact that he had now entered the public arena and so adapted both the form and content of his rhetoric to winning popular support. Thus, the punchy style of *Black Record* is very different from his pre-war memoranda, and he believed that one could maintain the nation's will to fight only by appealing to 'one strong primitive emotion. That emotion could only be hate' (p. 131).

Vansittart saw himself engaged in a struggle for public support against an influential view advocated by Bishop Bell of Chichester and left-wing publicists such as Victor Gollancz, who argued that one should distinguish between the regime and the German people. Basically, the Germans were an oppressed people and the 'other Germany' was just waiting for the opportunity to rise up and throw

³ David Dilkes (ed.), *The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, O.M., 1938-1945* (London, 1971), p. 13.

off the Nazi yoke. Thus the Allies should try and win them over by promises of generous treatment. The core of Vansittart's argument is contained in the Preface to the 1941 edition of *Black Record*:

The difference between them and me is simply this. They believe that, so soon as the Nazi system has been liquidated, a decent Christian, *effective* German government will emerge, in which you can have full confidence. This is most dangerous nonsense; German nature makes anything of the kind definitely impossible. I do not say that every German is bad; I do say that a majority of Germans in the plural has been made bad by centuries of misteaching, that it will follow *any Fuehrer*, cheerfully and ferociously, into any aggression. Germans in the plural have got to be completely regenerated and retaught—and this can only be achieved by force and time. Experience has amply shown already that the small and weak minority of decent Germans cannot possibly be *effective* by and of itself, until the vast bad majority has been kept in order long enough either to learn to be human or to die out and be succeeded by a less bloodthirsty generation. If you trust *any* Germany again before this necessarily slow process is complete, the world and you will be lost.⁴

Vansittart's main concerns were: first, to convince the Home Front of the need to carry on the war against Germany until its total defeat; secondly, to convince the smaller nations under German occupation, many of whose citizens were fighting in the British armed forces, that their sufferings under German occupation were appreciated and that their interests would be taken account of in the future peace, a point that he believed was totally neglected by the German sympathizers; and, finally, to ensure that a future peace with Germany would guarantee that it could never again pose a threat to Europe. In fact, the post-war Allied settlement for West Germany was not far from Vansittart's prescription, though how much it actually owed to his advocacy is debatable.

The central charge against Vansittart, particularly prevalent in

⁴ Robert Gilbert Vansittart, *Black Record: Germans Past and Present* (London, 1941), p. viii.

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Germany, has been that his anti-German polemic was racist. Certainly, he gave some credence to this view through his use of the terms 'nation' and 'race' interchangeably (a practice that was, however, common at the time), through his use of the term 'German nature', as in the quotation above, and through his references to Tacitus's comments on the Germans. Später rightly largely rejects this charge. He criticizes Vansittart's use of the notion of 'national character', which, like racist discourse, created 'the other' and involved the use of a circular logic, in which he attributed to the national character what he saw in Germany's national history and then explained the national history in terms of the alleged national characteristics. However, Später rightly points out that Vansittart's notion of the German national character was historically rather than biologically determined and, despite his occasional use of the term 'German nature', he considered it a cultural not a natural product. 'Nations', wrote Vansittart, 'develop and display national characters. They acquired by isolation, traditions, education, and perhaps also by climate an individuality which distinguishes one from another' (p. 251). The problem was that the German nation had been 'miseducated into [bad] traits, habits, attitudes'.

Vansittart's series of seven broadcasts in the autumn of 1940, published shortly afterwards as *Black Record*, unleashed a storm of controversy and it is his in-depth analysis of this debate and of the previous 1930s discussion about what to do about Germany among the British intelligentsia that forms the author's most interesting and original contribution. Several of those involved – E.H. Carr, Arnold Toynbee, Lewis Namier, and A.J.P. Taylor – were, or were to become, historians and their engagement with the central foreign policy issue of the day provides a striking contrast with the almost total lack of involvement by historians in the current central foreign policy issue, namely Britain's relations with Europe. A major theme that emerges is the inadequacy of Marxist approaches, with their stress on socio-economic factors as the foundation of what were seen as rival imperialisms, for grasping the nature of Nazism and the fundamental threat to civilization it posed. By contrast, Namier, Taylor, and the journalists, Wickham Steed and Frederick Voigt, with their wide knowledge and experience of central and eastern Europe, and with views of Germany and of the importance of its nationalism that were nearer to those of Vansittart, came much closer to the truth in seeing

it as essentially a *Kulturkampf*. In fact, Später makes the illuminating suggestion that, unlike the British politicians and the leftist intelligentsia, who viewed Nazism in terms of rational goals and calculation and socio-economic structures, Vansittart's emotional perspective, seeing Nazi Germany as a kind of rabid national beast, and Nazism as a *furor teutonicus*, was in a sense more appropriate to its object.

The debate provoked by Vansittart also engaged the SPD exiles in Britain and the author devotes around a third of the book to this aspect. He focuses, in particular, on the SPD dissidents—Fritz Bieligk, Carl Herz, Walter Loeb, Kurt Lorenz, and Bernhard Menne. They challenged the leadership by agreeing with Vansittart to the extent that, first, German nationalism was, and had been since before 1914, the dominant force in German politics and that the SPD leadership had been heavily infected by it; secondly, that Hitler was not an accident but had been 'carried to power by the greatest mass movement in German history and that his government [had] a majority among the people'; and, finally, that the German people were supporting the war and that it was 'an illusion to believe that the German people would work for Germany's defeat and a revolution, and that the smashed remnants of German socialists were secure guarantees against German nationalism' (both quotations p. 289). In their view, therefore, the German SPD had to undergo a process of self-criticism as regards its previous and current policies and actions. These individuals met with rejection by their fellow socialists at the time and a subsequent lack of sympathy from historians. However, the author does their position full justice, while, at the same time, pointing out that the SPD's identification with the fate of the German nation during the war years and post-1945 and its attempt to democratize nationalism and nationalize democracy facilitated its successful integration into post-war West Germany.

A discussion of Vansittart raises once again the question: was there a 'German problem' and, if so, what was it? It is a question that preoccupied not just the British intelligentsia but also many German exiles, from whom, indeed, much of the argument for the notion of a German 'special path' derived. Current historiography has demolished many of these arguments, such as those about the 'non-political German', and the origins of the Nazi catastrophe are now overwhelmingly attributed to the First World War and its aftermath.

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Moreover, Vansittart's assertion:

Nazism is no more than the extension and popularization of the old imperialism and militarism. There is not one single novelty in Nazism if you exclude some extra vulgarity . . . There is no material difference between Hitler's New Order and Naumann's 'Mitteleuropa'⁵

is clearly a gross distortion. Nevertheless, perhaps the current consensus with its rejection of any notion of German 'peculiarities', its emphasis on the democratic potential of pre-First World War Germany, and the continuing strength of liberalism is in danger of replacing the 'Kehrite' or 'Bielefeld' orthodoxy of the 1970s with a new one, in which the contribution made by aspects of pre-First World War Germany is played down as much as it was previously exaggerated. For, arguably, the way in which the experience of the war and its aftermath were processed by the German people in general, and its élites and intelligentsia in particular, was substantially determined by a set of existing values, attitudes, and mentalities developed before 1914.

Given the rise of Germany and the consequent threat to British hegemony in Europe, a British perception of a 'German problem' in the early twentieth century was inevitable. But, for Vansittart, the 'German problem' represented also and above all a cultural challenge. With his emphasis on the importance of mentalities and ideology, Vansittart reminds us that the Germans' own self image was largely constructed during the founding decades of the Reich in conscious contradistinction to 'the West', culminating in 'the ideas of 1914' versus the 'ideas of 1789'. In particular, the exclusion of any moral dimension from politics associated with the worship of *Realpolitik*, the respect for military rather than civil values, and the contempt for the concept of humanity (*Humanitätsduselei*) are *topoi* which run like a thread through German political discourse from 1871 to 1945. Britain's claim to embody liberal and humane values was regarded by German critics as mere *Heuchelei* and clearly there is some truth in that. For Britain tended to associate a *status quo*, in which it was dominant, with 'civilization'. However, *Später*, refer-

⁵ Vansittart, *Black Record*, pp. viii-ix.

ring to Hannah Arendt, makes the important point that the self-identification of Britain with such values, for all the many breaches that may have occurred in practice, provided a powerful restraining element, for it obliged Britain to try to live up to it. Vansittart was a professional diplomat of the old school and not given to sentimentality in the conduct of international relations. Nevertheless, it was, arguably, these contrasts that Vansittart felt so strongly and, for all the crudity of his polemics, was trying to articulate. It is a measure of the high quality of this exceptionally perceptive and balanced book that it encourages the reader to reflect on these matters.

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JOSIE McLELLAN, *Antifascism and Memory in East Germany: Remembering the International Brigades 1945–1989*, Oxford Historical Monographs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), xii + 228 pp. ISBN 0 19 927626 9. £50.00

Josie McLellan's book is a pleasant surprise in a number of ways: first, because there has been little interest abroad, and especially in Britain, in the fate of the Germans who fought in the Spanish Civil War; and secondly, because foreign interest in GDR history has long been overshadowed by West German post-war history. And as the study under review treats both the Spanish Civil War and its reception in the official GDR historiography, gaining access to the sources required was presumably a laborious task. And thirdly, the author poses interesting questions to which, on the basis of a comprehensive knowledge of the literature and a thorough study of the sources, she finds convincing answers.

Josie McLellan does not restrict herself to describing the fate of the Germans who fought in Spain after the end of the Spanish republic, and again after the end of the Second World War, in particular, in the GDR. She widens the question by investigating the expectations and experiences, shaped by the Civil War, of the mainly Communist German members of the International Brigades. She combines with this the question of continuities and discontinuities in pre- and post-war German Communism, which provided the political environment of the Germans who fought in Spain. From there she moves on to the role played by anti-fascism as a legitimation for, and a propaganda instrument in, the GDR's system of rule. Here the members of the International Brigades played as important a part as the actors in the internal German resistance. And finally, she compares the traditions of canonized anti-fascism with the memories and self-stylizations of the Germans who had fought in Spain, who were hardly able to object to the way in which they were used by the SED (Socialist Unity Party) regime. In a number of cases, however, they were able to preserve their own memories and opinions in private.

To start with, the author provides a brief but accurate collective biography of the Germans who fought in Spain: average age, political affiliation, deployment in Spain, and the usually painful course taken by their lives after the defeat of the Spanish republic, which often led them through French internment camps, and thereafter

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through German concentration camps. Because of its predominantly Communist orientation, the Soviet Occupation Zone and later GDR provided a future home for most of them. As early as the late summer of 1945, a first meeting of veterans of Spain was held in East Berlin. As individuals and as a group, they henceforth formed a historical entity with its own fate and its own history.

In the early post-war period, the SED frequently used them as an advertisement, as a particularly impressive example of anti-fascist resistance, and they were meant to help rehabilitate the German people. With the beginning of the Stalinization of the SED, their role was degraded to that of a decorative façade. From the late 1940s, to show signs of displeasure at the appointment of former Nazi functionaries to positions in the GDR state administration was no longer opportunity for veterans of the fighting in Spain. And between 1948 and 1953, Spanish veterans increasingly fell victim to the purges which were directed mainly at 'Western emigrants'. The anxieties created at this time were deep-seated, as McLellan demonstrates using the example of unpublished memoirs. Some of the eye-witnesses she interviewed were still nervous, fifty years on, and refused to allow their statements to be tape-recorded.

With the beginning of the de-Stalinization of the entire Eastern bloc from 1956, the SED corrected its course in ways which benefited the Spanish fighters. The SED now 'discovered' the veterans' past, which meant a noticeable rise in their public standing, but also brought with it constant appropriation of their history by Party and state. In 1963 the Solidarity Committee for the Spanish People was founded. And manuscripts long locked away could at last be published. The Party even encouraged the veterans, many of whom had retired during the 1960s, to commit their memories to paper, in some cases under the direction of Party historians appointed for the sole purpose of directing their statements and thus bringing out the 'correct' truths. The texts were collected in the central Party archive of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism. In 1968, a memorial to the Spanish fighters was unveiled in Berlin.

But, as McLellan demonstrates, this official concern on the part of the Party and state also had another, darker, face. The veterans of the fighting in Spain served as a living demonstration of the way in which Communism cultivated its traditions, and they could not deviate from the path prescribed for them without falling into disfavour.

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What was celebrated was a heroic, male, fighter type. The role of the women who had taken part in the Spanish Civil War was neglected, and politically undesirable people were at best ignored. Even the fact that the Spanish Republic had lost the war, and that the veterans were therefore on the losing side, did not fit into this heroic storyline, and, after a personal intervention by Walter Ulbricht, was cut out of the official history. The significance of the anarchists in the Civil War, including the relatively few Germans among them, was passed over in complete silence, while participants in, and eye-witnesses of, the Spanish war who, at the time, had been close to the Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (POUM, Workers' Party of Marxist Unification), denounced by the Communists as 'Trotskyist', were sharply attacked. These included Willy Brandt, who at that time had been a member of the Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei (Socialist Workers' Party), which co-operated with POUM. The fiercest attacks, however, were reserved for those veterans of the Spanish fighting who had at some stage left the Communist Party, such as Gustav Regler and Alfred Kantorowicz.

Perceptions of the Spanish war and its protagonists presented in literature, music, and theatre, however, were different. Wolf Biermann was the first to introduce tragic hues in the image of the Spanish fighters who, ultimately, had failed. Intellectuals and, especially, dissident members of the younger generation tried to differentiate between the Spanish veterans who had been painted in stark primary colours. This included pointing out that a dubious figure such as Erich Mielke, head of the Stasi, was counted among the veterans of the Spanish fighting. But subtly exercised censorship, not least the self-censorship demanded of eye-witnesses and historians, ensured that these sorts of critical thoughts were not disseminated.

After Ulbricht's fall from power the situation became a little more relaxed. Spanish veterans who had been disciplined, like Franz Dahlem, were partially rehabilitated, or were allowed to express themselves in public again, like Walter Janka. None the less, rehabilitation was selective, and the veterans who had fallen victim to Stalin's purges continued to be passed over in silence. In order not to cast any doubt on the SED's official version of history, constant submission to Party discipline to the point of self-denial was demanded of the Spanish fighters. This situation came to an end only with the end of the GDR. Their ideological socialization, however, will proba-

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bly prevent the few living eye-witnesses, who, in the course of a long life, have survived the Spanish Republic, the Franco regime, the Soviet Union, and not least the GDR, from taking full advantage of the freedom achieved at last.

Josie McLellan has presented the history of the Spanish fighters in the GDR in a brief but precise and well-written study. She recognizes the political role attributed to them with unerring accuracy, thus revealing a sober and realistic understanding of the system on which the SED state was based. Her investigation is grounded on a thorough study of the sources, especially of material which has not previously been available to Western researchers. The reviewer, who himself worked on the history of the German veterans of the Spanish Civil War twenty years ago, acknowledges this with admiration and some envy. And McLellan has been able to seek out and interview some surviving eye-witnesses. As a non-German, it was probably easier for her to gain access to people whose political preconceptions may have led them to refuse to talk to a West German historian. This book deserves the highest respect and praise because of the author's clear and sober judgement, her palpable empathy for the Spanish fighters exploited by political powers, and her solid knowledge of German post-war history.

PATRIK VON ZUR MÜHLEN was a Research Fellow at the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung from 1975 to 2004. He has published extensively on exile and emigration during the Third Reich, the Spanish Civil War, and the history of the GDR. Among his publications are *Spanien war ihre Hoffnung: Die deutsche Linke im Spanischen Bürgerkrieg 1936–1939* (1983), *Fluchtweg Spanien–Portugal: Die deutsche Emigration und der Exodus aus Europa* (1992), and *Aufbruch und Umbruch in der DDR: Bürgerbewegung, kritische Öffentlichkeit und Niedergang der SED-Herrschaft* (2000).

ANDREI S. MARKOVITS, *Amerika, dich hasst sich's besser: Antiamerikanismus und Antisemitismus in Europa* (Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag, 2004), 239 pp. ISBN 3 930786 45 1. EUR 15.00 (paperback)
CHRISTIAN SCHWAABE, *Antiamerikanismus: Wandlungen eines Feindbildes* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2003), 228 pp. ISBN 3 7705 3926 5. EUR 19.50 (paperback)

Ever since the horrendous events of 9/11, the academic (and non-academic) analysis of anti-Americanism has gone into overdrive. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's 2002 election victory on the back of his refusal to commit German troops to the looming war in Iraq has renewed an already prevalent interest in anti-American reflexes within Germany. Particularly cold-hearted and cynical German reactions to the World Trade Center atrocity have provoked the ire of commentators such as Henryk M. Broder, Andreas Hess, Dan Diner, and Andrei Markovits. Within this context, the debate on the genesis of anti-Americanism and anti-Western sentiment in Germany has initiated a number of thoughtful and level-headed publications.

While Markovits's recent study of the worrying relationship between anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism in Europe is certainly thoughtful and insightful, he makes no attempt to be level-headed about the issue. On the very first page, Markovits declares his partisanship as a US citizen, the son of Jewish immigrants from Europe, and a self-declared left-winger who deplores the intellectual dominance of the 'twin brothers' of anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism within certain sections of the European left. This laudable intellectual honesty makes this crystal-clear analysis of intellectual trends an all-the-more enjoyable read. Both the title and the cover photo of Markovits's polemic state the aim of the project. The hilarious play on the first line of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's poem *Amerika* ('Amerika, Du hast es besser' / America, you are better off) roughly translates into 'America, it is easy to hate you'. The cover shows an anti-Semitic graffito, photographed at a Hamburg subway station in April 2004: a Star of David carries the letters 'USA' in its centre, while the caption ludicrously suggests that the Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry is 'also' a Jew ('Kerry ist auch Jude!').

Markovits, a sociologist and political scientist at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, mainly concentrates on analysing current political and intellectual trends. He does, however, provide a chapter

on the historical roots of European (and especially German) anti-Americanism. In this section, he notes a surprising continuity in the anti-American discourse going back to the European discovery of America in 1492 (pp. 67 f.), in which America is regularly constructed as the European 'Other'. In this historical section, Markovits pays particular attention to the German construction of a Native American 'Noble Savage', embodied by Karl May's fictitious Apache chief, Winnetou, as a scathing critique of 'Yankeeism' and US-style capitalism. The 'Noble Savage', helped by a good number of German-born trappers, fights the erosion of his livelihood by the forces of a destructive Anglo-Saxon modernity.

Markovits's most controversial chapter is the one on current European anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism, and anti-Israeli sentiment. While his stinging attack on the European left's turning of a blind eye towards the aggressiveness and viciousness of some of Israel's neighbours and enemies (coupled with a latent demonization of Israel in many sections of the European media) is thoroughly justified, Markovits's construction of a symbiotic relationship between anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism is only partially convincing. Whereas he used to see the two phenomena as first cousins, Markovits states, he is now more prone to use André Glucksmann's term 'twin brothers' to describe their relationship (p. 173). While it is possible to write about European anti-Semitism without speaking of anti-Americanism, Markovits suggests, the reverse is not possible (p. 174). This seems far too dogmatic. The link between the two phenomena is well-established, but it is not total. There are a number of anti-American topoi that are not intrinsically linked to anti-Semitism: America as a nation of cultural superficiality, dominated by technology rather than intellect; the alleged dominance of American women; and the omnipresence of crude sexuality, turning human beings into sexual predators. The link can be made (and has been made), but it is not fundamental to the very existence of these anti-American topoi.

In the past, Markovits has argued that 'anti-Americanism is part of a larger search for German – and "federal republican" – identity'¹ in the Federal Republic of Germany. More recently, the writer Ian

¹ Andrei S. Markovits, 'Anti-Americanism and the Struggle for a West German Identity', in Peter H. Merkl (ed.), *The Federal Republic at Forty* (London, 1989), p. 33–54, at p. 37.

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Buruma and the philosopher Avishai Margalit have coined the term 'Occidentalism'² to describe the psychological-political function of anti-Americanism. Obviously inverting Edward Said's famous intellectual catch-phrase, 'Orientalism', which describes the consciously distorted Western conceptions of the 'East', 'Occidentalism' conversely constructs distorted images of 'America' and 'the West' for political use:

Four features of Occidentalism can be seen in most versions of it; we can call them the City, the Bourgeois, Reason, and Feminism. Each contains a set of attributes, such as arrogance, feebleness, greed, depravity, and decadence, which are invoked as typically Western, or even American, characteristics.³

All four features have been used in the—at least initially predominantly right-wing—German discourse on America. At least since the Wilhelmine period, Germany has seen many conscious attempts to define itself against an often imagined version of American modernity.

This is the core issue of Christian Schwaabe's study. Schwaabe, a political scientist at the University of Munich, follows Germany's 'long path towards the West'⁴ by tracing changing German attitudes towards America from 1871 to the present. He thus delivers an important intellectual-historical contribution to the current 'master narrative' of Germany's slow, but ultimately successful, Westernization.⁵ Schwaabe (like Markovits) takes the well-established line that most *Amerikabilder* and the correlating anti-American sentiment tell us very little about the USA, but quite a lot about the country that

² Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, 'Occidentalism', *New York Review of Books*, 17 January 2002, electronic edition: <<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15100>>.

³ *Ibid.*, pt. 1.

⁴ Heinrich August Winkler, *Der lange Weg nach Westen*, 2 vols. (Munich, 2000).

⁵ See also Axel Schildt, *Ankunft im Westen: Ein Essay zur Erfolgsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt am Main, 1999) and Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1999).

so forcefully tries to distinguish itself from this imagined 'America', in this case Germany (p. 9). The imagined America thus becomes an indicator of the degree of Westernization in Germany.

Schwaabe interprets the end of the Second World War as a true 'Zero Hour' in at least one way. The total collapse of Nazi Germany had taken the old German idea of military heroism to its grave. Increasingly, after 1945, Germans no longer defined themselves in terms of a 'heroic rejection of Western trading society' ('heroische Verweigerung gegen das westliche "Händlerium"', pp. 15 ff.), but more and more as a Western nation based on the idea of pacifism and 'Nie wieder Krieg'. After 1945, he argues, Germans often rejected America because, in the eyes of the Germans, it was beginning to resemble their own militaristic past (pp. 13 and 103 ff.).

In his analysis of Federal Republican attitudes towards America, Schwaabe involuntarily demonstrates both the advantages and the dangers of the new Westernization 'master narrative'. By describing long-term shifts in (West) German attitudes towards the West and thus in the German self-characterization *per se*, he makes an important contribution to our understanding of why the Federal Republic ultimately became a 'success story' (Axel Schildt). Schwaabe portrays both the Westernization of Germany's moderately conservative political élites and 'Americanization from below' (p. 134) by iconic American consumer products such as Coca-Cola and Mickey Mouse comic strips. The moderate right no longer fears the fundamental corruption of the Occident by the American Way of Life. A new left-wing anti-Americanism has come into existence in place of its outdated version: 'The old right-wing *Kulturkritik* is replaced by the Frankfurt School' (p. 120).

The new 'master narrative', however, at times ignores Federal Republican history by placing too much weight on hindsight. At least during the Adenauer years, right-wing anti-Americanism was by no means dead and buried. Conservative or reactionary academics such as Helmut Schelsky, Arnold Gehlen, and Carl Schmitt certainly rejected many features of Germany's Westernization (and Schmitt, despite a general perception to the contrary, was still an important voice even within moderate academic circles). Journalists with intellectual roots in Weimar conservatism, foremost among them the long-term editor of the daily newspaper *Die Welt*, Hans Zehrer, continued to voice anti-American resentments in an unbroken Weimar

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German tradition. Even voices from within the first Adenauer administration quite forcefully rejected the implementation of a Western political and economic system in Germany. While Schwaabe admits that German liberalism in the guise of the Free Democrats took some time after 1945 to rid itself of such baggage (p. 120), he mostly ignores a strong undercurrent of anti-Western and anti-American thought that existed throughout the 'long 1950s'.

Not despite, but because of, some controversial claims, both Markovits and Schwaabe provide important contributions to the current debate on the essence of anti-Americanism and its historical roots. Both accounts argue their points clearly and thoroughly. That makes them not only intellectually rewarding, but also a joy to read.

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ANKE BEISSWÄNGER, *Politik und Karikatur: Der Bundestagswahlkampf 2002 im Spiegel von Karikaturen in ausgewählten Tageszeitungen* (Munich: Martin Meidenbauer, 2005), 240 pp. ISBN 3 89975 035 7. EUR 39.90 (hardback)

Modern historians have a great affinity for newspaper cartoons (as opposed to the far more complex and elusive caricatures of the early modern period). Designed to capture the essence of a situation, an era or a famous individual in an easily accessible and quickly comprehensible piece of art, newspaper cartoons help to illustrate countless historical publications and grace numerous book covers. Compared to photographs, cartoons have the added advantages that they have been around for a very long time and that they are easier and cheaper to reproduce. Finally, cartoons make excellent teaching tools, as students usually prefer to discuss – often humorous – drawings instead of lengthy texts. One reason why historians predominantly use cartoons merely as illustration, decoration, or icebreaker in the classroom is that they often lack training in what else to do with images. While historians have put cartoons at the centre of their studies to see how certain events, problems, individuals or people have been portrayed in the past, there is still a widespread pictorial inferiority complex when dealing with sources generally considered to be the domain of art historians.

However, other academic fields also use images, and their research methodology, as Anke Beisswänger's book *Politik und Karikatur* shows, might also be interesting for historians confronted with large numbers of cartoons. Beisswänger studied Communication Science (*Kommunikationswissenschaft*), Marketing and Advertising Psychology (*Markt- und Werbepsychologie*), and Sociology at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, from which she graduated with the work under review here. Nevertheless, her book deals with contemporary history: the 2002 federal election campaign in Germany and the way it was represented in newspaper cartoons. Until now an article by Udo Michael Krüger¹ has been the only study of

¹ Udo Michael Krüger, 'Politische Karikaturen in meinungsbildenden Tageszeitungen', *Publizistik: Vierteljahreshefte für Kommunikationsforschung*, 26/1 (1981), pp. 56-85.

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German newspaper cartoons in elections, and Beisswänger compares her own findings on several occasions with Krüger's earlier results.

Politik und Karikatur is divided into two roughly equal parts. In the first, Beisswänger lays down the theoretical and factual basis for the analysis of cartoons, which forms the second part. The book opens with a chapter on the history and theory of caricature and cartoons. As both are subsumed under the same word in the German language, Beisswänger goes on to discuss the various definitions of the term *politische Karikatur*, before turning her attention to the various codes (or symbols) used by cartoonists in their work. The chapter closes with a discussion of the limits imposed on the cartoonists' work by 'taboo topics' as well as by editorial policies and the law.

The author then looks at the role played by the mass media in the transmission of policies. She argues that mass media are a necessary prerequisite for a working democracy, and that the media need to be open to different groups, and to disseminate a range of diverse opinions at different levels. In addition, the information has to flow in both directions, from the politicians to the citizens and vice versa, with the media serving as transmitter. In contemporary society, Beisswänger argues, mass media and politics have an interdependent relationship; a concept she explicitly prefers over the idea of 'the fourth estate' ('die Vierte Gewalt'), or notions that the politicians use the media ('Instrumentalisierung'), or increasingly depend on it ('Dependenzbeziehung'). The political tasks of the mass media are to inform, serve as a public forum in which issues of public interest are debated and articulated by various individuals and groups, to explain political life and options for participation to the public, and to criticize and control. The daily newspapers share these tasks with other, younger media, but have the longest tradition and, according to Beisswänger, are particularly well suited to reporting on the increasingly diverse and complex politics of our time. The daily newspaper is also the standard medium for political cartoons, which serve as 'visual commentaries' ('visueller Kommentar') and focus the contradictions of political reality.

Unfortunately, there is little empirical knowledge on the actual impact of cartoons on their readers. While some scholars and cartoonists are convinced that they are very effective in forming and changing opinions, others are more sceptical, or see cartoons simply as a mirror of political opinion, or as having an affirmative function.

Beisswänger takes the side of the optimists by arguing that cartoons have the potential to trigger critical reflection and are therefore able to play a central part in forming political opinions and will. Because cartoons also entertain, they can act as catalysts, inducing the reader to look for background information on issues picked up in cartoons.

Beisswänger then examines the role of the mass media in election campaigns and the features of these campaigns, which are increasingly 'Americanized' (p. 73) and dominated by external advisers and political spin doctors. Also discussed is the supposedly increasing personalization of the campaigns, although the extent of this trend is disputed. For the media, individuals are easy to cover, and personality is a 'news factor' ('Nachrichtenfaktor', p. 75). As a result, the increasing focus on the chancellor candidates in Germany fosters the perception of federal elections as duels between the most important candidates, while the political parties, which represent the structural and institutional side of politics, become less prominent. Individuals are easier to depict, and images attract public attention more than the printed or spoken word.

In the second part of her study, Beisswänger turns to the federal election campaign of 2002, which started with the nomination of the Conservative candidate Edmund Stoiber on 11 January and ended with election day on 22 September 2002. After very brief portraits of Stoiber and the incumbent Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, Beisswänger summarizes the main topics and events which dominated the election. The 309 cartoons by 26 artists she examines are a representative sample of all drawings published on the election campaign in four large German national broadsheets: *Die Welt* (97 cartoons), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (51), *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (93), and *Frankfurter Rundschau* (68). According to Beisswänger, these four newspapers represent the main political spectrum in the German media and are also opinion leaders. The timeframe for Beisswänger's study is the three months leading up to election day, that is, 21 June to 21 September 2002.

What are the results of her analysis? With regard to the topics addressed in the cartoons, Beisswänger concludes that eight main topics (depicted in ten or more cartoons) are especially often portrayed. They represent only 11.9 per cent of all topics, but nearly 40 per cent of all cartoons. Almost all of them deal with domestic issues, with 'unemployment' topping the list, representing nearly a third of

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all the main topics. The second large topic is the election campaign itself, while the only international main topic is arms control in Iraq. When the cartoons are arranged according to more inclusive categories, the election occupies the top rank with 31.7 per cent of all cartoons, closely followed by domestic policy (31.1 per cent). The third place is held by defence/war/conflict resolution, which features in just 6.5 per cent. For the cartoonists, the 2002 election was clearly dominated by domestic issues. While some of the main topics feature over the whole period examined by Beisswänger, others, like Stoiber's 'competence team', are prominent only for brief spells. A relatively high percentage of cartoons (8.3 per cent) feature 'taboo topics' such as individual suffering or religion.

Politicians of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Conservative Union of CDU/CSU are most often depicted (33.7 and 26.2 per cent). Interestingly, representatives of the oppositional FDP are more often portrayed than politicians from the Green Party, which formed the government with the SPD (4.9 and 3.9 per cent), probably because of the FDP's high-profile chancellor candidate in 2002, Guido Westerwelle. Members of the Socialist PDS feature only twice, while representatives of the Schill Party, a right-wing splinter group, are not depicted at all. In total, politicians are far more often portrayed than political parties. While the SPD features in 6.5 per cent of cartoons, the CDU/CSU is shown in 11 per cent.

Conservative newspapers tend to depict more left-wing politicians, while papers from the political left show more right-wing politicians in their cartoons. With the exception of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, which rarely depicts politicians at all, the other three papers predominantly show images of politicians from the opposite political camp. Beisswänger's analysis also confirms the assumption that politicians from the other side are usually depicted critically. Green politicians are the least negatively portrayed (58.3 per cent), compared to members of the CDU (80.6 per cent), while the former are also the most often neutrally characterized (16.7 per cent). FDP politicians are not positively depicted in any of the 309 drawings. Positive depictions are generally rare and feature almost exclusively in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*.

Most cartoons focus on important individuals, but Beisswänger suggests that the frequency with which they appear in cartoons depends on their public profile rather than their rank or office.

Nevertheless, the German Chancellor is traditionally the most frequently portrayed (92 times), while his challenger features in 62 cartoons. Neither is depicted stereotypically, although Schröder is sometimes shown as a member of the working class (7.7 per cent), while Stoiber is often drawn in traditional Bavarian attire (21.7 per cent). Most often, however, both candidates are shown as being well dressed (Schröder 44.2 per cent; Stoiber 27.5 per cent) or in sporting clothes, which again stresses the nature of the election campaign as a duel between the two main contenders (Schröder 10.6 per cent; Stoiber 13 per cent).

When it comes to the abilities and characters of the main candidates, both are depicted as dishonest and incompetent, although the Chancellor fares a bit worse. Again, the political direction of a newspaper is revealed not in praise of its own candidate, but in criticism of the representative of the other side. Not surprisingly, Beisswänger concludes that the political direction of a newspaper influences the content of its cartoons, in part because newspapers have to cater for the expectations of their readership. Nevertheless, she also highlights differences between the newspapers. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, for example, uses the most allusions from high culture, while cartoons in the *Frankfurter Rundschau* predominantly use stereotypes such as trade unionists, the unemployed, and so on. Beisswänger concludes her book by briefly pointing out where further research is necessary. The extensive appendix features a bibliography, a chronology of events in Germany between January and September 2002, a 'code book' for categorizing the cartoons in the sample, a collection of cartoons, tables with the results of Beisswänger's study, and an index.

Politik und Karikatur is a well-organized, thoroughly researched, and stringently argued book. It is also well-crafted, although the publisher's decision to translate the summary on the back cover into English, French, and Spanish seems a little ambitious. In addition, one cannot help wondering whether the author's results are worth the effort and expense of producing a book. While it is interesting and useful to study Beisswänger's methodology, none of her findings are particularly surprising. A paper with conservative sympathies will hardly publish left-wing cartoons, and during election time, cartoonists will naturally deal predominantly with the topics of the day, that is, the election campaign and the issues on which it will be decided. Perhaps one reason why the topic of how election campaigns are

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mirrored in modern newspaper cartoons has rarely been studied is the predictability of the results. Beisswänger discovers a few interesting details, such as how rarely Schröder, after all, the candidate of a social democratic party, is pictured as a member of the working class. However, the more fundamental questions, for example, the relationship between press cartoons and neighbouring articles, whether cartoons can indeed influence individual opinion, or whether the public understands the drawings in the way the cartoonists intended, are only briefly touched upon and marked as fields for further research at the end of the book.

Probably because this book is based on an MA thesis, the author is unnecessarily hesitant to venture beyond the solid ground of her empirical work and relies too heavily on quotations from established authorities when dealing with the history, meaning, and impact of cartoons. Especially the first half of the book at times seems like a reader rather than a monograph. Nevertheless, *Politik und Karikatur* can be recommended to those interested in the 2002 federal election in Germany, and to scholars seeking a method for working quantifiably with newspaper cartoons. This, in itself, is no small achievement.

MATTHIAS REISS is a Research Fellow at the GHIL. He is currently working on a study of the image of the unemployed in England and Germany from the end of the nineteenth century to the 1980s. He is the author of *Die Schwarzen waren unsere Freunde: Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in der amerikanischen Gesellschaft 1942–1946* (2002).

CONFERENCE REPORTS

Demonstration Marches of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries in a Comparative Historical Perspective. Conference held on 25–26 February 2005 at the German Historical Institute London.

For the last two centuries, organized demonstration marches have been widely used as a means of political protest, and there is little sign that taking to the streets to register support for, or opposition to, a cause has lost its appeal in the twenty-first century. Although they share certain elements, however, the success of demonstration marches and their ability to achieve the results desired by organizers and supporters vary considerably.

On 25 and 26 February 2005, scholars from a number of different countries and backgrounds in history, political science, anthropology, psychology, and geography, and people with practical experience in the organization of demonstration marches met at the German Historical Institute London to discuss the changing forms, elements, and outcomes of demonstration marches since the nineteenth century. Instead of focusing on individual demonstrations, each paper had a comparative perspective. The presenters were asked to discuss the use of symbols, rituals, and traditions; the aims and expectations of the marchers; their interaction with the media, politicians, the police, and onlookers; the significance and use of space; the importance of numbers; the problem of violence versus peaceful protest; how the success of demonstration marches could be measured; and their legacy.

Hagen Schulze (Director, German Historical Institute London) opened the conference and welcomed the participants. Thereafter Matthias Reiss (London), who had planned and organized the conference, briefly summarized some of the guiding questions, before Clifford Stott (Liverpool) presented the keynote speech: 'Overcoming the Historical Legacy of Gustave LeBon: Identity and the Social Dynamics of the Crowd.' Stott stressed the historical context in which ideas of crowd psychology first developed in nineteenth-century France. Born out of a framework of social tensions and upheaval in which the crowd was the lower classes' only weapon for creating

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change in their favour, crowd psychology seemed to offer the promise of manipulating and controlling the crowd as well as harnessing its revolutionary potential. The crowd was understood as a pathological intrusion into the social order which had no normative structure and had to be controlled by the use of overwhelming force. This view, popularized but not invented by LeBon, became highly influential and still often determines the authorities' approach to crowd control today. However, Stott stressed that police tactics based on LeBon's theory often provoked the violence they were designed to prevent. New theories of crowd psychology have successfully overcome the legacy of LeBon. They hold that crowd behaviour is driven by social identity and that changing the contexts of events also results in changes in the psychology of the crowd. Stott explained these new theories and the limitations of the old ideas using the example of the Anti-Poll Tax Riot which took place in London on 31 March 1990, and the policing of football fans during the 2004 European Championship in Portugal.

The first session, on 'The Long Nineteenth Century', was chaired by Jon Lawrence (Cambridge) and opened by Pia Nordblom (Mainz), who spoke on 'Resistance, Protest and Demonstrations in Europe in the Early Nineteenth Century: The "Hambacher Fest" of 1832'. Nordblom placed the celebration at Hambach into the context of widespread social and political protest in Europe in the early 1830s. Compared with the revolutionary activities elsewhere in Europe, Hambach was a peaceful affair in the traditional form of a public festival, but imbued with a new political meaning. Nordblom described the long procession to the castle of Hambach, which reminded contemporaries of the mass progression of Napoleon's armies, the use of colours and symbols by the participants, and the order of the procession. All in all, between 20,000 and 30,000 people from a broad social background attended the festival, but the organizers tried to keep the poor away. Nevertheless, in many communities in the Rhine area the lower classes rioted after the festival, and the Bavarian authorities reacted by taking punitive measures which contributed considerably to the violence in the area after the festival. Nordblom concluded by commenting on the changing and lasting legacy of the festival in Germany's political culture.

Hugh L. Agnew (Washington, D.C.) followed with a paper on 'Demonstrating the Nation: Symbol, Ritual, and Political Protest in

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Bohemia, 1867–1875'. Reforms within the Habsburg Empire after the war with Italy in 1859 opened the way for the transformation of the Czech nationalist movement into a mass-based political phenomenon. According to Agnew, a number of public manifestations of the late 1860s and early 1870s in Bohemia were symptoms of this gradual transformation. They included celebrations of the return of the coronation regalia from Vienna to Prague and the laying of the foundation stone of the new National Theatre, but especially the series of mass protest meetings called 'people's camps' (*tábory lidu*) that expressed the nationalist reaction to the *Ausgleich* with Hungary and the ensuing December constitution in Cisleithania. The *tábor* movement drew on foreign examples, in particular, the mass meetings organized by Daniel O'Connell in Ireland, but it also adapted symbols and rituals from domestic sources that were to remain recurrent features of Czech political demonstrations throughout the remainder of the century and beyond. Agnew explained the various symbols and procedures common to the celebrations and demonstrations, including the use of the traditional heraldic symbols of the Kingdom of Bohemia and aspects of its coronation rituals, the application of colours to represent political positions, the use of song and music, and the selection of specific locations for protest. In addition, he assessed the effectiveness of these manifestations in changing policy and winning popular support.

Birgitta Bader-Zaar's (Vienna) paper, ' "With Banners Flying": A Comparative View of Women's Suffrage Demonstrations 1907–1914', concluded the first session. Providing case studies from Britain, Austria, France, Germany, and the United States, Bader-Zaar explained the various ways in which female demonstrators dealt with the constraints they faced when moving in public spaces. Moderate suffrage organizations emphasized respectability and circumvented possible antagonism either by encouraging women to use cars and carriages, thus avoiding setting foot on the streets, or by organizing orderly, well-planned processions. Especially in England and the United States, the processions were characterized by a rich use of symbols such as suffrage colours, banners, floats, and pageants, all emphasizing feminine civic values. The militant Women's Social and Political Union joined in staging spectacular demonstrations that drew impressive numbers of participants and onlookers, but reverted to radical tactics such as raids on Parliament when its expectations

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of success were disappointed. The publicity around these events encouraged the Labour Movement in Britain to commit itself to the women's franchise, and, in contrast to the moderate suffrage movement, the radicals' protests were largely modelled on traditional labour demonstrations consisting of assembled crowds marching on foot. According to Bader-Zaar, interest in demonstrations began to fade shortly before the First World War. In England it became difficult to make every new procession more impressive and entertaining than the previous one. Movements on the Continent still hesitated to adopt this tactic, and the Labour Movements in Austria and Germany questioned its chances of success. Militants in the United States began to give up marching, preferring instead to picket a prominent spot, the White House. Nevertheless, demonstrations were important for the integration of suffragists in the movement, and for publicizing the cause. The ultimate decision concerning women's enfranchisement, however, lay in the hands of governments and parliaments, which could only be brought round under specific political conditions.

The second session, 'Protest between the World Wars', was chaired by Richard Bessel (York). In his paper 'Between Peace and Order: Demobilization and the Politics of the Street in Britain and Germany, 1917-1921', Adam R. Seipp (College Station, Texas) discussed the discrepancy between the support the war enjoyed for most of its duration and the rejection of its legacy in both defeated and victorious countries when demobilization began. Using evidence from demonstrations in Munich and Manchester, Seipp argued that this transition can best be understood as a crisis of reciprocity. The rhetoric in both cities was based on the idea that service during the war legitimized grievances and deserved reward. Not only members of the armed forces, but the entire social milieu of those who had served was depicted as having made sacrifices, and women and non-combatants were able to harness this flexibility to make space for their own demands. Seipp explained the need to frame the protest in both cities within a rhetoric of loyalty by arguing that the period of demobilization was still 'wartime', when protest was easily coded as disloyalty. In Manchester, the protesters' efforts to demonstrate within the boundaries of loyalty rendered their activities ineffective, while in Munich, the Jews were used as scapegoats to permit coded criticism of the government.

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Matthias Reiss (London) spoke on 'Marching on the Capital: National Protest Marches of the Unemployed in Interwar Great Britain'. In the 1920s and 1930s, four organizations in Britain organized national protest marches to London or Edinburgh: the National League of the Blind, the National Unemployed Workers' Movement, the Jarrow Borough Council, and the British Campaigners' Association. Each of these organizations contributed in its own way to this form of political protest, which reached its peak in 1936. In addition, each enjoyed different levels of political support and had different resources at its disposal. All marches were two-act dramas and shared many common features. The march to the capital served to demonstrate strength and the urgency of the marchers' cause, as well as to mobilize support, collect funds, and disseminate information. Former servicemen and non-combatants alike presented themselves as forgotten heroes of the Great War and tried to convey an image of military order to emphasize their respectability and deservingness. The climax of each march was the arrival of the marchers in the capital, where mass meetings for their reception were held. Afterwards, the marchers attempted to present their case to Parliament or to Cabinet members, but were rarely successful. All governments defended representation as the exclusive privilege of elected Members of Parliament. Reiss concluded that historians are still divided about whether the marches were successful and argued that they probably worked best as a means of information, as the street was the most effective mass medium to which the unemployed had unrestricted access.

The conference continued on the following day with a session on 'Protest in the City', chaired by David Gilbert (London). In 'Demonstrating in Zurich between 1830 and 1940: From Bourgeois Protest to Proletarian Street Politics', Christian Koller (Zurich) explained that demonstration marches became popular in this Swiss city during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Organized protest in the era of bourgeois revolutions up to 1870 took the form of assemblies, but the emerging Labour Movement merged this form of protest with other traditions and created the classical demonstration march, for which the May Day demonstration soon became the model. Until the end of the First World War, the Social Democratic Labour Movement was the only political force in Zurich to organize demonstration marches. In the 1920s, the Communists copied this form of protest, and in the

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early 1930s, the Swiss fascists contended with the left for the streets as a political arena. According to Koller, both the bourgeois assemblies and the proletarian marches tried to convey the impression that the claims of their respective movements were supported by large numbers of citizens. In addition, the Labour Movement's demonstration marches also intended to show that the workers were not a rebellious mob, but a disciplined class fighting for its rights by peaceful means. Nevertheless, the Labour Movement's marches into the bourgeois area of the town symbolized the proletarian attack on this class, which conferred a certain ambiguity on these demonstrations. Although both bourgeois protest meetings and organized proletarian street politics were intended to be peaceful, from time to time proletarian street politics slipped from Social Democratic control, leading to street battles with the police or military forces. In the early 1930s the emergence of the fascists as new actors in street politics also led to an increase in everyday political street violence. While the bourgeois protest assemblies twice successfully initiated far-reaching constitutional changes (in 1830 and in 1867–8), the success of the socialist demonstration marches is more difficult to assess. Few of these marches resulted in immediate action by the political élite. Koller thus suggested that the main achievement of the socialist demonstration marches was to give the abstract concepts of class and class struggle concrete expression by institutionalizing and ritualizing a certain form of collective body politic.

Neil Jarman's (Belfast) paper was entitled 'Another Form of Troubles: Parades, Protests, and the Northern Ireland Peace Process, 1995–2004'. Explaining the history and role of annual commemorative parades for demonstrating and affirming cultural and political identity in Northern Ireland from the eighteenth century on, Jarman focused on the symbolic importance of these parades to Protestants and Catholics after the declaration of a ceasefire in 1994. Since 1995 disputes about whether the Protestant Orange Order and related organizations have a right to march along 'traditional' parade routes in the face of opposition from local residents and political opponents have dominated much of the summer months, and in recent years a number of parades have degenerated into violent rioting and serious public disorder. Using the community of Portadown as a case study, Jarman reviewed the recent history of parades in Northern Ireland while placing the disputes within their immediate political context

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and acknowledging their historical antecedents. He also discussed the role of symbols, tradition, territoriality, and power as key elements that have underpinned and helped to sustain the problem, before summarizing the main attempts made by government, civil society, and the protagonists to address the problems and establish a peaceful means of managing the culture of parading that remains significant in the local context.

Nikola D. Dimitrov (Weimar) concluded the session with a paper on 'Street of Anger: Opposition Protests in Belgrade and Sofia during the Winter Months of 1996-1997'. Although Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had developed different types of socialist systems and faced different sets of problems in the 1990s, the outcries of 1996-7 in their respective capitals were similar. Large daily rallies on the main boulevards of Belgrade and Sofia brought together thousands of people who marched through the city centres from one government building to the next, shouted opposition slogans, and made as much noise as possible. The people in both cities utilized the same methods and their protests developed in similar ways over the winter months, leading to considerable street violence and outrage against the major public buildings in Belgrade and Sofia. Nevertheless, the results of the protests were strikingly different. In Bulgaria, parliamentary elections were announced (February 1997), while in Serbia the rivalry between the opposition leaders and a much more violent response from the government led to further years of political struggle. Showing a number of images and also referring to the recent street protests in Kiev, Dimitrov explained the use of space, satire, and irony in the demonstration marches he focused on.

The fourth and final session on 'New Models of Demonstrations' was chaired by Irina Novikova (Riga), who started by also making some remarks on the recent protest in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev. Speaking on 'Symbolizing "Peace" in the Cold War: the British and West German Easter Marches, 1958-1964', Holger Nehring (Oxford) compared the staging of the British and West German anti-nuclear weapons protests in order to show how protest traditions and the Cold War environment interacted in shaping the symbolics of protest in both the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. The protest form of the 'Easter March' was imported to West Germany from Britain in 1960, but despite this transnational link, the symbolic politics of the marches in both countries still depended on

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national political traditions and therefore differed markedly. Nehring focused in particular on the symbolics of 'peace', a word also used by the Soviet Union, the GDR, and Communist Parties to legitimize their own policies and denounce the West as totalitarian. This confronted the British and West German protesters with a formidable challenge when staging their protests. At the same time, protesters had to situate themselves within traditions of 'good politics' and 'public peace' in the two countries.

In contrast to Nehring, Fabian Virchow's (Kiel) paper 'Towards a Typology of Demonstration Marches: the Case of the Far Right in Germany' focused on the public processions of the far right. After the Second World War, the German far right was long unable to use demonstration marches as part of its political strategy. After initial attempts during the 1980s, some factions of the German far right took up the idea of demonstrations and rallies as a means of mobilizing followers and disseminating propaganda more systematically from the early 1990s. Now there are rallies every weekend in Germany, the largest of which can attract up to 5,000 participants, and a demonstration march calendar with certain fixed dates has been established among the far right. According to Virchow, these marches have become among the most attractive and high-profile events which the far right has to offer its young followers. On the one hand, the marches aim to recruit new followers and activists and are designed to season participants and train new leaders; on the other, these demonstration marches try to increase the neo-fascist movement's chances of disseminating its propaganda. Virchow argued that the demonstration marches of the far right differ in various ways, depending on the events which trigger them, their aims, and the ways in which they try to achieve them. He concluded by presenting a typology of far right marches in Germany, ranging from 'fighting demonstrations' to silent commemorative marches taking place at symbolic locations.

The final paper in this session, presented by Danielle Tartakowsky (Paris), was on 'Is the French *manif* still specific? Mutations of French Street Demonstrations'. Tartakowsky argued that national repertoires of collective action with their own, often implicit, rules came into existence in the countries of western Europe between the 1880s and the First World War. These national repertoires provided the framework for all kinds of demonstrations organized in the various countries of Europe, even where a formal right to public demon-

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stration did not exist. In France, where this repertoire has been summed up in the term *manif* since the 1950s, public demonstrations played a leading part in the main crises of the Third Republic (February 1934) and the Fifth Republic (May/June 1968), and have become more frequent since the 1970s. Although most of these demonstrations were similar to those of earlier decades, Tartakowsky suggested that the French *manif* is no longer as inclusive as it used to be before the 1980s. In the last decades of the twentieth century, new kinds of demonstrations appeared, with new functions in political life, new features, and partly in new places. Some of these new demonstrations have, with the tacit agreement of the government, become a conventional way of interfering in politics. As a result, a *de facto* constitutional right to demonstrate, provided the public order is not endangered, has been introduced by stealth in France. Tartakowsky explained that the new kinds of demonstrations are rather different from what the *manif* used to be, and that the *système manifestant* has been shaken by changes in French political culture, the crisis of the traditional organizations, the irruption of new models of demonstrations, and the circulation of other national models throughout Europe and all over the world.

The conference concluded with a panel discussion on 'Protest in the Twenty-First Century: Old Traditions, New Developments', which was chaired by Dominik Geppert (London) and brought together a number of people with practical experience of organizing demonstrations. Bertold Baur (Frankfurt/Main) from the German metalworkers' union IG Metall opened the discussion. In a short paper he summarized IG Metall's experience of mobilizing its members for demonstrations, while highlighting the opportunities and risks inherent in such a step. Felix Kolb (Dörverden), founding member of ATTAC Germany and a former spokesperson for this organization, reported on the efficiency of demonstrations in generating press coverage and attracting new members. He also argued that the reliance of social movements on mass demonstrations was a weakness, as the movements could not control the interpretation of the processions they organized. He suggested that instead of judging the 'success' of a demonstration, one should speak of its 'outcome'. Dieter Rucht (Berlin), who has worked extensively on contemporary protest and is a member of ATTAC Germany's academic advisory board (*Wissenschaftlicher Beirat*), commented on both papers. This was followed by a general discussion.

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The conference showed the various ways in which organizers of demonstrations were influenced not only by national traditions, but also by events in other countries. The question of how this transfer of knowledge actually took place is one of the points which still require more clarification. While the different papers showed strong continuities between demonstrations organized by diverse social and political groups over time, important changes also became apparent. The desire to appear respectable, for example, which dominated organized demonstrations from the nineteenth century on, became less important after the Second World War, when irony and satire acquired a more prominent role in many demonstrations and the formerly orderly, almost military-style processions became far less disciplined. Banners have likewise lost their once important symbolic significance and have been replaced by whatever people can find. The protesters on the streets of Belgrade, for example, enthusiastically waved Ferrari and other flags while demonstrating against the regime in 1996-7. The importance of the marchers' mobility is another question which needs further research. The denial of mobility is obviously significant in certain cases, for example, the blockade of the annual parades in Portadown by the police, and intrusion into the territory of the class-enemy is also a symbolic act, as the example of Zurich shows. However, the question remains as to whether a demonstration march in general has a different impact from a protest meeting. Finally, the appearance of new media, for example, photography, film, and television, and their impact on demonstration marches repeatedly came up in the discussion. While organizers of demonstrations use the publicity which the press and other media offer, they have little control over how a wider audience is informed about their march. When the unemployed marched to London between the world wars, for example, the police asked the film companies to abstain from filming the processions in order to deny them publicity. Photos of demonstrations are often carefully arranged and need to be interpreted with caution. This conference, which brought together people from various fields, will, it is hoped, be a step towards solving these and other problems, and highlight the need for an interdisciplinary and multinational approach to the study of demonstration marches. A publication is planned.

MATTHIAS REISS (GHIL)

Teaching World History. Conference held at the German Historical Institute Washington, D.C., 3-5 March 2005. Co-sponsored by the German Historical Institute London.

Over the past three decades, world history has become a major teaching field for undergraduates and high school students in the USA, and it now forms part of history curricula. Efforts to establish this field as a subdiscipline have produced remarkable historical scholarship and led to the founding of journals, organizations, and conferences. In continental Europe, however, with only a few exceptions, historians have thus far been reluctant to approach this field, and attempts to introduce a global perspective into secondary school and university curricula are still rare. Curriculum studies have only recently started to address this topic; international comparative studies do not yet exist. In an effort to bridge this gap, the conference *Teaching World History*, convened by Eckhardt Fuchs (University of Mannheim), Christof Mauch (German Historical Institute Washington), Karen Oslund (German Historical Institute Washington), and Benedikt Stuchtey (German Historical Institute London), was the third in a sequence of conferences on world history and historiography that have been organized by the German Historical Institutes in London and Washington since 1997. While the first two meetings dealt with the writing of world history since the early nineteenth century, the main goal of the third was to assemble academic practitioners of world history and representatives of the field of curriculum studies from several different countries to discuss the issues that arise in teaching world history both at college and secondary school level.

In the keynote speech, entitled 'Performing the World: Reality and Representation in the Making of World Histor(ies)', Arif Dirlik (University of Oregon) emphasized the public and pedagogical function of teaching world history. Focusing on the concept of historical spaces used in most world history research, he underlined the historiographical reasons for an approach that takes nations, civilizations, and cultures as its points of departure. He posed the question, however, of whether these conventional spaces were autonomous subjects of history or whether they are themselves created by this historiographical approach. Dirlik argued that these spatialities are constructs of modernity and therefore need to be historicized in order to reveal the spatialities and temporalities that are suppressed by such

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an approach. Outlining different modes of conceiving world history, he suggested the concept of 'world-history-as-totality', which sees the globe as a frame of reference. This mode calls for a proliferation of the use of the concept of space in historical analysis and the recognition of the interaction between many translocal spaces, such as ethnic and diaspora spaces. Using examples from Asia and the Islamic world, he demonstrated not only the historicity, instabilities, internal differences, and even fragmentation of the notions of nation and civilizations, but also their function as mediators for bringing a hegemonic political order to the world. Teaching world history, therefore, brings with it the obligation to acquaint students with the 'facts' of world history on the one hand, and to develop a critical perspective that articulates the suppressed in history and alternative paths of the historical process on the other.

The first session addressed the topic 'Teaching World History in Secondary Schools'. In his talk 'World History: Curriculum and Controversy', Peter N. Stearns (George Mason University) summarized the debates in the USA over the introduction of world history as a teaching programme at high schools and colleges. Whereas academic worries from specialized professional historians and the lack of specific training were important causes for objections, Stearns argued that cultural resistance by the national conservative establishment was the main force against the new world teaching programme, since it was seen as a threat to American values and the Western political heritage. The insistence on a national framework for history curricula at high schools corresponded to the resistance at college level to replacing the traditional Western civilization survey with world history courses. In addition, the flow and diversity of the US immigrant population and the growing complexities of the US world role—especially after 9/11—deepened the conflicts over new curricula between proponents of world history programmes and their opponents. Despite the ongoing cultural wars, Stearns believes that world history curricula have, on the whole, gained ground in American high schools and colleges. The resistance prevented neither the introduction of world history programmes and standards in many states and individual school districts, nor the success of the Advanced Placement World History course established by the College Board. Nevertheless, various issues, such as the quality of teaching, the uneven distribution of courses, teacher training, and

competing views of the contents of world history, as well as of the relationship between world and American history at the curricular level, remain significant.

Eckhardt Fuchs presented a comparative overview of the historical background of world history teaching at the secondary education level in the USA and in Germany in his paper on 'Why Teach World History in School: Curriculum Reform in German Secondary Education'. He showed not only that the varying traditions caused the development of different paradigms of history teaching, but also that German history instruction has been bound to a strict national perspective until the present. Curriculum issues have only become a topic within the German educational reform discourse because of the stimulus of international studies such as PISA. Fuchs demonstrated that the newly introduced history curriculum in Baden-Württemberg tries to take up some of the international developments – such as standards, output orientation, and a European perspective – but that it fails to incorporate a true world history approach. Referring to recent empirical studies of the effects of history instruction on the development of a historical consciousness among students, he claimed that curriculum reform in Germany can only be successful if it abandons insufficiently empirically supported statements about the relationship between history teaching and identity formation in a global world. In contrast, he pleaded for empirical research on history instruction and curricula in order to base history curriculum reform on scientific evidence and, in so doing, legitimize it in public discourse.

Susanne Popp's (University of Siegen) paper, 'Integrating World History into a National Curriculum: The Concept of a Globally Oriented Historical Consciousness', took up this topic and discussed how to include a globally conceptualized world history perspective into the Euro-centric German history curriculum. In her view, such a transformation would improve the ability of students to understand regional, national, and European history from a global perspective. She argued that changing the focus or perspective of historical analysis is an important factor in an increasingly globalized historical consciousness that enables students to learn to explore local events in a global setting and to analyse global issues by considering local examples. In addition, students can learn about the impact of historical consciousness on the identity of human beings while also learning to respect different views on history in other parts of the world and in

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other cultural domains. Drawing on some examples, Popp demonstrated how to place the national history curriculum into a more global framework, given that more than 5,000 years of German history are covered in the current curriculum. She proposed embedding European and national history in a global approach of connections, interactions, encounters, and contacts between major civilizations, thus placing cross-era, long-term social change into a global and comparative framework while also conceptualizing the history of globalization.

In the last presentation of this session, 'Creating National and International Assessments in World History', Robert Bain and Tamara L. Shreiner (both University of Michigan), took the current instructional climate of assessments and evaluations, especially in mathematics, reading, and science, as a point of departure for their argument to introduce large-scale testing into history as a way to further world history education. Although the National Assessment Governing Board has already created and administered a US history assessment, no assessment for World History yet exists, although the latter has been the fastest growing segment of the American school curriculum in recent years. The main obstacles have been the lack of a common structure of world history courses, the various types of world history, and the distribution of these courses throughout and across grade levels, which makes the development of a nationwide assessment difficult. In analysing the growth and state of world history education at the high school level, Bain and Shreiner described four patterns of world history curriculum. Challenged by this diversity, the Assessment Board suggested three options for creating a common national exam to assess students' understanding of world history. Bain and Shreiner offered a fourth model that asks professional historians to join forces at the national and the international level and to take up the challenge of assessing world history for the sake of securing the long-term existence and high quality of world history education.

The second panel shifted the topic from secondary school issues to teaching world history at the university. Anthony J. Steinhoff (University of Tennessee) opened this panel with his paper 'In Search of a New Paradigm: World History and General Education on the American Campus'. In the first part of his talk he focused on the relationship between world history and general education, arguing that, as a result of becoming the primary option for fulfilling general edu-

cation history requirements, world history surveys as 'mega western civilizations' have become unsatisfactory for students and teachers. The reasons are not only the huge amount of knowledge to be taught, the complexity of the pedagogical task, and the diversity of world history definitions, but also the ongoing debate on what constitutes general education. Exploring alternative ways of defining world history within general education, he suggested a link between the goals of the traditional liberal arts, such as the training and stimulation of the independent intellect, and world history teaching. Using examples from world history curricula and textbooks, he pointed out that such an approach needs a new conceptual and chronological framework for world history. Steinhoff therefore encouraged a thematic, micro-history approach to world history teaching that allows more choice at the level of course offerings and aims to raise the interest and engagement of the students.

In his paper 'Global History and Global Studies: A European Perspective and the Leipzig Experience', Matthias Middell (University of Leipzig) introduced a recently established graduate programme at the University of Leipzig. After suggesting four reasons for the current differences in the state of world and global history teaching in the USA and in Europe, he argued that, on the one hand, world history research and teaching take on different shapes in Europe and in the USA. On the other hand, attempts by the European Union to homogenize structures of higher learning and to decrease state regulation offer universities the chance to develop their own curricula and programmes. The University of Leipzig, with its long tradition in world history, and the structural changes after 1989, which strengthened the area studies programmes, utilized this opportunity. Leipzig's new Ph.D. programmes in Transnationalization and Occidentalization dating from the mid-1990s, its summer school for Ph.D. students which has been held since 2002, and international networks and programmes created over the past decade all opened the way for the inauguration of a European master's programme in global studies in 2004. This programme is co-funded by the EU Erasmus Mundus programme and involves three other European universities. In the final part of his talk Middell presented the structure and contents of the programme that, in contrast to survey courses at American colleges, is taught at the graduate level, and is therefore designed completely differently.

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Katja Naumann's (University of Leipzig) paper, 'The Debate on Transnational and Global History in Germany', filled out the picture of the state of world history teaching and research in Germany by reconstructing some debates on world, or global, history that have been taking place there in the last five years. These debates have raised four major points: the role of national history in relation to global history, the differences between 'transnational history' and global history, the challenges that this history offers to the professional standards of historians, and the question of whether global history should be seen as an additional field analogous to established fields, or as a new method of analysis that questions existing categories. Naumann pointed out that while much of this debate has been conducted at theoretical level, little attention has been paid to practical issues and questions. She therefore called for more consideration of how institutions, journals, and conferences can and should foster the study of global history, of the audience for global history, and, importantly, of future career prospects for global historians. The field of global history can only flourish in Germany and elsewhere if Ph.D. programmes are created to train global historians, and if more post-doctoral fellowships and faculty positions open than has hitherto been the case.

The third paper of this session turned the focus away from the USA and Germany. Marnie Hughes-Warrington (Macquarie University) discussed the status of global education and world history at Australian universities and secondary schools in her talk, 'World Histor(iography) Education: An Australian Perspective'. She emphasized the uniquely Australian aspect of world history curricula compared to the German and US cases: that is, the turn towards historiography as early as in high school education, especially in the state of New South Wales. Taking Macquarie University as an example, she argued that the establishment of a world history teaching and research programme beyond the first-year survey was made possible by this historiographical turn. Since 2002 Macquarie has offered a world history programme at all levels based on the questions of what world history is, what purposes it serves, what its historiographical traditions are, and how it might be taught and researched. This programme replaced the previous tradition of world history initiated by David Christian's 'big history' course at Macquarie. The new focus on historiography, designed by Hughes-Warrington and outlined in her talk, is justified because it provides a basis for discussing ethical

issues, and because historiographical reflections expose the patterns of privilege and exclusion in historical practice. In addition, it fosters an appreciation of the local, regional, national, and international contexts of world history writing, and it helps to clarify the contents and purpose of world history. Most importantly, Hughes-Warrington concluded, historiographical studies address the problem of the purpose and audience of history in general. In his talk 'An Emerging Field: World Environmental History', John F. Richards (Duke University) argued that environmental history provides a good structure for teaching world history, offering his own classes on world environmental history at Duke University as an example. The concerns of environmental history are necessarily global, as environmental changes are not limited by national or regional boundaries. In addition, Richards pointed out, other themes such as the history of science, technology, and medicine, gender history, labour history, and the history of migration also lend themselves well to world history approaches in the classroom.

In the panel on textbooks for world history, Roger B. Beck (Eastern Illinois University) pointed to the problems of inclusion and the potential of bias in world history textbooks in his paper 'World History Textbooks: Have We got it Right Yet?' He posed the challenging question of how we can make readers from other cultures in other parts of the world feel that we are accurately portraying their history in our world history textbooks. Is it possible to write a textbook that treats the military conflict in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s in a way that would satisfy both readers in the USA and in Vietnam? There are no clear answers to such a question, but it opened up the issue of the different interests and audiences of world history textbooks, which was taken up by Jerry H. Bentley (University of Hawaii) in his paper, 'The Construction of Textbooks and the Negotiation of Interests'. Bentley delineated five separate constituencies of world history textbooks: textbook authors, textbook publishers, the scholarly community, student readers, and the general public. Even though world history and world history textbooks have often been made the subject of 'culture wars' in the USA, as noted by Peter Stearns in his paper, Bentley argued that each of these five constituencies has an interest in the writing and teaching of a world history that does not aim to serve a particular ideological agenda. In his view, the position of the USA as a world leader gives American stu-

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dents and citizens a particular moral responsibility to understand world history and the role of American history within world history. Such an understanding should be an ecumenical one, dominated neither by ideologies of the right nor of the left.

In the final panel on world history and the new media, T. Mills Kelly (George Mason University) and Heidi Roupp (World History Connected) in their well-integrated papers, 'The Role of Technology in World History Teaching' and 'Teaching World History: Establishing the Teaching Field', discussed how world history teachers could make use of media inside and outside the classroom to enhance world history teaching. After presenting some of the concerns and problems surrounding new media, such as Powerpoint presentations in the classroom and student research on the internet, Kelly recounted some of his experiences as Director of the Center for the Study of History and New Media at George Mason University. He presented one of the Center's projects, the website World History Matters (<http://chm.gmu.edu/worldhistorymatters/>), which provides students with historical case studies involving primary sources, including images and texts, in order to enhance student learning outside the classroom. This website also contains a guide for students to direct them towards historically accurate websites for research, and to help them to evaluate the content of the websites they find. Kelly noted that he found that the use of media enhanced student learning much more effectively when it was used outside the classroom by individual students for self-directed learning, rather than by presenting websites and Powerpoint-directed lectures inside the classroom. In her presentation, Roupp discussed the challenges and opportunities of teacher training in a world history context. She pointed out some of the problems and needs of teacher training in the world history field, noting that few teachers have ever taken a world history course before they are asked to teach one. They also have only limited time and money to undertake more training alongside their full-time jobs. In the second part of her paper she discussed two possible solutions to these problems: the two-week world history summer workshops for teachers, sponsored by the College Board, the World History Association, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Stavrianos Teaching Fund, which have been held since 2000. These workshops include readings by world history scholars such as Peter Stearns, Jerry Bentley, Patrick Manning, and Kenneth

Pomeranz, as well as discussion of pedagogical techniques for critical thinking skills. A second means of disseminating teacher training material is the electronic journal *World History Connected* (www.worldhistoryconnected.org). This journal publishes research articles on world history, articles on pedagogical issues, and reviews of world history teaching resources. Access is free, and the site has had over 70,000 visitors since its founding in 2003.

The conference concluded with a round-table panel discussion in which Bill Bravman (Maret School), Arif Dirlik, Ross Dunn (San Diego State University), and Eckhardt Fuchs participated. The lively discussion picked up many of the questions raised in the papers. One major area of discussion dealt with the aims and contents of world history teaching, teacher education, quality assessment, subjects, and methods. A second topic focused on the ideological implications, cultural contexts, and political dimensions that are embedded within world history teaching. For the American participants, one important outcome of the conference was an awareness of the rise of world and global history in Europe that is based on different traditions and scholarly contexts and, therefore, takes on different shapes in the structure and contents of world history courses. For the German participants it was useful to discuss the various issues with American colleagues and to gain a better understanding of the world history field that is, after all, not nearly as homogenous and academically established as might appear from the outside. Nevertheless, the discussions also revealed commonalities between the USA, Europe, and Australia, that is, the assumption that if world history, and history in general, are to achieve any educational goals and to exercise pedagogical functions, they both depend to a large degree on how world history is composed and what purpose it serves. To date, the contents and purpose of world history have often been the subjects of heated public controversy, especially in the USA. This conference therefore provided the opportunity to examine past debates, reassess the current state of the field, and look towards promising future directions for teaching world and global history.

ECKHARDT FUCHS (University of Mannheim)
KAREN OSLUND (German Historical Institute Washington)

War and Peace in Europe's Collective Consciousness 1900-1950.
Conference of the German Historical Institute London, held from
31 March to 2 April 2005 at the Evangelische Akademie Meißen.

The world-wide protest marches against the latest war in Iraq, with millions of protesters on the streets, have brought the debate about the interrelationship between war and society back into the public mind. Although the war was ideologically labelled as an attempt to make the world safe for democracy (once more), politicians seem to have cared very little about public protests against a military solution in Iraq. The executive decision to declare war was not based on a majority of votes but on the strategic understanding of the political personnel in the Western countries, particularly the United States. Inspired by this clash between political decision-making and public attitudes, Lothar Kettenacker (former deputy director, GHIL) organized a conference on 'War and Peace in Europe's Collective Consciousness 1900-1950'. By examining the interrelationship between war and society in the first half of the twentieth century, we hoped to learn more about why war, in the second half of the century and today, is still seen as a means of power politics, although it is apparently discredited in the public mind.

Fifteen papers in four sessions examined the period immediately before and after the two world wars in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy at the level of social psychology. Focusing on the press and public opinion polls, the conference intended to read the barometer of public mood before and after the two major conflicts of the twentieth century. Diplomatic and governmental politics and the history of ideology were only subordinate reference points.

Jost Dülffer (Cologne) opened the first session on the period before the First World War with a discussion of early attempts at international peace-keeping. His paper, on 'Prevention or Regulation of War?', examined the two Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. As Dülffer showed, attempts to find a more peaceful international system in the decades before the First World War had little success. The Hague conferences did not result in the abolition of war. However, as Dülffer points out, the codification of rules for warfare was not least the result of rising pressure from an international public. While it is hardly convincing to see the Hague conferences as a decisive step towards the abolition of war, they were more than just a substitute

for a true reform of the international system. The introduction of a permanent court of arbitration in The Hague indicates that the debate about international peace keeping was, at least at a theoretical level, seriously conducted. However, with a third peace conference planned for 1918 it appears that internationalism failed before 1914.

Gerhard Hirschfeld (Stuttgart) presented the most recent research on the German experience of the outbreak of war in 1914. The historical reassessment of the 'August experience', questioning the assumption that the majority of Germans supported the declaration of war, leaves the historian with a dilemma. While in many ways an exclusively middle-class urban phenomenon, enthusiasm for war and support for a 'just war of defence' was a real experience for parts of society. It was also highly attractive to the intellectual debate in Germany, as numerous contemporary images and narratives suggest. Despite justified attempts historically to deconstruct the myth of general war enthusiasm, it should not be reduced to a mere construct of official propaganda, or a later mythical transformation. As Hirschfeld demonstrated, a detailed comparative study of chronological and geographical differences is the only way to reveal a history of pre-war mentalities in Germany.

Nicolas Beaupré (Berlin) examined how the French came to enter the war in 1914, and, more importantly, how and why the idea of 'enthusiasm for war in 1914' triumphed in the aftermath of the conflict. Beaupré discussed the origin of the public discourse on the outbreak of war from a post-1918 angle, illustrating important changes in literary responses before and after the war. As Beaupré showed in his discussion of French patriotism and pacifism, the original social and regional differences in the French response to the outbreak of war were retrospectively overshadowed by the need to resolve individual and collective trauma. Thus a posthumous enthusiasm for defending French honour was necessary to legitimize a new and victorious French identity.

Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann's (Oxford) discussion of the mood in Britain in 1914 focused on the interrelationship between political decision-making and public attitudes. He addressed the question of whether 'the mood of the British people in July and early August 1914 forced the liberal government into war, or whether it was the government which, by its decisions, influenced the mood in Britain'. His answers to these questions were twofold. Although

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identifying a 'give and take between the press and public opinion' and arguing that politicians tend to react to, and 'occasionally even hide behind', popular attitudes, the military fate of Belgium still played the crucial role for government politics in 1914. Thus the violation of Belgium neutrality on 4 August drove the British government into war. However, this development was not exclusively political. As Pogge von Strandmann showed, the conflict over Belgium also sparked public enthusiasm for war—not as a response to the political decision alone, but based on a discourse on war with Germany that long predates August 1914. Pogge von Strandmann illustrated this for different categories including spy novels, with Erskine Childers's *The Riddle of the Sands* (1903) serving as the most prominent example. As Pogge von Strandmann demonstrated for the British case, the two spheres of government policies and public opinion cannot be convincingly separated.

The second session on the inter-war period was opened by Gerhard Krumeich (Düsseldorf). In his paper on 'The Weimar Republic: A Continuation of War by other Means' he argued that, in the case of Germany, the war did not end in 1918. Krumeich used the leitmotiv of the traumatic experience of war to explain the aggressiveness of political thinking and political acts in the 1920s. The humiliating aspects of German defeat ever-present in German public awareness led to what Krumeich termed the 'nationalism of frustration', an aggressive response by young men and women who had lost their confidence in the state and now referred to categories of war. Thus heterogeneous groups were united under the categories of war and defeat, combining old militarism and new militancy which, as Krumeich pointed out, 'entered into a symbiosis of new political brutality'.

Angelo Ventrone's (Macerata) contribution to the conference looked specifically at the impact of the Great War on fascist ideology in Italy. Seeing the fascist idea of a 'culture of hierarchical brotherhood' as an alternative model to what has been understood as the development of modernity, Ventrone demonstrated that many strands of fascist ideology can be backdated to the war period. Important elements of fascist ideology such as the myth of rurality and simplicity, or the role of the individual both as 'self' and as part of a group that marches together, can be regarded as a response to the transformation of modern society and the traumatic effects of the First World

War. At the same time, Ventrone emphasized the efforts of the Italian ruling classes, and particularly the dictatorial regime, to use such ideology to form a uniform Italian society, and to control it.

The Italian case was very different from developments in France, where the experiences of the First World War had multifaceted responses. As Jean-Claude Allain (Paris) showed in his paper on 'The French Desire for Peace and Security in the 1920s', the peculiar situation of a victorious European power suffering from fatal casualties, wounded, invalids, damage to buildings and agriculture, and war debt created a much more ambivalent situation. Thus the French public negotiated between a wish to forget or ignore the war by expressing *joie de vivre*, and a concern to emphasize human tragedies and material destruction. Allain pointed out that developments which originated in the French experience, from creative arts to political pacifism, were highly versatile. Particularly with regard to the latter, he illustrated the many layers of French experience by discussing the French terminology of *pacifique* and *pacifiste*.

That the public did not always respond in line with government plans was Jay Winter's (Yale University) argument in his paper on the victory ceremony held at the Cenotaph on 19 July 1919. Based on written and visual material, Winter's paper demonstrated that the public voted with their feet in the summer of 1919, ignoring the staged dramaturgy of the official victory parade. As the metropolitan police reports show, there was no sign of triumphalism among the British public. In Winter's interpretation, the British public took the meaning of war out of the hands of politicians and, instead, mourned the millions of dead. Even the very British trait of using irony as a distancing device failed in the light of the disturbing 'outbreak of peace'.

Given these very different experiences during the inter-war years, the British and French reluctance and the German and Italian readiness for war seem obvious. However, as Hans Mommsen (Bochum) pointed out in the opening paper of the third session, which dealt with the outbreak of the Second World War, the majority of Germans gave no sign of enthusiasm in September 1939. Despite the massive armament programme and Hitler's (and the Nazi leadership's) constant threat to go to war in the period between 1935 and 1939, Mommsen suggested that the people still believed 'that Hitler had done everything possible to avoid war'. It was only after the victories

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over Poland and France (combined with the effects of Goebbels's propaganda), that the German people began to accept Hitler's decision for war. Once bribed into military conflict by military success, it became ever more difficult to return to a more peaceful and distanced attitude. As Mommsen pointed out, there is no systematic analysis of the attitude of the people to a continuation of the war during the final phase, an undertaking that is highly necessary in order to differentiate the picture that we have so far.

The German victory over France was at the centre of Barbara Lambauer's (Paris) paper 'Rather Hitler than Blum'. Lambauer pointed out that France's reluctant entry into the war was shaped by two aspects: firstly, the trauma of the First World War and its various manifestations that produced an aversion to any military conflict; and secondly, the growing extremist tendencies in French society, strengthened not least by the crisis of the Third Republic, which led to a general radicalization during the 1930s. French politicians thus feared Stalin more than Hitler, and anti-Bolshevism overshadowed German aggressiveness. As Lambauer showed, more than 57 per cent of the French declared their support for the Munich treaty of 1938. Despite the outbreak of war, the French public was still reluctant to embrace the idea of a new military conflict. The military collapse in early summer of 1940, despite an equally strong army, can be explained by this reluctance. As Daladier declared: 'We are at war because it has been forced on us.'

The relationship between British society and war was equally complex. As Lothar Kettenacker (London/Munich) showed in his paper, 'Declaration of War as a Matter of Honour', in the British case it was 'The People's War' much more than the politicians' war. Kettenacker demonstrated that Chamberlain was under constant pressure from public opinion to stand up to Hitler and his regime. The gradual rejection of the policy of appeasement towards Hitler was thus forced by the need to appease public opinion. The people, as Kettenacker pointed out, cared little for such things as collective security, balance of power, or the resources available for conducting a war. In Kettenacker's interpretation, it was hardly surprising that the British declaration of war in September 1939 had few consequences. It was only after Churchill took over from Chamberlain, a change from a Whitehall mandarin to a tribune of the people, that decisive military action followed. The public elevation of the Second

World War to mythical status did not become apparent before Chamberlain's resignation. The people, however, had already enforced their will at an earlier date.

The fourth and final session looked at the end of the Second World War, when many of the familiar patterns of society changed substantially. All the speakers in this session questioned the usefulness of the paradigm of victory and defeat for the interpretation of social phenomena after 1945. As Clemens Vollnhals (Dresden) showed in his paper, 'After the "German Catastrophe": Disillusionment and Pragmatism', the German experience was unique. Shocked by the ruthlessness of the Nazi leadership and its criminal and catastrophic conduct during the final months of the war, German society escaped into the role of victim. Self-pity being the main characteristic of post-war Germany, the much-acclaimed community of the people dissolved into a mass of private individuals struggling for survival and thus avoiding the question of their own political responsibility. As Vollnhals demonstrated, the democratic 'new beginning' of German society was reduced to a small minority. The 'pragmatic retreat into the private world' was followed by an extremely generous policy of integrating all those with Nazi connections. It was only in the light of the economic success of the Federal Republic that the next generation of Germans engaged in a discussion about its past and established democracy internally.

Marc Nouschi (Marseille) dealt with the French experience after 1945 in his paper, 'The End of the War 1945: France, the Trauma of Defeat'. Nouschi emphasized that for the French it was less a victory than the end of a war. Shifting the focus to the three main aspects of colonial empire, European policy, and mixed economy, Nouschi demonstrated that the French way after 1945 can be described as a united effort based on egoism, or, in Nouschi's words: 'France needs a European Germany in order to break the vicious circle of the past and to secure its own future.' Despite a number of continuities, this future displayed a positive new development, namely, France's kick-start into modernity. As Nouschi vividly described, this ranged from economic theory to the baby boom.

While France successfully overcame the trauma of its defeat in the summer of 1940, Britain struggled much harder to come to terms with winning the war. Toby Haggith (Imperial War Museum, London) showed in his paper, 'Remembering a Just War', that the first

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five years in Britain after 1945 were 'historically far more complicated and ambivalent' than might appear. Despite the comparatively small impact of the war in material terms and human suffering in Britain compared with the other European nations, and despite the heroic representation of war in popular culture and patriotic literature, the majority of the people did not collect military memorabilia or memorialize the Second World War, as had been the case in 1918–19. Haggith demonstrated that most of the British people seemed too tired and malnourished to celebrate victoriously. Would a 'just war' be followed by a 'just peace' in the sense that wartime sacrifices would be rewarded? Based on the sources available to him at the Imperial War Museum, ranging from eye-witness accounts to satirical magazines, Haggith painted a lively picture of British post-war society demonstrating ambivalent responses. Despite the fact that Britain had won the war, it appeared to have lost the peace.

Italy's path from the end of the Second World War into the first decades of the post-war period was dominated by political, economic, and social crises. As Gustavo Corni (Trento) argued in his paper, 'Italy: the Paradox of Liberation', the perception of the war, or rather, the suppression of the war events, was a crucial point in this unstable situation. Corni identified five categories in his pattern of Italian society: firstly, the common man whose major interest was agrarian reform and who voted for the monarchist party. The second group consisted of around 1.5 million prisoners-of-war plus those who had returned from emigration. The military, thirdly, formed a separate group. The fourth group in Corni's system was extraordinary: the 'good guys of Salò' (*bravi ragazzi di Salò*), that is, the combatants on the side of the puppet-regime built by Mussolini in September 1943. They had fought on the wrong side (morally and politically), but were not persecuted after the war. The partisans were the final group in Corni's system. Based on these five groups, Corni demonstrated that an open discussion in Italy was prevented by the emergent Cold War. The partisans, for example, had to face persecution after 1945 while a patriotic legend was created around the 'good guys of Salò'. In Corni's interpretation, heterogeneous Italian society was unable to find a common memory. Additionally, the economic and political divide between Italy's north and south meant that it was only after the end of the Cold

War and Peace in Europe 1900–1950

War in the 1990s that Italian society embarked on a combined discourse on the legacy of the Second World War.

A publication is planned.

TORSTEN RIOTTE (GHIL)

NOTICEBOARD

Research Seminar

The GHIL regularly organizes a research seminar at which recipients of grants from the Institute, Fellows of the GHIL, and other scholars report on the progress of their work. Any postgraduate or postdoctoral researchers who are interested in the subjects are welcome to attend. In general, the language of the papers and discussion is German.

The following papers will be given this term. Further meetings may also be arranged. Future dates will be announced on each occasion, and are available from the GHIL. For further information, contact Dr Indra Sengupta-Frey on 020 7309 2018. Please note that meetings begin promptly at 5 p.m.

- 8 Nov. Tina Rudersdorf
Die Gruppenausstellungen der Präraffaeliten in den
1850er Jahren

- 15 Nov. Christiane Reinecke
Regulierung und Kontrolle transnationaler Migration in
Deutschland, Großbritannien und Italien im Vergleich,
1880–1933

- 29 Nov. Alexander Drost
Tod und Sepulkralkultur im kolonialen Bengalen (17.–19.
Jahrhundert)

- 13 Dec. Valeska Huber
'The World's Turnstile': Der Suezkanal als Schnittstelle
zwischen Europa und Asien 1869–1929

Noticeboard

As a matter of interest to readers, we record the following papers which were given before the publication date of this Bulletin:

- 13 Sept. Malte Zierenberg
Von Schiebern und Schwarzen Märkten: Der Berliner Schwarzhandel, 1939–1950
- 20 Sept. Thomas Freiberger
Allianzpolitik in der Suezkrise
- 27 Sept. Christiana Brennecke
Liberal Spanish Exile in England, 1823–1833

Postgraduate Students' Conference

On 12–13 January 2006 the German Historical Institute London will hold its tenth annual conference for postgraduate research students in the UK and Ireland working on German history, Anglo–German relations, or comparative topics. The intention is to give Ph.D. students an opportunity to present their work in progress and to discuss it with other students working in the same field. It is hoped that the exchange of ideas and methods will be fruitful for all participants. The Institute will meet travel expenses up to a standard rail fare within the UK (special arrangements for students from Ireland), and also arrange and pay for student accommodation, when necessary, for those who live outside London. For further information please contact the Secretary by phone (020 7309 2023) or email (abellamy@ghil.ac.uk).

Noticeboard

War Experiences and Identities: The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Comparative Perspective

The importance of the armed struggles which took place across Europe and beyond between 1789 and 1815 for the framing of the political and military culture of the nineteenth century has been largely underestimated. The enduring legacy of this period of warfare relates not only to the much analysed after-effects of the French Revolution, which permanently influenced European political culture far beyond France's borders, but also to the constant state of war which existed between 1792 and 1815. These wars touched almost every European country as well as parts of Asia and Africa, and North America. They were for the first time conducted by mass armies mobilized by patriotic and national propaganda, leading to the circulation of millions of people throughout Europe and beyond (soldiers, prisoners of war, and civilians). They affected, to varying degrees, the everyday lives of women and men of different religions and social strata across Europe and many non-European regions. The new style of warfare had far-reaching consequences for civil society. Those who lived through the period between 1792 and 1815 as children, young people, and adults, shared – albeit from the most varied perspectives and disparate perceptions – formative common experiences and memories.

Until now the focus of research has mainly been on the political, diplomatic, and military dimensions of the war, viewed in the main through national historiographies. Comparative studies, including metropolitan–regional differences, are rare, as are studies of the social and everyday histories of these wars. The dimension of gender difference has, as yet, hardly been considered systematically. This conference, convened by Alan Forrest and Jane Rendall (University of York), Karen Hagemann (University of North Carolina/TU Berlin), Hagen Schulze (GHIL), and Reinhard Stauber (University of Klagenfurt) and to be held at the GHIL on 24–25 February 2006, hopes to encourage work in all these areas, and, especially, to cast comparative light on the images and narratives that recur in the experience and perception of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars across Europe and beyond. We are particularly interested in the construction of 'the self' and 'the other' by the drawing of boundaries defined in national, regional, social, or cultural terms.

Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain – Cultural Contacts and Transfers

The German Historical Institute, in co-operation with the Faculty of Modern History of Oxford University, will be holding a conference on 'Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain – Cultural Contacts and Transfers', to take place at University College Oxford on 23–24 March 2006. The conference aims to examine the vicissitudes of Anglo–German cultural relations in the age of Kaiser Wilhelm II and King Edward VII. The conference will thereby reflect a growing academic interest in cultural history and cross-cultural influences, and will provide a platform for the discussion of recent insights from historians working on cultural transfers between Britain and Germany on the eve of the First World War. The 'cultural transfers' concept refers to a process of productive bilateral engagement with another country's cultural heritage and innovations. In this particular case, these transfers were not only manifest in the context of the well-researched examples of British emulation of German social reforms, or the reverse example of the impact of British trade unionism on its German counterpart. Cultural transfers and contacts occurred at a number of levels, ranging from trans-national academic discourses to the success of British sports in Germany, and a great mutual interest in the other's achievements in music, literature, and the visual arts. The cultural transfers and contacts examined at this conference will reflect the numerous levels at which cultural exchanges occurred. In particular, the conference will focus on the often neglected fields of arts, sciences, legal culture, popular culture, and colonial culture. The contributions to this conference will therefore testify to the wide variety of Anglo–German cultural relations and their enormous density in the decade before the First World War.

Noticeboard

Removing Peoples: Forced Migration in the Modern World

One of the terrible and tragic themes of modern history has been the forced migration of millions of human beings. Scarcely a corner of the world has been spared the violence of the forced removal of peoples from their homes for political, economic, 'racial', religious, or cultural reasons. The causes, course, and consequences of the removal of peoples form a central theme in the history of the modern world.

The aim of the proposed conference, organized jointly by the History Department of the University of York and the German Historical Institutes in London and Washington, is to explore the theme of forced migration from a global and comparative perspective. The conference will therefore examine parallels and contrasts arising from various cases of removal during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—from North America to Anatolia, from Poland to India, from Mexico to Australia. Questions to be addressed include: what made it possible for so many millions of people across the globe to be forced from their homes during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? To what extent can this be explained by reference to the growth of race-thinking, the exercise of economic interests, the effects of the triumph of popular and national sovereignty, or a breakdown of civilized values as a result of war?

The conference will take place at the King's Manor in York on 20–22 April 2006. Further details, including the conference programme, may be found on the conference web site:

<http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~pjb6/migration/>

Professor Richard Bessel, University of York (rjb8@york.ac.uk)

Dr Claudia Haacke, University of York (cbh3@york.ac.uk)

Dr Karina Urbach, German Historical Institute London

(kurbach@ghil.ac.uk)

German History Society

The German History Society's Annual Public Lecture 2005 will be delivered by Gisela Stuart, MP for Birmingham Edgbaston and Presidium Member and UK Parliamentary Representative on the Convention for the Future of Europe. The lecture will be related to the 2005 AGM Conference theme of 'Germany and Europe: Cultural Interactions', and it will take place on Friday, 18 November 2005, at 7 pm in University College, London.

The AGM Conference will take place on Saturday, 3 December 2005, at the German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square. The theme of the conference is 'Germany and Europe: Cultural Interactions', and the speakers will include Chris Clarke (Cambridge), Jonathan Huener (Vermont), and Jonathan Wright (Oxford). For further information please contact:

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LIBRARY NEWS

Party and State in the GDR – Microfiche Edition of Files from the Bundesarchiv

Over the past decade the library has particularly focused on collecting material on the former German Democratic Republic, thereby strengthening its already substantial holdings on this period of German history. The library holds secondary literature on all aspects of the GDR and a growing number of editions of source material, for example, *DDR-Justiz und NS-Verbrechen: Sammlung ostdeutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen*, c. 11 vols. (Munich, 2002–c. 2008). The most recent acquisitions include the microfiche edition *Partei und Staat in der DDR – Akten aus der Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv* (K.G. Saur, 2004). These records are of paramount importance for the study of recent German history and the library is pleased to be able to provide this title as one of the few libraries in the UK to hold it.

The new K.G. Saur microfiche edition *Partei und Staat in der DDR* (Socialist Power in the GDR) provides general access to the files of the Stiftung 'Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv' (Foundation 'Archive of GDR Parties and Mass Organizations in the Federal Archives'). A wide range of documents such as reports, letters, notes, orders, and speeches provide revealing details on the history of the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany), its governing bodies, and leaders. These documents provide an insight into domestic and foreign policy, the GDR's international relations, and the functioning of state control. The first two parts comprise records from the offices of Walter Ulbricht and Erich Honecker. The edition also features the monthly reports by SED regional secretaries on regional issues and petitions drawn up by GDR citizens since the 1960s on political, social, and personal affairs. In addition, the microfiche edition also contains reports, information, and statements on military, cultural and educational, sports, youth, personnel, academic, and agricultural policy. Both editions are accompanied by a guide book.

Microfiches and finding aids are available at the GHIL to all users during normal opening times.

Recent Acquisitions

This list contains a selection of recent publications in German and English, primarily on German history, acquired by the Library of the GHIL in the past year.

- Abelshausen, Werner *et al.*, *German Industry and Global Enterprise. BASF: The History of a Company* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)
- Althoff, Gerd, *Otto III*, trans. by Phyllis G. Jestice (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003)
- Aly, Götz and Karl Heinz Roth, *The Nazi Census: Identification and Control in the Third Reich*, trans. and with a foreword by Edwin Black, with add. transl. by Assenka Oksiloff (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 2004)
- Anderson, Ross, *The Forgotten Front: The East African Campaign 1914–1918* (Stroud: Tempus, 2004)
- Andrea, Alfred J., *Encyclopedia of the Crusades* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 2003)
- Andreas Heusler *et al.* (eds.), *Biographisches Gedenkbuch der Münchner Juden 1933–1945*, vol. 1: A–L (Munich: Stadtarchiv, 2003)
- Apps, Lara and Andrew Gow, *Male Witches in Early Modern Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003)
- Aston, Nigel, *Christianity and Revolutionary Europe, 1750–1830*, New Approaches to European History, 25 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)
- Aulingen, Rosemarie (ed.), *Der Reichstag zu Regensburg 1546*, Deutsche Reichstagsakten. Jüngere Reihe: Unter Kaiser Karl V., 17 (Munich, 2005)
- Bailey, Michael D., *Battling Demons: Witchcraft, Heresy, and Reform in the Late Middle Ages*, Magic in History (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003)
- Balz, Hanno, *Die 'Arisierung' von jüdischem Haus- und Grundbesitz in Bremen*, *Erinnern für die Zukunft*, 2 (Bremen: Ed. Temmen, 2004)
- Beales, Derek, *Enlightenment and Reform in Eighteenth-Century Europe* (London: Tauris, 2005)
- Bearman, Marietta, *Wien – London, hin und retour: Das Austrian Centre in London 1939 bis 1947*, trans. by Miha Tavcar (Vienna: Czernin, 2004)

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- Beck, Thomas, Marília dos Santos Lopes, and Christian Rödel (eds.), *Barrieren und Zugänge: Die Geschichte der europäischen Expansion. Festschrift für Eberhard Schmitt zum 65. Geburtstag*, (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2004)
- Behringer, Wolfgang, *Im Zeichen des Merkur: Reichspost und Kommunikationsrevolution in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, 189 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003)
- Behringer, Wolfgang, *Witches and Witch-Hunts: A Global History* (Malden, Mass.: Polity, 2004)
- Beller-McKenna, Daniel, *Brahms and the German Spirit* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004)
- Benz, Wolfgang and Barbara Distel (eds.), *Instrumentarium der Macht: Frühe Konzentrationslager 1933–1937*, Geschichte der Konzentrationslager 1933–1945, 3 (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2003)
- Benz, Wolfgang and Barbara Distel (eds.), *Terror im Westen: Nationalsozialistische Lager in den Niederlanden, Belgien und Luxemburg 1940–1945*, Geschichte der Konzentrationslager 1933–1945, 5 (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2004)
- Benz, Wolfgang and Claudia Curio (eds.), *Die Kindertransporte 1938–39: Rettung und Integration*, Die Zeit des Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt/M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003)
- Berg, Dieter, *Die Anjou-Plantagenets: Die englischen Könige im Europa des Mittelalters (1100–1400)* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2003)
- Berg, Manfred and Philipp Gassert (eds.), *Deutschland und die USA in der Internationalen Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts: Festschrift für Detlef Junker*, Transatlantische historische Studien, 18 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2004)
- Bergengruen, Werner, *Deutsche Reise: Mit dem Fahrrad durch Kultur und Geschichte* (Munich: Nymphenburger, 2004)
- Bismarck, Otto von, *Gesammelte Werke: Neue Friedrichsruher Ausgabe*, ed. Konrad Canis, Lothar Gall, et al. (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004–); Abt. 3, 1: *Schriften 1871–1873*, ed. Andrea Hopp (2004); Abt. 3, 2: *Schriften 1874–1876*, ed. Rainer Bendick (2005).
- Black, Jeremy, *Kings, Nobles and Commoners: States and Societies in Early Modern Europe, a Revisionist History* (London: Tauris, 2004)
- Bornschein, Joachim, *Gestapochef Heinrich Müller* (Leipzig: Miltzke, 2004)

Recent Acquisitions

- Bradbury, Jim (ed.), *The Routledge Companion to Medieval Warfare* (London: Routledge, 2004)
- Braybon, Gail (ed.), *Evidence, History and the Great War: Historians and the Impact of 1914–18* (New York: Berghahn, 2003)
- Briggs, Robin, *Witches and Neighbours: The Social and Cultural Context of European Witchcraft*, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002)
- Brinson, Charmian and Richard Dove (eds.), 'Stimme der Wahrheit': *German-Language Broadcasting by the BBC*, Yearbook of the Research Centre for German and Austrian Exile Studies, 5 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003)
- Brown, David, *Palmerston and the Politics of Foreign Policy 1846–55* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002)
- Buddrus, Michael, *Totale Erziehung für den totalen Krieg: Hitlerjugend und nationalsozialistische Jugendpolitik*, Texte und Materialien zur Zeitgeschichte, 13, 2 vols. (Munich: Saur, 2003)
- Bull, Marcus and Norman Housley (eds.), *Western Approaches*. vol. 1 of *The Experience of Crusading* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)
- Burgdorff, Stephan and Klaus Wiegrefe (eds.), *Der Erste Weltkrieg: Die Urkatastrophe des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2004)
- Burke, Peter (ed.), *History and Historians in the Twentieth Century*, British Academy Centenary Monographs, 2nd impr. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)
- Buttinger, Sabine, *Das Kloster Tegernsee und sein Beziehungsgefüge im 12. Jahrhundert*, Studien zur altbayerischen Kirchengeschichte, 12 (Munich: Verein für Diözesangeschichte, 2004)
- Campbell, John, *Margaret Thatcher*, 2 vols. (London: Cape, 2000, 2003)
- Conze, Eckart and Monika Wienfort (eds.), *Adel und Moderne: Deutschland im europäischen Vergleich im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004)
- Cook, Chris and John Stevenson, *The Routledge Companion to European History Since 1763* (London: Routledge, 2005)
- Csendes, Peter, *Philipp von Schwaben: Ein Staufer im Kampf um die Macht* (Darmstadt: Primus Verlag, 2003)
- DeVries, Kelly, *Guns and Men in Medieval Europe, 1200–1500*, Studies in Military History and Technology, Variorum Collected Studies Series, 747 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002)

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- Diefenbacher, Michael and Wiltrud Fischer-Pache (eds.), *Der Luftkrieg gegen Nürnberg: Der Angriff am 2. Januar 1945 und die zerstörte Stadt*, Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte und Kultur der Stadt Nürnberg, 33 (Nürnberg: Stadt Nürnberg, 2004)
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