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Christiane Eisenberg has been Professor of British History
at the Centre for British Studies of the Humboldt University
of Berlin since 1998. Her research interests include the his-
tory of the trade unions in Germany and Britain and the
history of sport, in particular, football. She has written and
edited many books, including *Parliamentary Cultures: British
and German Perspectives* (2001) and *'English Sports' und
deutsche Bürger: Eine Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1800–1939* (1999).

23 May **LUTZ KLINKHAMMER (Rome)**
**The Memory of German Occupation and Nazi War
Crimes in Italy, 1943–45**
Lutz Klinkhammer has been a Research Fellow at the
German Historical Institute in Rome since 1999. His
research has focused on nineteenth- and twentieth-century
Italian history, the history of Europe at the time of
Napoleon, relations between state and Catholic Church
from 1870 to 1945, National Socialism and the Second
World War, and national cultures of memory since 1945.
His publications include *Nazisti: I rapporti italo-tedeschi nelle
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30 May **DIETER BERG (Hanover)**
**King Richard I (Lionheart) of England: Myth and
Reality. Some New Interpretations**
Dieter Berg has been Professor of Medieval History at the
University of Hanover since 1989. His research interests
include the history of Western Europe in the Middle Ages,

historiography in the Middle Ages, the history of science in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and Jewish history in general. He has published widely, including *Die Anjou-Plantagenets: Die englischen Könige im Europa des Mittelalters (1100–1400)* (2003), and is working on a biography of Richard I (Lionheart).

13 Jun. **MANFRED GAILUS (Berlin)**
Protestantism and National Socialism: A State-of-the-Art Report
Manfred Gailus has been *Privatdozent* at the Technical University of Berlin since 1999. His work focuses on protest research and relations between Protestantism and National Socialism. His most recent publications include *Von der babylonischen Gefangenschaft der Kirche im Nationalen: Regionalstudien zu Protestantismus, Nationalsozialismus und Nachkriegsgeschichte 1930 bis 2000* (2006) and *Contentious Food Politics: Sozialer Protest, Märkte und Zivilgesellschaft (18.–20. Jahrhundert*) (2004).

Seminars are held at 5 p.m. in the Seminar Room of the GHIL.
Tea is served from 4.30 p.m. in the Common Room, and wine is available after the seminars.

ARTICLE

SECURITY AS A CULTURE: REFLECTIONS ON A 'MODERN POLITICAL HISTORY' OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY[*]

Eckart Conze

I

In 1944, two years after he committed suicide in Brazil, Stefan Zweig's memoirs were published by Bermann Fischer Verlag in Stockholm.[1] According to the subtitle, these were the 'memories of a European'. But they were memories of a Europe that no longer existed; a Europe that, since 1914, had declined into war, civil war, and dictatorship. They were memories of a 'world of yesterday' – *Die Welt von Gestern*. For Zweig, this 'world of yesterday' was also a 'world of security', as he called his first chapter. This was the world he had been born into in 1881 in Vienna, during a 'golden age of security'. A 'feeling of security' had been the 'most desirable possession of millions'. It had been 'the shared ideal of life', and people had sincerely believed that 'peace and security, these highest goods, would [soon] be bestowed upon the whole of humankind'. The First World War, however, had put an end to this 'optimistic delusion'. In the years since then, Zweig went on, one had had to get used to 'living with no ground under one's feet, without law, without freedom, without security'. The word 'security', he claimed, had been 'deleted from the vocabulary as a phantom'.[2] In Stefan Zweig's memories we

[1] Stefan Zweig, *Die Welt von Gestern: Erinnerungen eines Europäers* (1st publ. 1944; Frankfurt am Main, 1994).

[2] Ibid. 17–21.

can recognize the memories of a whole generation. The experiences of loss which he describes are able to provide us with a key to understanding and analysing individual and collective orientations and patterns of human behaviour in the twentieth century.

Another member of Zweig's generation, Konrad Adenauer, was born in 1876 in Cologne, five years before Zweig. In his Christmas message of 1958, which was broadcast on the radio, the eighty-two-year-old Chancellor looked a long way back, and he, too, remembered 'those times before 1914, when peace, tranquillity, and security still really ruled on earth'. Since 1914, however, he said, peace and tranquillity had disappeared from people's lives, while fear had remained. 'Is it not sad', the Chancellor continued, 'is it not dreadful to think that most people alive today have never known tranquillity, peace, and security, a life free of fear?'[3]

Adenauer's speech has a precise historical location. Just a few weeks previously, Khrushchev's ultimatum had precipitated the second Berlin crisis. War anxiety spread through the West German population. And yet the West German Chancellor's words point far beyond the specific political situation of the late 1950s. They do not just illustrate generational experiences and the mental state of the people in the early years of the Federal Republic. The word 'security' is perhaps the key concept of Adenauer's policy.[4] By itself, this is not a particularly new or daring thesis, and it is not my intention to subject Adenauer's security policy to a renewed analysis in order to affix a specific label to one part of the history of the Federal Republic.[5]

[3] Radio broadcast by Konrad Adenauer, 25 Dec. 1958, printed in *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung*, no. 238, 30 Dec. 1958, p. 2375.

[4] On this cf. Arnold Sywottek, ' "Wohlstand" — "Sicherheit" — "Frieden": Beobachtungen zur westdeutschen Entwicklung', in Thomas Kühne (ed.), *Von der Kriegskultur zur Friedenskultur? Zum Mentalitätswandel in Deutschland seit 1945*; *Jahrbuch für Historische Friedensforschung*, 9 (2000), pp. 243–61, at 252.

[5] It is, after all, a problem of many political histories that their analytical framework is orientated by the history of political events, in particular, elections, changes of government, or the period of office of important politicians. Therefore developments relevant to political history which span these dates are often excluded, and social history, with its completely different approaches and concepts, takes responsibility for investigating and presenting long-term lines of development. The interest of social historians in contem-

Rather, I shall ask whether the concept of 'security' as an analytical category can throw light on the whole history of the Federal Republic and open up new perspectives on it. There is the striving for security of the 1950s, as expressed in Adenauer's Christmas message. A belief in the security of growth and progress shaped the 1960s and early 1970s. Then came the 1970s, which can be called a decade of inner security. And for the 1980s, too, important developments in the Federal Republic can be analysed in terms of the security paradigm, not least, to take just one example, the impact of international security policy on German society and politics. The catchphrases here are NATO rearmament and the peace movement.

Thus the category of security may possess the heuristic and substantive potential to generate the 'modern political history' of the Federal Republic which some German historians have been demanding since the 1970s.[6] This approach can potentially produce a political history which may reduce, if not bridge, the gap between politics and society which, in any case, cannot do analytical justice to the political process in modern societies.[7] It may be capable of producing

porary history has, fortunately, grown considerably in the meantime as, conversely, has contemporary historians' interest in social history.

[6] Hans-Ulrich Wehler set this out as a programme in ' "Moderne" Politikgeschichte oder "Große Politik der Kabinette"?', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 1 (1975), pp. 257–66, in debate with Andreas Hillgruber, 'Politische Geschichte in moderner Sicht', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 216 (1973), pp. 529–52. For a summary of the 1970s debate see Eckart Conze, ' "Moderne Politikgeschichte": Aporien einer Kontroverse', in Guido Müller (ed.), *Deutschland und der Westen: Festschrift für Klaus Schwabe zum 65. Geburtstag* (Stuttgart 1998), pp. 19–30. The critical points of the 1970s debate have recently been revisited not in the context of social history, but in the turn towards cultural history. Cf. Thomas Mergel, 'Überlegungen zu einer Kulturgeschichte der Politik', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft,* 28 (2002), pp. 574–606, or Achim Landwehr, 'Diskurs—Macht—Wissen: Perspektiven einer Kulturgeschichte des Politischen', *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, 85 (2003), pp. 71–117.

[7] The political history perspective of this article means that certain forms of the striving for security or perceptions of insecurity will not be taken into account. This applies in particular to the insurance system, whose development can be regarded as a yardstick for individual perceptions of security or insecurity. On this see, e.g., Peter Borscheid, *Mit Sicherheit leben: Die Geschichte der deutschen Lebensversicherungswirtschaft und der Provinzial-Lebensversicherungsanstalt von Westfalen*, 2 vols. (Münster, 1989 and 1993), or id.,

a political history which neither accords the state a decisive weight without taking account of the effectiveness of social and economic structures, nor equates the state with its economic and social dependencies.[8] And, finally, this approach may be able to produce a political history which transcends the boundary between inside and outside; between developments within states and societies on the one hand, and *inter*national and *trans*national developments on the other. This analytical boundary has always been an obstacle to knowledge, and now, given the existence of fundamental de-territorialization processes, it has been driven completely *ad absurdum*.[9]

In this sense, security can provide the basis for historical analysis not only as the aim of governmental actions and society's expectations of politicians, but also as a comprehensive horizon for socio-cultural orientation.[10] Thus it is a discourse of security which is under

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Sicherheit in der Risikogesellschaft: Zwei Versicherungen und ihre Geschichte (Stuttgart, 1999).

[8] On this cf. the ideas developed by Ute Frevert from a more social historical perspective in 'Neue Politikgeschichte', in Joachim Eibach and Günther Lottes (eds.), *Kompaß der Geschichtswissenschaft* (Göttingen, 2002), pp. 152–64, esp. p. 155. The loss of significance of the national or territorial state as the result of the rise of neo-liberalism should not hastily be interpreted as the retreat of the state in general, as does, for example, Mergel, 'Überlegungen zu einer Kulturgeschichte', p. 600. It seems more appropriate to think about a change of statehood in the processes of neo-liberalization and globalization.

[9] Cf. Eckart Conze, 'Abschied von Staat und Politik? Überlegungen zur Geschichte der internationalen Politik', in id. et al. (eds.), *Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen: Erneuerung und Erweiterung einer historischen Disziplin* (Cologne, 2004), pp. 15–43, and id., 'Nationale Vergangenheit und globale Zukunft: Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft und die Herausforderung der Globalisierung', in Jörg Baberowski et al., *Geschichte ist immer Gegenwart: Thesen zur Zeitgeschichte* (Stuttgart, 2001), pp. 43–65. On the historiographical-conceptional significance of territoriality, its rise and decline, cf. Charles S. Maier, 'Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era', *American Historical Review*, 105 (2000), pp. 807–31.

[10] The well-known German food critic, Wolfram Siebeck, writing in *Die Zeit*, 12 Feb. 2004, p. 56, has recently mocked this with respect to the Germans and their concern for the 'security of their food'.

investigation.[11] This applies not only to the Federal Republic of Germany, but also to all other modern and highly complex industrial or post-industrial societies. It could be argued that as a social value the term security indicates a structural problem of modern societies. As the sociologist Franz-Xaver Kaufmann pointed out thirty years ago, the problem is that the notion of 'insecurity' is as ambiguous as that of a desirable 'security'.[12] This points not only to the different concepts and understandings of security depending on different political and social contexts, but also to the mutability, permanent change, and thus historicity of the term security. This requires diachronic studies which promise to increase our knowledge of processes of social change, closely associated with historical and social security needs and the corresponding awareness of security. It also makes possible comparative investigations, in particular, international comparisons. The usefulness of security as an analytical category is thus by no means limited to the history of the Federal Republic or contemporary German history.

More strongly, perhaps, than in other areas of history, the topics and questions of contemporary history are drawn from the impulses of the present. In respect of the theme of security, this is so self-evident that it hardly requires more detailed demonstration.[13] The erosion of securities and the perception of this erosion characterize the political discourse of our time. This applies to the 'new world disorder' which has prevailed since the end of the East–West conflict; it applies, especially since 9/11, to the threat of international terrorism; and it applies to the threats posed to our natural environment by climate change and the dangers inherent in high-risk technologies. It also, however, applies to the increased level of threat—real or presumed—to public security posed by criminality, and, not least, to the actual or presumed loss of social security in the reformed welfare state.

[11] In this sense I define 'discourse', drawing pragmatically on Foucault, as a mode of expression which is socially institutionalized, comes about in public communication, and, in this way, is relevant to actions. On this cf. Ute Daniel, *Kompendium Kulturgeschichte: Theorien, Praxis, Schlüsselwörter* (Frankfurt am Main, 2001), pp. 167–78 and 353–9.

[12] Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, *Sicherheit als soziologisches und sozialpolitisches Problem* (2nd edn., Stuttgart, 1973), p. 341.

[13] The relevance of this theme is also reflected in the work of the sociologist Wolfgang Sofsky, *Das Prinzip Sicherheit* (Frankfurt am Main, 2005).

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Although the word 'justice' appeared in the heading of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's first government declaration in the *Bundestag* after his re-election in 2002, it was not justice but security that was its central concept. His government, he said, sees 'security as a fundamental civil right'. This was a core statement in Schröder's declaration, and he advocated what he called an 'extended notion of security':

> This, without question, includes personal security and the security of life against the dangers of war and criminality, but also material, social, and cultural security, in order to affirm one's own identity, and not least, the security of the law and insurance against illness and other life risks. . . . Only a society that can provide security in this comprehensive sense is capable of being a good neighbour and co-operating peacefully with others abroad, but also of taking the necessary measures for change at home.[14]

All federal governments since 1949 have declared security a policy goal, but no other government declaration has used the word security so often, or has committed itself to such comprehensive security promises. If respect or appreciation results from a shortage of something,[15] then it seems that the last few years have seen a shortage of security, that the awareness of security has shrunk, and an awareness of insecurity has grown. Again, this certainly does not apply only to the Federal Republic. But there the discourse of security and insecurity underlines the fact that, once again, a 'golden age of security' seems to have come to an end; that the security which had become a central part of the socio-cultural value system of the society of the Federal Republic since the 1950s, and which had crucially stabilized its socio-political order, is now in the process of disintegrating, both in people's perceptions and in reality.

[14] Government declaration by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Gerhard Schröder, to the German *Bundestag* on 29 Oct. 2002 in Berlin: 'Gerechtigkeit im Zeitalter der Globalisierung schaffen—für eine Partnerschaft in Verantwortung', printed in *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, no. 85–1, 29 Oct. 2005. The term 'security' appears more frequently than 'justice' in this declaration.
[15] Cf. Kaufmann, *Sicherheit als soziologisches und sozialpolitisches Problem*, p. 14.

What is security? First, it is necessary to clarify briefly what is meant by the term security in order to demonstrate that it can be used in a historical investigation (II). Thereafter I will look at the connection between security and politics in order to demonstrate that the category of security is suitable for use in a modern political history analysis (III). And, finally, I shall shine a few security-related spotlights on to the history of the Federal Republic. These are intended to demonstrate the analytical value and knowledge-generating potential of the approach I suggest (IV and V).[16]

II

Anthropologists and psychologists regularly point to security as one of the fundamental human needs, which places it biologically into the same category as other fundamental needs such as those for food, sleep, and sex.[17] From a historical or social science perspective, this striving for security must be explained in more specific terms, and security must be understood as a concept that covers the intactness of body, life, and property. One seeks security from a threat, from personal or collective dangers. In its generality, this statement points to the many dimensions of security: from social security against illness, the vagaries of the labour market, or age, to protection from technical risks, such as traffic safety, or reactor security, and the large areas of internal and external security as a core element of national security policy. This multi-dimensionality is probably also why, in modern societies, security does not represent a mere drive, but a socio-cultural value-system like those generated by the terms freedom and justice.[18] Security, therefore, is a fundamental concept and value of the politico-social language. Historiography has already worked out how the meaning of such central concepts changed in the nineteenth

[16] In the context of this article, this can only be a brief indication. However, I am preparing a monograph on the history of the Federal Republic in which the concept of security as a leading category is examined.

[17] Cf., e.g., Wolfgang Bonß, 'Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion von Sicherheit', in Ekkehart Lippert et al. (eds.), *Sicherheit in der unsicheren Gesellschaft* (Opladen, 1997), pp. 21–41, at 21.

[18] Cf. Kaufmann, *Sicherheit als soziologisches und sozialpolitisches Problem*, p. 28.

century; for the twentieth century, and especially for the post-war period, there are still clear gaps.[19]

Individual or collective objectives, governing actions, can be derived from values such as security or freedom, which, in terms of the theory of institutions, symbolize particular ideas, or *idées directrices*.[20] This does not mean that security is a static concept. On the contrary, security, too, is a social construct, a variable in the historical process. Different societies display very different notions of security and insecurity. And like these notions, social feelings of security or perceptions of security can change permanently. Thus the various constructs of security depend on the particular social structure and its historical nature. An awareness of security is the result, according to recent research, of subjective ways of processing social reality; to this extent it is an interpretation of reality.[21] This implies, for both individual and collective, a balancing of ideas about how society is and how it could be, and this gives rise to social and political action, and social and political change—a genuine subject for historiography.[22]

The history of ideas of security, of the awareness of security, and of perceptions of security is always also the history of ideas of the future, of awareness of the future, and of expectations of the future.

[19] This is also Mergel's finding in 'Überlegungen zu einer Kulturgeschichte', pp. 598 f. But cf. the approaches in Karin Böke, *Politische Leitvokabeln in der Adenauer-Ära* (Berlin, 1996).

[20] Cf. Kaufmann, *Sicherheit als soziologisches und sozialpolitisches Problem*, p. 35.

[21] Ekkehart Lippert et al., 'Einleitung', in eid. (eds.), *Sicherheit in der unsicheren Gesellschaft*, pp. 7–20, at 14; cf. also Bonß, 'Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion von Sicherheit', p. 21.

[22] This article does not deal with the development of an individual and subjective perception of security, or at most, marginally. However, I should like to stress the significance of this subject. In this context, emotional security could prove to be a category that is important but difficult to grasp. From such a perspective, we would have to investigate, much more stringently than this article can, the socially specific and group-specific nature of the understanding of security or insecurity and how it changed or stayed the same. This goes in the direction of research on historical values, and could thus build on, for example, Manfred Hettling and Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (eds.), *Der bürgerliche Wertehimmel: Innenansichten des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen, 2000).

This is because, in a certain sense, security implies a future in which not everything is possible, in which not anything can happen, but a future which is laid down and, to some extent, predetermined. In the words of Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, security in this sense signifies the 'destruction of the temporality of the future'.[23] The striving for security aims to overcome the openness of the future. It aims to bridge the gap between 'experiential space' (*Erfahrungsraum*) and 'horizon of expectation' (*Erwartungshorizont*). According to Reinhart Koselleck, this gap is what constitutes the modern in the modern period, and, especially since the ground-breaking developments and upheavals in the wake of the French Revolution, it has made people profoundly insecure.[24]

<div align="center">III</div>

The human desire for security results in attempts to build and guarantee protection against insecurity. Security of this sort presupposes protection and guarantees which are founded upon a concrete legal basis, and must be capable of implementation. The dependence of security on a protecting power points clearly, if not exclusively, towards the state. *Pax*, *tranquillitas*, and *securitas* were among the central functions which the rising modern state was expected to fulfil. In the writings of a Hobbes or Pufendorf, securing the *status civilis* as a guarantee of civil security by monopolizing legitimate force becomes the *raison* of the state.[25] This is not the place to pursue this argument

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[23] Kaufmann, *Sicherheit als soziologisches und sozialpolitisches Problem,* p. 157. Cf. also Daniel Frei and Peter Gaupp, 'Das Konzept "Sicherheit"—Theoretische Aspekte', in Klaus-Dieter Schwarz (ed.), *Sicherheitspolitik: Analysen zur politischen und militärischen Sicherheit* (3rd edn.; Bad Honnef, 1981), pp. 3–16.

[24] Reinhart Koselleck, '"Erfahrungsraum" und "Erwartungshorizont"—zwei historische Kategorien', in id., *Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten* (Frankfurt am Main, 1989), pp. 349–75. Here the essays on Niklas Luhmann's concept of *Erwartungssicherheit* (security of expectation) as the basic concept of a sociological analysis of security stand out. For Luhmann, securities of expectation are always involved when it is a matter of re-defining (unmanageable) contingency into (manageable) complexity. On this cf. Bonß, 'Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion von Sicherheit', p. 24.

[25] On this see, in a survey of the history of concepts, Werner Conze's entry on 'Sicherheit, Schutz', in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck (eds.), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-*

further, although the contemporary phenomena of privatizing the use of force and de-nationalizing security are certainly relevant to the historical analysis of the rise and decline of the modern territorial state.[26]

A policy of security, however, does not arise only out of the classical protective function of the state. The negative goal of warding off danger combined, relatively early, with the positive ideal of welfare. In other words, various levels of security, the understanding of security, and security policy began to differentiate and separate out. Thus in a *Handbuch des Teutschen Policeyrechts* of 1799 we read: 'The main purpose of the state, the security of the whole of society and every single member of it, does not exclude the subordinate purpose of the general welfare, satisfaction, and happiness of the members of the state.'[27] It is not super- or subordination that is crucial, but the fact that two levels are distinguished, here called 'security policy' and 'welfare policy' respectively.[28] This points towards a development in the course of which security was able to become a symbol of social value which, today, holds out the promise of much more than mere protection, namely, certainty, reliability, peace, and a feeling of safety.[29]

Something else which needs in-depth investigation is the extent to which, from the nineteenth century, the legitimacy of political orders was dependent on their actual or presumed achievements in the field of security. It needs to be investigated whether a reciprocal relationship existed between the state's security achievements and other sources of political legitimacy, such as guaranteeing freedom, or creating equality, and how this reciprocal relationship changed, or

sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, 8 vols. (Stuttgart, 1972–97), vol. 5, pp. 831–62, esp. 837–43; but cf. also Wolfgang Reinhard, *Geschichte der Staatsgewalt: Eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte Europas von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich, 1999), esp. pp. 113–22.

[26] On this cf., among others, Herfried Münkler, *Die neuen Kriege* (Reinbek, 2002), pp. 33–43; Mary Kaldor, *Neue und alte Kriege: Organisierte Gewalt im Zeitalter der Globalisierung* (Frankfurt am Main, 2000), pp. 146–54, or the political tract by Erhard Eppler, *Vom Gewaltmonopol zum Gewaltmarkt? Die Privatisierung und Kommerzialisierung der Gewalt* (Frankfurt am Main, 2002).

[27] Günther Heinrich von Berg, *Handbuch des Teutschen Policeyrechts* (1st publ. 1799; Hanover, 1802); quoted from W. Conze, 'Sicherheit, Schutz', p. 853.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Cf. Kaufmann, *Sicherheit als soziologisches und sozialpolitisches Problem*, p. 1.

became more differentiated, in the historical process. This points—in very general terms—to the tension between freedom and security, to the tendency to restrict freedom for the sake of security, and to the fact that the values of freedom and security cannot both be maximized.[30] In order to study this, we could look at the political debates and decisions concerning the restriction of freedoms in the USA since 9/11 in the name of security, and at the tasks and activities of the newly created Ministry for Homeland Security there. But even in German history, and particularly in the history of the Federal Republic, there are enough indications of the political and social relevance and explosiveness of this tension.[31]

IV

With respect to the Federal Republic of Germany, sharp contemporary criticism of the allegedly backwards-looking and restorative character of the Adenauer era shows that the tension between freedom and security relates not only to the policy of inner security, especially since the 1970s, but also to much wider socio-political developments since the foundation of the West German state. Hardly a single critic, however, could say what had actually been 'restored', and researchers today unanimously rate the 1950s as a period of breakneck modernization, even if it was *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau* (modernization in the service of re-building).[32] Yet this criticism had

[30] Cf. Lippert et al., 'Einleitung', p. 13. On this cf. also the classic study, now more than 60 years old, by the American sociologist Harold D. Lasswell, 'The Garrison State', *American Journal of Sociology*, 46 (1941), pp. 455–68, which is worth re-reading since 9/11.

[31] On this cf. the highly topical essay by Winfried Hassemer, 'Zum Spannungsverhältnis von Freiheit und Sicherheit: Drei Thesen', *Vorgänge*, 41/3 (2002), pp. 10–15, published soon after 9/11.

[32] Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek (eds.), *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre* (Bonn, 1993); cf. also Thomas Schlemmer and Hans Woller (eds.), *Gesellschaft im Wandel 1949 bis 1973* (Munich, 2002). But see also Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die Ära Adenauer: Gründerjahre der Republik 1949–1957* (Stuttgart, 1981), pp. 375–64, who early designated the 1950s as a 'period of exciting modernization', which was initially widely criticized by German contemporary historians. Cf., e.g., Christoph Kleßmann, 'Ein stolzes Schiff und krächzende Möwen: Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik und ihre Kritiker', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 11 (1985), pp. 476–94.

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a core of justification. For example, it pointed to the fact that political and institutional democratization as expressed, for instance, in the *Grundgesetz* (Basic Law) and the individual *Land* constitutions, and in the harmonious way in which the constitutional organs of the centre and of the *Länder* co-operated, was by no means the same as social liberalization, the development of a Western understanding of freedom, and civil society, as if these developments could have been achieved or implemented on 23 May 1949 precisely. It was at least a decade before the Westernization which had been expressed institutionally in the Basic Law and, in foreign policy terms, in Western integration since the early 1950s, also made itself felt in the society of the Federal Republic.[33] Of course, it was not only 1968 which marked the beginning of social liberalization in the Federal Republic. Rather, the APO (opposition outside parliament) and the student movement were aspects of a new socio-political and socio-cultural orientation which had begun to assert itself in society since the beginning of the 1960s.[34]

The fact that during the 1950s large sections of West German society remained stuck in the political, social, and cultural patterns of the pre-war period can be explained in generational terms. Deeply anchored and internalized mental dispositions, if they change at all, do not change overnight. Yet the generational explanation seems to have become a historiographical passe-partout. (Social scientists and historians display unbelievable ingenuity when it comes to inventing generations.) Looking beyond the generational explanation, a clearly identifiable and broadly based social striving for security provides a further explanatory approach for the slow progress of social liberalization and politicization in the 1950s.

[33] On the concept of Westernization (*Verwestlichung/Westernisierung*) see Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1999).

[34] Cf. id., 'Westernisierung: Politisch-ideeller Wandel und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in der Bundesrepublik bis zum Ende der 60er Jahre', in Axel Schildt et al. (eds.), *Dynamische Zeiten: Die 60er Jahre in beiden deutschen Gesellschaften* (Hamburg, 2000), pp. 311–41, and Ulrich Herbert, 'Liberalisierung als Lernprozeß: Die Bundesrepublik in der deutschen Geschichte—eine Skizze', in id. (ed.), *Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland: Belastung, Integration, Liberalisierung 1945–1980* (Göttingen, 2002), pp. 7–49.

This striving for security, understood as the need for a compensating stability, can be explained in terms of the extraordinary pace of change in all areas of life since the final phase of the war.[35] And this dynamic of change did not end with the founding of the Federal Republic. Rather, as a 'period of exciting modernization', in the words of Hans-Peter Schwarz, it continued far into the 1950s. In view of this dynamic and the enormous pace of change, people felt an increased need to regain firm, secure ground under their feet, especially in their individual existences in their personal environment. Thus for the overwhelming majority of West Germans, reconstruction meant 'setting up house again after the catastrophe, achieving a secure, respectable existence by means of hard work and thrift, and taking every chance offered by constant economic improvement'.[36] For most, the point of orientation was not a better, but ultimately unknown future, but the lost normality of the past, the good old times, which most citizens of the Federal Republic saw in the peace-time years of National Socialism, and, even more, in the years just before 1914.

In response to the question: 'When in this century, in your opinion, was the best time for Germany?', which the Allensbach Institute put in a public opinion poll in 1951, 45 per cent of those asked replied Imperial Germany, while 40 per cent said the years 1933 to 1939.[37] Thus what Konrad Adenauer evoked in his Christmas message quoted at the beginning of this article corresponded exactly to what the Germans were thinking and feeling, just as Adenauer as a type credibly embodied the West Germans' ideal of security and normality. The social patriarchalism of the Adenauer era, expressed in the first Federal Chancellor's authoritative style of government, 'Papa' Heuss's understanding of the office of the Federal President, and Sepp Herberger's fatherly treatment of his 'heroes of Berne' also belong in this context.

[35] Cf. Herbert, 'Liberalisierung als Lernprozeß', p. 38; cf. also, at an early date, Hans Braun, 'Das Streben nach "Sicherheit" in den 50er Jahren: Soziale und politische Ursachen und Erscheinungsweisen', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 18 (1978), pp. 279–306.
[36] Axel Schildt, *Ankunft im Westen: Ein Essay zur Erfolgsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik* (Frankfurt am Main, 1999), p. 61.
[37] Elisabeth Noelle and Peter Neumann (eds.), *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1947–1955* (Allensbach, 1956), pp. 125 f.

In material terms, the *Wirtschaftswundergesellschaft* achieved the desired normality around the mid-1950s at the latest. But normalization referred not only to material security, prosperity, and consumerism. Material prosperity created security. And just as the economic crises after 1918 had made the German middle classes, the *Bürgertum*, in particular, feel insecure, and had shattered their self-confidence and their certainty about the future, thus also undermining the legitimacy of the Weimar Republic, so the young Federal Republic now gained legitimacy and stability. What I have described here for the Federal Republic was not, of course, a uniquely German development. Comparable socio-culturally backwards-looking phenomena can be found in the whole of Western Europe. The reason lies, in general terms, in the political, social, and cultural disorientation of wartime and the post-war years. In the case of Germany, however, this process was, paradoxically, strengthened by the pace of economic development and the collective effort to make a new start—while looking backwards, however, rather than forwards.[38] All of these socio-cultural developments were accompanied by a security policy which both provided a basis for the processes of normalization and overarched them. The two essential pillars of this policy were a foreign and alliance policy based on Western integration, including the re-militarization of West Germany, and the building up and expansion of social security systems. Both aimed to dismantle the huge, socially perceived potential for insecurity of the post-war period, and thus to secure and support the state of normality that was gradually returning. It may be a coincidence that in 1955, the year in which the Federal Republic joined NATO, economic and living standards in West Germany reached pre-war levels again.[39] Was this not a return to security?

Until well into the 1950s, fear of war was among the West Germans' greatest anxieties and worries, flaring up again in the weeks of the building of the Berlin Wall and the days of the Cuban Missile Crisis.[40] This did not necessarily lead to overwhelming agree-

[38] On this cf. also Eckart Conze, 'Eine bürgerliche Republik? Bürgertum und Bürgerlichkeit in der westdeutschen Nachkriegsgesellschaft', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 30 (2004), pp. 527–42.

[39] Cf. Sywottek, '"Wohlstand"—"Sicherheit"—"Frieden"', p. 245.

[40] Cf., e.g., polling results in Noelle and Neumann (eds.), *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1947–1955,* pp. 352–4.

ment with Adenauer's policy of political and military Western integration, including the setting up of the *Bundeswehr*. Endorsement came later, when it became obvious that Western integration, including the division of Germany which it cemented, had become an important force for stability, and that Western integration was among the factors perpetuating the conditions for the economic miracle.

Fear of war was combined with a deep-seated collective fear of 'the Russian', of 'Ivan', as many Germans said, which was of central significance for the anti-Communism of the Federal Republic in the 1950s and 1960s. This can be interpreted as a politicization of anxieties and feelings of insecurity.[41] A contemporary history of fear of the Russians has yet to be written.[42] And was it not a secure social and political order, rather than a free one, that could offer protection against the Communism personified by 'Ivan'? The political language of the time confirms this. This refers not only to the formula 'the politics of strength', applied to foreign and alliance policy, which

[41] On the fear of 'Ivan' see Schildt, *Ankunft im Westen*, pp. 89 f. However, also cf., e.g., the literary treatment of the subject in, among others, Max Frisch, *Homo faber* (1st publ. 1957; Frankfurt am Main, 1977), pp. 8–10. The politicization or political instrumentalization of war anxieties and fear of Communism was, of course, not limited to the Federal Republic under Adenauer. It can also be observed in American society in the 1950s, and not only during the era of McCarthyism. In terms of political history, reference must be made to the creation and development of the National Security State. In terms of social and cultural history, e.g., reference could be made to the connection between processes of suburbanization and nuclear threat scenarios. American researchers have also pointed to the gender-specific forms of the need for security and perceptions of insecurity. Cf. Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945–1954* (Cambridge, 1998); Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, 1992); id., *The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1917–1953* (New York, 1994); H. W. Brands, *The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War* (New York, 1993), esp. ch. 2: 'The National Insecurity State 1950–1955'; Laura A . Belmonte, 'A Family Affair? Gender, the U.S. Information Agency, and Cold War Ideology, 1945–1960', in Jessica Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (eds.), *Culture and International History* (New York, 2003), pp. 79–93.

[42] Schild has also pointed to the need for this. See Schildt, *Ankunft im Westen*, p. 100.

naturally always included the strength of the economy and levels of prosperity, but also to the politico-ideological language in which metaphors such as 'bulwark', 'protective wall', and 'dyke' were used in an inflationary manner.[43] In 1957 Hermann Aubin, a leading German historian, spoke of Germany as the 'sentinel of the West' against the 'Slavic East', a role which, he claimed, the Germans had played for a thousand years.[44] This was 1957—not 1937!

This metaphorical language was not only anti-Communist but also anti-modern, for example, within the conservative, intellectual edifice erected by the Catholic *Abendländische Bewegung* in the 1950s. Members of this movement, like other conservatives, were concerned to 'check' modern civilization, as they put it, to 'build a dyke' against liberalism, secularism, and materialism. Their aim was to achieve security against modernity as such. Intellectual movements like these may be considered marginal, and it is true that by the second half of the 1950s, their time had passed.[45] Yet they reflected political and cultural insecurities and the striving for certainties. Thus the *Abendländische Bewegung* was one of a number of attempts to achieve a cultural and political re-orientation. They were generally accepted, at least for a time, precisely because in the decades of catastrophes and confusions, including personal ones, they held out the promise of firm support and a clear orientation.[46]

The offers of cultural re-orientation lost some of their attractiveness in the second half of the 1950s as large sections of the West German population could see that their situation had improved markedly in recent years. This, of course, made them susceptible to the argument that this improvement could be endangered, and,

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[43] Cf. ibid. p. 97, and Herbert, 'Liberalisierung als Lernprozeß', pp. 23 f.

[44] Quoted from ibid. p. 21. On Hermann Aubin see now the comprehensive study by Eduard Mühle, which goes far into the post-war period: *Für Volk und deutschen Osten: Der Historiker Hermann Aubin und die deutsche Ostforschung im Zeitalter der Extreme* (Düsseldorf, 2005).

[45] On the rise and decline of the *Abendländische Bewegung* after 1945 see Axel Schildt, *Zwischen Abendland und Amerika: Studien zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft der 50er Jahre* (Munich, 1999), and, more recently, Vanessa Conze, *Das Europa der Deutschen: Europaideen in Deutschland zwischen Reichstradition und Westorientierung (1920–1970)* (Munich, 2005).

[46] Cf. Herbert, 'Liberalisierung als Lernprozeß', p. 28.

indeed, this became the main issue of the 1957 elections. The highly successful slogan 'Keine Experimente' (no experiments), and the catchphrase 'Sicher ist sicher' (better safe than sorry) cleverly exploited the fear of new uncertainties, and thus helped to enhance even further the role of security as a social value. To point out that a political opponent was irresponsibly putting security at risk, for example, by advocating a change in the foreign or domestic policy *status quo*, was tantamount to a denunciation. Not in intellectual, but in political terms, the German Social Democratic Party's (SPD) path to Godesberg started here.[47]

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The Grand Coalition of the years 1966 to 1969 was a Grand Coalition of security. This had been foreshadowed in the general election campaign of 1965, when both big parties had once again used the promise of security to woo voters. The Christian Democratic Union's (CDU) posters featured the slogan: 'Unsere Sicherheit' (our security). No less expressive was the slogan on the SPD's posters, which proclaimed: 'Sicherheit JA' (security YES). This underlines the further rise of security as a symbol of social value, and it marks the beginning of a political and programmatic levelling out of the problem of security, which began to lose differentiation. From the 1960s, we can speak of an unspoken Grand Coalition comprising the CDU, its Bavarian sister-party, the Christian Socialist Union (CSU), and the SPD in important areas of security policy—in social security and internal security—perhaps least of all in the area of military security.

The example of internal security, *innere Sicherheit*—a term, incidentally, that was not used in the political language until the late 1960s, and first appeared as an entry in the index of *Bundestag* minutes in 1973[48]—shows that all differences and disagreements were

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[47] A comprehensive analysis, orientated by the history of ideas, of the SPD's path to Godesberg is now offered by Julia Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie: Die Westernisierung von SPD und DGB* (Munich, 2003).

[48] See Hans-Peter Bull, 'Politik der "inneren Sicherheit" vor einem mißtrauisch gewordenen Publikum', *Leviathan*, 12 (1984), pp. 155–75, at 158; cf. also Albrecht Funk, '"Innere Sicherheit": Symbolische Politik und exekutive Praxis', in Bernhard Blanke and Hellmut Wollmann (eds.), *Die alte Bundesrepublik: Kontinuität und Wandel* (Opladen, 1991), pp. 367–85, or Hans-Gerd

ultimately resolved relatively quickly in constitutional or legislative compromises, from the emergency laws of the 1960s to the changes in asylum law of the 1990s. The dilemma faced by the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and later the Greens, but also the political significance that this gave them, can only be hinted at against this background.

The potential for insecurity which had characterized the 1950s had largely dissipated by the mid-1960s. After the crises around Berlin and Cuba, the East–West conflict entered a phase of *détente* and co-operative conflict resolution, not least because both super-powers had a political interest in stabilizing the structures of the con-flicting systems by balancing nuclear deterrence, thus increasing security for both sides.[49] Neither the Vietnam War nor the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia posed a serious threat to the progress of East–West *détente*. International and foreign policy stability was matched by domestic and social stability, which was not even seri-ously upset by the events of 1968. The social criticism of 1968 was largely limited to students and intellectuals; in particular, they never achieved an alliance with the workers and unions in the Federal Republic. The recession of 1966, a temporary decline in growth rates, was quickly overcome. The 'dream of eternal prosperity',[50] of lasting 'prosperity for all' ('Wohlstand für alle'), to quote Ludwig Erhard, could continue to be dreamed. Social security systems, crucially expanded by the pension reform of 1957 and the introduction of pub-lic assistance in 1961, worked. And so it is hardly surprising that even at the end of the troubled year of 1968, 65 per cent of West Germans looked to the new year with confidence.[51]

Jaschke, *Streitbare Demokratie und innere Sicherheit: Grundlagen, Praxis und Kritik* (Opladen, 1991), p. 75.

[49] Werner Link, *Der Ost-West-Konflikt: Die Organisation der internationalen Be-ziehungen im 20. Jahrhundert* (2nd edn.; Stuttgart, 1988) is still useful on the various phases of the East–West conflict.

[50] Burkart Lutz, *Der kurze Traum immerwährender Prosperität* (Frankfurt am Main, 1984).

[51] Elisabeth Noelle and Peter Neumann (eds.), *Jahrbuch der öffentlichen Meinung 1968–1973* (Allensbach, 1974), p. 602. Cf. also Gabriele Metzler, 'Am Ende aller Krisen? Politisches Denken und Handeln in der Bundesrepublik der sechziger Jahre', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 275 (2002), pp. 57–103, at 74 f.

The idea of a secured future unified the citizens of the Federal Republic. It also unified the political parties, whose programmes reflected an optimistic belief in the certainty of progress, as did government declarations and the political measures of the federal and *Länder* governments. More strongly than before, security in West German society and politics became a security of the future. This combined with a conviction, nourished by academic studies, that all essential political and social processes are predictable, can be planned, and, therefore, ultimately, also controlled. Planning and control became the buzz words of the decade from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s.[52] Research on the future, whether of a scientific–technical or social scientific nature, became an academically respectable branch of knowledge. A successful manager in industry once complained in public that German universities had hundreds of historians who dealt with the past, but not a single chair of futurology.[53] And his comments evoked a big response.

Security no longer meant just normality and stability. Now it signified the certainty that this stability, with the profits and interest payments that it generated, could be placed on a permanent footing. This explains two things about the politics of the social–liberal Brandt–Scheel coalition which the new Chancellor developed in his government declaration of October 1969. It is no coincidence that this declaration was headed: 'Kontinuität und Erneuerung' (continuity and renewal).[54] First, it explained and justified the presumption of security of economic growth and prosperity, 'stability without stag-

[52] On this see the comprehensive study by Gabriele Metzler, *Konzeptionen politischen Handelns von Adenauer bis Brandt: Politische Planung in der pluralistischen Gesellschaft* (Paderborn, 2005).

[53] According to Jürgen Kocka, 'Geschichte—wozu? [1975/1989]', in Wolfgang Hardtwig (ed.), *Über das Studium der Geschichte* (Munich, 1990), pp. 427–43, at 428 f. Cf. also Metzler, *Konzeptionen politischen Handelns*, esp. pp. 141–9, and Alexander Schmidt-Gernig, 'Forecasting the Future: Future Studies as International Networks of Social Analysis in the 1960s and 1970s in Western Europe and the United States', in Gienow-Hecht and Schumacher (eds.), *Culture and International History*, pp. 157–72.

[54] Government declaration by the Federal Chancellor, 28 Oct. 1969, in *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages: 6. Wahlperiode, Stenographische Berichte*, vol. 71, pp. 20–34 (also for the following quotations).

nation', as Brandt called it, and the assumption that the welfare state would develop into 'the rule of social law' ('der soziale Rechtsstaat'). The list of programmes, measures, and laws introduced in its name is too long to reproduce here. Secondly, the socio-political and socio-economic stability which was achieved and considered to be secure also created the potential for social and political change, expressed particularly in the memorable slogan: 'Mehr Demokratie wagen' (dare more democracy). The dialectic of this argument is remarkable because it implies a reversal of the security-related objectives of the 1950s. Permanent security, Brandt pointed out, could be achieved in a developed society only through change.[55] In social terms this also points to the fact that the striving for security directed towards the stabilization of life circumstances, social advancement, or renewed social advancement had lost significance as a new generation had grown up without first-hand experience of the potential for insecurity of the early post-war years. Of course, a fundamental certainty about the future was the precondition for all these calls for a readiness to experiment and greater enthusiasm for reform. The 1972 SPD election manifesto summed this up: 'Quality of life is more than a higher living standard; quality of life presupposes freedom, including freedom from fear. It is security through human solidarity, the chance for self-determination and self-development, for co-determination and co-responsibility.'[56]

Contrary to expectations, the 'safety in secured progress' which Willy Brandt had wished his 'dear fellow citizens' in his New Year's address of 1970–1,[57] did not last long. The optimistic belief in progress of the late 1960s and early 1970s burst like a soap bubble when confronted by the oil price shock of 1973.[58] It was soon gener-

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[55] Ibid. p. 23.

[56] Quoted from Schildt, *Ankunft im Westen*, p. 40.

[57] Federal Chancellor's New Year's speech, 1970–1, in *Bulletin der Bundesregierung 1971*, no. 1, p. 2. See also Gabriele Metzler, ' "Geborgenheit im gesicherten Fortschritt": Das Jahrzehnt von Planbarkeit und Machbarkeit', in Matthias Frese et al. (eds.), *Demokratisierung und gesellschaftlicher Aufbruch: Die sechziger Jahre als Wendezeit der Bundesrepublik* (Paderborn, 2003), pp. 777–97.

[58] See Jens Hohensee, *Der erste Ölpreisschock 1973/74: Die politischen und gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen der arabischen Erdölpolitik auf die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Westeuropa* (Stuttgart, 1996).

ally agreed that the times of continuous growth were over. For many people, the future seemed to have grown darker again in the mid-1970s. A high inflation rate with negative growth—stagflation—unsettled the German population, whose older members immediately began to think of the Weimar Republic. New—old—fears and anxieties suddenly resurfaced. The levels of optimism regarding the future registered in opinion polls in the early 1970s were never achieved again, even though expectations of prosperity were maintained by state investments and subsidies, employment programmes, and other Keynesian measures in the realm of social security despite an awareness of the limits of growth and the fact that the downturn in the international economic cycle meant that unemployment and poverty levels were rising again.[59]

In 1969, Willy Brandt had still linked security with political and social change. At the beginning of Helmut Schmidt's chancellorship, against the background of the crises of 1973–4, the concept of security lost its reform-orientated dynamic. Brandt's key concept of reform was increasingly replaced by that of stability in political rhetoric and especially in Helmut Schmidt's 'new Chancellor-speak'.[60] The new Federal Chancellor's first government declaration testified to this. In general terms it named continuity and concentration as the leitmotivs of future policy, while the spirit of renewal seemed to have dissipated. Moreover, in sober and factual, almost functional language, Schmidt, speaking to parliament and the SPD parliamentary party in the *Bundestag*, also pointed out that the primary task of every government was 'to fulfil the classic functions of the state adequately for its citizens'.[61] The Chancellor was sharply criticized for this statement, in particular from among the ranks of his own party, who saw Schmidt's understanding of the state as approaching 'classic, pre-democratic views of the relationship between state and citizens'.[62] In

[59] Cf. Sywottek, ' "Wohlstand"—"Sicherheit"—"Frieden" ', p. 249.

[60] Wolfgang Jäger, 'Die Innenpolitik der sozial-liberalen Koalition 1974–1982', in id. and Werner Link, *Republik im Wandel 1974–1982: Die Ära Schmidt* (Stuttgart, 1987), pp. 9–272, at 14.

[61] Quoted from Jäger, 'Die Innenpolitik der sozial-liberalen Koalition', p. 15.

[62] According to Ulrich Lohmar, SPD deputy in the *Bundestag*, writing on Schmidt and his government's programme, in *Der Spiegel*, 27 May 1974, p. 10.

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the context of the present article, however, more important than this criticism is the fact that the classic functions of a modern state were security functions, namely, 'economic and social security, . . . internal public security, and . . . thirdly, external security'.[63]

Socio-economic uncertainty was allied to fears of the threat to internal security posed by political radicalism and terrorism. The 1970s can justifiably be called a decade of internal security. This field of politics was concerned with everyday public security issues, first in response to terrorism, later increasingly also to growing criminality and fear of crime. The new policy of internal security had little in common with the *Staatsschutz* of the 1950s, or even the emergency powers of the 1960s.[64] The executive measures undertaken to improve internal security had a broad impact. I need mention only the *Radikalenerlaß* (law designed to prevent members of radical or extremist organizations from working for the civil service) and the *Regelanfrage* (inquiries made of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution concerning all applicants for positions in the civil service to establish whether they had been members of, or had supported, radical or extremist organizations). These measures and the public discussion of them in the 1970s also contributed to a change in the social awareness of security. More and more citizens of the Federal Republic saw their world as increasingly insecure, and a perception spread that the Federal Republic was entering a period of insecurity. Within a few years, internal security had become so important in the political discussion and the hierarchy of political values that social policy or environmental goals and programmes were soon being presented and justified as contributing to an improvement in internal security. Thus the SPD's 1980 election manifesto states: 'Not only criminality and terror, but also the withholding of social justice, limiting the quality of life as the result of environmental damage, and the misuse of economic power under a veil of legality, all threaten internal security.'[65]

The discussion about an expanded concept of security was not limited to Germany. It was an international phenomenon which can be identified as taking place at about the same time everywhere in

[63] Quoted from Jäger, 'Die Innenpolitik der sozial-liberalen Koalition', p. 15.
[64] Cf. Bull, 'Politik der "inneren Sicherheit"', pp. 156 f.
[65] Quoted from ibid., p. 158.

the Western industrialized world.[66] This is not surprising as the origins of the debate about an expanded understanding of security were linked to the international crises of the mid-1970s, which also marked the end of the economic boom and, in a wider sense, of Eric Hobsbawm's golden age of the advanced capitalist states.[67] The debate, which naturally had individual national characteristics, began after the Middle East war of 1973 and the politically dictated rise in oil prices. At first, economic security was emphasized, in particular, the security of energy or sources of energy as the basis of economic well-being and social stability. What Helmut Schmidt expressed, in 1974, in general terms concerning the security tasks of the state, first found concrete political expression in the 1980 Inoki report in Japan. This report, commissioned by the Japanese government, attempted to cover all the dimensions of a possible threat to the Japanese people in a comprehensive security concept reaching from military security to the security of the food supply and security against earthquakes.[68] However, in examining national security policies we must not overlook the fact that in reaction to the crisis of the mid-1970s, nationally or internationally co-ordinated government policies were increasingly incapable of creating or restoring security. Could the world economy, which was seen as responsible for cyclical fluctuations, be directed nationally? With the rise of neo-liberalism from the mid-1970s, nation-states palpably lost economic and also political power. They had less chance than ever before to guarantee securities, or even just to create the best possible conditions for national security. In this sense, neo-liberalism achieved for the economy what the existence of nuclear weapons had achieved in the military sphere, namely, break-

[66] On this see Uwe Nerlich, 'Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik: Konzeptionelle Grundlagen für multilaterale Rahmenbedingungen', in Karl Kaiser and Hanns W. Maull (eds.), *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik*, vol. 1: *Grundlagen* (Munich, 1997), pp. 153–74; cf. also id., 'Europäische Sicherheitskultur: Das Ziel und der Weg', in Albrecht Zunker (ed.), *Weltordnung oder Chaos?* (Baden-Baden, 1993), pp. 21–36.
[67] Eric Hobsbawm, *Das Zeitalter der Extreme: Weltgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Munich, 1995), pp. 324–62. On this cf. also the review by Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, 'Das schwarze Jahrhundert und sein "Goldenes Zeitalter" ', *Neue Politische Literatur*, 42 (1997), pp. 365–77.
[68] On the Inoki report see Nerlich, 'Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik', pp. 156 f.

ing through the hard shell of the national state, as John H. Herz had put it as early as 1957.[69]

Environmental threats, too, respected no national borders and in this sense had a de-nationalizing or de-territorializing impact. This insight soon formed part of the ecological and environmental discourse which, as early as the 1970s, was not merely a national, but an international, even global discourse and increasingly took the whole earth as its frame of reference.[70] With the growing prominence of ecological risks, catalogues of security such as the Inoki report and the expanded understanding of security on which they were based gained plausibility. This applied not only to the increased awareness since the 1970s of the threat to nature as the basis of human life, but in particular to the risks associated with the use of advanced technologies, soon known as high-risk technologies, such as nuclear energy. The border-crossing character of environmental threats had a social impact and thus became politically even more powerful with the reactor catastrophe at Chernobyl.[71] The direction of the wind determined the distribution of risks and dangers, not the nation-state, which obviously could not guarantee security.

Opponents of nuclear power, who had organized themselves and had been protesting in the Federal Republic since the 1970s, were able, after 1986, to put an even stronger position by reference to the security or rather, insecurity, of nuclear power. This allowed the multi-dimensionality and associated inconsistency of the concept of security to emerge clearly. Nuclear energy and the building of nuclear power plants had been praised and presented, since the late 1950s, as an opportunity to make economic security and well-being permanent.[72] Now, however, people became increasingly aware that,

[69] John H. Herz, 'The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State', *World Politics*, 9 (1957), pp. 473–93.

[70] Cf. Kai Hünemörder, *Die Frühgeschichte der globalen Umweltkrise und die Formierung der deutschen Umweltpolitik (1950–1973)* (Stuttgart, 2004).

[71] On this see Franz-Josef Brüggemeier, *Tschernobyl, 26. April 1986: Die ökologische Herausforderung* (Munich, 1998).

[72] On this see Metzler, *Konzeptionen politischen Handelns*, pp. 70–80; cf. also Joachim Radkau, *Aufstieg und Krise der deutschen Atomwirtschaft 1945–1975* (Reinbek, 1983).

as in a system of inter-connecting pipes, the security of the energy supply was paid for by the high risks associated with the generation of nuclear power. The two securities, it seemed, could not be achieved at the same time, and political balance and value judgements were required. In this sense, experience with high-risk technologies, especially in the area of nuclear power, contributed to the growing awareness, especially in Western societies, of the relativity of security. This relates not least to the broad differentiation of security or securities. The aim of political action and decisions was now not so much the creation of security in general as the minimizing of insecurity and the development of security priorities.

In contemporary sociological descriptions of the 1980s, the notion of the 'risk society', coined by Ulrich Beck, brought these developments together.[73] Looking at society as a whole, Beck designated the 'extension of the risks of modernization' as security risks. It was not by chance that he particularly stressed technological developments such as nuclear energy or gene technology. However, the fact that these new-style security risks had a socially levelling or democratizing impact as they equalized and relativized old differences in insecurity or exposure to risk, thus reducing their significance, formed only one aspect of Beck's social analysis. The other consisted of his observations of the dissolution of social classes, traditional marriage and family structures, the roles of the sexes, and employment relations as socially binding institutions in processes of individualization. The finding of growing risks and eroded securities, for society as a whole as well as for the individual, naturally linked the two observations. Critics have repeatedly accused Beck of presenting and valuing existing structures of social inequality as, ultimately, of secondary importance. This cannot be discussed here. But in our context it is important that, in the figure of Ulrich Beck, the social sciences attempted to analyse and conceptualize the change and differentiation of society's understanding of security. The increased sensitivity to risk of modern societies in respect of both the social or welfare state level achieved and the level of technical security, which Ulrich Beck pointed out in a sociological perspective, and Hermann Lübbe,

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[73] Ulrich Beck, *Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne* (Frankfurt am Main, 1986).

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for example, in a philosophical one,[74] also represented a new political challenge in the sense of minimizing risk rather than comprehensively abolishing insecurity.

The language which, around 1980, Werner Conze used in his essay on 'Sicherheit, Schutz' for the volume *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*,[75] was still far from the terminology of Beck or Lübbe. This refers not only to the fact that environmental insecurity was not a theme of Conze's work. At that time, Conze probably lacked a political rather than an academic feel for this. In his forward-looking treatment of the mass demonstrations of the peace movement, he still pointed to the fear of the end of all security as its central motive, thus appropriating to himself an absolute understanding of security. This, of course, did not distinguish the historian from large sections of West German society, and, in particular, the peace movement. After all, they saw the nuclear arms race between East and West, which received a boost from the stationing of the new Soviet middle-range SS 20s and NATO's resolution to rearm at the end of the 1970s, not as a security risk that could, ultimately, be controlled politically. Rather, they perceived it as an existential threat to security, as something that put human existence as such at risk in a nuclear Third World War.

The reference to the East–West conflict and nuclear rearmament here raises a dimension of security and security policy, namely, exernal and, ultimately, military security, that is, 'classical security policy' which, in the 1970s and during the early years of Helmut Schmidt's chancellorship under the influence of world-political *détente*, had taken a back seat to the issues of economic, social, and internal security.[76] A few days after what was probably the biggest challenge to the internal security of the Federal Republic posed by the terrorist Red Army Fraction (the kidnapping and murder of

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[74] See e.g., Hermann Lübbe, 'Die schwarze Wand der Zukunft', in Ernst Peter Fischer (ed.), *Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Sicherheit* (Munich, 1991), pp. 17–31, or Hermann Lübbe, 'Erfahrungsverluste und Kompensation', in id., *Die Aufdringlichkeit der Geschichte: Herausforderungen der Moderne vom Historismus bis zum Nationalsozialismus* (Graz, 1989), pp. 105–19.

[75] W. Conze, 'Sicherheit, Schutz'.

[76] This is how Helga Haftendorn puts it in her book *Sicherheit und Stabilität: Außenbeziehungen der Bundesrepublik zwischen Ölkrise und NATO-Doppelbeschluß* (Munich, 1986), pp. 24 f.

Hanns-Martin Schleyer, and the highjacking of the Lufthansa plane *Landshut*), Helmut Schmidt, in his famous speech to the Institute of Strategic Studies in London in October 1977, put this dimension back at the centre of his own political action and into the focus of international politics. A politico-military balance between East and West, he said, was the prerequisite for security and for *détente*.[77] NATO's Double-Track Decision of 1979 was built on this premiss. It called for a comprehensive and differentiated military balance between East and West, and offered the Warsaw Pact the option of achieving this balance by introducing measures to control armament, but simultaneously threatened to implement Western rearmament should the negotiations fail.[78]

NATO's Double-Track Decision and the domestic political and social debates it sparked off, which, in the Federal Republic, in particular, essentially focused on the definition of security, was the dominant theme of Helmut Schmidt's last years in office and the start of Helmut Kohl's chancellorship. The decline of the social–liberal coalition and the switch to a government consisting of the CDU/CSU and the FDP cannot be understood and analysed without this security discourse. Incidentally, it points again to the socio-cultural appropriation of security as a value. The question of international and military security reached deep into the domestic politics and society of the Federal Republic, and allied itself with social developments which, in the context of the Federal Republic's system of political parties, culminated politically in the establishment of the Greens in 1980 and their entry into the *Bundestag* in 1983. In these processes, which cannot be unravelled in detail here, the central reference points were the questions of external, military security and security policy — an 'alternative security policy', as the peace movement's Krefeld appeal of November 1980 put it.[79] From an international perspective, in partic-

[77] Speech printed in *Bulletin der Bundesregierung*, no. 112, 8 Nov. 1977, pp. 1013–20; reprinted in Haftendorn, *Sicherheit und Stabilität*, pp. 195–212.

[78] Cf. *Kommuniqué der Sondersitzung der Außen- und Verteidigungsminister der NATO*, 12 Dec. 1979, printed in *Bulletin der Bundesregierung*, no. 154, 18 Dec. 1979, pp. 1409 f. and 1414.

[79] 'Krefelder Erklärung', 16 Nov. 1980, printed in Alfred Mechtersheimer (ed.), *Nachrüsten? Dokumente und Positionen zum Nato-Doppelbeschluß* (Reinbek, 1981), pp. 249 f.

ular, is it true to say that security and stability were ultimately the same thing, as the Schmidt and Kohl governments, NATO, and the Soviet Union as well saw it? Or was the stability of the East–West relationship, founded on nuclear deterrence, not secure, but insecure? In retrospect, and especially since 1990, the conditions governing the stability of the East–West conflict have emerged more clearly. It was essentially dependent on East and West sharing a similar understanding of security, the disciplining logic of nuclear weapons, and the rationalism of political activity which it imposed or enhanced. In looking at the understanding and definition of security, therefore, particular features of international politics and political activity, understood as communicative action, become comprehensible, as do the interconnectedness and interdependence of international developments on the one hand, and intra-state and intra-societal ones on the other. Given the historical analysis of modern societies and politics in modern societies, all this may seem self-evident. Yet this interdependence can be precisely worked out only when the subjects are clearly related to each other. Security is one of these subjects, and the mutability and historicity of the term and its contents are not a disadvantage for historical analysis. On the contrary, they are a decided advantage.

VI

The idea of total security has begun to falter since the 1970s. Neither as an emotional safety net nor as certainty about the future has it been possible to recreate security since then. In the 1970s encyclopaedias were still able to define security as 'a condition of not being under threat, objectively represented as the presence of protection or the absence of danger'.[80] Since then, however, it has become clearer that security and insecurity do not form an absolute opposition. Rather, they are relational terms; they mark two extremes on a scale, and an individual's or society's position on this scale is as dependent on objective factors as on subjective evaluations and perceptions. Only in borderline cases can security amount to the actual abolition of danger; more realistically, it reduces or minimizes risks. This is demonstrated by experiences with high-risk technologies such as nuclear energy in recent decades.

[80] Quoted from Bonß, 'Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion von Sicherheit', p. 22.

Where security cannot, or can no longer, be created or guaranteed, does trust help? The concept of trust has increasingly entered our everyday political language in recent years. Historians have even begun to investigate the historicity of 'trust'.[81] And quite a few political journalists see a genuine lack of trust and trustworthiness as a cause of the profound crisis faced by politics and society.[82] This is not as new as it may seem to some. As long ago as 1968, Niklas Luhmann identified trust as a 'mechanism for reducing social complexity'. It offers a chance at least partially to restore order and security, especially in the form of self-confidence, within the complexity of modern societies—security as a 'system of trust'.[83] Precisely this is the location of 'security as a culture'; but it is also the location of security as a task and function of politics in modern societies.

The topic of security will continue to occupy us. It points far beyond the ivory tower, for there can be no doubt that the experience of insecurity will continue and grow in intensity. 'The black wall of the future' is moving closer, as the philosopher Hermann Lübbe once put it.[84] The future is less predictable than it has ever been. In the age of global information, insecurities grow because opportunities and space for action no longer coincide with opportunities and space for information. We know everything that could happen because we know *that* it happens.[85] There is no way back to the 'golden age of security', even if people will never stop seeking this 'dream castle', as Stefan Zweig called it.[86]

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[81] See, e.g., Ute Frevert (ed.), *Vertrauen: Historische Annäherungen* (Göttingen, 2003).

[82] See, e.g., Gertrud Höhler, *Warum Vertrauen siegt: 50 gute Gründe, sich aufeinander zu verlassen* (Berlin, 2003).

[83] On this cf. Kaufmann, *Sicherheit als soziologisches und sozialpolitisches Problem*, pp. 20 f., and Lippert et al., 'Einleitung', pp. 13 f.

[84] Lübbe, 'Die schwarze Wand der Zukunft', p. 19.

[85] See ibid. and Martin Dinges and Fritz Sack, 'Unsichere Großstädte?', in eid. (eds.), *Unsichere Großstädte? Vom Mittelalter bis zur Postmoderne* (Constance, 2000), pp. 9–65, at 14 f. Cf. also Hans Jonas, *Das Prinzip Verantwortung: Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische Zivilisation* (Frankfurt am Main, 1984), pp. 7 f. In this context Jonas speaks of the 'heuristic of fear'.

[86] Zweig, *Die Welt von Gestern*, p. 21.

Article

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REVIEW ARTICLES

FOREIGN POLICY IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES

Karsten Plöger

PIERRE CHAPLAIS, *English Diplomatic Practice in the Middle Ages* (London: Hambledon and London, 2003), 256 pp. ISBN 1 85285 395 6. £25.00

DIETER BERG, MARTIN KINTZINGER, and PIERRE MONNET (eds.), *Auswärtige Politik und internationale Beziehungen im Mittelalter (13. bis 16. Jahrhundert),* Europa in der Geschichte, 6 (Bochum: Winkler, 2002), 444 pp. ISBN 3 930083 59 0. EUR 61.50

RAINER C. SCHWINGES and KLAUS WRIEDT (eds.), *Gesandtschafts- und Botenwesen im spätmittelalterlichen Europa,* Vorträge und Forschungen, 60 (Ostfildern: Jan Thorbecke, 2003), 407 pp. ISBN 3 7995 6860 3. EUR 49.00

PETRA EHM, *Burgund und das Reich: Spätmittelalterliche Außenpolitik am Beispiel der Regierung Karls des Kühnen (1465–1477)*, Pariser Historische Studien, 61 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002), 349 pp. ISBN 3 486 56683 0. EUR 44.80

I

Medieval diplomatic practice first became the subject of systematic studies in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, when the general interest in diplomatic history was at its zenith. It had been as the political history of the nation-state and its relations with other nation-states that history had established itself as an academic discipline over the preceding decades. At the same time, diplomacy itself was emerging as 'a distinguished vocation with specialized professional skills and a particular appeal to social and intellectual elites'.[1] However, the fact that, by and large, the political units of the Middle Ages lacked specialized institutions for the planning and conduct of

[1] Abba S. Eban, *Diplomacy for the Next Century* (New Haven, Conn., 1998), p. 34.

foreign affairs meant that this particular aspect of governance had little chance of attracting the attention of mainstream constitutional and administrative historians. Very few scholars of that early period made an effort to understand the unique character of medieval diplomacy.[2] Instead, the focus of attention of their contemporaries soon shifted to the history of one of the hallmarks of modern statehood: the evolution of the practice of representation through permanent embassies and resident ambassadors, which, as was soon agreed, had Renaissance Italy as its birthplace and gradually spread from there to northern and western Europe.[3]

The classic surveys of the history of diplomatic theory and practice produced in the twentieth century generally shared this obsession with modernity, espousing, as they did, a teleological view of diplomacy: the idea that, after protracted but continuous development, we have today achieved the best and final form in which to organize peaceful relations between states. Suggesting that there was 'a distinct upward curve of progress' in the development of diplomatic theory, Harold Nicolson, the doyen of diplomatic theory, in his main work aimed 'to concentrate upon the continuity of development rather than upon the sudden spurts and long retardations by which it has been marked'.[4] At a general level, this kind of approach has resulted in many of 'the dynamic and dispersed forces behind the formation of diplomacy which defined purposes often antithetical to the traditional teleology' being left unexplored.[5] Crucially, any con-

[2] Viktor Menzel, *Deutsches Gesandtschaftswesen im Mittelalter* (Hanover, 1892), and esp. Marie Alphonse René de Maulde La Clavière, *La diplomatie au temps de Machiavel*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1892–3).

[3] For a survey of the research done in this field in the late 19th and early 20th centuries see Fritz Ernst, 'Über Gesandtschaftswesen und Diplomatie an der Wende vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit', *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte,* 33 (1950), pp. 64–95, at 68–70. See also Garrett Mattingly, 'The First Resident Embassies: Medieval Italian Origins of Modern Diplomacy', *Speculum,* 12 (1937), pp. 423–39, and the second part of his *Renaissance Diplomacy* (New York, 1970). The first chapter of Matthew S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450–1919* (London, 1993), gives an overview of the innovations in diplomatic practice during the 15th and 16th centuries.

[4] Harold George Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, Home University Library of Modern Knowledge, 192 (3rd edn.; London, 1963), pp. 16–17.

[5] James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (Oxford, 1987), p. 3.

tribution that medieval Europe may have made to the evolution of diplomatic theory and practice was disparaged or ignored altogether. As late as 1963 Nicolson declared that 'it was the Byzantines who taught diplomacy to Venice; it was the Venetians who set the pattern for the Italian cities, for France and Spain, and eventually for all Europe', while in the medieval west 'there was little opportunity for any orderly or established system of international contact'.[6]

But the challenge to the study of medieval diplomatic practice came not only from within the discipline. The wider historiographical context was also changing.[7] The historians of the late nineteenth century generally focused on the intentions and deeds of the 'great men' who 'made history', and opted for a narrative and descriptive, rather than analytical, approach.[8] But around 1900 some of their colleagues, predominantly in France and Belgium, began to question these traditional paradigms of research and to advocate a history that accounted for social and economic factors rather than one that concentrated on leading personalities and isolated events. If this new, social science-orientated history sought to replace the study of politics with that of society, historians from the 1960s onwards increasingly turned to the study of culture, understood as the conditions of everyday life and experience.[9] The 'golden age' of conventional diplomatic history is now long gone. Although it retains an important place on university curricula today, it seems unlikely to regain its former prominence. Too often have its practitioners been charged with analytical short-sightedness and superficiality.

[6] Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, pp. 24–5, 12.

[7] Georg G. Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge* (Hanover, NH, 1997), pp. 1–16. On medieval history in particular see Hans-Werner Goetz, *Moderne Mediävistik: Stand und Perspektiven der Mittelalterforschung* (Darmstadt, 1999), pp. 72–6, 84–94, 106–25.

[8] Jacques Le Goff, 'Is Politics Still the Backbone of History?', in Felix Gilbert and Stephen R. Graubard (eds.), *Historical Studies Today* (New York, 1972), pp. 337–55, at 337–40; Gordon A. Craig, 'Political and Diplomatic History', ibid. 356–71, at 356–8; Paul G. Lauren, 'Diplomacy: History, Theory, and Policy', in id. (ed.), *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy* (New York, 1979), pp. 3–18, at 5–6.

[9] Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century*, p. 8.

In short, it is possible to look at the historical transformations of diplomacy from two rather different perspectives: one can choose to examine its contents (alliances, treaties, and so on), or one can confine oneself to exploring its forms (the means and techniques of communication employed by two or more participants in a given historical context). Both approaches, diplomatic history as well as the history of diplomacy, have received their share of criticism over the past hundred years.

II

During the second half of the twentieth century only a few medievalists, such as François Louis Ganshof, George P. Cuttino, Garrett Mattingly, and Donald E. Queller,[10] examined the available diplomatic documents, financial and administrative records, and narrative sources in order to gain a deeper understanding of the forms and structures of medieval diplomacy. Pierre Chaplais stands out among them. Towards the end of a long career devoted to the study of both the conduct and instruments of English medieval diplomacy, and the formal features of royal documents, he published the two parts of his *English Medieval Diplomatic Practice* in 1975 and 1982 respectively.[11] This extensive and richly annotated selection of documents was to be accompanied by a two-volume commentary, the first volume of which was to concentrate on the flow of information between gov-

[10] François Louis Ganshof, *Le moyen âge*: *Histoire des relations internationales*, ed. Pierre Renouvin, vol. i (Paris, 1953), see esp. ch. 12; George P. Cuttino, 'The Conduct of English Diplomacy in the Fourteenth Century' (D. Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1938); id., *English Diplomatic Administration, 1259–1339* (2nd rev. and enl. edn.; Oxford, 1971); id., *English Medieval Diplomacy* (Bloomington, Ind., 1985); Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*; Donald E. Queller, 'Thirteenth-Century Diplomatic Envoys: *Nuncii* and *procuratores*', *Speculum*, 35 (1960), pp. 196–213; and esp. id., *The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1967). Id., 'Western European Diplomacy', in Joseph R. Strayer (ed.), *Dictionary of the Middle Ages* (New York, 1982–9), vol. iv, pp. 201–14, is the best short introduction to the subject.
[11] *English Medieval Diplomatic Practice*, pt. 2: *Plates* (London, 1975), pt. 1: *Documents and Interpretation*, 2 vols. (London, 1982). For a list of Chaplais' publications see Michael Jones and Malcolm G. A. Vale (eds.), *England and her Neighbours, 1066–1453: Essays in Honour of Pierre Chaplais* (London, 1989), pp. xxi–xxiv.

ernments, and the second on the negotiation and conclusion of agreements between them. After many delays, the former was published in 2003 under the title *English Diplomatic Practice in the Middle Ages*.

One of the many merits of this book is that it does not shy away from tackling the difficult task of examining the forms, formulas, and practices of 'international' relations in the early and high Middle Ages. Whereas the second and third chapters deal with diplomatic correspondence and missions after *c.* 1200, the first chapter examines English diplomatic practice before that date, starting with the essentially oral world of late sixth-century communication. The cornerstone of Chaplais' exhaustive study, however, is the unparalleled richness of the archives of royal government from the twelfth century onwards. Chaplais' knowledge of these archives is second to none and has enabled him to write what will no doubt be the definitive manual of English medieval diplomatic practice. For no other European nation will it be possible to produce anything even remotely comparable, and future generations of students and scholars alike will find his book indispensable.

The range of topics covered is impressive. Not surprisingly, Chaplais is at his best when discussing the features and uses of the various kinds of written instruments of diplomatic communication: instructions and letters of credence and procuration. But the book also has useful sections on such central issues as the terminology of the sources, diplomatic protocol and etiquette, the languages deployed, and the logistics of diplomacy (travel, safe-passage). What makes its use somewhat cumbersome, however, is the abundance of lengthy footnotes citing additional material that has not found its way into the main text. The reader may be forgiven for wondering why Chaplais, whose mastery of his subject is never in doubt, uses a technique of accumulating evidence which adds no weight to the argument but seems to be informed solely by an ambition to make use of every last relevant document. The typesetting of this volume commenced in the mid-1980s and was not completed until December 1992; its text then remained unchanged until it was published eleven years later. This explains why the more recent research on Anglo–continental diplomatic relations is not taken into account: indeed, the main charge that could be levelled against this immensely erudite work is that there is something oddly self-referential and dated about it. As becomes evident in his meagre discussion of the significance of

diplomatic gift-giving, Chaplais' 'static', text-centred approach, which pays special attention to the features and functions of diplomatic documents, is out of touch with current historiographical trends in continental Europe.

III

Developments on the Continent have been comparatively more dynamic over the last twenty years. The triumph of social and cultural history did not lead to the complete decline of historical research on medieval diplomacy; on the contrary, it has resulted in a re-invigoration and methodological renewal of this approach. The fundamental conceptual work done by Dieter Berg[12] has laid to rest any doubts as to the existence of relations between the princely realms of western and central Europe, which were more or less clearly demarcated and regarded each other as 'foreign'. It has been generally accepted that the concepts and terminology of the modern system of nation-states cannot simply be transferred to the Middle Ages. Thus foreign policy and diplomacy have become firmly established as themes *sui generis* in continental medieval studies. Building on Ganshof's, Mattingly's, Queller's, and Chaplais' general findings, a younger generation of scholars has produced a number of individual case studies since the early 1990s.

Major conferences held in Berlin in 1999 and near Constance in 2001 aimed to 'take stock' and stimulate further research. Many of the scholars who have contributed to recent developments in the field of medieval foreign policy took part in the Franco–German symposium on 'Foreign Policy and International Relations in the Middle Ages (13th to 16th Centuries)', held in Berlin in March 1999. The main questions addressed there, reflected in the seventeen contributions to the conference volume edited by Dieter Berg, Martin Kintzinger, and Pierre Monnet, related to the central aspects of what is today classed as foreign policy and international relations. How did these contacts take place within the *Res publica christiana* of the high and late Middle Ages? How can they be described adequately from our present-day

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[12] Dieter Berg, *England und der Kontinent: Studien zur auswärtigen Politik der anglonormannischen Könige im 11. und 12. Jahrhundert* (Bochum, 1987), pp. 1–5; and id., *Deutschland und seine Nachbarn, 1200–1500*, Enzyklopädie deutscher Geschichte, 40 (Munich, 1997), pp. 1–4, 47–8.

perspective? And how were they perceived by contemporary observers? The essays by Françoise Autrand and Peter Moraw, providing fundamental reflections on the basic structures and the analysis of French and German foreign policy in the Middle Ages, introduce the reader to the topic. Wolfgang Georgi provides similar reflections for central and western Europe in the period before 1200, and in particular, for the Carolingian Empire. Bilateral relations between individual *regna* are the subject of essays by Klaus van Eickels, Martin Kintzinger, and Arnd Reitemeier, focusing on Germany and France, or Germany and England. Pierre Monnet looks at the foreign policy of communes, while Reinhardt Butz and Heinz-Dieter Heimann examine that of the territories. The protagonists of all three essays, therefore, are, without exception, political units within the Holy Roman Empire. Contributions by Bertrand Schnerb, Petra Ehm, Françoise Autrand, Nikolaus Jaspert, Raphaela Averkorn, and Jean-Marie Maillefer investigate the significance and form of the foreign policy of territories in Europe's major geo-political areas (France, Burgundy, the Empire, the Iberian peninsula, and Scandinavia). Thereafter Sabine Wefers and Ralf Mitsch analyse contemporary and modern views and interpretations of foreign policy.

The order of the essays is intended to allow comparisons to be drawn within each of the three sections, as well as between them. The intention is to compare and contrast kingdoms, territories, communes, and regions. While this works, it would have been helpful to have a conclusion relating the extremely disparate individual contributions back to the questions posed at the outset. This might have been more useful than the three introductions with which the volume begins.

The papers given at the spring conference of the Constance workshop on medieval history, held from 3 to 6 April 2001, and published in revised form in the collection of essays edited by Rainer C. Schwinges and Klaus Wriedt, *Gesandtschafts- und Botenwesen im spätmittelalterlichen Europa*, provide an ideal supplement to the publication by Berg, Kintzinger, and Monnet. They ask first about the wider framework within which the late medieval diplomatic and messenger system functioned, and secondly, they illustrate contemporary diplomatic practice in a series of case studies. Thus the level of methodological and conceptual reflection about foreign relations in the Middle Ages is left behind in order to ask about the everyday organization of these particular contacts. Two systematic investiga-

tions, those by Thomas Haye and Martin Kintzinger, take a diachronic perspective on the basic problem of diplomatic communication, that is, the Latin language as its medium, and safe-conduct (*salvus conductus*) as its precondition. The rest of the eight essays are case studies, spanning a period from the late twelfth to the early sixteenth century. As in the volume edited by Berg, Kintzinger, and Monnet, a large number of actors appear here: monarchies, republics, leagues, and cities. Werner Maleczek writes about the system of papal legates, taking examples from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Klaus Peter Matschke examines Byzantine diplomacy *vis-à-vis* the west on the eve of the fall of Constantinople. Arnd Reitemeier analyses individual examples drawn from relations between England, the Hanse, and France in the early fifteenth century. Thomas Riis reconstructs the development of the system of embassies in northern Europe in the Middle Ages from its earliest manifestation in the form of personal encounters to representation by delegations and the co-existence of mixed forms at the end of the period of investigation. Christina Lutter examines the structures of communication between Emperor Maximilian I and the Venetian Republic. Andreas Würgler looks at the diplomatic activities which unfolded at and around the *Tagsatzungen* (that is, the central leadership organ) of the Swiss confederation. Taking the example of the Bernese messenger service, Klara Hübner reveals one of the fundamental elements of the infrastructure upon which every diplomatic activity depended. Finally, Paul-Joachim Heinig investigates the position of the Roman–German ruling court in the European system of embassies.

Conference participants and contributors to the volume were given four points on which to concentrate (diplomatic staff, locations, languages, and formalities and ceremonial). This ensures that the volume consists of more than the more or less arbitrary juxtaposition of individual cases. Rather, it provides a wide-ranging, typological-comparative overview of the diverse diplomatic practices which the European powers used at the end of the Middle Ages.

IV

The wars conducted by the last of the Burgundian dukes, Charles the Bold (1465–77), have often been researched by historians, unlike the principles of his Imperial policy, or the activities of his diplomatic representatives to which it gave rise. The published version of Petra

Ehm's doctoral dissertation, which came out in 2002, combines an exhaustive account of Burgundian policy towards the Holy Roman Emperor under Charles's rule with a precise analysis of the staff and structures upon which it was predicated. She borrows from each of the three fields of research, or research approaches, described above: first, research on foreign relations as such; secondly, the technical aspects of diplomatic communication in the older tradition represented by Donald E. Queller or Pierre Chaplais; and third, the incorporation of social and cultural history approaches into this specific question.

In the first part of her study, structured by chronology and region, Ehms recapitulates the relations that were maintained with selected Imperial princes and Imperial Estates. She pays special attention to the ambassadors exchanged between Burgundy and the Holy Roman Empire, and to the overriding aims which Charles was pursuing through his contacts with the east. Thus she traces the establishment of a system of eastern alliances, which was intended to support the struggle against the French crown which was being conducted in the west, and to serve as the starting point for expansion within the Empire. In the second part of her study, Ehms looks at the preconditions for diplomatic relations with the Empire, considering both staffing issues and material conditions. Charles the Bold was unable to achieve his foreign policy goals (to impose his sovereignty, to secede from France, and to be crowned Emperor, or at least King) *vis-à-vis* the Empire and its parts, and Ehm seeks the reasons for this failure in the organization and methods of Burgundian diplomacy. This involves, first, both a detailed prosopographical investigation of envoys (social and geographical origins, education, career at court, diplomatic experience) and an analysis of the composition and size of the embassies in the Empire. The process of foreign policy decision-making is examined in connection with the parties which had formed at the Burgundian court with respect to Imperial policy. And secondly, the ceremonial value which Duke Charles assigned to the Imperial princes and the Emperor is measured by examining the gifts exchanged in the course of diplomatic relations with the Empire. The nature and extent of the gift-exchange with the Imperial princes and their envoys are rightly seen as indicators of the intensity with which Charles engaged with political and constitutional conditions in the Empire. As in the prosopographical section, an extremely useful

comparison is here also made with corresponding practices in relation to the courts of Italy, France, and England.

On the basis of these observations and the findings of the first part which concentrate on the course of events, the author makes a judgement as to whether the Burgundian ruler and his advisers were capable of familiarizing themselves with the specific rules and room for manœuvre governing action within the Empire in order to use these to help them realize their aims. Of great significance for success or failure on this point, and for the shape of diplomatic practice, was how the Burgundian court and the duke himself responded to the Empire, the princes, and the Emperor. On the basis of personal statements by Charles himself and the court chronicler's observations, Ehm can demonstrate that a general contempt was characteristic. These statements concerning the duke's perception of his eastern neighbours make it possible to classify and clarify a striking inconsistency in his Imperial policy. Although Charles repeatedly announced his desire to be crowned King and Emperor, the size and staff of the embassies he maintained in the Empire and his gift-giving policy towards the Imperial princes did not reflect this aim. On both points, the Burgundian duke exercised a restraint which contrasted strongly with his practice towards England, France, and the Italian powers, and can be seen as the outward expression of this contempt. A different attitude, Ehm concludes, could have allowed the duke and his advisers to make better use of the court's knowledge of the Empire and thus to avoid some of the structural failings that ultimately contributed to the failure of his eastern policy.

At least as far as the Burgundian side is concerned, the archives contain a wealth of unpublished material. Thus Ehm is able to build upon a broad source basis, and the result is an excellent, thoughtful study, whose value could, of course, have been enhanced even further by the addition of maps, illustrations, and an appendix. The fact that the aims, course, and instruments of Burgundian policy *vis-à-vis* the Empire are treated exhaustively not just for their own sake deserves special mention. Because these elements are integrated into a much wider context of function and meaning, their relations to each other emerge clearly.

V

The works by Pierre Chaplais and Petra Ehm illustrate impressively how productive the topics of medieval foreign policy and diplomacy can be where the source basis is favourable. Yet the two conference volumes in particular make clear that so far, progress has been uneven. Research is still presented overwhelmingly in the form of essays, and not all the participants in the intra-European diplomatic discourse by far have been taken into account. The north and the east, in particular, appear to be under-represented. Similarly, it is high time for the sporadic diplomatic contacts that existed with the non-Christian world to be investigated more closely. Only when the number of studies on bilateral relations has reached a critical mass will it be possible to pool the results and undertake systematic comparisons. The logical next step would be to investigate multilateral relations. However, the general lack of theoretical concepts for the analysis of foreign relations and the factors that determine them continues to present an unmistakable obstacle to research.[13]

Thus while research in this field is no longer in its infancy, its full potential has by no means yet been exhausted. Significant progress seems to be possible in dialogue with political science, and, in particular, with the discipline of international relations, which is expanding in the Anglo–American area. Of course, the different nature of the medieval world of states must always be respected, and terminological clarity must be maintained. Once these 'rules of engagement' have been established, there is no lack of points of contact, or opportunities for co-operation. A number of scholars of international relations are critical of any attempt to restrict the concept of diplomacy to specific (modern) practices and specific (state) actors. Instead, they understand it in terms of generic concepts such as 'mediation', 'representation', and 'communication'.[14] Diplomacy, in this interpretation, 'expresses a human condition that precedes and transcends the experience of living in the sovereign, territorial state of the past few hundred years'.[15] It may, indeed, exist wherever identity has bound-

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[13] Cf. Berg, *Deutschland und seine Nachbarn*, pp. 3–4, 49.

[14] See e.g. Der Derian, *On Diplomacy*, and Paul Sharp, 'For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations', *International Studies Review,* 1 (1999), pp. 33–57.

[15] Ibid. p. 51.

aries and those boundaries are crossed.[16] And perhaps, in the course of this continuous opening up of the discipline, it will be possible to engage in a dialogue those modern historians who have become accustomed to seeing the history of diplomacy in the Middle Ages as merely a transitional phase leading to modernity. After all, it could be said that the conditions and techniques of foreign policy in the European Middle Ages and the globalized world of the twenty-first century have more in common than we might think.[17]

[16] Costas M. Constantinou, *On the Way to Diplomacy* (Minneapolis, Minn., 1996), p. 113.

[17] See Karsten Plöger, *England and the Avignon Popes: The Practice of Diplomacy in Late Medieval Europe* (London, 2005), pp. 231–2.

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PALIMPSESTS OF MEMORY

Kay Schiller

GAVRIEL D. ROSENFELD, *Munich and Memory: Architecture, Monuments, and the Legacy of the Third Reich*, Weimar and Now: German Cultural Criticism, 22 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), xxiii + 433 pp. ISBN 0 520 21910 4. $50.00. £32.95
HAROLD MARCUSE, *Legacies of Dachau: The Uses and Abuses of a Concentration Camp, 1933–2001* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), xxii + 590 pp. ISBN 0 521 55204 4. £27.95 $35.00
PAUL BETTS, *The Authority of Everyday Objects: A Cultural History of West German Industrial Design*, Weimar and Now: German Cultural Criticism, 34 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), xiii + 348 pp. ISBN 0 520 24004 9. $50.00. £32.50

Memory studies have enjoyed a boom in German historiography over the past fifteen years or so. This has been largely due to a shift in interest brought about by the onset of a new period in German history beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall, which coincided with the rise of cultural history as the leading approach in Anglo–American historical scholarship on Germany and in Germany itself. Not surprisingly, the resulting end of the Cold War division of the two German states lent itself to the emergence of a set of new questions, most prominently with regard to the twelve years from 1933 to 1945 as the central epoch of twentieth-century German history. While the collapse of the Cold War order did not stop historians from continuing to pursue the historical analysis of every imaginable facet of the Nazi regime, a new trend which looks at its afterlife in the Federal Republic and the GDR has come to prominence alongside the once dominant search for the answer to the question of why things went so terribly awry. As Alon Confino observed in a recent article: 'We are now much more interested in the consequences than in the origins of National Socialism in East and West Germany and in their links to Nazi society, politics, economy and culture.'[1]

[1] Alon Confino, 'Telling about Germany: Narratives of Memory and Culture', *Journal of Modern History*, 76 (2004), pp. 389–416, at 389.

That the interest of exponents of what has lately become the dominant trend in contemporary German history, that is, cultural history, in the post-1945 offshoots of the regime should in one way or another be connected to the question of memory, in particular, to that of the war and the Holocaust, again is not surprising. This is primarily the result of the growth of memory culture both in Germany and abroad, as evidenced in the proliferation, since the 1990s, of local, regional, and national memorials and commemorative ceremonies as reminders of the victims of Nazi aggression. This trend culminated and, some have argued, may now have come to a conclusion in the recent opening of Peter Eisenman's Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin.[2]

Common to the titles under review here is that, in one way or another, they deal with culture, including everyday and material culture, and its relationship to the memory of Nazism in the post-war era. One example of a cultural history which centres on this memory in relation to the built environment is Gavriel D. Rosenfeld's *Munich and Memory*. Rosenfeld's comprehensive study of more than 225 of Munich's 'culturally significant' buildings and monuments reconstructed or erected since 1945 succeeds very well in explaining how the rebuilding of the erstwhile 'capital of the movement' for the first three decades after the war was predominantly, yet not exclusively, informed by attempts to make that heritage forgotten. Bavaria's capital, which had suffered heavy bomb-damage, was reconstructed either following 'traditional', that is, mostly older historicist or neo-classicist models (1945 to 1958), or by employing modernist architectural language (1958 to 1975). Only in a third postmodernist phase since the mid-1970s can one discover more than the occasional example of what the author considers to be the only appropriate form of urban reconstruction after the destruction brought about by the regime, that is, a 'critical preservationist' architecture. The latter is characterized by a desire for active engagement with the past through the preservation of its memory by the erection of a number of important memorials for the victims of Nazi racist policies.

During a process which Rosenfeld labels 'normalization', begun by the US occupation authorities but quickly adopted by Munich and

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[2] Cf., e.g., 'Gebirge an Schuld', Spiegel-Gespräch mit Norbert Frei, *Spiegel Special,* 4 (2005): *Die Deutschen 60 Jahre nach dem Kriegsende*, pp. 46–9, at 49.

Bavarian officials, Nazi architecture left intact by the war was either demolished altogether or stripped of the most overt emblems of the regime and given a new purpose. A good example of demolition and normalization is provided by the ideologically important party and state buildings erected between 1933 and 1937 on and near the Königsplatz. Along with the Feldherrenhalle, they were of prime importance for Nazi self-representation. The square itself had originally been a gem of nineteenth-century classicism, created by, among others, Leo von Klenze during the rule of Hellenophile King Ludwig I to celebrate the close relationship between Bavaria and Greece. Under the Nazi regime the architecture of this ensemble was altered in a number of ways to inject a sense of Nazi might and power into domestic and foreign audiences—with varying success. Among other changes its grassy mounds were paved over with granite slabs, which led to it being ironically called the 'flagstone sea' (*Plattensee*) in local parlance. The most prominent Nazi additions to the square were the twin Temples of Honour as crypts where the sixteen 'martyrs' of the 1923 beerhall putsch attempt were reburied and publicly honoured with resurrectionist rituals. Further additions were the monumental neo-classical Führerbau, during 1938 the location of one of Hitler's major pre-war foreign policy successes (the signing of the Munich Agreement), and the NSDAP Administration Building.

Protected by camouflage netting, these buildings, along with Hitler's House of German Art, survived the Allied bombing raids completely intact, which meant that after 1945 discussions began on what to do with them. The temples were eventually almost completely erased in compliance with a direct order from Eisenhower, the implementation of which, however, was delayed by almost two years of deliberations about whether an alternative use for them was feasible. The twin party buildings in turn were 'normalized' by converting them into the city's music academy and a research institute for art history. As Rosenfeld sums up: 'At the Königsplatz, two different strategies of forgetting competed with one another: normalization and demolition. Although both strategies shared the same aim, normalization banished memory more effectively' (p. 91). The 'traditionalists' dominated the attempt at collective forgetting in the urban environment until the late 1950s. They by and large successfully defended their aesthetic preferences against modernist inroads by asserting that Nazism itself was a product of modernity. In doing

so they did not even have to acknowledge that the neo-classicism they advocated was itself an architectural style very dear to Hitler.

Things changed when the economic miracle had its full impact on a rapidly expanding city—Munich's population crossed the one million threshold in 1957—and a new cityscape of commercial and civic projects emerged. This is when modernism came to the fore and a larger number of innovative buildings were constructed. Examples are high-rises such as Franz Hart's Federal Patent Office of 1959 and the Hertie department store at Münchner Freiheit designed by the latter and Rolf Schütze in 1964. In Munich, like everywhere else in the West during the 1960s, 'modernism [became] identified as the architecture of democracy' (p. 153), a process which culminated in the famous Behnisch and Partners designs for the Munich Olympic Games of 1972. In order to create an impression of openness and transparency, the stadium and the other venues relied on light materials such as glass and steel. They, along with Otl Aicher's designs, realized Willy Brandt's exhortation to use the Games as an 'opportunity to show the modern [that is, a democratic] Germany to the world' in the built environment.[3]

But, supposedly, Germany was not a country like any other, and Munich was not an ordinary city. It is arguable whether Rosenfeld's judgement is adequate when he points out that because modernism in architecture was virtually unchallenged during these years, like traditionalism, it contributed to a forgetting of the past, 'as memory wanes through consensus and is preserved through contestation' (p. 152). The reader detects an underlying accusation, as if the forgetting of the Nazi past were at the heart of the West German incarnation of the modernist project.

Rosenfeld is certainly justified in his condemnation of efforts to forget when it comes to 'normalization', to the post-war structures of turncoat Nazi architects who continued to build as though nothing had happened. He is also spot-on when analysing some of the buildings of postmodernists, such as Alexander von Branca's Neue Pinakothek of 1981, for example, which in the spirit of Helmut Kohl's 'blessing of a late birth' (*Gnade der späten Geburt*) was explicitly meant 'to normalize German architecture by rehabilitating traditional building forms and aesthetic approaches stigmatized by their use in the

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[3] Deutscher Bundestag, 6. Wahlperiode, 5. Sitzung, 28 Oct. 1968, p. 30.

Third Reich' (p. 244–5). Moreover, he shows convincingly that even where monuments and commemorative sites were created until the mid-1970s, including the re-naming of streets and squares, the majority were devoted to politically convenient, that is, conservative and Catholic resistance figures, rather than to other victims of the regime. Examples of this are the prominent after-lives of Jesuit priests Alfred Delp and Rupert Mayer and of the middle-class Scholl siblings of the resistance group White Rose in the urban environment, whereas the courageous deeds of working-class outsiders such as Georg Elser, whose bomb in the Bürgerbräukeller on 8 November 1939 failed to kill Hitler by a whisker, were excluded from public commemoration.[4] This certainly made it easier to forget the city's complicity with the Nazis.

However, as far as modernism is concerned, Rosenfeld's normative stance on what ought to have happened sometimes does not allow a differentiated picture to emerge. After all, it could be argued that individuals' motives matter as much as the outcome of their actions. The intention of architects such as Günther Behnisch (born 1924), Herbert Groethuysen (1921), and Werner Wirsing (1919), for example, was not to overcome the legacy of the past by simply erasing its memory, but to create a better Germany by re-connecting its architecture to international trends which in many respects had originated in the Bauhaus and its predecessor, the Werkbund. They belonged to a political generation which had experienced Nazism as youngsters or young adults and were able to reach positions of influence in their profession in terms of being entrusted with important commissions for representative state buildings only in the 1960s.

It is telling in this respect that Rosenfeld does not deal with the built environment in a broader sense. This would have included housing, that is, both individual homes and larger housing and apartment complexes, such as Wirsing and Günther Eckert's Wohnheimsiedlung am Maßmannplatz (1954–7) for young people of all social backgrounds. This housing complex was intended to help overcome the acute housing shortage after the war and to aid in the

[4] Elser's assassination attempt on Hitler, for which he was executed in Dachau less than a month before the end of the war, was eventually acknowledged in 1997 by the naming of a square in his honour in Türkenstraße, in the Munich quarter of Schwabing. Cf. Rosenfeld, *Munich and Memory*, p. 289.

creation of a democratic society by means of architecture which took its lead from the Werkbund's 1927 Stuttgart Weissenhofsiedlung.[5] Such attempts to purge the Nazi spirit must not be confounded with an intentional forgetting of the crimes committed by those who espoused it.

At the same time, Rosenfeld is certainly correct in his basic contention that although all West Germany's post-war re-building efforts took Nazi architecture as their negative point of reference, honest attempts at 'coming to terms with the past' (*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*) by way of 'critical preservation' were few and far between until the mid-1970s.[6] One such example from the 1950s, which is visible to the present day but came about more by accident than design, is Hans Döllgast's restoration of the façade of the Alte Pinakothek which left the memory of wartime destruction intact by employing relatively simple architectural means. Another was the ruin of the Armeemuseum, which was left completely untouched until its conversion into the seat of the Bavarian minister president in the early 1990s—a recent attempt to 'normalize' the past, instigated by a Conservative regional Bavarian government and executed under the aesthetic premisses of postmodernism.

In its focus on the interplay between memory on the one hand and actual buildings as well as architectural and public discourse about the urban environment on the other, Rosenfeld's study is part of what Alon Confino and Peter Fritzsche in a valuable volume of collected essays term the 'second generation of memory studies', which seek to 'analyze memory embedded in social networks, and as a commingling of immaterial and material interests and motivations'.[7] In

[5] See the statements by Groethuysen and Wirsing in 'Architekten über den Wiederaufbau', in Winfried Nerdinger and Inez Florschütz (eds.), *Architektur der Wunderkinder: Aufbruch und Verdrängung in Bayern 1945–1960* (Salzburg, 2005), pp. 76–80, and Winfried Nerdinger, 'Frei Otto: Arbeit für eine bessere "Menschenerde",' in id. (ed.), *Frei Otto: Das Gesamtwerk. Leicht bauen. Natürlich gestalten* (Basle, 2005), pp. 9–15, at 9–11.

[6] See also Winfried Nerdinger, 'Aufbrüche und Kontinuitäten—Positionen der Nachkriegsarchitektur in der Bundesrepublik', in Nerdinger and Florschütz (eds.), *Architektur der Wunderkinder*, pp. 9–22, at 18.

[7] Alon Confino and Peter Fritzsche, 'Introduction: Noises of the Past', in eid. (eds.), *The Work of Memory: New Directions in the Study of German Society and Culture* (Urbana, Ill., 2002), pp. 1–21, at 4–5.

Confino and Fritzsche's collection this applies, among others, to Andrew Bergerson's essay on Hildesheim and its citizens' dogged yet futile attempts to protect the local past against the intrusion of the memory of a supposedly external Nazi experience, and Jonathan Wiesen's account of 1950s West German PR as a site of 'false memory' production. The same recognition that public memory is never static but subject to frequent change and revision because it is influenced by the differing interests of social actors in time also informs Herbert Marcuse's *Legacies of Dachau*.

Marcuse's study looks at the changing post-war fortunes of the first concentration camp, some thirty kilometres north of Munich, from which the Nazi camp system originated after 1933. Like Rosenfeld's book, *Legacies of Dachau* focuses on the interaction between memory and the built environment, but much more directly, as the former camp site at Dachau is a *lieu de memoire par excellence* for Nazi crimes. This is true to the extent that the proximity of the camp—if not the 1,200-year-old municipality a few kilometres from the camp which, to the present day bears, the stigma of being associated with the crimes of Nazism—conveniently helped Munich to forget its legacy as 'capital of the movement'. It is telling that in the post-war period Dachau never succeeded in finding a European 'sister' municipality (p. 332), whereas Munich is twinned with Edinburgh, Bordeaux, and Verona, among other cities.

Like Rosenfeld, Marcuse tells the story of a desire for self-exculpation on the part of the residents not only of Dachau, but also of Bavaria and West Germany as a whole, for much of the first decade and a half after the war. In fact, this is as much a book about coping with the past in Dachau as about the 'politics of the past' (*Vergangenheitspolitik*) in the Federal Republic in general. This often leads the author away from his micro-study to undertake extensive forays into West German post-war history, which makes the book occasionally repetitive and not always a pleasure to read.

For Marcuse, the failure to acknowledge responsibility initially manifested itself in the development of a tri-partite myth which prioritized the 'victimization' of Germans over the victims of Germans, claimed the 'innocence' of 'ordinary Germans' for most of what had happened, and even pretended that most Germans had offered some form of passive 'resistance' to the Nazi regime (p. 12). In so doing, Marcuse confirms Robert Moeller's findings as well as those of

German scholars like Helmut Dubiel, Norbert Frei, Bernd Weisbrod, and others.[8] In *War Stories* Moeller stresses the discrepancy between a pervasive forgetfulness regarding the millions of victims of Nazism and a remarkable amount of remembering of the victimization of the former *Volksgemeinschaft* during the 1950s, in short, the mnemonic practice of 'selective remembering' prevalent among the German population.[9]

However, like Rosenfeld, Marcuse extends his story well into the present. This means that he includes recent shifts in the politics of memory which effectively demonstrate Germany's progress in coping with the past, a development from 'reflex to reflection' (p. 402). He divides the post-war history of the former concentration camp into five phases: 1945 to 1948, when it served as a US internment camp for Nazi criminals and German POWs; 1948 to the early 1960s, when its barracks provided housing for ethnic German refugees and expellees from Eastern Europe; 1962 to 1965, when parts of the remnants of the camp were turned into a memorial site; 1965 to 1998, when, with increasing numbers of visitors, the KZ-Gedenkstätte became a major tourist attraction; and, finally, the last few years during which the memorial site has undergone a number of renovations to recreate ignored and long-destroyed aspects and parts of its history and architecture, such as the *Bunker*, a prison within the prison and the SS and Gestapo's torture chamber. This process, which was completed in May 2003, turned the memorial site into an effective educational institution, which also has a good website in German and English. Anyone who plans to visit Dachau should consult it along with Marcuse's book.[10]

Marcuse's book comprehensively documents the tug-of-war between the interests of local and regional authorities, which wanted to demolish the concentration camp, and those of the Comité International de Dachau (CID), the main survivors' organization, which aimed to preserve as much of it as possible. In fact, today's memorial site contains only a fraction of what once belonged to the

[8] See my Review Article, 'The Presence of the Nazi Past in the Early Decades of the Bonn Republic', *Journal of Contemporary History,* 39 (2004), pp. 285–94.
[9] See Robert G. Moeller, *War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley, Calif., 2001).
[10] See http://www.kz-gedenkstaette-dachau.de/

camp, and were it not for the initiatives of individual former prisoners like the Dominican Friar Leonard Roth and the CSU politician Josef Müller, nothing of its architecture might have survived at all (pp. 145, 246–7, 249–50).

A plan which includes the original features of the camp, destroyed and rebuilt buildings, and post-war additions reads like a palimpsest of memory. Dachau, of course, is not the only camp which today looks nothing like it did when it was operational. However, while survivors' groups in principle agreed on the necessity of commemoration, the different experiences of those imprisoned there, from so-called 'asocials' to Jews, from Polish Catholic priests to German members of the Protestant Confesing Church, from homosexuals to prominent political figures from all over Europe, to name just a few of the victimized groups, led to difficult conflicts over the status of each group's victimization and, accordingly, the appropriate forms of commemoration. This is why, along with an International Memorial (completed 1968), we find a Catholic church (1960), a Carmelite convent (1964), a Protestant church (1967), a Jewish memorial (1967), and, since 1994, after much resistance from the CID, a plaque commemorating the suffering of gays (pp. 354–5) in or near the grounds of the former concentration camp.

A particular strength of Marcuse's book is that he connects the history of German collective remembering to a theory of political generations. While the latter is introduced rather late in the book, and one might not agree with Marcuse's cut-off dates which separate the generations from each other (pp. 292–3), he uses this analytical tool to great effect to demonstrate shifts in the German culture of memory. Not surprisingly, Marcuse is particularly scathing when he refers to those generational cohorts that provided the functional élites of both the Nazi regime and, after the amnesties of the 1950s, the reconstruction period.[11] For obvious reasons, many of those in positions of responsibility, who had been born between 1903 and 1925, that is, members of the 'generation of perpetrators', embraced the myths of victimization, innocence, and resistance, and did their best to block honest attempts to come to terms with the past.

[11] On the re-integration of these élites into West German society see Norbert Frei, *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration* (New York, 2002) and the essays in id. (ed.), *Karrieren im Zwielicht: Hitlers Eliten nach 1945* (Frankfurt, 2001).

But Marcuse also criticizes the '1968ers'. To be sure, he acknowledges that in the longer term members of this generation reinforced the critical engagement with the Nazi past which, since the late 1950s, had slowly replaced the previous 'selective remembering' for most Germans. However, despite often heard and self-important declarations to the contrary, that shift was not begun by the generation of the student activists. Rather, it can be explained by the impact of a combination of international and domestic factors before they entered upon the scene. To name just a few: the Jerusalem Eichmann trial and the trial of Auschwitz personnel in Frankfurt; the German release of films such as Alain Resnais' *Night and Fog* (1956); and the publication of powerful books about the past, most prominently the paperback edition of Anne Frank's diary (1955).[12]

Intellectually and morally this more honest appraisal of the past was carried by the predecessors of the '1968ers', the so-called 'sceptical generation' (Helmut Schelsky) or '1945ers' (A. Dirk Moses), former members of the Hitler Youth, *Flakhelfer*, and young draftee soldiers who, after the war, felt utterly betrayed by the Nazi regime and during the 1950s slowly moved into positions of influence in German society. Without them a KZ-Gedenkstätte Dachau may have never materialized, even if they may rightly be criticized for establishing a 'clean' version of the camp which could not be further from the 'dirty' reality of the 1930s and 1940s (pp. 249–51).

The moral rigidity and self-righteousness of the 1968ers, in turn, which informed their 'symbolic civil war' against their parents' unwillingness to face up to the hard facts of their involvement in, or support of, the regime, 'reflected rather than solved West Germany's problems with the Nazi past' (A. D. Moses, quoted on p. 299). Marcuse gives powerful examples of the resulting misunderstandings on the part of anti-establishment activists of this generation. Their unhistorical critique of the relationship between capitalism and fascism led them to brandish facile analogies between the present and the Nazi period, comparing, for example, US military tactics in

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[12] See also Detlef Siegfried, 'Zwischen Aufarbeitung und Schlußstrich: Der Umgang mit der NS-Vergangenheit in den beiden deutschen Staaten, 1958–1969', in Axel Schildt, Detlef Siegfried, and Karl Christian Lammers (eds.), *Dynamische Zeiten: Die 60er Jahre in den beiden deutschen Gesellschaften* (Hamburg, 2000), pp. 114–47.

Vietnam with Nazi genocidal methods (p. 313), or their own situation in the Federal Republic with that of the Jews in Nazi Germany (p. 300).

But this failure of understanding could also be found on the side of the former victims. On the occasion of a demonstration against the military-style dedication ceremony for the international memorial in September 1968, French and Belgian CID members initially responded to young activists with the exclamation: 'C'est les fascistes!' (p. 322). As Marcuse stresses, this reaction was symptomatic not only of the survivors, but also of the German 1945ers. The perception of the present on both sides of the generational divide in West Germany was shaped by historical memory, however distorted. Terrorism, then, was the most extreme form of a misguided rebellion against the legacy of the past. It simply meant carrying to extremes the 'accusing anger of children against the guilty silence of parents'.[13]

Marcuse does not fail to remind the reader that in some extreme cases this rebellion was informed by a hefty dose of anti-Semitism, for example, when Ulrike Meinhof justified PLO terrorism by calling the murdered Israelis at the Munich Olympics 'Zionist soldiers masquerading as athletes' (p. 318). Meinhof was not alone. As early as 1967 many West German students shifted their sympathies to the subjugated Palestinians forced to live under Israeli occupation when Israel emerged victorious from the Six Day War. Some, as has recently been shown convincingly, did not even shy away from terrorist attacks on Jewish targets in the Federal Republic in the aftermath.[14]

The idea that historical memory not only reflects the social world but also shapes it in often unexpected and surprising ways is also an underlying theme of Paul Betts's recent book, *The Authority of Everyday Objects*. Betts has written a cultural history of West German industrial design, which explores the uses and abuses of modernist aesthetics in the political and social spheres of post-war West Germany. The focus here is not on the architecture of public buildings or commemorative sites, but primarily on everyday household commodities such as lamps and furniture, crockery and glassware, as

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[13] Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (Oxford, 2002), p. 418.

[14] See Wolfgang Kraushaar, *Die Bombe im jüdischen Gemeindehaus* (Hamburg, 2005).

well as consumer electronics, and their relationship to history, memory, and national identity in 1950s West Germany.

For Betts, design rather than architecture and other more traditional branches of culture became the 'prime sphere of mythmaking, identity formation and cultural anxiety' during a period of 'nervous negotiation of past and present' (pp. 3–4). He identifies a number of reasons for this. Firstly, as in the other post-fascist nations, Japan and Italy, in the Federal Republic design culture aided in the establishment of the country's reputation as a 'vibrant centre of industrial modernism' (p. 3). This was a factor of major importance both for the export-led 'economic miracle' of the 1950s and 1960s, and as diplomatic currency in the uphill struggle to rebuild the country's reputation abroad, of which politicians like Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard were all too aware.

Secondly, modern design objects, such as Hans Gugelot's and Dieter Rams's Braun SK-4 1956 phonograph, 'Snow White's coffin', for example, although beyond the means of the average West German consumer, possessed 'the magical power to manufacture fetching images of future prosperity' (p. 69). In short, they held out the promise of good times to come. Despite the fact that this pledge had already been an integral part of Nazi techno-culture, as exemplified, among other things, in the streamlining of Ferdinand Porsche's Volkswagen design, after 1945 it lost nothing of its power to convince and bind citizens to the new state.[15] This was particularly true of the design of domestic interiors and consumer appliances, as the Bonn Republic's legitimacy was based on the idealization of the private and mundane rather than the public and spectacular. Accordingly, Marcel Breuer steel tube chairs, Bosch refrigerators, and Braun stereos became 'ciphers of hope, longing and normality' (p. 7).

Finally, as Betts shows very convincingly, West German design culture in the 1950s was informed by an aesthetic idealism which was intended to re-invent consumer durables as distinctive cultural goods and rid them of their contamination by National Socialism. This is to say, Betts demonstrates, that German industrial design did not change significantly from the products of the Bauhaus to Albert Speer's Beauty of Labour Bureau, to those advocated and developed

[15] See also Peter Fritzsche, 'Nazi Modern', *Modernity/Modernism,* 3/1 (1996), pp. 1–21.

after the war by the Werkbund, the German Design Council (found-
ed in 1951), and the Ulm Hochschule für Gestaltung. Yet the cultural
meanings attached to the styling of commodities did change dramat-
ically.

As a matter of course these cultural institutions and interest
groups shared a basic belief in anti-fascism and anti-Communism, as
well as the conviction that design should serve the nation's regener-
ation through some kind of humanist morality. Regarding American-
ization, however, the most powerful force in popular culture after the
war, opinions varied. Attitudes ranged from an outright rejection of
many US models of modernity in Werkbund circles, which included
the above-mentioned architect Werner Wirsing—the streamlined
styling of 'Detroit Baroque', for example, was associated with crass
commercialism and thus abhorred as much as the Gelsenkirchen
variety (pp. 87, 93–4)—to the admiration of Otl Aicher, the Ulm
Institute's founding father, for Charles Eames's chairs.

Members of the Ulm Institute of Design like Aicher's wife, Inge,
the surviving sister of the Scholl twins and co-founder of the insti-
tute, in turn, were adamantly opposed to the 1950s *Nierentisch* style
for home furnishings, which had originated in the design divisions of
department stores rather than in high-brow design schools. For
Scholl, this style, named after the ample use of organic, including
kidney, shapes, was a repackaged version of the *Gründerzeit* kitsch of
the late nineteenth century, purely decorative, without any deeper
meaning, except for its function of legitimizing the materialism of the
newly rich of the economic miracle years. Nierentisch styling was
diametrically opposed to the Ulm Institute's critical ethos and
attempt 'to forge a new progressive industrial culture' (p. 129) from
the rubble of National Socialism.

Founded by Aicher and Scholl and other '1945ers' in memory of
her murdered siblings, the Hochschule für Gestaltung Ulm (1955–68)
was the last incarnation of the Bauhaus dream of design as radical
reform.[16] Like its predecessor, the Ulm Institute was 'infused with a
grand vision of social reform, based on the reconciliation of art and
life, morality and material culture' (p. 151). In terms of an overarch-

[16] For a comprehensive history of the Ulm Institute see René Spitz, *hfg ulm:
The View Behind the Foreground: The Political History of the Ulm School of Design
1953–1968* (Stuttgart, 2002).

ing vision for post-war architecture, photography, and design products, the aesthetics developed at Ulm were intended to negate what its founders 'viewed as the Nazi legacy of emotional manipulation and irrationalism' (p. 145). This was based on their idealist belief in the educational powers of reason and rationality, as expressed in a purely functionalist—as opposed to monumentalizing—aesthetic of Nazi art and architecture. The sober styling of West German postwar industrial products, like the Braun range of consumer electronics, was intended to reconcile the spheres of modern technology and German culture. Importantly, in this context culture was re-conceived as a 'new affirmative life power of peace, democracy and tolerance' (p. 141), a force for the moral regeneration of the German people.

This brings us back to the issue of historical memory. As was to be expected, Scholl's attack on the 'Nierentisch nightmare' in 1962 was more than just a critique of a particular style. Rather, it anticipated the Mitscherlichs' diagnosis of West German society's *Inability to Mourn* (1967). Accordingly, the consumer hedonism of the Bonn Republic was interpreted as an escape from 'working through the catastrophes of Nazism, the war and the Holocaust'. Materialism and consumerism were seen as 'antithetical to collective mourning and memory work' (p. 130). In this interpretation then—to close the circle—the development of a consumer society in the 1950s, which expressed its tastes in a 'tasteless' manner, joined forces with the 'normalization' of the past in architecture (Rosenfeld), and the tripartite myth of victimization, innocence, and resistance (Marcuse) in preventing, at least for the time being, honest attempts to come to terms with the past.

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BOOK REVIEWS

In *History and Its Images*, Francis Haskell placed the beginning of the consideration of images as sources with Petrarch:

> When reading the biographies of later Roman emperors, Petrarch one day came across the statement that Gordian the Younger (who ruled AD 238–44) had been a man of handsome features. 'If that is true,' he wrote in the margin of his copy of the *Historia Augusta*, 'he employed a feeble sculptor [*sic hoc verum fuit, malum habuit sculptorem*]'. This apparently trivial comment marks a milestone of real significance in the development of historical thought, for Petrarch is here not only giving almost equal weight to a figured and a literary source, but recognising that they are not in agreement.[1]

Among the many consequences of the disciplining of knowledge is the division of the sort of speculation Petrarch voiced into the modern research fields of history, art history, and archaeology—which may be housed in separate buildings, a spatial arrangement that, sadly, too often reflects intellectual landscapes.

Nowhere is that division more palpable, or less self-conscious, than in the vexed question which historians have been posing in the wake of Marshall McLuhan's work on modern media: can images be sources? In 2001, the historian Peter Burke published *Eyewitnessing: The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence*, which argued that art could provide 'evidence' of some sort of social reality—which analytically Burke held separate from that art—but that art distorted that social reality.[2]

[1] Francis Haskell, *History and Its Images: Art and the Interpretation of the Past* (New Haven, Conn., 1993), p. 13.

[2] Peter Burke, *Eyewitnessing: The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence* (London, 2001). See the art historian Michael Baxandall's review of Burke in *English Historical Review*, 117 (2002), pp. 642–4.

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Bernd Roeck's *Das historische Auge* might be said to be a companion volume to Burke's. Both authors explicitly take up the question: can 'art' or 'images' be 'sources' for historians? Both range over centuries and across discrete political and social landscapes in their efforts to survey the ways in which art or images might be used by historians—and thereby, both presumably are intended to serve a broad readership as an introduction to art as historical evidence. Unlike Burke, Roeck does not, for the most part, differentiate among 'images', but throughout uses the terms *Kunst*, *Kunstwerk*, and *Bilder* pretty much interchangeably to refer to thousands of woodcuts; engravings; sculpted free-standing figures; carved, painted, and gilded altarpieces; oil- or tempera-painted walls, wooden panels, canvases, and parchments; even architecture. Roeck differentiates instead a series of questions which, he argues, historians can pose to images. Who made the image? When? Where? Is it 'authentic'? What is the image's function: religious or secular? He sketches some of the ways in which other scholars have analysed particular individual or groups of images for what they say about gender, social place, marginality, 'otherness', and political power, and touches upon ways in which images might serve as 'evidence' for 'neuzeitlichen Subjektivismus' and Norbert Elias's conception of the civilizing process.

Perhaps because I was an artist before I was trained as a historian I have found *mal posée* the very question of 'art' as 'source', on a number of levels. As currently framed, the question lumps together objects that were produced by specific individuals, of specific training, whose deployment of colour, shape, line, as well as symbol or iconography art historians have excavated with such precision. It overrides, in other words, precisely the kinds of conditions of production to which historians pay such care when they turn to court testimony or diplomatic correspondence. As Roeck acknowledges, commissions, in so far as we have evidence of them, were widely different in the degree to which they specified the content of each image, the colours to be used, the arrangement—and therefore gestures and physical relationships—of figures, and what, if any, other objects might be represented. Artists such as Leonardo da Vinci and Albrecht Dürer fought for greater autonomy in the execution of those commissions: we have ample evidence of friction between patron and artist. The framing of the question overrides, in other words, the careful attention to the complexities of speaking to which historians

have become increasingly attentive. Indeed, the term 'artist' is itself a product of the very period Roeck is covering, when members of what had been medieval guilds, regulated according to a hierarchy of masters and apprentices, self-consciously fashioned distinctive identities, 'styles'—such as those of Caravaggio and Rembrandt—that themselves acquired a 'value' in an increasingly self-conscious marketplace.[3] So, too, Roeck, in lumping together sculpted marble and wood, painted wooden panels and woodcuts, engravings and frescoes in his treatment of *Kunst* or *Kunstwerk* overrides a wide diversity of skills that he, as someone so deeply versed in social history, knows. He is aware, as well, of the carefully articulated hierarchy of value, and therefore social status and access attached to those differing skills. It mattered, as someone who knows Augsburg so well must know, whether one was a goldsmith or a wood sculptor, both of whom produced what he terms *Kunst*. Different social status put one into different communities of differing textual and visual educations—even within the same period and same town, as social historians of artisans and art historians have shown with such care. Not all *Kunst* reflected the same 'social reality'. A goldsmith travelled in different circles, conversing with humanists, conversant with the most sophisticated of textual communities, while a wood sculptor's wealth and status placed him in a different, poorer, less textually-oriented community.

If Roeck's detailed knowledge of what we might call communities of shared visual and textual educations might have refined his discussion of the makers of objects, so, too, might it have led to a more nuanced consideration of the problem of 'reception'. While he acknowledges how elusive any one viewer's understanding will be, his own work as a social historian provides the grounds for differentiating among different social groups on a number of levels, from simple access—the marginalized, after all, had access to very little—to the different kinds of education that different social groups might bring to bear in viewing any object. Reception is not the same thing as 'reading' an image as a 'source'; still, historians have become ever more articulate about the ways in which that source might have resonated—functioned culturally—in its own time.

[3] Svetlana Alpers, *Rembrandt's Enterprise: The Studio and the Market* (Chicago, 1988).

Social place also had consequences for one's physical relationship to the objects broadly gathered under the headings of *Kunst* or *Bilder*. At the most immediate level, the portraits Roeck explores under the rubric of political power would be housed in spaces of restricted access. Images in churches, as we are coming to understand, had varying degrees of access as well: clergy were the only ones who had full access to all the objects within any given church; lay patrons, as the Fugger did in Augsburg, could restrict access to the chapels they 'owned'; even within the nave, different social place might have consequences for one's seating as pews were introduced in the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; and rural parish churches rarely received any endowments at all: their altars were simple, their walls often relatively, if not completely, bare.

It is not simply that the lumping together overrides the specificity of the conditions of production and reception or the individuality and individual agency of each person who produced or viewed an object encompassed in that term, *Kunst* or *Bilder*. Roeck not only treats 'images' or *Bilder*, 'art' or *Kunst* or *Kunstwerk* as a body of objects that have something essential in common, but he holds that body of objects as something discrete from what he calls *Wirklichkeit*. Unlike the art historians Svetlana Alpers and Michael Baxandall, upon whom he draws, Roeck does not see images of any kind as *constitutive—active* in the very making—of that 'reality'. Quite the contrary (and logically following from his approach to patronage), Roeck opens the entire consideration with 'Das Kunstwerk als Produkt der geschichtlichen Welt' (p. 9). Roeck does not address what the *sources*—in the sense both of wellspring or origin and of documentation—for that 'reality' are.

The very framing of the question, in other words, reflects that disciplinary division of 'art history' and 'archaeology' from 'history'. Francis Haskell traces something of those shifts, as influential authors came to divide words and images, essentially as though the two exist in separate spheres of experience, such that now a number of historians, including Roeck, place under a single name, 'images', everything that is not exclusively 'textual', that is to say, two-dimensional, usually codex or single sheet, black and white. Haskell underlines how very strange is the division—for strange it is, finally—that emerges, as 'images' came to be severed from 'texts' in ways that they were not in the early modern period. In the early modern period, as

now, words and images frequently appeared together on the same physical plane such as a page or a panel; texts contained metaphors that linked those texts to images; gestures bound image and verbal depiction, as did names—words and images were and are deeply inter-referential.

And as images were separated from texts, the great majority of historians (who have become increasingly 'professionalized') privileged texts as sources in both senses of the word: as reliable documents for recovering or reconstituting or excavating—depending on how one conceived of the enterprise—some reality that existed in the past; and as themselves shaping, influencing, affecting, and, more recently, 'constructing' that 'reality'. Roeck treats images as discrete from texts and, like so many historians, accords images—of all kinds— at best a 'reflective' role in relationship to that discrete reality.

In 1972, Michael Baxandall published *Painting and Experience in Renaissance Italy*,[4] in which he situated 'style' within specific historical and material contexts in a dialectical relationship. For Baxandall, style or 'manner' was less something that differentiated one body of objects from another—the focus of connoisseurship with its concern with schools and individual artists. It was to be understood, more importantly, as the articulation in line, colour, relation—the languages of visual images—of values that a culture held more broadly. Proportion, the centrepiece of what Roeck calls 'realistic' representation, for Baxandall acquired its cultural value in the mercantile society of Renaissance Italian cities, which placed a market value on the skill of estimating volume and, with it, mass and worth.

Baxandall's work called attention to the eye of the viewer of images. In the wake of that watershed work, a number of art historians have explored 'the period eye', particularly for the early modern period. This approach provides one way out of precisely the problem that Roeck poses in his first section and returns to in his last: whether individual works of art possess some timeless 'beauty' or other visual value that makes those individual works somehow themselves ahistorical. Conceptualizing object and eye in terms of the period eye binds the two in a complex cultural dialogue, in which a culture's values are articulated in texts and images, which themselves then

[4] Michael Baxandall, *Painting and Experience in Renaissance Italy* (Oxford, 1972).

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shape how that culture conceptualizes that value. It historicizes perception itself, calling attention to the many ways in which eyes are themselves educated, not simply aesthetically—to certain ways of conceiving of beauty and not others—but to see, to take as 'realistic', for example, the stunning visual deception that the representation of proportion entails. Simultaneously, it offers the most historically sensitive interpretation of images: *how* they might have meant to their original viewers, as well as *what* they might have communicated.

Roeck's two-page discussion of Baxandall's work (pp. 71–3) reveals the problems at the very core of that question of whether *Kunst* or *Bilder* can be sources. Roeck takes up Baxandall in the first quarter of the book. In that section he claims to be representing the 'Positionen der Forschung' on the question of 'Kunstwerke als Quellen'. I could discern no principle guiding his selection of authors: Hegel is there, but not Kant, who certainly grappled and grappled influentially with the relationship between art and time; Erwin Panofsky is there, but not Louis Reau; Lambert Wiesing is there, but not Rudolf Arnheim, whose work was in such deep conversation with Ernst Gombrich's; Susanne Langer is there, but not Nelson Goodman, who has been so widely influential among early modernists. Nor are these authors set into the traditions within which they were in dialogue, which shaped their conceptualization of 'image'—not all have as expansive a definition of *Kunst* as Roeck deploys—as well as the questions they took up, the ways in which they themselves construed 'culture' and cognition. His handling of these works does not differentiate their use of the terms *Kunst* or *Bilder*, two referents of widely different connotations among the works he cites. Roeck's engagement with current scholarship is equally uneven: W. J. T. Mitchell is missing, to give one glaring omission, which then signals the absence of any sustained engagement with 'Visual Studies', an area where artists, historians, and art historians regularly meet and converse. There is a quality of isolation in the question itself, a distance from precisely those nexuses of scholarship where 'interdisciplinarity' has meant re-conceptualizing the very nature of the relationship between images and context—Mary Carruthers's work on the visuality of memory, or George Lakoff's work on metaphor, or Mary Baine Campbell's work on wonder and vision.

Roeck questions the utility of Baxandall because Baxandall does not treat images as *autonomous* sources. Indeed, Baxandall problema-

tizes the very premise of singling out one medium from others, of treating *Kunst* or *Bilder* as a self-evidently discrete body which exists apart—both for the purposes of modern historical analysis and for the past culture within which that art or those images originated. Baxandall, on the contrary, binds images in a complex and multi-layered inter-referentiality with other cultural objects. Following Baxandall's line of argument, 'images' are certainly 'sources', but like all sources, they are representative—in the many different connotations of that term that we now understand. Images are no more transparent or simplistic a statement of their times than are memoirs, testimonies, letters, chronicles, satires, plays, poetry, or fables. Do we ever ask of all extant texts—manuscript and printed, bound and single-sheet, public and private, secular and religious, eschatological and scatological—if they could be 'a source'? Do we not ask, instead, what kind of source? Or, better still, what, exactly, does this or that text tell me? Is that not a more fruitful question to pose?

Baxandall's work serves as a marker in the history of the troubled relations between the disciplines of history and art history. Perhaps no other work of an art historian, with the possible exception of Erwin Panofsky, is as well known among a broad spectrum of historians. More importantly, that work provided a frame within which art historians and historians could talk to one another: it reintegrated objects into their 'context', suggesting ways that texts and objects were more deeply implicated in one another than the previous conceptualization, with its essentialist division of 'word' and 'image', had allowed. It is striking, moreover, that the art historians who are Baxandall's most ardent critics are those who seek to preserve a divide between historians and art historians, who accord connoisseurship pre-eminent value, and who dispute that 'context' bears any essential relationship to the visual values of a work of art.

The very framing of the question preserves a divide between art historians and historians that many different sorts of scholars have sought to overcome. The past twenty-five years of scholarship have revealed: first, how very deeply texts and images were implicated in one another in the early modern period, from the use of visual referents in preaching to emblem and devotional books; second, the ways in which that older division of text from image is itself anachronistic; third, different models of cognition, both from the period itself and among cognitive psychologists today, in which images are central to

cognition—the work of Carruthers and Lakoff; and fourth, how very difficult it is to read not only images, but even the most seemingly transparent text, once we acknowledge the complexity of the culture within which it originated and the individuals who brought it into being.

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JEROEN DUINDAM, *Vienna and Versailles: The Courts of Europe's Dynastic Rivals, 1550–1780,* New Studies in European History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), xii + 349 pp. ISBN 0 521 82262 9. £60.00. $80.00

ANDREAS PEČAR, *Die Ökonomie der Ehre: Der höfische Adel am Kaiserhof Karls VI. (1711–1740),* Symbolische Kommunikation in der Vormoderne. Studien zur Geschichte, Literatur und Kunst (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003), vii + 432 pp. ISBN 3 534 16725 2. EUR 65.00

After a period of neglect the study of the early modern court is *en vogue* again. Conferences on different aspects of aulic culture mushroom, publishers' catalogues abound with books on pertinent topics, and in Britain as well as Germany several institutions focusing on the history of princely courts have sprung up.[1] Compared with previous times of heightened activity, however, the study of royal households is more ambitious in terms of both chronology and subject matter. Whereas in the past topics such as patronage, clientele networks, and court personnel were at the forefront of investigations, nowadays the rich tapestry of court life as a whole is being explored, encompassing such diverse aspects as rituals and ceremonies, court nobility, and gender roles. In addition, earlier assumptions about the terminal decline of the court in the age of Enlightenment, which had led to an almost exclusive emphasis on the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, have been replaced by a better understanding of the changing nature of royal and princely establishments during this period. At the same time, however, court history continues to be dogged by shortcomings. It has only recently been stated that it 'still has intellectual problems to overcome. Most of its practitioners do not like models or theories.'[2] A rather descriptive approach resulting largely from the fascinating source material is prevalent in numerous works.

[1] The Society for Court Studies and its journal, *The Court Historian* (since 1996), provide a focus for British and American scholars, while in the German-speaking countries the Residenzenkommission (http://resikom.adw-goettingen. gwdg.de/index.php), which edits *Mitteilungen* (since 1991) and the Rudolstädter Arbeitskreis zur Residenzkultur (http://www.rudolstaedter-arbeitskreis. de/index.html) fulfil a similar role.
[2] Paul Monod, review of Edward Corp *et al.*, *A Court in Exile: The Stuarts in*

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This charge can hardly be levelled against the two books under review here. Both studies engage in debate with the single most influential theoretical approach in the field of court history in the past, Norbert Elias's famous analyses of court society and the civilizing process,[3] and formulate models of their own in order to stimulate further research. Of the two books, Jeroen Duindam's *Vienna and Versailles* certainly deserves pride of place. Covering more than two centuries and comparing the two arguably most important royal courts of early modern Europe, it will provide a point of reference for years to come. An immense amount of source material from Austrian and French archives as well as contemporary memoirs has been digested, resulting in a book so rich in detail that, at first glance, it indeed seems to be mainly descriptive. Read more carefully, however, it quickly becomes clear that important discussions of the current state of thinking on princely households are embedded in this wealth of information. They yield important insights into the working of the early modern court and refute many rash conclusions which have found their way into secondary literature. Only a selection of these insights can be presented in this review, but all students of court history will find penetrating observations relevant to their own concerns.

Duindam starts with a brief overview of the origin and development of the major court offices in the Middle Ages. Having set the scene, he then turns to the first of the three main parts into which his book is divided, entitled 'Contours'. In this part he presents fundamental data on the size of the two courts, the costs involved in maintaining these large establishments, and the vast apparatus which ran the household of the ruler and, especially in the French case, also those of other members of the royal family. As anybody who has ever worked with court records knows full well, figures contained in these documents are notoriously difficult to interpret since the source material is enormous but by no means comprehensive, sometimes including only salaried charges and leaving honorary posts aside,

France, 1689–1718 (Cambridge, 2004), H-Albion, H-Net-Reviews, November, 2004.

[3] Norbert Elias, *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation* (1st publ. Berne, 1939), English edn.: *The Civilising Process*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1978–82); id., *Die höfische Gesellschaft* (1st publ. Darmstadt, 1969), English edn.: *The Court Society* (Oxford, 1983).

sometimes covering only some parts of the household and not others. Problems of definition, which are especially vexing with regard to an open institution with loose fringes such as the early modern court, further complicate the story. Despite these obstacles, however, Duindam provides sets of figures for both courts which may have to be adjusted in individual cases, but indicate general trends that will surely stand the test of time.

What Duindam's calculations reveal, for example, is the steady expansion of court offices at the household of the French king which, despite numerous efforts to curb this development, continued from the early sixteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century and was only brought to a halt by Louis XIV at the beginning of his sole reign. From then on the size of the *maison du roi* remained fairly constant until the 1780s when, shortly before its extinction, the most radical reforms in the court's history slashed the number of servants to half its previous level. The household of the monarch, however, formed only one part of the overall French court. The establishments of the various other members of the royal family, the staff responsible for the stables and the hunt, and the military guards have to be added to the total, which peaked in 1699 at slightly more than 5,000 (p. 60). Mainly as a result of the lack of secondary establishments and the more modest number of military units, the Habsburgs always presided over a smaller court. Surprisingly, however, given the traditional image of a monarchy based, especially after 1740, mainly on the bureaucracy, numbers at the Austrian court rose in the course of the eighteenth century until they reached a high point of 2,000 in 1780. Although they declined again under Joseph II, they never fell below early eighteenth-century levels. Small wonder, then, that in both countries court expenditure figured as the third largest item in the overall state budget after expenses for war and repayment of debts. However, whereas on average between 15 and 20 per cent of the French monarchy's total expenditure went on the court, and in some years as much as 38 per cent, the Habsburgs invested sums which in absolute as well as relative terms were always well below those spent by their rivals.

If the first part of Duindam's book is all about the nuts and bolts of two monarchical households, the second deals with the more colourful aspects of 'Court Life'. It follows the ruler's daily routine, which was dominated by prayers and church attendance, delibera-

tions with ministers and solitary paper work, outdoor recreations, meals, and different forms of entertainment in the evening. Duindam also charts the annual life cycle of the court, punctuated as it was by church festivals, saints' days, feast days of the chivalric orders, and other religiously charged ceremonies. In addition, at the Viennese court, and to a certain extent even at the court of Versailles, the change of season marked in summer by the move from the main palace to secondary palaces in the countryside exerted considerable influence on courtly patterns, since ceremonial regulations were usually relaxed and the hunt became the main activity of courtiers.

Yet more intriguing than the recapitulation of these fairly well-known trends are those passages in the second part which are devoted to courtly ceremonial. Leaving aside the great state occasions, Duindam concentrates mainly on forms of domestic ritual, such as *lever*, *coucher*, and, in particular, meals, which were at the centre of the representational culture of early modern monarchies and have traditionally occupied court historians. Drawing on an intimate knowledge of the sources, he is able to present a more nuanced picture of these rituals than has hitherto been available. He dismisses, for example, claims that Louis XIV invented or essentially redesigned many of these ceremonies and points instead to their long history at the French court, reaching back to the sixteenth century. He also revises widely held assumptions about public and private spheres at court. Although his findings confirm earlier observations that in general the Bourbon monarchs, even before Louis XIV, were more public figures than their Habsburg counterparts, on closer examination a more complex pattern becomes visible. Even at the French court there were different levels of public exposure of the king, varying, for example, in the case of meals, from festive banquets and semi-public meals to more or less 'private' dinners in his chamber. Ceremonies at court did not correspond to clear-cut models of public and private, but have to be imagined as a 'continuum ranging from display to intimacy' (p. 217).

Another illuminating aspect is the all-pervasiveness of quarrels over precedence at the two households in question. Although there were slight variations between the French and Austrian courts, the latter being rather more orderly than the former, the picture that emerges is one of ceaseless conflict over seemingly trivial details. At the heart of these disputes was constant apprehension about one's

rank and social honour which is reflected in the proliferation of ceremonial handbooks, memoirs, and records. The wealth of this material has often been interpreted as 'evidence for the consummate state of the ceremonialised court' (p. 208). In fact, however, it should rather be seen, as Duindam rightly argues, as 'an indication of lingering confusion' (ibid.) about the rules of conduct and status which permeated court society. In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries arguments about rank were further fuelled by the establishment of permanent diplomatic representatives at the European courts in the wake of the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Ambassadors jealously guarding the position of their masters in the ceremonial procedures of a foreign court entered the scene, adding to the already substantial potential for conflict. This precarious state of affairs also makes it unlikely that rulers used ceremonial as an 'ingenious tool' (p. 212) to manipulate courtly hierarchies and play courtiers off against each other to buttress their position as many court historians, foremost among them Norbert Elias, have posited. To a certain extent, as Duindam concedes, quarrels between courtiers could be used to redefine social status. In the majority of cases, however, monarchs were primarily concerned with the reputation of their court, attempting to uphold order and guarantee dignified conduct among their nobles.

As these examples indicate, Duindam is very successful in rewriting important aspects of the cultural and social history of the early modern court. His ambition, however, goes further. The third part of his book, under the heading 'Power', enters the territory of the 'political history of the court' which, as he claims, has 'yet to be written' (p. 226). Approaching the central questions of who exerted power at court and to what purpose it was harnessed from different angles, Duindam first surveys the different types of courtiers who had immediate access to the monarch and were thus potentially crucial factors in the decision-making process of early modern monarchies. Among those mustered are court jesters, valets, personal secretaries, confessors, doctors, youth friends, hunting companions, former governors, mistresses, high-ranking advisers and ministers, and favourites. The notorious figure of the favourite, in particular, has long attracted scholarly attention and also receives its fair share in Duindam's treatment. Many historians have seen the favourite as a product of the early seventeenth century, smoothing the transition to

advanced forms of administrative monarchy in a particular historical context and disappearing again at the end of the century. Duindam, however, describes him as a more permanent phenomenon, entering the courtly stage whenever a crisis loomed or weak rulers were on the lookout for trusted advice, although, as he states, at the Austrian court favourites made less of an appearance than in France.

Significantly, the burdens of kingship are a major factor in Duindam's analysis of power relations at court. Far from being a towering figure pulling the strings, most sovereigns struggled with a multitude of tasks and toiled to keep their entourage at bay. Remaining silent or giving evasive answers proved to be one strategy for coping with the excessive demands made on them; seeking people in whom they could 'confide without risking manipulation and defamation' (p. 234) was another. Especially in their early and late periods of rule, monarchs were heavily dependent on advice, as Duindam observes, relying during the former mainly on erstwhile instructors and during the latter on spouses or mistresses. In addition, there were always different parties at court fighting for privileged access to the monarch. Factional strife was as pervasive as disputes over precedence. It is, however, misleading to assume that court parties were formed around coherent programmes. There was never, as Duindam shows, a divide between noble courtiers and 'bourgeois' ministers; nor did supposedly foreign parties, such as the much-maligned Spanish party, exist at the courts under consideration. Instead courtiers, ministers, and diplomats always pursued their particular interests, and parties re-formed constantly according to changing political, religious, and dynastic circumstances. Compared to these passages about power at court the remainder of the third part, which concentrates on the wider significance of the court for Austrian and French politics and culture, is less satisfying. Duindam briefly surveys a variety of ways in which the court and, in particular, its nobility helped to integrate different regions and provinces more closely into the evolving modern state. Although his observations, for example, on the role of court nobles in provincial government are usually perceptive, they lack a more comprehensive treatment. Too often they boil down to a *tour de force* of well-known developments without any detailed discussion.

It has also to be said that Duindam's book is not always an easy read. Countless quotations in the original French and German ham-

per the flow of the argument. In addition, the first part teems with the names of different court offices in French, German, and sometimes English, which makes it difficult for readers to find their way around, especially since the index is not entirely reliable. This is all the more regrettable since the book contains a vast amount of detailed information and puts forward important arguments about wider aspects of the topic. Its greatest virtue, however, is to have resisted the temptation to simplify developments and press them into a mould. Duindam conveys the ambiguities of life at court, the uncertainties about ceremonial rules, salaries, and ranks, and the constant quarrels and disputes which must have made the existence of a courtier far from agreeable. He also lays bare the difficulties of dealing with the surviving evidence. *Vienna and Versailles* is therefore a timely reminder in the current vogue for court studies that our knowledge of royal households is more limited and the reality of court life more complex than we often concede.

By contrast, Andreas Pečar's book, a doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of Cologne, presents a more clear-cut picture, no doubt because of its smaller remit. A case study of the Imperial court under the reign of Charles VI (1711–40), it provides a close-up of this institution at the apogee of the baroque period, immediately before Maria Theresa's and Joseph II's reforms fundamentally changed the character of aulic culture in the Austrian monarchy. Some of the themes already discussed by Duindam therefore resurface in Pečar's book. Courtly ceremonial and etiquette are extensively dealt with as are certain (honorary) court offices such as chamberlain (*Kämmerer*) and privy councillor (*Geheimer Rat*). Despite this overlap, however, *Ökonomie der Ehre* is an entirely original study. It reverses the perspective, looking at the Austrian court from the viewpoint not of the ruler, but of the nobility assembled at court. Whereas Duindam investigates the different court offices and charts their development over time in order to gain insights into the workings of the royal household, Pečar is interested in the value which honorary court positions held for the aristocracy, career patterns, and the social and regional composition of office-holders as a group. This emphasis on the periphery rather than the centre of the court also allows him to cast his net more widely. The entire final part of the book, for example, is devoted to the palace-building activities of the Austrian court nobility in the decades around

1700, thus widening the scope of the study beyond the traditional concerns of court historians.

This way of looking at the court from the outside, as it were, also allows Pečar to take issue with one of Norbert Elias's best-known hypotheses, namely, that of the domestication of the nobility. According to Elias, Louis XIV had skilfully exploited ceremonial and etiquette in order to attribute social status and honour to his court nobles. This was meant, on the one hand, to protect the nobility against the supposedly rising middle classes and to underline their superior social status. On the other hand, and more importantly, however, it was intended to compensate the nobility for its loss of political power. In the hands of the monarch, the court thus evolved into an instrument for subjugating a once powerful and rebellious stratum of society. Looking at the same problem from the viewpoint of the nobility, by contrast, Pečar comes to different conclusions. Service at court then becomes, as his main argument runs, a means of noble self-realization, of living a life according to one's social standing.

Yet at first glance office-holding at the Austrian court seems to have been less than rewarding for courtiers. As Pečar demonstrates in one of the most interesting parts of his book (pp. 103–26) applicants for honorary posts had to invest enormous amounts of money, disguised as loans to the Emperor, before they were appointed to the rank of a chamberlain, which alone guaranteed access to court, and, later on, privy councillor. In addition, the financial return on their investment was meagre if there was one at all. Many positions were unsalaried, while those at the top of the hierarchy were expected to spend huge amounts of their own money on representational duties. Only in very few cases did the material benefits of court office—such as regular salaries, pensions, and gifts from the Emperor or foreign diplomats and others trying to ingratiate themselves with influential courtiers—outweigh the costs incurred, especially at the beginning of a career. Possession of a substantial private income was thus a precondition for court service. It excluded even members of the minor aristocracy, not to mention the middling classes which had played such a prominent role in Elias's account, but had never presented any threat to the nobility in the Habsburg monarchy. Besides, before 1740 grand social occasions were infrequent in Vienna and court life in general certainly less glittering than at Versailles.

Seen in this light the court of the Habsburgs looks rather undesirable. Yet there was no shortage of aristocrats vying with each other for office. According to Pečar, however, this is not necessarily a contradiction. Drawing mainly on Pierre Bourdieu's writings he explains the appeal of the court in terms of the social and cultural capital that was to be gained there. Far more important than amassing financial wealth was the social status that could be achieved or confirmed. Social exclusivity could best be demonstrated by proximity to the monarch in court office or during ceremonial occasions, which is why courtiers showed such a strong interest in conforming to courtly regulations. To them, court society was not an instrument of power at the disposal of the monarch but a stage on which to present their rank. To pursue a lifestyle that distanced them from other social groups also helped to underline their elevated status in society. The building of town palaces and summer residences therefore played an important part in noble strategies. Building projects, moreover, had the added advantage of being beyond monarchical control. The Habsburg Emperors, in stark contrast to Louis XIV's policy of preventing the French aristocracy from entering into architectural competition with the monarchy, refrained from palace-building activities and gave their nobility great latitude to indulge in projects of their own. The immense costs involved in erecting such lasting monuments to individual families were consequently of minor concern. As with the expense of life at court, expenditure on new buildings was regarded as an investment in social and symbolic capital, the more so since under the rules of aristocratic society money in itself did not possess any intrinsic representational value. The great efforts undertaken by nobles to secure a reputable place in court society therefore followed a particular rationality which was predicated on symbolizing rank both to the 'uneducated', lower classes of society and those of equal status.

In reconstructing these motives behind the nobles' pursuit of courtly careers Pečar provides a valuable contribution to the investigation of this social group, although it is unfortunate that female aristocrats do not figure in his account at all. Surely they had their part to play in securing a family's position in polite society. However, Pečar's study also throws light on the mechanics of court life in general, and the position of the ruler in particular. In both respects his

findings essentially correspond to Duindam's observations. Thus readers encounter the same endless quarrels over precedence with which they are already familiar from the comparative treatment of the French and Austrian courts, and are confronted with an analogous assessment of the favourite. Striking similarities are also revealed in the treatment of the monarch. The figure of the ruler that emerges from Pečar 's investigation is again rather passive, bound in its dealings with courtiers and diplomats by ceremonial regulations, tradition, and international conventions (most explicitly on p. 207). Yet the rich material displayed in both books leaves at least this reviewer with the impression that rulers were perhaps more assertive than the two authors admit. Especially in the later parts of Pečar's book the Emperor is depicted as quite adroit in influencing hierarchies at court and using the vagaries of court life to his political advantage (pp. 120–1, 233–4, 239–40, 243, and 250–1). Although this should not lead us back to the old image of the ruler as the all-powerful puppeteer, it is perhaps the office of monarch which still needs most clarification in court studies. To give rise to wider questions, however, is not the least merit of these two studies. They excel in providing vast amounts of new information, and in their engagement with, and judicious application of, theoretical models.

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URSULA GOLDENBAUM, *Appell an das Publikum: Die öffentliche Debatte in der deutschen Aufklärung 1687–1796*, with contributions by Frank Grunert, Peter Weber, Gerda Heinrich, Brigitte Erker, and Winfried Siebers (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004), xi + 970 pp. in 2 vols. ISBN 3 05 003880 2. EUR 158.00

Had this collection of essays been published in the middle of the eighteenth century, it would probably have been called *Berufung auf das gemeine Wesen*. This is how Adelgunde Luise Victoria Gottsched (the wife of the renowned Johann Christoph) in 1753 translated Samuel König's *Appel au public*, a central pamphlet in one of the public debates under scrutiny here. At first sight, the absence of a proper equivalent for the English or French 'public' in German at the time seems to vindicate Habermas's and Koselleck's traditional view: the *Aufklärung* was a late development and it was only in the last third of the eighteenth century that the German public sphere was politicized.[1] Such a conclusion, however, would be far off Ursula Goldenbaum's reassessment of the German Enlightenment. As she meticulously shows, Habermas found what he regarded as the first usage of the term *Publikum* (by Johann Christoph Gottsched in 1760) in a historical account, where it had been borrowed uncritically from another source. By the 1760s the term *Publikum* had already been in use for almost a decade in journals published in Berlin and Hamburg; in the letter Habermas refers to, Gottsched did not report a neologism but bemoaned the employment of foreign loan words, whose use he strictly opposed in his rhetorical and linguistic writings.

[1] Reinhard Koselleck, *Kritik und Krise: Eine Studie zur Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt* (Freiburg, 1959), published in English translation as *Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society* (Cambridge, Mass., 1988); Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (Neuwied, 1962), published in English translation as *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989). For a discussion of these works and their context, see Anthony J. La Vopa's 'Conceiving a Public: Ideas and Society in Eighteenth-Century Europe', *Journal of Modern History*, 64 (March 1992), pp. 79–116. T. C. W. Blanning has recently offered an insightful critique of Habermas in *The Culture of Power and the Power of Culture: Old Regime Europe, 1660–1789* (Oxford, 2002).

The 1750s, however, seem quite late as well for the appearance of such a seminal term as *Publikum*. Goldenbaum argues that its reception was hindered by the relative prominence of Latin in Germany and by the various meanings of the Latin word *publicum* (unlike 'public', it could refer to the governing authorities and their representation by individuals or in written documents). This is why Goldenbaum sees the linguistic search for first occurrences as a futile way of tracing the emergence of the middle-class public sphere in the Protestant territories of the Holy Roman Empire. She suggests instead looking for the thing itself rather than for its later significations, and she offers as a criterion the writing agent's conscious espousal of open argumentation and its factual production as a means of gaining ground within a community. Through a careful examination of seven public debates over an entire century, Goldenbaum and her collaborators try to demonstrate that the *Aufklärung* was politically orientated from its very beginning.

Frank Grunert studies the controversy between Christian Thomasius, the Prussian jurist and theologian Johann Christoph Becmann, and the Danish theologian Hector Gottfried Masius over the extent to which different confessions enhance their believers' allegiance to the state (1687–92). This early theological debate already concerned weighty political and philosophical issues, such as the Danish king's decision to grant asylum to French Huguenots (and thus to tolerate another confession in his territories), the lessons of seventeenth-century events in England and the Netherlands, and the complex relationship between religion and secular politics. As a consequence of Danish pressure on the Saxon Elector, Thomasius was forced to leave the University of Leipzig and move to nearby multiconfessional Prussia, where he had a successful career at the newly established University of Halle.

Goldenbaum looks critically at three debates. First and foremost among them is the debate over the Wertheim Bible. This was a Wolffian translation of the Pentateuch by Johann Lorenz Schmidt, published in 1735, that triggered a vigorous public controversy engaging journalists, theologians, and church and state officials all over the Reich, from Wertheim to Hamburg, Leipzig, Ansbach, Bamberg, Regensburg, and the courts of Berlin, Dresden, and Vienna. The translation was officially banned in Saxony and Prussia, then in the entire Empire; its author was interrogated and arrested before he

managed to escape and live under an assumed identity in Hamburg and Wolfenbüttel until his early death (1749). The story itself is well known,[2] but Goldenbaum brings the material she uncovered in several archives to bear on significant issues in German intellectual history, showing how the public discussion redefined some of the main participants' attitudes towards Wolffian philosophy, Pietism, religious orthodoxy, and the persecution of heterodox views. This essay is followed by an examination of the famous König affair in Berlin (1751–3), involving Maupertuis, Voltaire, and Frederick II, in which König's aforementioned *Appel au public* ignited a bitter controversy around the Berlin Academy and the allegedly despotic conduct of its president, Maupertuis, and the Prussian king. The third debate analysed by Goldenbaum took place from 1759 to 1762 between the Berlin-based journal *Literaturbriefe*, edited by Lessing, Mendelssohn, and Nicolai, and *Der Nordische Aufseher* of Copenhagen, published by Johann Andreas Cramer. At the centre of the debate stood the potential civility and decency of atheists, as well as the new aesthetic appreciation of the Bible and Klopstock's poetry. Hamann, Herder, and Kant all followed the debate and wrote about it.

Goldenbaum's essays are followed by reassessments of perhaps the two most familiar debates of the German Enlightenment, albeit from the perspective of public argumentation. Peter Weber examines the long discussion of the *Allgemeines Landrecht* (Prussian General Code) and legal reform in Prussia (1780–94), concentrating on the strategies employed by reformers under Frederick II and his successor Frederick William II. Gerda Heinrich reviews the debate on Jewish emancipation following Dohm's *Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden* (1781) and Mendelssohn's *Jerusalem oder Über religiöse Macht und Judentum* (1783). Both Weber and Heinrich demonstrate how a fresh, careful examination of primary sources may provide new insights into relatively well-known controversies. The collection ends with an essay by Brigitte Erker and Winfried Siebers on the controversy around August von Kotzebue's slander pamphlet, *Doctor Bahrdt mit der eisernen Stirn* (1790), a harsh assault on the thinkers, journals, and institutional reforms of the *Spätaufklärung*—part of the

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[2] See Paul S. Spalding's absorbing narrative: *Seize the Book, Jail the Author: Johann Lorenz Schmidt and Censorship in Eighteenth-Century Germany* (West Lafayette, Ind., 1998).

raging culture war following the Prussian *Religionsedikt* of 1788 and the French Revolution. The controversy, lasting until 1796, is particularly interesting because of its exposure of the rules of the game. Since malicious *ad hominem* attacks had been proscribed in eighteenth-century public debates, the breach of unwritten procedures in the acrimonious exchange between followers of the Enlightenment and its detractors caused a serious stir in the 1790s.

These contributions follow Goldenbaum's resolutely argued agenda concerning the *Aufklärung* as a whole. As pointed out above, she directly confronts Habermas's and Koselleck's views of the middle-class public sphere, which she traces back to a biased nineteenth-century interpretation. The examined public debates show, according to Goldenbaum, that the rise of a civil public sphere (*Öffentlichkeit*) occurred at the turn of the eighteenth century, as attested by an abundance of journals, periodicals, cafés, and societies (particularly in Leipzig and Hamburg), and public discussions of law, politics, and theology.

Another traditional criticism of the *Aufklärung* is that it was too much concerned with theology and not critical enough towards religion, lacking theoretical and political courage. Goldenbaum argues against taking the deist and sometimes atheist positions of some *philosophes* as the sole criterion for 'seriousness': such an interpretation obstructs the uniqueness of the French or Parisian branch of the Enlightenment, whose radicalism distinguished it from other Enlightenment centres in Europe. Moreover, Goldenbaum convincingly claims that the manner in which state and religion were challenged was inextricably linked to the local institutional context. The Protestant orientation towards Scripture itself and the politically guaranteed religious tolerance of the three Christian confessions in the Empire (since 1648) brought forth issues for public discussion different from the ones tackled in Catholic, centralized, and intolerant France.

The separation of faith from the Emperor's armed authority allowed the emergence of various forms of interaction between state and religion in the old Reich, including different rules for the application of censorship and a range of channels for the discussion of religious issues, such as the *Corpus evangelicorum* in Regensburg. Religious complaints, related legal theories, and the authorities' political actions were all publicly discussed in printed appeals, pamphlets, and requests, in theological and legal journals, and in publications by the

Imperial Reichstag or its representatives (three of the early *Aufklärer* were indeed jurists—Pufendorf, Thomasius, and Leibniz). According to Goldenbaum, Pufendorf's dictum about the structural monstrosity of the Empire and the traditional historiographical focus on Prussia and Austria have, until the last three decades, hindered a proper assessment of the multi-confessional and non-absolutist character of the Empire.

Goldenbaum thus claims it is no wonder that arguments for confessional tolerance were not a pivotal issue for the rising public sphere in the Protestant states of the Empire. Instead, she argues that the seminal theme of the *Aufklärung* was the relationship between reason and belief and the setting of boundaries to both. According to the account offered in *Appell an das Publikum*, the Enlightenment reached the same level of politicization in France and Germany by the 1780s, as attested by Mirabeau's deep interest in the legal and political schemes of the Berlin *Aufklärer* on his visit to the city in 1786 (mentioned in Peter Weber's contribution). Goldenbaum points out that before the Revolution most of the *philosophes* were not interested in a violent upheaval of society and certainly not in a full-blown democracy. Rather like their German peers (though in a different style), they preferred a gradual reform by 'enlightening' their rulers.

Goldenbaum's own examination of the debate over the Wertheim Bible (which extends over more than 300 pages) offers significant insights into the development of the unique philosophical constellation of the *Aufklärung*. It supplies a sound context for the genesis of Alexander Baumgarten's new aesthetics in contemporary theological controversies, from the Pietist–orthodox dispute to the public debate over the Wertheim Bible. Goldenbaum argues that during the latter debate (1735–9), the younger generation of Halle theologians became receptive to Wolffian philosophy, modifying and using it in their attempts to eschew the dangers they saw in an unlimited application of reason. They were influenced by Leibniz's defence of the Christian mysteries against Spinoza, who had argued that one cannot judge what one is not able to understand clearly. Unlike Descartes, Leibniz legitimized indistinct and unclear ideas as a form of knowledge. This assertion was complemented by Leibniz's distinction between truths recognizable through natural reason and those that can only be attained through revelation and Scripture. Taking up Leibniz's ideas while seeking to counter Schmidt's rationalist interpretation of the

Bible, the young Halle theologians appealed to aesthetic impressions and the sublime character of poetry as powers that cannot be subsumed under reason. In his early writings, Alexander Baumgarten dealt with themes that were associated directly with the debate over the Wertheim Bible: the interpretation of figurative speech, miracles and their meaning, and the use of metaphor and synecdoche. Baumgarten's emphasis on poetry, allusive words, and sensual perception may thus be seen as an attempt to defend Christianity against what was regarded in Halle as the untamed claims of reason in Wolffian philosophy.

Goldenbaum further demonstrates how the influential theology faculty at Halle was transformed in the 1740s and 1750s (mainly under the leadership of the elder Baumgarten, Siegmund Jacob) from a basis of intolerant Pietist opposition to Wolffian philosophy into an innovative centre of neologism and Enlightenment theology. Some of Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten's students developed and expanded his methods of biblical interpretation and textual hermeneutics, among them Johann Salomo Semler, Thomas Abbt, and Johann David Michaelis (the latter regrettably not mentioned by Goldenbaum in this context). The emergence of an uneasy marriage between Wolffianism and Pietism in the Baumgartens' exegesis and aesthetics, according to Goldenbaum, dominated the *Aufklärung*'s mainstream until the end of the century, highlighting the power of belief besides an autonomous reason within its own limits.

Despite these and other interesting insights into the theoretical and socio-political outlook of the *Aufklärung*, this collection raises several questions. Goldenbaum's emphasis on the early emergence of the German Enlightenment and its political character might have been better served by a parallel focus on its development until the 1750s. As she herself notes, the importance of the debates over legal reform in Prussia and the emancipation of the Jews has already been widely acknowledged. *Appell an das Publikum* could thus have profited from a detailed reassessment of the early controversy between the Pietists and the Lutheran establishment (whose importance for the emergence of the German public sphere has been demonstrated by Martin Gierl),[3] and the debate between the Pietists and Christian Wolff

[3] Martin Gierl, *Pietismus und Aufklärung: Theologische Polemik und die Kommunikationsreform der Wissenschaft am Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen, 1997).

(which led to Wolff's expulsion from Prussia and the increasing reputation of his philosophy as the embodiment of German Enlightenment thought). Furthermore, a comparison with public debates in the Catholic territories of the Empire—even in a very summarized form—might have assisted Goldenbaum in outlining the distinctive characteristics of the examined debates in the Protestant states.

Despite the focus on the early emergence of the *Aufklärung*, Goldenbaum wishes to trace the influence of the Wolffian–Pietist compromise on the course of German philosophy until Kant's *Critiques* and thereafter. From an editorial perspective, these seem to be contrasting endeavours. For the demonstration of the long-term development, several other debates should have been subjected to the careful examination of Goldenbaum and her collaborators, even if they are relatively well known: the controversy between Gottsched, Bodmer, and Breitinger over poetry and reason; the debate following the prize contest on monads at the Berlin Academy (in 1746–7, preceding the König affair); the discussion surrounding Lessing's partial publication of Hermann Samuel Reimarus's deist writings (the so-called *Fragmentenstreit*); the debate between Jacobi and Mendelssohn (subsequently involving other thinkers) over Lessing's alleged Spinozism; the famous discussion of 'what is Enlightenment' in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*; and the *Atheismusstreit* of the 1790s. The assessment of so many public debates over a large span of time would inevitably have entailed a considerable enlargement of the collection's already substantial scope; an editorial alternative could have been the publication of the long re-appraisal of the debate over the Wertheim Bible as a separate book. In the present collection with its noteworthy other contributions, Goldenbaum's impressive study of this debate and its implications seems slightly eclipsed by the larger framework and the sheer size of the whole enterprise.

These reservations notwithstanding, *Appell an das Publikum* is a timely and significant contribution to current research on the *Aufklärung* and to Enlightenment studies in general. Its two volumes are bound in fiery red and yellow covers, deliberately demonstrating Goldenbaum's claim about the relevance of the examined debates. Indeed, the essays included in this collection successfully show that the public controversies of the German Enlightenment were not merely cold intellectual skirmishes but hot battles conducted with sincere intellectual and political engagement.

Book Reviews

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GERHARD HIRSCHFELD, GERD KRUMEICH, and IRINA RENZ, in conjunction with MARKUS PÖHLMANN (eds.), *Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg* (2nd revised edn.; Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2004), 1,002 pp. ISBN 3 506 73913 1. EUR 78.00

In German historiography the First World War has been completely overshadowed by the Second, not least because of the latter's criminal and destructive dimension: the responsibility so much clearer, the loss of lives, both military and civilian, so much greater. More importantly, however, the period of the two wars is now interpreted as one long historical epoch: the second Thirty Years War, a kind of late nuclear fusion caused by German unification under Prussian leadership on the battlefield (1871). The Fischer controversy some forty years ago about Germany's irresponsible risk-taking and annexationist ambitions in 1914 has long since been settled. This was the last time the First World War was brought to public attention in Germany. The unleashing of the war, the main issue hitherto, and the continuity of German war aims in the two conflagrations are no longer in dispute. One tends to refer these days to the great seminal catastrophe, a term borrowed from George Kennan, and to think that everything has been said and settled. In his polemical stance against appeasement Churchill called the Second World War 'the unnecessary war' in order to give the impression that it could have been avoided had he been at the helm. He would have been reluctant to say the same of the previous war.

In Britain and France, once Germany's bitter enemies and now its close allies within the European Union, the First World War still figures as the Great War /Grande Guerre, an assessment which appears fully justified in view of the historical fallout. Their casualty figures were so much higher than during the Second Word War and the break with the past was more dramatic: the end of the Pax Britannica and the decline of Europe's leadership on the world stage. Of all the great empires that tumbled in its wake—Tsarist Russia, the Habsburg Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the German Kaiserreich—the last named had perhaps the least awesome fall.

In many ways a fresh look at this cataclysm encompassing the role of the major powers was overdue. The new *Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg*, initiated by Gerhard Hirschfeld and edited with the help of close colleagues, is therefore a most welcome arrival on the historio-

graphical scene. No place could be more fitting for the launch of such an enterprise than the Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte in Stuttgart, previously known as Weltkriegsbücherei and founded as early as 1921 for the purpose of setting Germany's record straight.

In retrospect, and judged from this specific location, it is safe to say that no country has moved further from its original point of view. Moreover, it is astonishing that a small institute with only a skeleton staff should have been prepared to tackle such a major undertaking, enlisting the support of no fewer than 146 contributors from fifteen countries. Under these circumstances it was a sensible decision to set a limit of one volume at an affordable price. A few reviewers have taken exception to the fact that not all contributions operate on the same model. However, any editor knows that it is an impossible task to persuade authors from different countries to sing from exactly the same hymn sheet all the time.

How did the editors respond to the challenge of compressing whole libraries of accumulated knowledge into one volume? The contents are divided into two major parts, one-third narrative subdivided into surveys on 'States', 'War and Society', 'Strategy' (and related questions), and 'Historiography', each comprising up to half a dozen essays, and two-thirds encyclopaedia listing more than 650 entries followed by a detailed chronology. This part is greatly enhanced by a substantial amount of visual material collected by the third editor, Irina Renz—photographs, cartoons, official documents, and maps— which will recommend the book to the public as well as university libraries. The international character of the work is nowhere more clearly expressed than in the eight articles on the major players (Germany, Belgium, France, Britain, Austria–Hungary, Italy, Russia, and the USA) all written by native historians except for the one on Russia and that on Britain, written by an expatriate American at Cambridge. Smaller powers are adequately dealt with in the lexical part.

The late Wolfgang J. Mommsen presents a most depressing picture of Germany at war: a government taken hostage by rabid nationalism bordering on hysteria, delusions of grandeur on all sides (except for the left) intent on the demand for extensive annexations and, finally, the trauma of unexpected defeat and revolution. Only the soldiers, it seems, had a realistic notion of the horrors of trench warfare, but no voice to stop the madness. No historian of the former enemy states could be more outspoken in his verdict on why and

how that war was fought and lost by his country. The terms dominating the public discourse are revealing: in Germany defence of the fatherland called for *Burgfrieden* (castle precincts rather than truce); in France, as Jean-Jaques Becker tells us, it was the *Union Sacrée* of the two ideological camps, republican and *laiciste* versus conservative and Catholic. As a result a kind of war culture cast its spell over the country, only to give way at a later stage to a deep yearning for peace. As in Germany, army command and government were at loggerheads, though with a different outcome: government and parliament trying to uphold civil liberties emerged victorious from this struggle. In the years to come awareness of the colossal sacrifices overshadowed the final victory.

Of all the major powers Britain was least prepared to wage a continental war. In a country with no draft at the beginning of the war, recruitment was a special challenge, according to Jay Winter. By the end of 1914 one million men had volunteered; after the Somme disaster another 700,000 signed up. The upper and middle classes were over-represented with Oxford and Cambridge taking the heaviest toll. It may be due to these statistics, the 'lost generation', that the Great War is nowhere more intensely remembered than in Britain. In three major battles of the war, beginning with the Somme (July–November 1916), the British lost a million men, dead, wounded, or missing. However, for the rest of the population life expectancy increased thanks to a more pro-active state and better food supplies for the working class. Other results of the war are well known: the decline of the Liberals, the rise of Labour, and loss of financial supremacy to the USA.

The rest of the surveys by country follow a more conventional approach with an emphasis on politics, economics, and strategy. In the case of Russia it was the autocratic systems which failed to cope with the war situation, with getting the army into shape and feeding a starving urban population. US politics were greatly influenced by big business which favoured those powers whose ports were not blockaded. Eventually the war came to a standstill before the full weight of American intervention could make itself felt and enable President Wilson to secure a lasting peace. One conclusion seems to be inescapable yet difficult to grasp for the Germans in both world wars: in times of war democracies get their act together much more efficiently than autocratic regimes.

Book Reviews

The most innovative section which makes most use of new research is that on 'society at war', with essays on women, youth, the working classes, soldiers, scholars, literature, religion, propaganda, medicine, and economics. The approach is clearly comparative and leaves its mark on the lexical section in the choice of entries later on. More than any other, this section justifies the editors' claim that they tackle their subject from an international perspective. Not all of the authors—most of the exceptions are German—are able to fulfil this promise in equal measure.

Ute Daniel's essay on women, mainly their recruitment into the labour force, and Dick Geary's on the working classes in Europe are perhaps the most substantial and wide-ranging. The workers and their representatives toed the line at the beginning, only to become the reluctant vanguard of the revolution towards the end of the war. It is depressing to see that there were hardly any independent minds among scholars and theologians. Annette Becker, who analyses the syncretism of religious and patriotic sentiment, would have been well advised to explore the role of the churches. War sermons are any agnostic's treasure trove for misguided advice to the faithful. It is quite impossible to do equal justice to all of these essays dealing with issues and topics which clearly show that 'total war' is more than military action.

The subject of the third section is what one would expect from a book like this in the first place: how the war came about (Jost Dülffer), the extension from European to world war (Stig Förster), the strategy of the opposing alliances (Wilhelm Deist for Berlin/Vienna and Hew Strachan for the Entente), international law and war crimes (Alan Kramer), and the conclusion of hostilities (Klaus Schwabe). These essays generally summarize previous research. The final and shortest chapter is devoted to the extensive historiography on the First World War. Here two of the three editors, Gerhard Hirschfeld and Gerd Krumeich, sketch the development from mere documentation to interpretation, from military to social history, from the national to the international perspective. Whether the research by Fritz Klein, although substantial, merits a separate essay on the GDR is a matter of opinion. On the German side ceaseless attempts to disprove German war guilt as laid down in the Versailles Treaty proved to be a major obstacle to real progress. It was not until Fritz Fischer's groundbreaking (though not in a methodical sense) work on the Reich's war

aims that German historiography joined the mainstream of international research. By that time, however, French and Anglo-Saxon historians had already advanced into new areas of research: 'war from below', the 'shaping of collective mentalities', and 'war culture'.

This is a review of an encyclopaedia. Whatever has been said so far, the many entries on a diversity of topics are the bargain offers, from 'Aberglauben', 'Adria', 'Henri Alain-Fournier' (French war poet) to 'Zweifrontenkrieg', 'Arnold Zweig' (German writer), and 'Zweite Internationale'. Anything the reader might have found missing in the narrative part is likely to turn up in the encyclopaedia section, for instance, the colonial war or statistics about war losses. As one would expect, names of individuals (generals, politicians, authors, artists), battlefields, and other locations, and special terms ('Dicke Berta', 'Franktireur', 'Tank' etc.) dominate this part of the book. But there are also many entries which reflect a more modern interest, such as 'Fronttheater', 'Gerücht', 'Hunger', 'Ikonographie', 'Judenzählung', 'Kochbuch', 'Mohnblume', 'Nibelungentreue' (special bonding between Germans and Austrians), 'Soldatenverbrüderung' (fraternization), 'Ungeziefer' etc. In former times such topics would have been dismissed as irrelevant; not so today, with our increased interest in everyday life at war. It is mainly for its first-class textbook quality that this encyclopaedia should be on every librarian's purchasing list; in Germany it probably already is in view of its nomination as Book of the Year. After all, it does no harm for the ordinary schoolboy to delve into the madness of trench warfare.

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Ferdinand Weisheitinger, born in 1883, served as a corporal in the Bavarian army during the First World War. In his diary he wrote about 'the madness' that he saw in the killing fields of the war. He described the faces and voices of the soldiers who were dying next to him. And he recorded his own anxieties about being mutilated or dying a slow death. Yet Weisheitinger was also an entertainer. Better known as Weiß Ferdel, he performed songs and skits at the front, mostly sentimental or humorous pieces that seemed to escape the horrors of trench warfare. Rather than express the deeply critical views that he penned in his diary, he delighted fellow soldiers and officers with slapstick and Bavarian *Mundart* (dialect).

The example of this soldier-entertainer, and the deeply humane contradiction between private views and public appearances that he experienced, forms one of numerous case studies in Martin Baumeister's excellent monograph on German theatre during the First World War. *Kriegstheater* offers a wealth of material on how different forms of theatre developed during the war, both in Berlin and at the front. Much of this material is new and will be valuable for scholars from a range of disciplines. What is more, by bringing together theatre studies and modern history, Baumeister opens a new perspective on some of the main debates concerning Imperial Germany and the cultural history of the First World War. He does so without losing sight of the political, social, and urban context. Indeed, one may take this book as a sign that historians of the First World War are starting to bring the politics back into cultural history.

Baumeister works with a widely cast concept of 'theatre', including the traditional, highbrow *Kulturtheater* and the more lowbrow *Unterhaltungstheater*, but also circus, *variet*é, and other forms of entertainment. A common feature of most of these forms of theatre in the years before and during the First World War was that they were arenas of popular culture—popular not so much in a normative sense, but in a socio-political one: their audiences were increasingly drawn from the urban masses that had begun to play an important role in the political process even before the war. Popular theatre was political theatre, for this reason alone. From August 1914 onwards it took

on a distinctly political character for another reason: it provided one of the main sites where the meaning of and mobilization for war were negotiated in the public sphere.

Baumeister's analysis of this *Kriegstheater* is divided into two main parts: the first deals with theatre in Berlin; the second with theatre at the front. At the outbreak of war, politics and culture were engaged in a potent amalgamation, underlining the importance of exactly the kind of history practised in this study. Baumeister sees a 'theatrical character' (p. 292) in the way the first days of war were made sense of in Berlin. Theatre was one of the main arenas in which the *August-erlebnis* was formed and canonized. While Berliners reacted in heterogeneous ways to the outbreak of war, popular theatre constructed the nation as awakening and rallying to arms in unison, in particular, through the imagery of family and community. Baumeister's findings underline Jeffrey Verhey's analysis of the 'spirit of 1914', offering a persuasive analysis of how the 'myth of 1914' was constructed in the first months of the war and reformulated until 1918.[1]

Berlin's theatres adapted to the war surprisingly well and quickly. There was a short-lived sense of crisis before most of them experienced a long season of wartime success, which was in stark contrast to more experimental forms of entertainment such as the Berlin cabaret analysed by Peter Jelavich.[2] The popular stages in particular saw a sustained demand for entertainment. The fare offered to audiences also changed fundamentally during the war. The genre of *vaterländische Schauspiele* that dominated the theatres during the first months of the war was soon superseded by a return to older themes and traditions. By early 1916 the theatre had clearly steered away from plays that were concerned with current events and the war itself. There were, however, important exceptions to this. One example is Otto Reutter, an entertainment star and the driving force behind a series of successful shows at the *Palast-Theater*. Baumeister provides a close reading of this *Heimattheater* that combined musical theatre, drama, and comedy in its staging of the city and the nation at war. Reutter addressed the challenges to traditional gender roles

[1] Jeffrey Verhey, *The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth and Mobilization in Germany* (Cambridge, 2000).
[2] Peter Jelavich, *Berlin Cabaret* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993).

provoked by the war and acknowledged the hardship endured by Berlin's population. Yet he glossed this 'other side' (p. 150) of the war with a generous dose of humour and music. Moreover, he constructed the city and the nation as a community united in opposition to internal and external enemies. Jews were ridiculed in grossly stereotyped scenes. While articulating suffering and hardship, Reutter's theatre re-affirmed official ideas of the *Volksgemeinschaft* at war.

In the second part of the book Baumeister contrasts this urban picture with the various forms of theatre at the front. There are well-researched examples ranging from the spontaneous entertainment staged for and by sailors to the more highbrow troupe of the *Gruppen-Theater Wijtschate*, of which Erwin Piscator was a prominent member. (He was later to become an influential director in the Weimar Republic and in the early Federal Republic.) The longer the war continued, the more organized and multi-layered did this culture of acting and entertaining at the front become. In Baumeister's description it never appears as a mere propaganda or morale-boosting exercise, but as an activity that was just as much driven by the soldiers themselves. When the army leadership became involved in soldiers' entertainment it did so in reaction to the many initiatives taken by the troops themselves. These forms of theatre performed by and for soldiers were 'islands of creativity on the fringes of the modern battle field' (p. 258), designed to break up the material reality of war. Baumeister shows this *Fronttheater* as a symbolic practice that was inherently ambiguous: war and laughter, play and seriousness co-existed. Its character as entertainment was dominant, but the theatre at the front addressed important underlying questions, in particular, ideas about the nation, normality, and family. What was mostly absent was the traumatic experience of warfare.

Another kind of *Fronttheater* took place on the official stages established in the zones occupied by the German army. Again, the extent to which the theatre was a political arena becomes obvious. In the occupied zones, theatre was an instrument of occupation. The demonstration of German culture and its superiority, not least through dramatic art, was a stated aim of the military leadership. If, as Ludendorff put it in 1917, the German war effort was characterized by a *Geist* that their enemies lacked, this 'spirit' was to be displayed prominently in the theatre. Consequently, *Deutsche Theater* were set up in both the Eastern and Western occupied zones. Kowno

and Vilna each got their own *Deutsches Theater*, similarly Brussels and Lille, where a German theatre was opened at Christmas 1915 in the largely destroyed city. These 'cultural deeds', as they were referred to by the German press, were designed symbolically to counter ideas about German barbarism and militarism. However, the audiences for such rhetoric remained largely domestic ones. Hardly any French or Belgian citizens are recorded as having visited the *Deutsche Theater*.

Beyond this rich and largely new material, three aspects of Baumeister's study stand out for historians of modern Germany and for cultural historians of the First World War. First, the issue of mobilization and propaganda. How was German society mobilized for war and where did the initiative in this process lie? Baumeister seems rightly sceptical about the value of propaganda as an explanatory concept, in particular, where theatre is concerned. This was not an arena in which propaganda was simply played out. 'Above' and 'below' (much-quoted, yet frustratingly imprecise terms for the location of power) interacted in more complicated ways. Mobilization from above met with decentralized and spontaneous forms of self-mobilization that could represent radically different interests. Only once the many private and semi-private actors and initiatives are taken into consideration can the scale and longevity of the cultural mobilization for war be fully understood. Baumeister sees this process as characterized by the same totalizing logic that historians have seen at work at political, military, and economic levels. All this is convincing, yet it is curious how little conflict he finds between the different actors involved in cultural mobilization. *Kriegstheater* describes the mechanisms of control and censorship that influenced this multi-layered process, but it leaves little room for the analysis of how ideas about the war were formed *before* they were put on stage. Surely some of the most telling moments took place during the writing, editing, and instructing that went on before the curtains opened, a process in which control and censorship would have met with self-mobilization and commercial interest. The question of whether the cultural negotiation of how this war should be dealt with in the theatre was quite as conflict-free a process as Baumeister seems to suggest remains open to debate.

The second key question that stands out is: what kind of war was staged in this *Kriegstheater* and whose war was it? Baumeister suggests that—in the theatres of Berlin at least—this was decidedly a

people's war. To be sure, the emperor and his predecessors were alluded to in a range of plays. There were famous examples of this in the early days of the war, such as 'Der Kaiser rief', a patriotic play by Franz Cornelius. Yet, in wartime theatre, the Prussian-German monarchy and the wider German aristocracy were pushed into the background. In the *Volksstücke* that came to dominate the stages of Berlin ordinary Germans were fighting a people's war. This popular concern was not only evident in the patriotic plays of the first months of the war, which focused mostly on ordinary Berliners following the call to arms. While later examples were less overtly optimistic about the war, they continued to depict it as a battle of the people, in which social differentiation and hierarchies were blurred. One can detect an intriguing democratic undertone in these *Volksstücke*. Baumeister leaves open the question of whether this should be seen as a mirror of wider socio-political changes.

The third issue of note is the relationship between home and front. Baumeister shows that theatre played a key role here. It constituted one of the few cultural activities that offered representations of normality and peace time to the soldiers at the front. Indeed, the staging of 'home' seems to have been one of the main functions of the *Fronttheater* performed by and for soldiers. Often enough this took the form of a curious gender theatre: in order to depict 'home' the soldiers took on female roles. Actors such as Erwin Piscator, entertainers like Weiß Ferdl, and countless amateur soldier-actors all appeared in female costume. This ranged from simply acting as female characters or imitating famous female stars to grotesque representations of the female body and transvestite shows that had strong sexual undertones. Hardly ever did this cross dressing meet with objections from the military authorities or the wider civilian public. Most of the soldiers who were asked to act as women relished the crossing of gender boundaries. Baumeister suggests that, by slipping into female roles, they were able to enact civilian identities and pre-war aspects of 'home'.

There are a number of issues that Baumeister's book raises, but which could have been pushed further. For one, the gendered strategies of narrating the war on the stage would have merited further analysis. One of the remarkable findings of this book is the extent to which the wartime stages were used as public spaces for the reversal or transcendence of gender roles. While soldier-actors at the front

assumed female identities, a re-narration of femininity took place in the popular theatres of Berlin. Baumeister addresses in passing some of the wider implications of this cross dressing, but it does beg the question of whether one of the main functions of German theatre at war was to give space to the cultural negotiation of new gender roles and challenged images of the male and female body. For another, the theatricality that Baumeister intriguingly identifies in the streets of Berlin at the beginning of war could have been unravelled further. There is an especially interesting section on 'public space as a stage' (pp. 34 ff.) in which Baumeister shows how patriotism and enthusiasm for war were 'played' by different groups in public. But what was at the heart of this remarkable overlap between street and stage during the early days of August 1914, and what should our understanding of theatre be as a result?

Finally, does all this amount to a revision of the cultural history of the First World War, a historiographical field that has been characterized for some time now by opposite interpretations about how societies and cultures responded to, and made sense of, the war?[3] Have those who have argued that the war was a catalyst of modernity overstated their case? Or have those interpreting the cultural responses to the war as essentially traditional been blind to novel forms of theatre developed between 1914 and 1918? Here Baumeister initially seems surprisingly hesitant. Surely his rich and well-researched material could have provided a more forceful conclusion than a cautious emphasis on ambiguity. There were exceptions, and Baumeister does well to stress them, but is the overall impression not one of the theatres narrating the war in a predominantly nostalgic and romantic language, of them looking backwards, rather than addressing the war in novel or modernist forms? However, on second reading, it is precisely here that one of the key strengths of this book lies. Rather than side with one of the two orthodoxies in this increasingly artificial debate, it argues its own case, if not, perhaps, altogether forcefully: new and old were not contradictions or oppositions in how theatre narrated the war. Cultural historians should

[3] For the contrasting positions see Modris Eksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (London, 1989); and Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge, 1995).

overcome the dichotomy between modern and traditional that seems to hinder rather than help our understanding of how European societies responded to and made sense of the First World War. This book, with its careful unravelling of the ambiguous ways in which German theatre negotiated a popular path through the war, takes an important step towards that aim.

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ROBERT GERWARTH, *The Bismarck Myth: Weimar Germany and the Legacy of the Iron Chancellor* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), xii +216 pp. ISBN 0 19 928184 X. £45.00

The politics of history (*Geschichtspolitik*) is a fashionable area for study at the moment. By *Geschichtspolitik* I mean the 'political use of history in public in order to achieve mobilization, politicization, or legitimization in political debate'.[1]

In his investigation of the Bismarck myth in the Weimar Republic, Robert Gerwarth deals with an explosive chapter of historical politics during Germany's first democracy. He has used a large number of mainly published sources, newspapers and journals from all political camps, minutes of Reichstag meetings, and materials from various archives.

Gerwarth identifies the core of the Bismarck myth of the Weimar period as the claim that the republic was founded, against the spirit of Bismarck, by political forces described by the chancellor as enemies of the Reich. The Bismarck myth thus defined played a central role in the heated ideological battle for the past, Gerwarth suggests, and this is why Weimar's political culture cannot be explained adequately without an analysis of the Bismarck myth. According to the author, the political right used this anti-democratic myth in a targeted way in order to destroy the republic's legitimacy. In addition to his main argument, Gerwarth goes on to claim that the Bismarck myth also made a considerable contribution to the rise of National Socialism by popularizing and encouraging two important elements of the radical right's agitation, namely, a strong anti-parliamentarism and the hope for a charismatic leader, a 'second Bismarck', as which Adolf Hitler, ever more emphatically, presented himself. Thus, according to Gerwarth, the Bismarck myth functioned as a 'destructive power' (p. 176) between 1918 and 1933.

In fact, Gerwarth marshals a great deal of evidence to demonstrate the astonishing degree to which the spirit of the Reich's founder was present at the political debates. Bismarck's likeness was even used in election campaigns. Thus an election poster for the conservative Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP, German National

[1] Edgar Wolfrum, 'Geschichte als Politikum — Geschichtspolitik', *Neue Politische Literatur*, 41 (1996), pp. 376–401, at 377.

People's Party) contrasts Bismarck, 'statesman of a black–white–red Germany', with Philipp Scheidemann, who had proclaimed the republic on 9 November 1918 and is here described as 'the mouthpiece of a black–red–gold Germany' (p. 79). This went along with a demand: 'German voters compare! Vote black–white–red! Vote Deutschnational!' (p. 79). Yet the rightist liberal Deutsche Volkspartei (DVP, German People's Party) also appealed to Bismarck in its election campaign. Its poster featured the mighty head of the founder of the Reich next to the text: 'Bismarck on 11 August 1867: "Politics is the art of the possible!" Vote Deutsche Volkspartei!' (p. 80).

These two examples alone—and they could easily be multiplied—demonstrate that historical–political references to Bismarck during the Weimar period were not limited to the 'Bismarck myth' as defined by Gerwarth. To be sure, it was deployed overwhelmingly by the political right wing as a weapon in the battle against the republic, and it had a negative impact in this area. But there were also references to the politics and personality of the founder of the Reich which were intended to stabilize the republic, not undermine it. Here we must first mention Gustav Stresemann, German chancellor in the crisis year of 1923, long-serving foreign minister, and Germany's first Nobel Peace Laureate. Of all the politicians in the Weimar Republic, Stresemann was probably the one with the best knowledge of Bismarck, and also the one who most frequently invoked Bismarck in justifying his own policies. Thus it is laudable that Gerwarth, although he focuses on the anti-democratic Bismarck myth, also explores in detail Stresemann's image of Bismarck, 'which deviated significantly from that of the nationalist right' (p. 74).

In a speech he gave on 1 December 1921, Stresemann appealed to his party friends: 'I ask you to go back in German history, to consider the greatest statesman the world had in the nineteenth century, Bismarck. Were his politics anything other than the politics of compromise? . . . Was his policy of the achievable not a hundred times more national-minded and forward-looking than the politics of those who felt the necessity to attack it?' (p. 75).

Stresemann's notion of 'national *Realpolitik*'—a key concept of his foreign policy—was derived directly from Bismarck. According to Gerwarth, he defined it 'contrary to the political ideas linked with the name of Bismarck on the Weimar right as a policy free of the illusions of both the right and left, a policy "which is conscious of the limita-

tions of our power and which seeks understanding and peace"' (pp. 84 f.). In order to justify both his Locarno policy (1925) and the Berlin Treaty (1926), Stresemann alluded to Bismarck as a *Realpolitiker* whose aim was to maintain the peace. Stresemann's commitment to an interpretation of Bismarck's politics which was undoubtedly closer to the 'real' Bismarck than the unscrupulous misappropriation of Bismarck by the political right wing is remarkable, even if the latter dominated in the historical–political struggle.

The political instrumentalization of Bismarck by the right-wing political parties and their press is impressively presented by Gerwarth. To mention just a few points: the DNVP called its large and popular youth organization the Bismarck Youth; in the elections for the Reich president in 1925, Hindenburg was discovered to have 'Bismarck-like qualities' (and Hindenburg later encouraged the erection of a Bismarck national memorial and the making of a two-part film in 1925 and 1927, which contrasted the great days under Bismarck with the sad republican present); in their campaign against the Young Plan, the right-wing parties referred emphatically to Bismarck, and even more strongly than in the years of stabilization, the Bismarck myth became a weapon in the fight against the 'system'.

This is all quite true, and Gerwarth demonstrates the far-reaching effectiveness of the Bismarck myth in the years of the Weimar Republic, but it needs to be pointed out that Gerwarth tends to overestimate the influence of these historical–political activities on the actual course of events. We can take it as an exaggeration when he claims that 'Bismarck was to play a key role in the final act of Weimar Germany' (p. 127), or that 'The Bismarck myth helped to create a political climate which smoothed the way for Hitler's success' (p. 143). Here his tunnel-vision, fixated on the Bismarck myth, seems to have led Gerwarth into making a disproportionate assessment of events in the republic's final phase.

Gerwarth frames his central chapters on the historical–political instrumentalization of the Bismarck myth in the Weimar Republic with a prologue and an epilogue. In the prologue he investigates the development of the Bismarck cult before 1918 and establishes that it served to support and legitimize the existing political order. Thus its function was the exact opposite of the Bismarck myth's after 1918, namely, to delegitimize the existing republican order. In the epilogue, Gerwarth comments briefly on the role which Bismarck and

the Bismarck myth played in the years of Nazi rule and in post-war Germany. During the final phase of the republic, Bismarck was, with Frederick the Great, the historical figure to whom Hitler referred most frequently, but this changed soon after the seizure of power was complete: 'The old nationalist myths were pushed into the background. Bismarck, so it seemed, had fulfilled his role for Germany's new rulers' (p. 149). Work on the Bismarck national memorial in Bingen was halted in 1934 and never resumed.

Gerwarth's comments, filling ten pages, on the gradual revision of the Bismarck myth in West Germany after 1945 do not go beyond a brief sketch. We must agree, however, with his statement that 'A revival of the Bismarck myth in the context of the re-emergence of a new German nationalism is not in sight' (p. 169). A poll carried out in 1998 revealed that 53 per cent of those asked did not know the name 'Bismarck'. This simple fact alone shows that the time for an instrumentalization of Bismarck for present-day political purposes, the time for a Bismarck myth of whatever sort, is gone for good. However, a serious academic engagement with the personality and politics of Bismarck is still worthwhile.

One comment in conclusion. This book by a German historian on a very German topic is written in English. Therefore where German-language literature on the subject exists in English translation, the English edition is used and cited in the footnotes. All quotations from primary sources are translated into English, which means that if they are to be cited in a German context, they have to be translated back into German or the original source located, sometimes involving great difficulty and inconvenience. It is clear that this is a highly unfortunate state of events. Was no German publisher prepared to publish this extremely worthwhile academic investigation?

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FRANK-RUTGER HAUSMANN (ed.), with the assistance of ELISA-BETH MÜLLER-LUCKNER, *Die Rolle der Geisteswissenschaften im Dritten Reich 1933–1945*, Schriften des Historischen Kollegs, Kolloquien 53 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2002), xxv + 373 pp. ISBN 3 486 56639 3. EUR 64.80

KARL-HEINZ SCHOEPS, *Literature and Film in the Third Reich*, trans. by Kathleen M. Dell'Orto, 1st English-language edn., based on the 2nd German edn. but revised and expanded, Studies in German Literature, Linguistics and Culture (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2004), viii + 371 pp. ISBN 1 57113 252 X. $75.00. £50.00

Successive German ambassadors to the Court of St James's have noted, and deplored in vain, what they have seen as a British obsession with Hitler and the Third Reich, not only in the media but also in the history syllabus of our schools. At the end of 2005 the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) echoed their complaints and offered suggestions on how schools might widen their teaching to cover the momentous events that have shaped Germany since 1945—division, the Cold War, the Berlin Wall, reunification—and the country's successful transformation into a strong and stable democracy. These are laudable sentiments. However, there is no disputing the fact that the Nazi dictatorship retains a powerful fascination for anyone interested in the nature of human evil, or how highly civilized communities can swiftly collapse into barbarism. What the ambassadors and the QCA overlook is the fact that German historians, too, are equally indefatigable in studying and researching the Hitler period. In their case an even greater impetus has been given to scholars by the sudden accessibility of archives that came with unification and the end of the Cold War. Frank-Rutger Hausmann's *Die Rolle der Geisteswissenschaften im Dritten Reich 1933–1945* is an excellent example of the spate of high-quality publications on the period that have appeared over the last two decades.

The essays in this stimulating and well-researched volume are the product of a colloquium held in the Munich Historisches Kolleg in February 2000 on the theme of 'Kontinuität und Wandel'. The scope is broad: English studies, *Germanistik*, history, Celtic studies, music, philosophy, psychology, Slavonic philology, sports science, linguistics, and pre- and early history are all covered. The volume opens with two general essays: a magisterial overview by Otto Gerhard

Oexle ('"Wirklichkeit"—"Krise der Wirklichkeit"—"Neue Wirklichkeit": Deutungsmuster und Paradigmenkämpfe in der deutschen Wissenschaft vor und nach 1933') and a fascinating investigation by Lothar Mertens of the principal research body in the Third Reich, 'Die Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaft/Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 1933–1936'. The Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaft (NdW) was founded in 1920 and re-named the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DfG)—the title it retains today—in 1934 when, presumably, the Nazis deemed any research funding emergency long since past.

As his rather forbidding title indicates, Oexle traces the progressive loss of confidence in the existence of an objective reality that set in at the turn of the century in the wake of Nietzsche. The crisis affected not only philosophy, but also literature, art, and the natural sciences in equal measure. His survey of the impact of intellectual and moral relativity, the sudden undermining of once stable norms and values, covers familiar ground but in unusual depth. Oexle argues that such constant debates, the search for a reality that could offer a sense of belonging, actually lent plausibility, even a veneer of respectability, to the *Machtergreifung*. Consequently, the disastrous outcome of the First World War, above all, the inflation of 1923, and the fatal fragility of the Weimar Republic could easily be interpreted as the necessary preconditions for the National Socialist revolution with its seductive vision of a new and revitalized Germany. Oexle quotes one of the most perceptive contemporary witnesses of the disintegration of values and the crude reality behind such a spurious teleology. In 1939, the year he fled to London, Sebastian Haffner wrote that 1923 and all that had led up to it 'did not prepare Germany specifically for Nazism but for any fantastic adventure' (p. 12).

The central figure in Mertens's account of the NdW/DFG is Johannes Stark, winner of the 1919 Nobel Prize for Physics. Despite his professional pre-eminence, Stark was a wilful eccentric and deeply unpleasant anti-Semite who misused his powers of patronage in the most shameful way. During his presidency of the DFG from 1934 to 1936, for example, he largely ignored disciplines other than his own. Quite apart from the emigration of many gifted physicists, Stark's bitter opposition to Einstein's work—Einstein's non-Jewish supporters such as Werner Heisenberg were notoriously defamed as 'white Jews'—crucially hindered the development of the subject in

Germany. Through such telling portraits Mertens highlights how research and its funding were constantly subject to personal animosities and feuds between various competing Nazi agencies. As for younger scholars with careers to establish, an examination of the files of over 1,200 applications to the NdW/DFG for research grants during the years 1934–7, lodged since 1945 in the Hoover Institution in Stanford, clearly shows a readiness for opportunistic *Selbstgleichschaltung*: before 1933 only 41 applicants were already members of the NSDAP (a further 16 had joined the SA, and 1 the SS); by summer of that year 51 had joined the party, 125 the SA, and 19 the SS. Though these figures show that around 75 per cent appear to have kept their distance from active participation in party organizations, none appear to have registered any opposition or much interest in the fate of their Jewish colleagues.

The succeeding accounts of individual disciplines all indicate, to a greater or lesser degree, the supine attitude of most academics whenever they came into contact with Nazi ideological requirements. K. Ludwig Pfeiffer, for example, demonstrates the difficulties the *Anglisten* had in their half-hearted attempts to dismantle traditional views of England as a leading cultural force. The result—seen most clearly in the two volumes of essays, published in 1941 and 1943 as the profession's contribution to the Aktion Ritterbusch (the so-called Kriegseinsatz der Geisteswissenschaften[1])—was banality and intellectual mediocrity.

As Pfeiffer remarks, English studies was a Cinderella subject. *Germanistik*, on the other hand, was a centrally important discipline. Germanists had long seen themselves as crucial actors in the process of nation-building. Holger Dainat's authoritative essay shows not only how the subject's traditionally conservative syllabus was, in effect, maintained throughout the Nazi dictatorship—though Jewish writers, of course, were silently written out of the canon—but also throws fresh light on the socio-political dimensions of the university system. Indeed, because the main task of university German depart-

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[1] Paul Ritterbusch, a lawyer, was *Rektor* of Kiel University. He co-ordinated the Kriegseinsatz der Geisteswissenschaften (1940–5), the largest humanities project of the Third Reich. The many volumes of this public enterprise sharply revise the self-serving image of the scholar tucked away in his ivory tower with no responsibility for the terrible events unfolding around him.

ments was the training of secondary school teachers, they were always peculiarly dependent on the state and its cultural policies. The discipline's roots can thus be traced deep into the authoritarian structures of the Wilhelmine period. Consequently, Jews, liberals, and women had less chance of establishing a career in this field than in many others. This entrenched conservative temperament largely explains the depressing submissiveness of Germanists in the Third Reich. There were relatively few dismissals and certainly fewer protests. Indeed, to the shame of many, there was significant support for Nazi ideology, even if much of it was opportunistic. Nevertheless, despite such conformity, Dainat paints a complex picture of the efforts made to maintain academic standards. For example, Nazi interference in the appointments to Chairs declined after 1937, though, of course, by then the field had been cleared of most racially and politically undesirable individuals. It is also clear that what university autonomy existed was allowed only because institutions offered little resistance to their ultimate masters. The fact that Germanists in the Third Reich ruthlessly pursued their academic careers, even as their society sank into unparalleled barbarity, ensured for most of them a smooth transition into the post-war dispensation.

The only rival in the humanities to *Germanistik* in terms of size and importance was history. Jürgen Elvert's wide-ranging contribution traces the complex and often contradictory post-war assessments of the role played by historians in the Third Reich. His close analysis of institutional changes shows that in 1933, one fifth (31) of 147 professors of history were dismissed or forced into retirement on racial or political grounds. Although a minority maintained a critical, if obviously muted or coded, attitude towards Nazi ideology, Elvert points to the melancholy fact that a proportionately greater number of historians overtly threw in their lot with the Nazis than in other disciplines. The central phenomenon is shown to be similar to that already noted in *Germanistik*: the characteristically anti-democratic, conservative-radical views of the majority of historians were formed long before the Nazis seized power.[2] Their hostility towards the Weimar

[2] For example, Elvert notes that of the 180 full professors in all branches of history in the 1920s, barely a dozen could be described as convinced or 'Vernunft-Republikaner' (p. 114). If anything, the older generation of Germanists, especially those who had fought in the First World War, was even more hostile to the Weimar Republic.

Republic, shared, of course, by many intellectuals, made it significantly easier for the Nazis' aggressive vision of a strong state to be widely accepted, at least initially. Given such intellectual and moral failure, it is all the more regrettable that it took until the 1998 *Historikertag* in Frankfurt-on-Main for a thorough debate on the role played by historians in the Third Reich to begin—over three decades later than that initiated by the younger generation of Germanists in their subject.

Joachim Lerchenmüller and Anselm Gerhard cover the smaller disciplines of Celtic studies and music, respectively. The former is shown to have been thoroughly politicized. Its proponents made up for their small number by the enthusiasm with which they served the Nazi state. In particular, they maintained strong links to the SS and Himmler's *Ahnenerbe* research programme that was intended to demonstrate the superiority of the cultural heritage of the Germanic past. Music scholars, on the other hand, needed no convincing of the cultural pre-eminence of their subject and thus required little pressure to share the nationalistic arrogance of the Nazis. Nevertheless, Gerhard's concentration on four case studies (Heinrich Besseler, Friedrich Blume, Hans-Joachim Moser, and Alfred Einstein) enables him to offer a carefully differentiated picture of a small profession that was distorted more by personal conflicts than ideological intolerance. The most interesting figure is Besseler: although he had been a member of the NSDAP since 1937, he did his best to protect his Jewish postgraduates. He later became a major figure in the GDR—a considerable achievement in a state that dealt more severely with ex-Nazis or Nazi opportunists than was the norm in the FRG.

In contrast to such small professional groups, philosophy with its relevance to practically every discipline within the university was a major subject and one seen as especially 'German'. The clashes both at personal and ideological level were correspondingly more explosive. Hans-Joachim Dahm's impressive survey covers not only the reception of Plato and Nietzsche and the infamous role of Heidegger in the Third Reich, but underlines also the crucial damage inflicted on the discipline by the dismissal after 1933 of one third of the professoriate with the subsequent suppression of such fields as Jewish *Religionsphilosophie,* logical empiricism, and neo-Kantian philosophy. Like Gerhard, Dahm strengthens his analysis with a close study of the ideas and activities of five exemplary philosophers, the most

interesting of whom are Erich Rothacker and Heidegger himself. Neither showed any strident sympathy for National Socialism before 1933, though Rothacker did publicly support Hitler for the Reich Presidency in 1932, when most men of his national-conservative temper were for Hindenburg. Both, however, became deeply embroiled in the Third Reich. The Heidegger story and his shabby evasiveness after the war are well-known, Rothacker's activities less so. For example, Rothacker held a major post in Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry, where one of his duties was to liaise with students organizing the 'Aktion gegen den undeutschen Geist', the infamous campaign that culminated in the *Bücherverbrennung* of 10 May 1933.[3]

In the only essay specifically commissioned for this volume, Mitchell G. Ash traces the individual and ideological ruptures in psychology after 1933. One third of the subject's professors (5) were promptly dismissed or harried into retirement by the Nazis. A familiar pattern emerges: isolated voices of protest were drowned out by the noisy enthusiasm of opportunists. Psychology, with its intimate relationship to the sister disciplines of psychiatry, biology, and anthropology, was peculiarly susceptible to the sinister, irrational dictates of Nazi ideology. Once the profession had 'eliminated a parasitically rampant Judaism' (p. 241), to quote Friedrich Sander, who had promptly succeeded to the Chair of a dismissed Jewish colleague at Jena, it was ready to sacrifice all academic integrity in order to advance Nazi aims.

The other four disciplines covered—Slavonic philology (Helmut W. Schaller), sports science (Jürgen Court), linguistics (Clemens Knoblauch), and pre- and early history (Wolfgang Pape)—receive equally informative treatment. Although Slavonic philology was taught at only five universities, Schaller shows that despite the *Wendenerla*ß of 1937 that was aimed at the oppression of the Lausitzian Sorbs, the Slavists on the whole remained untainted by accommodation with the regime. Sport, on the other hand, readily lent itself to instrumentalization by the Nazis. The discipline had rap-

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[3] After a short de-Nazification process in 1945, Rothacker was able to stay in his Bonn Chair where he was later to become Jürgen Habermas's Ph.D. supervisor. His activities in the Third Reich were not revealed until the 1980s. He published his memoirs in 1963 with the extraordinary title, *Heitere Erinnerungen.*

idly established itself after the First World War, and Court's essay reveals how Nazi policy merely continued the authoritarian, anti-democratic traditions developed in the Weimar Republic. He demonstrates the origins and impact of such ideas by a startling juxtaposition of the personalities of Carl Diem, the father of sports science in Germany, and Victor Klemperer, the Jewish Romanist. Both shared an almost identical intellectual and social formation—and thus similar ideas about the role of sport. However, whereas Diem found no difficulty in serving the Nazi regime, Klemperer was forced by circumstance and experience to re-think his earlier espousal of vitalistic Idealism. Thus it was Klemperer, not Diem, who was able to gauge the true significance of the Berlin Olympic Games in 1936 and to appreciate how easily idealist principles can be corrupted by political power.

Although linguistics was not an independent discipline at the time, Knoblauch's thoughtful essay argues that the idea of a 'value-free' science is a chimera. He demonstrates how linguistics was infiltrated by socio-political and ideological considerations well before the Nazis seized power. Indeed, where scholars' research helped to define and defend linguistic minorities, for example, it could be claimed that their work had beneficial effects. The problem, of course, arises when such efforts are distorted for criminal, racist, or aggressively expansionist ends—what Christopher Hutton has called, in a trenchant phrase, 'mother-tongue fascism'.[4]

The final chapter by Wolfgang Pape documents the extraordinary rise in popularity of pre- and early history. For example, between 1933 and 1942, the number of Chairs in the field tripled. In Breslau alone student numbers rose from 350 in 1932 to 2,000 a mere two years later. Naturally, this expansion reflected the value the Nazis placed on the subject and the readiness of its teachers to deliver what was required, that is, evidence of the supremacy of the Nordic races. Not surprisingly, perhaps, this branch of history was markedly over-represented in the ranks of the NSDAP—indeed, many had joined the party before 1933—and even more so in the SA and the SS where the *Ahnenerbe* project acted as a magnet for scholars in search of funding and openings for personal advancement. Pape delivers chapter

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[4] See Christopher M. Hutton, *Linguistics and the Third Reich: Mother-Tongue Fascism, Race and the Science of Language* (London, 1999).

and verse, via a series of fascinating charts, for this high level of conformism. More depressingly, he is able to show that 1945 brought no decisive caesura in the careers of those involved: nearly all remained in their university posts.

Throughout these essays the authors point, time and again, to uncomfortable continuities from the Wilhelmine era, through the Weimar Republic to the Third Reich, into the fledgling democracy of the Federal Republic, and occasionally into the GDR. The strength of many of the contributions lies in linking the history of institutions with exemplary case studies of individual scholars that have drawn fruitfully on the relevant university archives. In sum, the book admirably fulfils its aim of assessing the current state of research into the individual disciplines and pointing to the work that still has to be done. In one particular, however, a reservation must be made. If Klaus Hildebrand's recent complaint (quoted in Hausmann's introduction, p. vii) that the general public have not taken much notice of the considerable body of research into the situation of the universities in the Third Reich is correct, it behoves scholars to make their work more accessible. Hausmann himself defensively points to the need for careful referencing in the presentation of new research. But too many of the contributions are written in such convoluted German and equipped with so many footnotes—the record is 148 in an essay of 23 pages—that only the most dedicated members of the *Zunft* are likely to grind their way through them.

The translation of Karl-Heinz Schoeps's well-known study, first published in 1992 under the title *Literatur im Dritten Reich*, is welcome. It is based on the second German edition (2000), but revised, expanded, and brought up to date with current scholarship. Although the book is well researched, fully referenced, and equipped with a good bibliography, it would not claim the depth of original scholarship that informs the Hausmann compilation. That is not its purpose. Schoeps offers instead a broad-brush introduction to his topic that creates a reliable starting point for students. Two introductory chapters briefly set out the historical and ideological context of the period; these are followed by a more substantial discussion of literature and cultural policies in the Third Reich. The scope is wide: for example, it surveys the work of the Amt Rosenberg, Himmler's *Ahnenerbe* programme, and the morally dubious role played by many Germanists in pursuit of their careers. A particularly useful section

discusses the ideological significance of the many histories of German literature that flooded the market during the Third Reich, culminating in the multi-authored, five-volume *Von deutscher Art in Sprache und Dichtung*, the Germanists' contribution to the mammoth Kriegseinsatz der Geisteswissenschaften. Although the author does not examine the content of this sorry enterprise, he does single out for justifiably detailed attention the popular racist histories of German literature by Adolf Bartels and Hellmuth Langenbucher, a key figure in the Amt Rosenberg.

Individual chapters are devoted to the National Socialist novel, drama, poetry, and film, with a final essay on non-Nazi or anti-Nazi literature. There is little to be said for specifically Nazi literature in terms of quality; the work has merely historical value. On the other hand, Schoeps accurately notes the ambiguities of the so-called 'innere Emigration' which enabled such ostensibly 'oppositional' novels as Werner Bergengruen's *Der Großtyrann und das Gericht* (1935) and Ernst Jünger's *Auf den Marmorklippen* (1939) to be successfully published in the Third Reich. Indeed, Jünger's reputation in the Third Reich was so high that in 1942 the German Army published a special edition of 20,000 copies of *Auf den Marmorklippen* for distribution to the troops.[5] In contrast, this is followed by an interesting overview of specifically anti-Nazi literature, with special attention paid to the poetry of Albrecht Haushofer, imprisoned and executed after the July plot, and Rose Ausländer who survived the Czernowitz ghetto. The assessments have the merit of succinctness, though they all too often incline towards description rather than critical analysis. The chapter ends with an odd and scrappy note on the uses made of Schiller's *Don Carlos* and *Wilhelm Tell* in the Third Reich, which an attentive editor would have cut since most of it already appears in chapter 3.

The chapter devoted to 'Film in the Third Reich', however, is problematic. Although it has been enlarged and a few stills of such popular films as *Hitlerjunge Quex* and the notorious *Jud Süß* have been added, it still only runs to a mere fourteen pages of text, scarcely 5 per cent of the book's length. This raises the question of whether

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[5] Jünger himself always denied that his novel was politically inspired or intended as a contribution to resistance. See J. M. Ritchie, *German Literature under National Socialism* (Beckenham, 1983), pp. 128 f.

the title of the volume is misleading. The original version already contained a six-page chapter on the topic, but 'film' was not included in its title until the second edition. Even with the current modest expansion, the changed title is clearly unjustified. Moreover, although Schoeps rightly notes that Goebbels thoroughly understood the need for escapism in the films offered to the public, no discussion of Nazi film is adequate without a proper consideration of its most gifted practitioner, Leni Riefenstahl. Here nothing new is added to the meagre handful of sentences that appeared in the first edition. Nor is there any mention of the propaganda use the Nazis made of the *Wochenschau*, a central ingredient in cinema programming during the war years. However, despite such objections, *Literature and Film in the Third Reich* offers plenty of fascinating information for further study; it is also fluently and accurately translated.

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NIKOLAUS WACHSMANN, *Hitler's Prisons: Legal Terror in Nazi Germany* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), xvii + 538 pp. ISBN 0 300 10250 X. £30.00

Much has been written about the Nazi concentration camps and the role of the law courts in the Third Reich. Interestingly, the link between these two elements of repression, namely, the Nazi prison system, has not received as much attention in historical research. This does not reflect the importance of the subject. For instance, Klaus Drobisch, one of the few historians who has dealt with it, points out that in the pre-war years there were more prisoners in the traditional prison system than in concentration camps.[1] Nikolaus Wachsmann is therefore right in stating that 'Hitler's prisons played an important role in Nazi terror—but we know very little about them' (p. 5). Wachsmann's substantial volume goes a long way towards changing this state of affairs. *Hitler's Prisons* fills a gap in our knowledge of Nazi policies of repression and is undoubtedly fundamental to any understanding of them.

The book is divided into four chronologically ordered parts. Part I, 'Setting the Scene', deals with prisons in the Weimar Republic; Part II, 'Enforcing Legal Terror, 1933–1939', looks at the pre-war period; Part III, 'Escalating Legal Terror, 1939–1945', is devoted to the war years; and Part IV, 'Aftermath', traces the fate of justice officials and prison warders after 1945 and puts the topic of the whole book into a comparative perspective. One of the greatest strengths of the volume is that it does not isolate the subject, and never loses sight of the broader political context.

The Weimar Republic, as Wachsmann points out, 'was obsessed with crime' (p. 18), largely because of the crime wave that swept Germany after the First World War. This did not create good conditions for prison reformers trying to break with the authoritarian Wilhelminian-style prison. Untermaßfeld in Thuringia became a model penitentiary, where the Study Group for Prison Reform under the auspices of criminal law professors Moritz Liepmann and Lothar

[1] Klaus Drobisch, 'Konzentrationslager und Justizhaft: Versuch einer Zusammenschau', in Helge Grabitz, Klaus Bästlein, and Johannes Tuchel (eds.), *Die Normalität des Verbrechens: Bilanz und Perspektiven der Forschung zu den nationalsozialistischen Gewaltverbrechen. Festschrift für Wolfgang Scheffler zum 65. Geburtstag* (Berlin, 1994), pp. 280–97.

Frede instituted a system of rewarding prisoners for good behaviour on a scale of increasing liberties. Characteristically, the prison chaplain was replaced by three social workers. On the whole, however, the reformers had very limited influence. Among the reasons for this was the reluctance of prison officials, from directors to warders, to embark on the path of reform. (As Wachsmann shows in the following chapters, there was much less reluctance when it came to enforcing racial policy under the Nazi regime.) Of course, the reformers were also attacked by right-wingers who spread allegations about the 'leniency' of the Weimar prison and condemned 'sentimental humanitarianism'. In addition, rising crime rates and, even more significantly, more severe sentences during the economic crisis of the early 1930s, which went along with falling state budgets, left little or no scope for reforming the prisons.

Fundamental changes in quite a different sense were made after the National Socialists came to power. Prison regulations became harsher and prison camps were established, first the infamous Emsland camps. Initially, these were concentration camps where SA and SS men guarded the 'peat-bog soldiers' (*Moorsoldaten*), and they were to revert to this role later. Beginning in 1934, however, the ordinary judicial authorities took over the camps, although many of the guards remained in their jobs. Werner Schäfer, an SA-*Standartenführer* and senior judicial official who, immediately after 1933, had run Oranienburg concentration camp as Commandant became Commander of the Emsland camps. As a result, apart from the administrative affiliation of the Emsland camps, under Schäfer's rule there was not much difference between them and concentration camps.

Underlying the changes in the prison regime was, of course, an ideological shift. The Nazis divided the members of society into 'national comrades' and 'community aliens'. The latter, in their view, had to be isolated or even annihilated. The concept of community alien was very broad, including political opponents of Nazi rule, Jews, homosexuals, 'asocials', 'dangerous habitual criminals', and others. These groups had little to do with each other; one of the places where they met was the Nazi prison. Wachsmann outlines the strategies of repression employed against them. These included establishing new courts such as the *Sondergerichte* (special courts) and the *Volksgerichtshof* (People's Court) to deal with political crimes, and introducing sterilization and castration in the case of sexual misbe-

haviour. Wachsmann's multifaceted narrative combines an analysis of Nazi laws and regulations with statistical interpretations and the presentation of testimonies of prison inmates. The basic trend he describes is towards almost total control of the delinquents. This could affect the physical integrity of prisoners: by 1939, 2,079 forcible castrations and 5,397 sterilizations had been carried out. Most of the victims of forcible castration were sex offenders; sterilization was often inflicted on homosexuals who could also 'voluntarily choose' sterilization in order to avoid transfer to a concentration camp after completing a prison sentence, a fate awaiting about 40 per cent of sentenced homosexuals. The second feature of the basic trend towards total control was the prolonging of sentences with or without indictment. In November 1933 the Habitual Criminals Law was passed. This provided a legal justification for the new measures of forcible castration and security confinement that allowed 'incorrigible habitual criminals' to be imprisoned without limitation. Judges were seemingly enthusiastic about the new possibilities. Between 1934 and 1939 they handed down almost 10,000 sentences of security confinement.[2] The prolongation of most of the sentences, however, occurred under the auspices of the Gestapo. The secret police were often waiting at the gates of the penitentiaries for political prisoners and other community aliens who had just completed their sentences to take them into 'protective custody' and deliver them to concentration camps.

It is impossible, therefore, to understand Nazi repressive policies by looking only at one administrative branch of the regime. Wachsmann devotes a whole chapter to the 'Nazi Web of Terror', in which he analyses the conflicts and compromises between the police and SS apparatus (including the concentration camps), which was steadily gaining in power on the one hand, and the justice system, including the prisons, on the other. The Ministry of Justice was clearly in the

[2] The instrument of security confinement survived 1945, but it has been applied more reluctantly and has twice been reformed to make it more liberal, in 1970 and 1975 respectively. See Christian Müller, *Das Gewohnheitsverbrechergesetz vom 24. November 1933: Kriminalpolitik als Rassenpolitik* (Baden-Baden, 1997). Between 1980 and 2001, the number of people in security confinement was steady at about 1,000. It did not even change after German reunification. *Statistisches Jahrbuch 2003 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Wiesbaden, 2003), p. 368.

weaker position in this power struggle, and, step by step, made concessions, collaborating more and more willingly. In the second half of the 1930s, the above-mentioned practice of prolonging sentences via 'protective custody' increasingly became a matter of collaboration between both agencies. The Ministry of Justice ordered prison administrations and the judiciary to inform the police about the release dates of a growing number of groups of prisoners.

With the beginning of the Second World War, the radicalization of the Nazi regime made a quantum leap and the legal system came under still greater pressure. Wachsmann outlines this development in the following chapter, adroitly linking analyses of general pre-war and wartime developments. New judicial norms provided for an even more severe judiciary than during the first half of Hitler's rule. In 1942 the dictator made several decisions of crucial significance for the legal system. On 26 April, in the last session of the Nazi Reichstag, he reprimanded the courts for their 'leniency' and declared that he would 'relieve of their office judges who are obviously failing to recognise the requirements of the day' (p. 214), thereby breaking with the principle of an independent judiciary which he had solemnly guaranteed to the representatives of the German Judges in 1933. Important changes took place in the Ministry of Justice. After the death of Hitler's first Minister of Justice, Franz Gürtner, his deputy, Franz Schlegelberger, stayed in charge for more than eighteen months. In August 1942 he was sent into retirement. Otto-Georg Thierack, President of the People's Court became Minister of Justice with Curt Rothenberger as his State Secretary, and Roland Freisler became President of the People's Court. 'The Nazi leadership regarded Thierack as the right man to bring the judiciary further into line with its genocidal thinking' (p. 216), writes Wachsmann, and, indeed, Thierack did his very best not to disappoint his superiors. Just one month after his appointment, on 18 September, he concluded an agreement with Himmler effecting the transfer of certain groups of prisoners marked as 'asocials' to the concentration camps for 'annihilation through labour'.

Between 1939 and 1945 prison conditions generally went 'from bad to worse' (p. 227), as Wachsmann puts it. Hunger, illness, and overcrowding were common in penitentiaries throughout the Reich, but with the Thierack–Himmler accord matters changed fundamentally. The legal system now took an active part in the wilful killing of

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prisoners who had not been condemned to death by a court. Groups targeted were all prisoners of Jewish origin, Sinti and Roma, Russians, Ukrainians, Poles serving sentences of more than three years, and individuals sentenced to security confinement. Prisoners had clearly become an international group in the war years. While members of the above-mentioned groups were automatically trans-ferred to the jurisdiction of the police, the Ministry of Justice was to decide on each individual case where Germans or Czechs were sen-tenced to more than eight years' imprisonment. This practice pre-sumably stemmed from a proposal by Joseph Goebbels, with whom Thierack had talked four days before concluding the agreement with Himmler. (Wachsmann mentions these talks but does not specify their content.[3]) Hitler approved of these measures. He himself had previously pushed in this direction, arguing that it was incompre-hensible that 'asocials' should be spared, while the best of the nation gave their lives on the Eastern Front. He and his supporters feared the prospect that inferior elements could prevail in German society. The logic of the racial society demanded the killing of these people.

As far as I am aware, Wachsmann's is the first in-depth study of the Thierack–Himmler accord, which is of great importance in at least two respects. It affected about 24,000 individuals and it marks the point at which the legal system of the Third Reich switched from tacit collaboration to active participation in the extra-judicial perse-cution and killing of prisoners. The Ministry of Justice itself stopped acknowledging the validity of the sentences handed down by the judiciary. Of special significance in this respect was the 'individual transfer' of German and Czech prisoners because each case had to be examined. For this purpose a new secret section was organized with-in the Ministry. It was headed by Karl Engert, who had long worked as Thierack's deputy while the latter was President of the People's Court. Engert, a fanatical follower of Hitler from the early 1920s and one of the People's Court's most redoubtable judges, now had the opportunity to hand down the most severe verdicts without any legal framework. From November 1942, officials of Engert's commission travelled to penal institutions all over Germany to find out which of

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[3] Cf. Elke Fröhlich (ed.), *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, pt. 2: *Diktate 1941–1945*; vol. 5: *Juli–September 1942*, ed. Angela Stüber (Munich, 1995), pp. 504 f.

the prisoners with lengthy sentences were to be earmarked as 'aso-
cial'. The largest group consisted of perpetrators of violent crimes.
About one third of the examined prisoners had been sentenced for
high treason, that is, political resistance to the regime. Most were
Communists or Social Democrats. The examinations, whose outcome
could mean life or death for the individual prisoner, lasted no longer
than thirty minutes. Wachsmann shows that, more often than not,
prison officials supported the policy of 'annihilation through labour'.
By tracing the fates of transferred prisoners in the concentration
camps, Wachsmann demonstrates that this was not an empty phrase.
To quote just one example: 'At the end of 1942, the monthly mortali-
ty rate among the security-confined prisoners in Mauthausen was 35
per cent, far exceeding the death rate of all other inmate groups
except Jews. By comparison, the mortality rate of other "deviant"
Mauthausen inmates, classified as "professional criminals" and as
"asocials", was 1 per cent or less per month' (p. 298).

Once the practice of condemning prisoners to death by a simple
administrative procedure had been established, there was no reason
why prison inmates with sentences of less than eight years should
not be included. In late 1942–3 the Ministry of Justice had already
ordered prison governors to report such 'asocials', often petty crimi-
nals with repeated convictions. Governors again took an active part
in the selection of prisoners in this category. Several thousand pris-
oners were assigned to penitentiaries where working conditions
were especially dangerous or exhausting. Mentally ill and physically
frail or disabled prisoners were also often exposed to unbearable con-
ditions, which caused many deaths. On top of that prison inmates fell
victim to the last wave of murders that accompanied the collapse of
the Nazi regime. Wachsmann describes the terrible evacuations of
penitentiaries in the Eastern territories of the Reich and the outright
killing of prisoners, as in Sonnenburg, 100 kilometres east of Berlin,
where in January 1945 more than 800 prisoners were shot by a com-
mando of police and SS officials. This was the largest single massacre
in this context but certainly not the only one.

Wachsmann's concluding chapters are as persuasive as the rest of
his book. Especially convincing is his use of the analytical framework
of Ernst Fraenkel's ground-breaking study, *The Dual State* (1948).
Wachsmann's account of what happened to German prisons after
Hitler's defeat, and the comparisons he draws with punishment and

prison in the Soviet Union and the West are well-balanced and thoughtful, although by their nature they can only be short sketches. Wachsmann once again confirms the deplorable fact that only a small number of Nazi jurists had to answer for their share in the perversion of law. The most decisive attempt to come to terms with the judicial crimes of the Third Reich was the trial of leading jurists under American auspices in Nuremberg in 1947. Karl Engert, responsible for so many deaths, was among the defendants, but he attended only two days of the trial. Because of his supposedly poor health the prosecution against him was dropped. He died early in 1952. And he was not the only Nazi jurist by far who — literally — got away with murder, since the Western German judiciary did not follow the example of Nuremberg. As the author stresses, this was a far cry from the caricatures of the corrupt 'victors' justice' that German critics of the post-war years used to draw. A higher percentage of prison officials faced legal prosecution, but most of them were soon called back to work. By contrast, many of the prisoners so brutally persecuted in the Third Reich never received any compensation, in either of the two parts of Germany.

Wachsmann's highly readable book is a profound study not only of Hitler's prisons but also of his policy in respect of 'community aliens'. It sheds new light on the role of the Third Reich's legal system in the context of the 'social hygiene' policy, which all too often was a synonym for mass murder. In the era of Thierack and Engert, the justice apparatus did not shrink from active participation in crimes against humanity. Wachsmann's findings should be made accessible to a broader audience in Germany. It is to be hoped that a German edition of his book will be published soon.

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CONFERENCE REPORTS

The Cultural History of Diplomacy, 1815–1914. International conference held at the German Historical Institute London, 23 and 24 September 2005

After intense theoretical debate about cultural history as a new approach in historical research over the past decade, historians have started to practice what they preach, and have embarked on a number of projects dealing with politics in a new way. Studies of foreign policy and the diplomatic service, in particular, no longer examine exclusively economic, power-political, and geo-political motivation in diplomatic negotiations, but link form and content. To borrow Charles Webster's terminology, it is absolutely necessary to examine 'how policy was made in order to understand why it was so made'. Some of the historians who have successfully linked the 'how' and the 'why' in the history of diplomacy were invited to speak at an international conference held at the German Historical Institute London on 23 and 24 September 2005.

Nineteen speakers presented their latest findings under the title 'The Cultural History of Diplomacy, 1815–1914'. As Markus Mößlang (London) emphasized in his introduction, such an approach allows us to deal with diplomacy as both a real world experience and a structural element in international relations. Despite the large variety of possible topics, Mößlang identified central themes emerging from the cultural approach. Based on his research on British envoys to Germany, he showed how perceptions, public life, publicity, traditions, symbols, and symbolic actions provided an umbrella of multiple interests and analytical categories that help to broaden and diversify the understanding of diplomacy.

In her introductory remarks 'Are Diplomats Necessary?', Zara Steiner (Cambridge) underlined the central role of the state and its impact on the diplomatic service. The majority of changes in the diplomatic world were influenced by, or at least coincided with, domestic changes. Diplomacy, however, was never just limited to a national history, but was always an object of larger transformations. Thus the First World War still represents the major turning point in

the history of European diplomacy. In a world accelerated by transformation and change, diplomats seemed to have lost much of the control they formerly exercised, as epitomized in the catastrophe of 1914–18. However, as Steiner pointed out, older traditions lived on after the end of the First World War, and despite their interconnectedness, the two spheres of 'diplomatic' and 'domestic' did not necessarily follow the same pattern in their attempts to adapt to change.

The first session, 'Status and Self-Perception: The Aristocracy and the Diplomatic Services during the Nineteenth Century', chaired by Karina Urbach (London), was opened by Thomas Otte (Norwich) with an overview of 'The Role of the Aristocracy in the Diplomatic Services of the Great Powers, *c*. 1850–1914'. Dealing with contemporary and historical assumptions about diplomacy as the exclusive preserve of the aristocracy, Otte described the 'social dimension' of Great Power politics as an important aspect shaping diplomatic patterns. At the same time he showed how attempts to open up the diplomatic service to the rising middle classes did not fail completely, but came too late to adapt to the challenges before the outbreak of the First World War.

Dietmar Grypa (Eichstätt) focused exclusively on the Prussian diplomatic service. In his presentation, ' "Phoney Nobles" in the Prussian Diplomatic Service, 1815–1866', he questioned whether an aristocratic background really played a major role in the selection of future diplomats. Based on a detailed study of Prussia's diplomatic representatives, his paper showed that the introduction of an entrance examination in 1827 meant that qualification more than rank brought future diplomatists into the service. However, aristocratic status was still an important aspect. Grypa illustrated this by reference to the number of Prussians from the lower aristocracy and the middle classes who assumed the title of *Freiherr* (baron) without any justification, mainly to increase their social status amongst their European colleagues.

The perception of diplomacy as an aristocratic prerogative was an integral part of the debates on the reform of diplomacy. In the second session of the conference, entitled 'The Dawn of New Diplomacy: Reforms and Changes before 1914' (Chair: Michael Hughes, Liverpool), this debate was examined in the context of the Austrian and French diplomatic services. William D. Godsey Jr. (Vienna) discussed 'The Culture of Diplomacy and Reform in the Austro–Hungarian

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Foreign Office'. In his paper, Godsey featured Adolf von Plason and Alois Aehrentahl as the most influential reformers. While Plason focused on more practical aspects like admission standards and bureaucratic experience, Aehrenthal's attempts went much further, and often incorporated commercial considerations which had been a major concern of the domestic business community in Austria and Hungary. However, Aehrenthal's reform did not aim for a wholesale re-organization; nor did it overcome the social bias of diplomatic recruitment.

Jean-Marc Delaunay (Paris) questioned whether the diplomatic service in France underwent an important transformation during the time of the Third Republic. In his paper, 'The French Diplomatic Service, 1870–1914: Great Changes?', he placed the diplomatic service in the context of new staff and methods, new fields and changing activities, and changing ways of life. The insecurity of the political system, particularly in the decade preceding 1879, meant that the regime chose not to follow its own republican path of diplomatic negotiations, but rather adapted to the traditional traits of diplomacy. It was, in Delaunay's terms, the 'obsessive fear of decline' that shaped the French diplomatic service up to 1914.

In the third session 'Extension and Expansion of Diplomatic Services' (Chair: Christopher Baxter, London), the cases of Bavaria and Switzerland illustrated how minor states came to terms with the international environment after 1815. In his paper 'Crossing the Atlantic: Bavarian Diplomacy and the Formation of Consular Services Overseas, 1820–1871', Martin Ott (Munich) focused on consuls in North America. Ott identified mutual trade relations as the key motivation behind the establishment of consular missions in coastal and inland regions of the USA. From the point of view of the homeland, consulates were not intended to include representative duties, a fact that was often ignored by the consuls themselves. The increasing number of Bavarian immigrants in the USA led the consuls to adopt a semi-political role.

Claude Altermatt (Berne) entitled his paper 'From Hostility to Conformity: Switzerland and its Diplomatic System'. Unlike the Bavarian case, the Swiss diplomatic service emerged from an institution interested mainly in trade and economic aspects. Public dislike and strong federal traditions slowed down this process, but from the turn of the century Switzerland succeeded in establishing a diplo-

matic network, although it was modest in size, numbering only eleven legations.

In the Swiss case, the system of public referendums had placed many obstacles in the way of setting up a diplomatic service. The increasing importance of public attitudes towards politics was more specifically addressed in the fourth session, 'Facing the Public—Diplomacy and the Press' (Chair: Mathew Seligmann, Northampton). Rudolf Muhs (London) discussed this aspect in his paper on 'Diplomacy and Publicity: The Emergence of the Press Attaché in Prussia and Elsewhere'. In the light of Bismarck's early attempts to revive the Frankfurt Federal Diet by establishing Karl Zitelmann as attaché there, Muhs discussed the role of this new position which was intended to combat a hostile foreign press. The press attaché can thus be seen as the predecessor of a modern PR expert who increasingly adapted to professional standards and became a regular feature of diplomatic missions abroad.

William Mulligan's (Glasgow) paper, 'Mobs and Diplomats: British Diplomats and Public Opinion, *c.* 1870', concentrated on British reactions to American public opinion in the aftermath of the Civil War. Mulligan observed that the British diplomats constantly noted the state of American public opinion, which he saw as 'the major obstacle to the settlement of differences between the two countries'. Diplomats not only responded to an aggressive foreign press but at the same time had to moderate the impact of the British domestic press when it turned against their country of residence. As Mulligan concluded, 'many debates and issues flowed over borders, rather than being restricted to national borders'.

While the first three sections dealt with the structures and environment of the diplomatic service, the subsequent papers focused on the representational and symbolic aspects of diplomacy. In the fourth section, 'Protocol and Etiquette as Part of Diplomatic Representation' (Chair: Johannes Paulmann, Bremen), Antony Best (London) in his paper, ' "Almost a Civilized Country": The Role of Court Diplomacy and Protocol in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1867–1914', examined the attitude of the British government and head of state towards their Japanese counterparts through the practice of granting, or rather not granting, decorations to Japanese diplomatic representatives at the British court. In contradistinction to David Cannadine's hypothesis of equality between monarchies across the racial divide, Best saw

Japan's use of court diplomacy as unsuccessful. He illustrated this by reference to the treatment of the Japanese representative at Queen Victoria's Golden Jubilee.

Susanne Schattenberg (Berlin) further elaborated on the importance of protocol issues in her interpretation of the Russo–Japanese peace negotiations in Portsmouth in 1905. In her paper 'The Diplomat as "an actor on a great stage before the whole people": Diplomatic Strategies at the Peace Negotiations of Portsmouth in 1905', Schattenberg presented the Japanese as the masters of protocol at these negotiations, embarrassing their counterparts with regard to the accreditation of plenipotentiaries. However, as she pointed out, the Russian diplomats proved more successful in achieving their diplomatic aims by winning popular support through the American press. Schattenberg's main argument was that such cultural interpretations of diplomatic negotiation had to be reconciled with the traditional interpretation of American economic interests as the key factor behind the outcome of Portsmouth.

In the fifth session, entitled 'Representing the Republic: a New Culture of Diplomacy?' (Chair: Torsten Riotte, London), David Paul Nickles (Washington) discussed 'US Diplomatic Etiquette, 1815–1914'. Asking whether the US government intended to wage a cultural struggle against diplomatic practice, or aimed to adopt existing international practices, Nickles emphasized the distinction between revolutionary and republican. He further demonstrated that the US diplomatic service did not conform to certain diplomatic conventions (for example, it followed an anti-luxury ideology) while still conferring with others. Nickles concluded that American diplomatic etiquette during these years illustrates the influence of social change.

The French response to the clash between republican values and diplomatic protocol was different. As Verena Steller (Bochum) pointed out in her paper, 'The Power of Protocol: French Politics of Representation and the Symbolic Action of Diplomacy, 1871–1914', French diplomats had to reconcile the traditional forms of diplomatic representation with 'the stylistic devices of a genuine national Republican identity'. Although republican ideals became an important aspect of the domestic visualization of political power, the French diplomatic service followed long-established protocol, in most cases with success.

The following session, 'Encountering the Orient: Diplomatic Re-

lations and the Middle East' (Chair: Hagen Schulze, London), went beyond the borders of Europe, and dealt with diplomatic representation in North Africa. Richard Pennell's (Melbourne) discussion of British consular representations in Morocco, Tunis, and Tripoli, entitled 'What Effect did Not-So-Great Men have on Diplomatic Relations and Why', linked socio-historical research with aspects of cultural history. Focusing on three individual consuls, Pennell stressed the degree of independence and political power which the large distances and slowness of communications between North Africa and their British homeland conferred upon them. At the same time the consuls were able to influence the representatives of other European countries (and the USA), forming a closely interrelated élite that often intermarried. Pennell concluded that such local élites influenced political developments on a long-term basis.

In the following presentation Sabine Mangold (Wuppertal) discussed the encounter between European diplomats and North African custom. Her paper, 'Oriental Slowness? Friedrich Rosen's Expedition to the Sultan of Morocco in 1906', described the German diplomat's journey from Tangier to Fez to meet the Sultan. Following Moroccan custom, Rosen was forced to go on a lengthy expedition of eleven days although it would have been possible to travel faster. As Mangold pointed out, Rosen, as an Orientalist and a diplomat, responded with a mixture of irritation and sympathy to this time-consuming ceremony. In conclusion she suggested that understanding Oriental ceremonies is useful in identifying similar symbolic aspects of European diplomacy.

The final session of the conference was entitled 'Expertise and Status: Diplomatic Representatives and their Interaction with a Foreign Environment' (Chair: Hamish Scott, St Andrews). In her paper, 'The Art of Diplomacy: British Diplomats and the Collection of Italian Renaissance Paintings, 1851–1917', Saho Matsumoto-Best (Nagoya) examined the close relationship between diplomacy and the acquisition of art, emphasizing that diplomats used informal networks to resolve political issues. She discussed how the battle over Henry Austin Layard's collection of paintings bequeathed to the National Gallery after his death turned into a long-standing diplomatic battle between Britain and Italy lasting for almost fifteen years. She concluded that side-issues of this kind sometimes play a significant role in diplomacy.

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In his paper, 'Nation, Class, and Diplomacy: The Dragomanate of the British Embassy in Constantinople', G. R. Berridge (Leicester) showed that a rising degree of national excitement on the British side and the following reluctance to engage with local expertise led to the decline of a traditional institution in the diplomatic service. As Berridge illustrated, the British decision no longer to recruit Levantines in the dragomanate was based mainly on suspicion of what is nowadays called 'locally-engaged staff'. This step could be seen not only as the failure of a diplomatic service to adapt to local circumstances, but also as a result of the increasing impact of power politics on diplomatic practices.

Hamish Scott closed the conference with some remarks made from the angle of an early modern historian. He stressed that traditions continuing from the early modern period — the court ceremony, French as the diplomatic language, the dominance of aristocracy — had to be taken into account. For a more comprehensive picture as intended by a cultural history of diplomacy, he suggested, it is necessary not only to include a wider range of topics but equally to break down traditional periodizations.

The multi-perspective approach of the conference combined more traditional studies with new angles on the overall subject. All papers reflected the complexity of diplomacy and made it possible to draw a more comprehensive picture of the diplomatic services than is usually the case. The contributions underlined the fact that cultural categories shaped the diplomats' practice, behaviour, and influence, and are crucial for an understanding of the role of diplomacy in international relations between 1815 and 1914. Moreover, the wide geographical scope of the conference stressed the internationality of diplomacy as a global phenomenon.

The organizers of the conference intend to publish the proceedings.

MARKUS MÖSSLANG and TORSTEN RIOTTE

Fourth Workshop on Early Modern German History, held at the German Historical Institute London, on 21 October 2005

The workshop on early modern German history has established itself as an annual fixture in the conference calendar. It offers British, Irish, and German early modernists an opportunity to present their research-in-progress to a specialist audience, and to discuss current trends in historiography. As in previous years, after a Call for Papers the two organizers, Peter Wilson (University of Sunderland) and Michael Schaich (German Historical Institute London), invited eleven speakers to give papers at the fourth meeting, which was financed jointly by the German History Society, the German Historical Institute London, and the University of Sunderland. In addition, many other guests attended, including a number of Ph.D. students. Compared with previous years, there were more young German and Austrian historians among the speakers. The majority of them reported on the topics of their *Habilitation* theses.

Stefan Laux (University of Düsseldorf) opened the first session, which was moderated by Beat Kümin (University of Warwick), by introducing the theme of his 'second book'. This looks at the role of the Estates in shaping Jewish policy in the German territories from the late Middle Ages to the end of the Holy Roman Empire. Although it was undisputed that only the territorial ruler was able to grant Jews the right to settle and pursue a trade, the Estates, as Laux emphasized, exerted considerable influence at various levels. Both in the provincial diets and, especially, in exercising local rights, they had a say in deciding the fate of Jewish communities and, as a rule, the policy they followed was hostile towards Jews. The everyday life of Jews in the early modern period, therefore, was located on the intersection between the power of the prince and that of the Estates, and, as a consequence, was subject to all the imponderables to which this situation gave rise.

Ulrich Rosseaux (Technical University of Dresden) also opened up new perspectives on the society of the Holy Roman Empire, which was the overall theme of the first session. Rosseaux spoke about the emergence of leisure time in Dresden, a residence town in the Electorate of Saxony. Although the term 'leisure time' (*Freizeit*) was not used until the nineteenth century, phenomena behind the concept can be observed very much earlier. In the course of the eigh-

teenth century traditional entertainments, such as visiting the the-
atre, assumed ever greater proportions. At the same time, new ways
of spending leisure time were invented, and became much more dif-
ferentiated from the 1770s in particular (scientific expeditions, bal-
loon flights, visits to spas etc.). This development went along with an
opening up to embrace new social groups, especially the bourgeoisie,
and a temporal extension to cover the whole year (winter and sum-
mer seasons) as well as night-time hours. By around 1800, 'the basic
pattern of entertainment culture had been formed'. Like Rosseaux,
Anton Tantner (Internationales Forschungszentrum Kulturwissen-
schaften, Vienna) also looked at the everyday cultural practices of the
early modern town in his presentation of his *Habilitation* project. He
described the *Addressbüros* which had come into being all over
Europe since the seventeenth century, but especially in the capitals,
and whose purpose was to help visitors find their way in the con-
fused tangle of streets. These public *Fragstuben* naturally also
assumed other tasks. They functioned as employment offices, infor-
mation exchanges, pawnbrokers, and, in many cases, also as the
germ cells of newspapers. The essence of these institutions, ultimate-
ly, was to administer and distribute information, and this is why
Tantner sees them as the predecessors of modern search engines like
Google.

The conference continued, under the direction of Trevor Johnson
(University of the West of England), with three papers, all of which
looked at religious discourses in the Prussian–English context.
Joachim Eibach (University of Berne) and James Lee (University of
the West of England) started by presenting their joint project on the
political sermon in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth cen-
turies. Financed by the Gerda Henkel Foundation, it is based at the
Forschungszentrum Europäische Aufklärung in Potsdam. The two
speakers unanimously emphasized the explicitly political character
of many court sermons of the period around 1700. Thus, as Lee
explained, preachers at the court of the English Stuarts after 1660 did
not shy away from tackling political themes, even if they refrained
from direct criticism of the ruler and, at most, raised objections to the
behaviour of earlier monarchs. The sermons preached on the occa-
sion of the Prussian king's coronation in 1701, analysed by Eibach,
were also eminently political. They by no means limited themselves
to praising Frederick I; rather, they warned against a luxurious

lifestyle at court, exhorted their listeners to behave in a God-fearing manner, and expressed expectations of the ruler by which his government was to be judged ('healing justice', maintaining the peace, protecting the true religion). Even before the upheavals of the age of Enlightenment, Eibach emphasized, a politically charged public sphere existed. Alexander Schunka (University of Stuttgart) is also looking at religious discourses in Prussia and England in his *Habilitation* project, which, within the framework of a larger research project on the correspondence of the Berlin court preacher, Daniel Ernst Jablonski, will investigate the ecumenical aspirations of Anglican and Prussian clergy in the first decades of the eighteenth century. The negotiations between the two sides were not, of course, limited to differences of theological opinion, such as varying interpretations of transubstantiation. Political considerations also played an important role, and this is why the impact of the changing international system of powers will play an important part in Schunka's study.

The first of the two afternoon sessions, moderated by David Lederer (National University of Ireland, Maynooth), consisted of a paper by Charlotte Woodford (University of Cambridge) on the experience of violence during the Thirty Years War. Taking as an example the writings of two nuns in Bamberg, Maria Anna Junius and Elisabeth Herold, Woodford demonstrated how a detailed, contextualizing reading can open up individual perceptions and experiences. According to Woodford, neo-Stoic and traditional religious patterns of interpretation helped the two women to come to terms with occupation and other horrors of war. The female perspective was to have been complemented by a look at concepts of masculinity in the seventeenth century, but Jonathan Durrant (University of Cardiff) was unable to attend for family reasons, and his scheduled paper, 'Soldiers, Witches and Masculinity in Seventeenth-Century Germany', had to be dropped.

The fourth and final section, chaired by Andrew Thompson (University of Cambridge), looked at the problems of the emergent modern state in the eighteenth century as examined in three different dissertation projects. Niels Grüne (University of Bielefeld) began by discussing political communication and state-building in the Rhine Palatinate. Taking as an example the dispute about the division of common land (*Allmende*) in a number of villages near Mannheim, Grüne showed how a weak state depended on an alliance with the

poorer sections of the village population in order to implement its agrarian policies on the spot. In particular where social conflicts could not be resolved within the village community, and villagers submitted petitions to the central authorities, the state bureaucracy was able to realize its own political goals in a process of negotiation.

The weakness of the state apparatus, expressed in its inability to generate enough income during the post-1763 financial crisis, similarly gave rise to an experimental excise tax, the *Régie*, introduced by Frederick II, which Florian Schui is examining in the context of a project at the Centre for History and Economics at the University of Cambridge. Imported from France, the *Régie* and its administration proved to be of enormous significance for the development of the Prussian nation-state in two respects. First, it generated the income necessary for developing the state, and secondly, something approaching a homogeneous administration for all Prussian lands was implemented for the first time. Even if the French tax experts who had been brought to Prussia in 1766 were sent back in 1786 because of resistance to a tax regime perceived as foreign, they left behind a durable legacy going far beyond the tax scales which were largely retained. Processes of intellectual exchange between France and Prussia were also explored by Avi Lifschitz (University of Oxford) in his paper on the Berlin Academy of Sciences under Frederick II. Lifschitz placed the sensational dispute about the origin of languages, to which the Berlin Academy contributed by holding a number of essay competitions, into the context of wider academic debates, illuminating in particular the contribution made by Academicians of French descent to this European-wide controversy. In this way he succeeded in bringing to life the model of an international, enlightened public sphere.

As in previous years, many of the contributors displayed a heightened awareness of cultural, and in particular, discursive practices. Issues relating to the emergence of a 'modern' public sphere, the transnational exchange of ideas, and the forums of political communication linked many of the projects presented, despite great thematic variety. Something new this year, however, was the number of papers on the Prussian monarchy, approaching traditional fields of research using modern methods—a sure sign that Borussian historiography has revived in recent years. Despite such new emphases, however, the workshops held to date display a considerable themat-

ic continuity. The process of early modern state-building, a new urban history with emphasis on cultural history, the experience of violence in the seventeenth century, and the effectiveness of political and religious discourses have all been repeatedly discussed in past years. To make such trends in early modern studies visible was and is one of the primary aims of this Anglo–German event, along with bringing together historians from different national research traditions.

The next workshop will be held on 25 September 2006. To mark the 200th anniversary of the end of the Holy Roman Empire, however, it will, for the first time, be held not at the premises of the German Historical Institute in London, but at the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich. Proposals for papers should be sent to Dr Claudia Stein (University of Warwick, claudia.stein@warwick.ac.uk) by the end of May 2006. Michael Schaich (schaich@ghil.ac.uk, 0207 309 2014) is also available to answer any further queries.

MICHAEL SCHAICH (GHIL)

Social Stereotypes and History. Conference held at the German Historical Institute London, 28–29 October 2005

Although a heavily stereotyped group themselves, historians have so far made little use of social stereotypes as an analytical category. While there are numerous books on racial and ethnic, national, religious, and gender stereotypes in history, social stereotypes have mostly been ignored. There is no lack of theoretical work on this subject by social psychologists, but many historians prefer to talk about 'images', 'clichés', 'figures', or 'types' when dealing with widely held beliefs about certain social groups.

To examine why historians have not made more use of social stereotypes as an analytical category, the German Historical Institute London organized an international interdisciplinary conference on this topic, bringing together social psychologists and historians from different countries and different fields of expertise. After a short welcome by the Institute's director, Hagen Schulze, Matthias Reiß (GHI London), who developed and organized the conference, pointed towards the potential of social stereotypes in providing a link between mentalities and social practices in the past. He stated that the aim of the conference was to provide a broad overview of the different ways in which historians have used social stereotypes as a research tool in their work, and to discuss the usefulness and limitations of this concept.

The keynote speech was given by Victoria Mather (London), the author of the 'Social Stereotypes' column in the *Telegraph Magazine*, which has also been published in several books. Mather described stereotypes as a form of social shorthand and suggested that the reason for the popularity of her column, which, despite initial expectations, has been going for twelve years, is that it is neither patronizing nor malevolent. People recognize themselves and others, and take pleasure in doing so. Her social stereotypes describe little social battles in the minutiae of life, and these battles are the reason why these stereotypes exist. Mather conceded that to judge people based on stereotypes is a bad thing, but argued that there is often no other way, given the predominance of image and social fluidity nowadays. After a short discussion, Russell Spears (University of Cardiff), supported by Alex Haslam (University of Exeter), presented a theoretical introduction to the history and theory of stereotype formation in the

field of social psychology. They listed the changing definitions of stereotypes and discussed the various approaches and theories developed since 1922 when Walter Lippmann defined stereotypes as 'pictures in our heads'. They concluded that it had taken a long time for the social psychology of stereotyping to get social, and that it might take even longer to get historical. Yet they argued that social psychology has much to offer to historians, who often use only standard, individual-centred psychoanalysis in their works. More advanced theoretical models are, however, compatible with non-individualist approaches to history, and can benefit research on social movements and social processes in the past.

The rest of the day was devoted to examining occupational stereotypes in two panels on 'The Working World'. The first was chaired by Andreas Gestrich (University of Trier) and focused on the two largest groups of employees in pre-industrial times: the domestic servant and the agricultural labourer. In her paper on the former, Carolyn Steedman (University of Warwick) pointed out that over the last thirty years, not only social psychologists, but also scholars from a number of other fields (for example, cultural studies and gay studies) have concluded that social stereotypes form a useful concept for inquiry and analysis. However, she questioned whether it is of much use for historians, as historical research tends to construct social stereotypes. Steedman proposed a category of 'historical stereotypes' as a sub-division of social stereotypes. 'Historical stereotypes' are constructed and established by historical research, writing, and representation of various kinds, and are employed by a wide variety of people to furnish individual imaginations. Using the historical research (or the lack of it) on domestic servants and the contemporary representation of them on television as an example, Steedman showed how imagination, assumptions, and plot-lines shaped the stereotype of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century domestic servant. She conceded that attention to stereotypes can be useful after all to raise awareness of the constraints and necessities of history as a form of writing and cognition, and its role in the making of social stereotypes in modern society.

Alun Howkins (University of Sussex) then talked about the contested, changing, and politicized stereotypes of rural men and women in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Citing examples from various European countries, Howkins pointed out the existence

of two conflicting stereotypes of peasants. On the one hand was the image of the poor, ignorant, dirty peasant, who was hardly regarded as human, but almost as an animal. On the other was the stereotype of peasants as authentic and sincere, which depicted them as the bearers of tradition and religion, and praised their music and speech. This contradiction was also apparent when the stereotype was broken down along gender lines. Country women, for example, were celebrated in various forms, but also depicted as bold, rough, and unsexed by field work. According to Howkins, the negative stereotype dominated until the end of the nineteenth century, when, under the influence of Social Darwinism, 'the town' became the enemy and was identified with degeneration. From the 1880s on, the stereotype of the peasant became politicized all over Europe. In new states like Finland and Ireland, for example, it was employed to support a national renaissance based on rural culture. Howkins concluded that the stereotype of the agricultural worker was largely created by the urban élite and reflected urban ideas, and that its politicized form was mostly mobilized by the right.

The second panel of the day dealt with modern white-collar service jobs and was chaired by Hans Henning Hahn (University of Oldenburg). Sabine Biebl (University of Munich) focused on the period between the end of the nineteenth century and the end of the Weimar Republic, during which the image of white-collar workers (*Angestellten*) was consolidated. Biebl pointed to the difficulty of finding a common name, let alone a meaning, for this new and very heterogeneous group of office workers. The primary sources for the identity of white-collar workers as a distinct social group were, first, their privileged position within the production process, which they defended even after the economic reasons for it began to disappear, and secondly, their social distance from blue-collar workers. During the Weimar Republic, their claim to special social status became politicized, and the *Angestellten* were positioned as a buffer between the working class and the upper class in society. Thus in contrast to many other stereotypes, the image of the white-collar worker was defined primarily in relation to already existing social groups, and not in terms of their supposedly defining common characteristics and traits. In the media, however, the *Angestellte* were represented by several story-lines and social stereotypes — for example, the old accountant, the merchant, banker, or publisher, and the young female secre-

tary or shop assistant. The majority of these figures were presented as representatives of a new era, as individualists, and figures in transit, who were either on the move upwards or in steady social decline, and who reflected the modern capitalist society of the Weimar Republic in condensed form. These narratives, in return, were used to discuss and negotiate the structuring principles of this society.

Like the *Angestellte*, the profession of librarian in its modern form is also relatively new, and its early history is inseparably intertwined with the stereotype of those who chose librarianship as a career, according to Candace Benefiel (Texas A&M). It was the feminization of the profession which to a large degree created the image of the librarian as an educated, unattractive, unstylish, unmarried, pedantic woman who spends her days shushing people. This stereotype resulted from the low pay of librarians, the practical necessities of the job, the expectations of library patrons, and the pressure on newly married women to quit the profession. Librarianship was one of the few careers open to college-educated women in the nineteenth century, and the steady increase in the number of female librarians at the end of this century shaped the profession's image and identity. The legacy of these early librarians left a lasting impression on the public consciousness, partly because it had some basis in reality, but mostly because it was reinforced over time through stereotypical depictions of librarians in films, novels, advertisements, comic books, cartoons, and television. Benefiel concluded that driven by economic and demographic convenience, the stereotype of the librarian has been remarkably stable over a long period. She suggested that it has been codified by various media to such an extent that it forms more of a caricature than a stereotype. Librarians fear that it contributes to the marginalization of their profession, both in terms of respect and remuneration, and are obsessed with how others see them. However, if librarians cease to worry so much about the stereotype of their profession, Benefiel concluded, they might find that others do not take it so seriously either.

The next day began with a comparative session on the stereotype of 'the father' in the USA, Britain, and Germany, chaired by Christoph Conrad (Geneva). According to Jürgen Martschukat (Erfurt), 'the father' is one of the most powerful stereotypes in American history. From the Founding Fathers to the present day, fatherhood has been described as the ultimate objective of every

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American man's longing, but also as a cornerstone of the liberal capitalist republic, and as a metaphor and embodiment of rationality, responsibility, and reliability. Yet, despite the longevity and power of this normative belief about the ideal man, the corresponding nuclear family with homemaking mother and breadwinning father has hardly ever represented the household arrangements of a majority of Americans. Only in the 1950s did this normative ideal seem to correspond to reality. However, Martschukat argued that during that period two contradictory stereotypes of ideal manhood clashed with each other, posing a dilemma for American men: that of the caring, responsible father who was a provider and breadwinner, and that of the self-determined, autonomous, virile man who was an energetic explorer. The flip side of the stereotype of the responsible father and breadwinner was the emasculated conformist 'man in the grey flannel suit', embodied by the main protagonist of this 1950s book and film, Tom Rath. The way out of the dilemma was to promote the 'hobby' as an outlet for male creative energy. In addition, magazines like *Playboy* began to cater to male fantasies. The 1950s discourse on the weakening of American men as a result of the demands of a conformist society nevertheless strengthened the hegemonic position of heterosexual, white, middle-class men. At the same time, however, activists of the civil rights, women's rights, and gay rights movements pushed the limits and took their lives into their own hands, thus displaying character traits that, up to that point, had been exclusively reserved for heterosexual white men.

The father as breadwinner also figured large in the paper by John Tosh (Roehampton University) on paternal stereotypes in England since the Victorian period. For the Victorians, fatherhood was essentially a social status and an ordained stage of life. Consequently, the stereotype of fatherhood was not primarily concerned with the quality of a relationship, but with the performance of a social role. The pre-eminent criterion of a good father was his success as a breadwinner. In addition, he had to maintain his patriarchal authority, in which he was supported by the law and religious conviction, and to prepare his sons for their place in the adult masculine world. The latter was increasingly difficult to achieve in Victorian times because of the decline of patronage and the growth of professionalism, while the father's traditional responsibility for the moral education of his children was undermined by absentee breadwinning and the growing

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belief that this was the mother's ordained sphere. According to Tosh, the Victorian experience still bears on present-day debates about fatherhood. Absentee breadwinning is the strongest link with the Victorian pattern, while the Victorian anxiety about fitting boys into a mould of manliness has very little resonance today. Tosh argued that there is ample evidence that Victorian fathers were less remote and emotionally detached from their children than the stereotype of the unbending patriarch has made us believe. He concluded that despite the legal and social encroachments on the power and prestige of the father, the power of the inherited stereotype remains strong. According to Tosh, the performance of fatherhood is rooted in images which represent a lost perfection or a primitive condition from which we would like to be free. By distinguishing between the findings of social history and culturally powerful stereotypes, historians could have a positive impact on popular culture.

Till van Rahden (University of Cologne) examined stereotypical notions of fatherhood in the Federal Republic of Germany by focusing on Alexander Mitscherlich's book *Society without the Father* (1963). In the context of post-Second World War debates in West Germany, fatherlessness explicitly also included situations where men did not exercise their paternal function. Since the 1950s, this discussion has developed into a central public obsession. 'The father' became an important symbol in the debate about the perceived social and cultural crisis of post-war West Germany, and about the meaning of authority in a democratic polity. While conservatives in particular viewed fatherlessness as a threat to society, others began to consider it a blessing. Mitscherlich's book tapped into this debate and became an instant success. It took certain elements of the pessimistic reading of fatherlessness seriously, while trying to enlist support for an egalitarian vision of society, and providing a blueprint for future forms of education that prepared for a 'society without a father'. Mitscherlich wanted West Germans to embrace the symbolic fatherlessness of democratic polities as a chance to free themselves from false authority. According to van Rahden, the political significance of his book can hardly be overrated, as the search for new forms of fatherhood was vital to social and cultural transformations in Germany from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s. Mitscherlich was the first to argue that it was necessary to undo the nexus between democracy and authority on the one hand, and the search for new forms of

paternal authority within the family on the other. Thus *Society without the Father* ironically marked the beginning of the end of early West Germany's obsession with the question of fatherlessness.

The fourth session, chaired by Alex Zukas (National University, San Diego), dealt with ranks in society. Speaking about the stereotype of the aristocrat, Karina Urbach (GHI London) pointed to its enormous political dimension in the nobility's struggle with the bourgeoisie for social, cultural, and economic predominance. The nobility tried to create a stereotype of itself which underlined its superiority and justified its privileges: the dashing aristocrat, who was tall, preferably thin, and equipped with a distinctive Caesarian face. Through charity and church work, and paternalistic treatment of tenants and staff, the stereotypical aristocrats kept rural communities together and outshone the egoism of the bourgeoisie. In contrast to the latter, the aristocracy saw themselves as unselfish, economically independent, and therefore hard to corrupt. In short, aristocrats regarded and pictured themselves as natural-born leaders. Today, the aristocracy still provides a glamour factor even in egalitarian societies like Germany, while it has reinvented itself as the guardian of the national heritage in Britain. The counter-stereotype, however, is distinctly less flattering. Since the eighteenth century, the aristocracy has increasingly played the part of the villain in European literature. The middle classes saw the nobles as a homogeneous formation, but divided them into different types. The fat, aristocratic, farmer-type landowner appeared next to his pale, slim, delicate, and bored urban cousin. According to Urbach, four major stereotypes existed in all countries: the corrupt, the lazy, the amoral, and the philistine aristocrat. Yet according to Flaubert, in regard to the nobility, the bourgeoisie was torn between admiration and envy, so that its view of the upper classes was not all negative all of the time.

The two dominant stereotypes of the bourgeois, however, were both negative, according to Andreas Fahrmeir (University of Cologne). The bourgeois as a daft, boring, philistine existed next to the stereotype of the bourgeois as a sharp, money-grabbing, ruthless investor, and oppressor. While the former could be male as well as female, the latter was almost certainly a man. While the bourgeois-as-philistine is commonly found in artistic productions, the 'moneybags' is primarily the object of scholarly analysis and polemics. Common to both stereotypes is insistence on the importance of

money to the bourgeois mind, which reduces non-material values to cash terms. But while the philistine is pictured as genuinely stupid, the bourgeois-as-entrepreneur does not lack brains and wit. According to Fahrmeir, stereotypes of the bourgeois were, by and large, created, publicized, and perpetuated by people who were themselves part of the bourgeoisie. To a large extent, the figure of 'the bourgeois' was a product of middle-class self-doubt, and it provided a negative counterfoil to middle-class aspirations of intellectual, material, and moral advancement. Because 'the bourgeois' was a stereotypical figure, being one was a question of mentality rather than of objective social stratification. Fahrmeir concluded by suggesting that it was difficult to research the middle class without a stereotype or two as guidance. Stereotypes informed the way in which historical research was conceptionalized, and Fahrmeir confessed that he was not entirely convinced that there was indeed a line which separated stereotypes from social entities in whose existence historians tend to believe.

The final session on 'Crime and Punishment' was chaired by Frank Bösch (University of Bochum) and opened by Anja Johansen (University of Dundee). Comparing the stereotype of the policeman in France, Britain, and Germany, Johansen focused particularly on the image of this group among the generally law-abiding sections of society in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As their encounters with the police tended to be few, their expectations of police behaviour reflected widely shared assumptions rather than personal experience. According to Johansen, the stereotype of 'the policeman' was rooted in his functions as well as in the organizational approaches to the public taken by the police. Whether positive or negative, the police came to epitomize the nature of the political regimes they served. While the British 'Bobby' came to symbolize the civility and moderation of the liberal democratic British state, French and German policemen represented the despotic, authoritarian, and militaristic nature of their respective regimes. In Britain, the authorities and the police succeeded in projecting a positive image, so that excessive violence was regarded as marginal and erroneous by large sections of the politically relevant part of the population. In France and Germany, however, even supporters of the existing political order viewed violence as standard police practice. This stereotype was deliberately used in some periods of French and German history to

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cover the actual weakness of the police, but it doomed attempts at other times to project a more positive image. Negative stereotypes of the policeman, Johansen concluded, are strongly shaped by past sins and very persistent, while positive stereotypes are difficult to achieve and easy to lose again. Hopes that institutional reforms would provide an effective solution to violent and arbitrary policing have been abandoned at the turn of the twenty-first century, and the stereotype of the policeman will remain ambiguous, even in modern democratic societies.

Phillip Müller (Weimar) spoke about the changing image of 'the criminal' in Imperial Germany. Focusing on the case of the murderer Karl Rudolf Hennig, Müller described how the police in Berlin tried to catch the criminal by putting up 'wanted' posters and publishing personal descriptions in newspapers. According to Müller, the standardized police description and photograph of a criminal, while supposedly scientific and unambiguous, also functioned to confirm the criminal nature of its object. The newspapers, however, while cooperating with the police search, transformed Hennig into a heroic figure by describing his audacious flight from the police over the rooftops of Berlin. As a consequence, the public began to see the wanted criminal everywhere, even after he had long left the German capital. Supposed encounters with Hennig enhanced the social status of ordinary citizens, while others identified with the murderer and taunted the police by dressing up like him or sending the police postcards in his name. The police image of the criminal was thus less clear and more ambiguous than intended. It left room for an interpretation which regarded Hennig as a special and heroic individual who transgressed the norm. By participating in the hunt for Hennig, ordinary citizens could, at least for a short while, participate in his nimbus.

In her concluding comment, Ute Frevert (Yale) highlighted the wealth of synonyms used for social stereotypes during the conference, including prejudice, images, social reputation, roles, clichés, and satire. What we mean by 'social stereotypes' was obviously difficult to define. Pointing to the brevity of Victoria Mather's column, Frevert suggested that an essential characteristic of social stereotyping is the oversimplification of its objects by the use of very few components. In contrast, academic research is usually more detailed, although it ultimately also condenses reality into a generalized picture. She also looked at the relationship between experience and

stereotyping before turning to the function of the latter. Social stereotypes reduce complexity and foster social identity formation. Their popularization is closely linked with political usage, and power relationships can be mediated through stereotyping. Modern societies are hotbeds of stereotyping because they are complex and multifaceted, but can we also find stereotypes in pre-modern times? Regarding the process of formation, Frevert pointed out that some social stereotypes have a very long pedigree, while others, like the *Angestellte*, are relatively new. Some media produce social stereotypes through narratives—for example, TV series, newspapers, and novels. In contrast, stereotyping in other media, such as photography, paintings, or cartoons, is static. Stereotype formation, Frevert emphasized, is usually a group process. She pointed out that the study of social stereotypes is relevant only when linked to social practices. For historians, disputes about stereotypes are interesting, as it is then that social images shape action. Frevert concluded by stressing the importance of national comparisons to highlight the underlying social structure of stereotyping.

In the following discussion, Spears pointed out that individuals reinforce stereotypes all the time. He also stressed that stereotypes are about political projects and produced for particular audiences. Hahn questioned the usefulness of distinguishing between national, social, and religious stereotypes, as these are often intertwined, and stressed that stereotypes tell us more about those who use them than about the stereotyped. Conrad suggested speaking about the plausibility instead of the accuracy of stereotypes. He argued that the experience of the advertising industry shows that the vast majority of attempted stereotyping goes wrong. Gestrich emphasized that the political use of stereotypes is important, and asked whether visualization is a pre-requisite for effective stereotypes, while Zukas suggested that cross-class examinations of one social stereotype might bring interesting results about the groups who use them. Haslam, finally, stressed the importance of humour in group-formation. To speak of the accuracy of a stereotype was, however, problematic, as there was no 'truthful' view of social groups.

The conference showed that social stereotypes can and have been used successfully as a tool in historical research. However, it has also become clear that 'social stereotype' is a very fluid concept, which is understood in different ways by different people and used for differ-

ent purposes. A more intense dialogue between historians and social psychologists, who, despite intense research in the field of social stereotyping, have so far shown little interest in the concept's temporal dimension, might therefore be necessary to make it more useful as an analytical tool. The German Historical Institute's conference tried to initiate closer co-operation of this sort between the two disciplines. While it has produced no consensus on what social stereotypes mean and how they can best be used, it seems that further exploration of this field might bring interesting results.

MATTHIAS REISS

NOTICEBOARD

Research Seminar

The GHIL regularly organizes a research seminar at which recipients of grants from the Institute, Fellows of the GHIL, and other scholars report on the progress of their work. Any postgraduate or postdoctoral researchers who are interested in the subjects are welcome to attend. As a general rule, the language of the papers and discussion is German.

Due to circumstances beyond our control, it has not yet been possible to finalize the programme for the summer term. For further information, contact Dr Indra Sengupta-Frey on 020 7309 2018 or email her on: isengupta@ghil.ac.uk

As a matter of interest to readers, we record the following papers which were given before the publication date of this *Bulletin*:

24 Jan.   Guido Müller
           Probleme eines Forschungsprojektes: Bürgerliches Mäzena-
           tentum in Deutschland und Großbritannien seit dem 19.
           Jahrhundert

7 Feb.   Bernhard Dietz
           Gab es eine 'Konservative Revolution' in Großbritannien?
           Rechts-Intellektuelle Demokratie- und Liberalismuskritik
           in der Zwischenkriegszeit (1929–1939)

14 Feb.   Valeska Huber
           Rites de Passage and Rights of Passage: The Suez Canal as a
           Global Meeting Point 1869–1929

7 Mar.   Julia Angster
           Seemacht: Die Royal Navy im Britischen Empire 1815–1860

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11 Apr. Julia Lippert
        'Imagined King': Georg III. im Spiegel der heutigen briti-
        schen Medienlandschaft

25 Apr. Tobias Metzler
        Jews in the Metropolis: Urban Jewish Cultures in London,
        Berlin and Paris, 1880–1940

Scholarships awarded by the GHIL

Each year the GHIL awards a number of research scholarships to
German postgraduate and postdoctoral students to enable them to
carry out research in Britain, and to British postgraduates for re-
search visits to Germany. The scholarships are generally awarded for
a period of up to six months, depending on the requirements of the
research project. British applicants will normally be expected to have
completed one year's postgraduate research, and be studying Ger-
man history or Anglo–German relations. The scholarships are adver-
tised in the *Times Higher Educational Supplement* and *Die Zeit* every
September. Applications may be sent in at any time, but allocations
are made for the following calendar year. Applications, which should
include a CV, educational background, list of publications (where ap-
propriate), and an outline of the project, together with a supervisor's
reference confirming the relevance of the proposed archival research,
should be addressed to the Director, German Historical Institute
London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2 NJ.
    During their stay in Britain, German scholars present their projects
and the initial results of their research at the Institute's Research
Seminar, and British scholars do the same on their return from
Germany. For the year 2006 the following scholarships have provi-
sionally been awarded for research on British history, German history,
and Anglo–German relations.

Ph.D. Scholarships

Katharina Behrens: Scham und Schande in der englischen Stadt des späten Mittelalters

Elizabeth Benning: Economic Chaos and Political Transformation: West German Economic Power and the Reshaping of the International Economic System of the West, 1973–1978

Bernhard Dietz: Gab es eine Konservative Revolution in Großbritannien? Rechts-Intellektuelle Demokratie- und Liberalismuskritik in der Zwischenkriegszeit (1929–1939)

Klaus Gagstädter: Die Entwicklung von Amt II des RSHA im letzten Jahr des Zweiten Weltkriegs

Benno Gammerl: Staatsangehörigkeit, Staatsbürgerschaft und ethnische oder 'rassische' Differenzierung im britischen Weltreich und in Österreich–Ungarn, 1867–1918

Sarah E. Hackett: Integrated or Isolated? The Experience of Muslim Immigrants in Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Bremen

Valeska Huber: *Rites de Passage* and Rights of Passage: The Suez Canal as Global Meeting Point 1869–1929

Julia Lippert: 'Imagined King': Georg III. im Spiegel der heutigen britischen Medienlandschaft

Tobias Metzler: Jews in the Metropolis: Urban Jewish Cultures in London, Berlin and Paris, 1880–1940

Ina Scherder: Die Arbeitshäuser von Galway: Eine Studie der Entwicklung von Armenadministration und lokaler Verwaltung in Irland, 1838–1921

Anna Schramm: Der katholische Hochadel in England in der Zeit zwischen 1603 und 1648

Helen Shiner: 'Erziehung durch Umwelt.' The City Planner as Sculptural Patron: Fritz Schumacher and his *Kulturpolitik* for Hamburg, 1909–1933

Claudia Siebrecht: Künstlerinnen während des Ersten Weltkriegs

Andreas Steinsieck: Internationale Kriegsberichterstatter und britische Militärs: Wahrnehmungen und Interaktionen im Südafrikanischen Krieg (1899–1902)

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Postdoctoral Scholarships
Dr Angelika Epple: Mikrogeschichte der Globalisierung: Stollwercks Schokolade und die Automatie (1839–1971)
Dr Axel Fair-Schulz: Gradenwitz-Brandeis-Kuczynski: Eight Generations from Enlightenment to Socialism and Beyond (1800–2000)
Dr Andreas Klein: 'Herren des Gewaltmarktes': Machtstrukturen der Border Reiver im 16. Jahrhundert
Dr Daniel Schönpflug: Europa—Eine Familienangelegenheit? Hohenzollernsche Heiraten im europäischen Kontext 1648–1918
Dr Tatjana Tönsmeyer: Adel und ländliche Gesellschaft im 19. Jahrhundert: Böhmen, England und das ostelbische Preußen im Vergleich

Postgraduate Students' Conference

The German Historical Institute London held its tenth postgraduate students' conference on 12–13 January 2006. Its intention was to give postgraduate research students in the UK and Ireland working on German history an opportunity to present their work-in-progress, and to discuss it with other students working in the same field. The Institute also aimed to present itself as a research centre for German history in London, and to introduce postgraduates to the facilities it offers as well as to the Institute's Research Fellows.

In selecting students to give a presentation, preference was given to those in their second or third year who had possibly already spent a period of research in Germany. Students in their first year were invited to attend as discussants. Twenty projects in all were introduced in plenary sessions held over two days. As in past years most papers dealt with the twentieth century. Apart from two presentations on the Middle Ages and one on the late eighteenth and the middle of the nineteenth centuries respectively, all other speakers had embarked upon projects which concentrate on more or less the last hundred years of German history. In this context, however, it is striking that scholarly interest seems to be moving away from the Third Reich, which only a few years ago was at the centre of attention, to either the First World War and the inter-war years, or post-war

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Germany. Also conspicuous was the prominence of approaches from cultural history in many of the presentations.

As well as discussing their subjects and methodologies, the participants exchanged information about practical difficulties such as language and transcription problems, how to locate sources, and finding one's way around German archives. Many comments came from the floor, including information about language courses and intensive courses for the reading of German manuscripts, references to literature already published on the topic, and suggestions about additional sources. Information about institutions that give grants for research in Germany was also exchanged. The German Historical Institute can offer support here by facilitating contact with German archives and providing letters of introduction which may be necessary for students to gain access to archives or specific source collections. In certain cases it may help students to make contact with particular German universities and professors. The German Historical Institute also provides scholarships for research in Germany (see above).

The GHIL is planning to hold the next postgraduate students' conference early in 2007. For further information, including how to apply, please contact the Secretary, Anita Bellamy, German Historical Institute, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ, or: abellamy@ghil.ac.uk

List of speakers at the 2006 Ph.D. Conference

Andrew Baldwin (St Antony's, Oxford): British Perceptions of the German Constitution, 1918–1934
Elizabeth Benning (LSE): Oil, Power and the Atlantic Alliance: West Germany and the Western Response to the First Oil Crisis, 1973–1974
Alison Carrol (Exeter): National and Political Identity in Interwar Alsace
Tina Dingel (Limerick): The Citizen as Consumer: The Re-Making of German National Identity, 1920s to 1950s
Tim Grady (Southampton): Dying for the Fatherland: Representations of the German-Jewish WWI Fallen, 1914–1970
Katharine Griffiths (Newcastle): The Role of Nature in Dissident German Literature 1933–1945

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Thomas Gruber (Oxford): Atheism and Other Forms of Unbelief in the Middle Ages

Claire Hall (Hull): The Gestapo Spy Network in Germany and Europe, 1933– 45

Peter Illing (Christ's College, Cambridge): A Corporate Society in Revolt: Resistance to Joseph II's Reforms in Brussels, 1780–1790

Heather Jones (Trinity, Dublin): Prisoners of War and the Cultures of Wartime: Britain, France and Germany, 1914–1920

James Koranyi (SHiPSS, Exeter): Shaping and Reshaping Memory: The German Experience of World War Two and Communism in Romania

Jan Lemnitzer (LSE): 'A Few Burghers in a Little Hanseatic Town': The Bremen Maritime Law Campaign of 1859

Katarzyna Makowska (Birmingham): Germany and France: Convergence or Divergence in the Development of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)? Franco–German Security Co-operation in the Years 1999–2004

David Meeres (Limerick): 'Educated Back to the Right Path'? The Treatment of Delinquent Youth by Berlin Local Courts, 1939–1953

Carlos Meissner (York): Costa Rica Germans in Light of their Internment and Expropriations of the Second World War

Stephen Mossman (Oriel, Oxford): Piety and Thought in Fourteenth-Century Germany: Marquard von Lindau OFM

Leena Petersen (Sussex): The Poetic of the Space-in-Between: On Imagistic Approaches in *Fin-de-Siécle*

Linda Theresa Shortt (Dublin): Talking About My Generation? An Exploration of the Concepts of Generation and Geneaology in Post-1989 Literature

Damian Valdez (Trinity, Cambridge): The Matriarchal Imagination: The Reception of Bachofen in the Kaiserreich and the Weimar Republic, 1900–1933

Jan Vermeiren (UCL): Brothers in Arms: The German–Austrian Comradeship-in-Arms (1914–1918) and the Renaissance of the Greater German Idea

Contact details can be obtained from the GHIL.

Prize of the German Historical Institute London

The German Historical Institute London awards an annual prize for an outstanding Ph.D. thesis on German history (submitted to a British university), British history (submitted to a German university), Anglo-German relations, or an Anglo-German comparative topic. The Prize is 1,000 Euros. In 2005 the prize was awarded to Florian Altenhöner for his thesis, 'Kommunikation und Kontrolle: Gerüchte und städtische Öffentlichkeit in Berlin und London 1914-1918', submitted to the Humboldt University, Berlin.

To be eligible a thesis must have been submitted to a British or German university after 31 August 2005. To apply, send:

~   one copy of the thesis
~   a one-page abstract
~   examiners' reports on the thesis
~   a brief CV
~   a declaration that the author will allow it to be considered for publication in the Institute's German-language series, and that the work will not be published before the judges have reached a final decision

to reach the Director of the German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ, by 31 August 2006.

The Prize will be presented on the occasion of the Institute's Annual Lecture in October 2006.

For further information visit: www.ghil.ac.uk
Email: ghil@ghil.ac.uk Tel: 020 7309 2050

Noticeboard

Staff News

The academic staff of the Institute changes from time to time, as most Research Fellows have fixed-term contracts of three to five years' duration. During this time, along with their duties at the Institute, they work on a major project of their own choice, and as a result the Institute's areas of special expertise also change. We take this opportunity to keep our readers regularly informed.

DOMINIK GEPPERT, who studied history, philosophy, and law in Freiburg and Berlin, was a Research Fellow at the GHIL from November 2000 to October 2005. He is now Research Scholar with the Gerda Henkel Foundation (Düsseldorf) and *Privatdozent* at the Friedrich Meinecke Institute (Free University of Berlin). His main fields of interest are British and German contemporary history, international history, and history of the press. He is currently working on British–German press relations, 1890 to 1914. His most recent monographs are *Maggie Thatchers Rosskur — Ein Rezept für Deutschland?* (2003); *Die Ära Adenauer* (2002); and *Thatchers konservative Revolution: Der Richtungswandel der britischen Tories 1975–1979* (2002). With Udo Wengst he edited *Neutralität — Chance oder Chimäre? Konzepte des Dritten Weges für Deutschland und die Welt, 1945–1990* (2005).

MARKUS MÖSSLANG, who joined the GHIL in 1999, studied modern and social history at the University of Munich where he was a research assistant in 1997–98. His Ph.D. was published as *Flüchtlingslehrer und Flüchtlingshochschullehrer* (2002); he is co-editor of *British Envoys to Germany, 1816–1866*, vol. 2: *1830–1847* (2002) and vol. 3: *1848–1850* (2006). His main fields of interest are nineteenth-century Anglo–German relations, the cultural history of diplomacy, the contemporary history of higher education, and history and the new media.

KARSTEN PLÖGER joined the GHIL in January 2003 as a Research Fellow in late medieval and early modern history after completing his doctoral thesis at Balliol College, Oxford. Prior to that he studied history, English, and philosophy at the University of Kiel and at the University of Aberdeen. His main fields of interest are the intellectual, cultural, and diplomatic history of Europe in the Middle Ages. In

addition to continuing his work on English medieval diplomacy from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, he is currently producing a study on the discourse of boredom in early and high medieval Europe. His most recent publication is *England and the Avignon Popes: The Practice of Diplomacy in Late Medieval Europe* (2005).

MATTHIAS REISS joined the GHIL as a Research Fellow in 2002. He studied history, political science, and economics at the University of Hamburg, before changing to the University of Cincinnati (Ohio) in 1993, where he received an M.A. two years later. His main fields of interest are American, British, and German history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. His Ph.D. was published in 2002 as *Die Schwarzen waren unsere Freunde: Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in der amerikanischen Gesellschaft 1942–1946*. He is currently working on a study entitled 'The Unemployed, Protest, and the Public in Great Britain and Germany since 1870'.

TORSTEN RIOTTE joined the GHIL in January 2003. After finishing his Ph.D. at Cambridge University he is now, with Markus Mößlang, in charge of the Institute's four-volume edition *British Envoys to Germany, 1816–1866*. The results of his research on Hanoverian Britain have been published in various forms, including a monograph entitled *Hannover in der britischen Politik (1792–1815): Dynastische Verbindung als Element außenpolitischer Entscheidungsprozesse* (2005). With Brendan Simms he has edited an essay collection, *The Hanoverian Dimension in British History, 1714–1837* (2006), and he is currently working on a study of George III and the Holy Roman Empire. His research interests also cover the late nineteenth century with a focus on dynastic networks in Europe during the Victorian age, as in his forthcoming publication on 'Queen Victoria und das Schicksal der Welfenfamilie, 1878–1901'.

MICHAEL SCHAICH, who joined the GHIL in 1999, was a student of history and media studies at the University of Munich. After completing his M.A. he became a research assistant in the history department. His Ph.D. thesis on Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment in Bavaria was published in 2001 as *Staat und Öffentlichkeit im Kurfürstentum Bayern der Spätaufklärung*. He is also the editor (with Jörg Neuheiser) of *Political Ritual in the United Kingdom, 1700–2000*

(2006). While at the Institute he is working on the British monarchy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He is also a librarian at the Institute, and has been editing the *Bulletin of the GHIL* since November 2004.

INDRA SENGUPTA-FREY joined the GHIL in September 2004. She took her Bachelor's, Master's and M.Phil. degrees from the University of Calcutta, India and completed her doctoral degree at the University of Heidelberg, Germany in 2002. Apart from working as a college lecturer at the University of Calcutta, she has also been a Research Fellow with the Department of Indology and Religion, Tübingen University, and has held a part-time lectureship in History at South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University. Her main areas of research are the history of encounters between European and non-European cultures, German Orientalism, British colonialism, and culture and modernity in India. Her reworked Ph.D. thesis has just been published as *From Salon to Discipline: State, University and Indology in Germany 1821–1914* (2005). Her current research project is on monuments, archaeology, and public memory in colonial India.

BENEDIKT STUCHTEY is Deputy Director of the GHIL. His main research interest is presently the history of European imperialism and he is working on anti-colonialism from the early modern period to the twentieth century in a comparative perspective. His most recent publication is (ed.), *Science across the European Empires, 1800–1950* (2005). A former editor of the *Bulletin of the GHIL*, he is on the editorial boards of *European Review of History. Revue Européenne d'Histoire* and *Storia della Storiografia. History of Historiography*.

KARINA URBACH joined the GHIL in January 2004 as a Research Fellow in twentieth-century history. She studied modern history and political science at the University of Munich and took an M.Phil. in international relations and a Ph.D. in history at the University of Cambridge. She taught at the University of Bayreuth and was awarded the Bavarian Ministry of Culture's *Habilitationsförderpreis* in 2001. Her fields of interest include British–German relations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and she is currently working on a book about the international networks of the British and German aristocracies in the interwar years. She is the author of *Bismarck's*

Favourite Englishman: Lord Odo Russell's Mission to Berlin (1999), and co-editor of *Der Zeitgeist und die Historie* (2001) and *Birth or Talent? A Comparison of British–German Elites* (2003).

Talking and Acting: How Violent were the Middle Ages?

For some time now the question of violence in the Middle Ages has been a popular topic of research. For a long time the predominant view was that in the medieval period violence was an everyday experience, and, as such, was accepted as a natural part of social existence. This general impression has dominated the image of the Middle Ages in the eyes of the broader public, and continues to do so.

'Violence', of course, is by no means an unambiguous, value-free concept. Every attempt at definition gives rise to controversial debates. To simplify matters the organizers of this conference, Hanna Vollrath (Bochum/Cologne), Janet Nelson (London), and Martin Kintzinger (Münster), to be held at the GHIL from 22 to 24 June 2006, have decided to restrict the conference theme to a specific concept of violence, namely, physical violence, that is, the threat and infliction of bodily pain, possibly leading to death. Like any other concept, that of violence is marked by the cultural space in which it is used. To analyse and talk about violence in the Middle Ages therefore involves cultural perceptions in a dual sense: first, those of contemporaries in whose language and non-linguistic communication concepts of violence typical of the time have been conveyed; and secondly, those of twenty-first-century readers and observers.

The structure of the conference programme is determined by the notion that specific types and 'cultures of violence' left their mark on the whole of society. After two introductory papers on 'the language of violence', violence in various social groups, 'from bottom to top' will be analysed using concrete examples. A third group of papers will then deal with attempts to control violence, and their success or lack of it in doing so.

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A few questions have been formulated as possible food for thought and are intended to make the whole breadth of the topic clear. Was violence such a normal experience for literate medieval contemporaries that they only mentioned it in sensational circumstances? Was there a limit, conscious or otherwise, to what was acceptable, which was exceeded only if loss of reputation or honour was threatened? Could verbal attacks or denigration take the place of physical violence, providing an outlet for aggression, or were they in fact signs of a willingness to use violence which should be regarded as a precursor to actual acts of violence? Should depictions of acts of violence in medieval sources be taken at face value? Is the difference between actual violence and 'perceived' violence an essentially contemporary phenomenon, or should this difference also be taken into account in the Middle Ages? Did medieval people perceive themselves as threatened, and if so, did this induce them to take special precautions when leaving home and court, village, castle, city, or monastery? Were acts of violence primarily carried out by men? What role did women play in 'men's conflicts', in feuds and wars? How successful were attempts to curb violence by non-violent conflict solutions?

We hope that in the discussion it will become clear whether, and to what extent, perceptions of violence and the significance attached to it are determined by historical experience and political culture.

Re-Visiting Sites of Memory: New Perspectives on the British Empire

The aim of the conference, to be held from 29 June to 2 July 2006 at Cumberland Lodge, Windsor, is to take a fresh look at the British Empire by examining the way in which the experience of the Empire, crystallized in public memory in the form of certain 'sites', has aided the formation of collective identities within both the metropole and the erstwhile colonies.

The conference draws inspiration from the *Lieux de Mémoire/ Erinnerungsorte* thesis of Pierre Nora and Etienne François/Hagen Schulze, which identified the 'sites' that have served time and again as *loci* of collective, public memory and thus played a defining role in the formation of national identity in France and Germany. The thesis subsequently received a warm response in other European nations, such as the Netherlands, Italy, and Austria.The GHIL has already been actively engaged with the *Lieux de Mémoire* thesis. In 2002 the Institute hosted a conference on 'European Sites of Memory' to address the question of trans-national, European memorial sites.

With the present conference we hope to open up what has been a European or even a continental European methodological debate to regions beyond Europe by bringing a body of scholars of British imperial, colonial, and post-colonial history together to engage in a debate on sites of memory as one way of understanding imperial–colonial history. The *Lieux de Mémoire* project in Europe is part and parcel of the European narrative of nation: thus, the *Lieux de Mémoire* serve to reinforce national identity. In the case of entities such as empires, the question of such a common national identity resting on 'shared' *Lieux de Mémoire* obviously does not arise. However, the experience of empire (ranging from empire-building to anti-colonial struggles and decolonization) has found expression in a number of *Lieux de Mémoire* that capture the complexity of public memory and the ambivalence of collective identity in the imperial–colonial context. The conference aims to throw new light on this complexity by focusing on some *Lieux de Mémoire* that have particular meaning or even a range of meanings within the context of the British Empire.

Noticeboard

The Holy Roman Empire 1495–1806

The Modern European History Research Centre at Oxford University is planning a conference on this topic, to be held at New College, Oxford, from 30 August to 2 September 2006, in co-operation with the German Historical Institute and the Austrian Cultural Forum. In some measure it will thus constitute a commemoration of the Empire's dissolution exactly two hundred years earlier; but our main purpose is to assess the current state of scholarship on important aspects of the later history, through the early modern period, of one of Europe's most enduring political structures, and to set this into a full international context. Such a stock-taking has not previously been attempted in Britain, and a further aim will be to contribute to a better understanding in this country of that era in central-European history. Both plenary and parallel sessions will be held. We hope the conference will yield a publishable volume of essays. The languages of the conference will be English and German.

Themes and list of confirmed plenary speakers.

Theme 1: The Reich as a state or federation
Karl Otmar von Aretin
Georg Schmidt

Theme 2: The Reich as a society or series of societies
Susan Karant Nunn
Marc Forster

Theme 3: Political culture
Thomas Kaufmann
Thomas Winkelbauer

Theme 4: Core and periphery
Jan Lindegren
Nicolette Mout

Theme 5: The Reich and Europe
Heinz Duchhardt
Grete Klingenstein

Organizational committee:

Robert Evans (Oriel College, Oxford)
Robert Oresko (London)
David Parrott (New College, Oxford)
Lyndal Roper (Balliol College, Oxford)
Michael Schaich (German Historical Institute, London)
Hagen Schulze (German Historical Institute, London)
Peter Wilson (University of Sunderland)
Johannes Wimmer (Austrian Cultural Forum, London)

For further information, please contact Professor Robert Evans (robert.evans@history.ox.ac.uk).

Royal Kinship: Anglo–German Family Networks 1760–1914

The British royal family and its interrelations with German ruling houses is the best-known example of the supranational form of old European dynasties. What sets it apart from other dynastic networks is its Protestantism. The legacy of this transnational kinship can be found in the world of private correspondence, which will be the focal point of this conference, organized by the German Historical Institute London in co-operation with the Prince Albert Society.

Spanning 250 years, the sources which will be presented and analysed are unpublished private letters from the Royal Archives at Windsor Castle. Access to these papers was made possible by the Prince Albert Society project Common Heritage which, since March 2005, has been cataloguing all Anglo–German archive material at Windsor by Crown consent. This significant body of correspondence provides a unique source for understanding the nature of the network connecting the royal houses. All speakers will base their papers on this documentation from the Royal Archives. The conference structure follows the dynastic principle (*Familienprinzip*) by looking

at each German ruling house related to the British royals in turn. The six houses to be covered are: Hanover, Mecklenburg, Prussia, Coburg, Hesse, and Hohenlohe.

Contemporaries thought of eighteenth-century epistolary culture as increasingly influenced by women. This dimension will also be important in understanding regal networks. The claim that the British royal family has been feminized since the reign of Queen Victoria raises the question as to how much this influenced the choice of correspondents and the resulting contents. What strategies did the correspondents pursue? Was it just a matter of staying in touch with family, or did they have ulterior motives as well—political or otherwise?

The German families obviously cultivated their British cousins out of a desire for position, money, and greater influence at home. However, the interest of the parties in Britain seems more obscure. Why did they stay in such close contact with minor German relatives? Was this a rare opportunity to 'talk' to equals, and did these exchanges result in cultural transfer? When, and under what conditions, did the British royal family still actually try to influence German affairs?

Of course, over time the significance of international connections changed. How much did the process of national differentiation affect the self-image of the various correspondents? How did each side see its function in the political and social life of its respective nation? Did they consciously adopt new roles?

The conference will be held at the German Historical Institute London on 29–30 September 2006 and will include an excursion to the Royal Archives at Windsor.

LIBRARY NEWS

Recent Acquisitions

This list contains a selection of recent publications in German and English, primarily on German history, acquired by the Library of the GHIL in the past year.

Afflerbach, Holger (ed.), *Kaiser Wilhelm II. als Oberster Kriegsherr im Ersten Weltkrieg: Quellen aus der militärischen Umgebung des Kaisers 1914–1918*, Deutsche Geschichtsquellen des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, 64 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005)

Althoff, Gerd, *Die Macht der Rituale: Symbolik und Herrschaft im Mittelalter* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003)

Althoff, Gerd, *Inszenierte Herrschaft: Geschichtsschreibung und politisches Handeln im Mittelalter* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003)

Anthony, Tamara, *Ins Land der Väter oder der Täter? Israel und die Juden in Deutschland nach der Schoah*, Dokumente, Texte, Materialien; Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung der Technischen Universität Berlin, 54 (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2004)

Auge, Oliver, *Stiftsbiographien: Die Kleriker des Stuttgarter Heilig-Kreuz-Stifts (1250–1552)*, Schriften zur südwestdeutschen Landeskunde, 38 (Leinfelden-Echterdingen: DRW-Verlag, 2002)

Backes, Uwe and Eckhard Jesse, *Vergleichende Extremismusforschung*, Extremismus und Demokratie, 11 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2005)

Barbero, Alessandro, *Charlemagne: Father of a Continent*, trans. Allan Cameron (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004)

Baumeister, Martin, *Kriegstheater: Großstadt, Front und Massenkultur 1914–1918*, Schriften der Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte, NS 18 (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2005)

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Behrmann, Thomas, *Herrscher und Hansestädte: Studien zum diplomatischen Verkehr im Spätmittelalter*, Greifswalder Historische Studien, 6 (Hamburg: Kovac, 2004)

Beimrohr, Wilfried, *Das Tiroler Landesarchiv und seine Bestände*, Tiroler Geschichtsquellen, 47 (Innsbruck: Tiroler Landesarchiv, 2002)

Berman, Constance Hoffman (ed.), *Medieval Religion: New Approaches*, Rewriting Histories (New York: Routledge, 2005)

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Bismarck, Otto von, *Gesammelte Werke: Neue Friedrichsruher Ausgabe*, Abt. 3, 1: *Schriften 1871–1873*, ed. Andrea Hopp (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004); Abt. 3, 2: *Schriften 1874–1876*, ed. Rainer Bendick (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2005)

Black, Jeremy, *Rethinking Military History* (London: Routledge, 2004)

Blasius, Dirk, *Weimars Ende: Bürgerkrieg und Politik 1930–1933* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005)

Boockmann, Hartmut and Heinrich Dormeier, *Konzilien, Kirchen- und Reichsreform: 1410-1495*, Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte, 8 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2005)

Borgolte, Michael and Benjamin Scheller (eds.), *Polen und Deutschland vor 1000 Jahren: Die Berliner Tagung über den 'Akt von Gnesen'*, Europa im Mittelalter, 5 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002)

Borsdorf, Ulrich, *Erfahrungen eines Gewerkschafters 1875–1945*, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für soziale Bewegungen, 1; Schriftenreihe A/31 (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2005)

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Carl, Horst, Hans-Henning Kortüm, et al. (eds.), *Kriegsniederlagen: Erfahrungen und Erinnerungen* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004)

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