GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE LONDON

Bulletin

General Editor Andreas Gestrich

Editors Angela Davies, Jane Rafferty, Jochen Schenk, Michael Schaich, Kerstin Brückweh

German Historical Institute, 17 Bloomsbury Square,
London WC1A 2NJ

Tel: 020 7309 2050
Fax: 020 7404 5573

e-mail: ghil@ghil.ac.uk
library@ghil.ac.uk
Homepage: www.ghil.ac.uk

Opening hours of the Institute Library:

Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Friday	10.00-17.00
Thursday	10.00-20.00

Enquiries should be directed to the Librarians
Tel: 020 7309 2019/2022

The *GHIL Bulletin* appears twice each year
and is available free on request

ISSN 0269-8552 (print)
ISSN 3049-9135 (online)

Cover design: Lucy Schönberger
Photograph: John Goldblatt

German Historical Institute London

Bulletin

Volume XXX, No. 2 November 2008

CONTENTS

Contents

ARTICLE

'ACTS OF TIME AND POWER': THE CONSOLIDATION OF ARISTOCRACY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE, c.1580–1720

Hamish M. Scott

I

This article results from a research project examining the social construction of an aristocracy in most, though not all, European countries between the middle of the fourteenth century and the middle of the eighteenth century.[1] It examines one of the two decisive phases: the decades between the 1580s and the 1720s, which will be referred to as the 'long seventeenth century'. The other key period had been the Later Middle Ages, when first in England, then in the Iberian Peninsula, particularly the dominant Spanish Kingdom of Castile,

[1] This article is based on a seminar paper given at the German Historical Institute London on 12 Feb. 2008. I am indebted to the Institute's Director, Professor Andreas Gestrich, for the original invitation, and to the audience for their helpful questions, which I have tried to address in this revised version. I am also grateful to Professor Isabel de Madariaga and Dr Thomas Munck for their valuable criticisms and suggestions. I have retained the format of the original seminar paper and generally have not provided references to the abundant secondary literature on which these arguments rest. The best introductions to the early modern nobility are the two overlapping syntheses by Ronald G. Asch, *Nobilities in Transition 1550–1700: Courtiers and Rebels in Britain and Europe* (London, 2003) and *Europäischer Adel in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Cologne, 2008); while Hamish M. Scott (ed.), *The European Nobilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, 2 vols. (1995; 2nd edn. Basingstoke, 2007), contains national surveys and a full and up-to-date bibliography of the subject. This article was written during my tenure of a Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship, and I am grateful to the Trust for its support.

and finally in the lands ruled over by the Kings of France and their great rivals the Dukes of Burgundy, leading families gained in status and in social, economic, and political power, coming to form something approaching an 'aristocracy'. Elsewhere in Europe many of the same developments took place during the long seventeenth century, leading to a more complete stratification of the nobility in Central, Northern and Eastern Europe, at a period when earlier changes were being completed and redirected in the countries along the western periphery.

Central to this larger project is a distinction, which has not always been made, between 'nobility' and 'aristocracy'. 'Nobility' was a formal legal status which evolved in Western Europe between the thirteenth and fifteenth century and came to describe the collective lay social elite. In several European languages the word 'nobility', meaning both a quality possessed by an individual of high status and a description of the collective body of nobles, came into use during the Later Middle Ages: this was the case with *noblesse* in French and *Adel* in German. The status of nobility was characterized primarily by the possession of hereditary privileges, which were both social and legal in nature. The Second Estate (as it was styled) derived from the celebrated, if largely theoretical, medieval tripartite division of society into those who prayed, the First Estate (*oratores*), those who provided defence and military muscle (*defensores* or *bellatores*), and those who worked (that is to say everyone else, who made up the Third Estate, the *laboratores*) to provide for the first two Estates in their more important functions. Such social divisions were always more imagined than real, but the idea of a trifunctional division of society was always an important myth, particularly for the members of the Second Estate, who long regarded themselves as the fighting caste, the men on horseback, a role which had been the principal origin of their privileged status and remained their most important function within the monarchical State.

By contrast, the term 'aristocracy' denotes the leading families within the nobility, lineages which were not quite royalty but often related to the ruling family by ties of blood and marriage. These aristocratic Houses possessed enhanced social status, a monopoly of the higher titles of nobility, considerable social and political power, and economic resources primarily in the form of land, and so constituted a small but influential elite within the wider nobility. Traditionally

the term designated 'rule by the best', a usage which went back to Ancient Greece and remained important within political theory. It continued to be employed in this sense, designating a particular system of government, into the early modern period and even beyond. But during this period, the meaning of 'aristocracy' began to change and to correspond to the modern usage of the term: a description of the prominent lineages which made up the very top layer of the nobility. It was a relatively easy transition for a term which described the possession of political authority by an elite group, to be applied to that group itself, as it increasingly was during the seventeenth century. In Castilian and in Italian the word 'aristocracy' can be found during the earlier decades of the century to describe the noble elite, while in the third edition of his celebrated *Titles of Honour* the English scholar John Selden employed the noun in this sense.[2]

Three further preliminary points require to be made. In contrast to the situation in twentieth- and twenty-first century society, and even during the nineteenth century to some extent, wealth followed status and not the other way round. Many high status aristocrats in the early modern period would either inherit wealth or acquire it, primarily from their ruler, sometimes from other aristocrats by marriage or through inheritance. The possession of wealth on its own did not create the kind of status possessed by the individuals and families who are examined in this paper: it was perfectly possible, if uncommon, to be an impoverished aristocrat. In contrast to the later modern era, social status still resided in esteem, in the value and therefore the respect and approbation which other members of society felt towards an individual's function and role, and not in the mere possession of wealth. Seventeenth-century Europe was a deeply traditional society, despite the undoubted progress of national and international trade and of manufacturing, a world within which deference and traditional values held sway. Foremost among such established norms was respect for social superiors and for the aristocracy most of all.

This society differed from that of later modern Europe in a second way. The individual was always less important than the wider social group of which he or she formed part. The key analytical units in

[2] John Selden, *Titles of Honour* (1614; 3rd edn. London, 1672), 437.

what follows are families, lineages, and Houses, which were enduring, unlike the human beings they contained, who were transient and recognized as such. Noblewomen, and even many noblemen, lacked much in the way of what would now be called 'agency'. Decisions about upbringing and education, career and marriage or lack of it, would be made for them, often by a council consisting of the senior members of the lineage which existed in many aristocratic families. Some individuals, of course, refused to follow the dictates of the family strategy which had been adopted, and followed their own chosen paths, sometimes with considerable success. But these were unusual and probably exceptional, and with hindsight it is the degree of compliance which is striking and significant.

One final preliminary point, which is quite fundamental to the argument of this paper. Noble status descended primarily through the legitimate male line, that is to say, by means of the succession of a son to his father. Other forms of descent were possible, but much less common. Since nobility was an essentially male attribute in almost all European countries, that made the birth of a son, or preferably several male children, crucial to dynastic continuity. Studies of noble demography suggest that the *average* family was likely to survive for four or five generations in the direct male line, and that anything from a quarter to a third of all lineages might become extinct every century. Significant numbers of ennoblements were needed simply in order to maintain the number of noble families at a constant level, never mind bring about an expansion on the scale visible during the seventeenth century. Many 'new' lineages emerged at this time and some even joined the aristocracy, though on closer inspection the families which were becoming part of the noble elite usually turn out to be established lineages rising in status and wealth. Such replenishment was a permanent feature of the history of the European elite, though during the seventeenth century it was probably taking place more extensively. The possibilities for rapid social and political ascent were greater during these decades, and so the numbers of families joining the nobility or rising within it were correspondingly larger.

II

The aim of this article is to provide a comparative study of the consolidation of aristocratic power apparent over much of Europe during the 'long seventeenth century'. Its main theme, evident in the title, is derived from the English lawyer, lord chancellor, philosopher, and essayist Francis Bacon's celebrated essay 'Of Nobility', which dates from 1581, at the very beginning of this period. In this Bacon—who himself would benefit significantly from such 'acts of power', being ennobled twice and ending up as Viscount St Alban—proclaimed that 'new Nobility is but the Act of Power; But Ancient Nobility is the Act of Time'.[3] By this he meant that some noble families were long-established and owed their pre-eminence to the generations which had preceded them and had provided soldiers, courtiers, and administrators to serve their rulers, securing in return lustre, rank, and even wealth for their lineage. Sometimes these were even junior or illegitimate lines of ruling families, a circumstance which enhanced their standing. Other noble Houses, of more recent origin, owed their exalted position to an act of royal creation, as monarchs throughout Europe awarded privileged status to an increasing number of individuals in return for past or in anticipation of future services, thereby creating new noble families by acts of royal power. This distinction overlapped with a debate which had begun during the Renaissance concerning the relative merits of birth and hereditary status as against virtuous conduct (*virtù*), education, and especially service as sources of exalted status and the associated privileges. This paper contends that Bacon's aphorism exactly applies to the trajectory of European elites during the long seventeenth century, when some long-established lineages and other families of more recent—occasionally very recent—creation combined to form an expanded and reinforced aristocracy, and in so doing created the European social elite which would endure down to the First World War and, in some measure, beyond.

The overall argument, and particularly the emphasis upon a seventeenth-century consolidation of the elite, incorporates a funda-

[3] Sir Francis Bacon, *The Essayes or Counsels, Civil and Morall*, ed. Michael Kiernan (Oxford, 1985), 42.

mental shift in historical scholarship concerning the early modern nobility during this past generation. Until the 1970s and even 1980s historians of early modern Europe viewed the Second Estate as a group that was declining socially, economically, and politically. Here the influence of Lawrence Stone's *The Crisis of the Aristocracy*,[4] a study of the English peerage and its supposed decline during the decades before the outbreak of the English Civil War, was quite central. First published in 1965, it launched the notion of a 'crisis of the early modern nobility', which flourished particularly during the 1970s. This was encouraged by theories, which had been current during the previous two decades, about the 'general crisis of the seventeenth century', variously portrayed as the birth-pangs of capitalism and the product of the incessant fiscal demands of States which were almost permanently at war. Building on Stone's book and embracing his central metaphor, the French historian François Billaçois proclaimed a full-blown 'crisis of the European nobility' between 1550 and 1650 in 1976, by which time it had already been applied to Denmark, Castile, Sicily, France, and Muscovy; it would subsequently be extended to Bohemia, and may have been canvassed even more widely.[5]

This 'crisis' incorporated established assumptions about the early modern decline of the nobility. Politically it was believed to be losing out to the absolutist state, extending an established emphasis in the historiography of the period. The strengthening of monarchical authority during the seventeenth century was believed to have taken place largely at the expense of the traditional elite. The new, supposedly 'absolutist' regimes which emerged at this time, headed by Louis XIV's personal government (1661–1715) in France, were believed to rest upon the victory of monarchy over aristocracy, as the elite lost its traditional power and even influence, its reduced status exemplified by the great open prison of Versailles where, on one fashion-

[4] Lawrence Stone, *The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558–1641* (Oxford, 1965; abridged edn. 1967).

[5] François Billaçois, 'La crise de la noblesse européenne (1550–1650)', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 23 (1976), 258–77; four years earlier, Henry Kamen had argued in similar if more nuanced vein in *The Iron Century: Social Change in Europe, 1550–1660* (London, 1971), 129–65.

able interpretation, leading aristocrats were detained at the king's pleasure. The nobility's military function, that of 'warrior-elite', was eroded by near-simultaneous developments in the art of war: primarily the emergence of standing armies, the enlarged role of infantry, and the advent of gunpowder weapons, which were the central elements in what was styled the 'Military Revolution'. Its existence appeared to be imperilled by the loss of its military function, as the mounted cavalry lost its dominant position on the battlefield. These changes were also integral to the second strand in the 'noble crisis': an ideological challenge to its traditional pre-eminence, which went back to Renaissance ideas of honour and virtue, rather than the claims of birth and ancestry advanced by noble propagandists, as a source of social standing, at exactly the point at which the nobility's established claim to be the 'men on horseback' and so the dominant social group was itself becoming more and more difficult to sustain.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the elite was believed to have experienced severe economic problems which weakened it fatally. The idea of an economic 'crisis' of the English peerage in 1641 had been central to Stone's arguments, and one on which his numerous critics focused, in the process delivering some fatal blows to his overarching thesis. In the wider European context it has probably stood up rather better than the ideological or political strands, though whether the elite's undoubted economic problems merit the description 'crisis' is much more problematical. These difficulties resulted from two linked developments. The sixteenth-century Price Revolution had created problems for individuals and families whose income, above all the rents from long-term leases which could not easily be raised, was unable to keep up with the rapidly rising prices. When the period of expansion ended in the decades around 1600 (and the chronology has been hotly contested and clearly varied not merely from country to country but from region to region), many nobles found it difficult to keep their heads above water during a phase of recession and contraction, with falling prices, unstable markets, and a general slow-down in the economy. The notion of such economic difficulties affecting noble families is most persuasive when applied to the poorer members of the elite, though some better-off lineages also experienced real problems. The Spanish count of Benavente's income from his estates fell by one-fifth in only five years (1638–43) at the outset of the mid-century economic collapse.

Family expenditures were simultaneously being forced up by what has come to be styled 'conspicuous consumption', as the elite were expected to build expensive country residences and town palaces, and generally to bear the costs of a more opulent lifestyle which centred on the burgeoning courts that monarchs now maintained. The most obvious index of these economic difficulties is the spiralling level of debt which many families were shouldering. Yet while individual families undoubtedly experienced real periods of difficulty, increasing levels of debt should not be seen as an index of problems, far less decline, and the argument for a generalized economic 'crisis', like the wider thesis, remains unproven.

With hindsight, each of these challenges can be recognized to have been far less serious than was once believed. While individual noble families did experience real economic difficulties, and some families declined as a result, the Second Estate as a whole managed to ride out the contraction of the European economy during the seventeenth century. In particular, historians of the nobility are now much more cautious about using evidence of aristocratic borrowing, which had featured prominently in Stone's pages, as evidence of economic difficulties. Instead they now recognize that debt, for noble families, was frequently a symptom of economic strength, not weakness or decline, and that it could be a way of surmounting short-term difficulties. In a similar way, we now recognize that the undoubted changes in land warfare during this period did not reduce the nobility's role so much as change it fundamentally. It is now recognized that the elite was, in one sense, re-militarized during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as it came to provide the officer corps in the enlarged armies which most European states now maintained. There was a difference: the level of training and expertise which was required was now greater, and nobles served not as of right but because of the expertise which they acquired and put at the service of the monarchical state. But the nobility's military role was actually strengthened by the so-called 'Military Revolution', as they became the indispensable backbone of the enlarged armies of the period, a role they would retain until the First World War. In a similar way, absolute monarchy in Europe is now widely recognized to have rested not on confrontation but on cooperation with the social elite: in the expanded armies, as we have seen, in both central and local government, and in more specialized areas, such as the diplomatic services

which rulers were now maintaining and which were staffed from the end of the seventeenth century onwards overwhelmingly by aristocrats.

The 'crisis' theory, however, was important in directing attention to nobility as a subject and in stimulating detailed research, which began to appear in print during the second half of the 1970s. This detailed research quickly revealed that a 'crisis' metaphor was simplistic in the extreme, and replaced it with an emphasis on noble resilience and elite adaptability to changing circumstances, which has survived until the present day. The key word to describe the seventeenth-century nobility became and remains not 'crisis' but 'consolidation'. What is now impressing historians of the elite—and it should be said that the study of the nobility is extremely fashionable, in all countries and many languages—is the resilience, the adaptability, the sheer continuity of its social and political power in modern European history. Its obituary, so confidently written thirty years ago, is recognized to have been premature, for the seventeenth as for the eighteenth and even the nineteenth centuries. This fundamental change in approach provides the starting point for this article.

Four factors together brought about a visible strengthening of aristocratic power. The first has already been hinted at: the availability of land on a quite new scale in many, though not all, countries, brought about by the political upheavals and wars of these decades. Secondly, the seventeenth century saw important changes in family and inheritance arrangements and, to a lesser extent, in marriage patterns, and these together created a larger and more integrated and powerful noble elite. The third factor was state-formation, the creation of more powerful domestic regimes brought about primarily by the recurring and large-scale warfare of the age, which depended upon cooperation with this aristocracy and fostered its consolidation. Finally, and building on these developments, there was a stratification of the nobility, with a decline of the lesser nobility and, much more importantly, the emergence of a larger, more coherent, and, above all, more powerful noble elite, distinguished by titles and enhanced status and wealth. What Stone styled the 'inflation of honours', the proliferation of titles at this time, both contributed to and expressed this stratification.

The long seventeenth century and, above all, the frequent and extensive international and civil wars thus saw a completion of the

synergy between family organization and monarchical power under way in Western Europe since the Later Middle Ages and its expansion into other regions of the Continent, and this completed the social construction of an aristocracy in most European countries. Particular geographical and historical circumstances produced rather different outcomes and imposed individual timescales, but behind these national variations the same basic processes can be identified.

III

Seventeenth-century Europe was dominated by international conflicts and civil wars, as is well known. There were only four complete calendar years between 1600 and 1700 when fighting was not taking place somewhere in Europe, while certain leading states—the Spanish Habsburg Monarchy, France, Sweden—were on a war footing for over half of the entire period. The Thirty Years War (1618–48) dominated the first half of the century and the wars of Louis XIV the decades from the 1670s onwards, with the Dutch War (1672–9), the Nine Years War (1688/9–97), and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13/14). It was also, and to an unprecedented extent, a period of rebellions and civil wars, often attracting external intervention: the British Civil Wars of 1637–52 and of 1688–91, in France the conflicts of 1617–29 and the *Frondes* of 1648–53, the Bohemian Revolt of 1618–20, the so-called 'Time of Troubles' in early seventeenth-century Muscovy (1598–1613), Portugal's revolt against Spanish rule which began in 1640 and finally restored independence in 1668, the other revolts within the scattered lands of the Spanish Monarchy during the 1640s, to mention only the major domestic conflicts. Fighting was ubiquitous in early modern Europe, but the struggles of the seventeenth century were on a quite new scale both in their continuity and extent, and especially in their decisive outcomes, something which is quite central to the broader argument of this article.

These decades, and particularly the second half of the century, also saw sustained efforts at state-building, as rulers attempted to extend their authority, especially over taxation, to pay for the wars they were waging and to increase their control over outlying provinces and regions. The seventeenth century saw efforts to construct a 'British state', following the accession of the Stuart rulers of Scotland to the

throne of England in 1603, and, eventually, an Anglo-Scottish parliamentary union in 1707, together with growing English control over large areas of Ireland. It witnessed an expansion of central government authority in France from the 1630s onwards, and identical developments also in smaller states such as Denmark, where a form of 'absolutism' was established by a military coup in 1660, in Sweden, where Karl XI (1660–97) did likewise in 1680, and in the northern Italian polity of Savoy-Piedmont, where a significant extension of Turin's authority was apparent during the reign of Victor Amadeus II (1675–1730).

The seventeenth century also saw the creation of what has come to be styled a 'composite monarchy' in Brandenburg-Prussia and the consolidation of one in the Austrian Habsburg Monarchy, as Vienna's authority was increased first over the Kingdom of Bohemia (as a result of the outcome of the Thirty Years War) and then over Hungary, reconquered from its Ottoman occupiers between the 1680s and 1718. Further east, between Ivan IV's reign (1533–84) and the early decades of the eighteenth century, the lands nominally governed by the ruler of Muscovy, or 'Russia' as it was coming to be known, were dramatically extended by conquests and annexations. It expanded eastwards into Siberia; south-eastwards into Central Asia; southwards into the borderlands which separated the Ottoman Empire and its satellite Khanate of the Crimea from the rich farming territories of southern Russia; westwards against Poland-Lithuania, from which large swathes of territory were seized; and, finally, in the years immediately after 1700, in the eastern Baltic. During the century after the 1580s the tsar's territories probably trebled in extent; over the longer period *c.*1450–1721 this growth was even more remarkable, and unparalleled in early modern Europe.

These international and domestic conflicts, and the efforts at state-formation which accompanied them, were quite fundamental for the consolidation of aristocratic power. They made land available on a wholly new scale, as estates were confiscated from rebels or other opponents, or became available in recently-incorporated provinces or newly-conquered regions. These struggles simultaneously created a need for soldiers and administrators who could be rewarded with that same land, while new regimes struggling to establish themselves, such as the Romanovs in Muscovy after 1613 and the Braganzas in Portugal after 1640, sought to win political supporters by distributing these windfalls. The escalating costs of warfare to-

gether with the wider economic difficulties of the period led monarchical regimes all over Europe to distribute not pensions or other cash gifts to their elites, but landed property, and particularly where this was in short supply, titles and honours of all kinds. The Spanish King Philip IV (1621–65) was quite explicit about this. 'Without rewards and punishments [he wrote] no monarchy can be preserved. Now rewards may be either financial or honorific. We have no money, so we have thought it right and necessary to remedy the fault by increasing the number of honours.'[6] Existing nobles and a rather smaller number of newly-ennobled lineages were the principal beneficiaries of this largesse.

The question of landholding is a crucial but elusive subject for any historian of the nobility, since we remain very poorly informed about the details of which individual or family, or what institution, held a particular estate and the precise terms on which they did so. As proof of this generalization, one need only think of the repeated but usually unsuccessful efforts by early modern governments to establish reliable surveys or cadasters of landholding, in order to base their fiscal policies on a land tax at least in part. Even in the 1780s, and with the combined apparatus of the bureaucracy and the army to carry out the survey, the Emperor Joseph II was unable to complete a survey of landholding in even part of the Austrian Habsburg Monarchy, and his experience was identical to that of earlier attempts to draw up such a survey in states of any size. Within medium-sized polities—Denmark, Savoy-Piedmont, Sweden—greater precision was possible than in larger states such as the French, Spanish and Austrian Habsburg monarchies, to say nothing of the vast Russian empire. Yet the kind of detailed and remarkably precise survey of landholding which the first Norman King of England, William the Conqueror, had compiled in the shape of Domesday Book in the late eleventh century, was extremely unusual in early modern Europe, where reliable and detailed information of this kind remained scarce.

Landed property, however, was the principal foundation of noble power, apparent in the fact that in some countries certain estates were formally designated as reserved for the nobility—what was known as a *Rittergut* in early modern Germany—and that such land could not be acquired by a commoner. In almost every European

[6] Quoted and trans. by Kamen, *The Iron Century*, 163.

country the nobility were collectively the leading landowner. Land was a source of social and even political authority for those who held it, as well as an economic resource, and any would-be nobleman, or poorer noble who wished to rise in status, set about acquiring as much land as he—or, very occasionally, she—could secure. Within a traditional economy such as that of early modern Europe, land was also the principal source of income. If farmed directly, it yielded agricultural produce which could either be consumed or sold to generate cash; or it could be leased out to tenants in a variety of ways, either for short or more extended periods of time. It also generated revenues in the form of seigneurial dues and a variety of other payments which were collected by the local lord. Land was a far more reliable and also far more important economic resource than either trade or manufacturing, which in some countries nobles were supposedly prohibited from undertaking on pain of the loss of their privileged status: what was known as 'derogation'.

Landed property generated far more than economic resources, important as these undoubtedly were. Within a traditional and deeply deferential society it was also an important source of authority, whether formally in the legal powers which many nobles held and frequently exercised, or less formally in the shape of social leadership and dominance in their immediate locality. By the early modern period, extensive landholding—'rolling acres' in the English phrase—was seen as the essential accompaniment to the privileged status of nobleman or noblewomen. When a complete outsider—such as the landless English admiral Horatio Nelson, who was the third surviving son of a vicar in Norfolk—was raised directly into the higher nobility, he was quickly kitted out by the government with a suitable country estate adequate to his new status as Viscount Nelson, exactly as the Duke of Marlborough had been given Blenheim a century earlier.

Despite the lack of precise information, it is clear that the seventeenth century was exceptional in the amount of land which was transferred from one noble family to another, mainly as a result of the widespread civil strife of these decades. The French Religious Wars between the 1560s and the 1590s, together with the recurring civil strife during the next generation saw significant changes to the pattern of landholding in France, though the impact of this structural change remains to be investigated. In Bohemia, more than half of all

noble estates changed hands as a consequence of the failure of the Bohemian Rebellion of 1618–20 and the wider outcome of the Thirty Years War. In seventeenth-century Ireland even more property changed hands, with the extension of English control over large areas of the island and the accompanying decline of Gaelic lordship, together with the upheavals brought about by the civil wars of the mid-century and of 1688–91. In both these countries decisive political change and unsuccessful rebellion, with the losers being expropriated, were fundamental to the massive redistribution of property which took place. A rather different though comparable pattern is evident in the case of Muscovite Russia, where it was primarily the extensive lands conquered to the south and east which were awarded by successive Romanov rulers to their leading supporters and servants, thereby endowing the aristocracy emerging in Russia with estates in the rich agricultural lands of the so-called 'Black Soil' regions.

Analogous, though not identical, developments took place in Sweden, which dramatically emerged from political obscurity to become one of the leading European powers during the first half of the seventeenth century. The Swedish economy remained an economy of barter, and this, together with the country's own relative poverty and backwardness, inhibited the development of taxation on the scale evident elsewhere. Instead, successive rulers funded their seventeenth-century wars primarily by alienating the substantial crown estates, largely acquired as a result of the Protestant Reformation a century before, together with the vast new territories in the eastern Baltic which were conquered by Swedish armies during the period before 1660. Once again, the main beneficiaries were the high nobility, as the crown attempted to secure its cooperation in the imperial venture. Donations of this kind to favoured royal servants had begun during the sixteenth century, but after 1600 they reached quite unprecedented levels. These alienations took two forms. Some crown estates were sold outright to raise cash, or granted as security for loans, which a bankrupt monarchy was often unable to repay. Other properties were leased out for extended periods on very favourable terms in order to pay overdue wages or settle debts.

The scale of these alienations was quite remarkable: by 1680 it was calculated that the number of farms (the primary unit of land division in Sweden) directly controlled by the nobility had doubled since the beginning of the century. The aristocracy benefited in a second

way. In the eastern Baltic territories (Ingria, Kexholm, and Livonia) conquered during the 1610s and 1620s they secured large donations which probably eclipsed those within Sweden itself. By around 1680 in Livonia the leading Swedish families controlled approaching half of the estates (45 per cent), while the lesser nobility owned a further 12 per cent.[7] The greatest gainer in Livonia was none other than the Council magnate Axel Oxenstierna, Sweden's chancellor for four decades, Gustav Adolf's closest political collaborator and the uncrowned ruler for more than a decade after the king's death, during the Regency for Queen Kristina (1632–44). Subsequent campaigns in Germany during the Thirty Years War brought further landed booty to the Swedish elite by means of royal grants.

It is, of course, true that the absolute monarchy, which was set up after 1680, recovered some of this property by means of the celebrated *Reduktion* of Karl XI. During the 1680s and 1690s, in an initiative without parallel in early modern Europe, royal commissioners carried out a detailed investigation into noble landholding, seeking to recover alienated estates for the Vasa monarchy under the terms of the mid-fourteenth-century Land Law. Many noble families handed over at least part of their recent gains, and one or two were completely ruined, notably the de la Gardie. Magnus Gabriel de la Gardie, for a time the favourite of Queen Kristina and then the dominant figure in the Regency for the boy-king Karl XI after 1660, had secured vast landholdings through inheritance and crown donations, but lost almost everything in the *Reduktion* and in his penurious old age was reduced to living on royal handouts in very straitened circumstances. His case was exceptional, and the leading Swedish families—the so-called 'Council Aristocracy'—retained a significant proportion of their gains into the eighteenth century and far beyond. Exactly how much remains uncertain: the detailed impact of the *Reduktion* is still to be studied. But the one area which has been examined in sufficient detail, the rich farming province of Uppland, north of Stockholm, suggests that the aristocracy hung on to most of their new lands. There the nobility had secured 60 per cent of the estates during the seventeenth century; by the end of the reign of Charles XII in 1718, these families retained at least two-thirds of these gains, corresponding to the wider European pattern.

[7] E. Dunsdorfs, *The Livonian Estates of Axel Oxenstierna* (Stockholm, 1981), 4.

The consolidation of aristocracy and the redistribution of land which brought it about could be the result of changes of political regime, as the examples of Denmark, Portugal, and Muscovite Russia all demonstrate in different ways. In the Danish Monarchy, the crown, which had seized full authority in 1660, set out quite deliberately during the following decades to create a service aristocracy and to give it the landed possessions that its status required. The result was the emergence of a new elite of administrators, granted for the first time formal titles of nobility ('count' and 'baron'), which came to the fore during the closing decades of the seventeenth and the earlier eighteenth century. Table 1 highlights the success of these nobles, with important support from the crown, in securing lands to match their status.

Portugal's recovery of political independence after sixty years of Madrid's rule during its War of Independence (1640–68) and the accession of the plutocratic Duke of Braganza as John IV (1640–56) also saw a new aristocracy take shape. In 1640 there were fifty-six titled Portuguese lineages, after a notable 'inflation of honours' during the period of Spanish rule (1580–1640). No fewer than twenty-four of these families, almost half, remained loyal to the Spanish crown, which in many cases had granted them their new-found status and eminence. Their disappearance and the accompanying loss of land and income facilitated a reconstitution of the elite. The court aristocracy, which took shape under the early Braganzas, was rein-

Table 1: *Landed power of 'new' nobility in Denmark after 1660 (in percentages)*

	Zealand		*Funen*		*Jutland*	
	1680	1717	1680	1717	1680	1717
Old Nobility	37.6	23.9	58.8	—	48.0	32.5
New Nobility	20.2	17.9	4.0	38.8	10.8	25.1
Counts/Barons	9.6	19.5	17.1	51.0	13.8	18.1

Source: Based on E. L. Petersen, 'Poor Nobles and Rich in Denmark, 1500–1700', *Journal of European Economic History*, 30 (2001), 105–24, at 119, table 5.

forced by lineages drawn from the untitled but frequently venerable nobility.

Portugal provides an example of a country where formal possession of land was less important than control over the wealth it yielded. The country's earlier history meant that the three Military Orders of Avis, Christ, and Santiago controlled large tracts of land, but these were all under royal control since the Portuguese monarch was hereditary Grand Master of each. The new Braganza rulers distributed commanderies in these organizations and the income that went with them, primarily in the form of tithes, to the families which had supported the rebellion against Madrid. One outcome was the creation of a powerful and wealthy aristocracy, but one unusually dependent upon the crown. A century later, in the mid-1750s, the titled nobility controlled two-thirds (66.4 per cent) of this revenue; in the early 1610s this figure had been less than one-fifth (18.4 per cent), underlining the extent to which the aristocracy consolidated its wealth. By the third quarter of the eighteenth century over half of aristocratic income (on average) was derived either directly or indirectly from the crown.[8] The direct control and exploitation of land was less important in Portugal than the revenue it yielded, but the outcome was essentially similar: the creation of a wealthy aristocracy which exercised authority and possessed the resources needed to support it. Once again Bacon's 'Act of Power' was quite crucial, as it was throughout Europe.

This was also so in Muscovite Russia, though on closer enquiry it proves to be a slight variation upon the pattern elsewhere. In the vast expanses ruled over by the Romanov dynasty after 1613, control over a population which was thinly scattered and far less numerous than in other European countries was at least as important as dominance over land per se. The Russian elite, which at exactly this period was undergoing important changes which resembled the wider Continental pattern, based its power not merely on extensive landholdings but also on direct control of peasants, and this was consolidated by the formal imposition of serfdom by the Law Code of 1649. The reigns of Alexis (1645–76) and especially Peter I (1682/89–1725) saw

[8] Nuno Gonçalo Freitas Monteiro, *O Crepúsculo dos Grandes: A Casa e o Património da Aristocracia em Portugal (1750–1832)* (Lisbon, 1998; 2nd edn. 2003), table 4, 50–1, and table 27, 261–3.

further decisive changes to the Russian elite, with a vast increase in landholding and a shift towards hereditary ownership of property, and a sharp increase in the numbers in the boyar Duma. By the eighteenth century it was exhibiting features which were more distinctly 'European', with the introduction of the titles of 'count' and 'baron', and even an unsuccessful attempt to facilitate the creation of entails by means of the Law of Single Inheritance, introduced in 1716 but rescinded in 1731.

IV

This leads on naturally to the second theme: the issue of how landed property, once acquired, could be transmitted undivided to the next generation, and to the subject of inheritance arrangements. These were fundamental to aristocracy, which depended upon the transmission of social and political power, together with the human and economic resources to support this, from one generation to the next. Here there were essentially two systems: partible inheritance, where all the legitimate male children of a noble father, and sometimes even daughters too, secured a proportion of his property and wealth; and primogeniture, where the first-born son secured the lion's share of the landed property in particular. The first of these was obviously a threat to the creation and survival of large aristocratic patrimonies. One reason why this article says nothing about the Reich is that it was one principal area—the other two were Poland-Lithuania and Russia—where partible inheritance was widely practised. Despite family agreements to maintain the landed patrimony intact and share the revenues, it was one factor militating against the creation of a substantial territorial aristocracy there. A second was the extent of political fragmentation within the Holy Roman Empire and the distinctive constitutional structure which accompanied this, which limited the resources available to any single ruler for distribution to leading nobles and so inhibited any emulation of the development towards a more powerful aristocracy in progress elsewhere. During the Later Middle Ages and the early modern period there had been a distinct shift in much of Europe towards male primogeniture, that is to say, a system of inheritance in which the eldest son secured the bulk of the landed property and sometimes all of it, with the other

children being provided for out of the family's moveable wealth, if at all. The assumption always was that any nobleman of any standing, and certainly all aristocrats, required either an establishment and income of their own, or help in launching a career, usually in the army, in Roman Catholic countries also in the Church, or in rather fewer cases in government service. Noblewomen were granted a dowry which could be very considerable if they married, or what was termed a 'spiritual dowry' if they entered the Church, or they were maintained within the extended noble family if they remained unmarried and helped with the upbringing of the younger members of the lineage.

The move towards male primogeniture had been accompanied, particularly in Southern Europe, by the flourishing of formal arrangements by which family property was placed within an enduring entail. That is to say, a formal legal trust was created, with each succeeding generation of eldest sons enjoying the income but more or less unable to touch the landed capital enclosed within it.[9] Such arrangements had become widespread in late medieval Castile and had been established, on a much smaller scale, in fifteenth-century Portugal (the *mayorazgo* in the former, the *morgadio* in the latter), and during the sixteenth century had been adopted within the Italian peninsula, where Spanish influence was strong (the *fedecommesso*). Some entails had also been created in France, though the question of noble inheritance arrangements there is both highly complex and notably obscure, while rather different forms of the device had long been established in the British Isles. Where they existed, such arrangements created an enduring material base for the lineage and were an insurance against a spendthrift heir squandering the family wealth. They also created a secure line of succession, and this was at least as important. The permanent demographic threat to noble power was clear: the likelihood was that the average family might survive for four or five generations in the direct male line. One important function of an entail was to provide a series of substitutes from among brothers, nephews, uncles,

[9] The best guide to this crucial development is still the remarkable article by J. P. Cooper, 'Patterns of Inheritance and Settlement by Great Landowners from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries', in Jack Goody, Joan Thirsk, and E. P. Thompson (eds.), *Family and Inheritance: Rural Society in Western Europe 1200–1800* (Cambridge, 1976), 192–327.

and even female heirs, if the lineage failed in the direct male line. It could not guarantee against the extinction of an individual noble House, but it could make dynastic survival considerably more likely.

During the long seventeenth century such arrangements spread north of the Alps and became a defining characteristic of the aristocracies taking shape in these regions of Europe, as they had long been in most Mediterranean countries. The one southern European country where entails had not been established at an earlier period was Portugal, but it now came into line with its Spanish neighbour. The decades around 1600, during the period of Spanish–Portuguese union, saw the majority of Portuguese aristocratic families establish such entails, encouraged by a law code which sought to standardize the form of such trusts with the Castilian *mayorazgo* as the prototype. In Central Europe the seventeenth century was the crucial period for the adoption of such inheritance arrangements. The creation of a dynastic elite in the Austrian Habsburg Monarchy mentioned earlier was in many ways the classic case of the impact of the strict entail, what is known in German as a *Fideikommiss*. Bohemian families traditionally practised some form of partible inheritance, and during the sixteenth century many estates had been divided to provide for younger sons, with the consequent atomization of landholding. The earliest *Fideikommisse* were established in the period before the Thirty Years War, with the Dohna leading the way in 1600. But the main period of foundation was after 1620, and the principal founders were the families who were the greatest beneficiaries of the share-out of estates in Bohemia which was in progress. Almost all the Bohemian and Austrian aristocratic families of any standing and wealth created and maintained such entails. The Kingdom of Hungary was a rather different case, but here again some of the leading families who supported and were favoured by the Habsburgs adopted such arrangements, headed by the Pálffy and the Eszterházy, with their clutch of *Fideikommisse*.

Impartible inheritance among the high nobility also spread into Scandinavian countries at this period. In Denmark, families granted titles in the new aristocracy established after 1660 were specifically required to establish an entailed estate (the so-called *stamhus*), and this privilege was made more widely available to the nobility some years later; its impact is evident in the fact that by 1800 one-fifth of Denmark's agricultural land lay within estates of this kind. In

Sweden the titles of count and baron, which had been introduced during the second half of the sixteenth century and became far more widespread after 1600, when a titled aristocracy took shape, had been accompanied by the obligation to make landed property impartible, that is to say, indivisible, and for it to descend by male primogeniture, and this was confirmed in 1604. If a family failed in the male line, the fief reverted to the crown.

A similar form of inheritance arrangements became more common in France during the long seventeenth century. The vehicle for this was the *duché-pairie*, to which traditional military Houses had been admitted from the 1560s onwards. These were hereditary in the male line, though the crown retained the formal right to re-appoint each new generation to the dignity. They could also be entailed and descended through primogeniture, reverting to the crown when male heirs failed. In earlier times French noble families had made significant use of entails, but these had been subjected to restrictions during the 1560s, when both their duration and the degrees of kinship to which they could extend had been limited. By contrast *duchés-pairies* could be made subject to permanent 'substitutions', as the practice of entailment was known. In a certain number of provinces, 'substitutions' were formally prohibited: Brittany and Normandy were the leading examples of territories where this was so. But the crown could and did allow favoured individuals who were not *ducs-et-pairs* to create perpetual entails, overriding local legal codes in the process. Though detailed investigation remains to be conducted into the Bourbon aristocracy's use of such devices, it is clear that many families created entails and that this contributed to the increasing stability of landholding at this time.

The same intention was evident in seventeenth-century Ireland, though it was not to be fully realized in practice. The so-called 'surrender-and-regrant' agreements concluded by the English government with native Gaelic lords from the mid-sixteenth century onwards involved, at least by the 1580s, the obligation to accept male primogeniture. This was intended to replace the native custom of tanistry, by which a successor was elected or even designated by the chief, which obviously had considerable disruptive potential. During the seventeenth century the new and largely Protestant English elite in Ireland embraced primogeniture, if not completely, and some entails were even established. Remarkably, the celebrated 'Act to pre-

vent the further growth of Popery' (1704), the centrepiece of the so-called 'Penal laws' of eighteenth-century Ireland, imposed partible inheritance on Roman Catholic landed families, or such as survived, but not on their Protestant counterparts, who had secured social and political mastery during the seventeenth century. The intention was quite clear: to create an enduring Protestant ascendancy, underlining the intimate link which was now recognized to exist between primogeniture and the continuity of a landed elite.

In England a rather different pattern is apparent, though the outcome was to be very similar. The challenge to the social and political hierarchy during the later 1640s in particular, with the execution of a King and a radical attack upon property and noble status, had been considerable, while the fighting and then the unsuccessful search for stability after 1649 also posed a significant threat to England's traditional ruling caste. Insecurity of property was a fundamental danger for any landed elite. One important response, developed by two royalist lawyers, Sir Orlando Bridgman (1606?–74) and Geoffrey Palmer (1598–1670), was to lead directly to a new means of securing landed property for subsequent generations. This was the Strict Settlement, so-called since it was usually restricted to an individual and his direct heirs, normally his sons. This built on the celebrated statute *De donis conditionalibus* of 1285 (which had legalized and standardized the creation of entails) and combined it with the ability to create a life interest in a property under the Tudor Statute of Uses (1535); it also incorporated subsequent developments in the conveyancing of property to develop a flexible instrument for keeping the landed patrimony together.

The sixteenth and earlier seventeenth centuries had been a period of fluidity and even confusion where noble inheritance of land in England had been concerned. During the 1470s a legal judgement had made it possible for entails to be broken, and by the middle of the following century this had hardened into a doctrine. Together with the entrenched opposition of the courts, and of most lawyers, to entails, this had produced considerable uncertainty among landowners about how best to arrange the succession to their lands, with a striking diversity in actual practice. These uncertainties were significantly increased by the upheavals and insecurities of the 1640s. Bridgman's role was to provide a means, drawn from established ideas about the inheritance of landed property, to assuage the

landowners' anxieties. In its essentials and impact the English Strict Settlement resembled Continental entails, but it differed in one important respect: it made specific provision for widows and younger sons, and sometimes for daughters too, in addition to the heir to the title and property.

After 1660 the Strict Settlement spread very rapidly indeed among the peerage and gentry. Such agreements, often drawn up in wills or included in marriage settlements, were highly individualistic; their contours reflected the circumstances of a particular family. But their essentially dynastic aim was clear: to provide a secure landed patrimony to support a title in perpetuity. The Earl of Westmorland, who placed his lands within a Strict Settlement in 1668, spoke for his fellow peers when he declared that he did so in order that his estate 'might continue in his name and blood and may descend within the Earldom to the heirs male of the family'.[10] By the close of the seventeenth century there was scarcely a peerage family in England which did not have such a device to protect the bulk of its landholding. While historians have debated the precise extent to which it alone was responsible for the rise of larger estates at this period, its undoubted and major contribution to this trend seems undeniable. By the middle of the eighteenth century, as much as half of all English land may have been placed within settlements, and a hundred years' later this figure was probably between 70 and 90 per cent.[11] The great estates which had been created in the later decades of the seventeenth century would survive for the next two hundred years at least. Once again the impact of such arrangements was to facilitate the construction and survival of great landed patrimonies which were becoming a feature of much of Europe during the seventeenth century, as they had long been in Castile and in regions of France.

Where entails were not concluded or did not take root (as in Russia), the practice of endogamy, which strengthened within the aristocracy at this period, could play the same role. The widening of the aristocratic stratum of the nobility in itself contributed to this trend, since families with whom the most important lineages inter-

[10] Quoted by Sir John Habakkuk, *Marriage, Debt and the Estates System: English Landownership, 1650–1950* (Oxford, 1994), 52.

[11] These estimates come from the most recent and authoritative study: Habakkuk, *Marriage, Debt and the Estates System*, 48.

married were themselves entering the highest level of the nobility. This is clear from a detailed study of those aristocrats who became *ducs-et-pairs* over the period 1589–1723, which reveals that their marriages were overwhelmingly with other peerage families or lineages which were themselves part of the high nobility. This was so in four-fifths of instances: 129 marriages out of 162. Fewer than one-fifth were with *robe* dynasties or other ministerial families.[12] As in other countries, marriage within such a relatively narrow circle of aristocratic Houses, together with the established vagaries of succession and inheritance, strengthened the existing trend for most landed property to remain within the wider family, albeit at the price of extensive and often prolonged litigation over disputed inheritances. A shrewd and successful marriage strategy and a concentration upon intermarrying with other high-ranking lineages, which appears to be on the increase during the long seventeenth century, further consolidated aristocratic power throughout Europe.

Entails did one further thing. They created a reservoir of younger sons lacking much wealth of their own and so available for service in the monarchical State, which could give them both a career and, if they were fortunate, a degree of independent wealth which their own family's marital and inheritance strategies were denying them. In many aristocratic families the existence of an entail was accompanied by a strategy of restricted marriage, by which younger sons were actively prevented from marrying because of the financial implications for the wider lineage. Within Catholic countries—and many countries where such arrangements flourished were Catholic states—the second son and any younger brothers might be packed off to a career in the Church or the army, with such financial assistance as the lineage could manage from its own resources and, perhaps, from loans contracted for the purpose. Even in the post-Counter-Reformation Church there were bishoprics and even archbishoprics, and monasteries as well, which were in practice hereditary in the same family, and formed part of the resources and family strategy of that lineage. But even in Catholic countries, usually only one son would be launched on a career in the Church, and of course in Orthodox Russia and Protestant Denmark, Sweden, and England a

[12] Figures from Jean-Pierre Labatut, *Les ducs et pairs de France au XVIIe siècle: Étude sociale* (Paris, 1972), 187–8.

rather different pattern prevailed. Everywhere, however, younger sons were increasingly drawn to a career in State service.

V

This introduces the third theme: the central importance of state-formation for the consolidation of aristocratic power. The seventeenth century saw significant increases in the size of armies and a consequent expansion of government. There was a corresponding need for specialized personnel to officer the enlarged military forces and to staff the agencies of central and even local administration, and the nobility were the main, indeed, the overwhelming source of such personnel. The old idea that the modern State rested on teams of bureaucrats of middle-class origin who had studied Roman law has been largely discredited. On the contrary, it is now abundantly clear that monarchy depended, in the seventeenth century and beyond, on partnership with the established social elite. This was why the dying Cardinal Mazarin told the young Louis XIV in March 1661 that his regime must be based on the traditional partnership with the French nobility, which was his 'right arm'.[13] It was also one further reason, in addition to financial exigency, why the sale of offices, which often led to the acquisition of noble status sooner or later, flourished during these decades. This practice became most formalized in Bourbon France, leading to a great expansion of the *robe* nobility, but aspects of it were to be found in several countries and further cemented the bonds between monarchy and elite. Rulers possessed both the resources—abundant available land or, where this was lacking, pensions and titles—to endow the new aristocracy, while a royal licence or tacit permission was needed to establish or amend an entail.

There was an additional reason why Europe's rulers stood to benefit from the introduction or proliferation of entails. By the eighteenth century the idea that primogeniture and entail should be favoured by monarchs because of the pool of younger sons they made available for military or administrative service was an axiom of statecraft. That aim quite explicitly lay behind Peter the Great's

[13] Quoted by Richard Bonney (ed.), *Society and Government in France under Richelieu and Mazarin, 1624–61* (Basingstoke, 1988), 76.

attempt to introduce unigeniture into Russia in the Law of Single Inheritance and behind an identical attempt, half a century later, by Prussia's Frederick the Great to establish the *Fideikommiss* among the Junkers, with the intention of rendering noble power permanent.[14] Both attempts failed, and it would be the nineteenth century before entails were adopted at all widely among the higher nobility in either Prussia or Russia. The earlier initiatives were unsuccessful because of the extent to which the Junkers and their Russian counterparts were devoted to the principle of partible inheritance, and, perhaps more importantly, because of the relative poverty of much of the land in both countries. Legal trusts and the costs involved made sense only if there was sufficient landed and other wealth worth placing within a trust. In the Austrian Habsburg Monarchy the *Fideikommiss* flourished primarily in the rich farming areas of Bohemia, Lower Austria, and, to a lesser extent, Styria, and was far less widely adopted in more mountainous regions such as the Tyrol.

Such arrangements required the permission of the ruler for their creation or amendment, whether that was specific to the particular entail or generalized through enabling legislation. Over time, the second became more common than the first. But seventeenth-century rulers were happy to facilitate the establishment of such trusts, which not merely created a pool of younger sons available for state service but also established the kind of powerful and enduring aristocracies upon which monarchical power depended, as it had always done. This period saw a synergy between a series of developments, the chronology and detailed nature of which varied from region to region and even province to province, but which in their essentials were similar. The political upheavals and foreign wars of these decades made land available on a wholly new scale; individual families organized their affairs in ways which concentrated resources upon the eldest son and his heirs and so contributed to the emergence of aristocracies across much of Europe; while rulers deliberately encouraged this evolution by distributing lands and, less commonly, other forms of wealth to their elites, and facilitating its concentration upon the first-born male child. To adapt Charles Tilly's celebrated aphorism about the essential interdependence of war and

[14] See his comments in the 'Political Testament' of 1768: Richard Dietrich (ed.), *Die politischen Testamente der Hohenzollern* (Berlin, 1986), 500.

state power: during the seventeenth century the monarchical State and family practices and structures together made aristocracy, and the aristocracies in turn made States. The consequence was that Europe's aristocratic elite, by the decades around 1700, was defined to a greater extent than a hundred years before by its proximity to monarchical power.

VI

The fourth and final theme is the question of who benefited from monarchical largesse and the composition of the aristocracy which resulted from these developments. What kind of individuals received the lands taken from defeated rebels, alienated from crown demesne, or acquired as new provinces were incorporated? Undoubtedly some were 'new' men from outside the nobility, individuals who by their own efforts and, perhaps, a large slice of luck, simply being in the right place at an opportune moment, secured lands and the status to match. A very good example would be Richard Boyle, who rose from being a younger son of a Cambridgeshire yeoman farmer to become the First Earl of Cork.[15] Boyle built up a large landholding in southern Ireland by highly dubious means during the period when English authority in the island was being expanded (he was a member of the Dublin government), bought the title of 'Earl of Cork' for £4,000 from the Duke of Buckingham, James VI and I's all-powerful favourite, and established aristocratic lineages on both sides of the Irish Sea. But men like Cork, though they can be identified in most countries, were everywhere in a minority, and usually a very small minority at that.

Relatively few individuals made such a spectacular ascent and rose from outside the nobility into the aristocracy within one generation. Here the rise of the Hungarian family of Eszterházy, the greatest success story of seventeenth-century aristocratic Europe, was rather more typical. Originally an impoverished family in the lesser nobility, their ascent had begun during the more socially fluid decades before 1600. Subsequently they prospered through skilful marriages and fortunate inheritances followed by faithful service to the dynasty, to become the kingdom's greatest magnate lineage, with

[15] See Nicholas Canny, *The Upstart Earl: A Study of the Social and Mental World of Richard Boyle, First Earl of Cork, 1566–1643* (Cambridge, 1982).

an estate which at its eighteenth-century peak was more than one million acres in extent.

Two individuals were of particular importance in the family's rise, Miklós Eszterházy (1583–1645) and his son Pál (1635–1713). Miklós, who became palatine, that is, the head of the kingdom's government and representative of the Habsburg ruler, in 1625, secured great wealth, mainly in the shape of vast estates in the south-east of the Archduchy of Austria, around Eisenstadt in the Burgenland which became the centre of the family's power, together with the impressive castle of Forchtenstein. Himself a convert, he played a key strategic role in winning over Protestant magnates to Catholicism. The marital arrangements by means of which he aimed to retain this patrimony in family hands were even more remarkable and amount to a quite extreme example of endogamy. Miklós himself married, as his second wife, the widow of Imre Thurzó, Krisztina Nyáry, by whom he had a son Pál. He then married the son of his own first marriage to the daughter of Krisztina Nyáry's first marriage to Thurzó. These alliances enabled the Eszterházy to benefit from the extinction of the Thurzó in the male line in 1636. But his dynastic operations were far from finished. Even more remarkably, Miklós's son Pál was then married to the granddaughter of his own first marriage! Subsequently Pal Eszterházy would be the brother-in-law of Ferenc Nádasdy, who himself was the son-in-law of none other than: Miklós Eszterházy![16]

The point about these incestuous marriages, both figuratively and literally, was that they aimed to preserve and extend the family patrimony, and did so very effectively indeed. They were undertaken long before the family adopted the device of entail, and aimed at the same broad goal: that of preventing the break-up of the family's estates. Pál Eszterházy was in his turn palatine (1681–1713), skilfully balancing Hungarian patriotism with Habsburg dynastic loyalism, and secured further extensive estates for the family. By the 1690s, when a series of *Fideikommisse* were concluded—by this point his fecundity had led to the establishment of a series of collateral branches—the Eszterházy lands were close to their greatest extent. His mag-

[16] For these marital arrangements, and much more on aristocratic power within the Austrian Habsburg Monarchy, see R. J. W. Evans, *The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy 1550–1700* (Oxford, 1979), esp. pp. 241, 247, a brilliant and quite fundamental study for the subject of elites in Central Europe.

nate status was signalled in two further developments at this time: the award of the title of Imperial Prince (the first Hungarian to be so honoured) in 1687, and the building of an impressive family palace at Eisenstadt, which would remain the centre of its power until the construction of the fabled palace of Esterhaza during the second half of the eighteenth century.

Analyses of the composition of this new aristocracy reveal that the gainers were almost always established members of the nobility or, in England, gentry. Members of middle-ranking and even lesser noble families benefited, along with younger sons from the aristocracy itself, securing lands and status to match, and founded new aristocratic lineages, which established themselves in turn. The best example was provided by developments in Bohemia, referred to earlier, where the greatest beneficiaries from a redistribution of land during the Thirty Years War were a group of around ten families drawn from the country's old nobility, who consolidated their power impressively, and by the mid-seventeenth century constituted the first and most important element in a new magnate elite which would dominate the region for three centuries to come. The latest calculation is that native Bohemian families secured over half (53 per cent) of the confiscated estates which were then redistributed during the Thirty Years War.

A rather different pattern was evident in Denmark. After 1660 the monarchy recovered the sole right to ennoble, hitherto shared with the aristocratic Council and in practice exercised largely by the elite, which had resulted in relatively few ennoblements as the oligarchy closed ranks: little more than one a year over the entire period since 1536. This opened the way for a wide-ranging reconstitution of the elite. Titles were granted for the first time in 1671, and proved to be the first of a wide-ranging series of changes, which established what was, in practice, a Table of Ranks, as social distinction was closely tied to the acceptance of service to the crown. Such service was to be overwhelmingly administrative in nature: the new elite comprised the central government officials of the absolute monarchy. By the end of the eighteenth century, 62 comital titles and 58 baronial ones had been awarded. Many of these men were either courtiers or army officers, as the pattern of ennoblements began to change.[17]

[17] There is much information on this in Albert Fabritius, *Danmarks Riges Adel: Dens Tilgang og Afgang 1536–1935* (Copenhagen, 1946).

Membership of the aristocracy was changing in this way. At the same time, however, and perhaps more importantly, the nobility was itself becoming more compressed and stratified, with a much larger aristocracy both proportionately and in numerical terms. One dimension of this wider development lies beyond the subject of this paper: the widespread decline of the lesser nobility, caught during the sixteenth-century Price Rise in the vice of static or near static incomes, with rents fixed in long-term tenancies and no access to court patronage of the kind that enabled leading families to prosper, and rising prices, exacerbated by the demands of conspicuous consumption which imposed new levels of expenditure on even the poorer members of the Second Estate. The persistence of partible inheritance among the lesser nobility in some countries (in contrast to the aristocracy) and the consequent fragmentation of estates was a further reason for this group's difficulties at this time. Throughout Europe these decades saw a clear and at times marked decline in the numbers of poorer noble families, as many simply abandoned the unequal struggle to maintain their status. Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate this for Bohemia and for Lower Austria, with the clear rise of the Estate of Lords (*Herrenstand*) and within it the emergence of an aristocratic tier of counts and princes: the two highest titles of nobility.

Table 2: *Rise of titled nobility and decline of the lesser nobility in the early modern Kingdom of Bohemia, with their share of all landholdings (expressed as a percentage of the total number of peasants under their control)*

	1557	1603	1615	1656	1741
Estate of Lords	184 (49%)	216 (45%)	197 (45%)	293 (60%)	279 (?)
Estate of Knights	1,438 (34%)	1,131 (35%)	977 (31%)	587 (10%)	238 (?)
Total	1,622	1,347	1,174	880	517
Proportion of Lords in Nobility	11%	16%	17%	33%	54%

Source: Petr Mata, *Svět České Aristokracie (1500–1700)* (Prague, 2004), 159.

Table 3: *Nobles and lords in early modern Lower Austria*

	Estate of Lords		**Estate of Knights**		**Combined Totals**	
Year	Families	Individual Members	Families	Individual Members	Families	Individual Members
1415	43	67	167	222	210	289
1580	56	119	197	281	253	400
1620	87	243	128	224	215	467
1720/27	160	280	105	111	265	391

Source: Karin J. MacHardy, *War, Religion and Court Patronage in Habsburg Austria: The Social and Cultural Dimensions of Political Interaction, 1521–1622* (Basingstoke, 2003), 134.

Everywhere these decades saw a noted expansion of the aristocracy. One guide to this, which reinforced the process under way, was what has been styled the 'inflation of honours', the rapid expansion evident throughout seventeenth-century Europe in the numbers of titled nobles and even in the range of dignities which could be granted. The awarding of more and more titles, and the resulting rise of a lineage through the various ranks, which in German-speaking Europe went from baron to count and then prince, exemplified 'Acts of Power'. Tables 4, 5, and 6 provide three national examples of the way in which the numbers of titled noble families and the equivalent in Muscovy, the boyar Duma, simply exploded at this time. Whether it is the expansion of the *ducs et pairs* in France, or the *títulos* and the *grandeza* in the Spanish Monarchy, or the creation of a titled aristocracy in Sweden; the creation of non-royal dukes in later Stuart England, the emergence of an Imperial elite of princes, counts, and barons in the Austrian Habsburg Monarchy, or the introduction of a titled aristocracy in post-1660 Denmark and the earlier expansion of the boyar Duma in seventeenth-century Muscovy, the European trend is identical and always sharply upwards.

Table 4: *The rise of the* ducs-et-pairs *in Bourbon France*

Date	Ecclesiastical Peers	Royal Relatives	*Princes-Étrangers*	Aristocrats	Total
1589	5	10	14	11	40
1610	6	9	14	17	46
1643	6	8	14	28	56
1661	6	12	8	38	64
1715	8	6	11	48	73
1723	8	7	9	52	76

Source: Jean-Pierre Labatut, *Les ducs et pairs de France au XVIIe siècle: Étude sociale* (Paris, 1972), 69.

Table 5: *Expansion of the titled nobility in the Spanish Monarchy, 1500–1700*

	títulos	dukes	marquises	counts
1506	53	10	7	36
1557	64	11	10	43
1577	105	22	37	46
1597	127	23	46	58
1615	193	26	73	94
1630	212	27	81	104
		[41 grandees	1627]	
1665	236	[93 grandees	1659]	
1700	533	[113]	334	171

Source: Based on I. A. A. Thompson, 'The Nobility in Spain, 1600–1800', in Hamish M. Scott (ed.), *The European Nobilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries*, 2 vols. (London, 1995), i. 191. Though slightly different totals are given in the earlier study by Ignacio Atienza Hernández, *Aristocracia, Poder y Riqueza en la España Moderna: La Casa de Osuna siglos XV–XIX* (Madrid, 1987), 41, cf. 17, the two sets of figures reveal an identical trend.

Table 6: *Seventeenth-century expansion of boyar Duma cohort*

Year	Overall Size	Boyars	*Okol'nichie*	'Aristocracy' (Boyars plus *Okol'nichie*)
1613	37	24	8	32
1645	41	23	14	37
1676	96	39	32	71
1682	151	73	46	119
1694	154	63	48	111

Source: Compiled from Marshall T. Poe, *The Russian Elite During the Seventeenth Century*, 2 vols. (Helsinki, 2004), ii. 52, 63, 64.

This article has emphasized the important role of monarchs in granting lands to some of their leading subjects. The other principal commodity which they had to bestow was honours and dignities of all kinds, such as habits of the Military Orders in the Iberian Peninsula and the incomes that went with these, and titles most of all. Status preceded wealth, though in the socially unusually fluid seventeenth century, it could accompany enhanced economic well-being. Only a very small minority of the nobility actually possessed a title, even after the 'inflation of honours'. The award of a dignity such as that of 'count' or 'duke' confirmed the hierarchical nature of society, at the head of which stood the monarch himself, reinforced the stratification which was under way at this time, and identified the various strata of which the noble elite in a particular country consisted. By the later seventeenth century the hierarchy of titles had become effectively the hierarchy of the aristocracy.

This was one reason—another was the growing importance of court society and its own protocols—for the proliferation of reference works such as the *État de la France*, often officially or semi-officially inspired, which delimited precedence and whether, on formal occasions, the son of a duke preceded a marquis and similar questions. The award of a title also could alter a family's location within that same hierarchy, and for that reason such dignities were avidly

sought both by individuals and by the lineages of which they were part. All noble families were engaged in a permanent competition not merely to maintain their own standing, but if possible to rise in the hierarchy and to secure more status than their aristocratic rivals, as the more formalized court societies which emerged from the seventeenth century revealed. Titles were an important mark of success, as well as an indication of the extent to which aristocratic society—like the wider nobility of which it stood at the head—was now more and more hierarchical.

VII

These developments, finally, have one crucial importance in the longer perspective. Historians of the modern European nobility, taking their cue from Arno Mayer's *The Persistence of the Old Regime* published a quarter of a century ago,[18] have made clear just how successfully the aristocratic elite sustained its power into the nineteenth century and even beyond. Many of the families highlighted by Mayer had first secured real prominence and the lands and status to support this during the early modern period. It is striking that the three principal examples which Mayer uses for the Austrian Habsburg Empire—the Liechtenstein, Schwarzenberg, and Eszterházy families—all secured their vast patrimonies during the seventeenth century. The Liechtenstein benefited from the redistribution of landholding during the Thirty Years War, particularly in Moravia, while the Eszterházy gained from the recovery of Habsburg control over the Kingdom of Hungary at this period. All three families benefited from their continuing support of the Habsburg dynasty, as well as from their own opportunism and shrewd family strategies. Each lineage retained these estates down to the First World War and did so, interestingly enough, by continuing to make use of *Fideikommisse*.

This encapsulates the longer-term significance of the developments sketched in this article. Europe's aristocracy, which further consolidated its position during the eighteenth century, was sufficiently strong to survive the twin challenges of political revolution

[18] Arno Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War* (New York, 1981).

and economic transformation from the 1780s, and to preserve much of its power intact into the very different world of later modern Europe. That it was able to do so was due, in no small measure, to the firm and deep roots which it had established in Europe's social, political and economic life during the long seventeenth century.

HAMISH M. SCOTT is Wardlaw Professor of International History at the University of St Andrews. He has published extensively on early modern international relations and on 'Enlightened Absolutism', and is currently writing a study of the emergence of aristocracy in Europe, *c.*1350–1750.

ARTICLE

THE BOYS' OWN PAPERS: THE CASE OF GERMAN POW CAMP NEWSPAPERS IN BRITAIN, 1946-8

Ingeborg F. Hellen

I. *Context*

From 1939 to 1948 the number of German POWs and their camps in Britain fluctuated greatly. Until March 1944, because of the invasion threat, they never exceeded 1,854 men. Whereas the influx of Italian POWs reached a peak of 157,000 by 1943, after March 1944 the number of Germans rose to 402,000. Most of these were repatriated by

I am greatly indebted to the anonymous readers who offered constructive and helpful comments and guidance on the original draft of this article. Any imperfections are my own. My gratitude also goes to Mr Howard Falksohn of the Wiener Library at the Institute of Contemporary History in London and to Ms Angela Wootton of the Department of Printed Books at the Imperial War Museum Lambeth, for their help in accessing their libraries' collections of camp newspapers. It will be obvious that I owe an enormous debt to the former POWs in Britain and Germany who have not only assisted my research through interviews and correspondence, and where indicated have allowed me to quote them directly, but have in many cases given me copies of their private war diaries, memoirs, and correspondence: Fritz Berthele, Harry Dittrich, Karl Eube, Werner Feige, Paul Gerlach, Sieghard Halecker, Johannes Heerdegen, Ernest Hirsch, Peter Hoentsch, Walter Karch, Otto Knapp, Josef Kirchdorfer, Karl H. Knörr, Volkmar König, Georg Mohring, Professor Dr Jürgen Moltmann, Franz Münchow, Hans Niemeyer, Heiner Ruhe, Edwin Schanz, Gunnar Schweer, Eric Schaeffer, Johannes Thieme, Rolf-Werner Wentz, Karl-Heinz Weigel, Fritz Hermann Zimmermann, and the late Erwin Grubba, Helmut Heckeroth, Gerald Heyden, Paul Messer, Rudi Mock, Gerhard Riemann, Heinz Schneider, and Professor Dr Ulrich Schweinfurth. All translations in the text from the German are by the author.

July 1948. This study will focus not on the wider historical or military context, which is well documented,[1] but largely on the post-war period during which the prisoners produced their own camp newspapers or magazines. As such, these *Lagerzeitungen* were written by and for the POWs, but the extent to which they were the POWs' own creation, an authentic reflection of their lives, remains a key issue here.

How far the *Lagerzeitungen* formed a significant component of the camps' historical record between 1946 and 1948, let alone their historiography, is debatable. Judged by their near absence from scholarly work on the subject over the intervening sixty years—that by Henry Faulk and Kurt W. Böhme is the great exception—they form a largely unconsidered and perhaps forgotten literature. The reasons are not far to seek. As sources, these newspapers were by nature ephemeral: cyclostyled and cheaply reproduced on poor-quality paper, with print-runs normally in the low hundreds, and principally intended for internal circulation only. In all there were 348 titles, but some amalgamated and others ceased publication. Few issues survived the widespread 'culling' of unwanted paper records in 1948 when the last camps closed down. They were written and edited 'in house' for a diverse and changing range of POWs, and their journalistic conti-

[1] See, among others, Stefan Karner Bischof and Barbara Stelzl-Marx (eds.), *Kriegsgefangene des Zweiten Weltkrieges: Gefangennahme-Lagerleben-Rückkehr* (Vienna, 2005); Henry Faulk, *Group Captives*: *The Re-Education of German Prisoners of War in Britain 1945–1948* (London, 1977); Renate Held, *Deutsche Soldaten des Zweiten Weltkrieges in britischem Gewahrsam* (Munich, 2008); J. Anthony Hellen, 'Temporary Settlements and Transient Populations: The Legacy of Britain's Prisoner of War Camps: 1940–1948', *Erdkunde: Archiv für wissenschaftliche Geographie,* 53/3 (1999), 191–219; id., 'Revisiting the Past: German Prisoners of War and their Legacy in Britain', in *Rozvoj Ceske Společnosti v Evropské Unii,* iii. *Médi Teritoriální* (Prague, 2005), 218–30; Patricia Meehan, *A Strange Enemy People: Germans Under the British 1945–50* (London, 2001); Bob Moore and Kent Fedorowich (eds.), *Prisoners of War and their Captors in World War II* (London, 1996); Johannes-Dieter Steinert and Inge Weber-Newth, *Labour and Love: Deutsche in Großbritannien nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Osnabrück, 2000); Matthew Barry Sullivan, *Thresholds of Peace: German Prisoners and the People of Britain 1944–1948* (London, 1979); Helmut Wolff, *Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in britischer Hand: Ein Überblick* (1974), vol. xi. pt. 1 of Maschke (ed.), *Zur Geschichte der deutschen Kriegsgefangenen* (see n. 5).

nuity was subject to the disruptions of routine labour movements and cumulative repatriation out-flows. By September 1947, POW numbers had declined to 220,000 from a peak of 402,000 in September 1946.

However, a deep understanding of the history of this period cannot depend solely on the official records of individual camps, not least because so few camp commandants and adjutants had any fluency in German. In this connection the *Lagerzeitungen* unquestionably warrant attention as primary sources. Not only do they yield insights into the lives and changing attitudes of the POWs, but they were regarded by the Prisoner of War Department (POWD) of the Foreign Office, which had taken over responsibility for re-education from the Psychological Warfare Education Department (PWE) in 1944, as barometers as far as re-education was concerned. The POWD had noted in 1946 that 'they would reflect changes in political orientation, in mood, and in political activity', and in 1947 the department had described the camp newspapers as being both 'important as a means of exchanging free opinion' and also 'a rich source for assuring the success of re-education'.[2]

At their peak, German POWs were gathered in around 1,500 camps and hostels all over Britain from Cornwall to Caithness, but today demolition and site re-development has meant that the physical evidence of camps in the UK has largely disappeared; in 2002–3 five 'standard camps' still survived virtually intact, with another seven 'near-complete'.[3] In the war years the British population hardly noticed the presence of the camps, as most were deliberately located away from conurbations, major lines of communication, military concentrations, coastal areas, railway stations, air-fields, and defence-related industries. After the war years, rural sites were favoured, where POW labour would be most useful and accessible for work on the land (see Fig. 1).

[2] POWD (Foreign Office) cited in and discussed by Henry Faulk, *Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in Großbritannien: Re-education* (1970), vol. xi. pt. 2 of Maschke (ed.), *Zur Geschichte der deutschen Kriegsgefangenen* (see n. 5).

[3] Roger J. C. Thomas, *Prisoner of War Camps (1939–1948)*, Project Report, Twentieth Century Military Recording Project, London (English Heritage Swindon, 2003); and id., 'POW Camps: What Survives and Where', *Conservation Bulletin,* 44, 18–21.

Figure 1. *Distribution and location of the main Prisoner of War camps in Britain, 1944–8*



Source: J. A. Hellen.

The first German POWs to arrive, in November 1939, were housed at Camp No. 1 at Grizedale, a large country estate house in the Lake District. Later most POWs lived more modestly where space was available, from disused factories to tented accommodation on race courses. Growing numbers of Italian and later German POWs necessitated the erection of over 100 'standard' camps, settlements of prefabricated or brick huts, each generally capable of housing about 1,000 men. The facilities accorded with regulations on sanitation, heating, bedding, space per person, and so on agreed under the Geneva Convention. Although initially surrounded by barbed wire, after 1945 watchtowers were rare and virtually all camps removed the wire by Christmas 1946. Nonetheless, 'barbed wire disease' or 'stalag syndrome'—the feeling of homesickness, isolation, and loss of freedom, and more serious symptoms such as intense irritability, moodiness, depression, and even paranoia—persisted and exacerbated the risk for some, particularly the older men, of psychotic and psychological illnesses.

The day-to-day management of the camps followed rules prescribed by the British military authorities. Both provision at, and running of, the camps were periodically checked by the Red Cross (ICRC) inspectors. The overall responsibility for camps, satellites, and billeted-out men rested with the British commandant, reconciling in this capacity the various, at times conflicting, policies of the War Office, PW Division of the Foreign Office, the Treasury, Public Works Department, and so on. A *Lagersprecher* or camp spokesman, usually the most senior German officer or NCO, handled the internal organization and discipline of the POWs. Liaison was facilitated by one or more camp interpreters, often émigrés, who had a native speaker's familiarity with both languages and cultures.[4] These

[4] The initially widespread inability of the POWs to read, speak, or understand English, and the reverse situation for the British, posed obvious difficulties. To overcome these obstacles, and at the same time to present a United Kingdom which differed from that behind the camp perimeter, *English for All* (fortnightly for the POWs) was made available in camps from Apr. 1946 to May 1948; planned in 1945, by 1946, 40,000 copies of every issue were printed, albeit half the number the camps would have liked. Faulk, *Group Captives*, 19. The 16-page paper assumed basic vocabulary and grammar to be in place; an excerpt from Hemingway's *A Farewell to Arms* appears under the heading 'Elementary'. See *English for All*, no. 2, 1.

appointments could prove an inspired choice for achieving re-education and reconciliation, but occasionally the reverse resulted.

Documentary and other primary and secondary source material on the camps is scattered. In addition to the government papers at the National Archives, other evidence can be found at places such as the Imperial War Museum, local libraries, and county record offices. The official 22-volume German POW History (1962–74) edited by Erich Maschke is central to research into the camps,[5] and volume 11, part 2 (*Re-education*) by Faulk and volume 14 (*Geist und Kultur*) by Böhme, with chapters on publications and the camp newspapers, are invaluable.[6] Further material on individual camps can be found in the Red Cross inspection reports archived in Geneva and Berne, in the archives of organizations such as the International YMCA or church diocesan offices, in other collections in Germany, in county record offices and regimental museums, and in unpublished POW memoirs and private papers. Crucially for this research, a limited range of some of the 268 camp newspapers (the *Lagerzeitungen*) is stored at the Wiener Library and the Imperial War Museum, both in London.

II. *Papers Compiled for the POWs*

Just over a year after the confirmed arrival of the first German prisoners, the POW Recreational Association, already aware of the 'stagnation of mind that prison threatens all men with', began in April 1941 to supply them at the rate of one copy per six men with *Wochenpost,* a paper for German POWs in Britain.[7] It was edited by Bernhard Reichenbach and published in London, from where it was sent to all camps. Reichenbach subsequently wrote a retrospective assessment of the periodical, emphasizing that 'it was never an Eng-

[5] Erich Maschke (ed.), *Zur Geschichte der deutschen Kriegsgefangenen des Zweiten Weltkrieges,* 22 vols. (Munich, 1962–74).

[6] See esp. Faulk, *Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen,* 289–310 and 439–66; and Kurt W. Böhme, *Geist und Kultur der deutschen Kriegsgefangenen im Westen* (1968), vol. xiv of Maschke (ed.), *Zur Geschichte der deutschen Kriegsgefangenen,* 31–45 and 64–88.

[7] *Evening Standard* (London) 14 Feb. 1945, 2.

lish newspaper in German linguistic guise'.[8] Direct responsibility for its contents lay with the Prisoner of War (P/W) Department (hereafter POWD) of the Foreign Office, which saw it as an attempt to 'force prisoners, hitherto brainwashed from childhood by Nazi propaganda, to think for themselves'.[9] To that end it carried the full text of the daily *Wehrmacht* bulletin side by side with the British version of events. Readers regarded it with suspicion. By June 1942, when the threat of invasion was real and most German POWs had been transferred to camps in North America (their numbers in Britain having dwindled to a mere 200), publication of *Wochenpost* was suspended.[10]

Wochenpost was revived in November 1944, eventually publishing 186 weekly issues before it ceased publication in September 1948. It was distributed to 3,000 addressees, again with the aim of helping prisoners to resolve the conflict over what to believe. Initially it was regarded with scant respect. Some POWs condemned it out of hand: '*Wochenpost*? We just tore it up. Nobody read it, just tore it up and threw it at the feet of the chap who delivered it. We knew it was propaganda and never touched it.'[11] This view was echoed by H. Reckel at Gosford Camp near Edinburgh: 'There was nothing to read but *Wochenpost*, a special paper for POWs which no one took seriously.'[12] Others appreciated the paper, regarding the term *Wochenpest*, as some POW used to call the paper, as directed more against the editor than its contents, or as the only possible protest of the little man who resented being lectured.[13] One POW found the slang term *Wochenpest* 'plain silly' and another, who attributed its unpopularity to lack of local news, observes that to start with there was little else to read, but also that readers eventually came to appreciate it;

[8] Bernhard Reichenbach, 'Prisoners' Taste of Freedom: The British *Wochenpost* for German P.O.W.s', *Wiener Library Bulletin,* 13/5–6 (1959), 56.

[9] Miriam Kochan, *Prisoners of England* (London, 1980), 66.

[10] It was replaced by a modest, 8-page cyclostyled publication, *Die Lagerpost,* at a ratio of one copy per six men.

[11] Quoted from Kochan, *Prisoners of England*, 20.

[12] Quoted ibid. 24.

[13] Personal communication, J. Heerdegen, 3 June 2004.

a third even grew to like particular writers and looked forward to their contributions.[14]

Initially neither content nor tone of the 1944–8 issues of *Wochenpost* differed much from the earlier ones of 1941–2, both reporting on political, chiefly war-related, events of the day in their first two pages, which were taken from the German, British, and international media. General cultural matters appeared on the following four pages, while the last two were reserved for specific POW interests (search corner, sport, and so on). The revived paper added a comments page, intended to stimulate discussion, but it was soon dropped because responses were more emotional than objective. It seems that the POWD had underestimated the psychological traumas of the POWs—defeated, despondent, imprisoned, stigmatized, penniless save for *Lagergeld*, many of them still very young—who felt more like giving up on life than debating. Rejection of all forms of cooperation with the British at the earlier stage could be interpreted as a refusal to go over to the other side, but later as burying one's head in the sand.

However, far-reaching systemic changes were afoot. From early 1946 the oppressive rules and restrictions of camp life were progressively relaxed. Repatriation had been agreed at Westminster in July 1946, and the programme was begun on 26 September and lasted until late 1948. Postal services were already more or less 'normal' by the end of 1945 and from 26 October 1946, POWs could send parcels and remit money to Germany. From December 1946 fraternization with the general population and movement outside the camps were allowed and even encouraged.[15] Under such changed circumstances the second series of *Wochenpost* did eventually attract more favourable comment, not least in camp reports sent in by the training advisers. In April 1946 the editorial board of *Wochenpost* had received a perceptive letter from the A-graded editors of *Lagerbrille* at Camp 249 (Carburton), which set out a critique, the main points of which were as follows:

[14] Personal communications, U. Schweinfurth, 10 May 2004; and P. Hoentsch, 15 Apr. 2004.

[15] In fact, many POWs privately record that unofficial fraternization was already common before the ban was lifted, although there are frequent newspaper reports about miscreants being taken to court and fined or even imprisoned.

- Giving the impression that the readers were uneducated should be avoided.
- Irrespective of their upbringing under Nazi rule, young people have valuable qualities. They have shown courage, reliability, community spirit, and made sacrifices. For them to criticize their homeland, their society, condemn all that took place . . . would call forth opposition.
- Shorter, less academic articles might go down better.
- News from all four Occupation Zones and from different cities should feature.
- Above all, the editors were asked to be honest and not to deny that they wanted to educate or re-educate their readers.
- Access to authors hitherto unavailable, as well as good art etc. should be introduced.[16]

Their feed-back was accepted and acted upon to the extent that, by March 1946, the POWD admitted that the changed circumstances had altered the very politics of *Wochenpost.* By December 1946 the paper was judged by the POWD to be 'much better'; by the following July to be 'more respected', 'improving and attracting more takers, who read more thoroughly', and by August 1947 it was 'being quoted as an authority'.[17] Faulk reports a 1947 survey which found that 55 per cent of readers now accepted *Wochenpost*; another 14 per cent did so whilst criticizing certain points; 11 per cent did not care; and 20 per cent were opposed to it. Circulation had risen to 110,000 copies by September 1947.[18]

Nevertheless, muted criticism of *Wochenpost* continued. A manuscript play written and performed as a Christmas entertainment by Hermann Schulz of Camp 278 at Clapham near Bedford in 1947 presents a weary young POW who sees no way out but death. He knocks at heaven's gate, where St Peter, holding the traditional key, puts him through a screening. Towards the end, St Peter peers down into the camp below, where he spots more desperate inmates. He asks why one has such a miserable face and receives the reply: 'Oh, him! He's just read the *Wochenpost*!'[19]

[16] Faulk, *Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen*, 295.

[17] POWD, cited ibid. 299.

[18] Cited ibid. 299 and Faulk, *Group Captives*, 111.

[19] Hermann Schulz, 'Weihnachtsfeier in England, Lager 278', manuscript 1947.

As from March 1945, another magazine for the camps, entitled *Der Ausblick*, appeared. Under the title *Neue Auslese,* it went on sale in Germany itself from September 1945, when it was taken over by the American Central Office of Information with the POWD retaining only an interest in general policy. The training adviser reported that the magazine was liked, but that the standard was too high in tone and content.[20]

The camp libraries also provided camps with copies of the official daily Hansard for both the Commons and the Lords along with reading material such as the *Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs*, eighteen of which were published in German from autumn 1945, and the *British Survey* produced by the British Society for International Understanding. Finally, there was *Monatsbrief: Christliche Zeitung für Kriegsgefangene*, 'an excellently presented, YMCA-sponsored journal from Norton Camp 174 in Nottinghamshire, with a circulation of 3,000, sent out to all camps with the aim of bringing Christian doctrine and comfort to its readers and to restore their broken links with family, home and nation'. Its first editor, W. Theopold, 'mixed bible passages, homilies, stories, poems—some in dialect—a garnering of traditional piety and wholesome wisdom, mostly of a pastoral kind, and presented it in a setting of the church calendar'.[21]

[20] Quoted in Faulk, *Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen*, 297.

[21] Sullivan, *Thresholds of Peace*, 264–5. Norton Camp, once described by Gerhard Noller as 'a kind of monastic enclosure . . . excluded from time and the world', exercised a considerable influence in the wider camp system through its publications. For reflections on this theme see the report of the 1995 reunion of former POWs: *Die Universität hinter Stacheldraht, Cuckney, Nottinghamshire, England: Kriegsgefangenenhilfe des Weltbundes der Christlichen Vereine Junger Männer, 1945–1948. Bericht über eine Reise nach 50 Jahren, 1995* (Pfullendorf, 1995). Despite this, however, M. B. Sullivan, a former camp interrogator, reported external criticism of *Monatsbrief* to the effect that it lay rather uneasily on the borderline between nostalgia and renewal, was in danger of being escapist, falling into neo-romantic tendencies, providing a shield against reality, and presenting a way of not looking closely at the shadowy side of human nature. Nonetheless, it must have meant a lot to one German reader, who had included a page of *Monatsbrief* pasted into a copy of *Nordlicht*, the camp newspaper at Watten, found at the Wick Heritage Centre in Caithness.

In the course of time, camps created a *Zeitungsschau* (a display of newspaper cuttings), usually shown in an information room or on a canteen wall, as hut space and lighting permitted. It consisted of English-language newspapers passed to POWs by work contacts, or national, regional, and local newspapers donated to or bought in by the camp, translations of specific articles from such papers, *Wochenpost*, and clippings from German, Austrian, and Swiss papers which individuals had sent, and in one case a complete Aachen city paper regularly mailed to an inmate at Camp 31 in Warwickshire. Obviously not all camps were equally well served. The best supplied was probably Camp 300 at Wilton Park, with its role as a training centre for future course leaders, camp paper editors, and others.[22]

III. *In-Camp Publications as an Alternative to Government-Sponsored Periodicals*

If the objectives of *Wochenpost* in its early form as a POWD (FO) tool of psychological warfare for re-education had been sensed and rejected, an attempt to influence POWs by words from their own ranks might have seemed more promising. Indeed, from 1945 some training advisers had suggested forming discussion groups, camp parliaments, and camp periodicals. Availing themselves of 'spontaneous' camp initiatives to produce a paper of their own, whether for entertainment, contact, information, or re-education, might prove a more likely path towards an openness to new ideas where *Wochenpost* was evidently failing.

[22] Another form of *Zeitungsschau* is described at Camp 165 where the 'A' Camp was invited to a *Presseschau* (What the Papers Say) and a small number of interested men had assembled in the canteen to read and have articles from various sources translated for them. 'Although the inmates are regularly informed of events by the English radio and press, a show of this kind is quite indispensable for those of us who cannot read English. The interest the first event of this kind generated was confirmed by the ensuing discussion, which was remarkable for its objectivity and fair criticism', *Nordlicht* (Watten), 1 Sept. 1947, 20.

1. *Editor Selection and Training*

Editors were primarily regarded as pacemakers. Initiative and ability were more important than experience and political persuasion, although a background as an editor in the National Socialist state might have been a disqualification. Political screening and classifying men into 'white' (non-Nazi), 'grey' (indifferent), and 'black' (Nazi), which ended officially on 1 July 1947 and was based on seven gradations from A+ to C, was obviously not complete by the time the camp newspapers were organized. Ideally, editors would have been 'white' (Wilton Park-trained activists able to recruit and motivate contributors) but non-'whites' could be trained to become 'white'. An editor failing to meet expectations could always be transferred to another camp.

Building on work carried out by the Psychological Warfare Executive (PWE), Wilton Park Camp had opened in January 1946 as a training centre for POWs and in the years between 1945 and 1948 about 1 per cent of the 402,000 POWs in Britain attended a six- to eight-week training course on which professional, preferably but not invariably 'white' POWs were prepared for leading positions in the British administrative zone in Germany and to contribute to re-education as group leaders, training advisers, and editors in the camps. In many camp magazines and newspapers, former Wilton Park stu-

Table 1: *Political grading of camp newspaper editors: 1946 and 1947*

Year	Grades							Newspaper cooperative	No grading	No camp newspaper	Other*
	A+	A	B+	B	B-	C+	C				
1946	5	19	11	10	6	1	1	2	16	28	1
1947	1	7	22	22	6	–	–	11	27	4	–

Source: POWD, cited by Faulk, *Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen*, 443. Sample surveys, each of 100 camps.

*Note: 'Other' refers to a camp newspaper produced by the British camp administration.

dents reported on the training centre; they liked its methods,[23] and defended it against the disparaging slogan that it was merely an institution for opportunists seeking early repatriation.[24]

Any *Lagerzeitung* written in the context of such training therefore presented a filtered version of events and analysis 'steered' by the authorities. The presentation documented the authors' attempts to adapt to the new political reality, whilst others stuck strictly to objective contributions, drawing on their professional experience, memories, and general interests. Critical contributions were therefore very rare, but there were exceptions.[25]

2. *Planning Camp Magazines*

On leaving Wilton Park, trainees would take with them a summary of their coursework in the form of the camp magazine *Die Brücke* to assist them in their future work. This may explain why virtually the same topics were discussed in camp papers at the same time. 'Key problems of Germany' appears in *Ritt in die Zukunft*,[26] and in *Der neue Weg*,[27] 'Politics again? The duty to think politically' in *Quelle*,[28] and 'Political activity as duty: political thinking' in *Zeit am Tyne* (*ZaT*).[29] Evidence that editors set the tone and outlined the direction their paper would take appears in 'Bemerkungen der Schriftleitung' in *Der Quell*, Camp 93 at Harperley.[30]

> The paper is trying to offer education and entertainment, and to introduce the idea of democracy through contributions from

[23] Cf. *Die Zeit am Tyne (ZaT),* no. 5, Oct. 1946, 2, 'Impressions from Wilton Park', and no. 12, July 1947, 8, 'Women in Wilton Park' (the reference is to the first female course with ten participants from Germany).

[24] Faulk, *Group Captives*, 92.

[25] One such example is a probing interview by Ralf v. Bargen (later of *Die Zeit*, Hamburg) of 'Mr Rossiter' (Philip Rosenthal), a training adviser, on the highly contentious subject of political screening, in *ZaT*, Feb. 1947, 4. See also Faulk, *Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen*, 441, esp. nn. 407 and 408.

[26] *Ritt in die Zukunft*, no. 1, pt. 1, 14 May 1946.

[27] *Der neue Weg,* no. 23, 11 May 1946.

[28] *Quelle*, no. 3, 1 May 1946.

[29] *ZaT,* no. 11, May 1947.

[30] This working camp newspaper was run by an *Arbeitsgemeinschaft* (working group) of seven. Its editors appear to have changed with each number.

> other good papers and magazines as well as from POW readers. It hopes to kindle interest in all questions concerning public life, be it in the area of culture, society, economy, politics, or administration. At the same time it hopes to encourage readers to take part in discussions and to form their own opinions by inviting views from within the readership on 'issues of our time'. In addition there will be reports on events in the camp and its hostels. The editors look forward to lively cooperation from its readers.[31]

Camp newspapers or magazines are said to have arisen from the POWs' own desire to create a common bond, a symbol of belonging, although one POW remembered that 'there was no need for this; our common pariah status allowed us to be as thick as thieves. But we welcomed the papers for information and relaxation, especially those of us who could not read English well enough to enjoy it. Interest never flagged, even later on, when we were given leave to go out and meet English people.'[32] This was certainly the case at Camp 266, Langdon Hills in Essex, whose inmates had started a paper quite spontaneously in order to enjoy doing something together, buying the necessary paper, stencils, and ink through the camp welfare fund. When a new duplicating machine was needed, funds simply did not stretch to a replacement until a visiting adviser informed them that the POWD would provide one and set the wheels in motion, with the result that the paper flourished once again.[33]

Nonetheless, one cannot help feeling that the idea of a newspaper had in some way to be 'sold' at particular camps. Besides those going under the simple title of *Lagerzeitung*, many others strove to engage the attention of POWs by showing the way forward or offering reassurance, such as *Wegweiser* (signpost), *Leuchturm* (lighthouse), *Anker* (anchor), *Lotse* (pilot), *Regenbogen* (rainbow), *Glückauf* (safe journey),

[31] *Der Quell,* no. 1/2, 1947, 24.

[32] Personal communication, Johannes Heerdegen (Hamburg), 3 June 2004, who subsequently made a prize-winning film on this and other camps entitled *Reise in die Vergangenheit* (English version: *Journey into the Past)*, which won a gold prize at the Dortmund *Documenta* Festival 2003.

[33] Faulk, *Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen*, 442 quoting Training Adviser Report for Camp 266.

or *Aufbau* (reconstruction). Others recommended a newspaper as a link between main camp, satellite camps, and those men billeted-out on farms, or as a means of entertainment or information about events in the camp, the region, the country, and as a link with Germany.[34]

Richard Höhne of Camp 674 at Bagshot in Surrey called his paper *Zuspruch* (encouragement) and its first issue explains his choice of title as comforting and encouraging, reminding his readers of the saying that 'it helps to talk to one another'. He began his first editorial: 'The child has been given a name! That was almost the hardest task', that is, to set the direction the paper was to take.[35] Höhne had compiled the first ten-page issue of *Zuspruch* single-handedly, interspersing his articles with three pages of a Wilton Park lecture on 'German foreign policy 1939–45', a one-page article by Harold Nicholson on 'German POWs in England', a diary page from the Stratton Factory Camp, and a poem and short texts by famous German authors.[36] But he needed contributors, and asked for them to come forward.

Editors were not the only ones to reflect on the direction the camp paper would take. In Camp 174 at Norton, which was established by the YMCA and the ICRC to provide training for future primary teachers, youth workers, and Protestant clergy, the April 1946 issue of *Wegweiser* carries a reader's contribution reflecting on the first issue:

> I have read no. 1 of our camp paper very attentively, not only because the title touched me, and was immediately sympathetic, but also because the picture at the top seemed promising, for I assume it is the objective of our paper to be a help to every one of us to find a new path from Nazism and war to a brighter future. This is borne out in picture and title, and also by the editorials. . . . Nonetheless, reading the paper did not have an uplifting effect on me. I felt that intention and reality did not meld. This may be because some contributors used their newly gained freedom of expression in a negative sense. . . . I would therefore like to suggest the following: the two fac-

[34] *Lagerpost,* no. 1, Sept. 1946, 1.

[35] *Der Zuspruch,* no. 1, April 1946.

[36] *Spectator,* 24 May 1946.

> ulties, theology and education, should form an editorial committee which includes three elected members drawn from both lecturers and students. This committee would not only decide on which articles to print according to their form and content, but also offer contributors assistance if wanted. They might also decide on themes for each issue, which would invite contributions from both faculties.[37]

It is not known whether this suggestion to act democratically was taken up, however.

3. *Recruiting Contributors*

The British commandant at Camp 138, Wolviston Hall in Co. Durham, did not equivocate. Launching *Ritt in die Zukunft,* he wrote: 'This paper is an experiment. It is not large, but that may change if it is popular. I have great hopes that it will help you, teach you, entertain you. With your co-operation and contributions, it is sure to reach that goal.' The latter's German camp spokesman continued: 'We may not be top-notch, but the main thing is to get the horse going. Even those who have never put pen to paper may find that they can write charming stories to delight us all.'[38] And, spurred on by a pack of cigarettes per contribution, they did. It being May, the month of the German Mother's Day, the first piece to be handed in was a heartfelt tribute 'To my mother', perhaps not the dedication to reformed political thinking the commandant had hoped for, but proof of what many POWs had in their thoughts.

Initially it often proved difficult to attract contributions from POWs. Since every article had to be signed with name and camp number, it served as feedback for the POWD and as a means of assessing the author's and wider camp attitudes. Some worried about being regarded as turncoats, others about being seen as ingratiating themselves to achieve early repatriation. POWs from the eastern part of Germany, by then the Russian zone, feared reprisals if on their return they were known to have supported pro-British, pro-democratic activities.[39] Some were simply not accustomed to putting

[37] *Wegweiser,* no. 2, Apr. 1946, 28.

[38] Issue dated 14 May 1946, no. 1, pt. 1.

[39] Faulk, *Group Captives,* 144.

pen to paper and formulating their thoughts, people whose interests centred on their homes, families, and country, and who regarded working with words as a substitute for real life. Others, lacking the physical fitness of front-line troops, would have been worn out by eight or more hours of unaccustomed hard physical labour in all weathers. It was easier to recruit staff at officer camps because officers had no obligation to work, were free to organize their own time, often came from an educated background, and were trained to put thoughts into words. In time, all who were willing to contribute found a niche in sports reports, entertainment pages, as chess experts, or in religious celebration, writing about camp life, their area of professional expertise, or their hobby. A few, of course, never participated.[40]

Mass transfers and particularly repatriation, which began on 26 September 1946 building up to 15,000 a month, led to the progressive amalgamation of camps and the loss or redundancy of editors and staff.

> When our old Camp 121 joined Camp 247 at Ripon, our *Kleine Welt* (Small World) also ceased to exist. Many readers feared that this really was the end. The appearance of the united papers of *Die Pforte* and *Kleine Welt*, however, shows that life goes on. Readers of the latter will be happy to find all that had made our paper one of the best of its kind in England, and fans of *Die Pforte* will note that their paper, though in a new dress, is by no means worse.[41]

The format and appearance of the former were combined with the title and editorial staff of the latter to produce a fortnightly instead of a monthly paper. *ZaT* for Camp 18 had five editors in the twenty-six months of its existence. Camp 156 changed from *Heiderundschau* in

[40] Thus Camp 232 at Haywards Heath never had a camp magazine (personal communication, G. Mohring, 26 Apr. 2004), and another POW nominally attached to Camp 93 at Harperley, but actually billeted on a farm, never saw one (personal communication, G. Heyden, 17 May 2004). At Camp 18 at Featherstone, a former U-boat officer was 'too busy' to get involved with such writing (personal communication, R.-W. Wentz, 1 May 2005).
[41] *Die Pforte,* no. 18, 25 May 1946.

1945 to *Fackel* in 1946, and to *Die Umschau* from November 1947 to March 1948, the latter as a monthly as against weekly publication because of the shrinking number of readers.

Although eventually willingness to contribute to camp magazines increased, lack of continuity of staff posed a growing problem.[42] Transfers affected editors, contributors, illustrators, and printers alike. One thus finds the professional artist, Heinz Schneider, much of whose work survives, successively providing illustrations for Camp 221 at Blyth in Northumberland, before moving to Camp 69 at nearby Darras Hall, and finally coming into his own working for *Die Pforte* at Camp 247, near Ripon in Yorkshire.

4. *Magazine Production: Format, Layout, Size, and Circulation*

Several papers described the technical process of creating a *Lagerzeitung,* in most cases by hand.[43] *Die Pforte* produced 570 copies per issue, each of twenty pages, that is, 14,250 pages in total to be duplicated; as six pages appeared in colour, each required between two and seven separate runs, making it even more. Few papers graduated to a proper printing press, however, and some even remained in manuscript; five are known to have been 'professionally' printed, two of them on old machines restored by the POWs themselves. From May 1946, *ZaT* at Camp 18 was published using the *Hexham Courant's* local printers, not an easy task for typesetters who knew no German. The number of copies of *ZaT* produced could thus be increased from 250 in December 1945, to 1,000 by June 1946, albeit with only eight quarto pages, to 1,600 in *tabloid* format, and finally to 2,500. In-camp production of articles increased over time from 6 to 30 per cent, and finally to 80 per cent of the total, excluding those by the editorial staff. One thousand of these were sold in the camp (officers received pay), the rest going to other camps in the UK or abroad.

Camp magazines tended to have between eight and twenty pages, although some issues of *Nordlicht* reached 36 sides, usually foolscap

[42] e.g. Camp 667 at Byrness in north Northumberland reported in the new *Das Ziel* that 'since the former issue, 28 men have been repatriated due to illness, 42 transferred to Camp 662 at Catterick, Yorkshire, and more than 100 are billeted outside the camp'. Quoted from *Das Ziel,* 17 June 1946.

[43] Fig. 2, the cover of *Die Pforte,* no. 21 (23 July 1947), illustrates how effective the simple duplicator could be.

and later quarto size. *Die Pforte* was probably the only one routinely to fold the paper transversely, thereby creating a visually more pleasing format. It was also one of the few to have colour, others being *Der Quell* for Camp 93 at Harperley, and *Litfaßsäule* at The Barony, Camp 298, Dumfries. Most added drawings or lino-cut illustrations, even cartoon sequences. The front page usually displayed the magazine's title and number, its camp name and number, a date, and a picture which was sometimes a famous view in Germany or the UK, sometimes a seasonal or humorous topic. At only one camp, Norton, sometimes called 'Norton University' by the POWs, was a location map published, and this in itself was probably a statement of its administrative independence under the YMCA.

Camp newspapers were never regarded as commercial enterprises. Technical material such as paper, ink, and stencils were provided by the PWD free of charge; editorial work, contributions, and production by POWs was not remunerated, which was neither applauded nor resented by the POWs, but simply accepted. Camp 27 at Ledbury is the only one known to have offered an honorarium: 2*s*. per page, 2*s*. 6*d*. for one and a half pages, and 1*s*. per poem, brain-teaser, or sketch.[44] As a rule, papers were also distributed free of charge, an exception being Camp 189, which asked for one penny per issue 'to cover its costs'. The number of copies produced for a given camp at a given time varied according to its population. POWD never doubted that camp papers were a true reflection of POW life and thinking, nor did they ever find evidence to the contrary; the papers in their view therefore justified the material support they received from the POWD.[45]

IV. *Contents, Censorship, Political Agendas*

Even prison camp magazines followed agendas. Whether explicitly or implicitly, these were set by the POWD, the German readership, the YMCA in the case of Norton Camp, and in some cases by the commandant himself. The example of one of the two largest officers' camps at Featherstone can be cited in its commandant's words in

[44] Quoted in Faulk, *Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen*, 453.
[45] POWD, quoted ibid.

Figure 2. *Title page of* Die Pforte *(Gateway), Ure Bank Camp 247 at Ripon*
It reads: 'How our camp newspaper comes into being' and shows the simple printing methods employed.

Source: *Die Pforte,* no. 21, 23 July 1947. Coloured original by Heinz Schneider.

ZaT. From the beginning Lt. Col. Vickers saw *Lagerzeitungen* as a historical record of a particular time—the name *Zeit am Tyne* had been deliberately chosen to echo the title of *The Times*, then widely regarded as Britain's premier paper—and wanted it to be a showpiece for distribution abroad.[46]

At Featherstone the POWs requested that certain topics should be included: news about their homeland; information about developments in the wider world and about their own small world, the camp; information about their host nation and country; entertainment and mental stimulus; German-language material, especially if billeted-out with non-German speakers; morale-boosting items. The YMCA Camp 174 at Norton wanted to produce 'a record of camp life', and attempted to collect all POW magazines across Britain for that purpose. Arguably, that agenda is the one that engages the modern reader sixty or so years later, when little evidence remains of the camps. The German readership hoped for news from Germany, about their wider surroundings, and events in camp.

1. *Contents of Camp Magazines*

In broad terms, contents were shaped, even determined, by the various 'agendas' and desiderata. The editor of *Der Neue Weg* stated that 'ever since being set up in December 1945 *Der Neue Weg* had been run along the lines of re-education'.[47] It would have been hard for any POW magazine not to do the same. This paper devoted pages one and two to political contributions and reports from the home country, page three to entertaining, feuilleton-type articles, and page four to camp news, dates of events, local information, and humour. This pattern was more or less the same for all the 348 POW magazines which appeared and in some cases disappeared in the UK between 1945 and 1948.

Apart from contributions from a camp and its satellite hostels, a number of other sources would be regularly drawn on, including material from Wilton Park's *Die Brücke,* translations of items from the British press by British camp staff, and pieces from German newspapers and magazines. The papers were also wide-ranging in content, reporting on the surrounding landscapes and towns, British society

[46] *ZaT,* no. 1, 1 June 1946, 1.

[47] *Der Neue Weg*, 4 May 1946.

and encounters with the local population, work in camp workshops and voluntary work outside the camp or for private purposes, and cultural activities and study courses.[48] The number of lecturers from Britain and abroad who visited camps to speak on a wide variety of topics, and the way in which the POWs responded and were reported, for instance, at Camp 18 ('you could hear a pin drop, even in the canteen'[49]), contrast with the view of C. Brooks, Chief Editor of *Wochenpost*: 'These people not only repeat, parrot-like, the slogans Dr Goebbels has drummed into their heads—they even seem to have lost the very capacity for objective thinking.'[50]

Upbeat life is well represented; the downside of worries, failed escape attempts, illness, death, or suicide less so (although the ICRC inspectors' reports included such statistics), possibly for fear of being too outspoken. Instead there are jokes and cartoons such as the POW in the turnip field (see Fig. 5), perhaps amusing at first glance, but really a cry of despair, if not an accusation. *Neuer Weg* for Camp 115 in Cornwall presents a rare case of picking up the highly sensitive issue of political grading and its potential repercussions on repatriation and finding employment back home.[51] *ZaT* was the only paper to publish an interview with a camp screener, Philip Rossiter (formerly Rosenthal), along with an article by R. von Bargen, later of *Die Zeit* in Hamburg, on 'Worries about political classification'; unusually, it included short POW obituaries.[52] The official German history records that a total of 994 German POWs died in Britain from all causes between 1944 and 1948, 219 of whom were suicides. British records list 1,254 POW deaths between 1939 and December 1947, but they rarely featured in the newspapers unless they involved accidents at work.[53]

[48] Cf. K. Schleicher in *Die Pforte,* no. 9, 25 Oct. 1947, 10–12.

[49] *ZaT*, no. 3, Aug. 1946, 11. See e.g. report by Dr Hans Schulze on Professor H. Trevor-Roper's lecture, 'Gefahr und Aufgabe', *ZaT*, no. 14, Aug. 1947, 14.

[50] Quoted by Böhme, *Geist und Kultur der deutschen Kriegsgefangenen*, 65.

[51] H. Dommeratsky in *Neuer Weg*, no. 3, 1946, 11–12 (NB Camp 167 had the same title).

[52] *ZaT,* 8 Feb. 1947, 4.

[53] Hansard*,* 24 Jan. 1947, and Wolff, *Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in britischer Hand*, 40–1.

In normal life even a cross section of independently published papers covering a period of two to three years would find it difficult to provide a true record of all aspects of life in that time span. Whereas in civilian life the same facts are written up by journalists for very different readerships, here one camp newspaper had to consider all its readers, as well as following a prescribed path. At Camp 296 at Peters Hill, Sheffield, a working approach reflecting the understanding of readers was achieved by issuing two separate papers: *Zeit* for serious readers on the first day of the month, and *Halbzeit* for 'tabloid' fans on the fifteenth. Similar decisions were taken at the *Nordlicht* press office at Watten-Stuartfield: articles such as 'Health problems in captivity' may well have been based on the same Wilton Park suggestion as 'Do we get enough to eat?'

The one thought that was foremost in the minds of nearly all POWs, and increasingly so as the years went by, was the desire to go home. In the words of the editor of *Die Pforte*: 'repatriation is the ever-present, main topic of POW existence', and 'When guns are firing, behind barbed wire, everywhere—home is the direction our thoughts most frequently take.'[54] In March 1947, *ZaT* published a collection of limericks, including the following verse, in German:

> There was an old German called Hein
> Who lived—so long—on the Tyne
> Thinking by day and by night
> How to change black into white
> For he dearly wished for the Rhine.

2. *Censorship*

Papers produced in-camp were not censored before internal distribution. A summary of the POWD attitude to censorship of camp newspapers published in November 1946 states as Regulation 4: 'Due to the lack of British interpreter-translators all camp newspapers are regarded as not subject to censorship.'[55] It was the duty of the CO to inform himself of the paper's content and tone, a task he normally delegated to his intelligence officer (IO), and to pass suspicious ma-

[54] *Die Pforte,* no. 23, 1947, 20.

[55] Faulk, *Group Captives*, 144; and id., *Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen,* 441.

terial to the POWD. There were, of course, measures in place to pre-empt the need for censorship. Though POWs volunteered to act as editors, they were appointed or dismissed by their fellow inmates.[56] It was often expected that those graded A, or at least B, were more acceptable to the British authorities than Cs; in fact no more than 20 per cent were graded A. Grading had not been completed when the first papers were started, and was abandoned in July 1947, while papers continued to be issued until March 1948. More important than political orientation was the ability to attract contributors and readers, in short, to be an activist. Six- to eight-week courses at Wilton Park would train future editors, and on passing out, equip them with a handbook of recommended topics and their presentation in future camp papers; roving advisers would regularly visit camp editors' offices, thus forming a critical link between the POWD and POWs. A statement by the POWD circulated for training advisers in March 1947 insisted that 'Censorship within the camp of origin, i.e. the withdrawal of the right of editor and contributors to express opinions freely, would entirely undermine their value for re-education.'[57]

POW and camp personnel were not, however, permitted to send copies of their papers to third parties, to other camps, or to organizations. Commandants sent up to sixty copies per issue to the Literature Section of POWD in London, where, after being censored they were distributed to other camps and organizations.[58] Depressing news about Germany, complaints about conditions in the camp, negative views on democracy, the Allies, and especially the British government, and inflammatory language were all unwanted. The number of papers thus withheld varied from 2 to 6 per cent of the total, the higher figure applying after repatriation had affected the publication.[59] Where an editor had 'got out of line', a representative

[56] POWD, quoted in Faulk, *Group Captives,* 443.

[57] Quoted ibid. 444.

[58] A certain number—Faulk mentions sixty but *ZaT* sent 1,000 or more—were passed to the POWD in London and, after censoring, distributed elsewhere; a selection of the best were collated in a POWD publication called *Cross-section*. Ibid. 22.

[59] Quoted ibid. 444.

could visit the camp—or the COs would be asked to take the POW editors to the POWD—to discuss the matter in hand.[60]

With tongue in cheek, the editor of *Der neue Weg*, G. Schweer, used censorship and the delay it caused in publication to boost the circulation of his paper. When deliberately unusual wording aroused the suspicion of the camp interpreter, who referred it to the commandant who, in turn, referred it to London, the paper was prevented from coming out on the usual day, fliers adorned the camp, shrieking '*DELAYED DUE TO CENSORSHIP!*', curiosity was aroused, and the papers went like hot cakes when they finally appeared.[61] It seems that this ploy was not detected in higher places for, at the end of his first year as editor, and again on leaving the post, there was fulsome praise for *Der neue Weg* and its editor from Bush House (POWD): 'We should like to congratulate you, the editorial staff and all those whose efforts have contributed to the production of so excellent a publication, and at the same time express the hope that the same high standard of constructive criticism will be maintained.'[62] Herr Schweer went on to become a newspaper editor in Hamburg!

3. *The British Political Agenda*

Ostensibly at one level the agenda of the POWD could not fail, considering that those who were responsible for it provided ideas, materials, training, advice, supervision, and occasional accolades, as well as exercising censorship. Not all commandants who were required to put into effect instructions from the centre regarded camp magazines as their responsibility. The tone adopted by the commandant of Camp 139 at Wolviston, Co. Durham when introducing the idea of a camp magazine suggests that he was merely fulfilling his role in the chain of command.[63] By contrast, Lt. Col. Vickers

[60] The YMCA's original intention to collect all POW publications in order to build up a full picture of life in the camps may have proved difficult to achieve, considering censorship restrictions on contributions and their authors, and the YMCA archives held at Birmingham University today have no special collection of *Lagerzeitungen.*

[61] Personal communication, Gunnar Schweer, 15 Apr. 2004.

[62] Letter from M. L. R. Briggen to G. Schweer.

[63] *Ritt in die Zukunft,* 14 May 1946, 1.

at Camp 18, who expressed his 'best wishes for the new camp paper' at its launch in 1946, seems to have been an exception. He continued: 'I hope that it will fulfil its chief purpose for information and comments not only in Camp 18, but also for the inmates of camps in other parts of the country where it will be sent. I am certain that those who take it home will be reminded by it of the time they spent on the Tyne, not as a waste of time but as an opportunity.' His agenda seems to have been implemented when, in his farewell speech, he was able to say: 'I feel that *Zeit am Tyne* is *The Times* among camp papers.'[64]

There is evidence that the POW's own newspapers did foster independent thinking and, at times, a more critical engagement than had resulted from the POWD's strategy in *Wochenpos*t. 'Letters to the Editor' included an example of overt criticism as well as the response it drew in the paper's January 1948 issue.

> I have been told some time ago of a select group of ten gentlemen meeting to discuss the article on re-education by A. Weber, which appeared in the paper. Unfortunately the discussion took place behind closed doors, and so far no report on it has been published. Why are we not informed about the outcome of this undoubtedly interesting exchange of view? (signed) B—politically engaged.

This was printed with the Editor's reply: 'Did you really expect a report? It was merely an exchange of views! Moreover, we did not want to spoil the season of goodwill in our December issue.'[65]

Another voice appeared under the heading 'What the papers say about us', a regular feature in *ZaT,* in an English reader's letter taken from *The Times* of London: 'Mrs X seems to think that, after vindicating the principles of democracy and humanity, after retaining POWs in custody and undermining their morale, we should uplift their morale again through lectures on how democracy works. I beg to differ. We should repatriate them before their character has been ruined for good.'[66] Less nimble minds did not wrap up their criticism: 'One

[64] *ZaT,* no. 1, June 1946, 1.
[65] *ZaT*, no. 16, 8 Jan. 1948.
[66] *The Times,* 12 Aug. 1947.

wonders whether all those who command the POWs and lay down how their lives should be run are aware of the enormous emotional burden many of them have to bear. How can a man be expected to discuss political theories and fundamental problems concerning our age, and muster enthusiasm for these when there is only one thought in his mind: HOME.'[67]

Censorship had evidently not removed these observations in print, and independent critical thinking, in order to arrive at a new socio-moral point of view, which was the goal of re-education. The word 'critical' is not to be misunderstood here as disparagement of camp conditions or military discipline by a POW, which was sometimes dealt with by an immediate transfer to another camp, but in the sense of 'discernment'. British reaction to humorous POW protests, be they limericks or cartoons in the paper's entertainment section, remarks in a Christmas pantomime, or melodies hummed on the way to work were most likely met with tolerance. The principle of re-education was, after all, 'freedom of expression', and that was generally respected.

However unintentionally, the POWs also caused a change of mind among many in the British population, as fear of the POWs, and particularly escapes, gave way to recognition of the distress among these men. In spite of the fraternization ban from 1940, countless civilians did speak to, help, or stand up for POWs at the cost of heavy fines and even imprisonment.[68] The initial criticism and protests against the maltreatment of POWs by individuals, churches, charitable organizations, the press, and particularly MPs soon became a flood. After the War Minister's insistence as late as 26 November 1946 that the law could not be changed, fraternization and even private Christmas invitations came about less than four weeks later. Ordinary Britons had changed not only their own attitudes, but forced change on the government and many personal friendships sprang up, some of which have lasted for sixty or more years.[69]

[67] *Der Weg,* Nov./Dec. 1947.

[68] Examples listed by Faulk, *Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen*, 627.

[69] For a collection of 30 such 'histories' see Pamela Howe Taylor, *The Germans We Trusted*, with an intro. by Lord Hurd of Westwell, former Foreign Secretary (Cambridge, 2003), and the BBC2 *Timewatch* programme, *The Germans We Kept*, 2000.

V. Lagerzeitungen *as Chronicles of Camp Life*

With paper and even pencils initially in scarce supply, only a few POWs kept diaries and even fewer subsequently published their memoirs or autobiographies. Camp papers therefore provide intriguing, and to some degree unique, insights into what occupied the hands and minds of their readers. To start with, there were the daily domestic duties: bed-making, with military precision, lighting fires, sweeping-out, laundry work, growing vegetables and, often by order of some commandants, beautifying the surroundings with flowers. All of these are charmingly described and illustrated in *ZaT*, for example.[70]

After roll-call—often repeated, come rain or shine—there was the important issue of food. The subject is given much thought and space in the *Lagerzeitungen* in the shape both of poems and prose, which extol the cook and his labours. The camp spokesman for Skellingsthorpe Hostel at Camp 156 and the head baker at Featherstone Park, Camp 18, both tell of the difficult conditions and the strenuous efforts they made to supply their men with bread. At Camp 156, 47,000 loaves a week were produced, using 450 sacks of flour (6,300 pounds), with the dough being kneaded by hand.[71] At Featherstone the master baker also ran courses for beginners and improvers, and in 1947, eighteen apprentices passed their examinations to become journeymen.[72]

In May 1947 Ure Bank Camp announced in *Die Pforte* that Max Jäger, a watchmaker, had set up shop in Hut 105. He joined the many other trades illustrated in Fig. 3. Camp 18 similarly provided workshops for shoemakers and tailors, fitters and metalworkers, joiners and carpenters, and was thus self-sufficient in those trades, whether converting a hut into a chapel or making anything from kitchen tools to stage props, all in conjunction with training courses. *Der Quell* at Harperley reports on the construction of its theatre, now part of a 'listed' historic monument.[73] The importance of the training courses

[70] *ZaT,* no. 16, 8 Jan. 1948, 12.

[71] *Heiderundschau,* no. 56, pt. 6, 1946, 6.

[72] *ZaT,* Christmas 1947, 9. The bakery worked three shifts and two-thirds of its production went to other POW camps.

[73] *Der Quell,* no. 3, 1 May 1946 and *Heritage Today,* Dec. 2002, 37–40 (English Heritage).

is confirmed by Lieutenant Egon Schormann: 'I was 20 years old in April 1945, and originally a law student when I became a POW and student of the "hotel and catering industry" at Crewe Hall.' Having sat his examinations and obtained a qualification which would be accepted in Germany, he wrote to his parents:

> the five month course in twelve theoretical fields was taught by eleven masters according to the professional rules, the exams stuck close to the rules of the hotel and catering trade, the diploma was endorsed by the Commandant. . . . I truly hope that I shall never need to make use of this certificate, but who can tell? I may be 23 on release, the German universities may not be operating—I must think of other openings—as an under-waiter perhaps, if times continue bad.[74]

As for higher education, Camp 18 at Featherstone practically ran a 'university-in-exile', given semi-official recognition when, with delegates from Camps 29 and 174, some of its students attended meetings of the British Student Christian Movement (SCM) at Swanwick in Derbyshire.[75] Three camps specialized in professional training and education. Early in 1945, urged on by the ICRC and by scientifically qualified POWs, Camp 23 at Devizes started pre-clinical teaching with 222 medical students as a medical academy accredited by Hamburg University. To give it access to a teaching hospital, it moved first to Chepstow in the winter semester 1945–6, and subsequently to Camp 23 at Sudbury near Derby.

At Norton Camp 174, near Mansfield, colleges for teacher-training and Protestant theology were established in August 1945. Norton Camp, which published the *Monatsbrief* mentioned earlier, had been founded by the International YMCA and the ICRC in response to misgivings about the British re-education policy. Similar motives had led to the establishment of a *Jugendlager* (youth camp for POWs as young as 16) at Radwinter (Camp 180), later transferred to Trumpington (Camp 57) near Cambridge. When it closed in 1948, Norton had trained 600 primary school teachers and 125 youth workers; a

[74] Kochan, *Prisoners of England*.

[75] *ZaT,* no. 14, Aug./Sept. 1947, 6. Apart from officers, the camp housed other ranks working as orderlies, who underwent such training.



Figure 3. *A bird's eye view of Camp 247 near Ripon, published in* Die Pforte, *1947*

Source: Die Pforte, no. 19, June 1947.

further 200 had passed their *Abitur* examinations, qualifying them for university entrance, and 130 had completed the first stages of their theological training. A third college, a Roman Catholic seminary, was established at Berechurch Hall (Camp 186) near Colchester under the supervision of the Apostolic Delegate.

There was also voluntary work. One POW, Dr E. Stöbe, reports on archaeological excavations at Hadrian's Wall, Northumberland under the direction of Professor Eric Birley of King's College Newcastle (University of Durham).[76] Digging concentrated on the abutments of the first Roman bridge across the North Tyne, which linked the camp at Chesters with the Roman Wall. In the autumn of 1946 this was followed by the excavation of mile-castles, and in 1947 by work at Vindolanda and Corstopitum. The four qualified archaeologists turned into road builders when they constructed an access path from nearby Chollerford to the bridge foundations opposite the fort (Cilirnum), still in use today. During the long, harsh winter of 1946–7 interest was kept alive by Professor Eric Birley and other archaeologists in Saturday lectures and book loans from King's College. Such events were recorded in *ZaT*, and the POW's collaborative research was subsequently published in academic journals.

In November 1946 Ernst Bleuel had also reported in *ZaT* that German POWs had made a significant contribution to bringing in the harvest in Northumberland.[77] Every day up to 850 unsupervised volunteers had gone to 250 farms and eighteen drainage sites to help, and by 30 September 450,000 metres of drainage ditches had been dug or restored to enable 2,500 hectares of bog and moorland to be reclaimed. So necessary was this work that, instead of POW transport travelling 1,500 miles a week, hostels were opened at three other sites closer to the workplaces. Yet in terms of reconciliation, more important than the crops themselves was the seed corn of understanding sown by these men.[78] Harvest Thanksgiving was celebrat-

[76] Ibid. 7: 'Scherben—Mosaik eines Weltreiches: Ein Jahr Ausgrabungen.'

[77] *ZaT*, no. 6, 7: 'PoW's helfen in der Ernte.'

[78] The local *Haltwhistle Echo* of 25 Oct. 1946, headlined these efforts 'The Seeds of Peace' and commented that 'these men are carrying back to Germany, as their turn comes for repatriation, tales of kindness and solidness of the north-country land worker. His honesty and sympathy . . . have, without doubt, helped lay the foundations of a lasting peace the world has fought for seven weary years to realize.'

Figure 4. *Weekly class timetable: Officers' Camp (18), Featherstone Park*



Unser Wochenplan.

Zeit-Ort	Montag	Dienstag	Mittwoch	Donnerstag	Freitag	Sonnabend
8.15-Bar.1	Engl. ohne Vork.	Engl. mit Vork.	Engl. oh. Vorkenntn.	Engl. m. Vorkenntn.	Engl. oh. Vork.	Engl. m. Vork.
9.15-Bar.1	" " "	" " "	" 3-9 "	" " "	" " "	" " "
10.15-Bar.1	" " "	" " "	" 15-18 "	" " "	" " "	" " "
9.10-Kü.1	Landwirtsch. Gartenbau	frei f. Proben	Mathematik (Mittelstufe)	Deutsche Sprachschule	frei f. Proben	Projektionszeichnen u. bildende Künste
9.10-Kü.2	Deutsche Sprachschule	Praktische Technik	Vortrag: Wanderungen d. Engländer	Landwirtschaft u. Gartenbau	Praktische Technik	Landwirtschaft u. Gartenbau
10.10-Kü.1	Mathematik (Oberstufe)	Mathematik (Mittelstufe)	Mathematik (Oberstufe)	Mathematik (Oberstufe)	Mathematik (Mittelstufe)	Mathematik (Oberstufe)
10.10-Kü.2	Deutsche Literatur	Geschichte	Deutsche Literatur	Geschichte	Deutsche Sprachschule	Philosophie
14.15-Bar.1	Geographie	Botanik	Geographie	Botanik	Geographie	Botanik
14.15-Kü.1	Bilanz- und	Steuerkunde	Projektieren u. bild. Künste	Bilanz- u.	Steuerkunde	Physik
15.15-Kü.1	Industrielles	Rechn. Wesen	Kath. Gottesd. u. Beichte	Industrielles	Rechn. Wes.	Differential Rechn.
15.15-Bar.1	Differential- rechnen	Physik	Differential Rechnen	Allgem. Biologie	Physik	Kath. Bibelstd.
19.30-Kü.2	Bunte Bühne	Vortrag	Bunte Bühne	Vortrag	Bunte Bühne	Kammermusik -abend
20.30-Bar.1	Chorsingen	Engl. Bibelstd.	Chorsingen	Vortr. Grundgedanken Religion	Engl. Bibelstd.	Chorsingen

Wie verbrachte ich noch diese Woche: abds: Bunter Abend für die Bar.; nachm. Wäsche u. Stopfen; nachm. Zahnarzt; abds. Bridgepartie; vorm. Sporte; nachm. Baden i. d. Bar.;

Ausserdem lagen noch folgende Zeiten täglich fest für unsere Baracke:

7.15-7.35 – Kaffeetrinken; 13.15-13.35 – Mittagessen; 18.15-18.45 – Abendbrot;

7.45-8.10 – Zähl-appell; 17.45-18.15 – Zähl-appell; u. Sporttage (freiwillig) waren Dienstag u. Freitag.

Source: H. Heckeroth (former Luftwaffe pilot).

ed at Hexham Abbey in Northumberland by 400 locals and 1,000 German POWs with their commanding officer, an occasion widely reported in the local and national press.[79]

For most POWs, unlike the officer volunteers, the term 'working camp', meant just that. In 46 lines a ballad called 'The Turnip' in *Die Pforte* (Camp 247), tells of the finer points of turnip cultivation and cropping, of the land workers' seemingly endless toil and disappointments. Dr H. W. Thost, reporting on a peat cutter's day in northern Scotland at Watten, tries to find redeeming moments in all-weather, all-season, all-day labour on the peat crop.[80] He records how, for the 100 men who boarded the five Bedford trucks every morning at 7 a.m. for a seventeen-mile drive to work, the red-haired girl who always stood at the Halkirk stop waiting for the 8 o'clock bus was the most welcome sight of the day. Neither side ever spoke or waved a hand, but for the POWs it was visual proof of a world closed to them. How much greater was the joy and gratitude of these men at Watten when they were asked by local people to join in with their Highland Games, and thanks to support from their commandant, competed in some events. After admiring Highland dress, bagpipes, and dancing, they took second place in the tug-of-war. The applause from the former enemy was heart-warming to them.[81]

An appeal from the Red Cross for German POWs to make toys for orphanages at home in Germany was met with an enthusiastic response. Raw materials of all sorts were immediately squirrelled together, one hut being set aside as a toy factory (Fig. 6), and work began.[82] Many POWs longed to act paternally, to bring joy to children, and *ZaT* reports how, on one rainy night, there came a knock at the door and three pixies entered the toy factory. As the camp newspaper noted, it was difficult to say who was more delighted: the children who had discovered Santa's wonderland, or the men who

[79] Cf. *Hexham Courant,* 16 Nov. 1947, under the headline 'The 'Enemy' in Our Midst. But he has beaten his Sword into a ploughshare', and the *Daily Express*, 18 Nov. 1947, 'Abbey Locks its Doors for P.o.W. Service. Scores left outside'. The service was also reported by *The Times, Manchester Guardian, Daily Telegraph,* and *Daily Mail*.

[80] *Nordlicht,* no. 12, Oct. 1947, 23–7.

[81] Ibid. 29–32, article by Peter Schmidt, 'Der Sportmonat'.

[82] *ZaT,* July 1947: G. Klaffke, 'Drei Zwerge in Wunderland', 11.

Figure 5. *'The turnip field'. A cartoon from the Camp 247 newspaper, Ripon*



Source: *Die Pforte*, no. 24, October 1947.

showed them how to make things, or rediscovered their own delight in play.

Many camps turned into beehives of activity at night, the work ranging from carving chess sets for in-camp competitions to unpicking hessian sacks for recycling as slippers. On occasion the muses inspired some POWs in quite remarkable ways. A few murals, mostly of German landscapes or wildlife, which adorned canteens at Harperley (Co. Durham), Stirling (Stirlingshire, Scotland), and Brigg (Lincolnshire), still survive. Elsewhere there were paintings of biblical scenes in the camp chapels, as well as triptychs, nativity sets, crucifixes, and stations of the cross, and stage scenery for the camp theatres was in constant demand.[83] Pen-and-ink drawings and linocuts embellished many camp magazines from northern Scotland to Cornwall.

The camp artists exhibited inside many camps or, occasionally, at public exhibitions. One such, an exhibition and sale of eighty-four paintings and watercolours (priced from one to fifteen guineas) by five artists, was held at the Town Hall in Ripon and opened by the Bishop of Ripon and reported next day in the *Yorkshire Post*. It included crafts, ranging from musical instruments to the traditional Erzgebirge *Pyramiden,* from ships in bottles to shopping baskets. In opening this exhibition the Bishop was reported as saying that 'the prisoners had left a permanent mark of their stay in Ripon in the pictures which had been painted on the walls of the Y.M.C.A. Those pictures would remind us of what war meant and of the separation and unhappiness it brought, and they should strengthen our resolve to do all we could to prevent such things happening again.'[84]

The years of captivity released unsuspected or dormant artistic abilities in men, as if the liberation from the pursuit of a career had freed them to pursue seriously what had been no more than a hobby. The review published in *ZaT* of a three-man art exhibition mounted at Featherstone gave details of the restrictions imposed by captivi-

[83] The paintings in Moota Camp (103) chapel, Cumberland, now demolished, are fully illustrated in Gloria Edwards, *Moota POW Camp* (Kirkgate Museum Group, 2006).

[84] *Yorkshire Post,* 17 July 1947, 7. A similar link was established with Newark (Notts.) where Dr Wolfgang Scheffler, an art historian and former POW at Little Carlton Hostel, donated 240 of his local drawings to the town, which had held exhibitions of his work in 1988, 1995, and 2005.

Figure 6. *The 'toy factory' at Camp 18, Featherstone Park*

Die Spielzeughütte. Zeichnung von Horst Leske.

Source: *Die Zeit am Tyne*, no. 13, 1947, 11.

ty.[85] It was the second art exhibition at Camp 18 to show the work of young painters, sculptors, and architects, the previous one having been staged in September 1946, three months before contacts outside the camp were permitted.

'Every decent German camp has a stage. If it hasn't, it is not a decent camp. A stage needs to be constructed to make it so.' These words inspired a start to be made on building a theatre in Camp 165 at Watten on 24 March 1946. By September 1947 it had seen 150 performances; three months earlier at Featherstone *ZaT* had reported the first guest evening hosted *inside* the camp for the civilian population.[86] The number, variety, and venues of such performances up and down the country were impressive: tragedies, comedies, classical Greek plays, Shakespeare in English as well as German, the German classics, plays written and composed in-camp, operettas, variety shows—not a camp, not a week without one of these, and too many to review here.

That spirit seems to linger on. The first building that the new owners of Harperley POW Camp Museum sought to restore was the theatre. An operetta was translated into English, music students recruited from Durham University and dressed like the former camp band, the original conductor flown in from Hamburg, and an audience of ten ex-POWs assembled to be filmed for the BBC2 *Restoration* programme screened in 2003.[87]

Among other camp puppet or marionette theatres, that of Norton Camp under the direction of Wolfgang Kaftan excelled, with titles from the repertoire ranging from classics such as *Dr Faustus* to the more topical *Mr Punch Becomes a POW*, or *Punch Goes Fraternizing*. All in all, there were seventy performances in English and thirty in German at other camps and local schools to audiences totalling 25,000. Choir singing and instrumental playing naturally offered themselves as community-building and entertainment activities. *Nordlicht* mentions how even on the daily march to work POWs hummed, whistled, or sang anything from 'The Volga Boatmen's Song' to Chopin's 'Funeral March'.[88] According to *Querschnitt* the

[85] *ZaT*, 13 July 1947, 7.

[86] *Nordlicht,* no. 12, Oct. 1947, and *ZaT*, no. 12, June 1947, 10.

[87] BBC2*,* broadcast on 2 Sept. 2003.

[88] *Nordlicht,* no. 12, 1947, 27: P. Szameitat, 'On the 150th performance of the BB' (Bunte Bühne, the theatre's name).

first camp choir had started in October 1944. Three groups of 500 to 600 POWs arrived, followed by a further two on 21 December 1944.[89] There were barracks, but because of an administrative oversight no beds and, more seriously, hardly any food either, but on Christmas Day no fewer than 120 men assembled to form a choir. In the course of time most camps followed these examples, for their own enjoyment finding and pursuing common interests with the British public and giving pleasure to others. Donations of instruments followed from the YMCA, the Red Cross, and the public, and the camp magazines abound with announcements and reports on musical performances of all types.

Finally, team sports and athletics, sports days, even Highland games and regattas, all received regular coverage in the camp papers, whether inside the camps or in competition with local clubs after the non-fraternization restrictions were lifted in December 1946.

VI. *Conclusion*

The population of many German camps, numbering between 600 and 6,000 men including those allocated to satellite hostels and billeted on farms, was comparable in scale to that of some surrounding villages and small towns. But where the host communities normally had parish magazines to disseminate local news and views, and thus to contribute towards a shared identity, the *Lagerzeitungen* bore little similarity to these. The *Lagerzeitungen* were written for an exclusively male POW readership, for men without women; for men between the ages of 16 and 55, brought together by chance from all corners of the German Reich and from diverse civilian backgrounds; for men cut off from their families and communities and having little or no knowledge of the place, region, or society in which they found themselves prisoners.

To make judgements on the success and achievement of the camp newspapers at large among such a diverse readership would be virtually impossible, and not all retrospective comments have been favourable. They range from those of the former *U-Boot* officer who had 'no time for entertaining magazines' to those of the Heidelberg

[89] *Querschnitt,* no. 5, 1 May 1948 (Camp 77).

professor who wrote: 'Nice try, little impact, save for the Wilton Park papers' and the film-maker's view that 'We were all in the same boat and knew it; that saw to bonding; we did not need magazines for that.'[90]

More positively, in Lincolnshire the Heath Camp magazine at Wellingore alerted another respondent 'to new acquisitions in the library, to discovering literature and the arts, and to organizing theatre performances with and for our comrades. Contributing to the *Lagerzeitungen* became for them an absorbing interest.'[91] At another camp in the Midlands a former POW commented that 'we always looked forward to the camp magazine, even when fraternization was allowed',[92] and a third from a Sussex camp found that 'a new world opened to me through *English for All*', adding that he had kept all his copies to this day.[93]

For those responsible for the contents of a camp newspaper, visiting advisers, censorship, initial inside resistance, and other factors could make the task demanding, but identifying common interests among their readers, and creating, as it were a *Boys' Own Paper* was no less difficult.

At the outset editors had to conform with agendas imposed by higher authority. The purposes of the *Lagerzeitungen* were specific: to re-educate, to stimulate discussion, to provide information on Britain and British institutions, to assist bonding between men arbitrarily thrown together, to create a group ethos, and to entertain and divert. The different agendas could and sometimes did contradict each

[90] Personal communications, R.-W. Wentz, 13 Feb. 2005; and U. Schweinfurth and J. Heerdegen, 23 Apr. 2004.

[91] Personal communication, G. Riemann, 15 June 2004. This extraordinary working camp in Wellingore, Lincolnshire, held reunions for over 50 years and members collectively published several substantive volumes. These included *Dichtung und Musik hinter Stacheldraht,* a complete 288-page documentation of the camp's drama group *Unser Schatzkästlein*, its 63 productions ranging from *Wallensteins Tod* and *Julius Cäsar* to *Götz von Berlichingen, Hedda Gabler,* and many musical performances, and Gerhard Riemann's *Stationen der Erinnerungen: Englische Kriegsgefangenschaft 1944–1948* (Kamen, 2001), probably a unique record.

[92] Personal communication, J. Heerdegen, 23 Apr. 2005.

[93] Personal communication, S. G. Mohring, author of *Freedom in Captivity: Personal Recollections of World War II* (Books on Demand, 2001).

other, and what was actually published often failed to engage with the POWs. In the most influential of the camp papers, Rolf Jensen in a long article looking back at three years at Featherstone Camp wrote that the agendas ignored the fact that the POWs were interested first and foremost in returning home. 'Repatriation: this word explains most, if not everything, the POW thinks about.'[94]

To this extent, the official directives and agendas from the 'centre' paid little attention to the societal realities or to the psychology and mind-sets of those behind the wire, and the heterogeneity of the 1,500 camps and hostels involved was largely discounted. Faulk's assessment, written nearly twenty years after the camps closed and his own work had ended, still has contemporary relevance:

> Although the Second World War was the same historical event for both Germans and the Allies, they saw it from diametrically opposed points of view. . . . Re-education, unique in its attempt to alter the norms of group belonging . . . provided a unique opportunity to see how a mass of human beings, who arrived for the most part as a loose agglomerate, coalesced into groups in 1,500 separate camp units.[95]

Virtually all the camps eventually produced or shared in the production of a paper and created a record which mirrored the individuality of each camp. Faulk's comment that: 'No two camps were exactly alike, and consequently the camp was the psychological unit of imprisonment. Each camp evolved a tone, an atmosphere of its own, consisting of socially approved attitudes and opinion, which were obvious to all and approved by all' underscores the singular value and importance today of the individual camp papers as unique historical documents.[96]

Against the background of a familiar and shared culture, the German-language medium of each *Lagerzeitung* was a vital factor in recreation, particularly for those readers billeted on farms in an English-, Welsh-, or even Gaelic-speaking environment. One former editor commented that '*Wochenpost* may have failed because it lacked

[94] *ZaT,* no. 17, Mar. 1948.
[95] Faulk, 'Foreword' (2007) to *Group Captives*, 10.
[96] Ibid. 33.

small talk, local news and the personal touch', but the camp newspapers avoided this mistake.[97]

The formal announcement of a repatriation programme in September 1946 had raised spirits, and the ending of the non-fraternization law in December 1946, coupled with greater freedom of movement beyond the camps and a 10 p.m. curfew, for the first time brought the POWs into close and growing contact with local communities and individuals, and opened the outside world to them. These changes were quickly reflected in the more optimistic tone of their papers. Outside contacts were to lead to many other enduring friendships, as acceptance as equals had long been a deep, if unexpressed, need of the POWs. It found perhaps its highest expression in the 796 marriages between POWs and British women registered by mid-1948.

The camp leader at Featherstone Camp chose to mark the repatriation of the last officers in May 1948 and a statement of reconciliation with a letter to a local Tyneside newspaper:

> We have experienced so many examples of true hospitality and deep-felt interest in our mother-country that we should like, on behalf of those comrades already repatriated, to express our gratitude here. The benefits we received were a welcome compensation to the hard lot we endured by the long separation from our loved ones. I am quite sure those connections will outlast our repatriation.[98]

Finally, the ending of political screening in mid-July 1947 provided POWs with a new freedom to express their own thoughts in articles and letters in what they had come to regard as their own papers. In little more than two years, 268 *Lagerzeitungen* had been established and sustained. This achievement alone represented a sea change from the resigned 'ohne mich' attitude of many POWs to a tangible recognition, reflected in their papers, of what represented their own and the common good. The strict post-war regime, where POWs were returned each evening under guard from their outside work, gradually softened.

[97] Personal communication, G. Schweer, 6 Feb. 2004.

[98] Colonel Merkel, the last *Lagersprecher,* in Newcastle *Evening Chronicle*, 4 May 1948.

To what extent were the camp magazines objectively POW creations, reflecting their experiences, and consequently their 'own' papers? Assuming that the camp newspapers were the spontaneous result of a generally felt need for a voice and network within the camps, the British authorities had been quick to avail themselves of this medium as a vehicle for re-education and a barometer of mood within a large, and potentially threatening, foreign body in its midst. Wilton Park training, a handbook of suggested topics and approaches, the selection of editors, peripatetic advisers, censorship, and material assistance were all put in place to this end.

At the level of 1,500 individual camps and hostels, the actual writing and selection of contributions for publication in the *Lagerzeitungen* was done not by British officials but by fellow prisoners, and the resulting publications seem genuinely to reflect the minutiae of their restricted lives as much as their remote involvement in, and concern for, the great questions of the day being played out in their homeland. Whether for readers or writers of the *Lagerzeitungen*, the theoretical concepts and themes of re-education were daily put to a reality test over the years of captivity. Its outcome can still be read about in this 'forgotten literature', as it were, as case notes or progress reports on a group of individuals whose experience in the camps, whether good or bad, was an important, often formative, and for many unforgettable part of their lives, not least as evidenced by the reminiscences of the correspondents acknowledged at the beginning of this article.

INGEBORG FRIEDERIKE HELLEN was born in Speyer, Germany in 1933 and has lived near Newcastle since 1965. She is a graduate of the universities of Bonn and Newcastle upon Tyne and has worked mainly as a teacher of German and as an academic translator. From 1995 her interest in the *Lagerzeitungen* developed from fieldwork and archival research on the POW camps across Britain in collaboration with her husband.

REVIEW ARTICLE

ON THE OCCASION OF AVIAN FLU AND AN ANNIVERSARY: THE 'SPANISH' INFLUENZA PANDEMIC OF 1918–19 REVISITED

Eckard Michels

WILFRIED WITTE, *Erklärungsnotstand: Die Grippe-Epidemie 1918–20 in Deutschland unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Badens*, Neuere Medizin- und Wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Quellen und Studien, 16 (Herbolzheim: Centaurus Verlag, 2006), 452 pp. ISBN 978 3 8255 0641 4. EUR 28.90
MARC HIERONIMUS, *Krankheit und Tod 1918: Zum Umgang mit der spanischen Grippe in Frankreich, England und dem Deutschen Reich* (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006), 220 pp. ISBN 3 8258 9988 8. EUR 29.90

The influenza epidemic known as the Spanish flu went round the world in three waves between spring 1918 and the beginning of 1919. Within a short time it had affected all continents on earth and, in absolute figures, probably claimed more victims than any other epidemic in the history of humankind. It was the 'single worst demographic disaster of the twentieth century'.[1] In the 1920s it was assumed that about 22 million people had died worldwide; more recent estimates put mortality at closer to 50 million, a large majority of them in Asia, followed by Africa.[2] The flu went down in history as 'Spanish' only because it was in Spain, neutral during the First World War, that the uncensored media were able to report the outbreak of the first wave of the epidemic in May 1918. The illness had come to

[1] Howard Phillips and David Killingray, 'Introduction', in eid. (eds.), *The Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 1918–1919: New Perspectives* (London, 2003), 1–25, at 2.
[2] Niall Johnson and Jürgen Müller, 'Updating the Accounts: Global Mortality of the 1918–1920 "Spanish" Influenza Pandemic', *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, 76 (2002), 105–15.

Europe with the US troops that had landed in France in April. The second wave in particular, which started simultaneously on the American east coast, in West Africa, and in France in mid-August 1918, climaxing in October and November 1918, proved to be much more deadly than all other known flu epidemics. It is also the only flu epidemic in history so far that has killed mostly people of an age at which they are usually most resistant, that is between 15 and 40. It did not, as is the case with annual seasonal or other pandemic flus, claim its victims mainly among children and older people. A third, less lethal wave followed at the beginning of 1919. Some writers speak of a fourth worldwide wave, considerably weaker again, at the beginning of 1920. Medicine is undecided whether the puzzling incidence of a new type of meningitis, *encephalitis lethargica*, which suddenly appeared between 1920 and 1925 in a number of countries and claimed further hundreds of thousands of victims, was linked to the Spanish flu. For contemporaries, there was no doubt.

In German history too, the Spanish flu has been by far the most lethal epidemic of the last 150 years or so. It claimed about 250,000 lives (military and civilian) in addition to those who usually died each year of flu and pneumonia, the most common of its lethal complications. It thus by far eclipsed the smallpox epidemic of 1871–2, which was brought in by French prisoners-of-war and claimed about 175,000 lives; the cholera epidemic of 1866 that followed the Austro-Prussian war and had about 115,000 victims; and the cholera in Hamburg in 1892 with just under 10,000 dead. In 1918, flu was the most frequent cause of death among the civilian population in Germany (and in other affected countries). Between 30 and 60 per cent of the population became ill, depending on region. However, the pandemic of 1918–19 is not mentioned in recent overviews of German history in the twentieth century or surveys of the First World War. Hans-Ulrich Wehler's voluminous *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgesichte* is an exception to the extent that he mentions the epidemic briefly, but incorrectly dates it to after the end of the war.[3]

Yet at the beginning of the twenty-first century it is certainly no longer true to describe this event as a pandemic forgotten by history

[3] Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, 4 vols. (Munich, 1987–2003), iv. *Vom Beginn des Ersten Weltkriegs bis zur Gründung der beiden deutschen Staaten 1914–1949* (2003), 232.

and neglected by historiography, as is occasionally still done.[4] In the English-speaking world, in particular, many articles, monographs, and collections of essays on this topic have been published, dealing with the event in a national, regional, or local perspective.[5] Moreover, the pandemic has long been part of the school history curriculum in the USA, so that in one of his Peanuts cartoon strips Charles M. Schulz, who died in 2000, had his hero Charlie Brown mulling over a school essay on the topic. The first historical studies of the Spanish flu, mostly focused on one country, were published as early as the 1970s, partly under the impression of the two other epidemics of the twentieth century, the Asiatic flu of 1957 and the Hong Kong flu of 1968. Alfred Crosby's book on the epidemic in the USA, published in 1976, was a pioneering achievement. A new edition came out in 1989 partly in response to the fear of new epidemics such as AIDS. An atmosphere in which there were greater doubts than had been apparent in the optimistic 1960s and 1970s, when there was more faith in progress, that medicine would soon succeed in defeating all epidemics also played a part. However, the passages in which Crosby attempts to prove that in 1919 US President Woodrow Wilson, himself weakened by the flu, allowed the French to impose a draft peace treaty in Paris that he would never have accepted if he had been in good health are ultimately an unconvincing attempt to ascribe to the pandemic a historical significance going as far as shaping the post-war European order.[6]

The bird flu that first appeared in Hong Kong in 1997 and has since spread to many parts of Asia and Europe, so far infecting just under 400 people of whom more than half have died, has stirred up

[4] Thus the American historian Alfred Crosby in the new edition of his pioneering work, first published in 1976, Alfred W. Crosby, *America's Forgotten Pandemic: The Influenza of 1918* (Cambridge, 1989); Pete Davies, *Catching Cold: 1918's Forgotten Tragedy and the Scientific Hunt for the Virus that Caused It* (London, 1999); and recently Utz Thimm, 'Die vergessene Seuche: Die "Spanische Grippe" von 1918/19', *Mitteilungen des Oberhessischen Geschichtsvereins Gießen*, 92 (2007), 117–36.

[5] The bibliography assembled by Jürgen Müller in Phillips and Killingray (eds.), *The Spanish Influenza Pandemic*, 301–51, provides an excellent overview of the research.

[6] Alfred W. Crosby, *Epidemic and Peace 1918* (Westport, Conn., 1976); id., *America's Forgotten Pandemic*.

worldwide fears that a new flu pandemic may be imminent. The precondition for this is a mutation in the H5 N1 virus, so far transmitted only from birds to humans, which would allow it to spread directly from human to human. The virus responsible for the 1918 flu was also, it is assumed, transmitted from birds or pigs to humans in the American Midwest, and thus began its deadly passage round the world. It was first isolated in 1997 when clothing belonging to victims of the pandemic which had been preserved in the permafrost of Alaska and in the US Army's Armed Forces Institute of Pathology were subjected to scientific tests. Labelled H1 N1, it became the mother of all known strains of influenza virus. The events of 1918–19 therefore provide an awful historical warning, a horror-film scenario. Thus the publisher Fischer Verlag advertised a paperback by the American science journalist Gina Kolata about the hunt for the influenza virus of 1918 with the slogan: 'Bird flu: this will happen if we don't do something.'[7] Similarly, the federally funded Robert Koch Institute of Infectious Diseases in Berlin refers to the events of 1918–19 as a potential trigger for a pandemic of human flu in the information it provides about the dangers of bird flu. But it also points to the progress which medicine has made since then and suggests that there would be fewer victims; its worst-case scenario is about 100,000 dead in Germany.[8] Given this level of threat, a special UN coordinator for these issues was appointed in 2004 and Germany, like other countries, has since developed a national plan for coping with an influenza epidemic. For historians as well, the threat posed by bird flu has acted as a spur to look again at the events of 1918–19.[9]

It is striking that the relatively early monographs on the influenza epidemic of 1918 were written mainly in and about countries that were either neutral in the First World War, such as Switzerland (1981) and Sweden (1990), or were only peripherally involved in the military and political events of this conflict, above all the USA (1976,

[7] Gina Kolata, *Influenza: Die Jagd nach dem Virus* (updated new edn.; Frankfurt/M., 2006).

[8] http://www.rki.de/cln_048/nn_200120/SharedDocs/FAQ/Influenzapandemie/FAQ20 <accessed 31 May 2007>.

[9] Guy Beiner, 'Out in the Cold and Back: New-Found Interest in the Great Flu', *Cultural and Social History*, 3 (2006), 496–505.

1984), but also New Zealand (1988) and South Africa (1990).[10] In those nations that were at the centre of the conflict, by contrast, that is, France, Britain, and especially Germany, it took longer for the pandemic to find historiographers. The dramatic political and military events and the tense situation on the home front in 1918 appears to have marginalized the flu among contemporaries, and this situation seems to have perpetuated itself in the historiography of these countries. It could be said that the more war and revolution in 1918–19, the less flu(-historiography). Whereas French and British research on the Spanish flu began in the 1980s and 1990s, in Germany it began only hesitantly in the 1990s with a few short local histories.[11] The first two dissertations on the subject based on close archival research, those by Witte and Hieronimus under review here, were not published until 2006.

Witte's study, verbose and full of redundancies, takes a classical history of medicine approach. It looks mainly at the reactions of doctors and the medical administration in Germany, and reports contemporary scientific discussions of the character of the influenza and *encephalitis lethargica*. Witte's attempts to anchor the effects of the flu in society, however, by referring to the closure of theatres and cinemas in Baden at the height of the epidemic in October 1918, for example, merely produce lengthy digressions, such as that on the history of film (pp. 166–78), which contribute little to the main topic. Witte's

[10] Walter Nussbaum, *Die Grippeepidemie in der Schweizer Armee 1918/19* (Zurich, 1981); Magareta Aman, *Spanska Sjukan: Den Svenska Epidemin 1918–1920 och dess internationalla bakgrund* (Uppsala, 1990); Geoffrey Rice and Linda Bryder, *Black November: The 1918 Influenza Pandemic in New Zealand* (Wellington, 1988); Howard Phillips, *Black October: The Impact of the Spanish Influenza Epidemic of 1918 on South Africa* (Pretoria, 1990). For the US, apart from Crosby, *Epidemic and Peace*, see B. Luckingham, *Epidemic in the South-West 1918–1919* (El Paso, Tex., 1984).

[11] Stephen G. Fritz, 'Frankfurt', in Fred R. van Hartesveldt (ed.), *The 1918–19 Pandemic of Influenza: The Urban Impact in the Western World* (New York, 1992), 13–32; Manfred Vasold, 'Die Grippeepidemie in Nürnberg 1918—eine Apokalypse', *1999: Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts*, 10 (1995), 12–37; Kristin Olm, 'Die spanische Grippe in Sachsen in den Jahren 1918 und 1919' (medical dissertation, University of Leipzig, 2001); Matthias Kordes, 'Die sogenannte Spanische Grippe von 1918 und das Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges in Recklinghausen', *Vestische Zeitschrift*, 101 (2006–7), 119–46.

method of presenting the pandemic through the medical histories and destinies of three individual patients is innovative, but does not go beyond a description of the progress of the disease and the medical measures taken to combat it. What the three individuals thought about the illness, or how their environment dealt with infected people and the pandemic, however, remains unclear.

The much more rewarding book by Hieronimus is the first ever historiographical attempt to investigate the phenomenon of the Spanish flu and its potential impact on politics, society, and warfare systematically and comparatively in several of the belligerent powers at similar stages of social, economic, and medical development. The author chooses France as a reference point, taking Britain and Germany to illustrate possible divergent reactions. Given this pioneering work, it is regrettable that the study is not available in English, and will therefore remain largely inaccessible to an international public. Moreover, it has been prepared for the press by a publisher who dispenses with copy-editing or even just a reader-friendly layout.

Analysing the contemporary press, Hieronimus looks among other things at how French, British, and German society dealt emotionally with the illness without, however, explicitly referring to recent history of emotion approaches. He is thus attempting something that a historiography of the flu which has dealt mainly with the reactions of the medical profession and the demographic impact of the pandemic has not yet achieved, namely, to write a cultural history of the Spanish flu for the three countries under discussion.[12] However, in terms of sources this approach can have only limited success because of the press censorship that was practised in all three countries at the time in response to the war. In an attempt to prevent any public unrest, reportage of opinions and information about the flu was restricted. According to Hieronimus, the conformism in reporting the flu and the tendency to play it down was also the result of self-censorship by journalists who, for their part, wanted to bolster morale on the home front. Here ego-documents such as diaries, memoirs, and reports on public opinion prepared by the police and military authorities would surely have been a more appropriate

[12] This is mentioned as a gap in the research by Phillips and Killingray, 'Introduction' and Beiner, 'Out in the Cold and Back', among others.

source. Church sources, such as those used to good effect by Christian Geinitz in his dissertation on the mood in Freiburg on the outbreak of the First World War,[13] might also have been useful. Unlike Witte, Hieronimus looks not only at the influence of the flu on civilian society and the home front, but also (even if only cursorily) at its repercussions on the military and the course of the war on the Western front. He comes to the conclusion that the epidemic had no influence worth mentioning on military operations in this theatre of war, especially as the occasional delays in French and American mobilization on the Western front caused by the flu did not start until October, when Germany's western army was already disintegrating. In addition, soldiers suffered less than civilians from the epidemic because in all three countries they enjoyed much better medical care.

Both books take a local history approach in dealing with the flu on the home front. While the pandemic affected all European countries in more or less blanket fashion, it was the municipal authorities who had to combat it. This was especially true in the federally organized German Kaiserreich, where health policy was a state responsibility. Thus Witte looks at Baden because his dissertation was written at the University of Heidelberg, while Hieronimus, whose academic home is Cologne, investigated the three cities of Cologne, Manchester, and Marseilles. Hieronimus comes to the conclusion that there was, ultimately, little to distinguish the reactions of authorities and public media to this challenge in the three cities, or the options for action available in the three countries. The municipal authorities in all three countries reacted hesitantly because they feared that measures such as closing schools, restaurants, and theatres would merely depress the public mood even further. On the whole, the French press reacted more hysterically and heaped greater blame on the enemy who was allegedly the cause of the epidemic than the British and German local press, which reported in more sober fashion. In all three countries government authorities at national level, by contrast, took little notice of the phenomenon. This suggests that compared with other military, political, social, economic, and medical challenges, the Spanish flu was considered by governments in all three countries as a problem of secondary significance, despite the 200,000 to 250,000

[13] Published as Christian Geinitz, *Kriegsfurcht und Kampfbereitschaft. Das Augusterlebnis 1914 in Freiburg: Eine Studie zum Kriegsbeginn 1914* (Essen, 1998).

victims that it claimed in each country within about six months. Witte, for example, demonstrates this by reference to the planning for the demobilization of the German army between the spring and end of 1918. The flu, unlike typhus and venereal diseases which, it was feared, would be introduced by the returning troops, played no part in these plans. According to Hieronimus, the flurry of events precipitated by defeat and revolution in Germany meant that at the turn of 1918–19 the flu epidemic disappeared from the agenda even more quickly there than in the other two countries.

Hieronimus demonstrates the limited room for manoeuvre available to the authorities in the three countries, stretched to breaking point by the war, and given the limited medical knowledge about the flu at the time. This situation allowed the introduction merely of preventive, but not therapeutic, measures. The author looks at Switzerland which, as early as the first wave of flu in June 1918, took much more energetic steps to stem the pandemic, including banning assemblies and church services, closing theatres and cinemas, and disinfecting public transport. However, it transpires that even this level of intervention did not result in lower morbidity and mortality rates than in the three great powers. Thus it becomes clear that the virulence and large numbers of victims of the Spanish flu cannot be attributed to the special circumstances of the last year of the war and the rapid deterioration in public health suffered especially in a Germany strangled by a British naval blockade. Nonetheless, at the time, the public media linked the raging of flu in Germany with the consequences of the bad supply situation. Thus the flu was a factor with a potentially destabilizing effect on Germany's politics during the last year of the war. Unfortunately neither of the studies under review explores this aspect.

The detailed research undertaken by Hieronimus and Witte demonstrates that in all three countries under consideration, the Spanish flu left disappointingly few traces in official documents, the press, ego-documents, and art. Hieronimus argues convincingly that the ubiquity in the collective consciousness of death caused by epidemics, especially tuberculosis, combined with patchy state health care meant that the flu pandemic was not perceived as an exceptional threat in the three societies studied. Thus in the best sense of the word, the author historicizes the Spanish flu. Astonishingly, this is much less the case in Witte's book. Witte occasionally expresses sur-

prise at the Baden authorities' weak reaction, and attributes blame *ex post facto* (p. 135). This ultimately ahistorical approach is occasionally also found in other recent publications on the Spanish flu.[14] It projects present-day knowledge about the character of the flu, modern treatment options, the experience of relatively efficient health systems, and high expectations of state intervention in emergencies back into historical times. The result is a historiography assuming that an event that is seen as a health threat of the first order at the beginning of the twenty-first century, at least in developed countries, should have evoked similar reactions at the time. This sort of historiography is the product of societies that imagine themselves to be largely immune to health threats, and that are plunged into panic by any news of new illnesses, or ones thought to be long vanquished.

[14] e.g. Sara M. Tomkins, 'The Failure of Expertise: Public Health Policy in Britain during the 1918–1919 Influenza Epidemic', *Journal of the Society for the Social History of Medicine*, 16 (1992), 435–54; and for the USA, John M. Barry, *The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History* (New York, 2004).

ECKARD MICHELS is Senior Lecturer in History at Birkbeck College. He received the Werner Hahlweg Prize for Military History for his book *'Der Held von Deutsch-Ostafrika' – Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck: Ein preußischer Kolonialoffizier* (2008).

BOOK REVIEWS

JÜRGEN SARNOWSKY, *Der Deutsche Orden* (Munich: C. H. Beck Verlag, 2007), 128 pp. ISBN 978 3 406 53628 1. EUR 7.90

In recent years, several academics have published books which provide an introduction to the crusading movement for a general audience. Among these are a number which concern the military orders; Helen J. Nicholson's *The Knights Hospitaller* (2001) and *The Knights Templar: A New History* (2001) are good examples. These works provide a useful starting point for students and members of the public who are interested in learning about this subject, and this is particularly important given that the military orders have become a familiar theme in modern media. The depiction of these institutions through media such as film, fiction, and television documentaries seems to have provoked both a growth of interest in this subject and also a number of misunderstandings or misrepresentations. Accordingly, it is of the utmost value that historians have produced works that aim to fuel a general audience's desire to learn more, whilst providing them with an account which is founded on the available sources.

Jürgen Sarnowsky's work *Der Deutsche Orden* similarly provides an entry point into the history of the Teutonic Knights. It covers the development of the Order from the year 1190 through to the present day. Discussion is centred upon the brethren's political history but also includes thematic sections on topics such as culture and literature. Given that it has to cover all these areas and provide sufficient context for the comprehension of a general reader within the space of 128 'pocket-sized' pages (including bibliography and index) this is an ambitious undertaking.

The work begins with a description of the conditions which provoked the establishment of the Teutonic Knights. It discusses the emergence of the idea of a 'just war' according to Christian theologians such as Augustine and then talks about the broader context which gave rise to the crusades and later to the military orders. This is followed by a description of how institutions such as the Templars represented the conjunction of a monastic way of life with a military vocation. The subsequent development of other military orders is

then briefly outlined. This discussion lays down some of the fundamental principles which help to explain the subsequent development of the Teutonic Order.

From this point the book is divided into three chronological parts which are in turn divided into subsections. The effect of this structure is to provide a series of 'bite-sized' passages which enables a brisk, clear, and focused discussion of each key theme. The first part covers the Teutonic Order's origins and evolution in the years after its foundation in 1190. This includes some discussion about the development of their infrastructure and organization, and covers their role in the kingdom of Jerusalem during its brief recovery and subsequent decline in the thirteenth century. The brethren's Mediterranean possessions in regions such as Greece, Spain, and Italy are then briefly summarized. The origins of the Order's involvement in regions such as Hungary, Prussia, and Livonia are supplied along with some background material on the political situation in these areas prior to the arrival of the Teutonic Knights. The information provided for this topic strikes a largely successful balance between the demands of concision and reader comprehension.

In its first part, *Der Deutsche Orden* covers a number of themes which are sources of much debate in modern historiography. The first of these concerns the establishment of the Order. Currently, there is some debate between historians about the foundation of the institution; some believe that the first medical establishment created by the Order was founded in 1190, whilst others argue that it was a continuation of an earlier hospice in Jerusalem. The arguments on each side are summarized and explained. Although this is an introductory text the explanation of such debates gives an effective snapshot of the process of historiography which helps a reader to engage with this issue. Subsequently, in the section on the Mediterranean, a number of key themes are addressed including the Knights' relations with the Hohenstaufen emperors and the development of factions among the brethren and their landholdings. Although these topics are important there are passages where they are not placed in sufficient context or embedded in a clear narrative of events. For example, the Order's role in the Mediterranean during the 1240s is described largely in terms of its relations with the papacy and empire without reference to events such as the Barons' Crusade, the battle of La Forbie, the loss of Jerusalem in 1244, or Louis IX's crusade. It is

understood that this is an introductory work and that certain events have had to be edited out in the interests of brevity; however, these were key events for this theatre of war that are intrinsic to even the most basic narrative.

Part two explores the Order's position in *c.*1400. The bulk of the political discussion focuses upon Germany, Prussia, and Livonia, although the brethren's role in the Mediterranean is also covered. These sections are supported by a number of interesting statistics and there is also a strong sense of overview in that the events of the Baltic are placed in the context of wider events such as the Ottoman advances and the affairs of Germany. This contextual analysis is brief but highly effective and demonstrates how the wars of Prussia and Livonia fitted into the wider concerns of Christendom at this time. Even so, there are some places where greater explanation is required. For example, the Hussite Rebellion is mentioned without sufficient explanation about what it actually was. In this case it would have been possible simply to state that the Hussites were a Bohemian heretical movement which provoked a number of crusading expeditions from neighbouring countries during the fifteenth century. In many ways it seems that this example describes an inherent problem involved in covering 800 years of an institution's history in multiple regions in only a very short space.

Further areas such as 'culture and identity', 'structure and constitution', and 'everyday life' are explored at this point and these combine with the political sections to give a far more rounded view of the Order as a whole. Discussion on these themes breaks up the political narrative and also demonstrates what the brethren had achieved by this time. This in turn lays the foundations for a greater understanding of the forces that brought about the Order's decline in later years. In this way, this work has been effectively structured and ordered so that each subsection supplies material that can be drawn upon at a later stage.

The third part concerns the later history of the Teutonic Knights, beginning with the events that brought about the Order's defeat in the early fifteenth century. This is explained in terms of military strategy and also the evolution of the wider political situation of the time. The description of the growing isolation of the Order from its neighbours is particularly effective. From this point, the effects of the treaties and diplomacy which brought the Teutonic Knights into a

downward spiral are explicated along with the consequences this had upon the economic and institutional fabric of the Order.

Later sections concern the effects of Protestantism and the Reformation and also cover the subsequent history of the Order until the present day. These are rather brief in their treatment of these subjects and several centuries are despatched in only a couple of pages. Admittedly, during these years, the brethren's declining power meant that their actions did not affect the course of history in the same way as before; however a little more explanation might have been useful.

The epilogue explores the modern perception of the Teutonic Knights and how this has been shaped by the events of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As shown above, the history of the military orders has been interpreted and reinterpreted throughout the modern age to provide material for fiction writers and other manifestations of modern media. In a similar way, Sarnowsky demonstrates how the memory of the Teutonic Knights was employed to drive political agendas and to support nationalist sentiments in a number of countries in recent centuries. He demonstrates that this has created a distorted perception of their history that has little in common with the available sources.

Sarnowsky set himself a serious challenge when he attempted to condense the Order's history into so short a space but, on the whole, he is successful. He writes in a succinct and engaging manner that clearly communicates many of the main factors which were behind the Order's evolution and decline. Discussion upon the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is particularly effective. The context provided for this discussion has often been condensed and in most cases it is sufficient, although there are a number of events and ideas where the level of detail may not be adequate for a general audience to understand the topic in full. Nevertheless, despite these concerns, which are perhaps inevitable in a work of this length, *Der Deutsche Orden* does provide a clear introduction to this subject and supplies a link to materials for further study. It is highly readable and has a strong sense of development and pace. Events are often described in terms of the underlying principles and pressures which generated them and this facilitates a swift comprehension of their significance. The text is supplemented by a number of maps and black-and-white images. These are pertinent to the subject material and offer useful stimuli to the reader.

NICOLAS MORTON has recently completed a Ph.D. at Royal Holloway, University of London on the role of the Teutonic Knights in the Holy Land. He has taught a range of courses concerning the Crusades and the Medieval World at Queen Mary, University of London and his main research interest lies in German participation in the Crusades to the Holy Land.

KNUT SCHULZ, *Die Freiheit des Bürgers: Städtische Gesellschaft im Hoch- und Spätmittelalter*, ed. Matthias Krüger (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2008), 272 pp. ISBN 978 3 534 21350 4. EUR 49.90

This book consists of nine articles originally published between 1968 and 2000, an introduction by Krüger, and a list of the author's publications since his retirement as Professor of Medieval History at the Free University of Berlin in 2002. Knut Schulz is best known to English-speaking readers for his study of late medieval and early modern journeymen associations and wage-earners, *Handwerksgesellen und Lohnarbeiter*.[1] The papers in the book under review concentrate on the origins and composition of the elites in the episcopal cities of the Rhineland and the institutions by which they maintained power. Lacking documents from a single town to illustrate all aspects of his argument, Schulz develops a composite picture based mainly on examples from Worms, Speyer, and Cologne through the early thirteenth century, and Basel and to a lesser extent Strasbourg for the rest of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. This volume has more thematic unity than is usually found in volumes of collected articles, although the fact that they are by the same author and are reprinted unedited induces some repetition.

The two nouns in the title, which is taken from Otto of Freising's description of the Italian communes, are ambiguous for English readers. *Freiheit* was a broader concept than being directly subject to a territorial state. *Bürger* meant both 'citizen' and 'resident of a *Burg*', which is usually translated 'town' or 'fortification' in a German context but could have the broader meaning of 'settlement' in the west. The cities being investigated obtained freedom by evolutionary, 'organic' means. Schulz argues that 'liberty' was a characteristic of the urban areas, but it was held by their indigenous residents, most of whom were *censuales*. Their situation is the central theme of the first four articles of the collection, whose collective designation is 'Grundherrschaft und Stadt'. This designation in itself will appear controversial to persons wedded to the 'mercantile settlement' hypothesis of urban origins.

[1] Knut Schulz, *Handwerksgesellen und Lohnarbeiter: Untersuchungen zur oberrheinischen und oberdeutschen Stadtgeschichte des 14. bis 17. Jahrhunderts* (Sigmaringen, 1985).

Readers who are unfamiliar with Schulz's work could profitably begin with pages 69–77, which commence the third article and express the essential thesis of the first two more clearly than they do. *Censuales* were either free people who gave themselves to the saint of a church, or serfs who were given to a church after being emancipated. Their main obligation was a yearly payment of varying amount, increasingly called a head tax by the tenth and eleventh centuries. The *censualis* generally had no labour obligations that were attached to personal status, contrary to the situation of serfs, but might owe labour in connection with a land rental. They were not bound to the soil. A list from 1016 of the obligations of *censuales* stipulates that they were 'free of all servitude'. The Worms *censuales* received a *carta ingenuitatis* in 1016 that applied to nearly all inhabitants of the town; the word *ingenuitas* meant 'free', but in the sense that studies of Low Country elites suggest could mean 'noble'.

The charters gave *censuales* unrestricted freedom to marry and inherit property, and inclusion in the sworn association of the town meant that their other bonds were much weakened. The remaining signs of servitude, mortuary duties and the head tax, were ended when the citizens gained political rights. Regional variations are particularly strong with this stage. In 1182 Frederick I ruled that only those actually serving personally in the *curia* of the cathedral chapter of Worms were freed of the head tax, but not others, who were not 'public merchants' and simply wanted to use the status to escape obligations to the town. Political considerations determined the extent to which the Hohenstaufen gave privileges to communities that violated the liberties of churches as lords. In general, however, new town foundations on the Lower Rhine after 1200 were built on the assumption that the townspeople were *censuales*. Except in Westphalia, prohibitions against towns receiving lords' dependents proved unenforceable. Yet seigniorial obligations of persons living in towns remained an issue in many parts of Germany, and in the fifteenth century and the early modern period were even being restored.

In 1184 Frederick I for practical purposes ended the status of *censualis* in favour of freedom of the *Burg*. Freedom thus came at the end of a process during which bishops and other lords and their 'servants' played an important role in town development. 'Freedom after year and day' was granted to wanderers, but it was a late develop-

ment that made sense only when the inhabitants of the town were already mainly free and had formal liberties. The *censuales* of lords whose settlements evolved into towns were thus an important linkage point between urban and rural society.

As most town citizens were originally *censuales*, the *ministeriales* of the bishop were the origin of the urban governing aristocracies, which became clearly defined at the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when the law of the *censuales* became submerged in the freedom of the town citizenry in western Germany. *Ministerialis* and *censualis* were different status, but there was considerable movement between them. As holders of important offices from the bishop, the *ministeriales* became powerful and thus generated wealth. The *Richerzeche* (Rich Club) of Cologne is his major illustration of the link between the early ministerial elite and the merchants; often associated with the merchant guild, it was largely ministerial in the twelfth century, as were the *scabini* who comprised the first city council and court.

The essentially monolithic ministerial elites of the twelfth century began to bifurcate in the early thirteenth into two broad groups: 'knightly *ministeriales*' whose interests and marriage alliances gravitated increasingly towards the rural nobility as rural *ministeriales* gained noble standing; and 'burgher *ministeriales*', who mingled more with the other town wealthy. *Ministeriales* aided the town rebellions against their lords, notably at Trier and Mainz, even though they were technically officials of the same town lords. The guilds that came to power in the early thirteenth century were the wealthiest artisans and usually included the *Hausgenossen,* who were of ministerial origin as controllers of the lord's mint and thus expanded into money-changing. At Worms, for example, the city council in the early thirteenth century consisted of forty persons, of whom twelve were *ministeriales* and twenty-eight 'citizens'. Yet many people called *ministeriales* occupied the 'citizen' positions on the council, and into the early fourteenth century most 'citizen' members of the council were of ministerial ancestry. Far from ministerial standing being a disadvantage, some 'citizens' tried in the thirteenth century to become officials of the bishop for status advantages, notably exemption from the jurisdiction of the town court, although *ministeriales* were judges on it as officials of the bishop. Schulz thus concludes that between the late eleventh and late fourteenth centuries Worms and Mainz were

ruled by elites of largely ministerial ancestry. He also rejects the 'compromise' idea that while the earliest city officials were *ministeriales*, they were pushed aside by a newer, purely commercial group at the end of the twelfth century, although he does not deny that new families entered the patriciate after 1200 and that a distinction arose between old and new families. It follows from this that merchant guilds had little if anything to do with town formation in this area. The merchant guild hypothesis, which is based on Low German and Flemish examples, has been the basis of most survey discussions of medieval urban origins, but Schulz rejects it for the Rhineland.

The final section of the book, 'Stadtadel und Zünfte', carries the themes of the previous articles into the late Middle Ages, showing that ministerial status continued to be desirable. The town nobilities had been almost entirely ministerial in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, but from the late thirteenth century they were supplemented by some recruits from the rural nobility. Their rural interests, including fiefholding, brought them into conflict with policies of the town. The nobility became more distinct from the citizenry by privileges of Estate than before, shown in the establishment of noble societies with exaggerated rules for determining lineage, which meant that some had trouble filling the seats on the councils that were guaranteed to them. From the mid-fourteenth century the distinction between a genuinely urban nobility and the group that lived on the land became vaguer. Many towns in the fifteenth century tried to acquire extramural territories, which hampered their relations with nobles of the environs, many of whom were related to the town noble families.

Schulz concludes that guild origins are more complex than those of the elite. Some of the nominally 'craft' guilds, conspicuously the furriers, originated in the twelfth century as servants of the bishop. The trade organizations were established by the bishop and other town lords as a means of regulating the market. Others trades, called *officia,* were under the burgrave, who appointed a *magister*, usually a ministerial, for each of the trades, but he yielded in the late Middle Ages to a practitioner of the trade chosen by the members. The tradesmen thus had diverse origins and social ranks.

Neither the town lords nor the urban elites were inclined to grant far-reaching rights to the artisans. Their organizations had limited low justice over their members and were generally linked to a reli-

gious brotherhood, which in some cases was identified with the trade group. Schulz shows there that the 'craft guilds' with which the ministerial lineages shared power were the richer ones, many of whose members had ministerial ancestors. Genuine craftsmen only began taking power after 1380 and especially after 1400. The older regime in which the urban nobles of ministerial origin dominated but did not completely control the town governments declined quickly in the fifteenth century. The craftsmen's struggle for 'freedom' thus lasted intermittently for two centuries but led to a reconstitution of the urban elites and to what was initially a mixed regime of trades and lineages that by 1500 had generally yielded to guild control with minimal perquisites of nobility remaining.

I heartily recommend this book to anyone concerned with the urban origins or city elites. Reprinted articles are not intended to break new ground, but these constitute a convenient and accessible summary of a significant part of the output of a deservedly influential scholar. Schulz's sophisticated and densely argued theses have generally been accepted in Germany, but many English readers (the present reviewer is an exception) will find them more controversial. His arguments are essentially a revival of the *Hofrecht* thesis of urban origins associated with Gustav Schmoller. He is vigorously critical of the mercantile settlement thesis associated in Germany with Georg von Below, Friedrich Keutgen, Fritz Rörig, and Hans Planitz and in the west with Henri Pirenne and his followers. The mercantile settlement school and some legal historians have argued that the *ministeriales*, despite their prominence in the documents, were part of rural but not of urban history because they were unfree (while townspeople were free) 'officials' and part of the 'feudal' world that was foreign to the urban environment. Against this, Schulz shows that *ministeriales* were often listed among *liberi,* noting further that if we use the modern idea of freedom, most 'ordinary' inhabitants of the cities were free while their elites were unfree but enjoyed a higher *Stand* (Estate), which is nonsense in a real world. Although Schulz cautiously eschews claims of broader applicability (except for Bavaria and Flanders, where he makes some comparisons with recent literature), his conclusions have at least some comparative relevance in many organically developing cities, although not in urban plantations except in the German southwest.

DAVID NICHOLAS is Kathryn and Calhoun Lemon Professor Emeritus of History at Clemson University, South Carolina. His publications include *Medieval Flanders* (1992), *The Growth of the Medieval City: From Late Antiquity to the Early Fourteenth Century* (1997), *The Later Medieval City* (1997), and *Urban Europe, 1100–1700* (2003). His most recent work, *The Northern Lands: Germanic Europe, c.1270–c.1500*, will be published in 2009 by Wiley-Blackwell.

STEFAN GOEBEL, *The Great War and Medieval Memory: War, Remembrance and Medievalism in Britain and Germany, 1914–1940,* Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare, 25 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), xviii + 357 pp. ISBN 978 0 521 85415 3. £50.00. $90.00

Since its emergence in the sixteenth century, modernity has been defined in contrast to the allegedly 'dark' or irrational Middle Ages. Although medieval imagery was repeatedly revived in later cultural contexts, such as German Romanticism or the nineteenth-century English Arts and Crafts movement, it suffered its ultimate demise in the trenches of the First World War, which inspired the breakthrough of consciously modern ways of expression in arts and literature.

As the book by Stefan Goebel makes clear, this rough picture is not only simplified, but decidedly wrong. Far from eliminating medieval motifs from the modern world, the First World War created an unparalleled opportunity for medievalist authors and artists to offer meaning and consolation in the face of the terrible devastation wrought by modern warfare. Medievalism managed to establish a firm hold over significant aspects of remembrance activities well into the 1940s, when the experiences of the Second World War finally and widely discredited most attempts to draw heartening lessons from war.

Goebel demonstrates the long survival of medievalist motifs in the twentieth century, and by dealing with the written and visual legacy of two countries reveals common approaches and significant differences. The first difference concerns the protagonists of remembrance after the war. In Germany, with its long tradition of conscription, veterans' associations played a vocal part in the establishment of war memorials; in Britain, the organization of remembrance was dominated more by members of local communities. While in Britain medievalist imagery associated with Catholicism aroused Protestant suspicions, in Germany, critical Social Democrats could cause problems. Another fundamental difference in post-war remembrance emerged from the outcomes of the war. In both countries, the memory of the war was related to the need to find consolation for the surviving members of the families of fallen soldiers and of civilian casualties. Yet in Germany war was also associated with defeat. While in Britain the war effort could be presented as a successful crusade for

freedom and justice, many German allusions to medieval motifs served the remobilization of national pride. Goebel succinctly analyses the fortress-shaped Tannenberg memorial in East Prussia, which maintained the legitimacy of the wartime claims of expansion to the East. Moreover, the story of King Frederick Barbarossa residing in the Kyffhäuser mountain until the day of Germany's reawakening became a staple of right-wing ideologues who tried to rescue a message of redemption and Germany's future greatness from the spoils of the war. Such discourses lived side by side with a more general tendency in German memory to present the war as a matter of national defence against unjust enemies—a form of self-perception that facilitated the ascription of heroism and value even to the soldiers of a defeated nation.

One of the most inspiring aspects of Goebel's study is the wide range of source material he has drawn upon in order to reach his conclusions. About sixty illustrations document war memorials, sculptures, and buildings as well as the products of the visual arts, heroes' groves, and stained-glass windows. The latter are an example of national variants in the media of medievalist war remembrance. Stained-glass windows in local parish churches were typical for coping with the war in Britain. Iron-nail statues, on the other hand, were a German specialty. Often in the shape of medieval knights, they became focal points for a seemingly remote ritual: people gathered to drive nails into wooden statues on public display. This ritual served to mobilize the people financially and culturally, but it also offered opportunities for private grief and displays of 'iron' determination to persist with the war effort.

The sheer variety of Goebel's source material occasionally tempts the author to blend motifs from different origins into one great narrative. For example, the medievalist legacy allowed references to historical figures as well as to characters from poetry and literature; the visual representation of the Middle Ages during and after the war could draw on original medieval models but may also have been nothing more than a product of the imagination born from the medievalist revivals of the nineteenth century.

Goebel's style of arguing throughout the book might be called 'dialectical'. The five chapter headings each contrast two stark terms that underline the wide scope of the war experience. 'Catastrophe and Continuity' traces attempts by both societies to come to terms

with the caesura of the war, while at the same time seeking for meaning in the war effort. 'Mission and Defence' analyses how medievalist imagery such as, for example, that of the sword, helped people to formulate statements about the nature of the conflict. 'Destruction and Endurance' shows how representations of medieval armoury, with its associations of steel and strength, underpinned calls for endurance during the experience of industrialized mass warfare, while hopes for 'Regeneration and Salvation' were expressed by invoking medieval motifs in the use of myths and the construction of soldiers' tombs.

One of the most fascinating chapters juxtaposes 'Chivalry and Cruelty'. This juxtaposition is of fundamental importance since as far as medieval images are concerned, chivalric diction constituted the most formidable contrast to the atrocities committed during the war. In some cases, such as that of the famous 'Knights of the sky', visions of honourable one-to-one duels covered the much bleaker reality of air-raids. Whereas the pilots themselves at least cultivated rituals of respect for their enemies, any more generalized war discourse in both countries was locked into mutual accusations of unchivalric behaviour. After the war, however, Germans often recognized the British as 'gentlemen', reserving the epithet 'brutes' for the French (p. 208). Goebel's observation at this point shows that the role of medievalism in war remembrance calls for the integration of further national perspectives, the French being one. Goebel's study prepares the ground for such an attempt and impresses the reader both by the quality of its argument and the originality of its methodology.

Goebel himself relates his results to some recent historiography of the First World War. He argues that mourning (private grief) and mobilization (public grief) did not represent two mutually exclusive functions of war remembrance, but went hand in hand. Even more interesting, however, is his contribution to the history of modernity which, as he shows, was intimately tied up with the survival of medieval imagery. As far as the countries Britain and Germany are concerned, Goebel's results are well balanced. On the one hand, he notices 'significant overlaps between the composition of national medievalisms' (p. 288). Often members of particular social classes seem to have had more in common across national borders than with their own countrymen of a different class. On the other hand, 'British representations of the First World War differed in a host of ways

from German encodings' (p. 289). This might be seen both as a conclusion to a stimulating book, and as an invitation to further transnational research.

DETLEV MARES is Akademischer Rat at the Technische Universität Darmstadt. He is the author of *Auf der Suche nach dem 'wahren' Liberalismus: Demokratische Bewegung und liberale Politik im viktorianischen England* (2002) and is working on the visual representation of W. E. Gladstone in the illustrated press of his time.

HOLGER NEHRING and FLORIAN SCHUI (eds.), *Global Debates about Taxation* (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), x + 226 pp. ISBN 978 1 4039 8747 1. £55.00

At first glance, *Global Debates about Taxation* seems to be directed mainly at a small circle of taxation experts. It is therefore appropriate to point out from the start that it is also, perhaps even primarily, intended for readers who have specialized in the *history* of taxation (a field that has been neglected so far, but is booming at present). Beyond this, it is also addressed to others with historical interests because it makes clear to what extent taxation systems are a deliberately employed means of economic and social policy on the one hand, and the outcome of highly specific conditions and traditions in individual countries on the other. And, as the essays in this volume show, there has been an intense exchange of tax experts and ideas on taxation between various countries since the eighteenth century.

The book covers a large temporal and spatial range. The essays begin in the eighteenth century and go up to the present, and cover four continents: Europe, where the main focus lies, as well as north America, Asia, and Africa. The essays are divided into three sections, each summed up in the heading. The essays in the first section (Challenges of War and Occupation) deal with attempts made by European governments in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to recoup the sharply rising costs of war and its aftermath by changing taxation systems or improving methods of collection. The level of economic development meant that the taxation of landed property was the most significant factor at this time, but the essential basis for its efficient collection was still missing: a survey of the land and land registers (cadastres) to record the results. Several European states envisaged this large-scale project during the eighteenth century, but the first land registries were not established until the first half of the nineteenth. Taking the example of Piedmont, Christine Lebeau shows what technical and political difficulties had to be overcome in setting up land registries, and how experts were recruited for this purpose from France and Austria.

Florian Schui then presents probably the best example of the import of tax ideas and experts. He writes about the emergent Prussian state whose financial situation was badly strained by the high costs of pursuing a cameralist economic policy and supporting

a disproportionately large army. In 1763, after the end of the Seven Years War, Friedrich II saw himself forced to introduce a finance reform, against the will of his own administration, because the income from state property and urban excise duty was no longer sufficient. In order to combat domestic resistance, Friedrich did what the kings of the young Prussian state had frequently done before: he bought in expertise from abroad. In this case it took the form of 350 French tax experts who arrived in Berlin in 1766. They drew up and implemented a new taxation system which, interestingly enough, was not a copy of the existing (inefficient) French system of tax farming, but a state monopoly (*Regie*) adapted to Prussia's specific needs and conditions. This resulted in a considerable increase in tax yield and a more equitable distribution of the tax burden, at least in some respects. Nonetheless, the *Regie* was highly unpopular. Friedrich II's successor immediately sent the disliked French experts home and then modified the system, but did not abolish it. From a present-day point of view the *Regie* provided an important foundation for state-building and Prussia's rise to become a European Great Power. Schui describes this chapter of Prussian (financial) history in an exciting and, despite the necessary jargon, comprehensible manner. The way in which he embeds the special topic of taxation into general economic and social history (for example, the abolition of aristocratic privileges, the dawn of the bourgeois age, and the new taxation policy as a tool of cameralist economic policy) also conveys a larger context.

In the final essay in this section Alexander Grab takes us into the nineteenth century, to the Napoleonic kingdom of Italy. During the rule of Napoleon or his representatives in northern Italy, which lasted from 1796 to 1814 under various different names, an administration and taxation system on the French model were built up, although a number of elements dating from the earlier Austrian system in Lombardy were also incorporated or revived. As finance minister, Giuseppe Prina, an extremely loyal supporter of Napoleon, took responsibility for developing this new administration. He tried to fulfil the relentless financial demands which came from Paris by permanently adapting and developing the taxation system. The increasingly oppressive tax burden, imposed especially on the middle and lower classes, made him into one of the most unpopular figures in the government which operated by Napoleon's grace. He was lynch-

ed by a furious mob soon after the end of French rule in 1814. Grab's essay also offers an exciting, even dramatic, account of the excessive demands placed on a financial system combined with a detailed description of its structure.

The second section of the book (Federal Polities) deals with taxation policy within the framework of federal states. Given that the member states of the European Union retain formal sovereignty in tax matters, which gives rise to discussions about future convergence in this important area, this aspect is of particular interest.

The essay by Frances M. B. Lynch begins during the early phase of European integration (European Coal and Steel Community and the first years of the European Economic Community). Her account sharpens the reader's eye for the historical background of current controversies. Thus she describes in detail the stony path which led to the introduction of a value added tax (originally a French idea) in all member states at the time, and explains the economic interests behind their different positions. The introduction of VAT between 1968 (Federal Republic of Germany) and 1973 (Italy) represented convergence, at least in the area of indirect taxation, although different rates have been retained to the present day. The second focus of this essay is on whether, given the continuing competition concerning direct taxes within the EU, systems will be standardized or, as frequently feared, it will come to a 'race to the bottom'. Interestingly, Lynch comes to the conclusion that this is only to a limited extent the case, and that national taxation systems remain surprisingly resistant to change.

The two other contributions in this section look at developments before the First World War. Andreas Thier describes changes in Germany's taxation system between the Reich's foundation in 1871 and 1914, pursuing transfers of ideas both horizontally and vertically. The German constitution of 1871 specified that state governments would levy direct taxes, while the central, Reich government would be financed by indirect taxes, among other things. Consequently, we can observe a convergence in the tax systems of the member states, in particular, the increasing replacement of the hitherto dominant mixture of a tax on property and personal taxes by income tax. In his essay, which presupposes a certain amount of knowledge about the structures of the German Reich and is closely documented in the footnotes, Thier separates the part that economists, governments,

and political parties played in this development from what must be attributed to material constraints such as budget requirements or tax competition.

The introduction of federal income tax in the USA in 1913, at a time when Germany was also debating a Reich income tax, is at the centre of Holger Nehring's essay. In both cases, the reason for considering this additional tax burden on the citizens was the increased need for money to finance world-political ambitions and the beginnings of social policy (or rather, in the USA of the Progressive Era, *discussions* about social policy). Preliminary work by American economists and theoreticians of public finances were, in their own assessment, not advanced enough to allow them to depend exclusively on their own expertise. They therefore showed great interest in German tax legislation and the specialist literature that many of them had become familiar with while studying at German universities. The arguments put forward in favour of introducing a federal income tax (which had already failed once in the USA, in 1894) were greater redistributive justice and changed economic conditions. Opponents, however, feared that the state would have to delve deeper into citizens' privacy in order to obtain the necessary information about their property and income. Ultimately, this led to a fundamental discussion about the relationship between state and individual. On this matter, different views were put forward in the USA and in Germany, in line with their different political systems and traditions.

The third section (Empires and International Organisations) contains three essays on developments outside Europe. Martin Daunton looks at the interesting question of to what extent Britain transferred the elements and principles of its own tax system to its colonies. He asks what intentions concerning the reshaping of indigenous societies (in which pre-capitalist conditions often still prevailed) were behind this. British strategies differed in different parts of the Empire, depending on whether they were settler colonies or colonies in India or Africa. While white settlers could to some extent pursue their own goals, in India the existence of a highly complicated system had to be taken into account. In large parts of Africa, by contrast, new ground was broken in this respect. There were no capitalist structures and regulated taxation systems, with the result that attempts were made to catapult the indigenous people into 'modernity' by brutal and often unfair means. While implementing colonial taxation

systems, the British forgot many of the moral and philosophical principles that were sacred to them at home. They proved to be highly pragmatic in their attempts to (re)shape colonial economies, also with the assistance of taxation systems, into something useful to the mother country.

Elliot Brownlee describes a different attempt massively to influence the taxation system of a subject country, namely, the USA's endeavours to reform the Japanese tax system during the occupation period. To start with, the USA was mainly interested in keeping Japan relatively stable, economically and politically. But from 1947, against the background of the intensifying Cold War, the aim of building a strong Japanese economy as a bulwark against Communism in Asia was the main issue. Investment based on a higher savings–income ratio and an increase in exports were to lay the foundations for a Japanese economic miracle. In the view of the USA, a prerequisite for this was a tax reform. Carl S. Shoup, an eminent American economist and taxation expert, was tasked with developing a new tax system, while Japanese experts were excluded. What followed was a tug-of-war between the Japanese government, which did not want to support a policy of austerity, and the various agencies of the occupation authorities. The Japanese spun things out and delayed implementing some of the required reforms until the beginning of the Korean War. From that time on, the USA was even less able to force the Japanese government to introduce unpopular measures. The impact of the Shoup mission is, it seems, overrated in the USA to the present day, because soon after the end of the occupation, the Japanese government began to rescind most of the reforms. A brief outline of economic and social conditions in post-war Japan at the beginning of this essay, which is extremely instructive also in regard to present-day US 'missions', would have aided comprehension of the motives behind the Japanese government's stubborn resistance to American pressure.

The last two essays in the volume, finally, take us right up to the most recent past, shaped by the global implementation of neo-liberal ideas. In her essay, Miranda Stewart investigates the impact of globalization on the taxation systems of developing countries. Increasingly, these have to be adapted in such a way as to gain the favour of international financial institutions (above all, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank). The suggestions for reform made

by the predominantly American- and European-educated experts in these organizations and institutions aim mainly to reduce taxes on income, capital, and exports, and to compensate for this by raising consumption taxes. Taking the example of Ghana, the author demonstrates vividly the negative impact on the poor population of such reforms, which also accelerate the switching of largely self-sufficient economies to production for the world market in a dominant export sector.

In the last contribution in the volume Joseph J. Thorndike returns to Europe and examines the origins and development of the flat tax which has been introduced in a number of eastern and central European states since 1994 with, it seems, considerable success. Historically, the idea of a flat tax is nothing new, but it was revived in the mid-1950s by Milton Friedman and in the 1980s by the American economists Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka. Whereas the concept has not so far established itself in the USA, it was enthusiastically adopted by economic policy-makers in a number of transformation countries in the 1990s. The reasons for this, according to Thorndike, are as follows. A flat tax makes transformation economies attractive to foreign capital, which is desperately needed. It is not a complex tax system, and was thus easier for a tax bureaucracy which was not, initially, highly trained, to administer. And finally, it fits well with the ideological views of the new leadership elites in the formerly Communist countries, who favour low taxes, especially on capital yields, a relatively small bureaucracy, and a limited need for redistribution.

Each essay is approximately the same length and can stand entirely on its own. The geographical and chronological diversity of the contents makes for varied reading. However, it presupposes a certain degree of knowledge about very different historical constellations.

EVELYN KOLM is a Lecturer in Economic History at the Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration. In addition to numerous articles, she has published *Die Ambitionen Österreich-Ungarns im Zeitalter des Hochimperialismus* (2001). She is currently working on tax history as well as social mobility in a historical perspective.

HAROLD JAMES, *Family Capitalism: Wendels, Haniels, Falcks, and the Continental European Model* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), xii + 434 pp. ISBN 0 674 02181 9. $39.95 £25.95 EUR 34.00

Whenever the term 'family business' is used, it generally evokes images of small and middle-sized companies that have been in the same family for generations. It conjures up the idea of owners who, as a rule, head their own businesses, follow a paternalistic style of management, and stand out for their commitment to the traditions of their firm, to a particular branch of business, specific products, and their location. Decades ago, the Nestor of business history, the late Alfred D. Chandler, prophesied the inevitable decline of such family businesses, which he regarded as inflexible and hostile to innovation. He saw no place for family businesses in the modern national economies of the future, even if there were still a number of what he considered 'backward' national economies with many companies of this type, such as in Europe, for example. According to Chandler, the trend, led by the USA, was quite clearly towards public companies, that is, away from 'family capitalism' and towards 'a modern rational individualistic managerial capitalism' (p. 8).

The fact that Chandler's prediction, dating from the 1970s, has not come true, and that family businesses do not necessarily need to be associated with SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) is impressively demonstrated by Harold James in this book. Taking us right up to the present day, it looks at the history of three European family businesses in the iron and steel industry, namely, the German Haniels, the French de Wendels, and the Italian Falcks. All are long-lived family dynasties whose industrial origins go back to the end of the eighteenth or the beginning of the nineteenth century and lie in the industrial regions of the Rhineland. How extensive these dynasties had become by the beginning of the twenty-first century is illustrated by the number of their current partners and associates. In the case of the Haniels, James gives a figure of 550; for the de Wendels, 750. Yet the descendents of the founders of the firms outnumber their partners by far; in the case of the de Wendel dynasty, James suggests as many as 1,259 people. For the Italian Falck family, comparable figures do not seem to be available; in any case, James does not give any.

James's concern is not conventional family history but, as he writes in the introduction, the 'interplay of . . . families, states and markets' (p. 1). In order to highlight what the family contributes to the functioning of markets and states, he presents three case studies from heavy industry. The author justifies his choice of the steel industry by pointing to its military significance. This, he suggests, had an impact on the national view of self with the result that the steel industry was more susceptible to state influence than others.

James starts by briefly outlining the history of industrialization in France, Germany, and Italy, and asks four questions which will guide his account of the individual family enterprises. He is interested in national differences in entrepreneurial activity; the relationship between owners and managers; state influence on businesses against the background of political history marked by crises and upheavals; and the significance of the various waves of globalization for the development of individual family enterprises. In addressing these questions James presents three 'parallel family histories', each subdivided into chronological sections. They range from the *ancien régime* to the turn of the millennium, and thematically cover the ages of the individual, the corporation, oranizationalism, the post-war miracle, and, finally, globalization.

In his accounts of the individual families, the author sometimes seems to lose sight of his four guiding questions. In any case, even after attentively reading the three case studies, this reviewer finds it difficult to name national differences in the way the entrepreneurs behaved. There are simply too few comparative cases to be able to clarify a problem of such complexity if the aim is to do more than rehearse already well-known differences in stock corporation law, taxation law, and inheritance law in the context of family history. On the other hand, comparisons are drawn too quickly between the possible impact on these enterprises of political upheavals such as the French Revolution, the mid-nineteenth-century wars of national unification, and the First World War. Fundamental processes of industrial and entrepreneurial change took place between these events, so that it seems problematic to equate, so to speak, the impact of these political upheavals on the three companies. It also seems strange that there is no analysis of the impact of the end of the Second World War on the family enterprises, or of the earlier establishment of fascist, Nazi, or collaborationist regimes, which affected all three states

under consideration at about the same time. And not least, the way in which the family enterprises experienced the wartime economy during the Second World War would have been worth comparing.

Other questions also suggest themselves for a true comparison of the three entrepreneurial dynasties, but they are either not asked or dealt with only in passing. Thus the role of the women who, at times, stepped in to cope with succession problems in all three dynasties and saved the family business deserves greater appreciation. The same applies to the raising of children and other economically relevant aspects of passing on a bourgeois lifestyle. It seems as if the sources available to the author restricted both the range of questions he could ask and the opportunities for a comparison.

With reference to the goal that James set himself, he arrives at a conclusion which is no longer entirely surprising today, namely, that family enterprises, and especially the examples he has chosen on the basis of their longevity, can be more successful in the marketplace than Chandler supposed, particularly when they manage to set themselves up independently of the state. All three of the family firms investigated successfully mastered the challenges of globalization by leaving behind their usual line of business, the steel industry, and diversifying. The Haniels brilliantly held their own, leaving steel as early as the 1960s and thus freeing themselves from their dependence on the state. Haniel managed to invest in new, forward-looking, and relatively crisis-proof lines of business, such as food and pharmaceuticals retailing, long before the new market beckoned in the 1990s. This enticed latecomers such as the Falcks, who were only able to separate themselves from their core business decades later, to make risky and loss-making investments. In terms of success in restructuring their business, the de Wendels lay between the other two. While they were still far more significant steel producers than the Haniels after the economic miracle, by the turn of the millennium their former German rival had left them far behind in terms of turnover and profit.

Given this power of survival, it is not surprising that at the beginning of the twenty-first century, after the collapse of numerous public companies in the dot-com speculative bubble, corruption scandals, and evidence of striking mismanagement in a number of large international enterprises, the positive aspects of family businesses are again being stressed in public. Family networks, it is argued, create

trust and thus reduce transaction costs for the business. And, James concludes, the readiness to stand in for each other in difficult situations, which is characteristic of families, increases the chances of family businesses surviving, especially at times of change and crisis.

CORNELIA RAUH is Professor of German and European Contemporary History at the Leibniz University in Hanover. She specializes in twentieth-century social and cultural history, in particular, gender history, the history of the middle classes, the history of forced labour, de-Nazification, and entrepreneurial history. Her publications include (with Hartmut Berghoff) *Fritz K: Ein deutsches Leben im 20. Jahrhundert* (2000) and she has edited (with Thomas Kühne) *Raum und Geschichte: Regionale Traditionen und föderative Ordnungen vom Mittelalter bis in die Gegenwart* (2001). Her most recent book *Schweizer Aluminium für Hitlers Krieg? Die Alusuisse A.G. 1918–1950* will be published 2009.

JONATHAN WRIGHT, *Germany and the Origins of the Second World War*, The Making of the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), xii + 223 pp. ISBN 978 0 333 49556 8. £19.99

The Second World War was, in obvious ways, the unfinished business of the First World War. And this second conflict was not only bloodier and more global than the First World War, it also recast the twentieth century more profoundly. Yet the academic debate about Germany's responsibility for the Second World War is altogether different from that about its contribution to the First World War. Most historians accept that it was Hitler, the dominant figure in German politics between 1933 and 1945, who unleashed the war in Europe in September 1939. However, they have had a heated debate on his role within National Socialist Germany. Some historians view Hitler as 'the master in the Third Reich', others as 'a weak dictator'.

Hitler's road to war has been exhaustively explored. Though a specialist in the history of German foreign policy, Jonathan Wright, Professor of International Relations and a Fellow at Christ Church, University of Oxford, has not merely written an essay on foreign policy-making up to December 1941. Instead, he has incorporated domestic policies, since he wanted to illustrate the full complexity of processes and phases involved, be they changing public support, economic constraints, personal rivalries, or foreign pressures. In writing a concise book of this kind, Jonathan Wright sets the scene with three short chapters on, respectively, the state of historiography, Hitler's view of the world, and the way in which the Great Depression made his ideas common currency in Germany (24 pp.). Leaving aside a longer introduction and shorter conclusion, the main part of the book then concentrates on the Third Reich itself (148 pp.). This part comprises four chapters: dismantling Versailles, preparing for war, triggering the European war, and committing the German Reich to world war. Each chapter is subdivided into several sections.

The long-prevailing tendency after 1945 to separate the Führer from his followers and the Wehrmacht from its supreme commander obstructed an understanding of the Nazis' ability to carry the German public with them in their effort to reorganize the Third Reich for war. Though designating Hitler as the central agent of an uncompromising war policy, Wright is very far from absolving German society of the time from its responsibility for that policy. 'For if Hitler

had not been able to secure the support or at least the consent of civil servants, the military, industry, the judiciary, the universities, the churches and the great mass of ordinary people who fought and died, there would have been no war' (p. 1). Why, then, did the Germans follow him? An answer to this question is all the more pressing because before 1930 Hitler's political movement, the NSDAP, had never been capable of moving from fringe to mainstream. The crisis that brought Nazism to power was the Great Depression, since economic failure lay behind the political failure of Weimar's political institutions. To understand the nature of the appeal of Nazism, Wright argues, one must understand that from the beginning it offered a radical alternative to political deadlock. Nazism was a revolutionary movement. 'It needed enemies at home and abroad to justify its view of the world' (p. 32) and to justify the ruthless use of terror against those whom the Nazis had within their reach. To perceive the outside world through the lens of the victim and feel encircled by hostile powers produced a form of mental imprisonment and the desire for freedom from such constraints. In all his domestic activity after January 1933—fighting Communism, providing employment, and restoring traditional values—Hitler wasted no time in setting a new course in foreign and military matters. Indeed, they provided the fundamental rationale for his concept of the Reich's goals. The two accounts of the Chancellor's address of 3 February 1933 are rightly called 'key documents'. As long as the new course was successful, 'it bound regime and people together in a process to overcome the humiliations of the past' (p. 34).

The 'virtuous circle' (p. 185)—from Hitler's point of view—of domestic support for peacefully shaking off the chains of Versailles, itself feeding back into greater popularity at home, reached its first peak in the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936. Eighteen months later, on 5 November 1937, Hitler decided to achieve his expansionist goals by force more quickly. When he sensed a counter-current in German opinion, essentially fear of a new European war, he ordered the propaganda apparatus to turn off the 'pacifist record' and play an aggressive tune in order to prepare the nation psychologically for war. After the Munich Agreement, Hitler responded to the challenges at home and abroad by pre-emptive escalation. 'Whatever the case in other policy areas, the decisions of war and peace were his' (p. 186). Since there were no such bodies as a war cabinet or joint chiefs

of staff, or a committee system, it was in Hitler's hands alone that the threads came together. What mattered to him as Führer, whether acting as leader of the nation, the people, or the Party, as chief executive, chief legislator, supreme judge, supreme ideologue, or supreme commander of the armed forces, was the faithful obedience of his comrades, lieutenants, officers, and civil servants and the compliance of his followers. In 1939 Hitler took the calculated risk of European war over Poland, backed by the Soviet Union. The blame for what was to come was to be placed on others. Despite the Anglo-French declaration of war, the German public reacted with sober realism and 'reluctant loyalty'. Though Poland was a popular enemy, there were no outbreaks of enthusiasm for war as there had been in 1914.

Unlike other authors, Jonathan Wright takes his readers beyond September 1939 and examines the origins of Hitler's decision to go to war against the Soviet Union, involving conquest, exploitation, and annihilation, and the German declaration of war on the United States. 'These were indeed fateful decisions—decisions that changed the world' (Ian Kershaw). Hitler did not take these decisions in favour of a racial empire in a vacuum or whimsically. They were choices made under preconditions and external constraints, ideological fixations being an important part of this. The extent of support for a racial empire is debatable for Jonathan Wright. It is undeniable, however, that the bond between Hitler and the Germans, in and out of uniform, was never stronger than in the summer of 1940. Not only Hitler basked in the dazzling victory over France and the adulation it brought. Even a fervent anti-Nazi such as Ulrich von Hassell was carried away. Nor can it be denied that the extent of support for a racial empire was sufficient for Hitler to do what he wanted in Poland. In contrast to the initial situation there, the military leadership was willing to deal with a war of annihilation against the Soviet Union, be it military or economic. Though the Wehrmacht accepted the logic of fighting a racial war, 'so far as organized genocide against the Jews was concerned, the German army was not the instigator of the process—that was Hitler and the SS—but the army commanders did nothing to prevent it happening' (p. 181). A counter-current in public support for war had begun when London did not sue for peace. But it did not reach significant proportions until the destruction of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad in 1942–3. That unexpected defeat, further Soviet military successes, and Allied mass bombings made the

German people think that the war might be lost. Even then, fear of what defeat would bring proved to be a powerful incentive to keep fighting. It is also undeniable that there was no mass resistance or sabotage in Germany. Patriotic tenacity even produced a short-lived upsurge of public loyalty to Hitler after the attempt on his life on 20 July 1944 failed.

Jonathan Wright's book is well-researched, well-structured, and well-written. He has full command of the most recent literature, primary and secondary (up to 2006), and the relevant languages. Knowing the end of the story, the author has avoided the pitfall of reading German history from the outcome. He has mastered the difficult task of viewing it 'from the front' rather than 'from the back', even though from this angle Hitler's road to war is less clear-cut, and more confused and 'messy'. Wright successfully sets Hitler and his priorities of war and expansion into the context of constraints placed upon him, be they international, national, or material, both by elites and public opinion. Wright looks for a synthesis of Germany's impersonal structures and Hitler's intentions rather than stressing the contrast between them. In doing so, he shows that where things mattered to Hitler, he took the lead and did not shy away from making decisions and taking risks. In regard to his goals, Hitler was an effective leader and warlord, by no means a mere opportunist or propagandist. So far as the elites and the wider public are concerned, they present a more differentiated picture in Germany. On the one hand, there was a wider degree of complicity, even for the specific goal of racial empire; on the other, there was considerable doubt and scepticism, particularly in 1938. This reader should be in the hands of every student who wants to understand Germany's complicated history between 1930 and 1945.

Educated at the Universities of Cologne and Nottingham, JÜRGEN FÖRSTER was affiliated with the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt in Potsdam (formerly Freiburg) as a research fellow for over thirty years. He now lives in Freiburg as an independent scholar and teaches at the University of Freiburg. He is the author of *Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat* (2007) and is currently working on a documentary reader about the German military in the inter-war period.

DIRK SPILKER, *The East German Leadership and the Division of Germany: Patriotism and Propaganda 1945–53*, Oxford Historical Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), xi + 296 pp. ISBN 0 19 928412 1. £55.00

The division of Europe, and of Germany in particular, is a central field of research in contemporary history. Causes and effects have been comprehensively researched, but opinions continue to diverge sharply when it comes to evaluations. Assessments of the Stalin note of spring 1952, or of Nikita S. Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum at the end of the 1950s are examples. However, one question is central to almost all studies. How seriously should Moscow's and East Berlin's moves towards German unification be taken? Was this just a propaganda trick to win over Western sceptics for good and to divide the anti-Communist front in the West? Was Moscow interested only in preventing Western integration and rearmament in the Federal Republic? The investigation of these questions also casts light on Soviet relations with East Germany, in particular, on the relationship between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) and the German Socialist Unity Party (SED). It has long been accepted that the German Communists, when they returned to Germany with the Red Army in 1945, were acting fully in accordance with Stalin's policy for Germany, for example, by promoting the idea of a united Germany under Communist leadership. The SED Politburo, as is well known, remained committed to this goal until the 1960s, at least publicly. In a fundamental study,[1] Michael Lemke has recently shown that in the early years of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the SED believed that unity and socialism were compatible, which suggests that the initiative for German unity was not just a propaganda instrument. In the study under review, covering the years 1945 to 1953, Dirk Spilker also endorses this view.

The book is divided chronologically into five large chapters. The first starts by looking at the post-war planning which the German Communists in Moscow undertook even before the end of the Second World War, in close agreement with Stalin and the Soviet leadership. These plans demonstrate the German Communist Party's

[1] Michael Lemke, *Einheit oder Sozialismus? Die Deutschlandpolitik der SED 1949–1961* (Cologne, 2001).

(KPD) dependence on its Eastern protector, and the dominant position that German policy interests already had in the Kremlin at the end of the war. A few days before the signing of the unconditional surrender, three groups of émigré German Communists were flown from the Soviet Union to Berlin, Saxony, and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Under the leadership of Walter Ulbricht, Anton Ackermann, and Gustav Sobottka respectively, their task was to support the Red Army in rebuilding the country. The first job was to set up civil administrations at local level. Thus when the three Western occupation forces entered the former German imperial capital, they were already confronted with faits accomplis. Communists were favoured in key positions in the administration not only in Berlin, but also in other parts of the Soviet zone of occupation (SBZ). The Soviet occupying power also had its fingers in the pie when it came to setting up political parties. Order no. 2 issued by the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD) on 10 June 1945 laid down the framework within which the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the two bourgeois parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) could act. All three had been newly established, or revived, after the KPD. In this way the Soviet Union early made its intention to give the KPD preferential treatment clear. Spilker then looks at the enforced unification of the two workers' parties in response to the rapid rise in the SPD's membership and the devastating losses suffered by the Communists in the parliamentary elections held in Hungary and Austria in November 1945. Stalin and the KPD leadership were now convinced that the only way to maintain the leading role of the German Communists in the SBZ was quickly to establish a unity party.

The second chapter looks at the period from the Potsdam Conference to the establishment of the Bizone in Western Germany. The author deals in detail with Soviet occupation policy and investigates the origins of the KPD's Western policy. In this context, for example, the top SED politicians visited the Western zones in the summer of 1946 in order to influence developments in the West. Thereafter Spilker's study turns to Moscow's reparations policy and socio-economic structural changes, which reached a first climax in the land reform of autumn 1945 and the industrial reform of a year later. These measures, as is well known, ushered in the expropriation of the hated high financiers and large landowners (*Junker*). The East Ger-

man Communists followed Moscow's leadership on the assumption that Western capitalism was in steady decline and that socialism would gain the upper hand in the long term. This fed an almost boundless optimism which shaped the SED's German policy until the beginning of the 1950s. Comrades in East Berlin assumed that the economic and social burdens arising from the consequences of the Second World War would be too much for the Western occupation zones to bear, and that Communism would celebrate a victory there too. Spilker can show that Otto Grotewohl, later to become the GDR's minister president, developed his own 'magnet theory' as early as June 1946 to demonstrate the superiority of the East German planned economy over West German capitalism.

This optimism was not entirely unfounded because the young Federal Republic was threatening to plunge into a 'founding crisis', in Hans Günter Hockerts's words. The need to provide for war victims, empty pension funds, and initially persistent unemployment seemed to be making excessive demands on the West German state. But failures started early for the SED leaders too, and these form the subject of chapter three. Thus the first local, regional, and *Landtag* elections in the autumn of 1946 showed that despite being promoted by the Soviet Union, the SED faced competition from relatively strong bourgeois parties. In the elections to the Berlin city parliament, the SED gained only 19.8 per cent of the votes cast. To protect its own rule, the SED started a purge among its own ranks, directed primarily against former Social Democrats, and forced the CDU into the straitjacket of the Anti-Fascist Bloc. All this showed that Pieck, Grotewohl, and Ulbricht could not take absolute rule in the SBZ for granted. In drawing up the constitution, the SED took advice from some of the CDU's and LDP's legal experts, but the large gap between constitutional norm and constitutional reality soon became apparent. The failure of the SED–KPD Working Group and the Stalinization of the SED were clear indications that while the top comrades paid ostentatious lip service to the demand for German unity, they were actually giving precedence to consolidating their own rule at home. Under its leader Kurt Schumacher, the SPD, which separated itself strictly from the SED and strongly resisted all attempts at rapprochement, certainly contributed to this situation, as did the policy of the Western Allies, who increasingly impeded the work of the KPD in their zones. The West German KPD was ulti-

mately too weak to achieve East Berlin's German-policy aims. By convening the German People's Congress for Unity and a Just Peace in December 1947, the SED wanted to present itself as a pioneer of German unity and mobilize the West German workers in particular.

The reorganization of the German Economic Commission (DWK) at the beginning of 1948 and the permanent weakening of federalism in the SBZ associated with it smoothed the way for the establishment of the GDR. This is the subject of the fourth chapter. The rhetoric of unity lost its attractiveness and increasingly became a propaganda instrument used by the SED, which blamed the West for the division of Germany. Spilker investigates in detail the reactions of the SED to the Marshall Plan and the beginning of West Germany's economic integration into the West. In this context he analyses the development of East Germany's planned economy and the implementation of its own currency reform in June 1948. At this time the SED was already trying to persuade Stalin to found an East German state. The author describes in detail the intense preliminary discussions in Moscow and outlines the individual stages which, ultimately, led to the foundation of the GDR. This study is based throughout on a systematic evaluation of the relevant documents in the SED party archive. Whereas Spilker often breaks new ground in the first four chapters, the reader finds little that is new in the last one, which deals with SED German policy in the early 1950s. This applies to Grotewohl's letter at the end of 1950 and the East German campaign to hold elections for the whole of Germany, and especially to the Stalin note of spring 1952 and the crisis year of 1953.

On the whole, this is a well-structured and readable study of SED policy towards Germany and the West which is closely based on the sources. It complements Lemke's work mentioned above as it deals primarily with the early post-war years. Spilker shows that the SED leadership faced a dilemma even before the foundation of the GDR. On the one hand, it was pursuing goals relating to the whole of Germany which did not always agree with Soviet notions. On the other hand, it began to establish itself in the SBZ after the idea of transferring the East German model to West Germany had receded into a far distant future. To the extent that the SED turned its attention to stabilizing its own power, its German-policy initiatives increasingly became propaganda events. The SED leadership, which had initially seen no contradiction in the aims of unity and

socialism, ultimately preferred to have a dominant role in the SBZ/GDR rather than a subordinate position in a unified Germany.

DIERK HOFFMANN is Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte München–Berlin, Berlin division. He is the author of *Aufbau und Krise der Planwirtschaft: Die Arbeitskräftelenkung in der SBZ/DDR 1945 bis 1963* (2002) and *Die DDR unter Ulbricht: Gewaltsame Neuordnung und gescheiterte Modernisierung* (2003). He has just finished a biography of Otto Grotewohl, leader of the East German SED and first Minister-President of the GDR.

HARTMUT KAELBLE, *Sozialgeschichte Europas 1945 bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2007), 437 pp. ISBN 978 3 406 54984 7. EUR 38.00

In Lewis Carroll's *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, the Cheshire cat is able to disappear 'quite slowly, beginning with the end of the tail, and ending with a grin, which remained some time after the rest had gone'. This not only bewildered Alice, but also annoyed the royals. When the cat appeared on the Queen's Croquet Ground, the king wanted to behead the cat, which, given the disappearance of the cat's body, was not unproblematic. The Cheshire cat and its grinning are much like contemporary Europe: everyone has seen it, but it is not really there.[1] Hartmut Kaelble, one of the most prominent advocates of comparative and transnational history and one of the pioneers of genuinely European history-writing, seeks to answer the question about the cat's body in his ambitious social history of Europe since 1945.

This volume does not merely add to the author's earlier works on the same topic.[2] It is far more ambitious, as it develops a much more nuanced argument that seeks to push the boundaries of how the social history of Europe might be written. Apart from an introduction that defines European history after 1945 as part of 'multiple modernities' and sets out the methodological and geographical scope of the study, this volume contains twelve chapters that fall into three main sections, and a conclusion. By examining the development of the family, work, consumption, and value change in post-1945 Europe, Kaelble provides us with an outline of the fundamental social structures of what he calls 'European society'. In the section on social hierarchies and inequalities, the reader finds information on elites, social mobility, and migration patterns. In the last section, on society and the state, we find information on the media and the European public,

[1] Lewis Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, ed. Hugh Haughton (Harmondsworth, 1998), 74–7. I owe this allegory to Michael Geyer's brilliant piece 'The Subject(s) of Europe', in Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger (eds.), *Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories* (New York, 2007), 255–74.

[2] See Hartmut Kaelble, *Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft: Eine Sozialgeschichte Westeuropas, 1880–1980* (Munich, 1987), published in English as *A Social History of Western Europe, 1880–1980* (Dublin, 1990).

social movements, the welfare state, cities and urbanization, and education. The result of this tour de force is less a textbook that presents history in the form of a story than a handbook that provides succinct and well-structured summaries of key areas of European social history, broadly defined. Each chapter can be read by itself and provides the reader with a competent overview.

Kaelble deals with two fundamental questions about European history after 1945: first, how historians should conceptualize European history since 1945; and, second, more implicitly, the question of how Europe might be defined as a historical subject. Kaelble thus moves beyond Göran Therborn's path-breaking overview, *European Modernity and Beyond,*[3] and also offers a different take on European history from the one in Tony Judt's inspiring and intelligent *Postwar*.[4] Kaelble's book is unique in emphasizing that social history can no longer be based on the classic category that has influenced the writing of national social histories and has been directly related to the central role of work: class. Rather than replacing the category altogether, Kaelble broadens the scope of his enquiry and his conceptual focus by pointing to the importance of symbols, rituals, and myths for the constitution of society and discussing social structures as well as the agency of historical actors. Not only Kaelble's conceptual approach, but also his arguments make his study stand out from comparable volumes and from his previous work on the subject. Rather than defining the transformation of European societies since 1945 as a story of progress and convergence, he stresses complexity and differentiation and shows that progress and convergence in some fields went hand in hand with divergence in other fields. Political oppositions had an impact on society, culture, and migration and they continued to be pertinent after the end of the Cold War. Deindustrialization, for example, was in general far more brutal in 'Eastern' Europe than in the West. While the difference between the industrial centre and the agrarian periphery of Europe has declined since 1945, it has retained some of its importance. Divergences could also be explained by different war experiences in the Second World War and the Cold War. Nor has there been a general convergence

[3] Göran Therborn, *European Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societies 1945–2000* (London, 2005).

[4] Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (London, 2005).

behind a 'European social model', so that differences in attitudes and policies towards the welfare state, gender inequalities, and market organizations remain crucially important.

There are only a few factual problems with Kaelble's precise and finely chiselled account. Not all of his bibliographies (such as the one on social movements) reflect the state of the art of historical, sociological, and political science research. Some chapters appear to be driven by assumptions of modernization theory that rebel against the otherwise complex nature of the account. For example, peace movements were certainly not a novelty of the 1970s, and one might have wished for a far more critical account of the generational and value-change paradigms.[5] And although Kaelble is keen to stress that his European social history does not serve European identity-building, some passages (such as the one on migration patterns) seem a bit too optimistic about the general trajectory of European developments. Not least, the 'Europe' that emerges from Kaelble's book is decidedly 'Western' in many areas, although he has, in general, defied a narrowly political definition of 'Europe' and gone for a more pragmatic one.

Despite the emphasis on complexity, Kaelble's account ultimately stresses convergence, as it defines divergence as time-specific, rather than generic and fundamental. In the end, Kaelble's account is not one of complex and differentiated European societies, but of the emergence of what differentiated an otherwise seemingly homogeneous European society. It is on these conceptual assumptions—rather than in the almost faultless presentation of the material—that a critical evaluation of Kaelble's account has to centre, and it is to be hoped that Kaelble's book will not only be seen as an important contribution to contemporary European history, but also stimulate debate about how such a history might be written.

The first problem with Kaelble's approach is that human agency figures only indirectly in this account. To be sure, human actions make an occasional appearance, but they do so only as part of social formations, political organizations, and institutions, and the author rarely elaborates on the specific dynamics of these formations. This is highly reminiscent of the traditional history of social structures that

[5] See e.g. the contributions in Stephen Lovell (ed.), *Generations in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Basingstoke, 2007).

first emerged in the Federal Republic in the 1960s and 1970s. In the end, despite his emphasis on complexity and differentiation, Kaelble writes contemporary European history with a toolkit derived from Herbert Spencer and other nineteenth-century sociologists, as a history of the decomposition and recomposition of a coherent (if not organic) social whole. Recent historical and sociological approaches, however, have moved towards a much more complex understanding of society that explains the dynamic of societies precisely by pointing out that there is no social centre: society does not have an address, in Niklas Luhmann's famous words.[6]

Secondly, despite some attempts to do otherwise, Kaelble does not really interrogate what the subjects of European history might be. Rather, he takes part in the constitution of these subjects and presents us with statistical material that helps to constitute history as 'European'. Kaelble's book is almost an attempt to create Europe out of statistical and empirical knowledge and is reminiscent of the ways in which nineteenth-century statisticians helped to frame their nations and national economies in the nineteenth century.[7] Thus the precise relationship between (nation-)states and European societies is not explored in any detail.[8] Conceptually, Kaelble engages only at an implicit level with the ways in which historians might make productive use of data created by opinion pollsters, social scientists, and political actors for entirely different purposes.

The third problem is, perhaps, the fundamental one, as it concerns the ways in which Kaelble ultimately frames his study as one of multiple modernizations. While the multiplicity of perspectives, the emphasis on the persistence of social inequalities and on social movements do much to highlight problems, Kaelble's story is still main-

[6] Cf. the stimulating remarks by Benjamin Ziemann, 'Modernisierung, Politik und Region in der Gesellschaftsgeschichte Westfalens 1920–1960', in Michael Prinz (ed.), *Gesellschaftlicher Wandel im Jahrhundert der Politik: Nordwestdeutschland im internationalen Vergleich 1920–1960* (Paderborn, 2007), 417–32.

[7] Silvana Patriarca, *Numbers and Nationhood: Writing Statistics in Nineteenth-Century Italy* (Cambridge, 1996). Conceptually: Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose, 'Do the Social Sciences Create Phenomena? The Example of Public Opinion Research', *British Journal of Sociology*, 50/3 (1 Sept. 1999), 367–96.

[8] Alan Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (London, 1992).

stream and leaves out many of the contestations. The Europeanness of many of the developments that Kaelble summarizes so competently remains vague or unexplained. This becomes especially clear in Kaelble's chapter on migrations, where the central role that migrations within Europe, and from and into Europe, have played is succinctly outlined, but the precise meaning of these processes is not really explored. Not least, the fear of movement that these migrations have deeply ingrained in Europeans' imaginations does not become entirely clear from Kaelble's account. Nor does he ever explicitly explore the deep connection between migration and patterns of nation-building—fear of migration leading to the heightening of nation-building, while at the same time creating links between societies. Similarly, connections between civil society actors are conceptualized normatively as benevolent, rather than as also deeply linked to exclusionary practices and to the limits of transnational interactions.

Hence, war makes only a background appearance on Kaelble's stage, although more recent studies of contemporary European history and the national histories of European societies have stressed war as a key factor of socio-cultural history in order to overcome the triumphalism of many of the stories of affluence and value change.[9] To be sure, there is much to agree with an interpretation that highlights peace and affluence as defining characteristics of European history since 1945. But we can only make sense of it if we realize that its meanings were deeply imbricated with the history of pain and suffering before 1945, as well as with the history of violence and warfare and the heritage of colonialism that cast its shadow far into the post-Second World War period.[10] A social history of Europe after 1945 cannot really begin in 1945, as Kaelble's does—it has to take account of the horrors that happened before. In a variety of ways, the many civil wars that have conveniently been summarized under the label 'Second World War' were crucial in forging the parameters of

[9] Judt, *Postwar* and the discussions in Holger Nehring and Helge Pharo (eds.), *A Peaceful Europe: Negotiating Peace in the Twentieth Century*, *Contemporary European History*, 17/3 (2008).

[10] See, as a case study, Jim House and Neil MacMaster, *Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory* (Oxford, 2006).

European history that followed thereafter.[11] Ultimately, Kaelble's history might do little to uncover the cat's body that is less pleasant than its grin might suggest. It might thus help perpetuate the substance of many myths of Europeanization that it set out to historicize.

These critical points should not distract from Kaelble's achievements in this impressively researched and important book. Rather, they are meant to push the debate beyond disciplinary and methodological boundaries and encourage us to think about ways in which the history of social structures might be combined with more recent work that pays systematic attention to the political semantics of such social and societal changes and that combines attention to complexity and differentiation with the ability to provide us with controversial arguments. Kaelble certainly got it right when he argued that we cannot write the history of one Europe. But his general framework of convergence and divergence is also a bit dubious.

In short, then, this is a very useful and in many ways stimulating book for students and scholars alike. It is to be hoped that an English publisher will soon give readers without knowledge of German an opportunity to benefit from this account. Whether it will also cause debate about how the social history of Europe can and should be written remains to be seen. There is an urgent need for historians to engage with this question and to move beyond the social and political categories of more traditional approaches to social history-writing and to think about how contemporary European history might profit from engaging with the many original and inspiring approaches to the writing of European modernities before 1945.[12] Otherwise, historians may end up hunting the fantasies (if not utopias) of the European Cheshire cat and neglect the perhaps more unpleasant processes of power and contestation that really mattered.

[11] Cf. the remarks in Ute Frevert, 'Europeanizing Germany's Twentieth Century', *History and Memory*, 17/1–2 (2005), 87–116.

[12] See the pioneering suggestions for Germany in Geoff Eley (ed.), *Society, Culture, and the State in Germany, 1870–1930* (Ann Arbor, 1996); and id. and Keith Neild, *The Future of Class in History: What's Left of the Social* (Ann Arbor, 2007).

HOLGER NEHRING is Lecturer in Contemporary European History at the University of Sheffield and associate editor of the journal *Contemporary European History*. He has published widely on the comparative and transnational history of European peace movements since 1945 and on the social history of the Cold War in Europe. His book on the British and West German protests against nuclear weapons and the politics of fear and security in the Cold War of the late 1950s and early 1960s is forthcoming with Oxford University Press (2008–9). He has started work on another book on peace movements in both parts of Germany during the 1980s.

MANFRED KITTEL, *Vertreibung der Vertriebenen? Der historische deutsche Osten in der Erinnerungskultur der Bundesrepublik (1961–1982)* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007), 206 pp. ISBN 978 3 486 58087 7. EUR 39.80

A lively discussion is underway in Germany about how to commemorate the expulsion of Germans during and after the Second World War. The topic has assumed growing contemporary prominence, most recently in connection with the planned Centre Against Expulsions in Berlin, a project that has emerged as the brainchild of the main expellee pressure group, Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV), stoking considerable controversy both inside and outside the Federal Republic over the past few years. But the relevant debates have not been confined to the present, of course. Historians, journalists, and other commentators have also begun to pay growing attention to relevant memory politics during the previous decades of Germany's post-Second World War history. Robert G. Moeller, Rainer Schulze, Michael Schwartz, and others have made important contributions to the field, moving the historiography along and introducing new research questions along the way.[1]

Manfred Kittel's book *Vertreibung der Vertriebenen?* is one recent contribution to this ongoing discussion. Kittel, Professor of History at the University of Regensburg and researcher at the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich, sets out to examine how the 'German East'—an entity that he defines very briefly and vaguely as 'all the areas of East-Central Europe' that were 'decisively (co-)shaped by Germans in a historical perspective'—was portrayed in West German public discussions between approximately 1961 and 1982 (p. 9 n. 15). His primary focus lies on tracing changes across time, with a particular emphasis on determining whether an 'expulsion of the expellees' took place during those years, that is, whether the German

[1] See e.g. Robert G. Moeller, *War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley, 2001); Rainer Schulze, 'The Politics of Memory: Flight and Expulsion of German Populations after the Second World War and German Collective Memory', *National Identities*, 8 (2006), 367–82; Michael Schwartz, 'Vertreibung und Vergangenheitspolitik: Ein Versuch über geteilte deutsche Nachkriegsidentitäten', *Deutschland-Archiv,* 30/1 (1997), 177–95.

expellees and their interests were marginalized and ultimately shunted aside in West German public discussions (p. 169).

Kittel develops his analysis over eleven chapters that unfold in roughly chronological order and address a variety of themes. The relations between the pressure groups that purported to represent the German expellees and the main political parties are covered in overview, and a range of other issues also receives varying levels of attention. The main themes include the role of the 'German East' and of the expellees in West German electronic and print media; the cultural activities of expellee organizations; the politics of governmental subsidies to various expellee groups; particular memory-political initiatives, including the expellee lobby's abortive attempts to instigate the founding of a special governmental body to investigate crimes committed during the expulsions; and various expellee-specific activities at local and regional levels, such as the numerous *Patenschaften*—sponsorship agreements of sorts—signed between particular West German states and municipalities on the one hand and representatives of specific expellee groups on the other. The study draws on a wide range of published and archival sources, including West German government records and newspapers, as well as much less frequently used materials from the archives of several main television and radio stations.

Kittel concludes that the period from 1961 to 1982 must be divided into two distinct phases. The first runs through the 1960s and finishes with the forming of the Social–Liberal coalition at the very end of the decade. In his view, these years were characterized by a growing ambivalence towards the expellees and their legacies in the West German public sphere. On the one hand, the old patterns of the 1950s which had given prominence to the suffering of the expellees and preserved 'the Eastern districts of the German Reich . . . in the collective memory of the nation' while downplaying crimes committed by Germans during the Third Reich were still present. On the other hand, however, the decade also witnessed a growing trend towards viewing the expulsion of Germans as 'deserved punishment' for the Second World War and the Holocaust, whereby the 'injustice' (*Unrechtscharakter*) of the expulsions was excised from what became a 'mere cause-and-effect analysis' and the expellees increasingly found themselves deprived of their earlier victim status (pp. 9, 169).

The second period, which stretched from the beginning of the Social–Liberal era to the forming of the CDU–FDP coalition under Helmut Kohl in 1982, witnessed a sweeping victory of the second trend from the previous decade. The new federal government adopted an increasingly hostile attitude towards the expellee lobby, and a considerably more critical stance vis-à-vis traditional expellee concerns also took hold in much of the rest of society. Despite the continued existence of some countervailing trends in certain branches of the media and elsewhere, the prevailing memory culture in the Federal Republic was gradually transformed. The Holocaust now became the generally accepted reference point for assessing the expulsions, while 'national categories in the historical–political consciousness of the West Germans' faded away. As a result, the expellees and their 'Eastern German cultural traditions' became ever more marginalized, and the overall situation developed so unfavourably that 'it assumed characteristics of a second, cultural–spiritual (*geistig*) expulsion of the expellees' (pp. 178, 183).

Kittel's study has its merits. It is solidly researched and readably presented. The author is correct in pointing out that the memory-political aspects of the West German expellee problem have not necessarily received sufficient scholarly attention. The gaps in the historiography are particularly striking for the period after the 1960s, and Kittel goes some way towards filling a few of them. Although his coverage of such high political issues as the relations between the West German expellee lobby and the main parties breaks no new ground, in other areas the book does offer a good deal of fresh information. Kittel's discussion of the interaction between the expellee lobby and West German officials at regional and local level, for example, is in many ways new and original, as is his analysis of the failed expellee-led attempt to establish a Central Authority for the Prosecution of Expulsion Crimes, much of which he has already published in a recent article.[2]

But the book also has its problems. At least in this reviewer's opinion, they start with the very research question that Kittel sets out to pursue. The question of whether the expellees were somehow betrayed by the West German polity by being subjected to a second

[2] Manfred Kittel, 'Eine Zentralstelle zur Verfolgung von Vertreibungsverbrechen? Rückseiten der Verjährungsdebatte in den Jahren 1964 bis 1966', *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 54 (2006), 173–207.

expulsion of sorts, this time from the Federal Republic's public consciousness and collective memory, is hardly the most promising way to examine the complicated interaction among the expellees, their self-proclaimed organizational representatives, the political and administrative elites, the media, and the wider public in the Federal Republic. The hypothesis of a second expulsion originally stems from the expellee lobby's polemical attacks against the new *Ostpolitik* of the Social–Liberal coalition and is therefore politically loaded from the outset. It implies a rather bipolar, us-versus-them approach to the material, which is not conducive to an exploration of its full complexity.

This problem is compounded by the fact that the author's viewpoint often approximates that of the expellee lobby rather too closely. He has a tendency to draw seemingly uncritically on concepts rooted in the revisionist Eastern policy discourse of the 1950s, which the mainstream expellee organizations still employed with few adjustments in the 1970s and 1980s. He writes repeatedly about an alleged 'abandonment' (*Verzicht*) of German claims to the Reich's lost Eastern territories. He calls those territories *Ostdeutschland*, in contradistinction to the *Westdeutschland* of the Federal Republic and the *Mitteldeutschland* of the GDR. Such unabashedly Cold War terminology appears without inverted commas or any critical commentary (e.g. pp. 21, 25, 39, 41, 73). Many of the author's judgements about ongoing developments seem to reflect the contemporary commentary provided by the expellee lobby's press organs, particularly by the BdV's *Deutscher Ostdienst*. At least implicitly, he also tends to equate the opinions and interests of the leading expellee organizations with those of the millions of expellees in West Germany, despite abundant opinion poll data indicating increasing alienation among a growing majority of expellees by the end of the 1960s at the very latest. Accordingly, the expellee lobby's attacks against the West German media, for example, are presented as the 'the criticism of *the expellees*' (p. 147, italics added). At one point the author even seems to suggest that the expellee organizations enjoyed 'democratic legitimacy [to speak] for the old *Heimat*' (p. 111), a claim that stands sharply at odds with the elitist and exclusive procedures by which the groups typically ran their affairs and chose their leaders.

Another problem lies in the chronological scope of the study. Kittel's decision to concentrate primarily on what he regards as the

détente-influenced period between the early 1960s and early 1980s is certainly justifiable. But the absence of any sustained discussion of the preceding years, particularly of the highly formative decade of the 1950s, is not. The author makes only brief references to what happened before the start of the second Berlin Crisis in 1958, presumably on the assumption that his readers will be familiar with previous developments. However, many of the controversies that erupted when the anti-totalitarian, revisionist consensus that had characterized West German political rhetoric about the 'German East' in the 1950s, at least in public, began to be challenged in the following decade can only be properly appreciated against a fuller view of the preceding years. For example, the fact that during the 1950s expellee activists had become the country's loudest proponents of an aggressive and revisionist Eastern policy line premised on an unyielding defence of Germany's legal positions is crucial for understanding the increasingly aggressive attacks to which they were later subjected by those who viewed precisely this policy line as the biggest obstacle to détente and progress towards German unification. A similar general criticism also applies to the other end of the book, albeit less strongly. The study stops rather abruptly in 1982, with hardly a mention of what comes afterwards. Although an extensive analysis of the Kohl years would have unduly expanded the study's scope, at least some brief comments on the years beyond the early 1980s, perhaps in an epilogue, would have been desirable.

Ultimately, however, it is some of the assumptions underlying this study that tend to give the most pause, at least to this reviewer. Kittel is clearly concerned about the place occupied by what he calls '700 years of German history' (p. 185) in Eastern Europe in German public discussions and collective memory. From a cultural and historical viewpoint, that is understandable, as is the author's disquiet about what he views as insufficient attention to the expellees and their concerns in West Germany during much of the period analysed in this book—and, by implication at least, also at present. But his unease with what he appears to perceive as an excessive German tendency to downplay the expulsions of Germans and their injustices in deference to the Holocaust and to yield to historical and memory-political arguments associated with Polish and other Eastern European nationalisms raises difficult questions of balance and proportion. Could and should the history of the territories in Eastern Europe

formerly inhabited, at least in part, by Germans really be told and remembered from a national, German perspective as '700 years of German history'? Indeed, should that history be told and remembered from any national perspective as such? Or is it better viewed as a complex story of ethnic interaction, definition, and re-definition under shifting circumstances, whose brutal denouement in the mid-twentieth century deserves particularly careful weighing of causes and effects, actions and consequences?

PERTTI AHONEN is Senior Lecturer in Modern European History at the University of Edinburgh. He is the author of *After the Expulsion: West Germany and Eastern Europe, 1945–1990* (2003) and co-author of *People on the Move: Forced Population Movements in Europe in the Second World War and Its Aftermath* (2008). Currently he is working on a book entitled *Victims of the Berlin Wall*.

CONFERENCE REPORTS

Cosmopolitan Networks in Commerce and Society, 1660–1914, conference co-organized by the German Historical Institute London and the Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, and held at the GHIL, 6–8 Dec. 2007.

Cosmopolitan networks have always formed a part of social co-existence. Early traces can be found as long ago as antiquity, in the ancient Greek system of hospitality. But it was the great journeys of discovery of the late Middle Ages and the early modern period that first created a more global dimension in this area. In the period that followed, social contacts and economic relations became more intense, and global and cosmopolitan developments more closely intertwined. Recent historical research has recognized the significance of the networks that developed out of this, and has subjected them to close analysis, providing the topic of this conference.

The conference was opened by Andreas Gestrich, director of the GHIL and Margrit Schulte Beerbühl of the Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf. In their introduction, both pointed to the networking character of academic events and conferences, and emphasized the cosmopolitan impetus created by interdisciplinary work and international exchanges and transfer of knowledge between scholars.

The aim of the conference was to explore long-term qualitative and functional developments, and the spatial and social dynamic of networks, their structural strengths and weaknesses, and the complex interactive relations between influence and power.

The first session, 'Geographies of Transnational Trade Networks and their Dynamics', began with two contributions which provided examples of the dimensions of Jewish networks. Daniel Jütte (Harvard/Heidelberg) spoke on 'Jewish Trade Networks Around 1600: Some Remarks on the Understudied Biography of Maggino di Gabrielli'. Taking as an example the Jewish merchant Maggino di Gabrielli, who specialized in the glass trade, Jütte demonstrated that such enterprises were highly lucrative. Jewish merchants depended on existing family structures, but they also made use of contacts with

Christian courts and traders in order to build up and consolidate long-term trading structures. Failure, by contrast, could mostly be attributed to anti-Jewish tendencies among the population.

Rainer Liedtke (Gießen), speaking on 'The Best-Informed People in Europe? The Rothschilds' Agents' Network in the Nineteenth Century', presented the significance of informers for the Rothschilds. Between the Napoleonic Wars and the 1860s, the Rothschild family established banks in Frankfurt, Paris, Naples, Vienna, and London. But as the newspaper system was not a sufficiently developed source of information for their purposes, they used agents recruited from Christian informants. Liedtke stressed, however, that beyond this there was constant communication between the banks. Close contacts with politicians, the nobility, and other banks and economic enterprises were a further 'key to business success'.

In the keynote evening lecture, Mark Casson (Reading) provided some theoretical reflections entitled 'The Structure of Networks: Theory and History'. In his opinion, efficient networks optimize the flow of information. But they are cost-intensive, and therefore the economic factor cannot be ignored. A good network requires a complex infrastructure which, he argued, consists primarily of four components: size, diversity, relationship, and configuration. This means that the number of people involved in any given enterprise, their various responsibilities, the types of direct and indirect contacts cultivated (family, business partners, intermediaries), and cooperation in accordance with abilities form the basis of a 'good' network. Social networks create trust between those involved, confer advantages, and are the prerequisite for functioning physical networks, such as transport and trade. According to Casson, only this interaction guarantees success.

The next contributions investigated the spatial and temporal dimensions of trading networks among German émigré traders and their dependence on political factors. Margrit Schulte Beerbühl (Düsseldorf) and Klaus Weber (London) spoke on the topic 'From Westphalian Linen and Looms to West Indies Sugar Estates and Beyond: Networks of German Textile Trading Entrepreneurs'. They showed that it was not only families from the trading metropolises who were able to establish economic contacts spanning the world. Entrepreneurs from the interior of Germany established contacts via relatives in the Hanse towns in order to set up branches in London

(Abraham Korten's family), Bordeaux (Jakob Bethmann), and Cadiz (Ellermann family). They used pre-existing trading routes in order to expand their import and export businesses.

Monika Poettinger (Bocconi University, Milan) spoke on 'Foreign Entrepreneurs and International Networks: Germans in Nineteenth-Century Lombardy'. Looking at a number of German families who established factories in Milan, she underlined the importance of political circumstances for international networks, pointing out that Austria's foreigner-friendly policies increased the volume of trade. In addition, the fact that mainly specialized skilled workers emigrated was crucial in ensuring that enterprises found new financiers, resulting in expansion.

Bradley Naranch (Maryland) spoke on 'Cosmopolitanism and German Colonialism: Hanseatic Commercial Networks in Emerging Tropical Markets, 1859–85'. In his view, Hanseatic businesses overseas were relatively free of national pressures in the first phase of their existence. By linking up with eastern and western markets and economic centres, they were able to maintain a sizable trade. Moreover, the Hanse's envoys concluded contracts directly with the post-colonial states of South America, making use of the routes and bases established by the British Empire. This often resulted in closer contacts and relations between Britain and Germany, which could peak in economic relations.

Thomas Biskup (Hull) addressed the question: 'An Anglo-German Enlightenment? The British Empire and Transnational Scholarship Networks in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century.' The lively exchange between the scholars Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (Göttingen) and Sir Joseph Banks (London) which Biskup examined worked like a cosmopolitan intellectual network and was lastingly shaped by the research in natural science which was pushed ahead during the Enlightenment. As a consequence of the British navy's military and commercial expeditions, various plants, minerals, and so on found their way to Europe, where they formed the basis of this exchange.

The second session, which dealt with aspects of 'Strengths and Weaknesses of Networks', opened with a paper by Thomas Weller (Münster) on 'Intercultural Communication and Network-Building: Hanseatic Merchants in Seville and Cadiz in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries'. Underlining the intercultural problems which

arose out of transnational relations, Weller looked at the extent to which intercultural conflicts impaired and influenced trading networks.

Sherylynne Haggerty (Nottingham) analysed the non-functioning of networks in her paper entitled ' "I could do for the Dickmans": When Networks Don't Work'. She described a situation in which bad behaviour in public by family members resulted in a loss of reputation that had to be painfully restored by many demonstrations of trustworthiness to potential financiers. Although the establishment of a business succeeded, Haggerty made clear that family background as a factor must not be underestimated, especially in firms with international connections.

Sünne Juterczenka (Rostock) and Frank Hatje (Hamburg), by contrast, emphasized the significance of religious affiliation for the creation of stable networks. In their paper 'Making Friends and Doing Business: Quaker Missionary and Commercial Activities in Europe (*c.*1655–1720)', Jüterczenka pointed out that the success of various Quaker undertakings was the result of flexibility, mobility, and close contacts. Also crucial was the fact that the Quakers were not only concerned to acquire a comprehensive grasp of a number of branches of knowledge, but also allowed moral values to enter the way they worked. As a result, their business practice became synonymous with honesty, which made it easier for them to enter trade.

In his paper on 'Religion and Trade: The Van der Smissen Networks in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries', Frank Hatje (Hamburg) looked at another religious fringe group, the Mennonites. So far, he suggested, the community aspect among this group has been underestimated. As with the Quakers, their success was based on their reputation as reliable business partners. Because their beliefs prevented firm integration into wider society, they tried to gain the protection of their respective state powers by virtue of their economic achievements and relations. The Van der Smissen family's international trade connections demonstrate this.

The third session dealt with 'Networks of Influence and Power'. Speaking on 'Relationships between Gunpowder Manufacturers and the Office of Ordnance in the Great Wars 1793–1815', Gareth Cole (Exeter) examined the sometimes complex relations between political and economic power. Although the state and the merchants had opposing interests, the mutual network of dependencies repeatedly

resulted in reconciliations and compromises expressed, among other things, in the fact that the state forced the merchants to improve the quality of their gunpowder by exercising strict quality control, although it was dependent on their deliveries from India and southern Italy.

Helen Doe (Exeter) looked at a regional network. In her paper entitled 'Foreign Encounters at Home: Influences and Connections in Small English Ports in the Nineteenth Century', she presented the ports of Falmouth, Fowey, and those on the Isles of Scilly (all in Cornwall). Despite their insignificant size by comparison with other English ports, they were able to build up considerable trading networks. Falmouth profited from its importance to European mail shipping traffic, and worldwide trading enterprises were carried on from Fowey and the Isles of Scilly. The success of these ports was based on good contacts with other ports, personal relationships, a supply of information aided by newspapers, and the world-spanning network of British trade routes.

Albane Forestier (LSE) spoke on 'The Role of Personal Connections in the Late Eighteenth-Century West Indian Trade: A Comparison of Two Business Networks'. Taking as examples the British company of Pinney & Toben (Bristol) and the French firm Chaurand (Nantes), Forestier showed that kinship, religion, and ethnic aspects were not always essential to the success and longevity of such undertakings. She underlined that personal connections were probably the most indispensable support in the initial stages of building up a business or expanding trade, while personal inclination or recommendations were rarely crucial. The weighing up of utility and profit and the gathering of reliable information continued to be the determining factors.

Dorothée Doepfer (Vienna) investigated 'Networks of Western European Migrants at Concepción, Chile 1870–1910: A Microanalysis of Immigrant British, French, and German Merchants and Industrialists to Concepción and their Social and Economic Interconnectedness'. While a large number of the English and French migrants left Concepción during this period, the Germans mostly remained. Doepfer attributed this to different patterns of behaviour. The British and French hardly came into contact with the indigenous people outside their business interests. The Germans, by contrast, made an effort to integrate, which helped them to enter the leading

local political and economic circles and promoted the establishment of long-term trading connections.

The discussions which followed the papers cast further light on particular questions and raised new points, including the following. The setting up of firms by Jewish traders should not be seen as an 'involuntary' consequence of the diaspora, as many of these traders rose, some to high positions. In addition to family structures, the close relationship between patron and client must be considered. In terms of intellectual history, universalism had a positive impact as ethnic and religious prejudices increasingly took a back seat. Similarly, the failure of business enterprises should not be attributed solely to external causes; internal factors such as quarrels within the family also played a part.

The papers and discussions thus drew attention to the success of social and economic networks (Poettinger, Doepfer), but also pointed to their fragility, as there was always a close connection with their political genesis (Schulte Beerbühl/Weber, Cole). Added to this were the outstanding significance of personal contacts (Jütte, Liedtke), and the standing of the family (Haggerty). Moreover, women were sometimes also involved in businesses (Doe). The significance of religious factors (Juterczenka, Hatje), national identity (Naranch, Weller), and family background (Forestier) should not be overrated, for at the centre of all these interconnections we always find three essential premises which were crucial to the consolidation of business contacts and relations, namely, the information supply, adaptation, and integration (Casson, Biskup). Finally, in presenting their case studies, all participants expanded the debate about cosmopolitan networks and developed new perspectives for scholarly work.

A publication of the proceedings is planned.

OLIVER MALLICK (Rostock)

Monarchy and Exile, conference organized by the Society for Court Studies in conjunction with the German Historical Institute London, held at the GHIL, 14–15 Dec. 2007.

Monarchy has been defined both as an ideology and as a form of government. So close were the links between state power and monarchical authority that little scholarly attention has been given to monarchs who lost power and lived in exile. With the notable exceptions of works on the courts of the exiled Stuarts and Kaiser Wilhelm II, biographers have tended to treat their subjects' exiles as epilogues to their work or as periods of little interest. The Society for Court Studies in conjunction with the German Historical Institute London invited nineteen experts on the early modern and modern periods in order to establish both a more analytical approach to the topic and a coherent framework for studying monarchy in exile from 1600 to the present.

The Director, Andreas Gestrich (London), welcomed the speakers from Britain, Ireland, Germany, Hungary, and Canada, as well as a substantial international audience to the German Historical Institute in Bloomsbury Square. In his opening remarks he emphasized the importance of linking the early modern period to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Philip Mansel (London) opened the conference with a survey of recent books on exiles. Scholars have long identified the importance of exile communities in the creation of modern western culture. As Mansel pointed out, a study of monarchs in exile could provide important insights into contemporary attitudes to political legitimacy and regional identity; it could also help to avoid deterministic interpretations of European history in general.

The conference papers were arranged in chronological order and divided into five sections. The first section, entitled 'Forms and Definitions of Exile', was chaired by Thomas Biskup (Hull). With Marie de' Medici, the Transylvanian Prince Ferenc Rákóczi II, and the Habsburg Emperor Charles VI it covered three very different seventeenth- and eighteenth-century rulers.

Toby Osborne (Durham) discussed Marie de' Medici's self-imposed exile after 1632 as an attempt to organize international opposition to Richelieu. As Osborne demonstrated, exile was a process rather than a definitive event and the status of the French Queen Mother changed during the seven years she spent in the

Spanish Netherlands. The dynastic network that Osborne described as the 'society of princes' helped her to remain a political reference-point and to maintain a court and entourage (though with declining numbers). However, after the death of her host, the Infanta Isabella, and changes in the international political system, Marie de' Medici became increasingly isolated from the 'society of princes'. The decline in sovereign authority also caused practical problems that often beset exiles: financial difficulties, competing loyalties, and negative propaganda.

Ferenc Tóth (Budapest) presented the historiographical debate around the Transylvanian Prince Ference Rákóczi II. After defeat in the Hungarian War of Independence between 1708 and 1711, Rákóczi lived at the court of Louis XIV and, as Tóth demonstrated, was acknowledged as a member of French court society. After the death of Louis XIV, Rákóczi withdrew from society before accepting an invitation from the Ottoman Sultan. He would spend his last years in or near Constantinople. As Tóth showed, Rákóczi used his exile to publish political pamphlets on the legitimacy of an independent Hungarian monarchy. He also approached the French government in order to influence international diplomacy. Despite his efforts to support Hungarian sovereignty and independence, Rákóczi's reputation in Hungarian historiography is controversial. The iconic status he gained during the War of Independence has been overshadowed by his extended exile. Hungarians seem divided over whether to regard Rákóczi as a national hero forced to emigrate or an exiled rebel.

William O'Reilly (Cambridge) contributed to the section on definitions of exile with a highly innovative paper. In his interpretation of Charles VI he described the Emperor's reign in the Habsburg monarchy in central Europe as an exile from Spain, where he had lived and claimed the throne for much of the War of the Spanish Succession. In O'Reilly's words, Charles later treated the Habsburg monarchy as if it were composed of Spanish crown lands. O'Reilly supported his view of the Emperor's Spanish character and mentality with evidence ranging from the language in the Emperor's biographical writings to the many Spanish exiles employed at the court in Vienna. O'Reilly presented exile as a leitmotiv in the Emperor's life, affecting his style of government and representation. Charles VI can be described as 'an Austrian emperor who wanted to be King of Spain'.

The second session, chaired by Michael Schaich (London) and entitled 'Confession', focused on the Stuart exiles. Given that Henrietta Maria, the wife of Charles I, was the youngest daughter of Marie de' Medici, who died in exile, it is possible to identify five generations of almost continuous exile endured by one family. Only with the death of Henry Benedict Cardinal of York in 1807 did the Stuart exile end in Rome.

Anna Keay (London) contributed to the debate about the 'creation of monarchy' with a paper on the challenges which exile presented to the young Charles II. The young King's time in France, and in Bruges after 1654, revealed how he aimed to create his own forms of monarchical representation during his fourteen years of exile. Leaving England as Prince of Wales in 1646, he re-invented his own religious and ceremonial expressions of kingship after his father's death in 1649, using royal liveries and the ceremony of 'touching for the King's evil' to demonstrate that his restoration was possible.

By focusing on monarchical praxis, John Cronin (Florence) emphasized the spatial dimension of exile. In his paper on the Irish royalist elites, he demonstrated the survival of specific social structures during periods of exile. He showed, for example, that the exiled Stuarts still attempted (sometimes successfully) to raise substantial sums of money in England, Scotland, and Ireland to fund their government in exile, legitimizing their acts by using documents stamped with a newly created great seal. He further elaborated on the importance of kinship links and patron–client connections within the Irish loyalist network. They helped to raise funds, support assertions of the dynasty's right to rule, and continue the fight against the Cromwellian government. Stressing the military power and activities of the exiled Stuarts, Cronin argued that their court was more than a shadow institution.

Karen Britland (Keele) maintained that there was a strong link between the public image of an exiled monarch and his or her attractiveness to creditors and supporters. Henrietta Maria's return from England to Paris in 1644 caused serious financial problems for the consort of Charles I. As a daughter of Henry IV, however, she found popular support in France. Britland's extensive knowledge of the role of theatre at the court of Henrietta Maria provided fascinating evidence of the transformation of her public image from her arrival through the different stages of the civil war until her death in 1669.

Britland argued that Catholicism was crucial for the exiled Queen's public image in France. However, it proved more difficult to gain the necessary financial assistance which, as Britland argued, was necessary for the exiled Queen to play her part in the public staging of monarchy.

Edward Corp (Toulouse) focused on the extended exile of the Old Pretender, James III, in Rome after 1719. He identified three factors that were necessary for the Stuart pretender to maintain his royal status at the papal court. After the Catholic religion and a moderate, non-controversial public role, Corp argued that James III had to succeed in making the people of Rome believe that—eventually—the Stuarts would be restored. The latter hypothesis proved crucial not only in discussion of the Stuarts' exile but also throughout the conference, particularly when debating how an exiled monarch maintained his or her royal status. As Corp demonstrated, the question can be answered by looking at how James III was treated in public, at official entertainments, and private receptions. After the Pope and Roman society stopped believing in a restoration of the Stuarts, they were no longer considered to be of royal status, as is illustrated by the fate of Charles Edward Stuart, Bonnie Prince Charlie, after the death of his father in 1766.

The third section, which was chaired by Torsten Riotte (Frankfurt am Main), was entitled 'Revolution'. Unfortunately Emanuel de Waresquiel (Paris) was unable to present his paper on Louis XVIII in Ghent during the Hundred Days. Philip Mansel (London) and Peter Hicks (Paris), two experts on the Bourbons and Bonapartes, discussed the different experiences of the two dynasties during their periods of exile.

Philip Mansel showed that international politics and, most importantly, the geo-political frontiers of a future French state within the European state system proved crucial to the return of the Comte de Provence as King Louis XVIII in 1814. International support also affected the exile of Provence, ranging from a short interlude of royal grandeur during his first stay at Mittau (1798–1801) to more sobering, even disillusioning, experiences at Hamm (1793–4), Verona (1794–6), and Warsaw (1801–4). Louis XVIII found his final destination fifty miles from London at Hartwell, where he spent five years before returning to France. The significance of Louis's court in exile was determined less by its role as a French political centre than by the

intentions of the rulers and governments of Europe and their plans for France's future. Equally importantly, Mansel argued that the experience of over twenty years of exile helped transform Provence from a fugitive into a monarch. This transformation helped to modernize and Europeanize the French monarchy to a degree that had proved impossible during the final crises of the *Ancien Régime*. As Mansel convincingly argued, Bourbon rule in 1814 was not a continuation of the pre-revolutionary monarchy.

Peter Hicks discussed Napoleon I's exile on Elba. The ten months that Napoleon spent as sovereign of the small island off the coast of Tuscany show that he was torn between a desire to establish his rule as a sovereign prince on the island, and a desire to return to France in part because of financial pressures after the Bourbons refused to pay the pension negotiated in April 1814. The former appeared at least as powerful and time-consuming as the latter. Life at the Palais imperial des Mulini revealed attempts to reproduce imperial court etiquette, such as the diplomatic circle, although on a minute scale. Napoleon's hyperactivity and his insistence on dealing with every aspect of the island's infrastructure and administration himself are notorious and led some contemporaries to question his mental health. Authors implied a 'decadence intellectuelle'. However, as Hicks argued, the sovereignty established on Elba appears less fragile than Napoleon's regime in France. It was the impossibility of maintaining his life on Elba because of financial difficulties that drove Napoleon to bid again for the much less secure crown of France.

The fourth section, 'Nation-Building', was chaired by John F. Pollard (Cambridge). Its narrow chronological focus (all three papers dealt with the decades after 1860) allowed a detailed discussion of Italian and German unification and their impact on different monarchies. It also showed that the road to exile was less inevitable than appears with hindsight. While the Bourbons of Naples and the Hanoverians in exile failed to return, King Johann of Saxony made an agreement with Bismarck to be re-established on the throne on condition that he accepted Prussian hegemony.

Guy Stair Sainty (London) argued against the prevailing negative public image of the Bourbons of Naples. He demonstrated that the positive view of Italian unification in popular historiography disguises many unpopular measures taken after 1860, such as rigid cen-

sorship, closure of monasteries, and the spread of nepotism in the administration. Sainty emphasized that the coercive measures used to crush resistance to the new government in retrospect popularized the Bourbon monarchy among people in the south for many decades. He painted a lively picture of the Bourbon court in exile in Rome between 1860 and 1870 to illustrate how both individuals and the political context shaped the failure of the royal family to survive as a monarchy. Unlike some of his brothers, the exiled Francis II did not show any of the qualities necessary to capitalize on popular opposition to the new Italian state.

James Retallack (Toronto) discussed the 'strange survival of monarchical Saxony' in a presentation that excelled, not least by the original use of visual material. The historiographical debate about the domestication of German monarchs after 1871 in the Prussian-dominated German empire lay at the core of his paper. Retallack demonstrated that the few months between the defeat at Königsgrätz in July and King Johann's return in November 1866 had seen the Saxon King and government negotiate for their survival. Backed by the Saxon Crown's popularity, or rather the ambivalence of the Saxon population towards Prussia, King Johann and his court remained key players on the political stage. Prussia, and Bismarck in particular, proved sensitive towards public opinion and allowed King Johann to return. However, the defeat of the Saxon army had a strong impact on Saxon prospects. One cynical contemporary saw the King of Saxony return not as a monarch, but as Mayor of Dresden. As Retallack demonstrated, competing views about the Wettin dynasty after 1866 are well suited to foster discussion about the structure of the German empire and its federal dimension, with regard to both its component monarchies and popular attitudes.

Torsten Riotte's (Frankfurt am Main) paper was directly related to the discussion about Johann's restoration. While the King of Saxony returned from exile, George V of Hanover refused to negotiate with Prussia on any but legitimist terms. Although his wife advised him to come to an agreement with Bismarck (directly citing the Saxon precedent in correspondence with her husband), George V was not prepared to accept defeat. The period from 1866 to 1871 showed many familiar features of monarchy in exile. George V subsidized opposition newspapers, financed a Hanoverian legion to undermine Prussian rule, and supported the anti-Prussian party that later

became the Deutsch-Hannoversche Partei (German Hanoverian Party). Riotte placed greater emphasis on the later stages of Hanoverian exile after George V's death in 1878. The tension between the exiled king and the loyalist party at home provided an opportunity to discuss the differences between legitimism and regionalism. The exiled king proved crucial to the survival of local patriotism while at the same time local patriotism re-invented the image of the Hanoverian monarchy, rescuing it from its former unpopularity to make it a key element in local identity.

The final session, chaired by Philip Mansel (London), was entitled 'Defeat and Exile'. Both the French Emperor Napoleon III and the German Emperor Wilhelm II left for exile after crushing military defeats, in 1870 and 1918 respectively. Their reigns were succeeded by the Third Republic and the Weimar Republic. In this context, the issue of monarchical legitimacy appeared particularly questionable.

The two accounts by William H. C. Smith (London) and Heidi Mehrkens (Brunswick) demonstrated the usefulness of a less biographical approach to exiled monarchs. Smith, a leading expert on the Second Empire, claimed that neither the Emperor nor the Empress Eugenie believed in the political future of the dynasty. Suffering severe health problems during his two years of exile in England (1871–3), Napoleon III was more concerned to ensure the future of his son and family than to make serious plans to recover his throne. Equally, the French public showed little support for the former Emperor. Amongst the competing factions of republicans, legitimists, Orleanists, and Bonapartists, the last were the weakest. However, as Mehrkens demonstrated, the Emperor's attitudes were not known to the Prussian government. Mehrkens found evidence that Bismarck seriously considered reinstating Empress Eugenie as Regent of France. Bismarck considered the plan as a means to pacify France and in particular Paris. Appearances were as important as reality in maintaining a political role for monarchs in exile.

John Röhl (Sussex) discussed the German Kaiser Wilhelm II's exile from November 1918 to his death in June 1941. Wilhelm II's personality had already weakened monarchy in Germany long before the outbreak of the First World War. Germany's defeat discredited the Hohenzollern dynasty even further in the eyes of the majority of Germans. A return of the exiled monarch after 1918 appeared impossible to contemporaries. Röhl painted a compelling picture of

Wilhelm II indulging in the composition of obscure, mostly self-righteous writings. Röhl also emphasized the anti-Semitic elements in the Kaiser's correspondence. In the debate about Wilhelm II's role in the Netherlands, which sees the Kaiser either as preoccupied with cutting trees on his enclosed property and detached from world politics, or as hoping for a restoration of the monarchy as a Hohenzollern institution, Röhl stressed that Wilhelm II lived in a world of illusions. Although Wilhelm's attitude towards the Nazi party was ambivalent, Röhl showed that he shared its hostility towards the Jews.

The findings of the conference invite further engagement with the topic of monarchs in exile. The distinctions between the 'society of princes' and the 'family of kings' pose many questions for the early modern and modern periods. The popularization of monarchy in the nineteenth century also posed the question of how far a popular image can be influenced by a monarch himself. As all papers illustrated, exiled monarchs appeared to be very present in debates about legitimacy, and in the creation of opposition to and criticism of the government of the day.

It is the intention of the organizers to publish the proceedings of the conference in edited form.

TORSTEN RIOTTE (Frankfurt am Main)

Keeping Secrets: How Important was Intelligence for the Conduct of International Relations, 1914–1989? Conference held at the GHIL, 17–19 Apr. 2008.

There is only one country in which the dream of every intelligence officer has come true: Russia. Former KGB officer Vladimir Putin became a world leader who did not forget his roots.[1] That Western politicians also mingle *with* and are fascinated *by* Intelligence Services became apparent during the Iraq war. Tony Blair was said to have a weakness for *Spooks*. The much-debated dossier of September 2002 and its usage has shown once again that statesmen employ intelligence work selectively to justify their actions.[2] Intelligence and policy seem to have become dangerously close.

When social historians talk about the 'missing dimension' they mean gender studies. For political historians the missing dimension is a different one: intelligence. Harry Hinsley, Ernest May, and Christopher Andrew put this dimension on the map, but they never had an easy time keeping it at the centre. There is, as yet, no theory of intelligence and even to define the term seems difficult. As David Kahn once stated, 'none of the definitions that I have seen work'.

Karina Urbach (GHIL) therefore pointed out in her introduction that she did not intend to organize an intelligence conference per se. Though many of the distinguished speakers and chairs were intelligence experts, they were surrounded by historians of international relations who only occasionally use intelligence material and do not put it at the centre of their work. Their role therefore was to act as a counterbalance, asking 'did it matter'?

Furthermore, every speaker had to tackle difficult questions. What were the effects of intelligence on national and international action, security, and cooperation? What material were decision-makers getting and what were they actually doing with it? How great

[1] An article in the *Economist* recently called Russia a 'Spookocracy'. *The Economist*, 25 Aug. 2007, 25–7.

[2] There is a battle going on between intelligence circles that claim their reports were sexed up by the government's head of information, while the government claimed this was brought forward by 'rogue elements' in the intelligence community. For this see Michael Herman, 'Intelligence's Future: Learning from the Past', *Journal of Intelligence History*, 3/2 (Winter 2003), 1–8.

was the danger of ethnocentrism? How important was human intelligence compared to technical intelligence?

Over the two-day conference, historians and intelligence practitioners got on remarkably well and found that they had a lot in common. It is probably no coincidence that many historians of a certain generation have worked for Intelligence Services: both professions face mountains of sources, some of which contradict each other completely. They constantly have to make up their minds which information can be dismissed and which is decisive. The jungle of names, codenames, operations, information, and counter-information, like all other historical sources offers no easy answers. As former head of MI5 Eliza Manningham-Buller once noted, life is not like the television series *Spooks*, 'where everything is knowable and soluble by six people'.

Despite what the two professions have in common, they are also wary of each other. They have reason to be. Intelligence experts believe in secrecy and have to protect their sources. Occasionally they drop well-selected crumbs to historians. Historians in return feel excluded and, at worst, manipulated by this. Anyone who has worked in the National Archives in London knows how frustrating it can be, despite the so-called Freedom of Information Act, to get to the bottom of an issue.

The first panel, which was chaired by Zara Steiner (Cambridge), therefore focused on the question of whether intelligence was the 'missing dimension'. Christopher Andrew (Cambridge), whose official history of MI5 will be published in 2009, gave a strong defence of the history of intelligence. He stressed that in the twentieth century intelligence work had often played a key part in world events and that for decades historians had missed the obvious. Andrew illustrated this with several poignant examples from the First World War, when intelligence work helped the British to get the USA into the conflict, to the history of decolonization. Furthermore, he stressed, the whole question of how much intelligence information influenced the decisions of world leaders had so far been ignored, the most famous cases of this being VENONA and its impact on President Truman, and the complete neglect of Churchill's post-war use of intelligence. Andrew pointed out that one problem has been that the subject is flooded with trivial literature. For the public it is therefore difficult to distinguish between wild conspiracy theories and schol-

arly work. (This does not mean that the study of spy novels should not be taken into account. James Bond and his Russian equivalent have been the best recruitment officers Intelligence Services ever had.) Andrew is hopeful, however, that a new generation of students will ask the right questions.

William E. Odom (Yale), former director of the National Security Agency (NSA), was more ambivalent about the role of intelligence. He started his paper with a joke which summed up his opinion that intelligence is the record of accurate but useless answers to ambiguous questions, and that good agents have to be 'con artists'. In his paper Odom went on to outline the communication revolutions of recent decades and their effect on intelligence work. His special admiration was for the work of mathematicians, who as a truly international community—unlike historians—actually talked and listened to each other. However, any trade-off between signal intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) was, in his eyes, 'idiotic'. In the Poland crisis of the 1980s HUMINT had, for example, been important:

> My own experience is mixed. Again and again, I saw such technical intelligence have little effect on diplomacy and foreign policy. On a few occasions, I saw it cause sharp reversals in policy, reversals strongly resisted at first by policy makers. Here I speak only about SIGINT products. My experience with HUMINT is more limited, but I can think of only a couple of times when it played a key role, and even then, SIGINT provided the context that made it compelling.

A further problem Odom encountered in his work as adviser to Presidents Carter and Reagan was that although policy-makers put great pressure on the intelligence community during crises, 'they do not want to believe the intelligence they receive unless it fits their preconceptions'.

Odom ended his paper by saying that he still felt ambivalent about the impact of intelligence. The Russian sources were one problem; another the inability of the recipients of intelligence to interpret the material: 'The intelligence-policy interaction problem troubles me more than any other about the role of intelligence, and it is probably the least studied.'

David Kahn (New York) in his paper focused on another central question for historians of intelligence: how was intelligence institutionalized and when did it actually begin to matter? He quoted Clausewitz, who like other politicians and military men of his time was sceptical about intelligence: 'Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain . . . In short, most intelligence is false.'[3]

Kahn stressed that for centuries intelligence failed to bring decisive victories. Two revolutions changed this. The French Revolution gave intelligence a permanent home for the first time and the Industrial Revolution engendered new forms of communication. The first nation to set up a special provision with the government service was Russia as a direct result of losing the Crimean war. Kahn sees here the key to the rise of intelligence:

> the paradigm recurred that people paid attention to intelligence only after a threat or a defeat. Germany, which had not had an intelligence unit in its general staff all during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because it had never lost a war in those years established one after World War I. The United States set up the Central Intelligence Agency as a consequence of Pearl Harbor, and assembled its various intelligence units into an Intelligence Community under a director of national intelligence after the attacks of 11 September 2001.

In the discussion, Paul Kennedy argued that in the Battle of the Atlantic sophisticated new weapons had been the decisive factor rather than intelligence. Kahn agreed that intelligence had indeed only been a supplementary element. The same was true for France, as Stephen Schuker (Virginia) showed in his paper on 'Intelligence and Grand Strategy in France 1919–40'. There was, first of all, a cultural problem within French society. Since the Dreyfus affair intelligence had been associated with a stigma and distrust of the military. This was complicated by the fact that within the deeply divided French intelligence community, competing agencies would not trust each other:

[3] David Kahn, 'Clausewitz and Intelligence', quoted in Michael I. Handel, *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy* (London, 1986), 117.

> Whatever the flaws of the intelligence services during those decades, they reflected a larger absence of coordination—incoherence is not too strong a word—in the executive branch of French government. Both civilian ministries and the military services were affected. France found itself confronted with such overwhelming problems of demography, military defence, and foreign policy after World War I that no satisfactory solution existed.

Regarding the influence intelligence work has on decision-makers, Schuker agreed with Robert Jervis that 'the range of choice revealed by intelligence estimates based on professional analytic procedures may not afford the leader the requisite flexibility to stay afloat politically. Even in less dire circumstances, the evidence turned up by intelligence agencies may prove politically unpalatable, and therefore unwelcome to the policy-maker.'

The subject of France continued in the panel on 'Military and Political Intelligence, 1914–39', chaired by Paul Kennedy (Yale). Peter Jackson (Aberystwyth) looked at the difficult subject of intelligence cooperation between two nations. His analysis focused on Franco-British relations, which were far from ideal in the 1930s. There was no systematic collaboration in intelligence matters, one reason for this being the British government's fear that France would turn bolshevist. However, as Jackson pointed out, even under the best of circumstances cooperation is difficult. There are fears of leaks and the danger of penetration. Most importantly, 'the material received in exchanges has strings attached. Intelligence liaisons are used to further national policies.'

Even if excellent intelligence is available, you might not be able to use it. Jonathan Haslam's (Cambridge) paper 'HUMINT by default' focused on the enormous windfall of intelligence the Soviets received from 1917 to 1941 and how they failed to make proper use of it.

In the course of his paper, Haslam outed further spies, including Baron Rothschild. The Russians relied on human intelligence by default because they failed to keep up with advances in SIGINT. But then Stalin's personality was such that he found it almost impossible to rely on human sources over which he did not have complete control. The results were not merely disappointing but almost disastrous (for example, Stalin's response to the German invasion in June 1941).

The Russian theme continued in the session on 'Dictators at War', which was chaired by Hermann Hiery (Bayreuth). David Holloway (Stanford) looked at Stalin and his usage of intelligence at two different junctures of world history: the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 and the Russian nuclear programme.

Khrushchev was the key critic of Stalin's use of intelligence in 1941 ('everything was ignored'), yet in the 1970s other interpretations surfaced, claiming that the intelligence Stalin received was far from unambiguous. Holloway stressed that not all material was yet available but that 'the material we do have shows that on the most important issues the intelligence reports given to Stalin were far from consistent: on the date of the German attack, for example; on whether or not an ultimatum would precede the attack, or on whether Hitler was determined to defeat Britain (or do a deal with it) before attacking the Soviet Union.' Though atomic intelligence reached Stalin between 1941 and 1945, it did not have a critical impact on his calculations. Holloway concluded that intelligence was 'less important than one might expect if one looked at the intelligence alone, without taking into account the way it was understood and they way it was used'.

Parallels with Adolf Hitler's use of intelligence were drawn. Gerhard Weinberg (Chapel Hill) painted a picture of an amateurish handling of intelligence by Hitler. First of all Weinberg diagnosed a traditional neglect of intelligence in Germany, which resulted mainly from arrogance. Unlike in Britain and America, no academic talent was recruited, and to become an intelligence officer was far from a prestigious career move. The Air Force Intelligence was particularly incompetent and the Germans were completely fooled by British intelligence. Furthermore, German intelligence agencies did not share information with their allies. The only intelligence taken seriously by the Germans was information about orders of battle. Though Hitler used such tactical intelligence, his important decisions were 'made because of ideological goals and perceived needs with no or practically no interest in the possible goals and plans of Germany's enemies'. Hitler's reaction to intelligence coups was particularly revealing, according to Weinberg. The Germans staged three main coups (the breaking of the British convoy code; the theft of the code of the American military attaché in Cairo; and the famous Cicero case in Ankara), yet the material was never seriously exploited or used for strategic purposes. Weinberg gave several

examples of Hitler's major decisions, none of which were influenced by intelligence information:

> The decisions to invade Yugoslavia and Greece, to assist his ally Benito Mussolini by dispatching forces to North Africa, the decision to go to war with the United States, the decisions for the summer offensives on the Eastern Front in 1942 and in 1943. It was the almost total blindness to wider issues such as the hopes, perceptions, and plans of Germany's enemies, that contributed to the thousand year Reich's demise 988 years early.

The Cold War session was introduced by Arne Westad, director of the LSE's Cold War centre. John Prados (Washington) covered a long time span of American intelligence work. Outlining the great shifts from the Second World War to the Cold War, he stressed that different pillars of intelligence (SIGINT, photo/satellite intelligence, HUMINT, interviews with prisoners of war, spies, captured documents, and so on) took the lead at different times. Prados went on to analyse the information leaders received. One of the sources were the PDBs—the President's Daily Brief—which were accumulated by the CIA and also used as a vehicle to show that the agency had informed policy-makers properly. The effect of the PDBs was mixed. Eisenhower had started a daily brief and Jimmy Carter was an eager consumer of PDBs, while Reagan only became interested in them during the Iran Contra-affair. In the following discussion General Odom added that one problem often was that the mass of intelligence was too much for the Presidents, who in his opinion did not act on PDBs.

British intelligence during the Cold War was the focus of Richard Aldrich's paper (Warwick). He drew attention to an often neglected issue of intelligence work: how much did it cost and what were its benefits? When writing the history of intelligence, historians seldom think about the issue of money, while intelligence people think about it all the time, especially when there are general spending crises to combat. In 1961–2 a financial review of intelligence work was undertaken by, of all people, a former friend of Kim Philby. However, as Aldrich showed, the anatomy of the enemy was studied in an almost anthropological sense by talented military attachés who travelled through East Germany and looked at how soldiers lived.

The Anglo-American alliance management was particularly important for the British. Cooperation with the NSA was 'priceless', and the British learnt a great deal from mixing with top Washington people. American colleagues also helped their British counterparts to secure their jobs: they pressed the British government not to make cuts in the Intelligence Services, but rather to save on army expenditure.

Aldrich stressed the need to invest in the study of intelligence during the Cold War period which could help us to understand the lessons learnt. Arne Westad agreed that it still takes a long time for intelligence material from the Cold War to be made available and that it is vital to put pressure on politicians to declassify it. A discussion ensued about the problem of sources. Although documents of the 1930s had now finally been made available, the people most able to set them into context were dead.

Of course, all speakers at this conference were faced with varying problems in gaining access to sources. This was particularly true in the case of Russia. It was therefore very fortunate to have two Russian scholars at the conference who had unusual access. The majority of what is in print stems from British and American sources and the Western perspective therefore dominates our view of intelligence history. Academician Alexander Fursenko's (Moscow) and Vladimir Pechatnov's (St Petersburg) work provided a peek over the fence. Their joint paper, entitled 'The Kremlin: Intelligence and Foreign Policy, 1950s–1960s', showed that the interaction between intelligence and policy-makers was very complicated in the Soviet Union. The Politburo was not well informed about the outside world and suffered from ethnocentrism. Intelligence officers feared to displease their bosses. In Russia there is to this day no discussion about Soviet leaders and their usage of intelligence. Khrushchev, for one, believed that 'he could manage without anyone'.

The speakers' verdict was that 'in the Soviet Union the decisive role belonged to the Politburo, party hierarchy, and Khrushchev personally, when he ruled the country. The intelligence was regarded as an auxiliary tool, which sometimes was useful but whose views and advice were disregarded more often than not.'

In the discussion that followed Christopher Andrew was particularly interested in the KGB's grand strategy in Third World countries. Pechatnov stressed that a great effort had been made by the services,

but that there was not much to show for it in the end. Andrew also wanted to know about Andropov's time in office, which must have enlarged the KGB's influence. Fursenko stressed that domestically the KGB was very influential.

Michael Herman (Oxford), a former practitioner, chaired the second part of the Cold War session, which covered case studies of France and Germany. Georges Soutou (Sorbonne), during his archive research for this paper, had encountered a lot of empty boxes. Though he was willing to break the equivalent of the British Official Secrets Act, he described the evidence he could present as at best 'spotty'.

The French realized very early on that it was not possible for them to penetrate Soviet intelligence. However, their own system was fortunate in being influenced by decision-makers who had learnt their tricks in the Resistance (one of them Professor Soutou's father). Intelligence cooperation with the US was tricky since the French were scared that American protection could easily turn into a form of domination, or even occupation. French sovereignty had to remain intact and the French therefore needed a strong defence against American, Chinese, and Soviet threats. In return, the Americans did not trust the French. This fear stemmed from the idea that parts of the Resistance had been Communist and, indeed, it took a long time for Soviet moles to surface. It was the British who advised the Americans to share more information with the French. While Soutou called French intelligence 'pedestrian', Holger Afflerbach (Leeds) labelled the German case as 'provincial'. Having to cope, like his French colleague, with a lack of sources, he focused on an institutional history. The founder of the new German intelligence service after the war, General Gehlen, who had been dismissed by Hitler, was welcomed by the CIA 'because he told them what they wanted to hear'. There were great continuities of German threat perception from the Nazi period to the 1960s: Russia was seen either as a steamroller, or as a House of Cards. Apart from ideological reasons, Gehlen built up the Soviet threat to secure jobs. He was also very successful in building a network across the German party spectrum—Adenauer as well as Schumacher worked closely with him. Afflerbach stressed, however, that although Gehlen helped Adenauer he did not form his opinion. In the long run Gehlen's past and that of his co-workers made him highly vulnerable to blackmail.

Up to the building of the Berlin Wall, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) was, in Afflerbach's opinion, very successful in its operations, much more so than its opponent the Staatssicherheit (Stasi). The BND also had good contacts with Israel, which proved important during the Six Day War (Christopher Andrew had already outlined in his paper Teddy Kollek's work for the British; a similar link existed with the Germans). Afflerbach's verdict was that although spies invented things to make themselves more interesting, there is no evidence of large-scale manipulation of facts. The work of the BND was not spectacular, but on the whole much better than its image.

The Round Table Discussion, chaired by Stefan Halper (Washington), tackled the question of what is and should be the future of intelligence?

Public expectations of intelligence have never been greater. Intelligence institutions receive bigger budgets, governmental esteem, and influence than ever before. We are in greater need of good intelligence since terrorism is posing a serious threat. At the same time it is difficult to balance the needs of the Intelligence Services with the public's concern for civil rights.

This problem was discussed by three distinguished former practitioners: Baroness Park of Monmouth, former MI6 controller in Vietnam, Moscow, and the Congo, and after her retirement Principal of Somerville College Oxford, is one of only two people who are allowed by MI6 to talk about their work. She was joined by Sir Richard Dearlove, former head of MI6 and now master of Pembroke College Cambridge, and by James Pavitt, former deputy head of CIA operations and currently a partner of Scowcroft Associates. Dr Halper, who had helped greatly to bring this panel together, stressed that the discussion would follow Chatham House rules. Therefore the following is a summary without direct attribution.

First of all, there was general agreement that intelligence work had changed radically since the Cold War. The practitioners present were all trained during the Cold War and had to learn to re-structure their work drastically.

One practitioner criticized statements made during the conference that technical intelligence had become more important than human intelligence. In Afghanistan, for example, a mixture of both had been vital for success. Although technical intelligence needs to play an integral role, the threat of Al Qaida, which is a 'highly individual'

group, demands more and better human intelligence. Good agents are needed and a relationship of trust between controller and agent is paramount. However, while it is easy to do soft work (analysing open sources such as newspapers and so on), it is extremely difficult to infiltrate terrorist groups, since agents, who used to have a shelf-life of up to thirty years now last only three months, at best. Since infiltration is extremely difficult many services would no longer even attempt it, the ones present excluded.

The tragedy of 11 September 2001 has brought forward reforms within the CIA, some of which were very heavily criticized by one participant as rushed and ill-advised.

The practitioners also discussed problems they faced in their work. The information they collect is never the perfect product; usually 50 per cent of it is valuable and one has to learn to work with contradictions. There are always the problems of money (though at the moment they feel well resourced), the handling of defectors, and, of course, the ever increasing sophistication of the enemies.

Regarding cooperation between politicians and intelligence people, all speakers were adamant that their role was only to inform policy-makers. It was stressed that covert operations should always be policy-driven.

Though espionage between states will never cease, terrorism is a global problem. It was pointed out that terrorists had always been dealt with as a transnational threat, but now international cooperation was even more vital. The Anglo-American relationship was seen as a particularly successful case in point.

Regarding the demand for more transparency it was stressed that never before have the services been discussed more publicly. People in the intelligence world now faced the dilemma that testifying in courts and talking to journalists could risk operations and the lives of agents. One participant criticized the publication of the 9/11 report, which included too much valuable information and was therefore harmful to the work of the services.

The practitioners ended on a grim note. They predicted another attack and they were sure it would be branded as an intelligence failure.

Brian Hanrahan (BBC) explained in the discussion that when intelligence material is offered to him he does not want to be manipulated or taken in. He thinks that the Intelligence Services have a

major PR problem. If only two MI6 people are allowed to talk about their work, the public will never understand what MI6 stands for: 'You need more people to show your story.' The services should open up to serious historians and support good research: 'give access to sources to historians. This will win public support.'

Michael Herman had already pointed out that there might be hope of 'cohabitation':

> Secrecy still needs to be taken seriously. Nevertheless, historians can help in getting it applied in a commonsense way: partly through constant pressure on officials and politicians to consider whether past secrets have now reached their sell-by dates, and partly through producing scholarly work that encourages less frenetic public attitudes: less demand for revelations, less demonisation of intelligence . . . Serious intelligence history can make positive contributions on all these fronts.[4]

Georges Soutou agreed with this. He said that next time a German taxi driver complained to him that the government is wasting taxpayers' money, he would mention the usefulness of such conferences.

The conference received wide press coverage and the Russian inter-war material will be the focus of a BBC programme. Proceedings will be published in 2009–10. They will include additional articles by Ernest May (Harvard) whose paper on 'Intelligence in the Fall of France, 1940' was distributed during the sessions and Sir Martin Gilbert on 'Churchill's Usage of Intelligence'.

Postscript

General William E. Odom died six weeks after this conference. He was widely recognized as a leading scholar of the Soviet Union and had taught international relations at Yale University. During his distinguished career he had been military adviser to Presidents Carter and Reagan. The latter made him director of the National Security Agency, where he was known for his hard stance against the Soviet Union. From the very beginning, Odom publicly opposed the war in

[4] Herman, 'Intelligence's Future', 4.

Iraq. In 2007 he delivered a radio address for the Democratic Party: 'Most Americans suspect that something is fundamentally wrong with the president's management of the conflict in Iraq. The challenge we face today is not how to win Iraq, it is how to recover from a strategic mistake: invading Iraq in the first place.' Everyone who had the honour of talking to him will agree with Zbigniew Brzezinski's verdict: 'he was both a fighter and an intellectual'.[5]

KARINA URBACH (GHIL)

[5] For this quotation see Matt Schudel's obituary of General Odom, *Washington Post*, 1 June 2008, p. C08.

Cultural Industries and Cultural Politics: Britain 1750–2000, ADEF Annual Conference 2008, organized by Christiane Eisenberg (Centre for British Studies, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) and Andreas Gestrich (German Historical Institute London), held at the Wolfsburg in Mülheim/Ruhr, 2–4 May 2008.

This year's conference of the Arbeitskreis Deutsche England-Forschung (ADEF) was the first in a series of two, with a follow-up conference planned for November 2009 in London. The conference focused on the tension between 'cultural industries' and 'cultural policies' in Britain from about 1750 onwards. In Britain the 'cultural industries' worked in close cooperation with the press and the advertising and consumer-goods industries, while alternative suppliers such as the Court, the Church, the nobility, and urban authorities, the potential organizers of public cultural policies, had only an indirect influence.

As Christiane Eisenberg (Berlin) pointed out in her introduction, 'The Cultural Industries: Structure and Aims of the Conference', this approach to the complex and somewhat unusual topic was a result of the difficulties of dealing with 'culture as such', since the meaning of the term 'culture' varies between European countries. The differences between 'culture'/'cultural industries' and the German terms 'Kultur'/'Kulturindustrie' are an obvious example. The first conference was therefore mostly concerned with the situation in Britain and tried to identify problem complexes, periodizations, and actors' opportunities for action by looking at specific examples. The resulting issues of broader comparisons and theoretical approaches were deliberately ignored for the time being, especially since the state of research outside Britain would have made it difficult for all speakers to make comparisons.

The conference was opened by the doyen of the modern history of sport, Wray Vamplew, whose keynote lecture 'Economic Approaches to Sport and Cultural History' provided a general overview of the way in which economic theories and methods can be applied to sport and cultural history, and the role of economics for sport as a cultural product. He touched on some of the particular characteristics of culture that an economic description of sport needs to consider, and focused on the economic aspects of sport as a cultural product. Using Allen Guttmann's and Stefan Szymanski's theories on modernization

and associativity respectively further to illuminate the relationship between cultural and economic aspects in sport, Vamplew stressed that while it is possible to explain sport as such in entirely economic terms, the main goal should be to treat culture as a joint output of economic and cultural factors and to emphasize interconnectivity, a notion that was also repeatedly confirmed by subsequent presentations.

The first section, 'Eighteenth Century: The Rise of Commercial Culture', consisted of two presentations: Ruti Ungar (Berlin/London) speaking on 'The Commercialization of Honour: Boxing in Eighteenth-Century England' and Timothy Blanning (Cambridge) on 'The Business of Music and the Status of the Musician in Eighteenth-Century Britain'. The two presentations complemented each other extremely well and provided a detailed picture of the overall development of the cultural industries in eighteenth-century Britain.

Blanning, although careful to point out that the term 'cultural industry' might not be wholly appropriate and cautioning against a straightforward Whig interpretation of history, described eighteenth-century London as a city that had undergone a massive expansion both financially and in terms of population. This had led to a steadily increasing demand for entertainment and a laissez-faire attitude in and towards the commercial sector. At the same time, the city was still characterized by the traditional political and social structures. As Blanning made clear, London was essentially a city of two halves: a 'Residenzstadt' and a rapidly developing merchant centre, linked by money, but otherwise separated by a clear east-west divide. Against this background, Blanning outlined the development of the music industry. He pointed out that it underwent increasing commercialization, which in turn benefited various parts of the existing cultural industries (publishers, journalists, instrument manufacturers, pleasure gardens, etc.) and led to increased interdependence and interconnections between them. Commercialism also functioned as the primary driving force in the upper market, where the target audience consisted entirely of the nobility and gentry. These were the potential organizers of public cultural policies, but they preferred private concerts themselves and saw no need for wider-reaching initiatives. Using Georg Friedrich Handel as an example, Blanning subsequently examined the impact of these features on the art of music and the artist. Pointing out that while the commercialization of culture offer-

ed many benefits to the artist, enabled musical expansion, and also influenced the art itself (for example, the available orchestras and the taste of the audience both influenced the compositional process), Blanning also cautioned that a purely or mostly economic perspective nevertheless offered an unduly simplified explanation and ignored several aspects, such as the importance of political events, religion, or the political structure as responsible for the lack of infrastructure.

Ungar's examination of the sport of boxing in the eighteenth century likewise managed to detail the success of a particular cultural industry and delineated several parallels with developments in the sphere of music described by Blanning. Boxing had been a popular activity in England since the beginning of the seventeenth century, but became even more popular and very fashionable in the second half of the eighteenth. Although the sport existed in a legal grey area, it nevertheless managed to transcend class barriers and appealed to a wide section of the population, which in turn helped to further commercialize the events and prevent the authorities from taking action against the organizers. This allowed for a development very similar to that in the music industry in terms of the level of interaction with the cultural industries (publishers, publicans, fight organizers, betting, the selling of assorted merchandise such as mugs or porcelain figurines, etc.) and the opportunities afforded to the boxers to turn their success as sportsmen into commercial success. Taking the Jewish boxer Daniel Mendoza as an example, Ungar's overview of the commercial possibilities boxing held for successful stars of the sport invited comparisons with Handel's success as described by Blanning and touched upon some of the limitations inherent in boxing as a chance for social betterment.

Moving on to the nineteenth century, Peter Bailey (Indianapolis) opened the second section, 'The Operation of Business in a Modern Class Society', with his presentation, 'British Music Hall: The Business of Pleasure Revisited'. Focusing on vaudeville and the 'popular end of legitimate theatre', Bailey described the history of the British music halls as comparable to the overall development of British capitalism and increasing industrialization. Compared to the eighteenth century, music halls and theatres existed in a far more commercial climate in which several of the previously identified trends and characteristics had undergone a commercial widening and deepening.

This in turn encouraged further growth and added another layer of complexity to the relationships both within the cultural industries and between the cultural industries and cultural politics.

According to Bailey, the result was a general movement towards more 'business-like' concepts, strategies and structures, which foreshadowed many of the features of the music-hall business in the twentieth century. 'Fun' was the central keyword underlying these developments, and the need to provide the most and best fun affected both the final product and its production. On the production side, the efforts of music hall proprietors led to an increased professionalism and embrace of new opportunities, ranging from technology (film, electric lights) and finance (foreign capital, mostly from the USA) to the actual production process itself. This increasingly relied on organized and specialized labour, although some of the traditional ties and values, such as feelings of clannishness or family ties still remained. 'Fun maximization' also gave rise to the idea of 'entertainment packages', which were offered in association with other aspects of the leisure industries, such as restaurants or hotels.

In the twentieth century the music halls and theatres continued to be an overall success story and the entertainment sector became an accepted and recognized part of the economy. However, as Bailey showed in his paper, the relationship with the state remained ambivalent. A general movement towards free trade and commercialized forms of leisure still prevailed. However, a laissez-faire climate clearly no longer existed and regulations and licensing were often a hindrance, although the overall relationship was too complex to be described as overwhelmingly positive or negative.

Klaus Nathaus (Berlin) gave the second paper covering the period from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century. He was the only speaker who dared to present an international comparative perspective in his analysis of 'Sport Clubs in a Commercial Society with a Comparative View of the German Case'. Nathaus argued that the commonly held perceptions of commercialization as a negative factor and voluntary associations as a positive factor for the overall development of sport are not necessarily accurate, and he referred to the cases of Germany and Britain as examples.

Starting with the British case, Nathaus described eighteenth-century British sport as a highly commercialized activity, including its organization. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, the middle

classes started to object to this commercialized nature with all its undesirable side effects and tried to turn sport into a form of 'rational recreation' contributing to health, moral improvement, and better social relations. This amounted essentially to an effort to teach and control the working classes, but ultimately failed because of increasing commercialization and demand for commercial leisure. In Germany, similar attempts to use sport as an instrument of social control were far more successful because of the tight regulation of the commercial entertainment sector and an already more restrictive social and political climate. Working-class associations could be blocked or banned and the lack of alternative sources of funding meant that clubs had to depend on the goodwill of individual patrons. This development further strengthened the influence of the elites and carried over into the associations which, rather than restricting themselves to the task of organizing and controlling the games, also functioned as political bodies and managed to absorb all influences from the market.

Corresponding to the other sections, the third one, 'Twentieth Century: Modernization and Expansion of Business', was intended to have two speakers. But Dave Laing (London) was unable to attend the conference and his presentation on 'The American (Dis-)Connection: British Popular Music after 1950' had to be cancelled. This left Dilwyn Porter (Leicester) as the sole speaker. Discussing the relationship between 'Sport, Business and the Media in Twentieth-Century Britain', he started by examining the long-standing links between sport and business, but focused for the most part on the role of the media. He distinguished between two forms, newspapers and television, of which the latter has arguably had a far greater impact over recent decades. Television broadcasting has not only changed the perception of the established forms of sport, but has also led to the development of new forms of 'media sport', where the media itself is responsible for changes in the form. This transformation started in the 1960s, when sport underwent an institutional reform and the previously still valued amateur ideals were discarded as outdated. Underlying this transformation were two factors: increased sponsorship by business and rapidly developing 'media sport'. Both were supported by the general growth in sports consumerism and facilitated by increasingly critical and 'anti-establishment' views within society that also pushed for institutional reform. Subsequently, the

commercial climate changed and the role of the media became progressively more important, eventually also increasing the level of interdependence and interconnectedness between the sectors of sport, media, and business.

As Porter made clear, sponsorship became one of the most important sources of revenue, which in turn also affected the nature of the sporting organizations. Since media coverage played an important role in determining the chances and amount of sponsorship and also influenced the overall popularity of individual sports and sport in general, this led to a further loss of autonomy, resulting in the transformation of sport as a product and an expansion of its links to other parts of the cultural industries. However, he also pointed out that some special cases still exist in which the cultural or national importance of sport can serve as a 'protector' against market forces, as in the case of cricket. A 'sense of bereavement' and some resistance can also be detected among the population. It might also be necessary to draw a distinction between the situation in England and that in other parts of Britain.

The final presentation of the conference was Franz Brüggemeier's (Freiburg) examination of 'The Creative Industries Concept and Cultural Politics in Contemporary Britain: A Historian's Perspective'. He provided an analysis of how from the mid-1990s onwards the idea of 'cultural industries' was linked to 'cool Britannia' and the early years of the Blair government. Essentially an economic concept and referring to a cluster of interlocking industry sectors, the political concept of 'creative industries' was in this context driven primarily by the idea of making culture more 'productive'. Brüggemeier used the definition of the concept given by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport in his presentation. This recognizes a total of eleven industrial sectors as part of the 'creative industries' and defines the term as 'those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property'. Although Brüggemeier admitted that this definition is not without its problems, he also pointed out that some statistical data supports the 'creative industries' model. 'Creative industries' have experienced steady growth over the last thirty years, account for roughly 5–7 per cent of the UK's GDP and employ roughly the same percentage of the total work-

force (and up to 30 per cent if a wider definition such as 'creative class' is used).

According to Brüggemeier, the idea of creativity also possesses a social and cultural dimension. Since creative and innovative people are an essential resource for businesses, companies might be willing to follow potential employees instead of the more established model of mobility that requires the workforce to follow potential employers. The state can thus steer economic development by attracting the 'creative class' to selected regions, which usually entails the creation of a tolerant, open, and multicultural climate. This climate is in turn fostered by the arrival of the 'creative class' and the growth process eventually gains a dynamic of its own, making further political involvement unnecessary. Brüggemeier noted that it might be tempting to regard this as the logical reaction to the experience of commercialization and cultural politics in the past and, ultimately, a merging of cultural industries and cultural politics. However, the fairly recent introduction of the concept and the still ongoing and rather controversial discussions surrounding some of the central ideas and definitions make any kind of accurate assessment impossible. A definite evaluation would clearly be premature.

The concluding remarks were provided by Andreas Gestrich (London). He noted that clear parallels in the development of the cultural industries in the spheres of music and sport had been successfully established throughout the periods covered by the conference and appreciated that the identification of these periods contributed to a general overview. On the other hand, Gestrich regretted that the differences between the two examples of sport and music had not been carved out systematically because the wide scope of the conference often did not allow for more intensive examination. However, according to Gestrich, one of the key factors that could be identified during the conference was the crucial importance of the media as an intersecting agent between the various sectors of the cultural industries. Cultural politics, on the other hand, fell somewhat short and for the most part featured only as an interference in the market, which led to a comparatively strong focus on the economic sphere. With respect to the multidimensional nature of the 'cultural industries' model Gestrich asked whether this was a somewhat deceptive result or an accurate reflection of the specifically British features of the topic. One main task of the 2009 follow-up conference, therefore, is

further to explore the cultural industries in Britain and to expose the findings to international comparisons.

STEPHAN SCHWANKE (Berlin)

Consumers in the Public Sphere: Conceptualizing the Political Public in a Consumer Society, conference of the German Historical Institute London, held at the GHIL, 23–24 May 2008.

Relations between politics and consumerism are often presented in a negative light. It is sometimes held that an increase in consumerism goes along with a decrease in political commitment. In 2007 Eric Hobsbawm suggested that participating in the market has replaced taking part in politics. The consumer has taken the place of the political citizen. It has been easy to make statements like this because although consumer research is an established field, relations between politics and consumerism have been a relatively marginal topic, especially in the German historiography.[1] Similarly, the New Political History has dealt with consumerism only in isolated cases. How the political public can be conceptualized in a consumer society was the topic of an international conference, 'Consumers in the Public Sphere', organized by Kerstin Brückweh (London).

In her introduction Brückweh developed five complexes of questions based on the observation that two types of consumers were increasingly seen on the political stage in the twentieth century: organized consumers, who gained a hearing by coming together in organizations such as co-ops; and unorganized consumers, who took part in the public discourse through the social technique of market research and opinion polling. Criticism of this technique was made mainly from the perspective of the nation-state, or of an idealized public sphere—thus Jürgen Habermas. Brückweh therefore stated the first problem as the relations between consumerism, participation, and the nation-state in the twentieth century. Some of the criticism of unpolitical consumerism has resulted from a definition that was too narrow. More recent concepts therefore see consumerism as essentially more than individual choices in the use of food or luxury goods. Rather, the term stands for a wide range of processes and structures, individuals and their actions, and thus offers access to a comprehensive analysis of modern societies. This wider perspective gave rise to Brückweh's second set of questions, which asked about

[1] The situation in Britain is different because of the research programme 'Cultures of Consumption' which ran from 2002 to 2007 and was directed by Frank Trentmann.

the limits of consumerism if, in principle, anything can be defined as consumerism. The third set also dealt with drawing boundaries, but this time from the perspective of the New Political History. The conference entered new territory by examining the hitherto uninvestigated connections between organized and unorganized consumers. It combined the history of consumerism and New Political History with research on the scientification of the social via the technique of market research and opinion polling. Therefore it had to be discussed, fourth, what relations existed between organized and unorganized consumers, and how these two types of consumers related to the classical political actors such as politicians and political parties. While market research and opinion polling claim to speak for all consumers and citizens, including the organized ones, organized consumers stand for a specific group only. Based on her own research project on market research and opinion polling in Britain, Brückweh asked, fifth, what temporal divisions were significant. In conclusion, referring to Habermas's 'Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere', she suggested that the criticisms voiced there in 1962 should be seen more as a statement by a contemporary scholar than as providing an analytical framework for the history of the second half of the twentieth century. As she pointed out, other groups of actors, such as organized consumers for example, also influenced the political public sphere.

In the first session, Sheryl Kroen (Gainesville) used films and images from the Marshall Plan period to present insights into national ideas of consumerism. While West Germany ahistorically and apolitically pushed a consumer paradise to contrast with the German Democratic Republic's rigid planned economy, the British Office of Information attempted a didactic new narrative of British capitalism since the Glorious Revolution. Kroen called for special attention to be paid to critical historical phases such as the Marshall Plan period, when the histories of democracy and capitalism were written anew. In his commentary on this paper Andreas Gestrich (London) suggested that the British propaganda material could be located more specifically in recent domestic politics, such as food rationing, rather that in a new narrative of capitalism since the seventeenth century. He also pointed to generally accepted criticism of Habermas and underlined that here it was the state that published the propaganda material. In the following discussion it was suggested that the examples from the Federal Republic could be inter-

preted as a clear counter-narrative to Nazi ideology and a continuation of Weimar history rather than as an ahistorical narrative of the post-war period.

The second session dealt with organized consumers in the political public sphere and approached the relationship between consumerism and politics from a French, British, and German perspective. Alain Chatriot (Paris) pointed out that although France had witnessed an increasing mobilization of consumers since 1945, the topic of consumerism had never been at the heart of the political debate. He saw this as a reason to investigate relations between the state and civil society, taking the numerous consumer groups as an example. All organizations found themselves caught between a desire for recognition and state support on the one hand, and the wish for independence on the other. Chatriot came to the conclusion that a re-reading of the history of consumer mobilization in France and the state's reply to these organizations demand a reassessment of Gunnar Trumbull's argument that consumer protection is an addition to existing civil rights.

In his paper on German co-ops, Michael Prinz (Münster/Bielefeld) assumed that two features were characteristic of these organizations: for a long time, German co-ops represented the biggest movement after the British one, but unlike in Britain, they disappeared almost completely. Prinz refuted the traditional explanatory patterns which suggested that there had been no effective bridge between the subsistence economy of the associations and a society based on the creation of demand—Ludwig Erhard's goal—by pointing to developments since 1890. In this view, after the rapid rise encouraged by the Allies a turning point came with the re-establishment of the Nazi Rebates Law in 1954. The Rebates Law resulted in a decline of the consumer associations' total equity. In addition, from the mid 1950s the impact of the lasting economic boom was as noticeable as the transition to self service. The consumer associations reacted to these changes by accepting that competition provided the social policy framework and that the consumer had an unrestricted right to free choice. In conclusion, Prinz established that the consumer co-ops felt responsible not to the 'customer as citizen', but to the 'citizen as customer'.

Matthew Hilton (Birmingham) dealt with British consumer activists, also taking a long-term perspective. He argued that their

myriad activities (co-ops, product testing, boycotts, and so on) alone suggest that Habermas's thesis of the passive consumer was wrong. Given the different political intensity of these forms of action, Hilton asked about the boundary between consumption and politics. The structural criteria on which he based his chronology were oriented by the changing emphases on rights and duties as the motor driving action. Three phases emerged from this. Beginning in the nineteenth century, the emphasis had been on duties. There was concern to protect the interests of others, just as protests were made on behalf of others. This phase came to an end after the Second World War, when rights were strengthened. Examples were the rise of various product-testing journals and other achievements of consumer protection. Roughly from the 1980s, however, duties were more strongly emphasized again. Hilton wanted to locate this development in a global perspective and finally came to the conclusion that the most successful consumer activities were those that were based on individual as well as collective, altruistic motives, and thus on rights as well as duties. He argued that anyone regarding consumption as a political problem should deal with basic needs.

In the commentary which followed, Andrea Ellmeier (Vienna/ Innsbruck) first established that the national historiographies were hardly connected and then asked three questions. First, who were the organized consumers, and how were they mobilized? Second, how was the public constructed? And third, who articulated the interests of the consumers? She emphasized that we were dealing with strong gender divisions in a society where women were in charge of responsible shopping, while men organized the co-ops. Thereafter the political aspect of consumption was controversially discussed. While some participants thought that consumption was strongly determined by everyday action and pragmatic solutions, others considered it necessary to rethink the existing concepts used to explain consumers in liberal societies and to incorporate overall economic developments in political analyses of consumption. As at the end of the first session, discussions developed around the relationship between the local, the national, and the global, and around consumption and capitalism. There seemed to be a consensus that more interest had to be taken in the history of capitalism within the history of consumption. Interesting for the topic of the conference was the largely negative answer to the question of whether market research had played

any part for organized consumers. Rather, it was argued, the German consumer associations had promoted a subsistence economy in the post-war period as, on the basis of their membership structure, they were familiar with need. A change became apparent, however, at the precise moment when, at least in the Federal Republic and in Britain, opinion polling (the subject of the following session) became more firmly anchored in the political system.

While organized consumers are a fairly well-researched field, the same cannot be said for unorganized consumers. Frank Mort (Manchester) presented various marketing strategies in his micro-study of Soho in London. Given that the significant goods here are 'sex and food', he described how in the 1950s businesses in the area tried to connect with the Soho of the late nineteenth century and present the area as a location of homosexual culture and modern forms of heterosexuality: Soho as a brand. Mort ended his paper at a political level with the Profumo affair, which started in Soho's consumer culture.

In her paper Judith Coffin (Austin) also dealt with the 1950s from a gender perspective. She asked how women's magazines in France created a specific image of a female public using market research and opinion polling. Coffin supported the assumption of the conference that market research cannot be separated from opinion polling, as the cost of running opinion polling institutes is covered not by prestigious political polls, for example, but by commercial sponsors such as Kodak and Palmolive, or magazines such as *Elle*. This women's magazine, she said, is interested both in its impact as a product, and in its attractiveness as a medium for advertising. It uses both established methods such as omnibus surveys and experiments in the magazine itself with quizzes, competitions, psychological tests, and questionnaires for its female readers. These techniques enable *Elle* to constitute and visualize the public which it wants to address, and the public for which it purports to speak. Coffin interpreted opinion polls as promoting the circulation of knowledge between the various sectors of mass culture. At the same time, she argued, it represents a form of communication that, in the twentieth century, replaced earlier forms of the public sphere as described by Habermas.

In a detailed commentary, Kai-Uwe Hellmann (Berlin) drew up a list of questions for both papers. He assessed Mort's paper as an early example of branding or re-branding, and in relation to Coffin's

paper, referred to the possible connection between advertising and education in women's magazines. The discussion that followed picked up on his suggestion to differentiate between terms such as 'choice' and 'decision', and argued for a historicization of these concepts also in relation to political election choices and changing party allegiances. Also discussed was whether there were limits on the topics for opinion polls and the media in which they could be published. Here the conference's dual approach, that is, political history as well as consumer history, proved to be productive again. While political or academic journals had less room for manoeuvre, women's magazines could more closely touch upon the critical issues of the day, which frequently had something to do with notions of morals.

The educational aspect raised by Hellmann was picked up by Norbert Grube (Zurich) in his paper, 'Targeting and Educating Consumers'. While 'targeting' is a general strategy of market research, he pointed out, the Institut für Demoskopie in Allensbach had introduced the concept of 'educating'. Its protagonists wanted to educate West Germans towards a market economy, while also finding out more about the Federal Republic's consumer society. A turning point was reached in the mid-1950s, when a trend towards modern (luxury) goods began, promising even workers a higher standard of living. This was associated with an educational aim which conformed with the intentions of the Adenauer government. The Allenbach pollsters initially saw consumers as passive buyers who needed guidance from above, whether from entrepreneurs or the government and its various advertising campaigns. However, this view changed in the 1960s. What was required now was information about what citizens as active consumers and voters (subconsciously) wanted in future. The institutes could hardly keep up with this utopian demand, and thus Grube saw the 1960s less as a period when market research and opinion polling blossomed than as a phase of deep insecurity. This, he suggested, resulted in a renegotiation of methods and categories. What was interesting here compared to Coffin's paper was that market researchers and opinion pollsters also experimented in various ways with alternative methods, such as the Rorschach test.

The first concern of Benjamin Ziemann (Sheffield) in his commentary was to place the historical roots of market research firmly in the inter-war period and to emphasize the role of the Allies for political opinion polling after the Second World War. He also stressed the lim-

its of technical reliability; thus public opinion polls resulted in splits and artificially produced social categories. Ziemann ended by arguing that opinion polling had led to a further disintegration of the public sphere. During the discussion, the earlier timeframe was pushed back even further to the first decade of the twentieth century when, as the American monopoly was broken, capitalism was restructured and provided the basis of a need for market research. In addition, the interplay between consumerism and politics was discussed against the background that while the same methods were used in the different areas and, especially in omnibus surveys, the same people were polled on political and consumer-related topics, clients only received the results that they had commissioned. The following session looked at the side of the clients, those who commissioned polls.

At the beginning of the last panel Lawrence Black (Durham), in his remarks on consumption in the sphere of the political, concentrated on the work of the Labour politician Tony Crosland, pointing to a connection which has been neglected so far in works on the politician. Beginning with Crosland's work on the Co-operative Independent Commission (1955–8) and the Consumers' Association (1958–64), Black analysed the politician's influence on both institutions and their impact on Crosland's political thinking and actions. Crosland criticized the traditional co-op structure which, unlike the more modern-seeming Consumers' Association which conducted product tests, was not orientated by consumers' interests. Crosland, as Black pointed out, combined this view with an assessment of the future of politics and his own party. In Crosland's writings, the adaptation to modern consumer thinking and ideas of participation was a lesson for politics. For Crosland, Black said in conclusion, consumerism provided a key forum for a lively and critical public debate. It was also a means, in Crosland's view, for reshaping the practice of politics.

The question of how consumers and Labour go together today was tackled next, by the sociologist John Clarke (Milton Keynes). His essay dealt with the construction of the 'citizen-consumer' in the course of the reform of state services from 1997. This term was coined against the background that New Labour politicians had identified consumer culture as a significant characteristic of the modern Western world. As a result, the principle of choice was applied to the 'one

size fits us all' model of the public services, which was now seen as antiquated. This had consequences for political language, political concepts, and their acceptance by citizens. One outcome of the hyphenization of the terms 'citizen' and 'consumer', according to Clarke, was the reformulation and hierarchization of relations between workers and those who could choose from what was on offer. The attempt, started by New Labour, to give the 'citizen' a new image by using the term 'consumer' was not successful in Clarke's opinion. At most, he suggested, it emphasized the neo-liberal strand in New Labour more strongly than the socialist one. In conclusion, Clarke put up for discussion the question of whether the introduction of the 'citizen-consumer' had been a strategy of depoliticization.

In her commentary Christina von Hodenberg (London) picked up on the unequal power relations between state and individual citizen. She doubted whether the concept of the consumer was useful for analysis, as it is too vague and covers up differences in, for example, ethnicity, age, or gender. She suggested that not drawing a distinction between the terms 'need' and 'want' also contributed to a lack of conceptual clarity. In conclusion, she argued for retaining parts of Habermas's concept of the public sphere, especially those relating to participation. In the discussion that followed, it was suggested that defining the consumer more narrowly, for example, as a customer or patient, only displaces the problem. Rather, both papers had shown that at critical moments, the topic of consumption was integrated into new political strategies.

Heinz-Gerhard Haupt (Bielefeld/Florence) undertook to sum up the conference. With reference to the five complexes of questions put at the beginning of the conference, the first conclusion he drew was that the phase from 1945 to 1965 had proved to be especially worth investigating in many respects: as a period of rapidly growing mass consumption; as a time when commercial market research and political opinion polling were established and linked; and as years when organized consumer associations were restructured. These developments could be attributed to changing market conditions which, he suggested, should be integrated more strongly into consumer history. The second conclusion Haupt drew from the conference was to agree with Hodenberg's criticism and call for a deconstruction of the consumer. In addition to the deconstruction of practices, types of consumers, and market segments, he suggested that a deconstruction

of the discursive figure of the consumer was highly promising for historical analysis. These topics, he said, always become susceptible of historical analysis when associations arise, that is, for example, when individuals actively combine under the label of consumer. Haupt went on to argue that the distinction between consumer wants and needs should be retained for the twentieth century, as consumption understood as fulfilling essential needs was particularly interesting for an analysis of political action. Looking at processes of depoliticization and repoliticization, he said, was especially relevant for a conceptualization of the public sphere in a consumer society, as crises in consumer society are often presented by politicians as a technical failure, or something with outside causes (almost like a natural disaster), and thus depoliticized. Against this background, Haupt emphasized that politics must be understood as a communication process. We have to ask how communication takes place about and through consumption. Work in the field of market research and opinion polling is of interest in a number of respects: they present themselves as part, first, of the history of knowledge and of science, and secondly, of the history of professionalization. Thirdly, they can be seen in the sense of Niklas Luhmann's observation of the observer as an analysis of categories and methods; and fourthly as an investigation of performative acts. The concluding discussion touched upon the myth of market research and opinion polling as an American invention, and raised the question of the USA's role on the European consumer stage. It was assumed that preconceived ideas about the USA cover up actual transfer relations.

Eleven years after Christoph Conrad was responsible for organizing the Berlin conference 'Meinungsforschung in der Geschichte moderner Demokratien' (Opinion Polling in the History of Modern Democracies), a number of significant works on political opinion polling have been published. However, the linking of research on consumerism and political opinion polling, which Conrad himself personified, has not happened. The GHIL conference, whose proceedings we plan to publish in English, revealed an occasional speechlessness between historians of consumption, scholars of the New Political History, and those researching the scientification of the social sphere. Thus further discussion and work on the intersection between these directions of research are desirable.

Conference Reports

KERSTIN BRÜCKWEH (German Historical Institute London)
CARL PHILIPP SCHUCK (Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster)

NOTICEBOARD

Research Seminar

The GHIL regularly organizes a research seminar at which recipients of grants from the Institute and other scholars report on the progress of their work. Any postgraduate or postdoctoral researchers who are interested in the subjects are welcome to attend. As a general rule, the language of the papers and discussion is German and meetings start at 5 p.m. except where indicated otherwise. Meetings held before the publication date of this *Bulletin* are recorded here as a matter of interest to readers. For further information concerning future dates please contact Dr Martina Steber on 020 7309 2015, or by email (msteber@ghil.ac.uk).

19 Aug. (3 p.m.) Dr Ralf Lützelschwab (Berlin)
Herrschen durch Heilige? Die Reliquienschätze europäischer Herrscher und Herrscherkirchen und ihr Einfluss auf die herrscherliche Legitimierung (13.–16. Jh.)

Maria Framke (Bremen)
Wahrnehmung und Wirkung des europäischen Faschismus in Indien (1922–45)

26 Aug. (3 p.m.) Uwe Ziegler (Gießen)
Zwischen England und Frankreich: Verfassungsdebatten und reformerische Praxis des preußischen Frühkonstitutionalismus, 1790 bis 1820

Dr Torsten Riotte (Frankfurt a.M.)
Legitimität und Öffentlichkeit: Exilmonarchie von Karl Stuart bis Wilhelm II.

9 Sept. Dr Oliver Werner (Leipzig)
Der Mitteldeutsche Handelsverein aus britischer Perspektive

Noticeboard

16 Sept. Dr Hiram Kümper (Bochum)
Sexualität und Gewalt in Alteuropa. Studien zur Kultur- und Rechtsgeschichte des Vergewaltigungsdeliktes: England und das Reich im Vergleich, ca.1250–1550

23 Sept. (3 p.m.) Dr Kim Priemel (Frankfurt a.O.)
Unterdruck: Arbeitnehmer-, Belegschafts- und Gewerkschaftshandeln im deutschen und britischen graphischen Gewerbe, ca.1967–91

7 Oct. Anne Neubauer (Berlin)
Britische Landwirtschaft und europäische Integration, 1957–75

28 Oct. (3 p.m.) Jun. Prof. Dr Ulrike Gehring (Trier)
Der entgrenzte Horizont: Zur Rationalisierung des Bildraumes im 17. Jahrhundert

21 Oct. Dr Andreas Bihrer (Freiburg)
Begegnungen im frühmittelalterlichen Europa: Beziehungen zwischen England und dem Reich von der Mitte des 9. bis zur Mitte des 11. Jahrhunderts

11 Nov. Karl Adam (Erlangen-Nürnberg)
Die Balkanpolitik Englands von der bosnischen Annexionskrise bis zu den Balkankriegen 1908–13

18 Nov. Dr Heidi Mehrkens (Braunschweig)
Außer Dienst: Europas abgesetzte Staatsmänner und Monarchen als politische Akteure (1815–1918)

2 Dec. Dr Silke Strickrodt (Berlin)
'The Truly Married Woman': Christian Missions and Female Education in Nineteenth-Century Sierra Leone

Scholarships Awarded by the GHIL

Each year the GHIL awards a number of research scholarships to German postgraduate and postdoctoral students to enable them to carry out research in Britain, and to British postgraduates for research visits to Germany. The scholarships are generally awarded for a period of up to six months, depending on the requirements of the research project. British applicants will normally be expected to have completed one year's postgraduate research, and be studying German history or Anglo-German relations. Scholarships are advertised twice each year on H-Soz-u-Kult and the GHIL's website. Applications may be sent in at any time, but allocations are made in April (deadline for applications 15 Mar.) for the current year and October (deadline: 30 Sept.) for the following calendar year. Applications should be addressed to the German Historical Institute London, Attention: W. Haack, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ. For further information on how to apply please consult the GHIL's website.

During their stay in Britain, German scholars present their projects and the initial results of their research at the Institute's Research Seminar, and British scholars do the same on their return from Germany. In the second allocation for 2008 the following scholarships have been awarded for research on British history, German history, and Anglo-German relations.

Karl Adam (Erlangen-Nürnberg): Die Balkanpolitik Englands von der bosnischen Annexionskrise bis zu den Balkankriegen 1908–13
Dr Andreas Bihrer (Freiburg): Begegnungen im frühmittelalterlichen Europa: Beziehungen zwischen England und dem Reich von der Mitte des 9. bis zur Mitte des 11. Jahrhunderts
Maria Framke (Bremen): Wahrnehmung und Wirkung des europäischen Faschismus in Indien (1922–45)
Jun. Prof. Dr Ulrike Gehring (Trier): Der entgrenzte Horizont: Zur Rationalisierung des Bildraumes im 17. Jahrhundert
Karoly Konecsny (Exeter): The German Military Administration in the Operational Areas of Hungary
Dr Hiram Kümper (Bochum): Sexualität und Gewalt in Alteuropa. Studien zur Kultur- und Rechtsgeschichte des Vergewaltigungsdeliktes: England und das Reich im Vergleich, ca.1250–1550

Martin Lenk (Berlin): Tugend, Kommerz und Militär: Politiktheoretischer Diskurs und politische Öffentlichkeit in England, 1678–1683
Dr Heidi Mehrkens (Braunschweig): Außer Dienst: Europas abgesetzte Staatsmänner und Monarchen als politische Akteure (1815–1918)
Stefan Moitra (London): Working-Class Culture and Cinema in Germany and Britain after 1945: A Comparative Study of South Wales and the Ruhr
Anne Neubauer (Berlin): Britische Landwirtschaft und europäische Integration, 1957–75
Dr Kim Priemel (Frankfurt a.O.): Unterdruck: Arbeitnehmer-, Belegschafts- und Gewerkschaftshandeln im deutschen und britischen graphischen Gewerbe, ca.1967–91
Dr Silke Strickrodt (Berlin): 'The Truly Married Woman': Christian Missions and Female Education in Nineteenth-Century Sierra Leone
Christiane Winkler (London): Zwischen Historisierung, Memorisierung und Aktualisierung: Heimkehr aus der Kriegsgefangenschaft in Ost- und Westdeutschland
Uwe Ziegler (Gießen): Zwischen England und Frankreich: Verfassungsdebatten und reformerische Praxis des preußischen Frühkonstitutionalismus, 1790 bis 1820

Forthcoming Conferences

Knowledge-Production and Pedagogy in Colonial India: Missionaries, Orientalists, and Reformers in Institutional Contexts. Conference to be held at the GHIL/SOAS, 13–15 November 2008.

Recent scholarship on colonial knowledge-production has moved beyond the discourse analysis inspired by the work of Edward Said towards a more historically nuanced and richly 'sourced' understanding of the subject. The overall effect of this recent research has been to revise our notions of colonial knowledge as a whole—from the coherent and hegemonic instrument of rule advocated by an earlier generation of scholars to a more fractured, dialogically produced, potentially open-ended, and socially unstable mass of ideas and practices.

New lines of research have addressed the wider intellectual contextualization (both in the colony and metropole) of 'orientalist' (and to a certain extent missionary) knowledge (Majeed 1992, Mackenzie 1995), as well as a deeper exploration of the careers of colonial scholars and particularly their relations with indigenous 'informants' and cultural 'intermediaries' (Irschik 1994, Bayly 1996, Wagoner 2003, Dodson 2002). In addition, these studies have broadened the field of enquiry to include the contribution of European, mainly German, scholarship (Rocher 1993, Pollock 1993, Dalmia 2003). This conference will seek to take stock of this revisionist historiography by looking at the interface between ideas and practice—between the diffuse and fractured knowledge produced by Orientalists, missionaries, and local interlocutors on the one hand, and the potentially more 'blunt' new educational institutions founded under colonial rule on the other. Potential research questions which will be explored at the conference will include the following:

- the degree to which the production of knowledge about India and the generation of policies in education and reform were more or less continuous or at variance with one another across time;
- conceptual, methodological, and stylistic differences between various strands of colonial scholarship as they impinged upon the development of pedagogical realities;
- the potentially diverse relations between schools, museums, and centres of higher learning; the importance of Indian elites in the production and pedagogic implementation of this knowledge about India;
- how we might approach the wider dissemination of orientalist pedagogies beyond the realm of colonial institutions.

For further information contact:
Dr Indra Sengupta, German Historical Institute London (isengupta@ghil.ac.uk) or Dr Daud Ali, School of Oriental and African Studies (da7@soas.ac.uk).

Re-imaging Democracy 1750–1850: Government, Participation, and Welfare in German Territories. Joint Conference of the University of Oxford, the Historisches Seminar of the University of Munich, and the German Historical Institute London, to be held in Munich, 9–10 January 2009.

This meeting is being organized against the background of an Oxford-based project, 'Re-imagining democracy 1750–1850', convened by Mark Philp and Joanna Innes. The larger question with which the project seeks to engage is: how should the history of democracy be written? How should this history be formulated and set out to meet the needs and expectations of scholars operating in the early twenty-first century? As the project is conceived, it is particularly concerned with a formative period in the history of modern democracy: a period when 'democracy' ceased to be almost universally a term of reprobation and came to be re-imagined as desirable, or at least as an emergent force with which it was important to come to terms.

The meeting in Munich is intended to set up a dialogue between British and German historians about the German specificities of the development of modern democracy. In a general sense it is concerned both with what contemporaries called 'democracy'—with ways in which the word was employed and this form of regime conceptualized—and with a larger set of practices and attitudes which we today might think of as democratic. Some of the aspects which will be addressed are the conceptual history of the term democracy; constitutionalism; the ideal and reality of the reform states; the role of representative bodies, local government, and the press; contemporary theories of society; the modern concept of *neuständische Gesellschaft*; and questions of social status and belonging.

Postgraduate Students' Conference

On 15–17 January 2009 the German Historical Institute London will hold its thirteenth annual conference for postgraduate research students in the UK and Ireland working on German history, Anglo–German relations, or comparative topics. The intention is to give

Ph.D. students an opportunity to present their work in progress and to discuss it with other students working in the same field. It is hoped that the exchange of ideas and methods will be fruitful for all participants. The Institute will meet travel expenses up to a standard rail fare within the UK (special arrangements for students from Ireland), and also arrange and pay for student accommodation, where necessary, for those who live outside London. For further information please contact the Secretary, Anita Bellamy, by phone on 020 7309 2023, or by email (abellamy@ghil.ac.uk).

German Images of 'the West' in the 'Long Nineteenth Century'. Conference to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 2–4 July 2009. Organizers: Dr Riccardo Bavaj and Dr Bernhard Struck (St Andrews), Prof. Andreas Gestrich and Dr des. Martina Steber (GHIL).

Images of 'the West' have played a decisive role in modern German history. Until the middle of the twentieth century a sharp divide between 'Western civilization' and 'German culture' dominated the political discourse, but after 1949 German politicians ensured that the Federal Republic was anchored in 'the West' and German intellectuals alluded to the 'Western' role model. Models of the 'West' were adopted by historiography. They included the concept of 'Westernization' (Anselm Doering-Manteuffel), accentuated by consensus liberalism, and the normative model of 'the long road West' (Heinrich August Winkler), used to characterize a specific German path to modernity.

However, in the process of analytic modelling almost inevitably unambiguous images of 'the West' are constructed. With a shift of focus to actual historical perceptions of 'the West' the unambiguousness starts to dissolve. What emerges instead is a plurality of conflicting notions.

Focusing mainly on the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the conference intends to historicize the concept. Asking for elements of appropriation and rejection, taking seriously the spatial dimension, and grasping the concept's inherent dynamism, the conference

seeks to scrutinize the function of images of 'the West' within political discourse.

For further information contact:
Dr des. Martina Steber (msteber@ghil.ac.uk).

New Approaches to Political History: Writing British and German Contemporary History. Summer school to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 7–12 September 2009. Organizers: Kerstin Brückweh (GHIL) and Martina Steber (GHIL).

For some time, historians in Britain and Germany have been thinking (often independently of each other) about how a 'new' political history can be written. They start from an open, constructivist, and dynamic concept of politics, thereby releasing 'the political' from a perspective focused solely on (nation-)states, political parties, and interest groups. On the one hand established themes such as power or rule are re-examined; on the other, attention is drawn to fields that are new to political history (for example, emotions). These new departures bear various labels, such as 'New Political History' or 'Cultural History of Politics'. So far there has been little exchange between British and German historians. The GHIL Summer School 'New Approaches to Political History: Writing British and German Contemporary History' seeks to set up such an exchange, and to concentrate the dialogue on German and British history since 1945. In four sessions, Ph.D. students and post-docs will debate their work and conduct a theoretical-methodological discussion under the guidance of German and British experts: (1) Changing focuses of attention: religion and emotion; (2) Linked spheres: politics and society; (3) New rules of the political game: state and parties in transition; (4) Politics in a globalized world: security and transnationalization.

For further information contact:
Dr des. Martina Steber (msteber@ghil.ac.uk) or Dr Kerstin Brückweh (kbrueckweh@ghil.ac.uk).

LIBRARY NEWS

Recent Acquisitions

This list contains a selection of recent publications in German and English, primarily on German history, acquired by the Library of the GHIL in the past year.

Allemeyer, Marie Luisa, *Fewersnoth und Flammenschwert: Stadtbrände in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007)

Altrichter, Helmut (ed.), *Adenauers Moskaubesuch 1955: Eine Reise im internationalen Kontext*, Rhöndorfer Gespräche, 22 (Bonn: Bouvier, 2007)

Aly, Götz and Michael Sontheimer, *Fromms: Wie der jüdische Kondomfabrikant Julius F. unter die deutschen Räuber fiel* (2nd edn.; Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2007)

Arendt, Hannah, *The Jewish Writings*, ed. Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman (New York: Schocken Books, 2007)

Argast, Regula, *Staatsbürgerschaft und Nation: Ausschließung und Integration in der Schweiz 1848–1933*, Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, 174 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007)

Asch, Ronald G., *Europäischer Adel in der Frühen Neuzeit: Eine Einführung* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2008)

Auer, Leopold, Werner Ogris, et al. (eds.), *Höchstgerichte in Europa: Bausteine frühneuzeitlicher Rechtsordnungen*, Quellen und Forschungen zur Höchsten Gerichtsbarkeit im Alten Reich, 53 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007)

Backes, Uwe and Henrik Steglich (eds.), *Die NPD: Erfolgsbedingungen einer rechtsextremistischen Partei*, Extremismus und Demokratie, 17 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2007)

Bade, Klaus J., Pieter C. Emmer, et al. (eds.), *Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa: Vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008)

Bahlcke, Joachim (ed.), *Die Oberlausitz im frühneuzeitlichen Mitteleuropa: Beziehungen, Strukturen, Prozesse*, Quellen und Forschungen zur Sächsischen Geschichte, 30 (Leipzig: Verlag der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, 2007)

Balbier, Uta Andrea, *Kalter Krieg auf der Aschenbahn. Der deutsch-deutsche Sport 1950–1972: Eine politische Geschichte* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007)

Barry, Jonathan and Owen Davies (eds.), *Palgrave Advances in Witchcraft Historiography* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)

Bechhaus-Gerst, Marianne, *Treu bis in den Tod. Von Deutsch-Ostafrika nach Sachsenhausen: Eine Lebensgeschichte*, Schlaglichter der Kolonialgeschichte, 7 (Berlin: Links, 2007)

Beckett, Ian Frederick William (ed.), *Modern Counter-Insurgency* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007)

Behrmann, Carolin, Arne Karsten, and Philipp Zitzlsperger (eds.), *Grab, Kult, Memoria: Studien zur gesellschaftlichen Funktion von Erinnerung* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007)

Bender, Peter, *Deutschlands Wiederkehr: Eine ungeteilte Nachkriegsgeschichte 1945–1990* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2007)

Bernet, Claus, *'Gebaute Apokalypse': Die Utopie des Himmlischen Jerusalem in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz, 215 (Mainz: von Zabern, 2007)

Betz, Hans Dieter et al. (eds.), *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft*, 9 vols. (4th rev. edn.; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998–2007)

Beyrau, Dietrich, Michael Hochgeschwender, et al. (eds.), *Formen des Krieges: Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, Krieg in der Geschichte, 37 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007)

Biess, Frank, Mark Roseman, et al. (eds.), *Conflict, Catastrophe and Continuity: Essays on Modern German History* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007)

Blackbourn, David and James Retallack (eds.), *Localism, Landscape, and the Ambiguities of Place: German-Speaking Central Europe, 1860–1930*, German and European Studies (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007)

Blanning, Tim, *The Pursuit of Glory: Europe 1648–1815*, The Penguin History of Europe, 6 (London: Allen Lane, 2007)

Blaschke, Karlheinz (ed.), *Moritz von Sachsen. Ein Fürst der Reformationszeit zwischen Territorium und Reich: Internationales wissenschaftliches Kolloquium vom 26. bis 28. Juni 2003 in Freiberg (Sachsen)*, Quellen und Forschungen zur Sächsischen Geschichte, 29 (Leipzig: Verlag der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, 2007)

Brechenmacher, Thomas (ed.), *Das Reichskonkordat 1933: Forschungsstand, Kontroversen, Dokumente*, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Zeitgeschichte. Reihe B: Forschungen, 109 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007)

Brenner, Wolfgang, *Walther Rathenau: Deutscher und Jude* (Munich: Piper, 2007)

Burkhardt, Kai, *Adolf Grimme (1889–1963): Eine Biografie*, Veröffentlichungen aus den Archiven Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Beiheft 11 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007)

Burleigh, Michael Christopher Bennet, *Sacred Causes: Religion and Politics from the European Dictators to Al Qaeda* (London: Harper Perennial, 2007)

Chickering, Roger, *The Great War and Urban Life in Germany: Freiburg, 1914–1918*, Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)

Czech, Hans-Jörg and Nikola Doll (eds.), *Kunst und Propaganda im Streit der Nationen 1930–1945: Eine Ausstellung des Deutschen Historischen Museums Berlin in Zusammenarbeit mit The Wolfsonian-Florida International University, Miami Beach, Florida, The Mitchell Wolfson, Jr. Collection* (Dresden: Sandstein, 2007)

Dahlmann, Dittmar (ed.), *Unfreiwilliger Aufbruch: Migration und Revolution von der Französischen Revolution bis zum Prager Frühling*, Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 2 (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2007)

Davis, John R. (ed.), *Richard Cobden's German Diaries*, Prinz-Albert-Forschungen, 2 (Munich: Saur, 2007)

Davis, John R., *The Victorians and Germany* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2007)

Dean, Martin, Constantin Goschler, et al. (ed.), *Robbery and Restitution: The Conflict over Jewish Property in Europe*, published in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, War and Genocide, 9 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007)

Diner, Dan, *Gegenläufige Gedächtnisse: Über Geltung und Wirkung des Holocaust*, Toldot, 7 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007)

Dörner, Bernward, *Die Deutschen und der Holocaust: Was niemand wissen wollte, aber jeder wissen konnte* (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 2007)

Doerry, Martin, *'Mein verwundetes Herz': Das Leben der Lilli Jahn 1900–1944*, afterword Brigitte Hamann (Hamburg: Spiegel-Verlag, 2007)

Duchhardt, Heinz, *Stein: Eine Biographie* (Münster: Aschendorff, 2007)

Duchhardt, Heinz (ed.), *Stein: Die späten Jahre des preußischen Reformers 1815–1831* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007)

Duchhardt, Heinz, *Stein-Facetten: Studien zu Karl vom und zum Stein* (Münster: Aschendorff, 2007)

Duhamelle, Christophe, Andreas Kossert, et al. (eds.), *Grenzregionen: Ein europäischer Vergleich vom 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2007)

Echternkamp, Jörg and Stefan Martens (eds.), *Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Europa: Erfahrung und Erinnerung* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007)

Eckel, Jan and Thomas Etzemüller (eds.), *Neue Zugänge zur Geschichte der Geschichtswissenschaft* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007)

Eckert, Andreas, *Herrschen und Verwalten: Afrikanische Bürokraten, staatliche Ordnung und Politik in Tanzania, 1920–1970*, Studien zur internationalen Geschichte, 16 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007)

Edgerton, David, *The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)

Eichengreen, Barry, *The European Economy Since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond*, The Princeton Economic History of the Western World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007)

Eichenhofer, Eberhard, *Geschichte des Sozialstaats in Europa: Von der 'sozialen Frage' bis zur Globalisierung* (Munich: Beck, 2007)

Elzer, Herbert, *Die Schmeisser-Affäre: Herbert Blankenhorn, der 'Spiegel' und die Umtriebe des französischen Geheimdienstes im Nachkriegsdeutschland, 1946–1958*, Historische Mitteilungen, Beiheft 68 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2008)

Fäßler, Peter E., *Globalisierung: Ein historisches Kompendium* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007)

Fahrmeir, Andreas, *Citizenship: The Rise and Fall of a Modern Concept* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007)

Fest, Joachim, *Albert Speer: Conversations with Hitler's Architect*, trans. Patrick Camiller (Cambridge, Mass.: Polity Press, 2007)

Fleckner, Uwe (ed.), *Angriff auf die Avantgarde: Kunst und Kunstpolitik im Nationalsozialismus*, Schriften der Forschungsstelle 'Entartete Kunst', 1 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007)

Förster, Jürgen, *Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat: Eine strukturgeschichtliche Analyse*, Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte. Militärgeschichte kompakt, 2 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007)

François, Etienne, Jörg Seifahrt, et al. (eds.), *Die Grenze als Raum, Erfahrung und Konstruktion: Deutschland, Frankreich und Polen vom 17. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2007)

Frei, Norbert (ed.), *Martin Broszat, der 'Staat Hitlers' und die Historisierung des Nationalsozialismus*, Vorträge und Kolloquien/Jena Center Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, 1 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007)

Friedrich, Susanne, *Drehscheibe Regensburg: Das Informations- und Kommunikationssystem des Immerwährenden Reichstags um 1700*, Colloquia Augustana, 23 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007)

Friedrich, Thomas, *Die missbrauchte Hauptstadt: Hitler und Berlin* (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 2007)

Gebhardt, Miriam and Clemens Wischermann (eds.), *Familiensozialisation seit 1933: Verhandlungen über Kontinuität*, Studien zur Geschichte des Alltags, 25 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2007)

Geiss, Imanuel, *Nation und Nationalismen: Versuche über ein Weltproblem 1962–2006*, Presse und Geschichte, 26 (Bremen: edition lumière, 2007)

Gerhardt, Uta, *Denken der Demokratie. Die Soziologie im atlantischen Transfer des Besatzungsregimes: Vier Abhandlungen*, Transatlantische Historische Studien, 31 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2007)

Geulen, Christian, *Geschichte des Rassismus* (Munich: Beck, 2007)

Gieseke, Jens (ed.), *Staatssicherheit und Gesellschaft: Studien zum Herrschaftsalltag in der DDR*, Analysen und Dokumente, 30 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007)

Glienke, Stephan Alexander and Volker Paulmann (eds.), *Erfolgsgeschichte Bundesrepublik? Die Nachkriegsgesellschaft im langen Schatten des Nationalsozialismus* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2008)

Gotthard, Axel, *In der Ferne: Die Wahrnehmung des Raums in der Vormoderne* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2007)

Gräfe, Thomas, *Antisemitismus in Deutschland 1815–1918: Rezensionen, Forschungsüberblick, Bibliographie* (Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 2007)

Gregor, Neil (ed.), *Nazism, War and Genocide: New Perspectives on the History of the Third Reich* (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2008)

Grieger, Manfred and Dirk Schlinkert (eds.), *'Niemand wusste, was morgen sein würde': Ehemalige Zwangsarbeiter des Volkswagenwerks erinnern sich* (Wolfsburg: Volkswagen AG, 2007)

Grunert, Frank and Friedrich Vollhardt (eds.), *Historia literaria: Neuordnungen des Wissens im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007)

Haase, Christian, *Pragmatic Peacemakers: Institutes of International Affairs and the Liberalization of West Germany 1945–73*, Beiträge zur England-Forschung, 58 (Augsburg: Wißner, 2007)

Hachtmann, Rüdiger, *Tourismus-Geschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007)

Hachtmann, Rüdiger, *Wissenschaftsmanagement im 'Dritten Reich': Geschichte der Generalverwaltung der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft*, Geschichte der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft im Nationalsozialismus, 15, 2 vols. (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007)

Haftendorn, Helga, Georges-Henri Soutou, et al. (eds.), *The Strategic Triangle: France, Germany, and the United States in the Shaping of the New Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007)

Hahn, Peter-Michael, *Friedrich der Große und die deutsche Nation: Geschichte als politisches Argument* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007)

Hammer, Paul E. J. (ed.), *Warfare in Early Modern Europe 1450–1660* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007)

Haustein, Sabine, *Vom Mangel zum Massenkonsum: Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien im Vergleich 1945–1970*, Campus Forschung, 910 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2007)

Henke, Klaus-Dietmar (ed.), *Tödliche Medizin im Nationalsozialismus: Von der Rassenhygiene zum Massenmord*, Schriften des Deutschen Hygiene-Museums Dresden, 7 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2008)

Herbstritt, Georg, *Bundesbürger im Dienst der DDR-Spionage: Eine analytische Studie*, Analysen und Dokumente, 29 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007)

Hermes, Peter, *Meine Zeitgeschichte: 1922–1987*, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Zeitgeschichte. Reihe A: Quellen, 52 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007)

Herzt, Deborah Sadie, *How Jews Became Germans: The History of Conversion and Assimilation in Berlin* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007)

Hilmes, Oliver, *Herrin des Hügels: Das Leben der Cosima Wagner* (4th edn.; Berlin: Siedler, 2007)

Hirschinger, Frank, *Fälschung und Instrumentalisierung antifaschistischer Biographien: Das Beispiel Halle/Saale 1945–2005*, Berichte und Studien/Hannah-Arendt-Institut für Totalitarismusforschung, 53 (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2007)

Hockerts, Hans Günter, Claudia Moisel, et al. (eds.), *Grenzen der Wiedergutmachung: Die Entschädigung für NS-Verfolgte in West- und Osteuropa 1945–2000* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006)

Hoegen, Jesko von, *Der Held von Tannenberg: Genese und Funktion des Hindenburg-Mythos*, Stuttgarter Historische Forschungen, 4 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007)

Hoffmann, Peter, *Stauffenbergs Freund: Die tragische Geschichte des Widerstandskämpfers Joachim Kuhn* (Munich: Beck, 2007)

Holzer, Anton, *Die andere Front: Fotografie und Propaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg. Mit unveröffentlichten Originalaufnahmen aus dem Bildarchiv der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek* (Darmstadt: Primus, 2007)

Horn, Gerd-Rainer, *The Spirit of '68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956–1976* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)

Hotson, Howard, *Commonplace Learning: Ramism and its German Ramifications, 1543–1630*, Oxford-Warburg Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)

Housley, Norman (ed.), *Knighthoods of Christ: Essays on the History of the Crusades and the Knights Templar, presented to Malcolm Barber* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007)

Hughes, R. Gerald, *Britain, Germany and the Cold War: The Search for a European Détente 1949–1967*, Cold War History Series, 17 (London: Routledge, 2007)

Hummel, Karl-Joseph and Christoph Kösters (eds.), *Zwangsarbeit und Katholische Kirche 1939–1945: Geschichte und Erinnerung, Entschädigung und Versöhnung. Eine Dokumentation*, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Zeitgeschichte. Reihe B: Forschungen, 110 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008)

Jansen, Christian and Henning Borggräfe, *Nation, Nationalität, Nationalismus*, Historische Einführungen, 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2007)

Jarausch, Konrad Hugo and Thomas Lindenberger (eds.), *Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories*, Studies in Contemporary European History, 3 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007)

Jessen, Olaf, *'Preußens Napoleon'? Ernst von Rüchel, 1754–1823: Krieg im Zeitalter der Vernunft* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007)

Johanek, Peter (ed.), *Die Stadt und ihr Rand*, Städteforschung. Reihe A, 70 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2008)

John, Jürgen, Horst Möller, et al. (eds.), *Die NS-Gaue: Regionale Mittelinstanzen im zentralistischen 'Führerstaat'*, Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte. Sondernummer (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007)

Jünger, Gretha, *Briefwechsel Gretha Jünger, Carl Schmitt: 1934–1953*, ed. Ingeborg Villinger and Alexander Jaser (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007)

Jüttemann, Veronika, *Im Glauben vereint: Männer und Frauen im protestantischen Milieu Ostwestfalens 1845–1918*, L'Homme Schriften, 16 (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008)

Junghans, Helmar (ed.), *Die sächsischen Kurfürsten während des Religionsfriedens von 1555 bis 1618*, Quellen und Forschungen zur Sächsischen Geschichte, 31 (Leipzig: Verlag der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, 2007)

Juterczenka, Sünne, *Über Gott und die Welt: Endzeitvisionen, Reformdebatten und die europäische Quäkermission in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, 143 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008)

Kaiser, Tobias, *Karl Griewank (1900–1953): Ein deutscher Historiker im 'Zeitalter der Extreme'*, Pallas Athene, 23 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2007)

Karlauf, Thomas, *Stefan George. Die Entdeckung des Charisma: Biographie* (2nd edn.; Munich: Blessing, 2007)

Keipert, Maria (ed.), *Biographisches Handbuch des deutschen Auswärtigen Dienstes*, iii. *L–R* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2008)

Kess, Alexandra, *Johann Sleidan and the Protestant Vision of History*, St Andrews Studies in Reformation History (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008)

Kessler, Mario, *Ossip K. Flechtheim: Politischer Wissenschaftler und Zukunftsdenker, 1909–1998*, Zeithistorische Studien, 41 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007)

Kiernan, Ben, *Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007)

Klee, Ernst, *Das Kulturlexikon zum Dritten Reich: Wer war was vor und nach 1945* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2007)

Kleedehn, Patrick, *Die Rückkehr auf den Weltmarkt: Die Internationalisierung der Bayer AG Leverkusen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zum Jahre 1961*, Beiträge zur Unternehmensgeschichte, 26 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2007)

Klimke, Martin and Joachim Scharloth (eds.), *1968: Handbuch zur Kultur- und Mediengeschichte der Studentenbewegung* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2007)

Knabe, Hubertus, *Die Täter sind unter uns: Über das Schönreden der SED-Diktatur* (4th edn.; Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 2007)

Kollmeier, Kathrin, *Ordnung und Ausgrenzung: Die Disziplinarpolitik der Hitler-Jugend*, Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, 180 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007)

Koop, Volker, *'Dem Führer ein Kind schenken': Die SS-Organisation Lebensborn e.V.* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007)

Koop, Volker, *Kai-Uwe von Hassel: Eine politische Biographie* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007)

Kopper, Christopher, *Die Bahn im Wirtschaftswunder: Deutsche Bundesbahn und Verkehrspolitik in der Nachkriegsgesellschaft*, Beiträge zur historischen Verkehrsforschung, 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2007)

Krassnitzer, Patrick and Petra Overath (eds.), *Bevölkerungsfragen: Prozesse des Wissenstransfers in Deutschland und Frankreich, 1870–1939* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007)

Kriedte, Peter, *Taufgesinnte und großes Kapital: Die niederrheinisch-bergischen Mennoniten und der Aufstieg des Krefelder Seidengewerbes, Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts bis 1815*, Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, 223 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007)

Kroll, Thomas, *Kommunistische Intellektuelle in Westeuropa: Frankreich, Österreich, Italien und Großbritannien im Vergleich, 1945–1956*, Industrielle Welt, 71 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007)

Labouvie, Eva (ed.), *Adel in Sachsen-Anhalt: Höfische Kultur zwischen Repräsentation, Unternehmertum und Familie* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007)

Labouvie, Eva and Ramona Myrrhe (eds.), *Familienbande – Familienschande: Geschlechterverhältnisse in Familie und Verwandtschaft* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007)

Lappenküper, Ulrich, *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 bis 1990*, Enzyklopädie deutscher Geschichte, 83 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008)

Leeb, Rudolf, Susanne Claudine Pils, et al. (eds.), *Staatsmacht und Seelenheil: Gegenreformation und Geheimprotestantismus in der Habsburgermonarchie*, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, 47 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007)

Levy, Daniel and Natan Sznaider, *Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter: Der Holocaust* (new edn.; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2007)

Lillteicher, Jürgen, *Raub, Recht und Restitution: Die Rückerstattung jüdischen Eigentums in der frühen Bundesrepublik*, Moderne Zeit, 15 (2nd edn.; Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007)

Luks, Leonid, *Zwei Gesichter des Totalitarismus: Bolschewismus und Nationalsozialismus im Vergleich, 16 Skizzen* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007)

Maier, Helmut, *Forschung als Waffe: Rüstungsforschung in der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft und das Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Metallforschung 1900–1945/48*, Geschichte der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft im Nationalsozialismus, 16, 2 vols. (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2007)

Martin, John Jeffries (ed.), *The Renaissance World* (New York: Routledge, 2007)

Mawdsley, Evan, *Thunder in the East: The Nazi–Soviet War 1941–1945* (London: Hodder Arnold, 2007)

Mayer, Hans, *Aussenseiter*, afterword Doron Rabinovici (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2007)

Mendelsohn, Daniel, *The Lost: A Search for Six of Six Million* (London: HarperCollins, 2007)

Michalske, Hainer, *Die Gutenberg-Reichsausstellung 1940: Ein Beitrag zur nationalsozialistischen Kulturpolitik*, Beiträge zur Kommunikationsgeschichte, 18 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2007)

Michl, Susanne, *Im Dienste des 'Volkskörpers': Deutsche und französische Ärzte im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, 177 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007)

Mlynarczyk, Jacek Andrzej, *Judenmord in Zentralpolen: Der Distrikt Radom im Generalgouvernement 1939–1945*, Veröffentlichungen der Forschungsstelle Ludwigsburg der Universität Stuttgart, 9 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007)

Moe, Espen, *Governance, Growth and Global Leadership: The Role of the State in Technological Progress, 1750–2000*, Modern Economic and Social History (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007)

Moses, Anthony Dirk, *German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)

Müller, Jan-Dirk et al. (eds.), *Text und Kontext: Fallstudien und theoretische Begründungen einer kulturwissenschaftlich angeleiteten Mediävistik*, Schriften des Historischen Kollegs. Kolloquien, 64 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007)

Nagel, Jürgen G., *Abenteuer Fernhandel: Die Ostindienkompanien* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007)

Nagl, Dominik, *Grenzfälle: Staatsangehörigkeit, Rassismus und nationale Identität unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft*, Afrika und Europa, 5 (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2007)

Naumann, Klaus, *Generale in der Demokratie: Generationsgeschichtliche Studien zur Bundeswehrelite* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2007)

Nelson, Janet Laughland, *Courts, Elites, and Gendered Power in the Early Middle Ages: Charlemagne and Others*, Variorum Collected Studies Series, 878 (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 2007)

Neugebauer, Karl-Volker (ed.), *Grundkurs deutsche Militärgeschichte*, ii. *Das Zeitalter der Weltkriege 1914 bis 1945: Völker in Waffen* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007)

Nicklas, Thomas and Matthias Schnettger (eds.), *Politik und Sprache im frühneuzeitlichen Europa*, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz, Beiheft 71: Abt. für Universalgeschichte (Mainz: von Zabern, 2007)

Niven, Bill, *The Buchenwald Child: Truth, Fiction, and Propaganda* (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2007)

Pauler, Roland, *Leben im Mittelalter: Ein Lexikon* (Darmstadt: Primus, 2007)

Pyta, Wolfram, *Hindenburg: Herrschaft zwischen Hohenzollern und Hitler* (Munich: Siedler, 2007)

Raasch, Markus, *'Wir sind Bayer'*, Düsseldorfer Schriften zur neueren Landesgeschichte und zur Geschichte Nordrhein-Westfalens, 78 (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2007)

Randig, Christina, *Aufklärung und Region: Gerhard Anton von Halem (1752–1819),* Publikationen, Korrespondenzen, Sozietäten (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2007)

Richter, Sebastian, *Norm und Eigensinn: Die Selbstlegitimation politischen Protests in der DDR 1985–1989*, Zeitgeschichten, 4 (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2007)

Rohrschneider, Michael and Arno Strohmeyer, *Wahrnehmungen des Fremden: Differenzerfahrungen von Diplomaten im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, Schriftenreihe der Vereinigung zur Erforschung der Neueren Geschichte e.V., 31 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2007)

Rürup, Reinhard with the assistance of Michael Schüring, *Schicksale und Karrieren: Gedenkbuch für die von den Nationalsozialisten aus der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft vertriebenen Forscherinnen und Forscher*, Geschichte der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft im Nationalsozialismus, 14 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2008)

Rutz, Rainer, *Signal: Eine deutsche Auslandsillustrierte als Propagandainstrument im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2007)

Sabrow, Martin, Rainer Eckert, et al. (eds.), *Wohin treibt die DDR-Erinnerung? Dokumentation einer Debatte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007)

Sarasin, Philipp, Silvia Berger, et al. (eds.), *Bakteriologie und Moderne: Studien zur Biopolitik des Unsichtbaren, 1870–1920* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2007)

Schäbler, Birgit (ed.), *Area Studies und die Welt: Weltregionen und neue Globalgeschichte,* Globalgeschichte und Entwicklungspolitik, 5 (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2007)

Schenk, Dieter, *Der Lemberger Professorenmord und der Holocaust in Ostgalizien* (Bonn: Dietz, 2007)

Scherstjanoi, Elke, *SED-Agrarpolitik unter sowjetischer Kontrolle 1949–1953*, Veröffentlichungen zur SBZ-/DDR-Forschung im Institut für Zeitgeschichte; Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 70 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007)

Schilling, Heinz and Heribert Smolinsky (eds.), *Der Augsburger Religionsfrieden 1555: Wissenschaftliches Symposium aus Anlaß des 450. Jahrestages des Friedensschlusses, Augsburg 21. bis 25. September 2005*, Reformationsgeschichtliche Studien und Texte, 150 (Münster: Aschendorff, 2007)

Schindler, Norbert, *Der Prozess der Zivilisation in der Kleinstadt: Die Traunsteiner Kaufmannsfamilie Oberhueber (1600–1800)* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2007)

Schlaffer, Rudolf J. and Wolfgang Schmidt (eds.), *Wolf Graf von Baudissin 1907–1993: Modernisierer zwischen totalitärer Herrschaft und freiheitlicher Ordnung* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007)

Seyferth, Alexander, *Die Heimatfront 1870/71: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im deutsch-französischen Krieg*, Krieg in der Geschichte, 35 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007)

Stein, Claudius, *Staatskirchentum, Reformkatholizismus und Orthodoxie im Kurfürstentum Bayern der Spätaufklärung: Der Erdinger Landrichter Joseph von Widnmann und sein Umfeld (1781–1803)*, Schriftenreihe zur bayerischen Landesgeschichte, 157 (Munich: Beck, 2007)

Steinmetz, Willibald (ed.), *'Politik': Situationen eines Wortgebrauchs im Europa der Neuzeit*, Historische Politikforschung, 14 (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2007)

Stephan, Inge and Alexandra Tacke (eds.), *NachBilder des Holocaust*, Literatur, Kultur, Geschlecht (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007)

Studt, Birgit (ed.), *Haus- und Familienbücher in der städtischen Gesellschaft des Spätmittelalters und der Frühen Neuzeit*, Städteforschung. Reihe A: Darstellungen, 69 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007)

Unseld, Siegfried, *Der Briefwechsel: Siegfried Unseld, Peter Weiss*, ed. Rainer Gerlach (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2007)

Usborne, Cornelie, *Cultures of Abortion in Weimar Germany* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007)

Vogler, Günter (ed.), *Bauernkrieg zwischen Harz und Thüringer Wald*, Historische Mitteilungen, Beiheft 69 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2008)

Weber, Hermann and Ulrich Mählert (eds.), *Verbrechen im Namen der Idee: Terror im Kommunismus 1936–1938* (Berlin: Aufbau Taschenbuchverlag, 2007)

Weigelt, Horst, *Von Schlesien nach Amerika: Die Geschichte des Schwenckfeldertums*, Neue Forschungen zur schlesischen Geschichte, 14 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007)

Weis, Eberhard (ed.), *Die Protokolle des Bayerischen Staatsrats 1799 bis 1817*, i. *1799 bis 1801*, ed. Reinhard Stauber; ii. *1802 bis 1807*, ed. Esteban Mauerer (Munich: Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2006, 2008)

Weiß, Dieter J., *Kronprinz Rupprecht von Bayern (1869–1955): Eine politische Biografie* (Regensburg: Pustet, 2007)

Wentker, Hermann, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen: Die DDR im internationalen System 1949–1989*, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 72; Veröffentlichungen zur SBZ-/DDR-Forschung im Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007)

Wickham, Chris, *Framing the Early Middle Ages: Europe and the Mediterranean 400–800* (2nd impr.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007)

Winiwarter, Verena and Martin Knoll, *Umweltgeschichte: Eine Einführung* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2007)

Wirsching, Andreas (ed.), *Herausforderungen der parlamentarischen Demokratie: Die Weimarer Republik im europäischen Vergleich*, Schriftenreihe der Stiftung Reichspräsident-Friedrich-Ebert-Gedenkstätte, 13 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007)

Wrede, Martin and Horst Carl (eds.), *Zwischen Schande und Ehre. Erinnerungsbrüche und die Kontinuität des Hauses: Legitimationsmuster und Traditionsverständnis des frühneuzeitlichen Adels in Umbruch und Krise*, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz, Beiheft 73: Abt. für Universalgeschichte (Mainz: von Zabern, 2007)

Zimmermann, Clemens, *Medien im Nationalsozialismus: Deutschland 1933–1945, Italien 1922–1943, Spanien 1936–1951* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2007)

Zimmermann, Rüdiger (ed.), *'Kampf dem Hakenkreuz': Politische Graphik des Verlags J.H.W. Dietz Nachf. im antifaschistischen Abwehrkampf. Eine Ausstellung der Bibliothek der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* (Bonn: Historisches Forschungszentrum der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2007)

PUBLICATIONS OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE LONDON

Vol. 1: Wilhelm Lenz (ed.), *Archivalische Quellen zur deutsch-britischen Geschichte seit 1500 in Großbritannien; Manuscript Sources for the History of Germany since 1500 in Great Britain* (Boppard a. Rh.: Boldt, 1975)

Vol. 2: Lothar Kettenacker (ed.), *Das 'Andere Deutschland' im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Emigration und Widerstand in internationaler Perspektive; The 'Other Germany' in the Second World War: Emigration and Resistance in International Perspective* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1977)

Vol. 3: Marie-Luise Recker, *England und der Donauraum, 1919–1929: Probleme einer europäischen Nachkriegsordnung* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1976)

Vol. 4: Paul Kluke and Peter Alter (eds), *Aspekte der deutsch–britischen Beziehungen im Laufe der Jahrhunderte; Aspects of Anglo-German Relations through the Centuries* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1978)

Vol. 5: Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Peter Alter and Robert W. Scribner (eds), *Stadtbürgertum und Adel in der Reformation: Studien zur Sozialgeschichte der Reformation in England und Deutschland; The Urban Classes, the Nobility and the Reformation: Studies on the Social History of the Reformation in England and Germany* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1979)

Vol. 6: Hans-Christoph Junge, *Flottenpolitik und Revolution: Die Entstehung der englischen Seemacht während der Herrschaft Cromwells* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1980)

Vol. 7: Milan Hauner, *India in Axis Strategy: Germany, Japan, and Indian Nationalists in the Second World War* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981)

Vol. 8: Gerhard Hirschfeld and Lothar Kettenacker (eds), *Der 'Führerstaat': Mythos und Realität. Studien zur Struktur und Politik des Dritten Reiches; The 'Führer State': Myth and Reality. Studies on the Structure and Politics of the Third Reich* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981)

Vol. 9: Hans-Eberhard Hilpert, *Kaiser- und Papstbriefe in den Chronica majora des Matthaeus Paris* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981)

Vol. 10: Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Gerhard Hirschfeld (eds), *Sozialprotest, Gewalt, Terror: Gewaltanwendung durch politische and gesellschaftliche Randgruppen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982)

Vol. 11: Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Wolfgang Mock (eds), *Die Entstehung des Wohlfahrtsstaates in Großbritannien und Deutschland 1850–1950* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982)

Vol. 12: Peter Alter, *Wissenschaft, Staat, Mäzene: Anfänge moderner Wissenschaftspolitik in Großbritannien 1850-1920* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982)

Vol. 13: Wolfgang Mock, *Imperiale Herrschaft und nationales Interesse: 'Constructive Imperialism' oder Freihandel in Großbritannien vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982)

Vol. 14: Gerhard Hirschfeld (ed.), *Exil in Großbritannien: Zur Emigration aus dem nationalsozialistischen Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982)

Vol. 15: Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Hans-Gerhard Husung (eds), *Auf dem Wege zur Massengewerkschaft: Die Entwicklung der Gewerkschaften in Deutschland und Großbritannien 1880–1914* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984)

Vol. 16: Josef Foschepoth (ed.), *Kalter Krieg und Deutsche Frage: Deutschland im Widerstreit der Mächte 1945–1952* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985)

Vol. 17: Ulrich Wengenroth, *Unternehmensstrategien und technischer Fortschritt: Die deutsche und britische Stahlindustrie 1865–1895* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986)

Vol. 18: Helmut Reifeld, *Zwischen Empire und Parlament: Zur Gedankenbildung und Politik Lord Roseberys (1880–1905)* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987)

Vol. 19: Michael Maurer, *Aufklärung und Anglophilie in Deutschland* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987)

Vol. 20: Karl Heinz Metz, *Industrialisierung und Sozialpolitik: Das Problem der sozialen Sicherheit in Großbritannien 1795–1911* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988)

Vol. 21: Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Wolfgang Schwentker (eds), *Max Weber und seine Zeitgenossen* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988)

Vol. 22: Lothar Kettenacker, *Krieg zur Friedenssicherung: Die Deutschlandplanung der britischen Regierung während des Zweiten Weltkrieges* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989)

Vol. 23: Adolf M. Birke and Günther Heydemann (eds), *Die Herausforderung des europäischen Staatensystems: Nationale Ideologie und staatliches Interesse zwischen Restauration und Imperialismus* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989)

Vol. 24: Helga Woggon, *Integrativer Sozialismus und nationale Befreiung: Politik und Wirkungsgeschichte James Connollys in Irland* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990)

Vol. 25: Kaspar von Greyerz, *Vorsehungsglaube und Kosmologie: Studien zu englischen Selbstzeugnissen des 17. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990)

Vol. 26: Andreas Wirsching, *Parlament und Volkes Stimme: Unterhaus und Öffentlichkeit im England des frühen 19. Jahrhunderts* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990)

Vol. 27: Claudia Schnurmann, *Kommerz und Klüngel: Der Englandhandel Kölner Kaufleute im 16. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991)

Vol. 28: Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Vom Wiener Kongreß zur Pariser Konferenz: England, die deutsche Frage und das Mächtesystem 1815–1856* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991)

Vol. 29: Peter Alter (ed.), *Im Banne der Metropolen: Berlin und London in den zwanziger Jahren* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993)

Vol. 30: Hermann Wentker, *Zerstörung der Großmacht Rußland? Die britischen Kriegsziele im Krimkrieg* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993)

Vol. 31: Angela Schwarz, *Die Reise ins Dritte Reich: Britische Augenzeugen im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland (1933–1939)* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993)

Vol. 32: Johannes Paulmann, *Staat und Arbeitsmarkt in Großbritannien: Krise, Weltkrieg, Wiederaufbau* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993)

Vol. 33: Clemens Picht, *Handel, Politik und Gesellschaft: Zur wirtschafspolitischen Publizistik Englands im 18. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993)

Vol. 34: Friedrich Weckerlein, *Streitfall Deutschland: Die britische Linke und die 'Demokratisierung' des Deutschen Reiches, 1900–1918* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994)

Vol. 35: Klaus Larres, *Politik der Illusionen: Churchill, Eisenhower und die deutsche Frage 1945–1955* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995)

Vol. 36: Günther Heydemann, *Konstitution gegen Revolution: Die britische Deutschland- und Italienpolitik 1815–1848* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995)

Vol. 37: Hermann Joseph Hiery, *Das Deutsche Reich in der Südsee (1900–1921): Eine Annäherung an die Erfahrungen verschiedener Kulturen* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995)

Vol. 38: Michael Toyka-Seid, *Gesundheit und Krankheit in der Stadt: Zur Entwicklung des Gesundheitswesens in Durham City 1831–1914* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996)

Vol. 39: Detlev Clemens, *Herr Hitler in Germany: Wahrnehmung und Deutung des Nationalsozialismus in Großbritannien 1920 bis 1939* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996)

Vol. 40: Christel Gade, *Gleichgewichtspolitik oder Bündnispflege? Maximen britischer Außenpolitik (1910–1914)* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997)

Vol. 41: Benedikt Stuchtey, *W. E. H. Lecky (1838–1903): Historisches Denken und politisches Urteilen eines anglo-irischen Gelehrten* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997)

Vol. 42: Sabine Sundermann, *Deutscher Nationalismus im englischen Exil: Zum sozialen und politischen Innenleben der deutschen Kolonie in London 1848 bis 1871* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1997)

Vol. 43: Knut Diekmann, *Die nationalistische Bewegung in Wales* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1998)

Vol. 44: Bärbel Brodt, *Städte ohne Mauern: Stadtentwicklung in East Anglia im 14. Jahrhundert* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1997)

Vol. 45: Arnd Reitemeier, *Außenpolitik im Spätmittelalter: Die diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen dem Reich und England 1377* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1999)

Vol. 46: Gerhard A. Ritter and Peter Wende (eds), *Rivalität und Partnerschaft: Studien zu den deutsch-britischen Beziehungen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Festschrift für Anthony J. Nicholls* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1999)

Vol. 47: Ulrich Marsch, *Zwischen Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft: Industrieforschung in Deutschland und Großbritannien 1880–1936* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2000)

Vol. 48: Lothar Reinermann, *Der Kaiser in England: Wilhelm II. und die britische Öffentlichkeit* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2001)

Vol. 49: Josef Reindl, *Wachstum und Wettbewerb in den Wirtschaftswunderjahren: Die elektrotechnische Industrie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Großbritannien 1945–1967* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2001)

Vol. 50: Jörn Leonhard, *Liberalismus: Zur historischen Semantik eines europäischen Deutungsmusters* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001)

Vol. 51: Willibald Steinmetz, *Begegnungen vor Gericht: Eine Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte des englischen Arbeitsrechts (1850–1925)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002)

Vol. 52: Andreas Rödder, *Die radikale Herausforderung: Die politische Kultur der englischen Konservativen zwischen ländlicher Tradition und industrieller Moderne (1846–1868)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002)

Vol. 53: Dominik Geppert, *Thatchers konservative Revolution: Der Richtungswandel der britischen Tories (1975–1979)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002)

Vol. 54: Nikolaus Braun, *Terrorismus und Freiheitskampf: Gewalt, Propaganda und politische Strategie im Irischen Bürgerkrieg 1922/23* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003)

Vol. 55: Andreas Fahrmeir, *Ehrbare Spekulanten: Stadtverfassung, Wirtschaft und Politik in der City of London, 1688–1900* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003)

Vol. 56: Christoph Heyl, *A Passion for Privacy: Untersuchungen zur Genese der bürgerlichen Privatsphäre in London, 1660–1800* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004)

Vol. 57: Ulrike Lindner, *Gesundheitspolitik in der Nachkriegszeit: Großbritannien und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Vergleich* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004)

Vol. 58: Ursula Rombeck-Jaschinski, *Das Londoner Schuldenabkommen: Die Regelung der deutschen Auslandsschulden nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005)

Vol. 59: Thomas Wittek, *Auf ewig Feind? Das Deutschlandbild in den britischen Massenmedien nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005)

Vol. 60: Hans-Christof Kraus, *Englische Verfassung und politisches Denken im Ancien Régime: 1689 bis 1789* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006)

Vol. 61: Margrit Schulte Beerbühl, *Deutsche Kaufleute in London: Welthandel und Einbürgerung (1660–1818)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006)

Vol. 62: Florian Altenhöner, *Kommunikation und Kontrolle: Gerüchte und Städtische Öffentlichkeiten in Berlin und London 1914/1918* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008)

Vol. 63: Renate Held, *Deutsche als Kriegsgefangene in Großbritannien im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2008)

Vol. 64: Dominik Geppert, *Pressekriege: Öffentlichkeit und Diplomatie in den deutsch-britischen Beziehungen (1896–1912)* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007)

Vol. 65: Frank Bösch, *Öffentliche Geheimnisse: Skandale, Politik und Medien in Deutschland und Großbritannien, 1880–1914* (Munich: Oldenbourg, forthcoming 2008)

Vol. 66: Christoph Heyl, *Wunderwelten: Schreibendes Sammeln und sammelndes Schreiben in England, 1600–1700* (Munich: Oldenbourg, forthcoming 2009)

STUDIES OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE LONDON—OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Eckhart Hellmuth (ed.), *The Transformation of Political Culture: England and Germany in the Late Eighteenth Century* (Oxford, 1990)

Ronald G. Asch and Adolf M. Birke (eds.), *Princes, Patronage, and the Nobility: The Court at the Beginning of the Modern Age c.1450–1650* (Oxford, 1991)

Rolf Ahmann, Adolf M. Birke, and Michael Howard (eds.), *The Quest for Stability: Problems of West European Security 1918–1957* (Oxford, 1993)

Alfred Haverkamp and Hanna Vollrath (eds.), *England and Germany in the High Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1996)

John Brewer and Eckhart Hellmuth (eds.), *Rethinking Leviathan: The Eighteenth-Century State in Britain and Germany* (Oxford, 1999)

Benedikt Stuchtey and Peter Wende (eds.), *British and German Historiography 1750–1950: Traditions, Perceptions, and Transfers* (Oxford, 2000)

Willibald Steinmetz (ed.), *Private Law and Social Inequality in the Industrial Age: Comparing Legal Cultures in Britain, France, Germany, and the United States* (Oxford, 2000)

Martin H. Geyer and Johannes Paulmann (eds.), *The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society, and Politics from the 1840s to the First World War* (Oxford, 2001)

Jeremy Noakes, Peter Wende, and Jonathan Wright (eds.), *Britain and Germany in Europe 1949–1990* (Oxford, 2002)

Benedikt Stuchtey and Eckhardt Fuchs (eds.), *Writing World History 1800–2000* (Oxford, 2003)

Dominik Geppert (ed.), *The Postwar Challenge: Cultural, Social, and Political Change in Western Europe, 1945–1958* (Oxford, 2003)

Benedikt Stuchtey (ed.), *Science across the European Empires, 1800–1950* (Oxford, 2005)

Michael Schaich (ed.), *Monarchy and Religion: The Transformation of Royal Culture in Eighteenth-Century Europe* (Oxford, 2007)

Matthias Reiss (ed.), *The Street as Stage: Protest Marches and Public Rallies since the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford, 2007)

Karina Urbach (ed.), *European Aristocracies and the Radical Right 1918–1939* (Oxford, 2007)

Markus Mösslang and Torsten Riotte (eds.), *The Diplomats' World: A Cultural History of Diplomacy, 1815–1914* (Oxford, 2008)

Dominik Geppert and Robert Gerwarth (eds.), *Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain: Essays on Cultural Affinity* (Oxford, 2008)

FURTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE LONDON

Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Wolfgang Mock (eds.), *The Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany* (London: Croom Helm, 1981)

Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Gerhard Hirschfeld (eds.), *Social Protest, Violence and Terror in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1982)

Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker (eds.), *The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983)

Gerhard Hirschfeld (ed.), *Exile in Great Britain: Refugees from Hitler's Germany* (Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers, 1984)

Kaspar von Greyerz (ed.), *Religion, Politics and Social Protest: Three Studies on Early Modern Germany* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984)

Kaspar von Greyerz (ed.), *Religion and Society in Early Modern Europe 1500–1800* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985)

Josef Foschepoth and Rolf Steininger (eds.), *Die britische Deutschland- und Besatzungspolitik 1945–1949* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1985)

Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Hans-Gerhard Husung (eds.), *The Development of Trade Unionism in Great Britain and Germany, 1880-1914* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985)

Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds.), *Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986)

Gerhard Hirschfeld (ed.), *The Policies of Genocide: Jews and Soviet Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986)

Ralph Uhlig, *Die Deutsch-Englische Gesellschaft 1949–1983: Der Beitrag ihrer 'Königswinter-Konferenzen' zur britisch-deutschen Verständigung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986)

Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds.), *Max Weber and his Contemporaries* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987)

Peter Alter, *The Reluctant Patron: Science and the State in Britain 1850–192*0 (Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers, 1987)

Stig Förster, Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Ronald Robinson (eds.), *Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884–1885 and the Onset of Partition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988)

Adolf M. Birke, Hans Booms and Otto Merker (eds.), *Control Commission for Germany/British Element: Inventory; Die britische Militärregierung in Deutschland: Inventar*, 11 vols (Munich: Saur Verlag, 1993)

Günther Heydemann and Lothar Kettenacker (eds.), *Kirchen in der Diktatur* (Göttingen and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993)

Dagmar Engels and Shula Marks (eds.), *Contesting Colonial Hegemony: Africa and India 1858 to Independence* (London and New York: British Academic Press, 1993)

Ulrike Jordan (ed.), *Conditions of Surrender: Britons and Germans Witness the End of the War* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996)

Hermann Hiery and John M. MacKenzie (eds.), *European Impact and Pacific Influence: British and German Colonial Policy in the Pacific Islands and the Indigenous Response* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997)

Peter Alter (ed.), *Out of the Third Reich: Refugee Historians in Post-War Britain* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998)

Sabine Freitag (ed.), *Exiles from European Revolutions: Refugees in Mid-Victorian England* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003)

Dominik Geppert and Udo Wengst (eds.), *Neutralität: Chance oder Chimäre? Konzepte des Dritten Weges für Deutschland und die Welt 1945–1990* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2005)

BRITISH ENVOYS TO GERMANY

Sabine Freitag and Peter Wende (eds.), *British Envoys to Germany, 1816–1866,* i. *1816–1829*, Camden Fifth Series, 15 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Royal Historical Society in association with the German Historical Institute London, 2000)

Markus Mösslang, Sabine Freitag, and Peter Wende (eds.), *British Envoys to Germany, 1816–1866,* ii. *1830–1847*, Camden Fifth Series, 21 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Royal Historical Society in association with the German Historical Institute London, 2002)

Markus Mösslang, Torsten Riotte, and Hagen Schulze (eds.), *British Envoys to Germany, 1816–1866,* iii. *1848–1850*, Camden Fifth Series, 28 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Royal Historical Society in association with the German Historical Institute London, 2006)

HOUSE PUBLICATIONS OF THE GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE LONDON

Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Two Centuries of Anglo-German Relations: A Re-appraisal* (London, 1984)

Adolf M. Birke, *Britain and Germany: Historical Patterns of a Relationship* (London, 1987)

Gerhard A. Ritter, *The New Social History in the Federal Republic of Germany* (London, 1991)

Adolf M. Birke and Eva A. Mayring (eds), *Britische Besatzung in Deutschland: Aktenerschließung und Forschungsfelder* (London, 1992)

Gerhard A. Ritter, *Big Science in Germany: Past and Present* (London, 1994)

Adolf M. Birke, *Britain's Influence on the West German Constitutio*n (London, 1995)

Otto Gerhard Oexle, *The British Roots of the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft* (London, 1995)

Research on British History

Lothar Kettenacker and Wolfgang J. Mommsen (eds.), *Research on British History in the Federal Republic of Germany 1978–1983* (London, 1983)

Frank Rexroth (ed.), *Research on British History in the Federal Republic of Germany 1983–1988: An Annotated Bibliography* (London, 1990)

Ulrike Jordan (ed.), *Research on British History in the Federal Republic of Germany 1989–1994: An Annotated Bibliography* (London, 1996)

Andreas Fahrmeir (ed.), *Research on British History in the Federal Republic of Germany 1995–1997: An Annotated Bibliography* (London, 1998)

Regina Pörtner (ed.), *Research on British History in the Federal Republic of Germany 1998–2000: An Annotated Bibliography* (London, 2002)

Annual Lectures of the German Historical Institute London

1979 Samuel Berrick Saul, *Industrialisation and De-Industrialisation? The Interaction of the German and British Economies before the First World War* (London, 1980)

1980 Karl Dietrich Erdmann, *Gustav Stresemann: The Revision of Versailles and the Weimar Parliamentary System* (London, 1981)

1981 A. J. P. Taylor, *1939 Revisited* (London, 1982)

1982 Gordon A. Craig, *Germany and the West: The Ambivalent Relationship* (London, 1983)

1983 Wolfram Fischer, *Germany in the World Economy during the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1984)

1984 James Joll, *National Histories and National Historians: Some German and English Views of the Past* (London, 1985)

1985 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Britain and Germany 1800 to 1914: Two Developmental Paths Towards Industrial Society* (London, 1986)

1986 Owen Chadwick, *Acton, Döllinger and History* (London, 1987)

1987 Hagen Schulze, *Is there a German History?* (London, 1988)

1988 Roger Morgan, *Britain and Germany since 1945: Two Societies and Two Foreign Policies* (London, 1989)

1989 Thomas Nipperdey, *The Rise of the Arts in Modern Society* (London, 1990)

1990 *Not available*

1991 Lothar Gall, *Confronting Clio: Myth-Makers and Other Historians* (London, 1992)

1992 Keith Robbins, *Protestant Germany through British Eyes: A Complex Victorian Encounter* (London, 1993)

1993 Klaus Hildebrand, *Reich – Nation-State – Great Power: Reflections on German Foreign Policy 1871–1945* (London, 1995)

1994 Alan Bullock, *Personality and Power: the Strange Case of Hitler and Stalin* (London, 1995)

1995 Ernst Schulin, *'The Most Historical of All Peoples': Nationalism and the New Construction of Jewish History in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (London, 1996)

1996 Michael Howard, *The Crisis of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1916–17* (London, 1997)

1997 Johannes Fried, *The Veil of Memory: Anthropological Problems when Considering the Past* (London, 1998)

1998 David Blackbourn, *A Sense of Place: New Directions in German History* (London, 1999)

1999 Gerhard A. Ritter, *Continuity and Change: Political and Social Developments in Germany after 1945 and 1989/90* (London, 2000)

2000 Peter Pulzer, *Fog in Channel: Anglo-German Perceptions in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 2001)

2001 Heinrich A. Winkler, *The Long Shadow of the Reich: Weighing Up German History* (London, 2002)

2002 *Not available*

2003 Werner Paravicini, *Fact and Fiction: St Patrick's Purgatory and the European Chivalry in the Later Middle Ages* (London, 2004)

2004 Anthony J. Nicholls, *Always Good Neighbours – Never Good Friends? Anglo-German Relations 1949–2001* (London, 2005)

2005 Jürgen Osterhammel, *Europe, the 'West', and the Civilizing Mission* (London, 2006)

2006 John Breuilly, *Nationalism, Power and Modernity in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (London, 2007)

2007 Stig Förster, *The Battlefield: Towards a Modern History of War* (London, 2008)

German Historical Institute London Bulletin, Issue 1 (Spring, 1979)–
German Historical Institute London Bulletin Index, 1979–1996 (London, 1996), plus supplement for the years 1997–2001

Öffentlichkeiten zwischen Krieg und Frieden



Florian Altenhöner
Kommunikation und Kontrolle
Gerüchte und städtische Öffentlichkeiten in Berlin und London 1914/1918

2008 | VIII, 375 S. | 8 Abb. | Leinen | € 39,80
ISBN 978-3-486-58183-6
Veröffentlichungen des Deutschen Historischen Instituts London, Band 62

Kaum ein anderer Zeitraum der europäischen Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts hat so viele Gerüchte hervorgebracht wie die ersten Wochen des Ersten Weltkrieges. Gerüchte sind mehr als nur amüsante Anekdoten einer aufgeregten Zeit. Als Massenerscheinung verweisen sie auf komplexe Veränderungen im Verhältnis zwischen Staat, Publikum und »öffentlicher Meinung«. Der Erste Weltkrieg war auch ein Medienkrieg, der sowohl in Großbritannien als auch im Deutschen Reich zu Glaubwürdigkeitskrisen der Presse führte. Als Folge entstanden und verbreiteten sich Gerüchte als ein komplementäres Element öffentlicher Kommunikation. Florian Altenhöner legt dar, wie Gerüchte einen kommunikativen Raum des Möglichen konstruierten, in dem sich Wünsche, Ängste und Erwartungshaltungen entfalten konnten.

Eine Publikation des Deutschen Historischen Instituts London

Dr. Florian Altenhöner ist Historiker in Berlin.