GERMAN HISTORICAL INSTITUTE LONDON

Bulletin

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The *GHIL Bulletin* appears twice each year
and is available free on request

ISSN 0269-8552 (print)
ISSN 3049-9135 (online)

Cover design: Lucy Schönberger
Photograph: John Goldblatt

German Historical Institute London

Bulletin

Volume XL, No. 1 May 2018

CONTENTS

(cont.)

Book Reviews

Conference Reports

PREFACE

ANDREAS GESTRICH

The German Historical Institute London regularly holds seminars, and each year one series is given a specific theme, with some of the resulting papers subsequently being published in the *Bulletin*. The theme for summer 2016 was new histories of the nineteenth century written in a national or European framework, chosen because of what we perceive to be a revival of academic and public interest in that period.

In the 1970s and the 1980s the nineteenth century was very fashionable as a subject of historical research and many innovative historiographical approaches originated within this burgeoning field. Prominent examples are the merging of social and cultural history in British Victorian studies or, in sharp methodological contrast, the sociological approaches of the Bielefeld version of societal history (*Gesellschaftsgeschichte*) and Eric Hobsbawm's trilogy on the 'long nineteenth century'. Histories of the working classes and women's or gender history focused on groups and topics hitherto neglected by historians, but also on the way in which historians themselves reconstructed and narrated history. Most of these new perspectives and methods spearheaded a rethink of how we write history and were first discussed in the context of the nineteenth century before they made their way into the historiographies of other periods. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the pace and innovative power of scholarly treatments of the nineteenth century appeared to be on the wane. Academic interest, along with the dynamic impetus of methodological and historiographical innovation, shifted towards earlier periods at one end of the historical spectrum and to the twentieth century at the other. A marked increase could be observed in studies on National Socialism, the Holocaust, and the Second World War as well as, after 1989, the GDR, or, more recently, the 1970s.

While scholarly interest in nineteenth-century history was fairly low for at least two decades, it now seems to have made a comeback as an important subject of historical research. Some of this renewed interest might originate in the fact that certain aspects of present-day life seem to bear a clear resemblance to phenomena and problems of

the nineteenth century, such as the rise of ethnically oriented nationalisms, the increasingly precarious nature of work and labour relations, and the return of high levels of social inequality. However, it is also worthwhile revisiting the nineteenth century in the light of new historical developments and experiences.

One of the major challenges of writing nineteenth-century history today is certainly globalization, whose growth and impact on the modern world are closely connected to momentous changes which occurred during the nineteenth century. Globalization as a perspective was only marginal to historical research in the 1970s and 1980s, but today it is no longer acceptable to write modern national or European history from merely a European point of view.

In this context, one great achievement of modern historiography relating to the nineteenth century, challenging us to rethink many of our assumptions, is Jürgen Osterhammel's magisterial work *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (German original 2009; English trans. 2014). Probably no-one writing about the period will be able to ignore this book, and it will be interesting to see how it influences the conceptualization and structuring of future national and European histories of the nineteenth century.

To give just two examples of the challenges it poses, Osterhammel first reminds us that, contrary to common perception, the nineteenth century was in fact less a century of nation-states than a century of empires, and that it ended in a world war in which empires rather than nation-states fought each other. Second, he reminds us that, from a global perspective, the nineteenth century should not be viewed, as it often has been, as an 'age of modernity'. Neither industrialization nor any of the other processes commonly associated with the term (for example, secularization) had spread on a global scale by the end of the century. Instead, Osterhammel stresses the global dimension of processes such as growing economic, administrative, and military efficiency, increasing mobility, and intensifying mutual perceptions and transfers across cultures.

To discuss the problems of underlying master narratives and other potential difficulties in organizing histories of the nineteenth century, the GHIL arranged a lecture series in summer 2016 entitled 'Narrating the Nineteenth Century: New Approaches'. We asked two British and two German colleagues who at the time were engaged in writing either a British or a German national history, or a history of Europe in

the nineteenth century, to share their thoughts with us. All four presentations are available as podcasts <https://www.ghil.ac.uk/podcast.html>. In addition, for this issue of the *Bulletin* we have chosen to print abridged versions of the contributions to that lecture series by two eminent historians, Richard J. Evans and David Cannadine. Both were then still working on new histories of the nineteenth century, which have since been published. Juxtaposing some of the ideas driving these two important new works with the authors' organizational approaches to the available materials and literature provides a useful way of examining the exigencies and complexities of writing a modern history of the nineteenth century.

In the first text, Richard Evans reflects on his new book on nineteenth-century Europe, published in 2016 as volume 7 of the new *Penguin History of Europe* under the title *The Pursuit of Power*: *Europe 1815–1914*. Evans takes up some of the challenges posed by Osterhammel and discusses the importance of perspectives and categories of global history for the writing of a new European history. How should a new history of nineteenth-century Europe be periodized? Does it make sense to try to cover the huge variety of subjects that have formed the focus of historical research in recent decades?

In the second text, David Cannadine introduces his account of nineteenth-century Britain, recently published in the *Penguin History of Britain* as *Victorious Century: The United Kingdom 1800–1906*. For Cannadine, the nineteenth century was incontrovertibly a 'British century' in which the UK seemed to dominate the globe, and when, for good or ill, 'British history' took place in many other parts of the world as well. At a time when global history has become so prominent, Cannadine suggests, this seems an appropriate opportunity to revisit nineteenth-century British history, and he chooses an unusual and very specific British timeframe for this, from the Act of Union with Ireland in 1800 to the landslide victory of the Liberals in the 1906 General Election.

Both books make an enormously important contribution to the discipline's attempts to have a fresh look at nineteenth-century national and European history. They will be widely discussed and shape future debates.

ANDREAS GESTRICH is Director of the German Historical Institute London.

WRITING THE HISTORY OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE

RICHARD J. EVANS

My book covers the century from 1815 to 1914.[1] As Tim Blanning says, every history of Europe has to start at some arbitrary date, but some dates are more arbitrary than others.[2] We speak habitually of the nineteenth century or the twentieth century, but of course we all know the period 1801 to 1900 or 1901 to 2000 has no real meaning beyond the merely chronological. History is full of loose ends, and even the outbreak and conclusion of major wars that so often provide start and end dates for histories covering discrete segments of the European past, including mine, of course, leave many issues unresolved. Different aspects of history have different chronologies: a date that has a meaning in political or military or diplomatic history may have very little in social, economic, cultural, or, as feminist historians have passionately argued, women's history. French historians of the *Annales* school have become accustomed to speaking of immobile history, or the *longue durée*, which persisted well into modern times in many parts of Europe. Despite the fall of the *ancien régime* in political systems at the end of the eighteenth century, the *ancien régime économique et social* persisted well into the second half of the nineteenth, and it took until this point for serfdom, for example, to disappear from many parts of Europe. The long-established demographic patterns of high birth and death rates did not begin to change in most parts of Europe until after 1850, just as industrialization was a marginal process confined to small pockets of the European economy until the second half of the nineteenth century. Arno Mayer

This text is based on a lecture given at the German Historical Institute in May 2016, with the addition of footnotes providing the basic bibliographical information. Its source is the Introduction to Richard J. Evans, *The Pursuit of Power: Europe 1815–1914* (London: Penguin, 2016) and it is reproduced here by permission of the publisher.

[1] Evans, *The Pursuit of Power*.

[2] Tim Blanning, *The Pursuit of Glory: Europe, 1648–1815* (London, 2007), p. xxiii.

argued in his book *The Persistence of the Old Regime* that the dominance of traditional aristocratic elites continued until the First World War and not much of significance changed in politics either.[3] Mayer's view has not been widely accepted—change happened in the world of nineteenth-century Europe, not just in politics but in other spheres as well.

Some historians have decided that the most meaningful period to study is the 'age of revolution', to quote the title of the first volume of Eric Hobsbawm's celebrated analysis of the years 1789 to 1848 (1962).[4] Hobsbawm's periodization was followed by Jonathan Sperber in his excellent survey *Revolutionary Europe* (2000), covering the same period.[5] There is a price to pay, I think, for choosing these years, for what came after was a very different Europe, one much less easy to conceptualize in a single framework. Not by chance, Sperber's follow-up volume has a wordy title that conveys, no doubt unconsciously, the difficulty he found in solving the problem of a unifying theme. It is called *Europe 1850–1914: Progress, Participation and Apprehension* (2009).[6] Hobsbawm went on to write two more volumes, *The Age of Capital*, covering the years 1848 to 1875, and *The Age of Empire*, taking the story up to the First World War.[7] Anyone who tries to write a history of nineteenth-century Europe has to confront these three tremendous volumes, which tower over the literature on the era. And with his uncanny gift for conceptual innovation Hobsbawm went on to characterize the whole period covered by his trilogy as 'the long nineteenth century'. That is a model followed by many textbooks and primers, for example, Simpson and Jones's useful *Europe: 1783–1914*.[8] But the long nineteenth century, of course, in terms of political history at least, is a broken-backed century. The first half of the century is dominated by the legacy of the French Revolution and attempts to

[3] Arno J. Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War* (London, 1981).

[4] E. J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789–1848* (London, 1962).

[5] Jonathan Sperber, *Revolutionary Europe: 1780–1850* (Harlow, 2000).

[6] Id., *Europe 1850–1914: Progress, Participation and Apprehension* (Harlow, 2009).

[7] E. J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital 1848–1875* (London, 1975); id., *The Age of Empire 1875–1914* (London, 1987).

[8] William Simpson and Martin Jones, *Europe: 1783–1914* (London, 2000).

suppress it; the second half is characterized by the growth of new political institutions and the advance, however fitful, of democracy. Like Sperber, many historians covering the period from the battle of Waterloo to the outbreak of the First World War, or from the French Revolution to the First World War, have given up on the attempt to find any kind of conceptual unity, and have chosen anodyne titles like R. S. Alexander's *Europe's Uncertain Path*,[9] which gives no clue as to where the path is coming from, or where it is leading to.

Throughout most of the twentieth century historians regarded the rise of nation-states and the conflicts between them as the central features of European history in the nineteenth. The triumph of nationalism forged new political and cultural entities and inspired revolts against large and, it seemed, outmoded multinational empires, uprisings against oppression by some nationalities, or ambitions to achieve dominance over them by others. And this model of nation-states was exported across the globe in the twentieth century, making its emergence in Europe in the nineteenth seem even more important. Historians once saw this process in positive terms, putting celebratory accounts of the unification of Italy and Germany, the growth of Czech and Polish national consciousness, and other products of the age of nationalism, at the centre of their narratives. As national and ethnic rivalries spilled over into the huge conflict of the Second World War, the rise of nationalism appeared in a darker light, a view underlined by the Balkan wars of 1990s. Since then, we have come increasingly to live in an age of globalization, as the barriers created by the Cold War have crumbled, and international institutions, new global means of communication, multinational companies, and many other influences, have eroded national boundaries and begun to bind us all together as a global human community. And since the turn of the century at the latest, this has altered our vision of the past, which historians have come to see increasingly in a global perspective. The call for the writing of global history is not, in itself, new. It was issued as long ago as the 1970s by the French historian Marc Ferro and was present in the concept of *Universalgeschichte* (universal history), as practised by Ranke in the nineteenth century, and Arnold Toynbee and William McNeill in the twentieth. But a global history that linked

[9] R. S. Alexander, *Europe's Uncertain Path, 1814-1914: State Formation and Civil Society* (Oxford, 2012).

the different parts of the world rather than telling their discrete stories has emerged only recently, as historians have begun to examine subjects such as the effects of empire on European economies, societies, cultures, and political systems, notably but not exclusively those of Britain; the global economic ties that bound Europe to other parts of the world in a nexus of mutual interaction; and the rise of worldwide empires as a common European process rather than one specific to any particular nation. Historians have also been busy rewriting the history of individual European nations in a global context, emphasizing the effects of European diasporas—the millions of Europeans who emigrated to other parts of the globe—on the 'mother-country', the infusion of European nationalism with elements of racial theory derived from the experience of colonization in Africa or Asia, and the emergence of global geopolitics as a key factor in relations between European states.

A particular influence on my own approach has been exerted by Jürgen Osterhammel, whose *Transformation of the World* is, indeed, a truly global history,[10] not a Eurocentric one, such as Hobsbawm's three volumes ultimately were. Covering the nineteenth century, Osterhammel's chapters deal with an amazing variety of topics including memory, self-observation, time, space and mobility, living standards, cities, frontiers, power, revolution, state, energy, work, communications, hierarchies, knowledge, civilization, religion, and so on. And he deliberately picks out common themes, connections in different parts of the globe, shared developments in global processes. Yet the argumentative and effective presence of the author throughout the book generally, I feel, eclipses that of the people who lived at the time he is writing about.

Often historical surveys spend all their time establishing the broad contours of interpretation without attempting to convey how they could be discerned in the lives and experiences of contemporaries. That is perhaps understandable in a brief textbook whose ultimate purpose is to prepare students for examination, but a more extensive work such as Penguin ultimately commissioned from me, aimed in the first place at the general reader, fortunately has the space to provide the detail that conveys the flavour of the period and its mixture

[10] Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century,* trans. Patrick Camiller (Princeton, 2014).

of strangeness and familiarity, and as far as possible to allow contemporaries to speak for themselves. I once wrote a review of Nipperdey's three marvellous volumes on nineteenth-century Germany,[11] in which I complained not only that there were no jokes in them, which made them rather hard to read, but also that we constantly heard just Nipperdey's own voice, with contemporaries never getting to speak.[12] In my own book, I try to remedy this deficit by quoting from contemporary sources as much as I can, in order to give something of the flavour of how people living at the time thought and expressed themselves.

Other, no less ambitious works of global history written around the same time as Osterhammel's have offered a rather different approach to the nineteenth century, based on the perception that this was the period above all others when Europe led the world and came to exercise dominion over other parts of the globe. Historians such as Chris Bayly, in his *Birth of the Modern World*,[13] and John Darwin in his masterly survey of global empires, *After Tamerlane*,[14] have established, with a wealth of comparative evidence, the rough equality, in almost every respect from living standards to cultural achievements, of a whole range of civilizations across the world in the early modern period. The Mughal Empire in India, the Qing Empire in China, the great pre-colonial empires of Benin and its neighbours in Africa, the Ottoman Empire, and other large states, were roughly on a par with Europe in the early eighteenth century in many respects. By 1815 this was clearly no longer the case. Europe had forged ahead, not, as some historians, notably Niall Ferguson in his book *Civilization*,[15] have maintained, because of its intrinsic superiority, but, I think, because of quite specific historical circumstances. Europe maintained and extended its advantage on many fronts right up to the early

[11] Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1800–1866: Bürgerwelt und starker Staat* (Munich, 1983); id., *Deutsche Geschichte 1866–1918*, i: *Arbeitswelt und Bürgergeist* (Munich, 1990), ii: *Machtstaat vor der Demokratie* (Munich, 1992).

[12] Richard J. Evans, 'Too Quick to Judge', *Times Literary Supplement*, 5–11 Oct. 1990, p. 1079.

[13] C. A. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Malden, Mass., 2004).

[14] John Darwin, *After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405* (London, 2007).

[15] Niall Ferguson, *Civilization: The West and the Rest* (London, 2011).

years of the twentieth century, though towards the end of the period it increasingly came under attack. The First World War put it into question; the Second World War destroyed it, bringing down the global European empires in its aftermath. This global hegemony is an important justification for taking the years 1815 to 1914 as a distinct and meaningful period of European history. What I try to do, therefore, is to emphasize the global context right through the book, bringing events and processes on other continents into the narrative and analyses as a way of helping and trying to explain what was happening in Europe.

A global history also means, to use another fashionable term, transnational history. Many histories of Europe have consisted of largely separate narratives of different national histories. Grant and Temperley's *Europe in the Nineteenth Century*,[16] which held its own for a long time as a standard textbook, falls into this category; Simpson and Jones's *Europe: 1783–1914*, mentioned above, is in the same mould, with separate chapters on France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the Habsburg Empire. The German historian Michael Salewski's 'History of Europe' (2000) is subtitled 'States and Nations from the Ancient World to the Present',[17] and presents a series of disconnected histories of individual nations and states and the relations between them. That means that ultimately the reader loses sight of what, if anything, bound Europe together as a whole; what these states and nations have in common; or what wider processes affected them. The long-established and still incomplete *Oxford History of Modern Europe* takes a similar approach, with every volume devoted to a single country except for the four that cover the relations between them over different periods. But as well as being an evolving assemblage of individual states, Europe also had a definable existence as a collective entity, not as a geographical area whose eastern boundaries, in particular, were vague and hard to define, and whose confines became blurred in the course of European emigration to other parts of the world, but rather as a social, economic, political, and cultural region sharing many common characteristics and including Russia, the Balkans in the east, Scandinavia, Spain, and Portugal.

[16] A. J. Grant and Harold Temperley, *Europe in the Nineteenth Century, 1789–1914* (London, 1927).

[17] Michael Salewski, *Geschichte Europas: Staaten und Nationen von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich, 2000).

In taking an approach that, as far as possible, is transnational, I am consciously following in the footsteps of Lord Acton, the founder of the *Cambridge Modern History* at the end of the nineteenth century. In his plan for this enterprise, Acton told his contributors:

> Universal history is not the sum of all particular histories, and ought to be contemplated, first, in its distinctive essence, as Renaissance, Reformation, Religious Wars, Absolute Monarchy, Revolution etc. The several countries may or may not contribute to feed the main stream. . . . But attention ought not to be dispersed, by putting Portugal, Transylvania, Iceland, side by side with France and Germany. . . . My plan is to break through the mere juxtaposition of national histories and to take in, as far as may be, what is extraterritorial and universal.[18]

In the event, of course, Acton died before he could realize this ambitious project, and when it was eventually published under the more efficient but less imaginative editorship of Sir Adolphus Ward, the *Cambridge Modern History* did, indeed, largely adopt a country-by-country approach, reflecting, I think, the nation-based vision of a younger generation of historians in the changed political and cultural atmosphere of the Europe they inhabited.

It was only with the fall of communism, the extension of the European Union to much of Eastern Europe, and the renewed onward march of globalization, that the possibility of writing a real European history re-emerged. We can no longer equate it, however, as Grant and Temperley and their counterparts and many others have done, with the history of politics and international relations. Since the 1970s at the latest, historical investigation has expanded its field of vision to encompass almost every aspect of human activity in the past. Already in the early 1960s, Hobsbawm's *Age of Revolution*, which drew on the French tradition of writing a broad comprehensive kind of history, owed much to the *Annales* school. It contained chapters on religion, ideology, science, the arts, the economy, and much else. Subsequently, as Osterhammel's work has shown, historical research has extended its range even further, including the history of landscape and the environment. Hobsbawm was able to bind all

[18] Quoted in Roland Hill, *Lord Acton* (London, 2000), 394.

this together across the Age of Revolution—gradually losing coherence as he wrote further into the century—through an overarching master-narrative that placed the development and determining influence of capitalism at its core. His books are Eurocentric because they are about the impact of the industrial revolution and the French Revolution, the dual revolution, on Europe and the world. Historians of the early twenty-first century, the time when the grand master-narratives have fallen into disrepute, do not have this luxury. The most we can do, as Tim Blanning says, is to trace 'lines of development'.[19]

Two of the main lines that Blanning identifies for the years 1648 to 1815 in his book, are what he calls 'the relentless march of the state to hegemony' and 'the emergence of a new kind of cultural space—the public sphere'.[20] These developments continued an expansion and dominance that were almost unthinkable in the previous age. The state structures of Restoration Europe that emerged in 1815 would, in some ways, still have been familiar to the continent's inhabitants of the mid-eighteenth century, even though appearances were often deceptive. The power and intrusiveness of the state were relatively limited, and popular participation in politics was minimal, despite the still-vivid example of the French Revolution. The public sphere was confined mostly to a small stratum of the educated and the literate and their institutions, from periodicals to coffee houses and reading clubs. But by 1914 the state had been transformed by universal male suffrage, and in some parts of the continent even female suffrage, and the direct participation of the people, the masses, in shaping national, regional, and local politics, not least through organized political parties. And the control that the state could exercise over its citizens, in areas ranging from education to health, military service, and social work, had expanded vastly by 1914.

The linked processes of improving communications and a growing economy, described by Blanning, accelerated faster in the nineteenth century than anyone in the eighteenth could have imagined. In 1815 the railway, the telegraph, the steamship, and the photograph were barely visible over the historical horizon. By 1914 Europe was entering the age of the telephone, the motor car, the radio, and the cinema. In 1815 we were still in the age of the Newtonian understanding of the universe, of representational art, and classical music.

[19] Blanning, *The Pursuit of Glory*, p. xxiv.

[20] Ibid. pp. xxiv, xxv.

By 1914 Einstein had propounded his theory of relativity, Picasso had painted his Cubist works, and Schoenberg had composed his first atonal pieces. Europe was also, in an even more immediate, more sinister sense, entering the age of the machine gun, the tank, the submarine, barbed wire, and the fighter plane. The first aerial bombardment of an enemy was recorded in 1911, during the Italian invasion of Libya. The first European concentration camps were opened in South Africa by the British and in south-west Africa, in Namibia, by the Germans. Such developments, foreshadowing the immense violence and destructiveness of the first half of the twentieth century, stand as a warning against treating the nineteenth century, as most of its inhabitants did, as an age of linear progress and open-ended development. Progress had its price and in the succeeding period, between 1914 and 1949, as Ian Kershaw shows in *To Hell and Back*,[21] Europe paid it in full measure.

Blanning's volume ends on a gloomy note as far as the conditions of life for the vast majority of Europeans was concerned, with the beginnings of industry and the effects of rapid population growth bringing 'a new kind of poverty', he says, 'not a sudden affliction by famine plague or war but a permanent state of malnutrition and underemployment.'[22] Yet, on the other hand, the nineteenth century, as this suggests, was relatively free of major European wars. The wars that happened before 1914 were all limited in time, with distinct aims, and confined to a small number of countries and usually to a relatively small area, unlike those of the twentieth or the eighteenth century. As in many other aspects of this period, Europe's changed relationship with the rest of the world was an important determining factor. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, European wars did not involve other parts of the globe as they had in the eighteenth century. The reason for this was not only Britain's global hegemony and command of the seas, but also an enormous anxiousness on the part of European states not to repeat the disastrous global conflicts of the eighteenth century. Thus the loss of life in battle between 1815 and 1914 was far smaller than it had been in the previous century.

There was loss of life on a large scale in other respects during the nineteenth century, of course. There were famines, notably in Ireland, Scandinavia, and Russia, and plagues, too, in the form of periodic out-

[21] Ian Kershaw, *To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914–1949* (London, 2015).

[22] Blanning, *The Pursuit of Glory*, p. xxvii.

breaks of cholera that swept the continent, but these were neither as frequent nor as devastating as plagues had been in previous eras. By the end of the century they had largely vanished from Europe. This did not mean, of course, that social, economic, and other forms of inequality vanished along with them. An important part of what I want to do is to describe the shifting contours of inequality in the nineteenth century, with older forms, such as serfdom on the land, giving way to newer ones, such as wage labour in the factory. And here, among many other areas, I take issue with Hobsbawm, who sees the rise of industry as an unadulterated, unalloyed descent into worse and graver forms of oppression. I think it is important to look at the nineteenth century in a broader perspective. It was the age, *par excellence*, of emancipation, with millions of people—serfs, women, and religious minorities, notably the Jews—being given greater equality of status. These were enormous changes that should not be underestimated. But, of course, equality and emancipation were only ever partial and conditional, as the years after 1914 were to show.

Arguments and disputes about inequality were at the centre of nineteenth-century European politics. Building on a legacy of ideas bequeathed by the French Revolution, increasing numbers of political thinkers and actors began to conceive of and implement ways of overcoming the inequalities they witnessed. The spectrum of solutions ranged from aristocratic paternalism and a sense of *noblesse oblige* at one extreme to the anarchist attempt to destroy the state at the other. Socialism, liberalism, communism, nationalism, and many other doctrines prioritized one method or another of freeing people from the yoke of oppression and exploitation according to how they defined it. Most of those who put stability and hierarchy first recognized that they could not survive simply by clinging to the old order; and so they too became participants in the great debate on inequality. Religions offered a variety of answers to problems rooted in the temporal world, or advocated escape from it altogether. What all of these many strands of thought had in common was a desire to acquire and wield power so they could put their ideas into action. While Tim Blanning calls his history of Europe from 1648 to 1815 *The Pursuit of Glory*, signifying the priorities of the dominant political elites of the age, I decided to give my book the title *The Pursuit of Power*.

The Pursuit of Power, of course, is not simply political, at least if politics is defined in a narrow way: states grasped for world power,

governments reached out for imperial power, armies built up their military power, revolutionaries plotted to grab power, political parties campaigned to come to power, bankers and industrialists strove for economic power, serfs and sharecroppers were gradually liberated from the arbitrary power exercised over them by landowning aristocrats. The central process of the century, the emancipation of vast sections of the oppressed from the power of their oppressors, found its most widespread manifestation in the emancipation of women from their imprisonment to the nexus of laws, customs, and conventions that subordinated them to the power of men. Just as feminists fought for equality before the law so, too, in a new world of industry, labour unions went on strike for more power, wages, and better conditions of work. Modernist artists challenged the power of the Academies, and novelists organized their work around struggles of power in the family, the locality, or other social institutions.

Nineteenth-century society increased its power over nature: governments gained the power to avert or alleviate hunger and natural disasters, such as fires and floods; medical researchers reached out in their laboratories for power over disease; engineers and planners extended humankind's power over nature; and, in a different sense, scientists and mechanics devised and exploited new sources of power, from steam to electricity and the power loom to the internal combustion engine. Power could be formal or informal; it could be exercised through violence or persuasion, it could be consensual or majoritarian, it might take economic, cultural, social, political, religious, organizational, or many other forms. But as the nineteenth century progressed, people increasingly prioritized power over glory, honour, and comparable values that had been dominant previously. By the end of the century, power had been reconceptualized in racial terms as Europeans came to regard their hegemony over much of the rest of the world as evidence of their superiority over its inhabitants. And, of course, in the end this racialized form of nationalism came back to devastate Europe in the conflicts of the Balkan wars and then the First World War.

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REWRITING THE BRITISH NINETEENTH CENTURY

DAVID CANNADINE

When I signed the contract to write what became *Victorious Century*, the nineteenth century was the one immediately before that which we were then in, so there has been a considerable increase in historical distance since that time.[1] I ask myself, and I fear reviewers may make the same point: why do we need another history of nineteenth-century Britain? After all, there is a long and illustrious pedigree of such books beginning, for the sake of argument, with Halévy's wonderfully incomplete multi-volume account,[2] and Trevelyan's more concise survey.[3] And there are two very fine volumes which are still well worth reading in the original *Oxford History of England,* by Sir Llewellyn Woodward[4] and Sir Robert Ensor.[5] Then, of course, there are the two books by Asa Briggs[6] and Donald Read[7] in the Longman series, which cover the same period. We have contributions by Norman Gash[8] and Edgar Feuchtwanger[9] in the Arnold series, and there are the three more recent books, to which I shall return, in the *New Oxford History of England*, by Boyd Hilton,[10] Theo Hoppen,[11] and

This lecture was delivered at the German Historical Institute London in June 2016. Footnotes have been added.

[1] In the meantime, this book has been published as David Cannadine, *Victorious Century: The United Kingdom, 1800–1906* (London, 2017).

[2] Élie Halévy, *History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century*, trans. E. I. Watkin, 6 vols. (London, 1949–52).

[3] George Macaulay Trevelyan, *British History in the Nineteenth Century (1782–1901)* (New York, 1922).

[4] Llewellyn Woodward, *The Age of Reform 1815–1870* (Oxford, 1938).

[5] R. C. K. Ensor, *England 1870–1914* (Oxford, 1936).

[6] Asa Briggs, *The Age of Improvement, 1783–1867* (London, 1959).

[7] Donald Read, *England, 1868–1914: The Age of Urban Democracy* (London, 1979).

[8] Norman Gash, *Aristocracy and People: Britain 1815–1865* (London, 1979).

[9] E. J. Feuchtwanger, *Democracy and Empire: Britain 1865–1914* (London, 1985).

[10] Boyd Hilton, *A Mad, Bad and Dangerous People? England 1783–1846* (Oxford, 2006).

[11] K. Theodore Hoppen, *The Mid-Victorian Generation, 1846–1886* (Oxford, 1998).

Geoffrey Searle.[12] There are also relatively recent single-volume attempts by Norman McCord,[13] Bill Rubinstein,[14] and Hugh Cunningham.[15] There is a serious question in the light of this market, which cannot be said to be undersupplied with histories of nineteenth-century Britain: do we need any more? What is the case for having another go? I naturally have a vested interest in supposing that we do need another volume, as otherwise I would not have written one. And what case can I make for that? I hope my answers to these questions may be of some interest.

When I was starting out in my professional career, which was rather a long time ago, the nineteenth century was a very exciting period to be working on. During the 1950s and 1960s, scholars began to get into many of its archives for the first time, which helps explain why in the 1970s I became a historian of the nineteenth century myself. But I think it is fair to say that in recent decades, the nineteenth century has been overwhelmed and over-burdened by the spectacular weight of the erudition that has accumulated about it. The prodigious abundance of material that has been published on it over the last fifty years and more is almost unmasterable, and we are also now compelled to take account of the rise of what is termed 'four nations' history'. This means that we have to write the history of the nineteenth century either of Britain or of the United Kingdom, and need to pay more attention to Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. When Penguin asked me to become general editor of this new history of Britain in the 1990s, one of the points that they were particularly insistent on was that unlike the old *Penguin History of England*, this should, indeed, be the *Penguin History of Britain*, partly in response to the fact that in the 1990s devolution was in demand and on the political agenda in both Wales and Scotland.

We are all now additionally urged that we have to integrate the history of Britain and of the British Empire to a greater extent than ever before, but it is not easy to do so in practice. We are also constantly told that unlike in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, Britain's claims

[12] G. R. Searle, *A New England? Peace and War, 1886–1918* (Oxford, 2004).

[13] Norman McCord, *British History 1815–1914* (Oxford, 2007).

[14] W. D. Rubinstein, *Britain's Century: A Political and Social History* (London, 1998).

[15] Hugh Cunningham, *The Challenge of Democracy: Britain 1832–1918* (London, 2001).

to great power pretentions are now over. With the handing back of Hong Kong to the Chinese in 1997, we finally needed to get over the imperial phase of British history and that, of course, was pre-eminently the nineteenth century. We are further instructed that we have to take account of the global history turn. We are all, these days, apparently supposed to be writing transnational history, and therefore, when we talk about Britain, we need to be thinking of its relations with the world, and, indeed, with the world beyond the British Empire. I am also struck by the thought that one of the relationships that tends to get left out, both in the discourse of the new imperial history and in the priorities of global history, is the history of Britain's strong and complex links with the rest of Europe. It seems to me that relations between the nation and the continent, especially in the nineteenth century, were actually of great significance, and, in particular, I want to say in this setting, between Britain and Germany. Yet the history of global Britain does not often appear to be comfortable with the history of Britain and Europe.

As this suggests, one of the challenges of writing a one-volume history of nineteenth-century Britain today is deciding what to leave out—which inevitably means leaving out a great deal. Another challenge is trying to devise an appropriate expositional structure, a point I will illustrate with reference to the three relatively recent *New Oxford History of England* volumes: Boyd Hilton on the years 1783 to 1846, Theo Hoppen on 1846 to 1886, and Geoff Searle on 1886 to 1918. As it happens, I know all three authors, I am certainly an admirer of them all, and in many ways of these books. When you set out to write a survey you begin to appreciate, more than you might have done before, what the merits and strengths are in other authors who have tried their hand at what is, in some ways, a similar task. The comments that I am about to make, although in some ways critical, are based on a general recognition that these are three very serious, significant, and important books.

What, then, are their strengths, interests, and weaknesses? It seems to me they are all quintessentially Oxford books, in that their main focus is still almost overwhelmingly *English* history. Boyd Hilton, unsurprisingly, is particularly strong on theology and politics. Theo Hoppen, as befits the fact that he is an outstanding historian of Ireland, is very good on Anglo-Irish relations. And Geoff Searle heroically took on the task of treating the late nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries, and the First World War as well. They are in some ways very different books. If you are a series editor, one of the things you worry about is that although each of the books might be rather good they do not really approach the topic or the problem in the same way. That is certainly true of these three authors. Hilton does not really have a clear, narrative structure; there is a lot of back and forth, toing and froing, and he never quite works out how to resolve the contradictions, paradoxes, and challenges of narrative versus analysis. Hoppen has many wonderful insights, but I think in the end his book is really a collection of brilliant essays. The material on entrepreneurial culture is terrifically good, and there is a wonderful chapter on the 'Celtic fringe'. But it does not quite hang together as a book. And Geoff Searle's account is a heroic attempt to give a comprehensive account of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but he gives the impression that he is rather overwhelmed by it, and the First World War is added on in a way that does not fully work. I also think that each of these books covers such a short span of time that they never develop a sense of dynamism and momentum, even though the periods which they cover were themselves very dynamic and very momentous.

All that said, I cannot deny that these three instalments represent both a provocation and a challenge to someone in my position. How could I accomplish in one volume the things I am criticizing them for having failed to achieve in three volumes? One answer is that I have been trying to do something different. There is no point in setting out to beat them at their own game because they are terribly good at it, for reasons I have already given. In my case, by contrast, I have attempted to write a book that is geographically wider ranging in terms of the four nations of the UK and the wider world, and covers a much longer period of time, and I have to do all that in a shorter compass. That is not an easy thing to do, as I have discovered. I have tried to sequence the chapters deliberately in a strictly chronological order, something which is rather unfashionable nowadays, and which the first two of the *New Oxford History* volumes do not do. But it seems to me that one needs to have some sense that history does occur in a sequence of events over time. Books that do not convey that, whatever else they may be doing very well, seem to be to be missing something that we historians are supposed to do. I am trying to write a narrative, chronological account of this extraordinarily

momentous century, doing more things in some ways, but less in others, and in a shorter compass than it took Boyd Hilton and Theo Hoppen and Geoff Searle three volumes to do.

In the light of all of that, let us turn to the book itself. It is called: *Victorious Century: The United Kingdom, 1800–1906*, which seems appropriate since, by various criteria—economic, social, and political—Britain was the most successful nation in the world for much of the nineteenth century. And it was certainly the UK's century of global dominance; if the nineteenth century 'belonged' to one single nation, it 'belonged' to Britain. But this dominance and these successes, such as they were, often seem more convincing in retrospect than they did to contemporaries. A great deal of what was going on at that time, as distinct from what has been made of it later, was very fragile and often uncertain, and incomprehensible to those who had to live through it, much as we do not fully understand what is going on now. One thing I sought to do in the book is to convey the sense that how the British nineteenth century looks in retrospect, and how it seemed at the time, are not necessarily the same things. Britain was a successful economy and a successful society, but there were many vicissitudes along the way and people did not always think that the economy was working or that its society was stable. By various criteria, the United Kingdom was, for much of the nineteenth century, the greatest power in the world. Yet there were reverses and disasters, and in many ways its dominant global position was something of a fluke: Europe had not yet got its act together, at least not until the late nineteenth century, and the United States was riven by the Civil War, which meant that, between 1815 and 1870, Britain had no major international rivals. But once a unified Germany and a reunified United States came upon the scene, Britain's global dominance seemed much less secure, and was not destined to last.

It is also fair to say that the beginning and ending dates are slightly unusual. I did not want to write another history of the nineteenth century bounded by the years 1815 to 1914 because so many other books have already done that, whereas I thought it would be rather interesting to try something else, and so my dates are 1800 to 1906. I chose the first one because it implies a different dynamic to the book than if you start in 1815, as I am beginning not with the Battle of Waterloo, but with the Act of Union with Ireland. And that, in turn, signals that if we are to make sense of nineteenth-century Britain, the

United Kingdom's relations with Ireland are absolutely crucial. And I wanted to end, not with the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, but with the disappearance of a certain vision of Tory England in 1905–6, and to convey the resulting Edwardian sense of both optimism and anxiety. This meant that I begin the book with an Act of Parliament and end it with a General Election, which also seems appropriate given the extraordinary continuity and prestige of the British constitution and the British parliament across so much of the nineteenth century, both domestically and internationally.

What does Britain's nineteenth-century history look like if it is treated in this way? What does this book actually do? There are eleven substantive chapters, and each of them is topped and tailed by a prologue and an epilogue. What I have done—and here I return to the point about how you devise the expositional structure to help you accomplish what you are trying to do—is to begin and end each of the substantive chapters with a political episode or its equivalent, while the substance of each chapter consists of parallel narratives that deal with Britain and the world, the state of the nation, the vicissitudes of politics and culture, broadly conceived. But I have not made a fetish of these categories or ranked them rigidly in the same order in each chapter, as was the case with two volumes in an earlier series.[16] Instead, I have mixed them up, sometimes putting politics as the first main section in some of the chapters, but in other cases giving greater emphasis to Britain's relations with the wider world, or to the domestic state of the nation. To the best of my knowledge, no one has tried this before, and I hope it works.

The book also tries to say something about how and why twentieth-century Britain was haunted by what was, in many ways, a misconceived notion of the country's nineteenth-century greatness, which it took to be permanent, immutable, and utterly robustly based. I have sought to show that nineteenth-century Britain was really none of those things at all. It might seem like that for later generations looking backwards, but it certainly was not like that for contemporaries living it forwards. During the First World War, Britain wanted another Nelson and another Trafalgar; but what it got was Jellicoe and Jutland. It also wanted another Wellington and another Waterloo; but what it got was Haig and the Somme. This is but one example of

[16] Derek Beales, *Castlereagh to Gladstone, 1815–1885* (New York, 1969); Henry Pelling, *Modern Britain, 1885–1995* (New York, 1960).

the ways in which many twentieth-century Britons were disappointed in their efforts to live up to their nineteenth-century forebears. Yet the reality was that much of Britain's nineteenth century 'greatness' rested on insecure and transient foundations, and ever since, we have been compelled to recognize, or alternatively to deny, just how insecure and transient those foundations were. I hope my book will enable people living in Brexit Britain, and in the wider world beyond, to get the British nineteenth century in a better and more even-handed historical perspective. And in coming to better terms with that complex period in our national past, we may also come to better terms with where Britain is (or is not) now.

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ARTICLES

PRINCESSES, SEMEN, AND SEPARATION: MASCULINITY AND BODY POLITICS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY GERMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

FALKO SCHNICKE

In the late 1820s the young Leopold Ranke was eagerly preparing for his first research trip to the Austrian Empire. Engrossed in the writing of his second book, the freshly appointed Professor of History at the University of Berlin was especially interested in reports by Venetian ambassadors. Once he found himself sitting with the coveted reports at the Austrian State Archives in Vienna, he shared his excitement with friends and intellectuals in letters that reveal an additional dimension of his quest. For Ranke, the sources were not dead paper: rather, he saw them as 'blood and mind' ('Blut und Geist'),[1] and called them 'beautiful princesses' ('schöne Prinzessinnen').[2] Like all historians, Ranke experienced the difficulties of archival research; after hours of reading, he felt exhausted and lonely away from his friends. It was difficult to decipher the ancient handwriting and he was sometimes bored with his work.[3] These frustrations and disappointments, however, were outweighed by sensations of sexual attraction he found himself experiencing as he worked; he described some of his archival sources as a 'handsome Italian lady' ('schöne Italienerin') with whom he was 'in love'. He wished to con-

I am deeply indebted to Marynel Ryan Van Zee (University of Minnesota) and Kathleen Canning (University of Michigan) for their instructive comments on earlier drafts of this article.

[1] Leopold von Ranke to Heinrich Ranke, Nov. 1828, in Leopold von Ranke, *Das Briefwerk*, ed. Walther P. Fuchs (Hamburg, 1949), 176. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations in this article are by the author.

[2] Leopold von Ranke to Bettina von Arnim, Feb. 1828, ibid. 139.

[3] Ibid. 122–8, 180.

summate his relationship with her, describing 'sweet and contented *Schäferstunden*'—the latter then, as now, a romantic term for sexual intercourse—and even 'hoped to father a wunderkind' with his beloved, meaning the book he aimed to finish using these materials.[4] This was not a momentary perception; later, in 1836, when Ranke gained access to a new archive, he again used bodily and sexual metaphors to refer to his excitement and desire. The archive had just been opened to researchers for the first time, and Ranke imagined it as a 'total virgin' ('noch ganz eine Jungfer') waiting to be 'entered' by him ('bei ihr Zutritt habe[n]').[5]

Since these metaphors arose at a time when archival research was about to become the benchmark for historical studies, and Ranke was to become one of the most important nineteenth-century historians—and one of the founders of German history as an academic discipline—his letters reveal not only his intense scholarly interest in his materials, but also refer to the significance of metaphors of gendered and sexualized bodies in the establishment of that discipline. While the fact that it was inaugurated as a masculine discipline, in that it was both professionally practised by men only but also culturally encoded as a purely masculine realm, is common knowledge, the part the body played in this encoding is not. Although mostly overlooked in the history of historiography, the body was important for the discipline's self-image, as we can see, even at this early stage, in the quoted identification of sources with female bodies and of scholarship with heterosexual intercourse and procreation.

As the gendered body became one of the central elements of political discourse in modern Western societies from the nineteenth century,[6] it also became central to the historical discipline that was emerging at the same time. This development was fundamental to all elements of historical study, including definitions of the historian's qualities, historical methods, and the discipline's institutions. In one way or another, biological and symbolic, individual and collective

[4] Leopold von Ranke to Heinrich Ritter, Oct. 1827, ibid. 121–2.

[5] Leopold von Ranke to Ferdinand Ranke, Nov. 1836, in Leopold von Ranke, *Neue Briefe*, ed. Hans Herzfeld (Hamburg, 1949), 230.

[6] See Catherine Gallagher and Thomas Laqueur (eds.), *The Making of the Modern Body: Sexuality and Society in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley, 1987); Kathleen Canning, *Gender History in Practice: Historical Perspectives on Bodies, Class, and Citizenship* (Ithaca, NY, 2006).

bodies were meaningful in all of these contexts. Sources on the discipline's self-description[7] produced by historians such as Ranke himself (1795–1886), Johann Gustav Droysen (1808–1884), Heinrich von Sybel (1817–1895), Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–1896), and many other scholars mostly unknown today, reveal a gender and body-oriented habitus, to use Bourdieu's term, which structured, and was structured by the professional practice of the emerging discipline. In Bourdieu's formulation, the habitus, understood as a 'matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions',[8] creates individual and collective practices.[9] For the purposes of this article, the concept of habitus therefore helps to explain why so many different scholars acting independently similarly coded the discipline as masculine. In this sense, the male historian's habitus contributed to the establishment of history within the modern research university during the nineteenth century.

The discipline's development has been summarized as the masculinization of the discipline. Bonnie Smith's analysis of the gendered structures of Western historiography during its professionalization is a milestone in this field. Her pioneering study of academic practices and metaphorical definitions inaugurated an approach to the history of historiography that has been crucial in helping historians understand how their discipline was established as a male realm.[10] Nevertheless, this interpretation is not attentive to the complexity of the relationship between the German historical discipline and the body revealed by close analysis of sources from the founding period. What we still lack is a study that clarifies the role the body played in this process, so that its importance can be fully appreciated in order to understand exactly how the discipline's masculine character was created. As is already clear from looking at Ranke, there was a relationship between imaginations of bodies, bodily practices, and academic

[7] By this I mean sources in which professional historians directly or indirectly describe the aim, scope, methods, or members of their discipline.

[8] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, 1977), 83.

[9] Id., *The Logic of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, 1990), 54.

[10] Bonnie G. Smith, 'Gender and the Practices of Scientific History: The Seminar and Archival Research in the Nineteenth Century', *American Historical Review*, 100/4 (1995), 1150–76; ead., *The Gender of History: Men, Women, and Historical Practice* (Cambridge, 2001).

scholarship. But how the body was positioned and politicized to serve the discipline's purposes requires further research.[11] While it is fair to assume that historians were not the only profession using sexual and body images to define themselves, they have been chosen here to make a start in exploring this topic because they represent a prominent example.

The evidence presented here complicates existing findings about bodies in scientific contexts and academic masculinities. Other studies have identified the progressive elimination of the scientist's body in discourses relating to the practice of the modern natural sciences during their formation,[12] and a denial of masculine bodies during the professionalization of the British historical discipline.[13] In Germany, the metaphorical and physical incorporation of masculine bodies contributed to the establishment of history's status as an academic subject. This article investigates the impact of the body-oriented habitus on the history of German historiography, that is, how body, gender, and disciplinary knowledge were interconnected in the long nineteenth century. At issue here is not the production of historical knowledge *by* the historical discipline but, rather, the production of knowledge *about* the discipline itself. In this context my argument is that, first, the body was the vehicle for establishing history as a male/masculine enterprise, and second that both female and male bodies were involved in this process. In a broader sense, this analysis contributes to a wider understanding of modern gender norms because German historical practice, in particular, reveals one aspect of how perceptions of bodies and gender in general have shaped modern Western societies and their knowledge practices.

[11] See, as a first step in this direction, Falko Schnicke, *Die männliche Disziplin: Zur Vergeschlechtlichung der Disziplin 1780–1900* (Göttingen, 2015). The present article presents some arguments from this book, which is only available in German.

[12] Werner Kutschmann, *Der Naturwissenschaftler und sein Körper: Die Rolle der 'inneren Natur' in der experimentellen Naturwissenschaft der frühen Neuzeit* (Frankfurt/M., 1986). Other accounts have highlighted the importance of at least the sensitive parts of the scientist's body, with the eyes leading the way. Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, *Objectivity* (New York, 2007).

[13] Judith L. Newton, *Starting Over: Feminism and the Politics of Culture Critique* (Ann Arbor, 1994), 97–124.

Analysing sources from the period of the establishment of the discipline between approximately 1780 and 1900, this article contributes to this project by focusing on three significant elements of the historical discipline in turn. First, crucial contemporary ideas about the historian's qualities are examined. These drew on anthropological understandings of human sexual and gender differences coming out of the broader eighteenth-century conversation about human nature, and influenced the development of the historical discipline. In them, the body appeared mainly as an implied metaphor. Second, I examine essential practices such as the creation of methodology and historical methods. As suggested at the beginning of this article, the long argument about methodology used explicit, gendered, and corporeal metaphors to discuss what to do with the materials of history, as we have seen in the example of Ranke above. Finally, I investigate central institutions where the body was significant as a physical entity. The universities and the historical seminars were able to place these ideas and practices into a purely male/masculine space, which was guarded by the practitioners of history and their bodily actions. This article, therefore, will present different representations of the body in the examples discussed, ranging from abstract language to sexualized metaphors,[14] and, finally, the physical body. Each of the three sections concludes by elaborating a certain type of body politics[15] used to define academic history: first, the anthropological dis-

[14] For the approach outlined above, metaphors are neither understood as simply literary or linguistic phenomena, nor interpreted in the line with the theory of substitution, according to which a metaphor that is transferred from one context to another changes both its meaning and its textual function. (For a summary of this group of interpretations of metaphors see Mogens Stiller Kjärgaard, *Metaphor and Parable: A Systematic Analysis of the Specific Structure and Cognitive Function of the Synoptic Similes and Parables qua Metaphors* (Leiden, 1986), 59–65.) Metaphors are understood here rather as political forms; in this article metaphors of gender, sexuality, and bodies are seen as the result of social practices and as capable of influencing them.

[15] The term 'body politics', which is often used but rarely defined, needs at last an operational definition. It is here understood as a set of arguments and actions referring to biological, physical, or symbolic bodies by which gender and thus power hierarchies from outside the discipline are instrumentalized in response to politically motivated intentions. In the words of Jordanova, this is because the body is 'a general category' in the Western tradition and 'the medium through which sexual matters were represented and explored'.

dain for female bodies and the exaltation of male ones by defining the latter *ex negativo* as academic (instrumentalizing femininity); second, the designation of heterosexual male bodies as the only adequate ones for the practice of history (instrumentalizing masculinity); and third, the transformation of this language into physical practices (implementation).

I. *Defining the Historian's Qualities (Anthropology)*

Among the discourses that shaped German society in the nineteenth century, anthropological debates occupied a crucial place. The definition of history, too, was strongly influenced by gendered ideas of anthropology. Drawing on debates since the Enlightenment, these ideas concentrated on questions regarding the 'true' and 'objective' nature of men and women. As the discipline was established from the late Enlightenment on, the anthropological debate with its long history and continued vitality contributed to defining the historian's qualities. Allegedly scientific arguments derived from anthropological discourses used the body to deny women those characteristics that would have qualified them to undertake what was understood as real scholarship in general, and historical research in particular. In this respect, the historical discipline was in keeping with the nation, because during the nineteenth century the two were not only connected by an understanding of history as political and national (with all the exclusions that caused) but shared common gender and body

Ludmilla Jordanova, *Sexual Visions: Images of Gender in Science and Medicine between the Eighteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (New York, 1989), 13. Body politics consists of individual or collective acts of addressing, placing, empowering, or disempowering bodies that are physical but also associations of language and human actions impacting on each other, a point that Smith-Rosenberg stresses. Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, 'The Body Politic', in Elizabeth Weed (ed.), *Coming to Terms: Feminism, Theory, Politics* (New York, 1989), 101–21, at 101–3. A viewpoint that differs from Smith-Rosenberg's (and is also generally held), sees body politics as not only a matter of female bodies, and therefore includes male bodies as its subjects and objects. A review of the sources investigated for this article suggests that this is a crucial condition for coming to a comprehensive understanding and implementation of Jordanova's early, yet often disregarded, plea to consider male bodies as well. Jordanova, *Sexual Visions*, 14.

imaginations. Using metaphors referring to the body, the anthropological debate amalgamated corporeality with academic history upholding the close connection between masculinity and the body that historical studies on masculinities have shown.[16]

This was already the case in the early stages of the discipline, as illustrated by the example of Friedrich Schiller who, from 1789 onwards, worked for several years as a historian at the University of Jena. The tangible, everyday consequences for the historical discipline created by gendered hierarchies can be seen in the genesis of his well-known inaugural lecture, 'What is Universal History and to What End Do We Study It?' of May 1789. Schiller wrote to his friend, Christoph Gottfried Körner, saying that he would send him the manuscript of this lecture to ask for his opinion. This was important to Schiller, because he hoped to use the lecture to lay the foundations for his professorship in history.[17] But he did not accept Caroline von Beulwitz and Charlotte von Lengefeld, who later became his wife, as conversation partners of equal weight in this matter. Although Körner, an author, was not a professional historian, while Beulwitz and Lengefeld were intellectuals and part of the cultural life of Weimar classicism, it was no accident that Schiller asked Körner alone to advise him on his entry into 'scientific' history. This demonstrates the different perceptions of men and women, including their relation to academic history, which Schiller, along with many other authors, justified in a number of publications as the natural order.[18] In 1794 Schiller was sure that women 'can never and must not share scholarship with men because of their nature'. He saw the reason for this in anthropological constants such as the 'whole internal construction of their [women's] essence' ('ganze innre Bau seines Wesens').[19]

[16] See e.g. George L. Mosse, *The Image of Men: The Creation of Modern Masculinity* (Oxford, 1998), 24; Wolfgang Schmale, *Geschichte der Männlichkeit in Europa (1450–2000)* (Cologne, 2003), 182–5.

[17] Friedrich von Schiller, *Briefwechsel: Schillers Briefe 1.1.1788–28.2.1790*, ed. Eberhard Haufe (Weimar, 1979), 303.

[18] Claudia Honegger, *Die Ordnung der Geschlechter: Die Wissenschaften vom Menschen und das Weib, 1750–1850* (Frankfurt/M., 1991).

[19] Friedrich Schiller, 'Ueber die nothwendigen Grenzen beim Gebrauch schöner Formen' (1794), *Philosophische Schriften*, ed. Benno von Wiese, 2 vols. (Weimar, 1963), ii. 3–27, at 17.

Since the Enlightenment, scholars, doctors, philosophers, teachers, and other educated men (and women) had tried to explain the difference between men and women by reference to physical differences. In this context, 'nature' stood for the physical elements of life and early became a synonym for a creature's (living) body, as influential encyclopedias noted.[20] It is crucial to pay attention to these kinds of fairly abstract body metaphors because the anthropological discourse was used in order to generate general truths about men and women: 'their generality is an important feature of the way they [the metaphors] functioned.'[21]

To provide evidence, scientific attention was directed to the genitals but also to other organs, for instance the brain, which had been studied in France and Germany since the eighteenth century. The findings physicians obtained by measuring and weighing the brain were generalized and produced the 'common knowledge' that men are more intelligent because male brains are bigger.[22] Morphological and anatomical data was thus transformed into scientific 'facts' about the nature of the sexes and, as such, was used in several contexts, including defining history. Against this background, and as a result of the various publications dealing with gender differences in physical terms, it is easy to see why Schiller did not need to name the female body explicitly when discussing the inability of women to be historians. He could operate with allusions to it ('nature', 'essence') to make his point clear. Within the discourse of the late Enlightenment it was clear that semantically, 'nature' lay in the realm of the body and its anatomy, as Londa Schiebinger and Ludmilla Jordanova have shown.[23] As a result, in his letter to Beulwitz and Lengefeld, Schiller

[20] See Johann Heinrich Zedler, *Grosses Vollständiges Universal-Lexikon*, 64 vols. (Leipzig, 1740; reprint Graz, 1995), xxiii. 1036.

[21] Jordanova, *Sexual Visions*, 8.

[22] For detail on this issue see Michael Hagner, *Geniale Gehirne: Zur Geschichte der Elitegehirnforschung* (Göttingen, 2004); Frank Stahnisch, 'Über die neuronale Natur des Weiblichen: Szientismus und Geschlechterdifferenz in der anatomischen Hirnforschung (1760–1850)', in Frank Stahnisch and Florian Steger (eds.), *Medizin, Geschichte und Geschlecht: Körperhistorische Rekonstruktionen von Identitäten und Differenzen* (Wiesbaden, 2005), 197–224.

[23] See Londa Schiebinger, *The Mind Has No Sex? Women in the Origins of Modern Science* (Cambridge, 1989), 178–88, 201; Jordanova, *Sexual Visions*, 43–65.

announced that he would show them the script of his lecture merely 'for fun', because it might include 'something interesting for you'.[24] In his view, their bodies and related competences prevented a professional or strategic debate of the sort he could expect to have with Körner.

In Imperial Germany students used their bodies in several ways to perform and demonstrate academic masculinity (excessive alcohol consumption and duels in the fraternities, for example),[25] and this had also been important earlier. Marian Füssel has established that the link between masculinity and the academic realm was close long before the end of the nineteenth century. Although emphasizing the significance of status and regional differences, he demonstrates that early academics had already established cultural meaning through physical action and language.[26] Schiller followed this pattern in his own way, and related his inaugural lecture to his masculinity by excluding women from his historical work.[27]

Schiller's case is emblematic of how gendered spheres, once they have been separated, remained neatly distinct, even in the early period of the German historical discipline's professionalization. In Schiller's day, when universities as totally homosocial institutions had not yet been challenged by the claims of the women's movement, the male body was already established as the only scientific one in the sense of being the only one capable of producing academic discourse (*Wissenschaft*). In the course of the nineteenth century this thought took hold within the German historical discipline. Even mid century concessions by historians who regarded women as possessing as

[24] Schiller, *Briefwechsel*, 287.

[25] For more details see Miriam Rürup, 'Auf Kneipe und Fechtboden: Inszenierung von Männlichkeit in jüdischen Studentenverbindungen in Kaiserreich und Weimarer Republik', in Martin Dinges (ed.), *Männer – Macht – Körper: Hegemoniale Männlichkeiten vom Mittelalter bis heute* (Frankfurt/M., 2005), 141–56.

[26] Marian Füssel, 'Studentenkultur als Ort hegemonialer Männlichkeit? Überlegungen zum Wandel akademischer Habitusformen vom Ancien Régime zur Moderne', ibid. 85–100.

[27] In Schiller's work, however, depending on the genre, both heroic and passive female figures are to be found. For the ambiguous image of women in Schiller in general see Helmut Fuhrmann, 'Revision des Parisurteils: "Bild" und "Gestalt" der Frauen im Werk Schillers', *Jahrbuch der Deutschen Schillergesellschaft*, 25 (1981), 316–66.

much reason as men (for example, Heinrich von Sybel),[28] could not alter that; such sentiments turned out to be merely rhetorical, as we can see in von Sybel's other perception of female professors as an 'utterly dispensable asset'.[29] Despite all the significant social changes going on at this time in the economic sphere, the family, and university structures, the idea of male-only scholarship remained constant throughout the professionalization of the historical discipline. The same applied to the idea that the foundation of scholarship lay in the (male) body, which was still important towards the end of the century.

One example of the body's later significance is provided by Georg Busolt, Professor of History at Kiel from 1881 who, almost a hundred years after Schiller's inaugural lecture, still shared the latter's views to the extent that invoking women's qualities and bodies as unfit for historical practice seemed completely self-evident. He defined his discipline in a volume edited by Arthur Kirchhoff, *The Academic Woman*,[30] which collects numerous statements on the question of whether women should be admitted to university, as follows:

> As far as my discipline, history, is concerned, the following are required to solve the problems it poses: a view which is intensely and methodically trained, with a strong emphasis on investigating facts, a rich experience of life and human nature, political judgement and broad knowledge of the economic, the governmental, and, to some extent, also the religious spheres. All these are characteristics . . . which a woman, because of her entire nature ('*ihrer ganzen Natur nach*'), could not possess, so that even the most capable among them will never be suitable as a historian.[31]

[28] Heinrich von Sybel, 'Ueber die Emancipation der Frauen: Vortrag gehalten zu Bonn am 12. Februar 1870', in id., *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Berlin, 1874), 57–79, at 59.

[29] Ibid. 73.

[30] This edited volume was part of the lively debate on the possibility of women studying at university during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The editor, Arthur Kirchhoff, had asked several male professors, scholars, and women's teachers for their opinion on this issue by letter. He published all responses received in 1897.

[31] Arthur Kirchhoff (ed.), *Die Akademische Frau: Gutachten hervorragender Universitätsprofessoren, Frauenlehrer und Schriftsteller über die Befähigung der Frau zum wissenschaftlichen Studium und Berufe* (Berlin, 1897), 185.

Here the body was presented as 'nature' again. Other nineteenth-century historians did the same, as Jordanova has shown using the example of Jules Michelet.[32] In his writings he 'represented social conditions through naturalistic and medical metaphors',[33] and other German historians used the term *Natur* in discussing their health in order to link their body to their academic work,[34] as Busolt did when he set the body as the limit of a scientific approach to history. His denial of female historians was still primarily backed up by reference to the female body: while he spoke of learnt qualities (knowledge in several fields), he referred, as Schiller had done a century earlier, to the nature of women, that is, the female body and related skills. The established difference between men and women was taken as a biological fact, structuring not only the society of Imperial Germany as a whole, but also the historical discipline in particular.

The historical discipline, as Busolt's contribution underlines, was by no means just influenced by a certain set of ideas of role-division, but functioned as one of its (co-)producers by reinforcing the confrontation between the male intellect and the female body and associated emotional and psychological characteristics in its realm.[35] The use of 'nature' as one of the most abstract body metaphors of all helped him to deliver this message because its generality warded off criticism. Busolt made it even more general by using the unnecessary extension of 'entire nature'. In this respect, the choice of abstract vocabulary was highly political as it invoked the notion of an ahistorical, general truth about the social status of men and women. Busolt linked the skills mentioned to male bodies only, because unlike in female bodies, intellect and reason were matched in them, and they were understood as being properly academic. Yet male bodies were not directly mentioned, but merely alluded to in distinction to

[32] Jordanova, *Sexual Visions*, 66–86.

[33] Ibid. 80.

[34] Falko Schnicke, 'Kranke Historiker: Körperwahrnehmungen und Wissenschaft im 19. Jahrhundert', *Historische Anthropologie*, 25/1 (2017), 11–31.

[35] For the German case in general in this confrontation see Karin Hausen, 'Family and Role Division: The Polarisation of Sexual Stereotypes in the Nineteenth Century, An Aspect of the Dissociation of Work and Family', in Richard J. Evans and William Robert Lee (eds.), *The German Family: Essays on the Social History of the Family in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century Germany* (London, 1981), 51–83.

non-proper, non-academic bodies and their 'female special anthropology' ('*weibliche Sonderanthropologie*').[36]

Jacob Caro, another historian whose voice we hear in Kirchhoff's volume, unintentionally offered an explanation for the fact that both the masculinization of the German historical discipline and the body as its vehicle remained almost unquestioned for such a long period. He claimed: 'In the study of history it is necessary to separate the situation from the contingency. If we admitted women, who are interested in the contingency of the situation, to the debate, we would be declaring that there are constant revolutions. Could this be the intention?'[37] What is striking about this quotation is that it shows that the German historical discipline was anxious about changes it might face if women were accepted into it. In Caro's view the discipline's male/masculine character was not secure, but under threat. Caro feared that it would lose the epistemological character he and his male fellows had just established. To prevent that, both Caro and Busolt emphasized that their discipline was essentially masculine. Women, by contrast, were associated with a serious lack of the abilities required to appreciate logical order and facts, and with an even more serious lack of mental qualities such as reason, intellect, sagacity, mental strength, responsibility, authority, and originality. Far more than in Schiller's case, this use of the female body seems defensive, aiming to protect the masculine character of history against the transitions and claims of the women's movement but also to defend the political status quo and to ensure the German historians' conservative world view.

Even these few examples indicate a first kind of body politics within the historical discipline, as the status of people within academic history depended on their actively and intentionally gendered bodies. As these texts (and others[38]) show, this is the result of the conjoining of the body and historical research in the conflation of the bodies of individuals who were professional, academic historians, the bodies of individuals who were denied this status, and collective bodies, such as the historical discipline. Marginalized in this and the second important collective body, the nation, women were not full

[36] Honegger, *Die Ordnung der Geschlechter*, 126.
[37] Kirchhoff (ed.), *Die Akademische Frau*, 186–7.
[38] See Schnicke, *Die männliche Disziplin*, esp. 61–341.

members of either.[39] In both cases men were defined as historical subjects, while women were set aside because of their 'nature', meaning their body.

Thus the first type of body politics in German academic history defined the collective body of the discipline by highlighting its opposite (instrumentalizing femininity). Harking back to popular anthropological knowledge, women and their bodies were cited only as negative examples, while female historians in the entire Western world were simply ignored or intentionally filtered out.[40] This meant that female bodies were seen as inappropriate, as representing corporeal lack, and as alien to the discipline. Femininity was important in defining the masculine discipline and the body became political, in a broad sense, because it was a category of knowledge and an essential part of the discipline's discourse. In compliance with this, masculinity assumed an academic value, whereas it was considered impossible for the female body to write professional history, a kind of body politics that could be interpreted as 'being-perceived' by men in Bourdieu's terminology of perception:

> Thus, the perceived body is socially doubly determined. On the one hand, in even its seemingly most natural aspects (its volume, height, weight, musculature, etc.) it is a social product. . . . On the other hand, these bodily properties are apprehended through schemes of perception whose use in acts of evaluation depends on the position occupied in social space.[41]

As a result, 'masculine domination', in Bourdieu's phrase which constitutes women as symbolic objects whose being (*esse*) is a being-perceived (*percipi*), has the effect of keeping them in a permanent state of

[39] For the German context of this see, among others, Ute Planert, *Antifeminismus im Kaiserreich: Diskurs, soziale Formation und politische Mentalität* (Göttingen, 1998).

[40] While other national contexts are much more fully researched, for Germany see Angelika Epple, *Empfindsame Geschichtsschreibung: Eine Geschlechtergeschichte der Historiographie zwischen Aufklärung und Historismus* (Cologne, 2003); Hiram Kümper, *Historikerinnen: Eine biobibliographische Spurensuche im deutschen Sprachraum* (Kassel, 2009).

[41] Pierre Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, 2001), 64.

bodily insecurity, or more precisely, of 'symbolic dependence'.[42] This became apparent in the German historical discipline, as male perception defined femininity in relation to an assumed corporeal inability to produce academic history, making women dependent on men in terms of their ability to participate in the production and experience of history. By contrast, male bodies were not mentioned explicitly, but only indirectly, by claiming female bodies as their opposite. Within this first kind of body politics male bodies were established as proper academic ones merely *ex negative*.

II. *Empowering and Questioning Masculinity (Methods)*

In terms of methods and methodology—as a second aspect of the establishment of history as a discipline, following anthropology—the discipline of history was set up as a male space of action by the sexualization and embodiment of operations aimed at producing knowledge. In an intense discourse on method and methodology, historians considered a set of defined operations necessary to create their discipline. Although research on the gendering of historical methods has hitherto been neglected, there is evidence that, based on anthropological ideas, male bodies were again positioned at the discipline's centre in terms of method. As a result of this location, history as an important constituent of the German modern research university was permeated by the conviction that male historians and male bodies were required for truly scientific, proper academic investigations to be undertaken.

An early example is Justus Möser, author of a history of Osnabrück, who in his concise essay 'How to Present One's Emotions Well', published in 1780, conceived of lecturing as an intellect-based use of the emotions. Intended as advice for educated circles, the essay explained what was necessary to create a good speech and introduced the traditional five rhetorical steps as expressions of the 'fire' ('Feuer'), 'desire' ('Begierde'),[43] and 'heated imagination' ('erhitzte

[42] Ibid. 66.

[43] Justus Möser, 'Wie man zu einem guten Vortrage seiner Empfindungen gelange' [1780], in id., *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. vii: *Patriotische Phantasien und Zugehöriges*, ed. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen (Hamburg, n.d.), 11–15, at 12.

Einbildung')[44] that the male author needed to succeed. According to Möser, the scholar required 'passion' and 'love' for his topic. In his words, these are the opposite to *Erschlaffung*,[45] a term that is difficult to translate; the word indicates 'relaxation', a 'diminution of swelling', or a 'return to a flaccid state'. *Erschlaffung* in this context was meant to be both the inability of the male scholar to do scholarly work and the productive goal of scholarly work. Suggesting that successful research required a repetition of those productive activities, Möser identified the historian's work with phases of male sexual arousal. Accepting Christian Begemann's interpretation, Möser invented a 'cycle of libidinous pushes'.[46] This was not an innovative view, as such sexualized concepts of intellectual production were commonplace in the late eighteenth century. Yet among historians Möser was one of the first to apply them to his academic work. The reference to the body in this description lies in the suggestion of the male historian's sex organ which, through the combination of 'desire' and *Erschlaffung*, moved into the centre of the historical discipline.

It is crucial to note that for Möser the image of reduced arousal (*Erschlaffung*) also stood for the failure to work on a sound methodological basis. More precisely, this meant that he semantically equated the loss of male sexual ability, extending into biological impotence, with poor scholarship. This perspective shows how tightly the use of methods and sexual potency were intertwined as early as the late eighteenth century and how both were fixated on the male body. If the relaxation of the penis was seen as a threat, this implies the inherent coupling of academic work with male physiology. This understanding, conveying the idea that only men had sex drive and that this could be transformed into academic work, was significantly transmitted through the growing discourse on sexuality in the eighteenth century. Masculinity was based on sexuality, as Isabel Hull has established;[47] but, while according to the knowledge of the late

[44] Ibid. 13.

[45] Ibid. 12.

[46] Christian Begemann, 'Kunst und Liebe: Ein ästhetisches Produktionsmyologem zwischen Klassik und Realismus', in Michael Titzmann (ed.), *Zwischen Goethezeit und Realismus: Wandel und Spezifik in der Phase des Biedermeier* (Tübingen, 2002), 79–112, at 86.

[47] Isabel V. Hull, *Sexuality, State, and Civil Society in Germany, 1700–1815* (Ithaca, NY, 1996), 245–6.

eighteenth-century women could indeed also feel sexual desire, they should be denied it on moral grounds.[48]

In his speech commemorating Barthold Georg Niebuhr, the founder of the University of Bonn, mentioned above, Sybel later argued along these lines when he articulated the unavoidable connection between historical criticism and, as he called it, a 'masculine maturity of culture' ('männliche Reife der Bildung').[49] In 1864 Sybel also established ties between this fairly abstract opinion and the actual practice of his discipline: this 'masculine maturity', he wrote, is necessary 'to allow us to balance imagination and reason, to prefer solid truth to the most pleasing fantasy, and to gain a solid picture of events as they really happened'.[50] In these sentences, Sybel dealt with the core of the methodical inventory of history, source criticism and the development of historical judgement. In his text, he was gendering these crucial methods by defining them as forming part of masculinity. Sybel emphasized this through the significance he attributed to characteristics indicating masculine maturity, such as 'conscious volition',[51] and 'reflective, critical, self-confident intellect.'[52]

In his speech entitled 'On the Rules of Historical Knowledge' he more or less implicitly framed the rule that historiography had to be masculine at the methodological level if was to be seen as a scientific enterprise. The result of this position became apparent when Sybel articulated his perception of medieval historiography: 'This era had no idea of historical judgement, no sense of historical reality, no hint of critical reflection.'[53] The lack of masculine maturity, which Sybel identified with his own age only, is directly connected here with medieval history's lack of scientific qualities.

Within the German branch of academic history there was no place for a positive evaluation of 'womanly qualities', as was the case among some German economists around the turn of the twentieth century whereby characteristics assumed to be female (such as sympathy and devotion), and even women researchers themselves, were

[48] Ibid. 251–2.

[49] Heinrich von Sybel, 'Ueber die Gesetze des historischen Wissens (1864)', in id., *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Berlin, 1874), 1–20, at 15.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid. 12.

[52] Ibid. 8.

[53] Ibid. 16.

seen as benefiting socio-economic studies.[54] But no such assessment was to be found in the self-descriptions of historians. Only operations understood as masculine were accepted as both proper and scientific. 'What makes the man also makes the historian',[55] wrote Hartwig Floto, one of the members of Ranke's seminar. A 'scientific' historian was so naturally considered masculine that maleness and the ability to be an historian were equated semantically—a way of thinking that, incidentally, was not limited to men. Emilie von Berlepsch, a female critic of Swiss history, herself preferred a historian to be a 'talented male'.[56]

Forms of gendering historical methods were acts of designation and naming, achieved by the aspects mentioned so far. They supported the German historical discipline's masculinization and brought the body into play. One of these examples is the letter, mentioned above, which the young Leopold Ranke wrote to Bettina von Arnim in 1828. The two had a short but intense relationship in Berlin, while he was one of the guests at her salon before he left to undertake his research. During his journey he missed her as a friend and possibly more. In this situation he experienced the sources he studied in the archives in Vienna as female objects, calling them 'beautiful princesses', that is, gendering and embodying them. 'You would never believe', Ranke wrote in his letter of February 1828, 'the weight of manuscripts still waiting for me, full of things worth knowing. Just think, perhaps beautiful princesses, all cursed and waiting to be disenchanted.'[57] It is possible that Ranke was merely trying to impress Arnim, whom he admired as a writer and a woman, but the metaphors quoted meant much more. Ranke did not restrict them either

[54] Marynel Ryan Van Zee, '"Womanly Qualities" and Contested Methodology: Gender and the Discipline of Economics in Late Imperial Germany', *Gender and History*, 22/2 (2010), 341–60.

[55] Hartwig Floto, *Ueber Historische Kritik: Akademische Antrittsrede, gehalten am 2. Mai in der Aula zu Basel* (Basel, 1856), 17.

[56] Emilie von Berlepsch, *Einige Bemerkungen zur richtigern Beurtheilung der erzwungenen Schweitzer-Revolution und Mallet du Pan's Geschichte derselben* (Leipzig, 1799), 55.

[57] Ranke, *Briefwerk*, 139. The entire passage in German reads as follows: 'Sie glauben nicht, welche Last von Manuskripten voll der wissenswürdigsten Sachen noch auf mich wartet. Denken Sie sich so viel, vielleicht schöne Prinzessinnen, alle verwünscht und zu erlösen'.

to conversations with her, or to his first research trip, but used this language again and again to frame his academic work. As mentioned at the beginning of this article, in a letter of 1827 to Heinrich Ritter, a university friend, he called the materials he was studying the 'object of his love', with whom he wished to have *Schäferstunden*, meaning intimate sexual relations;[58] in 1836 he wrote to his brother calling an archive a 'virgin' he was about to 'enter';[59] and in 1837 he notified Ludwig von Schorn, director of the Weimar art collection, that he had found 'arousing sources' ('Lust erregende Materialien').[60] This list covering a period of nearly ten years shows that Ranke's metaphors were not merely ephemeral, but formed part of his view of himself. Moreover, the elaborate expressions are striking, showing how important their content was to Ranke.

Images like those mentioned evoke an erotic relationship between men and historical sources. As regards the princesses and their mentioned curse and enchantment, to supplement Smith's persuasive interpretation of obsession and fetish,[61] behind Ranke's expression lay a significant narrative of gender and body norms derived from the German fairy-tale tradition that requires some unpacking. The Grimm brothers' well-known and influential compilation, *Children's and Household Tales*, was published in 1812–1815, followed by several early reprints at exactly the time when Ranke's letter was written. The compilation was not only widespread, but Ranke knew that his friend Arnim was in close contact with the Grimm brothers and their intellectual environment.[62]

In the fairy-tale context, Ranke's letter about his research invokes a masculine heterosexual fantasy. As the literature points out, erotic or sexual thoughts within fairy tales are almost always male fan-

[58] Ibid. 121.

[59] Ranke, *Neue Briefe*, 230.

[60] Ibid. 244.

[61] See Smith, 'Gender and the Practices of Scientific History', 1165–75; and ead., *The Gender of History*, 116–29, who reads the 'princesses' and other quotations as an articulation of the astonishingly intense way in which archival study was done by obsessed professionals with a fetishistic love for their research.

[62] Note the dedication the Grimm brothers made to her. Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm (eds.), *Kinder- und Haus-Märchen: Gesammelt durch die Brüder Grimm* (Berlin, 1812), iii.

tasies. They are produced by men and presented from a male perspective.[63] In the typical fairy-tale setting, an expectant, immature, dormant, virginal, and other-directed princess waits for a potent and sexually active, self-determined prince, described as the successful hero *par excellence*.[64] The associated body order empowered the heterosexual male body and provided sexualized perceptions of female availability and willingness; the image is of a masculine desire for penetration facing a female desire to be penetrated. This tendency was supported structurally by the fact that tales of disenchantment were geared to a marriage between prince and princess; in this sense, disenchantment, match-making, and the consummation of marriage (heterosexual penetration) were closely affiliated.[65] The idea of disenchantment, as another characteristic of the topoi of fairy tales, was related to a gender order based on the polarity of the sexes.[66] In Ranke's letter the male historian disenchanted the historical sources, identified as female; that is to say, he embodied an active-initiating role as against the passive-receptive role of the princesses, his material.

Effective archival research and the discovery of sources, which formed the core of nineteenth-century German academic historical activity,[67] were thus established as the bodily activities of heterosexual men. To hone this argument further, it could be said that saving

[63] Lutz Röhrich, 'Erotik, Sexualität', in Kurt Ranke (ed.), *Enzylopädie des Märchens: Handwörterbuch zur historischen und vergleichenden Erzählforschung,* 15 vols. (Berlin, 1984), iv. 270; Wiebke Walther, 'Märchenprinzessinen in "Tausendundeiner Nacht"', in Frederick de Jong (ed.), *Verse and Fair Sex: Studies in Arabic Poetry and the Representation of Women in Arabic Literature* (Utrecht, 1993), 92–100, at 100.

[64] See Rainer Wehse, 'Prinz, Prinzessin', in Ranke (ed.), *Enzylopädie des Märchens*, (2002), x. 1311–19, for a critical collection of these general characteristics as well as their important exceptions and specifications.

[65] According to Röhrich, it would be totally out of character in a fairy tale if the prince was not interested in marrying the princess he had disenchanted. This is because the aim of disenchantment is to allow the marriage of the protagonists, who are typically depicted as being of marriageable age and to have reached sexual maturity. Lutz Röhrich, 'Erlösung', in Ranke (ed.), *Enzylopädie des Märchens*, iv. 204–5.

[66] Ibid. 204.

[67] See Friedrich Jaeger and Jörn Rüsen, *Geschichte des Historismus: Eine Einführung* (Munich, 1992), 19, 60; Stefan Jordan, *Geschichtstheorie in der ersten*

archival material from obscurity, which was the essence of professional historiography, was masculinized and heterosexualized by Ranke. From his point of view, it seems that he felt it was appropriate to use imagery which identified historical research with men and included the idea of sexual intercourse. Given that he used his seminar to broadcast this understanding of archival research to his disciplinary offspring,[68] as he saw them, it was quite influential. These examples thus illustrate the transfer of gender and body norms from outside the academic space into the practice of the historical discipline, and the heterosexualization of the historical realm.

Johann Gustav Droysen, Ranke's Berlin colleague, also displayed an obsession with the sexualization of professional history in his *Historik* of 1857. In the first section of his methodological *magnum opus* he describes the development of historical questions as 'conception through copulation' ('Empfängnis in der Begattung'),[69] that is, he describes history in terms of biological procreation and physical action. Although Droysen does not explain this phrase, it is highly instructive. It shows how ambiguous the discipline's masculinization was in this specific case, as it reintroduces the female body. As there is no further discussion, this impression cannot be repudiated at the textual level. But Droysen denied his discipline to women by defining it through activeness and creative process,[70] and by advocating an androcentric view of history.[71] Rather than making women a crucial part of history against this background, it is more likely that he merged the meaning and vocabulary of sexual reproduction and intellectual work by men, in line with a long tradition of interpreting

Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts: Die Schwellenzeit zwischen Pragmatismus und Klassischem Historismus (Frankfurt/M., 1999), 88–90.

[68] Smith describes this seminar as a 'centerpiece of disciplinary power'. Smith, 'Gender and the Practices of Scientific History', 1175.

[69] Johann Gustav Droysen, *Historik*, vol. i: *Rekonstruktion der ersten vollständigen Fassungen der Vorlesung (1857), Grundriß der Historik in der ersten handschriftlichen (1857/1858) und der letzten gedruckten Fassung (1882)*, ed. Peter Leyh (Stuttgart, 1977), 108.

[70] For one of the rare feminist readings of Droysen see Hannelore Cyrus, *Historische Akkuratesse und soziologische Phantasie: Eine Methodologie feministischer Forschung* (Königstein/Taunus, 1997), 24.

[71] Falko Schnicke, *Prinzipien der Entindividualisierung: Theorie und Praxis biographischer Studien bei Johann Gustav Droysen* (Cologne, 2010), 72–95.

reaching back to Socrates.[72] Droysen's understanding of the historical question as a 'grain for new growth' ('Samenkorn eines neuen Wachstums'),[73] which—in a mixed and inconsistent understanding—was for him derived from an 'embryonic beginning' ('embryonische[r] Anfang')[74] is further evidence for this view.

This type of language was not novel among historians, who were familiar with it from the legal sphere.[75] We can see here that the language of conception was used to shape not only legal discourse but also the historical discipline, and thus formed a successful basis for gender and body politics. Using words such as 'conception', 'copulation', and 'embryonic' to depict his work, Droysen symbolically connected academic history with the historian's body and the semen originating from his sexual organs. This interpretation is supported by other German historians producing similar metaphors in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. In a letter of 1860 Sybel compared his correspondent's infants with his academic articles, which he called his 'intellectual children'.[76] In the late 1830s Georg Gottfried Gervinus, a leading literary and political historian, had already called a methodological error made by a (male) historian in his manual on history a 'miscarriage'.[77] History was sexualized to the exclusion of women, highlighting men's bodies and men's sexual capacities.

Practices of exclusion could also be used by one male historian against another in conflicts about power and authority. Thus Droysen criticized Ranke for his belief that a historian should discount his own political and personal convictions in his work, and argued instead that scientific history was only feasible if the historian was open about his own political beliefs. In this debate about the

[72] For more details on this see Christian Begemann, 'Der Körper des Autors: Autorschaft als Zeugung und Geburt im diskursiven Feld der Genieästhetik', in Heinrich Detering (ed.), *Autorschaft: Positionen und Revisionen* (Stuttgart, Weimar, 2002), 44–61.

[73] Droysen, *Historik*, 107.

[74] Ibid. 106.

[75] See e.g. Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford, Calif., 1988).

[76] Heinrich von Sybel and Eduard Zeller, *Briefwechsel (1849–1895)*, ed. Margret Lemberg (Marburg, 2004), 292–3.

[77] Georg Gottfried Gervinus, 'Grundzüge der Historik' (1837), in id., *G. G. Gervinus Leben: Von ihm selbst 1860*, ed. J[ulius] K[eller] (Leipzig, 1893), 353–96, at 360.

historian's stance (a debate which was crucial for defining what history as a scientific discipline could be, and which was by no means limited to these two men[78]) Droysen called Ranke 'a big talent and a small man'.[79] He carried this gender degradation to extremes by publicly describing his opponent's ideal of objectivity as 'worthy of a eunuch' ('eunuchisch') in his lectures.[80] This suggested that the lack of a political stance meant a lack of virility, and thus of the ability to undertake historical research. As German society in general excluded homosexual masculinities,[81] the emerging historical discipline obviously did the same. Droysen's serious attack might also have been an expression of differences within the discipline. Distinct understandings of the nature of historical research, connected with a generational conflict, were expressed by highlighting different masculinities.

This example indicates that defining the German historical discipline as masculine did not mean that this process took place without any conflicts among male historians. And these internal conflicts could be tough. Although there have been a few important, respected, and politically influential eunuchs in history (including rare outstanding functionaries at the courts of antiquity),[82] the use of this term with reference to Ranke discredited both his professional work and his person. The act and effect of the (symbolic) castration went far beyond a simple cultural de-masculinization; it again targeted the male scholar's body.

In his letters Ranke presented the heterosexual, active man as one who could treat (and even 'penetrate') archival sources properly, but Droysen denied him this status. Eunuchs, a topic familiar to Droysen

[78] For more context see, among others, Gunter Berg, *Leopold von Ranke als akademischer Lehrer: Studien zu seinen Vorlesungen und seinem Geschichtsdenken* (Göttingen, 1968), 104–218; Reinhart Koselleck, Wolfgang J. Mommsen, and Jörn Rüsen (eds.), *Objektivität und Parteilichkeit in der Geschichtswissenschaft* (Munich, 1977).

[79] Johann Gustav Droysen, *Briefwechsel*, vol. i: *1829–1851*, ed. Rudolf Hübner (Osnabrück, 1967), 333.

[80] Droysen, *Historik*, 236.

[81] Mosse, *The Image of Men*, 45.

[82] Keith Hopkins, *Conquerors and Slaves* (Cambridge, 1980), 172–96; Dirk Schlinkert, 'Der Hofeunuch in der Spätantike: Ein gefährlicher Außenseiter?', *Hermes: Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie*, 122/3 (1994), 342–59; Peter Guyot, 'Eunuchen', in Hubert Cancik and Helmut Schneider (eds.), *Der Neue Pauly: Enzyklopädie der Antike*, 18 vols. (Stuttgart, 1998), iv. 257–8.

from his research on Greek antiquity,[83] represented a double disparagement for men. First, they were household slaves, whose duties originally included looking after their master's bed-chamber and taking care of children.[84] Second, their effeminate and androgynous status meant that eunuchs were associated with homosexuality and same-sex intimacy because they were used as catamites (for example, by Alexander the Great).[85] In both cases, eunuchs as castrated men were no longer accepted as fully-fledged males acting out their (hetero-)sexual potency and were reduced to the status and work traditionally reserved for women.[86] Cultural differences dividing the world into separate men's and women's spheres were annihilated as the result of a male body that was, in fact, only slightly modified.

What we can learn from this example is that masculinity and sound male bodies were the standard of history, and that it was possible to carry out scientific disputes by invoking masculinity in the nineteenth century. But although science in general and scientific history in particular was a field in which men could perform their masculinity, it exposed them to some risks too. As Bourdieu said, in this sense men 'are also prisoners, and insidiously victims, of the dominant representation'.[87] Gender is a useful category for the analysis of historical power hierarchies going beyond an overt male–female division. While no women were involved (but the idea of femininity, as castrated manhood, was), images of gendered bodies were nevertheless deliberately used to promote one man over another, and to undermine the social status of one's opponent. Criticism of scholarship that was considered wrong, as in the case of Ranke, could be followed by the intentional debasement of the male scholar's body-based gender—or at least by a serious challenge to it.

In sum, the second type of body politics used in defining history as an academic discipline was to refer to male bodies directly (instrumentalizing masculinity). Male bodies continued to be the model but, unlike the instrumentalization of femininity, the first type of body

[83] See the introduction to Johann Gustav Droysen, *Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen* (Berlin, 1833).

[84] Guyot, 'Eunuchen', 257–8.

[85] Ibid. 257.

[86] For the loss of what was understood as real or proper masculinity see the discussion of countertypes in Mosse, *The Image of Men*, 56–76.

[87] Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, 49.

politics described in this article, they were described in terms of both positive and negative characteristics based on accepted ideals of masculinity. Because historical methods were one of the major aspects of the emerging discipline, it is no surprise that they were used to address this. The proper accomplishment of the discipline's needs was seen to be the task of heterosexual men as an expression of masculine dominance in the academic discipline of history, and in general as a result of symbolic violence, in the words of Bourdieu.[88] The scientific body had to be purely masculine in a specific sense, that is, potent and procreative.

What made this second type of body politics political was the increasing masculinization of the discipline. This gendering of the discipline was, like the first, binary, but was no longer based on an explicit opposition between femininity and masculinity, but on conflicts within masculinities. Of course, as we have seen in the example of Droysen's 'eunuch' jibe above, these conflicts might reference femininity in order to highlight the status of different types of masculinity, but this remained implicit. The first result of this shift was that female bodies were no longer invoked in this process, not even as negative examples. And second, the connection between masculinity and scientific history was spelled out, as some masculinities (active heterosexual masculinity) were defined as more academic than others (castrated masculinity).

III. *'Our History is Men's History' (Institutions)*

The discussion so far illustrates that history was, above all, culturally defined as body-related and masculine by the historians of the long nineteenth century. This can be demonstrated with reference to a statement made by Otto von Gierke, a professor of law, in 1897: 'Our universities are men's universities',[89] he said, just as 'our history is men's history'. This related to both knowledge production and institutional practices within history as an academic field. It is there-

[88] Ibid. 38: 'Symbolic force is a form of power that is exerted on bodies, directly and as if by magic, without any physical constraint; but this magic works only on the basis of the dispositions deposited, like springs, at the deepest level of the body.'

[89] Kirchhoff (ed.), *Die Akademische Frau*, 23.

fore not surprising that there was not a single historian in Kirchhoff's edited volume who unreservedly supported the admission of women to university. In their statements, one of the four historians was against female students, while three were undecided, which meant that they would allow women to study only in very rare, exceptional cases. In other disciplines the proportions were more in favour of the general admission of women.[90] Given the increasing acceptance of at least the idea of female students from the last third of the nineteenth century onwards,[91] this fairly limited insight illustrates the historical discipline's particularly conservative disposition by comparison with other subjects.

This was expressed in those institutions that shaped history. Apart from the the use of anthropology by historians and historical methods, the perception of these institutions was conducive to establishing the German historical discipline as a gendered and embodied academic subject. Once again, the argument concerning the admission of women to universities is an instructive source. Heinrich von Treitschke, Ranke's successor in Berlin and one of the most outspoken opponents of female students, refused to accept that the 'masculine educational institutions',[92] meaning the existing universities, should tolerate an 'invasion by the skirt'.[93] Treitschke ignored academic studies by women, which meant that they had no opportunity to become professional historians. In his opinion, this would not have been appropriate to the natural status of women. He was able to see only 'sophistry' with 'dirty consequences' in the ideas of the women's movement.[94] This position was not motivated by any scientific or intellectual interest. It was purely political, but nevertheless influential in terms of defining the institutions in which the discipline was housed, and the kinds of bodies that they could have in them.

[90] Karin Hausen, 'Warum Männer Frauen zur Wissenschaft nicht zulassen wollten', in ead. and Helga Nowotny (eds.), *Wie männlich ist die Wissenschaft?* (Frankfurt/M., 1986), 31–40, at 33.

[91] Patricia M. Mazón, *Gender and the Modern Research University: The Admission of Women to German Higher Education* (Stanford, Calif., 2003).

[92] Heinrich von Treitschke, *Politik: Vorlesungen gehalten an der Universität zu Berlin*, ed. Max Cornicelius, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1899), i. 258.

[93] Ibid. 252.

[94] Ibid. 240.

The violation or transgressing of borders was not to be tolerated in this context, as Treitschke's disciplinary control documented. The *Berliner Tageblatt* reported one day in 1896 that he had halted his lecture when he discovered that a female student had forced her way into the room. In response not least to the wide-ranging social and economic changes taking place in German society as a whole, the women's movement, insisting on equal educational rights, confronted the historical discipline with hitherto unknown challenges, such as women appearing at lectures. Reactions were mostly defensive; Treitschke did not start speaking again until, offering her his arm, he had escorted the woman out of the lecture room,[95] accompanied, as one of the students later reported, 'by the stamping of her [male] fellow students',[96] the common way of applauding at that time. Although historians such as Hans Delbrück in Berlin and Theodor Lindner in Halle accepted women in their seminars (although only a small number of supposedly 'exceptional' women),[97] true academics (in their own view) such as Treitschke and his male students used their bodies to mark the limits of their profession physically in order to avoid what they feared would be the 'twilight of the amateurish', as Herta Nagl-Docekal puts it.[98]

Treitschke's consistency of behaviour on the one hand and the students' reactions on the other regulated the discipline's collective body. It was not only Treitschke who deployed his body to exclude other bodies from doing history; so, too, did the male students who physically supported him. Instead of metaphors, here real physical behaviour reconstituted a disciplinary homogenous collective male body disturbed by a female student. Although open to everyone in principle, lectures as the crucial method for teaching history were thus corporeally defined and secured as a masculine practice for which masculine bodies were the tools.

[95] Richard Wulckow, 'Die Erschwerung des Frauenstudiums an der Berliner Universität', *Berliner Tageblatt: Montagsausgabe*, 6 June 1896.

[96] Theodor Spitta, *Aus meinem Leben: Bürger und Bürgermeister in Bremen* (Munich, 1969), 151–2.

[97] Kirchhoff (ed.), *Die Akademische Frau*, 187–8.

[98] Herta Nagl-Docekal, 'Für eine geschlechtergeschichtliche Perspektivierung der Historiographiegeschichte', in Wolfgang Küttler, Jörn Rüsen, and Ernst Schulin (eds.), *Geschichtsdiskurs*, vol. i: *Grundlagen und Methoden der Historiographiegeschichte* (Frankfurt/M., 1993), 233–56, at 249.

Treitschke was prepared to act this way since the female student who attended his lecture was neither the first nor the only woman to whom he actively denied excess to academic schooling. Other students, such as Helene Stöcker and Hildegard Wegscheider, had also applied to attend his courses in the 1890s. Treitschke refused them personally; these are only two of the women who wrote autobiographies outlining their experiences.[99] At the time, such practice was in line with the law; in 1886 the Prussian education secretary had issued a statement confirming that women were forbidden from attending university lectures.[100] And a law introduced ten years later, allowing women access to universities as guest students, gave (male) academic teachers the final decision as to who could attend.[101] Treitschke obviously regularly acted as a gatekeeper, as did many other professors throughout Prussia.[102] While this way of handling the situation was effective in the sense that the male collective body was maintained, it exposed the discipline's reactionary orientation as Treitschke tried to restore a *status quo ante* that was about to change. The change announced itself loudly in the presence of the female intruder.

Treitschke, however, continued to express his understanding of the historical discipline by invoking the traditional social structure of the university. Sustaining cultural othering, that is, the banishing of women into a separate sphere, Treitschke asserted that the admission of women would adulterate the character of universities. In his view, universities were not merely institutions of higher education but places of comradeship, which he held to be extremely important for

[99] Helene Stöcker, '[Lebenslauf. 1939]', *Ariadne: Almanach des Archivs der Deutschen Frauenbewegung*, 5 (1986), [1]–[6], at [3]; Hildegard Wegscheider, *Weite Welt im engen Spiegel: Erinnerungen* (Berlin, 1953), 31.

[100] 'Nichtzulassung von Personen weiblichen Geschlechts zu den Vorlesungen an den Universitäten', *Centralblatt für die gesamte Unterrichts-Verwaltung in Preußen*, 28 (1886), 620–1.

[101] 'Zulassung von Frauen zum gastweisen Besuche von Universitätsvorlesungen', *Centralblatt für die gesamte Unterrichts-Verwaltung in Preußen,* 38 (1896), 567.

[102] Ilse Costas, 'Von der Gasthörerin zur voll immatrikulierten Studentin: Die Zulassung von Frauen in den deutschen Bundesstaaten 1900–1909', in Traude Maurer (ed.), *Der Weg an die Universität: Höhere Frauenstudien vom Mittelalter bis zum 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 2010), 191–210, at 209.

the development of young men.[103] Treitschke's serious interest in maintaining this situation was documented in the argument he used against Stöcker. In her memoir, she reported his comment that 'German universities have been exclusively for men for half a millennium and I will not help to destroy them'.[104] Thus Treitschke kept the masculine culture of his discipline stable. But it was the same pattern again, because at the same time he emphasized how unstable he felt this culture was. His comment offered an insight into the anxiety and insecurity he felt about any challenge to the discipline's status. He reacted in the way he did, not because he saw the male discipline as sacrosanct, but rather because he perceived it to be under threat.

Other—more liberal—colleagues shared his views. The opinion that history should be reserved for men was widely held among professional German historians during the nineteenth century. Delbrück, for example, explained how the social and and scientific character of universities would change if women were to be admitted. As he was not in favour of female students attending universities in future he, along with others such as Treitschke,[105] suggested physically separate universities for women, so that men's universities would not be affected.[106] Obviously, suggesting women-only universities was not the same as excluding women from the historical discipline. Yet the positions were closely connected. This was paradoxical as, if realized, this new type of university would have meant a substantial step forward for women's higher education, with the support of conservative historians. This idea was raised during the modernization of Imperial Germany, an era of rapid transitions in terms of how people lived, worked, and saw the world.[107] It was also part of the late nineteenth-century cultural criticism popular among historians who claimed that modernity would cause the downfall of German culture.[108] Their support was intended to express that at

[103] Treitschke, *Politik*, 252.

[104] Helene Stöcker, cited in Christl Wickert, *Helene Stöcker 1869–1943: Frauenrechtlerin, Sexualreformerin und Pazifistin. Eine Biographie* (Bonn, 1991), 27.

[105] Treitschke, *Politik*, 257.

[106] Kirchhoff (ed.), *Die Akademische Frau*, 187.

[107] For an overview of Germany around 1900 see Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte Deutschlands im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2014), 25–67.

[108] Johannes Heinßen, *Historismus und Kulturkritik: Studien zur deutschen Geschichtskultur im späten 19. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 2003).

times of change, the education sector also had to change in order to secure the historical discipline's msculine character. This again demonstrated how vulnerable this male status was perceived to be by the historians themselves.

To gain a deeper understanding of the body politics which formed the discipline's way of conceptualizing itself through institutions, it is necessary to take the practices of historical seminars into consideration. They were a crucial element in this context because they were a place for developing masculinity as well as collective identities and academic comradeship, as we have seen.[109] Responsible for gendering the historian's anthropology and historical methods paradigmatically, as described above, these aspects of 'male citizenship'[110] were extremely important from the second third of the nineteenth century onwards, the time when the historical seminars emerged.

With regard to body politics, two points are crucial. First, these seminars were institutions for practising historical methods within a group of male peers under a master's guidance. These groups came about selectively, as they were strictly limited to young men only,[111] chosen by an entrance test consisting of an informal interview, as in the case of Ranke. For those students who survived this gatekeeping ritual, the male network to which they gained access was extremely helpful and supportive. They familiarized themselves with specific historical approaches by way of personal advice and theoretical and practical training, comprising regular exercises evaluated by the group and Ranke himself. One student, none other than Jacob Burckhardt, noted that only the seminar could clarify for him what historical criticism meant.[112] Members used the seminars to prepare publications based on document-related work and the interrogation

[109] Smith, 'Gender and the Practices of Scientific History', 1153–64; ead., *The Gender of History*, 105–16.

[110] Smith, 'Gender and the Practices of Scientific History', 1163.

[111] According to Berg, *Leopold von Ranke als akademischer Lehrer*, 54, on average five to ten students attended, sometimes even just three and, only once, eighteen.

[112] Jacob Burckhardt, *Briefe: Vollständige und kritisch bearbeitete Ausgabe*, vol. i: *Jugend und Schulzeit, erste Reisen nach Italien, Studium in Neuenburg, Basel, Berlin und Bonn 1818 bis Mai 1843*, ed. Max Burckhardt (Wiesbaden, 1949), 157–8.

of sources on a wide range of themes.[113] The very first words of Sybel's book on the First Crusade, for example, were devoted to the source criticism practised in Ranke's seminar, where the major sources had been studied by Sybel and his group in 1837.[114] Others, too, benefited in the same way, and published joint articles in journals.[115] Since these benefits resulted from the physical presence of the male students at the seminar, the statements quoted here about the historian's qualities and masculine methods were institutionalized through the inclusion of certain bodies and neglect of others. Like the archives and libraries that denied access to women, these seminars set up a connection between proper scientific tools and male bodies, disqualifying females and those masculine bodies that were not able to attend the seminars (for example, working-class men).

The historical seminar was also a quantitatively significant factor. Out of the total of 481 students Berg was able to identify in his study on Ranke as an academic teacher, 279 were participants in his seminar. Many came from abroad, but there was not a single woman among them (as far as this can be deduced from the partly abbreviated form in which first names were given).[116] Among the participants were many outstanding historians who later became famous, including Burckhardt, Wilhelm Dilthey, Alfred Dove, Maximilan Duncker, Sybel, and Georg Waitz. This list shows how successful the training within a male peer group was. Ranke's seminar was the model for the seminars which his former students established when they had earned their own professorships. This was the case with Waitz and Sybel,[117] who borrowed the practice of teaching in the mas-

[113] For a selection of dated topics discussed in Ranke's seminars see Berg, *Leopold von Ranke als akademischer Lehrer*, 53.

[114] Heinrich von Sybel, *Geschichte des ersten Kreuzzugs* (Leipzig, 1881), pp. iii–iv.

[115] Smith, 'Gender and the Practices of Scientific History', 1156.

[116] For the whole list, which as the author states may display only a third of the real number, see Berg, *Leopold von Ranke als akademischer Lehrer*, 222–42.

[117] Alfred Dove, 'Ranke: Leopold v. R.', in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, ed. Historische Commission bei der königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften (reprint Berlin, 1970), xxvii., 259; Volker Dotterweich, *Heinrich von Sybel: Geschichtswissenschaft in politischer Absicht (1817–1861)* (Göttingen, 1978), 255–8.

ter's home as well as his preference for a limited number of attendees.[118]

In his own view, their success gave Ranke the idea that, in addition to his real family, he had created a new, academic one in the form of his seminar, which he called his 'great historical family'.[119] The word seminar is etymologically linked to breeding but, in addition, this idea is body-related in that Ranke directly referred to the image of his intellectual pupils as his sexually conceived children similar to biological ones. As early as 1840 he had written to tell Sybel, one of the first members of his seminar, how happy he was that the 'semen' ('Same') he, Ranke, had 'supplied' had had such a successful result, meaning Sybel.[120] Family used as a metaphor in this context evokes the picture of a male society reproducing itself without any women, which fits Droysen's approach to his discipline as a mixture of intellectual and reproductive work. In this sense, having no daughters was not a problem or a symptom of a dysfunctional family; on the contrary, it was in line with the notion of a naturally male discipline and the idea of symbolic male parthenogenesis that historians believed in. Ranke's highly influential 'family', as he imagined his seminar, produced not only individual historians, but to some extent the whole discipline, which is why it was called the 'nursery of German historiography'.[121]

Thus the German historical discipline consisted of male bodies constituting the core of the discipline (training methods, discussion of sources, an interconnection between individual and group work, preparation of publications). And, what is more, the discipline owed its future existence to these bodies; its institutionalization and organization depended on them. Historical seminars must therefore be acknowledged as a crucial instrument in the embodiment of masculine domination in historical theory and practice. Their institutional status was accomplished and guaranteed by a certain kind of body politics—the third type of body politics investigated here—that was

[118] Ibid. 257, 264.

[119] Leopold von Ranke, 'Beim funfzigjährigen Doktorjubiläum. 20. Februar 1867', in Alfred Dove and Theodor Wiedemann (eds.), *Sämmtliche Werke*, vol. li/lii: *Anhandlungen und Versuche* (Leipzig, 1888), 587–91, at 587.

[120] Ranke, *Briefwerk*, 305.

[121] Otto von Heinemann, *Aus vergangenen Tagen: Lebenserinnerungen in Umrissen und Ausführungen* (Wolfenbüttel, 1902), 111.

enmeshed with a transformation into practice (implementation). Unlike the previously mentioned types of body politics (instrumentalizing femininity and instrumentalizing masculinity), this did not remain in the rhetorical and symbolic realm, but transferred the masculine definition of the discipline into a physical application. The political dimension of this bodily habitus was that it created a space exclusively for certain masculinities and tried to secure it from gender equality, or at least competition. The body politics implemented here was based on the first two forms of body politics discussed above, but unlike them, it produced its own reality of a gendered discipline by physical and corporeal actions. Male bodies were used to mark borders, as in the case of Treitschke and his students, or established an institutional tradition based on a patriarchal logic and the exclusion of women, as in the case of the seminars. Body politics of this kind was realized by the presence of real bodies at the same time and at the same place, and by the common activities that they were involved in, and established the 'masculine marketplace of knowledge'.[122] This third type of body politics could thus be described as the embodiment and physical realization of masculine dominance within the discipline, not as the necessary result of the body politics previously explored, but as their plausible consequence.

IV. *Conclusion: A Resistant Masculine Realm*

The aim of this article has been to deepen our understanding of how the German historical discipline was defined as masculine and what role the body played as a medium for this process. The article has offered insights into the complexity and contradictions of the process, focusing not on the simple fact that the German historical discipline was established as a male enterprise, but rather on the specific way in which this was achieved.

First, I showed that the subject's masculinization was a complex occurrence, involving different disciplinary elements. The three investigated here are the ideas of anthropology, historical methods, and institutional practices; the discipline was gendered in more ways than

[122] Smith, 'Gender and the Practices of Scientific History', 1160.

the basic fact that most historians were men. Second, the article reveals the body as the vehicle of the discipline's masculinization. Late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century historians addressed different types of bodies. To define academic history as masculine, they referred to sources which were metaphorically described (and therefore gendered) as female bodies—passive, available objects of which the male historian could take possession. By contrast, masculine and collective bodies were seen as reflecting the discipline's scientific approach, yet were at the same time perceived to be endangered and vulnerable, as the examples of Möser and Treitschke show. In addition, the case of the gendered rivalry between Droysen and Ranke about what historical scholarship meant in a scientific context highlights the potential of gendered body images even for male-only conflicts.

Each of the disciplinary elements (anthropology, methods, institutions) discussed explains the connection between society and scholarship and demonstrates how gendered bodies carried cultural and disciplinary meanings. At the same time it becomes clear that the historians' claim that history must be masculine in order to be scientific did not always reflect a position of strength. It was sometimes a defensive reaction to certain aspects of modernization, such as liberalization in general, or the women's movement in particular.

In the material investigated, I have demonstrated different body politics which shaped the discipline: first, the anthropological disdain for female bodies and the exaltation of male ones by defining them *ex negativo* as academic (instrumentalizing femininity); second, the designation of heterosexual male bodies as the only adequate ones for historical practice, including the challenging of others perceived to be less virile or masculine (instrumentalizing masculinity); and third, the transformation of this language into physical practices (implementation).

Accordingly, the scientization of the German historical discipline from the late eighteenth century on, sustained through disciplinary changes, perpetuated the professionalization and inclusion of modern gender norms and related body politics. Gender norms and related body politics became an essential part of the discipline and achieved a fundamental impact on its definition so that scientific positions within history were 'themselves . . . sexually characterized, and characterizing',[123] relying both on language and body actions.

[123] Bourdieu, *Masculine Domination*, 96.

Because this language and these actions were repeated time and again, it is possible to read the passages and behaviour discussed as an expression of a certain habitus. With minor innovations over the years, they formed a mind-set which has been reproduced not only in the works of the cited historians but also by all groups of historians within the German historical discipline—even opposing ones, as the confrontation between Droysen and Ranke indicates. What is more, this was passed down from one (academic) generation to another, as this article's broad timescale shows.

Referring to the habitus asserts the central importance of gender and body knowledge within the discipline clearly in three ways. It is, first, possible to dissolve the paradox by which unconsidered, implicit knowledge is established as canonical disciplinary knowledge. Second, the habitus helps us to understand that the quotations included in this essay were neither spontaneous nor accidental statements. And third, it is possible to discern a widespread consistency among nineteenth-century German historians.

The almost homogenous social background of professional historians in this period,[124] corresponds to an almost homogenous habitus, which Bourdieu explains as habitual orchestration affecting almost constant perceptions, appreciations, and actions: 'The objective homogenizing of group . . . habitus, resulting from the homogeneity of the conditions of existence, is what enables practices to be objectively harmonized without any intentional calculation . . . and mutually adjusted "in the absence of any direct interaction".'[125] In addition to the similar social background, an (almost) homogenous habitus became more and more likely as the assimilating power of academia, generated by the progressive professionalization of scientific history,

[124] As prosopographical research has shown, historians tended to be recruited from the Protestant, educated middle classes, and were socialized in an urban environment. They had a father employed as a (senior) officer, clergyman, teacher, or professor, were educated at humanistic secondary schools, studied at Protestant Prussian universities, and pursued a career path comprising assistantships, *Habilitation*, assistant professorship, and, eventually, full professorship. Wolfgang Weber, *Priester der Klio: Historisch-sozialwissenschaftliche Studien zur Herkunft und Karriere deutscher Historiker und zur Geschichte der Geschichtswissenschaft 1800–1970* (Frankfurt/M., 1987), 59–187.
[125] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 80.

increased.[126] The body order we have observed, affecting the German historical discipline's very core, was, therefore, part of a general repertoire of knowledge covering gender and body hierarchies within the subject. As a 'structured structure', the habitus of historians of the long nineteenth century also functioned as a 'structuring structure', thereby reproducing itself.[127] In this respect, the language and actions developing and ensuring the primacy of masculinity in the German historical discipline's self-description were based not on spontaneity but on systematic rules. In sum, at a time when changing family lives, increased mobility, expanded urbanization, technology, and, of course, the movement for women's independence were causing former securities to be lost, German historians tried to create their discipline as a resistant masculine realm. The body played its part in this, supposedly offering stability on the basis that nature was, allegedly, unchangeable.

[126] Sebastian Manhart, *In den Feldern des Wissens: Studiengang, Fach und disziplinäre Semantik in den Geschichts- und Staatswissenschaften (1780–1869)* (Würzburg, 2011).

[127] Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 54: 'Through the economic and social necessity that they bring to bear on the relatively autonomous world of the domestic economy and family relations, or more precisely, through the specifically familial manifestations of this external necessity (forms of the division of labour between the sexes, household objects, modes of consumptions, parent–child relations, etc.), the structures characterizing a determinate class of conditions of existence produce the structure of the "habitus", which in their turn are the basis of the perception and appreciation of all subsequent experiences.'

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NATIONAL SECURITY AND HUMANITY: THE INTERNMENT OF CIVILIAN 'ENEMY ALIENS' DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

ARND BAUERKÄMPER

On 27 October 2017 Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced that his Liberal–National coalition government had lost its parliamentary majority. The reason was as simple as it was incomprehensible: Barnaby Joyce, leader of the National Party and Deputy Prime Minister of Australia, had to resign his seat in Parliament because he was a citizen of both Australia and New Zealand.[1] According to Section 44 of Australia's Constitution of 1901, Australians who hold dual citizenship are not eligible to sit in the House of Representatives or the Senate. The section is directed against any 'person who . . . is under any acknowledgement of allegiance, obedience, or adherence to a foreign power, or is a subject or a citizen or entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject or citizen of a foreign power: or . . . is attainted of treason, or has been convicted and is under sentence, or subject to be sentenced, for any offence punishable under the law of the Commonwealth or of a State by imprisonment for one year or longer.'[2] In the days and weeks that followed, more Members of Australia's Parliament realized that they held dual citizenships, and Turnbull now heads a minority government. He has announced that all MPs must prove that they have renounced any foreign citizenship to which they might be entitled.

Section 44 of the Australian Constitution reflected not only the White Australia Policy that was in force, but also the widespread xenophobia that led to the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901.[3]

This article is based on the Gerda Henkel Visiting Professorship Lecture delivered at the German Historical Institute London on 28 November 2017.

[1] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, no. 251, 28 Oct. 2017, 6.

[2] Parliament of Australia, Section 44 of the Constitution, <https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/archive/Section44>, accessed 6 Mar. 2018.

[3] Kay Saunders, ' "The stranger in our gates": Internment Policies in the United Kingdom and Australia during the Two World Wars, 1914–39', *Immigrants and*

Restrictive conceptions of citizenship such as those expressed in Australia's constitution were to reach unprecedented dimensions during the First World War. In fact, foreign nationals were oppressed in many belligerent states. 'Enemy aliens' (a designation enshrined in the British Aliens Act of 1905), in particular, became the object of hate propaganda, harassment, attacks, and, in some cases, even murder. As well as prisoners of war (POWs), civilian foreign nationals were targeted. Against the backdrop of nationalist mobilization and agitation against this group, governments imposed various restrictions on them. Internment and deportation were common. Before looking at these repressive measures and the propaganda campaign that accompanied them, this article will examine the context of total warfare and the role of civilian enemy aliens from 1914 to 1918. The third section will investigate the humanitarian engagement of the activists and organizations that opposed internment. The limitations on their activities and the contradictions inherent in them will also be highlighted. The article will conclude with a brief summary and some deliberations on the impact of the internment of civilian foreign nationals during the First World War in the twentieth century, and on anti-terrorist policies since the turn of the millennium.

I. *Introduction: Mobilization for War, 'National Security', and the Exclusion of 'Enemy Aliens'*

In general, perceptions of crisis and uncertainty have varied according to prevailing security cultures. These include the convictions, values, norms, and practices that shape perceptions of danger and influence decisions on measures to counter them, for instance, emergency legislation and imprisonment. On the basis of this definition, the perceptions and aims of specific individuals and institutions are topics of investigation in studies of security cultures. Emotions (in particular, fear and anxiety, but also trust and confidence) have to be taken into account as well. Specific actors usually perceive, imagine, define, accept, or reject security threats, most commonly resulting in count-

Minorities, 22/1 (2013), 22–43, at 28. In the meantime, Barnaby Joyce has announced his resignation as leader of the National Party in response to political pressure because of his relationship with a former assistant. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, no. 47, 24 Feb. 2018, 6.

er-measures, to be analysed in detail hereafter. Historical studies of security cultures, therefore, reconstruct and explain interpretations, imaginations, conceptualizations, and definitions of 'security' by specific actors, their emotive responses, as well as their agency and particular actions.[4]

The First World War, which left 17 million soldiers and civilians dead, was in many ways the first total military conflict. Overcoming the division between combatants and non-combatants as well as between the front line and the home front, it involved soldiers and civilians alike. The term 'home front' testified to the blurring of the previous distinction, while the mass killing of thousands of soldiers defied traditional ideas of heroic fighting and individual bravery. Trench warfare on the Western Front, in particular, frequently resulted in anonymous death, horrific physical injury, and lasting psychological strain. Fears, anxieties, and scares were the other side of national pride and conceptions of honour. In the words of Barbara Rosenwein, they constituted emotional communities that combined comprehensive inclusion with uncompromising exclusion.[5]

More particularly, fears of espionage, treason, and subversion that had increased in almost all major states in the early twentieth century reached unprecedented levels during the First World War, not without reason. After all, on 22 July 1913 the German Reichstag

[4] Christopher Daase, 'Sicherheitskultur: Ein Konzept zur interdisziplinären Erforschung politischen und sozialen Wandels', *Sicherheit und Frieden*, 29/2 (2011), 59–65; id., 'Die Historisierung der Sicherheit: Anmerkungen zur historischen Sicherheitsforschung aus politikwissenschaftlicher Sicht', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 38 (2012), 387–405; id., 'National, Societal, and Human Security: On the Transformation of Political Language', *Historical Social Research*, 35 (2010), 22–37; id., 'Wandel der Sicherheitskultur', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: Beilage zur Wochenzeitung 'Das Parlament'*, B 50/13 Dec. 2010, 12–14; Eckart Conze, 'Securitization: Gegenwartsdiagnose oder historischer Analyseansatz?', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 38 (2012), 453–46.

[5] John Horne, 'War and Conflict in Contemporary European History, 1914–2004', in Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger (eds.), *Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories* (New York, 2007), 1–95, at 84–5. On the concept of 'total war', see Alan Kramer, *Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War* (Oxford, 2007), 328, 331. See also Annette Becker, 'Paradoxien in der Situation der Kriegsgefangenen 1914–1918', in Jochen Oltmer (ed.), *Kriegsgefangene im Europa des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Paderborn, 2006), 24–31, at 29. On 'emotional communities' see Barbara

had lifted the ten-year rule that had allowed Germans living abroad to keep their German citizenship only for ten years. The new law allowed them to retain it for life. In those countries which had seen sizeable German immigration since the late eighteenth century, the change heightened fears of split loyalties, treason, and subversion. These were to become powerful emotional forces (and sometimes pretexts) governing the treatment of foreign nationals in the belligerent states from 1914 to 1918.[6]

Under the impact of total war, only remnants of civil society and humanitarianism remained in the major European states. In fact, governments and nationalist populists unleashed violence even against unarmed civilians, as this article will demonstrate. Taking the treatment of civilian internees as an example, it will highlight the advancement of concerns about 'national security' (as a genuine concern, an argument, or even a pretext for vested interests and specific aims) during the First World War. Citizens of antagonistic states and minorities were subjected to rigorous surveillance, interned, or even exterminated. This policy complemented the mobilization and utilization of all material and human resources for warfare. Not least, propaganda campaigns denounced 'enemies within' in order to keep up morale and provide an outlet for civilians' zeal to participate in the war. As so-called 'enemy aliens', citizens of antagonistic states (even if they were naturalized, and including stranded intellectuals and sailors) became victims of both an oppressive policy 'from above' and populist xenophobia 'from below'. Against this background, not only foreign nationals, but also those who seemed prepared to collaborate with the enemy were suspected and oppressed.

Rosenwein, 'Worrying about Emotions in History', *American Historical Review*, 107 (2002), 821–45.

[6] Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 116–18, 136; Evgenij Sergeev, 'Die Wahrnehmung Deutschlands und der Deutschen in Russland 1914–1918', in Horst Möller and Aleksandr Čubar'jan (eds.), *Der Erste Weltkrieg: Deutschland und Russland im europäischen Kontext* (Berlin, 2017), 97–108, at 100; Annemarie H. Sammartino, *The Impossible Border: Germany and the East, 1914–1922* (Ithaca, NY, 2010), 22–3; Daniela Caglioti, 'Subjects, Citizens and Aliens in a Time of Upheaval: Naturalizing and Denaturalizing in Europe during the First World War', *Journal of Modern History*, 89 (2017), 495–530, at 516, 523; Saunders, 'The stranger in our gates', 30.

In particular, the internment of civilians was as an innovation of the First World War, as the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Gustave Ador, pointed out in 1917. In general, civilians in foreign countries were not protected by international treaties or conventions during the First World War. Nevertheless, some international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) defended basic standards of humanitarianism.[7]

Yet the treatment of civilian enemy aliens was largely shaped by a powerful and overwhelming need for outright military victory, the priority given to 'national security', and comprehensive political integration. On the home front, political dissent was therefore as rigorously suppressed as the foreign nationals who were widely suspected of being traitors, saboteurs, or spies. The policies and measures intended to safeguard domestic security led to the rise of 'national security states', which, in turn, mobilized dissent and protest among dissidents and pacifists. They demanded the preservation and protection of citizens' liberal and human rights for POWs and civilian internees. Although these critics of the obsession with national security were largely silenced and sidelined during the First World War, they effectively appealed to the governments' own interests, even in the short run. Pointing to the danger of reprisals, liberals and humanitarian organizations exploited the principle of reciprocity ('tit for tat') that rulers had to take into account. Moreover, in a long-term perspective these associations and their representatives contributed to improving the status of civilian internees in international law, paving the way for the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which were ultimately to protect civilians in belligerent states.[8]

[7] Matthew Stibbe, 'Ein globales Phänomen: Zivilinternierung im Erstem Weltkrieg in transnationaler und internationaler Dimension', in Christoph Jahr and Jens Thiel (eds.), *Lager vor Auschwitz: Gewalt und Integration im 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 2013), 158–76; Annette Becker, 'Captive Civilians', in Jay Winter (ed.), *The Cambridge History of the First World War*, vol. iii: *Civil Society* (Cambridge, 2014), 257–81, at 260.

[8] Peter Holquist, '"Information is the Alpha and Omega of our Work": Bolshevik Surveillance in its Pan-European Context', *Journal of Modern History*, 69 (1997), 415–50, at 417–19, 443, 445 (quotation at 443). For the wider context see Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception* (Chicago, 2005); Richard Thurlow, *The Secret State: British Internal Security in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford, 1994).

II. *'An Innovation of this War': The Treatment of Enemy Aliens*

In the First World War citizens of enemy states (POWs and civilians) were usually oppressed, and authorities also questioned the loyalty of minorities that they associated with enemy states. Although they were ordinary citizens, governments denounced, oppressed, and persecuted these 'foreigners'. At the same time, pacifists, socialists, and anarchists, who opposed their nations' war efforts, aroused suspicion, leading to harassment and oppression. In the 'official mind' as well as in the eyes of large sections of the population, these groups were a (potential) 'fifth column' of spies and saboteurs. Against the backdrop of these fears of subversion and treason, conspiracy theories proliferated in belligerent states such as Britain, Germany, France, and tsarist Russia. As a corollary, demands for national security gained legitimacy and urgency. Starting with efforts to deprive antagonistic states of male civilians as potential soldiers, nationalist politicians and 'concerned' citizens put pressure on governments and state authorities to control the mobility of the potential 'traitors', seize their possessions, and intern them. As rumours about 'hidden hands' spread, especially in the face of major defeats, military commanders and political elites, in particular, took measures that were intended to protect national security and prevent treason and subversion. In addition to enemy aliens and ethnic minorities, dissidents such as members of the pacifist Union of Democratic Control in Britain and the Bund Neues Vaterland (League of the New Fatherland) in Germany were targeted. Censorship and police raids deprived these organizations of vital resources. Governments justified these harsh measures by highlighting their obligation to protect the majority of citizens in a total war and thereby stabilize the home front.[9]

Yet these repressive policies restricted basic rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, and movement. In particular, they affected the treatment of POWs, civilian foreign nationals, and minorities. Among the groups that were targeted, POWs were fairly well protected, if by no means comprehensively. As early as 1863, the Lieber Code had obliged the troops of the North American states to treat

[9] Otto Lehmann-Russbüldt, *Der Kampf der Deutschen Liga für Menschenrechte vormals Bund Neues Vaterland für den Weltfrieden 1914–1927* (Berlin, 1927).

POWs from the Confederate States humanely in the bloody American Civil War. The Geneva Convention of 1864 confirmed this provision. Even more detailed regulations on POWs were passed by the conferences that were held in The Hague in 1899 and 1907. By contrast, the Hague Convention (of 1907) did not contain any explicit provisions for the treatment of civilians who were citizens of enemy states, apart from protecting them in war zones. The signatory states obviously did not foresee the scale of violence that was to occur in the First World War. Moreover, the implementation of the basic norms of international law remained in the hands of sovereign national governments, which had rejected any binding restrictions at The Hague. As soon as war was declared in 1914, the primacy of military victory and national security therefore meant that POWs and civilian enemy aliens were subjected to harsh restrictions promptly imposed on them by governments and the military. In multi-ethnic empires, in particular, minorities suspected of working for the enemy were also targeted. Measures taken against these groups ranged from isolation to forced labour, deportation, and internment in camps. In the case of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, repression peaked in outright genocide in 1915.[10]

All belligerent states declared a state of emergency at the beginning of the war. Reinforcing executive powers, special laws and extraordinary decrees allowed the authorities to restrict the basic human rights of enemy aliens and domestic opponents to the war. Most commonly, police and military authorities were empowered to arrest and intern enemy aliens. Furthermore, the freedom of speech

[10] Annie Deperchin, 'The Laws of War', in Jay Winter (ed.), *The Cambridge History of the First World War*, vol. i: *Global War* (Cambridge, 2014), 615–38, at 625; Becker, 'Captive Civilians', 260–1, 272, 280–1. On the Geneva Convention of 1864 see Uta Hinz, 'Humanität im Krieg? Internationales Rotes Kreuz und Kriegsgefangenenhilfe im Ersten Weltkrieg', in Oltmer, *Kriegsgefangene*, 216–36, at 218–19; Jochen Oltmer, 'Einführung: Funktionen und Erfahrungen von Kriegsgefangenschaft im Europa des Ersten Weltkriegs', ibid. 11–23, at 17; Alan Kramer, 'Kriegsrecht und Kriegsverbrechen', in Gerhard Hirschfeld et al. (eds.), *Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg* (Paderborn, 2003), 281–92, at 284–5; Becker, 'Paradoxien', 28. On the Hague Convention, see Stefan Oeter, 'Die Entwicklung des Kriegsgefangenenrechts: Die Sichtweise eines Völkerrechtlers', in Rüdiger Overmans (ed.), *In der Hand des Feindes: Kriegsgefangenschaft von der Antike bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Cologne, 1999), 41–59, at 50.

and assembly was severely restricted, not only in (constitutional) monarchies, but also in republics such as France, where citizens' and human rights had been declared as early as 1789 as a result of the revolution. All these repressive measures were to maintain the security of the indigenous populations. Governments and authorities also legitimized them by referring to similar steps that had (supposedly) been taken in enemy countries. This justification highlighted the principle of reciprocity, which characterized government policies vis-à-vis citizens of enemy states throughout the war. It resulted in reprisals, but also (though less frequently) in alleviations in internment camp conditions and exchanges of captives.

The internment of civilians was a particularly harsh measure which violated the basic principles of humanity enshrined in international law by 1914. In Germany alone, 112,000 internees were registered during the war. Most had been deported from Belgium and the western provinces of tsarist Russia. In the course of the First World War, German authorities recruited or forced 100,000 Belgian and French citizens to work in Imperial Germany and the occupied territories. In November 1918, 3,500 British civilians alone were still interned in Germany. In Britain, there were 32,000 interned civilians in mid 1915. Two years later 36,000 German and Austrian enemy aliens were held captive in camps, and 24,255 of them were still interned at the end of the war. In France, the authorities seized 60,000 Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians. In Romania 4,000 Germans and citizens of Austria-Hungary, and 1,000 Bulgarians had been arrested by 1916. Three hundred thousand citizens of the Central Powers and Russian Germans (that is, citizens of the tsarist Empire) were held captive in Russia.[11]

Internment camps for civilians (often incarcerated with POWs) were established in places ranging from Ahmednagar (India) to

[11] Figures taken from Matthew Stibbe, 'Civilian Internment and Civilian Internees in Europe, 1914–1920', in id. (ed.), *Captivity* (London, 2013), 49–81, at 73. Also see Tammy M. Proctor, *Civilians in a World of War* (New York, 2010), 76–129; Isabel V. Hull, *A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War* (Ithaca, NY, 2014), 125–40; Matthew Stibbe, *British Civilian Internees in Germany: The Ruhleben Camp, 1914–1918* (Manchester, 2008), 184; id., 'The Internment of Civilians by Belligerent States during the First World War and the Response of the International Committee of the Red Cross', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 41 (2006), 5–19, at 7–8.

Pietermarizuburg (South Africa), French Dahomey, and Liverpool (Australia). The policies that the belligerent states imposed on civilian 'enemy aliens' were also entangled on a global scale. With the exception of Japan, where a camp was established at Bando, governments reacted to each other in terms of both alleviations and reprisals. Several accords on exchanges testify to the central role of cross-border perceptions and interactions in the First World War. They immediately affected the lives of the civilians, who were often held as hostages. Especially the colonial powers Britain and France set up a global system of internment camps, and as a result, internees were frequently transferred between various regions of the world. The British Foreign Office also worked to control and regulate interment, even vis-à-vis the Dominions, thereby triggering frequent clashes between the governments.[12]

In Britain invasion scares, rumours about espionage, and fear of subversion had spread since the turn of the century. Starting in 1910, a subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence had prepared for the internment of civilian enemy aliens in the case of war. Acting on these plans, the Liberal government of Prime Minister Herbert Asquith introduced the Defence of the Realm legislation to Parliament, which passed the bills with broad support on 8 August 1914. Under the terms of the Aliens Registration Act, which had been enforced five days earlier, all citizens of enemy states living on the British Isles had to register with the police and were not permitted to live in, or enter, any zones where they might pose a security risk.[13]

Police constables had arrested 12,381 foreign nationals by 12 November 1914, among them 8,612 Germans and 3,756 citizens of the Habsburg Empire.[14] After a German submarine torpedoed the ocean liner *Lusitania* on 7 May 1915, Germans were attacked in large-scale, violent riots, following accusations and defamation in the popular press. The editor of the weekly *John Bull*, Horatio Bottomley, for

[12] Mahon Murphy, *Colonial Captivity during the First World War: Internment and the Fall of the German Empire* (Cambridge, 2018), esp. 1–3, 6, 8–9, 13, 24, 26, 30–2, 39–60, 63–6.

[13] Becker, 'Captive Civilians', 262.

[14] Christoph Jahr, 'Zivilisten als Kriegsgefangene: Die Internierung von "Feindstaaten-Ausländern" in Deutschland während des Ersten Weltkrieges am Beispiel des "Engländerlagers" in Ruhleben', in Overmans (ed.), *In der Hand des Feindes*, 297–321, at 298.

instance, demanded a 'vendetta against every German in Britain whether "naturalised" or not'. He claimed: 'you cannot naturalise an unnatural beast—a human abortion—a hellish freak. But you can exterminate it. And now the time has come.' Emotives, to use William Reddy's term, reflected and heightened hostility and xenophobia. Ministers showed themselves impressed by the populist and nationalist propaganda. On 13 May Asquith ordered the internment of all non-naturalized male Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians who were liable for military service in their home countries. Women, children, and invalids were to be expelled immediately.[15]

Unlike the British government, the German authorities had not comprehensively prepared for the internment of civilians. Only when war became likely, on 31 July 1914, did the government draw on the law on the state of siege that had been passed in Prussia in 1851. It gave the German Emperor and the commanders of sixty-two military territories comprehensive executive powers. They could impose martial law that restricted the freedom of expression and assembly more comprehensively than in Britain.[16] Enemy aliens, indigenous minorities, and dissidents (especially socialists and pacifists) were subjected to military justice dispensed by forty extraordinary courts established by the military commanders. Authorities were given a free hand to arrest members of all groups that might

[15] Panikos Panayi writes about these events, but without relating them to human rights, in his *The Enemy in Our Midst: Germans in Britain During the First World War* (New York, 1991), esp. 283–91; id., 'Prisoners of Britain: German Civilian, Military and Naval Internees during the First World War', *Yearbook of the Centre for German and Australian Exile Studies*, 7 (2005), 29–43, esp. 29–30, 38. For xenophobia and antisemitism see id., 'An Embattled Minority: The Jews in Britain during the First World War', in Tony Kushner and Kenneth Lunn (eds.), *The Politics of Marginality: Race, the Radical Right and Minorities in Twentieth-Century Britain* (London, 1990), 61–81; id, '"The Hidden Hand": British Myths about German Control of Britain during the First World War', *Immigrants and Minorities*, 7 (1988), 253–72; id., 'Anti-German Riots in London during the First World War', *German History*, 7 (1989), 184–203; David Reynolds, *The Long Shadow: The Great War and the Twentieth Century* (London, 2013), 56; Jahr, 'Zivilisten als Kriegsgefangene', 299–300, 321; Kramer, 'Kriegsrecht und Kriegsverbrechen', 286. On 'emotives' see William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge, 2001).

[16] Reynolds, *The Long Shadow*, 60.

endanger domestic security in the war without specific charges, hearings, or the right to appeal. Moreover, German socialists and pacifists who opposed the war could be forcibly recruited into the army. These government measures were fuelled by nationalist mobilization and large-scale populist propaganda.[17]

In October 1914 the Reich Ministry of the Interior, the Prussian Ministry of War and the Interior, and the German Admiralty decided to intern all Britons aged from 17 to 55, with the exception only of women, children, the elderly, pastors, and priests. This decision was influenced by the internment of German citizens in Britain and France, and early riots against them in those two countries. Britain had ignored a German ultimatum to free all interned Germans by 5 November 1914. As a consequence, British civilians were arrested and taken to the camp in Ruhleben (near Berlin). A similar camp in Holzminden was set up for French civilians. This interrelationship between internment in Germany and Britain highlights cross-border perceptions and reactions. It also points to the political power of German nationalists who put pressure on the authorities to lock up supposedly dangerous foreigners in the interests of preserving security on the home front.[18]

In France, too, citizens of Germany and the Habsburg Empire were largely perceived as a security risk. In addition to these potential spies and traitors, however, criminals and 'anti-social elements' were interned in French camps. All in all, 45,000 German, Austrian, and Hungarian civilians had been arrested by the end of 1915. The French authorities, however, proved unable clearly to identify the loyalties of citizens of the multi-ethnic Habsburg monarchy (in particular, of the Poles, the Czechs, and the Slovaks). The authorities also

[17] Christian Schudnagies, *Der Kriegs- oder Belagerungszustand im Deutschen Reich während des Ersten Weltkriegs: Eine Studie zur Entwicklung und Handhabung des deutschen Ausnahmezustandes bis 1918* (Frankfurt/Main, 1994).

[18] Jahr, 'Zivilisten als Kriegsgefangene', 299–301; Stibbe, *Internees*, 24, 27–30, 35–7, 40; Kramer, 'Kriegsrecht und Kriegsverbrechen', 286; Holquist, 'Information is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work', 442. On the rise of international law and the discussion about human rights in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870–1960* (Cambridge, 2002), 11–97; Paul Gordon Lauren, *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen* (Philadelphia, 2011), 43–77.

placed many Alsatians and Lorrainians under police surveillance, as they suspected them of pro-German loyalties. Only those who had clearly committed themselves to France (for instance, by serving in the army) were exempt from these oppressive measures in the region bordering on Germany.[19]

In the Habsburg Empire, security policies were directed not only against citizens of enemy states, but also against ethnic minorities charged with supporting Russia or Italy. Thus internees from tsarist Russia also included non-Russians in Austria-Hungary. As early as 27 August 1914 a special surveillance authority, the Kriegsüberwachungsamt, had ordered local police officers to intern individuals who seemed to pose a risk to the Habsburg Empire and threatened to impede its war effort. Wealthy suspects were confined to specific villages or communities, which restricted their mobility without them being put into camps. The distinction between confinement and internment was a special feature of the treatment of enemy aliens in Austria-Hungary.[20]

Against the backdrop of a successful offensive by Russian armies in late 1914 and early 1915, spy hysteria mounted in the Habsburg Empire, fuelled by fears of military defeat. In particular, minorities such as the Ukrainian Russians (Ruthenes), who were widely stigmatized as supporters of the Russian war effort, were subjected to random internment. They were held captive in camps such as Thalerhof (near Graz) without indictment or trial. After Italy entered the war in May 1915 the Austrian government ordered all citizens of that country to be interned too.[21]

The victims, as well as some liberal Austrian officials, had repeatedly protested against internment. In response to these complaints and charges of arbitrary decision-making, the government had established a commission of inquiry as early as November 1914. Its task was to investigate and reverse unjustified and ill-founded decisions on internment. Because of illness and epidemics that had spread in camps such as Thalerhof, however, the commission was not able to

[19] Claude Farcy, *Les camps de concentration français de la Première Guerre Mondiale, 1914–1920* (Paris, 1995); Kramer, 'Kriegsrecht und Kriegsverbrechen', 286. Figures taken from Becker, 'Captive Civilians', 267.

[20] Georg Hoffmann, Nicole-Melanie Goll, and Philipp Lesiak, *Thalerhof 1914–1936: Die Geschichte eines vergessenen Lagers und seiner Opfer* (Herne, 2010), 47.

[21] Ibid. 81.

start work until mid 1915. When the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire faced collapse, the new emperor, Charles I, finally decreed a general overhaul of civilian internment in 1917. As a result of these inquiries, many interned civilian enemy aliens were set free or transferred from internment to confinement. Yet the authorities still banned them from military operation zones. According to the powerful generals, this restrictive measure was to avert any security risk for Austrian soldiers and civilians.[22]

Like Britain, the government (Council of Ministers) and authorities of tsarist Russia had taken precautionary measures against civilian foreign nationals even before the First World War broke out. Four days before partial mobilization, on 25 July 1914, General Mikhail Beliaev ordered the arrest of all men with foreign citizenship who were capable of serving as soldiers. As a result, the Russian authorities immediately interned 50,000 of the total of 600,000 civilian enemy aliens in the country.[23] In December 1914 the Council of Ministers banned all associations of foreign citizens in the Russian Empire. However, the authorities initially treated Austrians and Hungarians more leniently because they wanted to win over the Slav minorities in the Habsburg Empire, or at least to neutralize them. When German and Austro-Hungarian armies broke through the Russian front line in the battle of Gorlice-Tarnów in May 1915, however, the tsarist authorities imposed restrictive measures on Germans and citizens of Austria-Hungary. In the following weeks and months all civilian foreign nationals and members of minorities who were now generally suspected of disloyalty were deported from territories near the front line. In cities, too, (putative) spies and saboteurs suffered oppression. As these 'traitors' were publicly stigmatized and rumours about espionage and sabotage abounded, xenophobia spread like wildfire in the spring of 1915.

Against the backdrop of fears of military defeat, riots against Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians escalated into random lootings. In St Petersburg (which had been renamed 'Petrograd' as early as August 1914) and Moscow, civil activists (*obshchestvennost'*) promoted the nationalist and xenophobic campaign that the Council of

[22] Ibid. 29–46. Also see Steffen Bruendel, *Zeitenwende 1914: Künstler, Dichter und Denker im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Munich, 2014), 95; Stibbe, 'Internment', 58.
[23] Becker, 'Captive Civilians', 262.

Ministers had initiated in 1914. In the face of military disasters, propaganda was stepped up in May and June 1915, in order to mobilize all resources for the war effort.

In May 1915 the tsarist regime decreed that all citizens of nations Russia was fighting in the war had to be registered, and naturalization was abandoned. The Ministry of the Interior was obsessed with popular opinion about the war in the provinces and councils. A large-scale campaign against enemy aliens was undertaken to boost morale and demonstrate to its Western allies in the Entente that the tsarist Empire was determined to fight on. Not least, its punitive policies towards enemy aliens were intended to dispel any doubts held by Slavs in Austria-Hungary about Russia's solidarity with, and support for, them.[24]

Unexpectedly, the Russian authorities temporarily lost control of the campaign against enemy aliens. The riots that shook Moscow in May 1915 were similar to the unrest that had been directed against Germans in Britain a few days earlier, and some international communication is likely, though not documented. Yet the Council of Ministers failed to harness the xenophobic protests to support their official policy of war mobilization. In fact, the populist and nationalist agitation against enemy aliens ultimately turned against the rulers and thus backfired. Appealing to the widespread Russian nationalism in civil society and encouraging the formation of new patriotic organizations, the Council of Ministers involuntarily contributed to the breakup of the multi-ethnic tsarist Empire. The activities of these associations, which increasingly opposed official policies from 1915 onwards, highlight the ambivalent nature of the *obshchestvennost'* in the First World War. The abdication of Tsar Nicholas I in February 1917, which was to be followed by the installation of a liberal gov-

[24] Anastasiya Tumanova, 'Voluntary Associations in Moscow and Petrograd and their Role in Patriotic Campaigns during World War I (1914–February 1917)', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 62 (2014), 345–70, at 348, 354, 358; Becker, 'Captive Civilians', 269. For more details and the wider context see Thomas Porter and William Gleason, 'The Democratization of the Zemstvo during the First World War', in Mary Schaeffer Conroy (ed.), *Emerging Democracy in Late Imperial Russia: Case Studies on Self-Government (the Zemstvos), State Duma Elections, the Tsarist Government, and the State Council Before and During World War I* (Niwot, 1998), 228–42; Manfred Hildermeier, 'Traditionen "aufgeklärter" Politik in Rußland', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 276 (2003), 75–94.

ernment and, ultimately, the Bolshevik Revolution in October, eventually radicalized the demonization of suspected internal foes. Yet violence was no longer primarily directed against POWs and civilian internees, who represented about 5 per cent of the Empire's population in 1917. By contrast, class differentiation now overshadowed the previously dominant ethnic and national splits.[25]

Even neutral countries such as Switzerland sought to control foreign nationals. 'Internment' (legally impossible in a neutral country) was a special case there. Starting with a Franco-German agreement, Switzerland became a centre for the exchange of sick and wounded soldiers. A total of 67,700 combatants passed through the country from January 1916 until the repatriation of the last German soldier in February 1919. Women who had fled from the war and the wives of interned soldiers were admitted as well, with the result that 491 French, 809 German, 463 Belgian, and 380 Austro-Hungarian civilian internees lived in Switzerland on 31 October 1917. Xenophobia, limited resources, and concerns about the obligations of neutrality, however, meant that there were never more than 30,000 foreign nationals in Switzerland at the same time. The authorities initially lodged them in hotels and sanatoriums, not in camps. The foreigners were welcomed by the owners, who had suffered severely from plummeting demand after the outbreak of the First World War. Yet resentment against the refugees mounted as shortages led to poverty, unemployment, and unrest in 1917–18. Refugees from Russia, in particular, were suspected of being Bolshevik revolutionaries. Referring to 'national security', the Swiss government decided to restrict the ad-

[25] Eric Lohr, *Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I* (Cambridge, 2003), esp. 31–54, 166–73; Dietrich Beyrau, 'Mortal Embrace: Germans and (Soviet) Russians in the First Half of the Twentieth Century', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian History*, 10 (2009), 423–39, at 433–4; Tumanova, 'Voluntary Associations', 366–7; Matthew Stibbe, 'Introduction: Captivity, Forced Labour and Forced Migration during the First World War', in id. (ed.), *Captivity*, 2, 9–10; Holquist, 'Information is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work', 426–8; Heather Jones, 'Kriegsgefangenenlager: Der moderne Staat und die Radikalisierung der Gefangenschaft im Ersten Weltkrieg', *Mittelweg*, 36/4 (2011), 59–75. For the explosive force of the politics of nationalization in Russia under the tsars during the First World War see Mark von Hagen, 'The Great War and the Mobilization of Ethnicity in the Russian Empire', in Barnett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder (eds.), *Post Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State-Building* (London, 1998), 34–57.

mission of foreign soldiers and civilians. All in all, the internment was by no means exclusively motivated by altruistic humanitarian concerns that complied with the official glorification of Switzerland as a 'lighthouse of humanity'. In fact, providing a temporary refuge supported the ailing tourist industry. Moreover, between January 1916 and August 1919 the Swiss government received 137 million francs from the warring parties. It was also able to demand the delivery of more goods to the country from the Entente powers, which had sealed Central Europe off with their economic blockade. Not least, care for soldiers and civilians underpinned the humanitarian credentials of the Swiss elites and shielded their policy of (armed) neutrality from external interference.[26]

While the treatment of civilian foreign nationals had not been covered by international law before 1914, the internment of this group violated the contemporary understanding of humane treatment. Living conditions in internment camps such as that in Ruhleben were generally better than those for the POWs, and mortality was much lower than in the Second World War. In Germany, for example, only 3.2 per cent of internees died between August 1914 and May 1918. Yet internment ran counter to the standards of humanity that had been widely accepted by 1914.[27]

III. *Remnants of Civil Society in a Total War: Relief and Aid from International and National NGOs*

Despite their often strong bonds with the governments of the belligerent states, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),

[26] Thomas Bürgisser, *'Unerwünschte Gäste': Russische Soldaten in der Schweiz 1915–1920* (Zurich, 2010); id., 'Internees (Switzerland)', *1914–1918 Online: International Encyclopedia* <https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/internees_switzerland>, accessed 6 Mar. 2018. Figures taken from Anja Huber, 'The Internment of Prisoners of War and Civilians in Neutral Switzerland', in Stefan Manz, Panikos Panayi, and Matthew Stibbe (eds.), *Internment during the First World War: A Global Mass Phenomenon* (London, forthcoming 2018).

[27] Marc Spoerer, 'Zwangsarbeitsregimes im Vergleich: Deutschland und Japan im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg', in Klaus Tenfelde and Hans-Christoph Seidel (eds.), *Zwangsarbeit im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts: Bewältigung und*

other NGOs, such as the Society of Friends of Foreigners in Distress in London, and pacifists such as Ludwig Quidde and Bertrand Russell repeatedly criticized the frequently inhumane treatment of POWs and the random internment of civilians in the warring nations. They demanded the lifting of punitive measures, and called for relief. As early as 1914 the ICRC established an international information agency in Geneva that passed news about POWs and civilian internees to their relatives. The Agence internationale des prisonniers de guerre (AIPG, International Agency of Prisoners of War), which was directed by Frédéric Ferrière and had recruited no fewer than 1,200 mostly female volunteers by the end of 1914, received between 2,000 and 3,000 inquiries every day during the war years. In the last weeks before the ceasefire of 11 November 1918, the agency had to cope with a daily workload of no fewer than 15,000 to 18,000 requests. The files of the AIPG eventually comprised 4.9 million cue cards containing personal information. The organization also succeeded in obtaining lists of prisoners from the belligerents.

Even more importantly, the information agency published reports about POW and internment camps that had been inspected by committees of the ICRC. It organized aid for captured soldiers and interned civilians, especially parcels with much-needed provisions, such as food and clothing. By the end of 1915 the AIPG had sent almost 15.9 million packets to POWs and internees. Postal exchange provided relief and distraction, thereby preventing, or at least alleviating, 'barbed-wire disease'. Not least, the ICRC demanded and supported an exchange of captured soldiers, especially wounded ones, as well as old and sick civilians. The national Red Cross organizations in the neutral states of Switzerland, Denmark, and Sweden were especially active in this field. But even the governments of Germany and France in 1916, and Germany and Britain in the following year, agreed to set free civilian internees. Like punitive measures, relief was ultimately based on the principle of reciprocity between nation-states. International NGOs, however, were merely able to encourage and facilitate humanitarian aid in the First World War.[28]

vergleichende Aspekte (Essen, 2007), 187–226; Kramer, 'Kriegsrecht und Kriegsverbrechen', 286; Jahr, 'Zivilisten als Kriegsgefangene', 315–16 (figure), 318.

[28] Dieter Riesenberger, *Für Humanität in Krieg und Frieden: Das Internationale Rote Kreuz 1863–1977* (Göttingen, 1992), 61–82; Heather Jones, 'International

Within nation-states, too, civic associations and citizens' groups protested against the internment of civilian enemy aliens. In Germany the Bund Neues Vaterland in Berlin, modelled on the Ligue française pour la défense des droits de l'homme et du citoyen (French League for the Defence of Human and Citizen's Rights) of 1898, demanded that citizens of foreign states should be treated humanely, promoted understanding between the warring nations, and called for them to pursue a transparent foreign policy. The association, which was renamed Deutsche Liga für Menschenrechte (German League for Human Rights) in 1922, planned to set up a Zentralstelle für Völkerrecht (Central Agency for International Law). This organization also collaborated with the Quaker-led Friends Emergency Committee for the Assistance of Germans, Austrians and Hungarians in Distress in London. Swiss internationalist Elisabeth Rotten had established a branch in Berlin, the Auskunfts- und Hilfsstelle für Deutsche im Ausland und Ausländer in Deutschland (Information and Assistance Office for Germans Abroad and Foreigners in Germany) in October 1914. Rotten's agencies were supported by various individuals and institutions that worked across national borders, such as the ICRC and the ecumenical movement in Europe. Funded by philanthropists such as Aby Warburg, Rotten's agency also co-operated with the American Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) in providing relief for civilian internees. The YMCA was engaged in inspecting camps, especially in Russia and Germany, which the ICRC did not have access to. The Quakers tackled the plight of arrested enemy aliens. The Vatican, too, represented by Pope Benedict XV, attempted to reduce the burdens on the lives of interned civilians. Not least, women's organizations such as the International Women's Relief Committee in Britain contributed to the relief effort.[29]

or Transnational? Humanitarian Action during the First World War', *European Review of History*, 16 (2009), 697–713; Hinz, 'Humanität im Krieg?', 222–6.

[29] Daniel Roger Maul, 'American Quakers, the Emergence of International Humanitarianism, and the Foundation of the American Friends Service Committee, 1890–1920, in Johannes Paulmann (ed.), *Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford, 2016), 63–87, at 75–87; Matthew Stibbe, 'Elisabeth Rotten and the "Auskunfts- und Hilfsstelle für Deutsche im Ausland und Ausländer in Deutschland 1914–1919"', in Alison S. Fell and Ingrid Sharp (eds.), *The Women's Movement in Wartime: International Perspectives, 1914–1919* (Basingstoke, 2007), 194–210; Stibbe, *Internees*, 185; id.,

Altogether, the challenges of providing aid for civilian internees, which were usually closely related to similar efforts for POWs, promoted collaboration and networking between pacifist and humanitarian organizations that had campaigned for peace before the First World War. Humanitarian organizations such as the ICRC and the Quakers continued to support civilian enemy aliens. These associations exerted moral pressure on national governments that had to justify their policies. The ICRC, in particular, successfully lobbied for the recognition of mental illnesses (such as 'barbed-wire disease') that resulted from long-term and boring internment.

Yet the power of international humanitarian organizations ultimately proved to be limited. Battles disrupted contacts and co-operation between most humanitarian and liberal associations and societies. Their cross-border relations ultimately foundered on the rock of radical nationalism that opened international co-operation to the damaging charge of disloyal behaviour or even subversion and treason. By and large, national sovereignty and security trumped civil society and humanitarian concerns. National and international organizations that supported interned civilians and POWs had to strike a balance between the need for neutrality and their humanitarian mission. The ICRC, for example, had to take the policies of its national sections into account, as they were largely independent of the central organization in Geneva. The German Red Cross, for example, was primarily engaged in providing relief for Germans, while most civic organizations supported their own national war effort. For instance, patriotic women's associations cared for wounded soldiers under the supervision of the various supreme military commands.

The ambivalence of the advocates of humanitarian engagement in tsarist Russia is a case in point. Despite censorship by state authorities, it was not only the Germans who protested at the repressive policies imposed on them by the Council of Ministers in Petrograd. Some Octobrists and Constitutional Democrats in the Duma, too, defended the rights of German civilians. Yet their support was diluted and restricted by their Russian nationalism and strong support for their country's war effort. Instead of strengthening the norms of humanity and civil society, the activities of Russian civic organiza-

'Internment of Civilians', 14. For a retrospective view see Lehmann-Russbüldt, *Kampf*, 16–17, 63–4, 79, 168–81.

tions such as the associations of the Third Element professionals and the councils of the *zemstvos* fuelled a strong nationalist mobilization that targeted civilian enemy aliens, thereby contributing to their oppression. As these examples demonstrate, the official activities of governments and civic engagement by NGOs were by no means exclusively opposed to each other; on the contrary, they were frequently interrelated. In the last resort, humanitarian activists and societies did not succeed in putting pressure on governments, let alone forcing them to observe the rules and regulations of existing international law. As a result, the vast majority of POWs and civilian internees had to endure repressive measures and reprisals. It was not least the vicious circle of violence and reprisals against enemy aliens that lent the First World War its total nature and extreme brutality, even on the home front.[30]

All in all, the demands of national security and the principle of national sovereignty prevailed over the basic human rights of civilian foreign nationals, who were largely equated with captured soldiers. Against the backdrop of feelings of insecurity, 'internal foes' became the target of anxieties and scares. Strong emotions seemed to demand stringent measures against the hated 'enemies within', and 'better safe than sorry' was the order of the day. Rulers of the warring states therefore took advantage of loopholes in international law in order to arrest and intern civilian enemy aliens and prevent international humanitarian organizations from monitoring the treatment of civilian foreign nationals and supporting these victims of the war. For instance, the ICRC's efforts to inspect German camps near the front and in the occupied territories failed. Moreover, neutral states such as Sweden, Switzerland, and (until April 1917) the USA, which served as protecting powers, only reluctantly informed the ICRC about any maltreatment and abuse of POWs and internees that their inspectors had observed in the belligerent states. The neutral states thereby sought to prevent reprisals. Inspections by delegations of neutral protecting powers were based on the principle of reciprocity that ultimately reinforced national sovereignty in the treatment of

[30] Jean H. Quataert, 'Women's Wartime Services under the Cross: Patriotic Communities in Germany, 1912–1918', in Roger Chickering (ed.), *Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–1918* (Cambridge, 2000), 453–83, esp. 456–7, 465–6; Deperchin, 'The Laws of War', 633; Stibbe, 'Internment of Civilians', 15.

POWs and civilian internees. The warring states therefore sought to prevent their soldiers from deserting and being captured. The Italian government, for example, refused to send aid to its citizens held in captivity in Germany and the Habsburg Empire. The activities of the Red Cross were ultimately restricted to pragmatic care, while their national organizations actively contributed to the war effort of their states.[31]

Only rarely did the national sections of the Red Cross put pressure on their governments to at least lessen the rigorous control, repression, and internment of enemy aliens. Obviously for tactical reasons, they usually referred to the danger of reprisals against the nations' own citizens instead of defending the principles of humanitarianism. Pragmatic considerations of national interests trumped high-minded idealism. Undoubtedly, humanitarian organizations encouraged and promoted agreements about the treatment of foreign citizens, and they succeeded in restricting reprisals against POWs and civilian internees. Yet they remained weak vis-à-vis the governments of the various nation-states that held civilian foreign nationals as hostages. Indeed, some POWs and civilian internees themselves justified reprisals, as long as they were directed against civilian enemy aliens.[32] The all-embracing war culture prevailed over the minuscule civil society.[33] Faced with the need to safeguard political and social cohesion in total war, security policies and cultures took precedence over liberty, humanitarian concerns, and basic human rights until the end of the war, even in European democracies and the USA.[34]

[31] Hinz, 'Humanität im Krieg?', 227–30; Stibbe, 'Internment of Civilians', 17–18.

[32] See Becker, 'Paradoxien', 30.

[33] On concept of 'war culture' see Arnd Bauerkämper and Elise Julien, 'Einleitung: Durchhalten: Durchhalten! Kriegskulturen und Handlungspraktiken im Ersten Weltkrieg', in eid. (eds.), *Durchhalten! Krieg und Gesellschaft im Vergleich 1914–1918* (Göttingen, 2010), 7–28, at 12–14; Gerhard Hirschfeld and Gerd Krumeich, 'Wozu eine "Kulturgeschichte" des Ersten Weltkriegs?, ibid. 31–53; Stibbe, 'Internees', 185.

[34] Peter Gattrell, 'War after the War: Conflicts, 1919–1923' in John Horne (ed.), *A Companion to World War*, vol. i (Oxford, 2012), 558–75; Horne, 'War and Conflict', 90; Stibbe, 'Introduction', 11.

IV. *Conclusion: Humanitarianism under Pressure*

As the repression of innocent civilian enemy aliens in general and their internment in particular demonstrates, the First World War was a major disaster involving violence and extremism. Under the restrictive conditions of the war, national and international humanitarian organizations could only alleviate the plight of POWs and interned civilians to some extent. In particular, the ICRC at least occasionally succeeded in putting pressure on the warring states by appealing to their governments to comply with basic standards of humane treatment. As the rulers of the belligerent countries aimed to win over public opinion in neutral states and sought to avoid reprisals, this strategy was repeatedly successful. In the propaganda war, all states claimed moral superiority, which was an important incentive to comply with international law. Having influenced the agenda in international politics even before the war, humanitarian organizations and their national sections took advantage of these efforts from 1914 to 1918. Despite their failure to prevent some gross violations of humanitarian norms, they often managed to restrict punitive measures and reprisals against enemy aliens. They thereby questioned the doctrine of unreserved national security, and curtailed executive state action.

Overall, however, legal norms had largely proved powerless against the claims of 'national security' made by the belligerent states in the First World War. Demonizing the enemy, war propaganda nourished fears of 'aliens' (including minorities) and fuelled suspicion, resentment, and xenophobia. Emotional ties within communities on the home front were as strong and powerful as comradeship between soldiers. In particular, the mass internment of foreign civilians reflected the all-encompassing, radical quest for 'safety first', which shaped government policies in the warring states. Even helpless civilian enemy aliens represented the hated foe. In the multi-ethnic empires, minorities, too, were stigmatized as 'fifth columnists', as were dissidents, pacifists, conscientious objectors, socialists, and communists.

The 'enemy within' became the object of hate and fear, surveillance, repression, and internment. Punishing this reviled group was intended to compensate for war losses. Participation in violence against civilian foreign nationals also gave citizens the chance to

demonstrate their support for the national war effort, even though civilians in captivity were an easy and helpless target for self-appointed 'patriots' and their popular associations. Above all, however, the mass internment of civilians reflected the violent potential of a nationalism that was based on the conception of an ethnically homogeneous community. Furthermore, it signalled the enormous expansion of state power, especially with regard to the provision of security. With the exception of the (few) international organizations, humanitarian associations were divided by national borders that prevented interaction and exchange. In fact, civil society was largely harnessed to the national war effort, as the proliferation and expansion of patriotic societies and nationalist organizations demonstrate. In total war, they were to mobilize all available resources for the battles that, it was believed, were being fought for the very survival of the nation. When basic humanitarian provisions and human rights prevailed, this was due less to the norms of international law than to the strategies of national governments that sought to maintain their reputation in international politics and observed the principle of reciprocity, lured by the prospect of mutual benefits. Most importantly, fears of reprisals against the nation-states' own citizens were influential.[35]

The long-term impact of the internment of civilian enemy aliens proved to be ambiguous. On the one hand, pressure from humanitarian organizations gave rise to innovations in international law. The Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929, for instance, extended and specified regulations for the treatment of POWs. However, it was only the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (in particular, the fourth one) that adopted provisions for humane treatment. This departure from almost exclusive protection of combatants in international law mainly reflected the experience of the Second World War, especially Nazi atrocities and the Holocaust. Democratic states pursued a much less drastic policy against 'enemy aliens' that nevertheless affected 110,000 forcibly deported Japanese in the USA as well as thousands of Germans, Austrians, and Italians in the United Kingdom. Yet the turn towards more comprehensive protection of civilians after 1945 was also influenced by the lessons of total warfare from 1914 to 1918,

[35] Jones, 'Kriegsgefangenenlager', 65–7, 71, 74–5; Deperchin, 'The Laws of War', 628; Stibbe, 'Internment of Civilians', 18–19; Hinz, 'Humanität im Krieg?', 220, 228.

and attempted to remedy the failure of the ICRC to achieve an agreement at a conference in Tokyo in 1934. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 eventually became a pillar of international humanitarian law. In 1993 the United Nations Security Council eventually adopted the report of a committee of experts which had asserted that the Geneva Conventions had definitively and irrevocably passed into the body of binding customary international law.[36]

On the other hand, the violence of war continued to shape political and social developments after the armistice of 11 November 1918. Paramilitary organizations and veterans' associations mobilized sections of the populations in states such as Germany, France, and Britain. Although the First World War did not lead directly to a brutalization of politics, the experience of warfare contributed to the extreme violence in the post-war politics and societies of many European states. Moreover, war veterans were symbolically appropriated as heroes, not only within the confines of nation-states, but also in a transnational process. Retarding demobilization, paramilitary groups prevented a stabilization of the new post-war states that emerged from the collapse of multi-ethnic empires and autocracies. But even the victorious states were beset with unrest. In northern Italy, for example, frustration over the *vittoria mutilate* (mutilated victory) fuelled the violence of the fascist squads from 1919 on, before Benito Mussolini managed to convince the old elites (especially King Vittorio Emanuele III) to vest supreme power in him. Previously, the

[36] Rachel Pistol, *Internment during the Second World War: A Comparative Study of Great Britain and the USA* (London, 2017); Johannes Morsink, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent* (Philadelphia, 1999), esp. 36–91; Johannes Morsink, 'The Dawn of Human Rights: The Universal Declaration and the Conscience of Humanity', in Rainer Huhle (ed.), *Human Rights and History: A Challenge for Education* (Berlin, 2010), 25–36; Daniel Levy, 'Cosmopolitization of Victimhood: Holocaust Memories and the Human Rights Regime', in Annette Weinke and Norbert Frei (eds.), *Toward a New Moral World Order? Menschenrechtspolitik und Völkerrecht seit 1945* (Göttingen, 2013), 210–18; Thomas Buergenthal, 'International Law and the Holocaust', in Michael J. Bazyler and Roger P. Alford (eds.), *Holocaust Restitution: Perspectives on the Litigation and its Legacy* (New York, 2006), 17–29; William I. Hitchcock, 'Human Rights and the Laws of War: The Geneva Convention of 1949', in Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William I. Hitchcock (eds.), *The Human Rights Revolution* (New York, 2012), 93–112; Oeter, 'Die Entwicklung des Kriegsgefangenenrechts', 51–3.

Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 had unleashed a new wave of violence. Under the impact of anti-communist and antisemitic conspiracy theories, the fight against the national 'enemy within' paved the way to the 'red scare' that spread in countries such as Britain and the USA from 1917 to the mid 1920s. As the wartime emergency persisted after the armistice of 11 November 1918, militarism by no means subsided. Radical nationalists agitated against putative foes allegedly endangering national security. The repression of civilian enemy aliens from 1914 to 1918 significantly contributed to the post-war violence. It may even have had a lasting impact, as indicated by the internment of 'enemy combatants' in Guantanamo Bay and the restrictions on civil liberties in the USA since 2002 on the basis of the Espionage Act of 1917.[37]

[37] Robert Gerwarth, 'The Central European Counter-Revolution: Paramilitary Violence in Germany, Austria and Hungary after the Great War', *Past and Present*, 200 (2008), 175–209; id. and John Horne (eds.), *War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War* (Oxford, 2012); Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski, 'Europeanization through Violence? War Experiences and the Making of Modern Europe', in Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel (eds.), *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches* (Houndmills, 2010), 189–209; Peter Gatrell, 'War after the War: Conflicts, 1919–1923', in Horne (ed.), *A Companion to World War*, 558–75; Stibbe, 'Internment', 66, 73. On Italy see Ángel Alcade, 'War Veterans and the Transnational Origins of Italian Fascism (1917–1919)', *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 21 (2016), 565–83; Martin Clark, 'Italian Squadrismo and Contemporary Vigilantism', *European History Quarterly*, 18 (1988), 33–49.

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CLASSICS REREAD

A HEROIC WORK OF EXTRAORDINARY SCHOLARSHIP: ON THE NEW TRANSLATED EDITION OF H. G. ADLER'S THERESIENSTADT *OF 1960*

BEN BARKOW

H. G. ADLER, *Theresienstadt, 1941–1945: The Face of a Coerced Community*, ed. Amy Loewenhaar-Blauweiss, trans. Belinda Cooper (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 882 pp. ISBN 978 0 521 88146 3. £77.00 (hardback)

More than sixty years after its original publication, H. G. Adler's *Theresienstadt* remains indispensable to anyone who has more than a casual interest in what was among the most perverse and strange sites of incarceration in the Nazi empire.[1] Although sadly few people realize it, Adler's book is also essential reading for anyone engaged in trying to understand the Holocaust. Despite this, for much of its existence it has been unavailable to most people, and between 1960 and 2005 no edition was in print. Until now there has been no edition in English. Those who wanted to own a copy had to scour the second-hand market and pay dearly for the privilege.

The new edition is, to paraphrase Charles Dickens, the best of books, it is the worst of books. To begin with what makes it the best: H. G. Adler is a unique figure among writers on the Holocaust and he wrote a very special book indeed—and one with a complicated past. He had been an inmate in Theresienstadt (Terezín) for thirty-two months before voluntarily accompanying his wife and mother-in-law to Auschwitz, where both were gassed. He was then sent to a sub-camp of Buchenwald in Langenstein, where he was liberated in April 1945. He eventually settled in London and worked as a freelance researcher and writer, producing around two dozen books, covering history, fiction, poetry, and criticism.

[1] H. G. Adler, *Theresienstadt 1941–1945: Das Antlitz einer Zwangsgemeinschaft. Geschichte, Soziologie, Psychologie* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1955; 2nd edn. 1960).

Theresienstadt is a work of extraordinary scholarship. Adler carried out immensely detailed research during the 1940s and 1950s, assembling a vast amount of documentation which underpins his work. The riches of his archival researches are so great that a supplementary volume was published to make a selection of them public (never reprinted, never translated). His ability to have done this outside the academy and in a world dominated by the Cold War, closed archives, and no external funding (that I know of) is truly remarkable.

The structure of the book reveals something of Adler's priorities. It is divided into three parts; History, Sociology, and Psychology. History takes up 150 pages, Sociology 336, and Psychology just 42. Sociology was the key to how he was able to take the raw observations which he had made in the ghetto as a way of coping and surviving it, and hang them on a conceptual framework, to be upholstered with his archival findings. Consistent with his title, we are examining a community. Whether or not this serves as a microcosm or paradigm of modern industrialized, 'mechanical and materialistic' society is another issue and in 2018, perhaps no longer the critical one. Adler had grappled with how to approach the writing of the book and found in the sociological thought of figures such as Georg Simmel and Franz Baermann Steiner the perspective that opened up his avenue of approach. The helpful Afterword by Adler's son, Professor Jeremy Adler (translated from the 2005 German edition by Wallstein[2]), reflects in detail on Adler's intellectual setting and inspirations.

I would add that for most readers, his theoretical commitments do not matter all that much, since his writing is idiosyncratic and rooted within himself and is not 'harmed' by the theories he followed. In a sense, being an 'amateur' turned out to be a strength rather than a weakness. Also, his insights and wisdom are greater than the theorists he read in many instances: he is by some length the better and more important writer.

What strikes the modern reader is that Adler is unashamedly the moralist, weighing evidence and bringing in judgements. His lengthy reflections on guilt and Judaism are fascinating. His refusal to put on rose-tinted spectacles when looking at his peers, or to

[2] H. G. Adler, *Theresienstadt 1941–1945: Das Antlitz einer Zwangsgemeinschaft*, with an Afterword by Jeremy Adler (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005).

reduce their behaviour to issues of black and white, contains an important challenge to anyone thinking about Holocaust commemoration and education today. In many cases, this is now based on such radical simplifications that it universalizes, relativizes, and instrumentalizes the Holocaust so completely that the most instrumentalized and politically correct end of Holocaust educational practice is almost as distorting as the soft end of Holocaust denial. Reading Adler is an astringent corrective to this tendency.

But there is a further dimension to the book that deepens it profoundly and gives it a very rare kind of authority—it is as much a survivor's testimony as it is a scholar's text. Survivor testimony, these days, is taken as a sort of gold standard of Holocaust education. This is questionable in and of itself, but even if we accept that it is, the failings go further. One of the tragic ways in which we are getting Holocaust education and commemoration so badly wrong is by ignoring the testimonies given in the immediate aftermath of the war (mainly because they are not on film, not in colour and not in high definition, not a hologram). But these early testimonies are among the most vital and significant we have. And while most testimonies are able to describe only what happened in one or two places at one or two moments, Adler's testimony embraces not just the whole of the Holocaust, but wider human history, as he makes clear in his concluding chapter:

> Theresienstadt is part of the history of an empire, and thus part of the simultaneous history of the world. The subjects of the camp's history could not evade this interrelationship; the course of its history is first of all involved in and then largely determined by the surrounding history (pp. 559–60).

Many of the things Adler describes or explains are only possible because he was there to witness them, or the peer of those who had been. Indeed, his strategy for his own psychological and emotional survival involved turning himself into a detached, yet close observer of the camp/ghetto and its life. Taking all these qualities into account, I cannot think of a more monumental, towering, searing statement of survival and indictment.

I believe that this is a masterpiece and one of the most important books about the Holocaust that has been (and perhaps will ever be)

written. (One of the others would be Adler's own, utterly ignored, *Der verwaltete Mensch,* a study of the bureaucracy of deportation.[3]) I would suggest that Adler's fictional, poetic, and critical writings, now enjoying rapidly growing admiration and respect, can only be properly understood if *Theresienstadt* and *Der verwaltete Mensch* are taken into account. These books are the intellectual and moral core of his *oeuvre*.

Where does this work sit in the historiography of the Holocaust? *Theresienstadt* belongs to that first generation of studies of the subject that I personally think of as 'heroic'. These books are now often overlooked, but deserve to be at the heart of every student's reading list. Its peers include Raul Hilberg's *The Destruction of the European Jews* (1961), Gerald Reitlinger's *The Final Solution* (1953), Hannah Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1963), Elie Wiesel's *Night* (1960), Eva Reichmann's *Hostages of Civilisation* (1950), and the edited volume by the Jewish Historical Institute Warsaw *Faschismus – Getto – Massenmord* (1961), among the works of many other authors including Jacob Presser, Reuben Ainsztein, Uwe Adam, Norman Bentwich, Arnold Paucker, and more.

There are shelf-loads of these early accounts and they offer something more than the semi-industrialized outpourings of university departments today. Such books are often not scholarly—or not primarily scholarly—but are informed by a passionate concern that the Holocaust be recognized, remembered, and understood as both an immense crime and a collapse of civilization and morality. The authors were frequently of the generation that lived through the war, if they were not themselves survivors. In our age of relativization, trivialization, and denial—not just of the Holocaust but truth and reality in general—these works, with their unshakeable moral core, are very much worth reconnecting with.

They are, of course, works of their time. They are products of the Cold War, and some are infused with Cold War politics. They are works written during Israel's youth, and often reflect that fact. They were written despite the fact that the authors had access to a grossly limited set of archives. They are generally not feminist in outlook. But against this they are responses of greater or lesser immediacy. They are not consciously seeking scholarly detachment but are pas-

[3] H. G. Adler, *Der verwaltete Mensch: Studien zur Deportation der Juden aus Deutschland* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1974).

sionate, angry books written to force recognition of crimes and injustices and to awaken the slumbering conscience of a largely indifferent world. Adler should stand at the very heart of this heroic generation. Thanks to the bizarre publishing history of his work, he does not, being thought of as obscure, difficult, and marginal (only the middle one of these terms is true).

Sometimes the heroic generation are criticized for the harshness of their judgements, for instance, relating to the conduct of Jewish Councils. Today's scholars are more nuanced and tend to make far softer judgments—if they dare to make judgments at all. (They would do well to consult this earlier generation of frequently non-academic writers in order to reflect on their responsibilities as historians, philosophers, social scientists etc. in relation to forming moral judgments.) Yehuda Bauer (perhaps straddling the heroic and subsequent generations), for example, has poignantly used Lawrence Langer's phrase 'choiceless choices' to describe the dilemmas facing Jews and Jewish Councils struggling to cope with Nazi duplicity and hate. There is certainly truth in this but Adler, who is remarkably sensitive to the circumstances under which Jewish Councils laboured, judges them harshly nonetheless. His reflections are worth looking at.

In the preface to the second edition he reviews some of the criticisms made of the first edition, and focuses on critics of his portrayal of Jakob Edelstein, the first leader of Theresienstadt's Jewish Council. Adler was accused of being unduly harsh in his judgements of Edelstein's actions and decisions. He defends himself by acknowledging Edelstein's sacrifices and good intentions but goes on:

> No, this man does not deserve our hatred and scorn, but when we look back at the impact he had, he also does not merit being turned into a role model or hero. The fact that he did not avoid the unavoidable only fits into the larger picture, but the fact that he did not shy away from what was avoidable tarnishes his memory . . . There [in Theresienstadt] we see Edelstein stoop to new lows (p. xviii).

Most of Adler's contemporaries judged the Jewish Councils in terms of black and white and found them black. Today's scholars find them largely white (or at least 'choiceless'). Adler's contribution

(just one of many in this book) is to sift through the shades of grey that delineate reality and judge discriminately, but judge. In some areas the leadership was choiceless, in others choices existed. Where choices existed, the leaders deserve to be held accountable for the decisions they took. Adler finds much in their conduct that is weak, dishonest, and occasionally evil. This is the case with Edelstein's successor Paul Eppstein:

> In this connection I would like to mention the case of Vladimir Weiss, a Zionist from Prague who was deported to Auschwitz in September 1943, with his wife and child, because he sent Eppstein a memo on corruption . . . This was not an instance in which Eppstein succumbed to tragic circumstances; these were actions he deliberated over and undertook of his own free will. Something like this cannot be whitewashed . . . (p. xix).

Theresienstadt is unusual in another way. It is, of course, annotated. But not like other books. Its 356 footnotes or endnotes extend to 180 pages, because Adler cites and quotes at length from dozens of sources, includes critical evaluations of them, and tells the stories of their authors. This 'sourcebook' aspect of *Theresienstadt* provides an invaluable trove of documents which illuminate Adler's argument but are equally important as free-standing contributions to our understanding of events and people. Among those quoted is Philipp Manes, a Jewish businessman who organized lectures, play-readings, and concerts, and wrote an almost 1000-page Chronicle before being sent to Auschwitz (the late Dr Klaus Leist and I edited and translated the manuscript).[4] Adler offers this evaluation:

> Manes, a man of strict fairness, optimistic spirit, and subtle powers of observation did not succumb, like most of the inmates, to senseless political rumour; however, his outlook nevertheless confirms the tragic attitude of all too many elderly Jews from Germany towards the SS, whose abysmal villainy he did not suspect until the bitter end. Because people often do not believe in the presence of this attitude—this naïveté, which we have repeatedly described . . . (p. 709).

[4] Philipp Manes, *Als ob's ein Leben wär: Tatsachenbericht Theresienstadt 1942–1944*, ed. Ben Barkow and Klaus Leist (Berlin: Ullstein, 2005).

Adler then quotes passages from Manes's chronicle to illustrate his point, perhaps a little unfairly, since it is quite difficult, if you take the whole Chronicle into account, to work out what Manes's attitude really was. We will look at translation issues below, but the rendering of 'Ahnungslosigkeit' as 'naïveté', seems weak. I think 'cluelessness' approximates more closely to what I take Adler's feelings about Manes to have been.

I have sketched out some of the many things that make this 'the best of books'. It is time now to look at what makes it 'the worst'. This comes down to set of issues relating to the publisher, the translator, and the editor. *Theresienstadt* is a large book. But Cambridge University Press have opted to make it a *really* large book, a peculiar and uncomfortable format that is extremely heavy and sits very uncomfortably in the hand. Reading it involves a considerable amount of weightlifting. Despite this, the binding is that of a cheap paperback. This book will not last if handled regularly, as it should be.

More significant are some editorial decisions I consider to be deeply damaging. Firstly, the glossary. The original has a glossary spanning around thirty pages. This reflects the distinctiveness, and indeed, oddness of the ghetto terminology (not to mention Nazi terminology). I contend that you cannot understand Terezín if you do not grapple with the fact that it was part Czech, part German, and part other, more sparsely represented nationalities. This fact, coupled with the ghetto's long pre-history, shaped the language and the language in turn shaped the inmates.

Let us look at one central word: *Ubikation*. This refers to living quarters. Its use was universal. The definition Adler gives is: 'Czech, "ubikace", from the Czech and Austrian military terminology meaning quarter.'[5] The word thus brings to life Adler's comments about Theresienstadt as part of a larger history. It has its origins in time when Terezín was an Austro-Hungarian garrison. Readers of the translation will not encounter this key word anywhere in the book and their understanding will be the poorer.

The deletion of the glossary robs readers of a great deal and denies them access to the frequently ironic use of language through which the inmates tried to lubricate the grinding experience of the ghetto. Thus, *Mazzeorden* (matzo medal) = the yellow star;[6] *Vitamin B,*

[5] Adler, *Theresienstadt*, Wallstein edition (as in n. 2), p. lvi.

[6] Ibid. p. xlv.

Vitamin P – B = Beziehungen (connections) P = Protektion;[7] *Průser* = a vulgar Czech expression meaning something like 'shit-through'. Adler explains that among the Czech Jews it denoted an illegal activity that had been spotted by the authorities.[8]

Another, even more significant example, is the term *Schleuse*. Literally it means sluice (as in in a canal lock, not a funnel, as the translation has it). In Theresienstadt it took on a densely layered set of meanings. Adler's glossary gives it and its derivatives almost a full page, indicating how much there is to understand about it.[9] Adler states that these are the central words of the camp language. Readers of the English edition encounter the word with no explanation and can never understand its full significance. Yet without this word and its derivatives it is not possible to understand the workings of the camp and their impact on the inmates.

Characteristically, Adler classified the words in the glossary: unmarked words were those common in documents and usage; 'O' indicated words mostly confined to documents; 'U' meant words common in usage but not documents and so forth.

The original book boasted three indexes: persons, places, subjects—spanning some thirty-eight pages. They allow you to navigate through the 926 pages of the Wallstein edition in immense detail to locate whatever you are looking for, and to let happenstance reveal unlooked-for treasures. These indexes have been stripped out of the translation and replaced with a single twenty-eight page index of much lower quality. Look up the name Trostinetz (or Trostenets), to take one example at random: in the original you will find four entries; the translation offers only one. Look up Aachen, Egypt, or Europe, or an important witness such as Gerty Spies, and you will not find anything at all.

The original hardback editions reproduced a plan of the ghetto on the flyleaf, drawn at the time of the ghetto. On the verso was a full page of notes explaining the abbreviations and numbers on the plan. The 2005 Wallstein edition improved on this quite considerably, turning it into a fold-out page at the back of the book with both the plan and the key, so that you can have both before you the whole

[7] Ibid. p. lvii.
[8] Ibid. p. xlviii.
[9] Ibid. pp. l–li.

time you read. The CUP translation features the plan, much reduced in size so it is very difficult to work with, and missing the key altogether, on the back of the dustjacket. (The 2005 Wallstein edition is the best available, a superb production, adding the essay by Adler's son, a good size, sewn-in-sections so it lasts forever, and good value—€49 for the paperback when it was in print, although now much more expensive second hand. It is exemplary.)

Finally, and most disappointing, the translation itself. Words were the lifeblood of Adler, he cared about them profoundly and crafted his prose with immense deliberation and attention to detail. This is reflected in the first paragraph of the Preface to the first edition, and it is about words and language:

> Although I made an effort to write this book using an untainted German, because of the topic involved—an SS camp set up for Jewish inmates—the text came to reflect and was often subject to the general deterioration of language in the age of mechanical materialism, as well as, in particular, the amorphous, coerced language of the National Socialists and the colloquialisms and written language of Theresienstadt. But the demon that created this camp and left it to vegetate must, certainly, also be conquered linguistically (p. xxiii).

You must take it on trust that, contrary to appearances, the original German of these two sentences is rather beautiful. But it is at least clear that we are dealing with a complex text which reflects and uses four kinds or phases of language. Adler's intention is to write an unspoiled German. He acknowledges that he cannot achieve this because three things prevent him. Firstly, the general decay of language in an industrial and materialistic age; secondly, the formless yet frantic language of National Socialism (the ideology, not the people who embraced it); and, finally, the extraordinary *patois* of Terezín. Things are made yet harder because Adler is being a touch disingenuous—his German may be 'untainted' or 'unspoiled' but that does not mean that it is plain. And it is not—it is dense, allusive, layered, and complex. His book is, aside from being a work of scholarship and testimony, a self-consciously literary work and a work of literature. I do not think Adler would have enjoyed the irony that his effort to conquer linguistically should have been turned into a linguistic quagmire.

While it may not be possible to recreate these linguistic layers and shades in English, the translator and editor should at least be sensitive to them and try to find ways to convey to the reader something of what Adler is doing. A good translation does not offer word-for-word equivalence (which results in nonsense—see below). It must recreate in the rhythms and idioms of the target language something of the music of the original, while also conveying the information in the text. To achieve this with Adler requires artistry as well as scholarship, perhaps backed up by an extensive apparatus of footnotes. The present edition sadly does not achieve this, or even seem to try.

Let us consider the book's title. Adler's subtitle is *Antlitz einer Zwangsgemeinschaft,* which is a brilliant formulation, and 'Zwangsgemeinschaft' is a word of his own invention. This is obviously a challenge for a translator. What we are given is *The Face of a Coerced Community*. I think this is problematic. 'Face' is a poor choice for 'Antlitz', which is a slightly archaic and poetic word, perhaps best rendered as 'countenance' or 'visage'. Working backwards I would expect 'face' to translate back into German as 'Gesicht', not 'Antlitz'. Stylistically 'countenance' is the best match for Adler's original. More significantly, 'coerced' also seems wrong. Nazi policy towards Jews after 1941 was characterized by extreme violence and force. 'Coercion' commonly implies persuading or bullying people by social pressure, rather than driving them into concentration camps at gunpoint. Coercion perhaps better describes the state of the home front. Those judged by the Nazis to be racially valuable were coerced into complicity. The Jews in Theresienstadt were put there by at gunpoint, and were violated in every way until they either died or were deported to be murdered somewhere else. That is not coercion; that is genocide.

I cannot say what the best translation would have been—I suspect that it should not be a direct translation at all (because the original is pretty much untranslatable). It calls for a creative, artistic intervention to produce something carrying the broad sense but with equal linguistic power. Either that, or something quite unrelated to the original, and a brief explanation of that decision.

The reader of this translation must not expect to experience anything approaching Adler's elegance and artistry. But can they at least understand what he is saying? Often, yes; frequently, no. On pages 123–4 we read:

> To create these paradisiacal conditions, 17,500 people first had to vanish into Auschwitz. Simultaneous with the easing of conditions, partly to the benefit of a minority, partly to the benefit of all who remained, they were produced by a will that was responsible for the gas chambers. That will wore the undeserved and barely camouflaged mask of a benefactor. In this way, developments in Theresienstadt grew into the most gruesome ghost dance in the history of Hitler's persecution of the Jews.

This is bordering on gobbledygook. Adler is saying that the deportation of 17,500 people to Auschwitz led to conditions easing. In some respects this benefited a minority of the population; in other respects it benefited everyone left behind in the camp. Nevertheless, he continues, this easing of conditions expressed the same intention towards the Jews that was responsible for the gas chambers, albeit thinly disguised as by an ill-fitting mask of benevolence. Thereby developments in Theresienstadt became the eeriest of ghostly dances in the history of the persecution of Jews under Hitler. (If you imagine I have maliciously chosen the one passage that is badly translated, let me assure you, I could produce dozens of similar examples.)

Throughout the book there are formulations that are clumsy, confusing, absurd, or plain wrong. On page 70 Adler quotes from a lengthy document describing Theresienstadt which was written by Otto Zucker, an architect and civil engineer who had served in the First World War and was the deputy of Paul Eppstein. Among other things Zucker describes the functioning of the kitchens and food distribution in the ghetto. In one of these passages the translator offers us: 'For a normal mass kitchen operation one needs a cooking pot room that corresponds to 1.2 litres per person.' Cooking pot room? The original German is 'Kesselraum', literally, a boiler room, which does not seem to make sense. What I think is being referred to is some measure of capacity relating to the cauldrons used in military and field kitchens to produce hundreds of meals in a short space of time. Zucker specifically refers to military kitchens in this passage. He also refers to the fact that they were able to get new cauldrons, but could not install them owing to the labour shortage.

Overall, the translation reads like a first draft. It would have been a decent first stab and after revision and correction (perhaps two or

three iterations) might have recreated Adler's prose creditably. But it is so clunky and riddled with errors that it obscures a book that would have been challenging to read even if perfectly translated and edited.

I referred above to the Philipp Manes Chronicle edited by Dr Klaus Leist and myself. In preparing an English language edition of it we confronted similar problems to those facing the translator and editor of *Theresienstadt*: a poor basic translation, lack of support with copy-editing and proof-reading, and immense commercial pressure to hand over a finished manuscript. In our case we worked round the clock for several weeks to fix it, although the result is far from perfect (and our manuscript was a fraction of the length of *Theresienstadt*). I relate this to ensure that the translator and editor do not shoulder the responsibility alone. The publisher must share the blame.

Is it simply too difficult and expensive to produce a good English edition of Adler? Of course it is not. By way of comparison, consider the magnificent *Complete Works of Primo Levi,* published two years ago.[10] Three volumes, newly translated (and well translated), elegantly produced (still a cheap binding, though) and over 5,500 pages. Price on Amazon: £78.00. *Theresienstadt* has 882 pages; price on Amazon: £77.00.

If *Theresienstadt* had been written recently and published for the first time today, its impact would have been immense, and it would have triggered many a controversy and helped to shape the research agenda for years to come. It would be interpreted, I believe, as a critique of the fields of Holocaust research, commemoration, and education, and be seen to challenge fundamental aspects of how we engage in these activities.

As it is, the book has never been appreciated in the English-speaking world, simply because so few have been able to read it, if they could track down a copy at all. Tragically, what Cambridge University Press, with its associates, the US Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Terezin Publishing Project—the three organizations behind this edition—have produced is a version that perpetuates the confusion about Adler and that, albeit in a new and unexpected way, continues to deny us the chance to hear his true voice. It is a huge missed

[10] Ann Goldstein (ed.), *The Complete Works of Primo Levi*, with an Introduction by Toni Morrison, 3 vols. (New York: Liveright, 2015).

opportunity and Holocaust scholarship, education, and commemoration are the losers.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

FORGOTTEN, NOT FORGIVEN? NEW GERMAN-LANGUAGE WORKS ON THE 1918/19 GERMAN REVOLUTION

ALEX BURKHARDT

JOACHIM KÄPPNER, *1918: Aufstand für die Freiheit. Die Revolution der Besonnenen* (Munich: Piper, 2017), 528 pp. ISBN 978 3 492 05733 2. €28.00
WOLFGANG NIESS, *Die Revolution von 1918/19: Der wahre Beginn unserer Demokratie* (Munich: Europa Verlag, 2017), 464 pp. ISBN 978 3 95890 074 5. €24.90

The centenary of the outbreak of the First World War in 2014 provided the occasion for a veritable glut of new books to commemorate and reassess what George Kennan called the 'great seminal catastrophe of the twentieth century'.[1] The year 2018 offers a similar opportunity for scholars to pen their thoughts on the German Revolution, which brought an end to the war as well as the Hohenzollern monarchy. In contrast to 1914, however, the revolution has tended to slip under the radar of the popular historical imagination. Ian Kershaw is quoted on the back cover of one of the books reviewed here to the effect that 'today' the revolution is 'often forgotten or underestimated', while a compendium of essays released in 2010 was entitled *Die vergessene Revolution* ('The Forgotten Revolution').[2] There is, indeed, little doubt that the revolution does not enjoy the sort of prominence in Germany's popular historical tradition that the French or Russian revolutions have acquired in their respective nations; nor has it generated the same kind of public interest as, say, the rise of the Nazis or the Holocaust.

[1] George F. Kennan, *The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations 1875–1890* (Princeton, 1979), 3.
[2] Alexander Gallus (ed.), *Die vergessene Revolution von 1918/19* (Göttingen, 2010).

Despite this, the German Revolution was at one time one of the most intensively researched fields in modern German history—and one of the most controversial. The conservative historiography of the 1950s held that the Majority Social Democrats (MSPD) had no option but to forge a deal with imperial elites in order to crush a burgeoning 'Bolshevik' revolution centred around the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils.[3] But in the 1960s and 1970s, scholars such as Eberhard Kolb, Susanne Miller, and Ulrich Kluge dedicated their fledgling careers to challenging this view by arguing that the Council movement carried a 'democratic potential' which the Social Democrats failed to exploit because of their excessive fear of Bolshevism and misplaced faith in the military. They thus left untouched 'anti-democratic' figures and institutions which would later play a crucial role in delivering the republic over to Hitler.[4] To some extent, then, the German Revolution of 1918/19 may have been 'forgotten', but the Social Democrats' perceived failure to seize the day and fully democratize Germany in late 1918 was never really 'forgiven', at least not by certain sections of the German historical profession. This rather negative evaluation of the SPD's role in the revolution was taken to an extreme in the German Democratic Republic, where historians depicted the Social Democrats not so much as excessively timid or misguided, but as conscious 'traitors' to the tradition of Marxist class politics who showed their true colours during the revolution when they sided with the old regime to become 'murderers of workers' ('Arbeitermörder').[5]

The legacies of these judgements are very perceptible in two German-language books released in 2017 to mark the revolution's centenary: *1918: Aufstand für die Freiheit* ('1918: Uprising for Freedom'), by Joachim Käppner, and *Die Revolution von 1918/19: Der wahre Beginn unserer Demokratie* ('The Revolution of 1918/19: The Real Beginning of our Democracy') by Wolfgang Niess. Both books bill themselves as

[3] See Karl Dietrich Erdmann, 'Die Geschichte der Weimarer Republik als Problem der Wissenschaft', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 3 (1955), 1–19.
[4] See Eberhard Kolb, *Die Arbeiterräte in der Deutschen Innenpolitik, 1918–1919* (Frankfurt/M., 1978); Suzanne Miller, *Die Bürde der Macht: Die Deutsche Sozialdemokratie 1918–1920* (Düsseldorf, 1978); Ulrich Kluge, *Soldatenräte und Revolution: Studien zur Militärpolitik in Deutschland 1918/19* (Göttingen, 1975).
[5] A similar argument was also advanced by Sebastian Haffner in his famous polemic, *Die deutsche Revolution: 1918/19* (Berne, 1969).

correctives to the revolution's lack of popular recognition by providing new narrative accounts aimed at mass audiences, and each is written by a trained historian turned journalist (Niess wrote a doctoral thesis on the historiography of the revolution and now works as an editor for *SWR Fernsehen,* while Käppner, a journalist at the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, also holds a Ph.D. in twentieth-century German history).[6]

In their accounts, both authors focus mainly on those traditionally considered the revolution's most prominent actors—Social Democrats, the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils, the masses who gathered in Berlin and other big cities to demonstrate for peace—while 'old elites' in the military, industry, and bureaucracy serve (as per usual) as the villains. Meanwhile, despite becoming more central to the historiography of the revolution since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the *Bürgertum*, both Protestant and Catholic, is handled quite cursorily by both authors.[7] Above all, however, both of these books draw heavily on the radical West German scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s in assessing the revolution's achievements, failures, and historical significance.

Niess sets the scene with the protests in Berlin that flared up in November 1918 against the Kaiser and the continuation of the war, whereas Käppner opens with a description of the uprising in Kiel. But the second chapters of both books then go back in time to analyse the marginalized condition of the Social Democrats during the Kaiserreich and their conflicted conduct during the war, before providing fluidly written litanies of those events and actors generally considered central to the course of the revolution. These are, briefly, the High Command's realization during the autumn of 1918 that the war was lost, the resulting 'revolution from above' of democratic reforms introduced in October 1918, the spread of the 'revolution from below' in the form of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils, and the burgeoning conflict between the moderate and radical faces of the

[6] Niess's thesis was published in 2013 as *Die Revolution von 1918/19 in der Deutschen Geschichtsschreibung: Deutungen von der Weimarer Republik bis ins 21. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 2013).

[7] See e.g. Hans-Joachim Bieber, *Bürgertum in der Revolution: Burgerräte und Bürgerstreiks in Deutschland 1918–1920* (Hamburg, 1992); Michael Epkenhans, *Das Bürgertum und die Revolution 1918/19* (Heidelberg, 1994); Peter Fritzsche, *Germans into Nazis* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998).

revolution over the new year of 1918/19, which ultimately led to the breakup of the Majority Social Democratic/Independent Social Democratic (USPD) provisional government and the MSPD's deal with the old elites. The closing chapters of both books depict the growing violence and radicalism of the revolution during the first months of 1919, though Niess' book also deals with the Kapp Putsch, its aftermath, and the deeply divisive elections of June 1920, while Käppner includes a chapter on the ambivalent impact of the revolution on women (who gained the vote and provided some of the revolution's leading figures, but who were also generally excluded from the Councils and frequently lost their wartime jobs to returning soldiers.)

The arguments these books present about the revolution would be familiar to anyone conversant with the West German historiography of the 1960s and 1970s. Niess promises to 'deal with' several 'legends' in his introduction, but these turn out to be the same assumptions that guided much of the conservative historiography of the 1950s, as well as the East German position that the Social Democrats consciously betrayed the revolution. Broadly speaking, in these books, Niess and Käppner provide the same answers to the same set of historical questions addressed half a century ago by historians such as Kolb and Miller; that is, whether or not the Council movement carried a genuine 'Bolshevik' threat (it did not), whether or not the Social Democrats were sufficiently aggressive in their attempted democratization of Germany in 1918/19 (they were not), and whether or not this failure to be more reformist paved the way for the Nazis (it did).

All of this, of course, adds up to a version of German history highly redolent of the *Sonderweg* thesis, according to which the failure of the liberal revolutions of 1848 left Germany with a modern economy and a backward political structure dominated by the old elites, until 1918/19 arrived as a historic chance to thoroughly democratize German society and thereby place the nation on the more agreeably congruent historical trajectory then being traversed by Britain and France.[8] Both Niess and Käppner roll out precisely such a narrative in their chapters on the Social Democrats during the Kaiserreich, but there is little mention in either book that, since the late 1980s, this ver-

[8] For a useful summation of this literature, see Jürgen Kocka, 'German History before Hitler: The Debate about the German *Sonderweg*', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 23/1 (1988), 3–16.

sion of German history has been heavily and convincingly called into question, that it now seems clear that both the Kaiserreich and the German *Bürgertum* were more democratic and 'advanced' than the proponents of the *Sonderweg* theory assumed, and certainly with respect to the supposed bastions of liberal parliamentarism in Britain and France.[9] To be fair, Käppner does fleetingly allude to this position, but he rather breezily dismisses it on the grounds that it constitutes a 'misjudgement of the power of the old elites' (p. 49).

With the perceivedly 'special' nineteenth century background of the German Revolution in place, both Käppner and Niess then proceed to argue that the SPD failed to enact the necessary democratic reforms in November and December 1918 because of an irrational and exaggerated fear of left-wing, Bolshevik-inspired radicalism and a misguided faith in the trustworthiness of the military. However, the extent to which this fear really was exaggerated remains open to question. The successful radicalization of the revolution under the Bolsheviks in Russia and its horrifying consequences were very much in everyone's minds in late 1918. That a similar potential for a violent 'second revolution' did exist in Germany became abundantly apparent during the course of 1919 and 1920, when some elements of the council movement, disappointed by the SPD's perceived failure to enact a 'proper' revolution, embarked upon a seemingly interminable series of uprisings which punctuated the first five years of the Republic. Some of them involved thousands of armed workers. That these uprisings also came within the context of the Red Army's highly unsettling progress in Eastern Europe is also significant, and recent research has shown that the Social Democrats, the liberal and conservative media, and much of the German middle classes all feared the apocalyptic possibility of a co-ordinated Bolshevik-style revolution from within and possible Soviet invasion from without.[10]

[9] On the limits of 'liberalism' in putative 'western' nations and the democratic advances of the German *Bürgertum*, see e.g. Arno J. Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War* (London, 2010); David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Oxford, 1984).

[10] The importance of the Bolshevik Revolution in framing the MSPD and media's perceptions of what was happening in Germany is related in Mark Jones, *Founding Weimar: Violence and the German Revolution of 1918–1919* (Cambridge, 2016). The author of this Review Article has also written about *bür-*

On top of this, Ebert and Scheidemann could have been forgiven for thinking that the war might imminently resume and that the spread of a rather threatening looking Council movement would massively complicate the task of concluding a favourable peace with the Allies.[11] Only with the benefit of hindsight can we blithely suggest that these fears and concerns were illusory or exaggerated.

In any case, that the principal motivation behind the SPD's compromise with the old regime was indeed a fear of the revolutionary Left is in itself questionable. During the winter of 1918/19, the Social Democratic government was faced with ostensibly more banal, but potentially more catastrophic, problems even than the threat of a Bolshevik-style uprising, such as the mammoth demobilization which the Allies had demanded be enforced in record time, securing the food supply despite the continuing Allied blockade, reckoning with an imminent housing crisis, and guarding Germany's eastern borders in the face of possible uprisings and secessions.[12] Could the government have mastered this incredibly fraught, pressured and uncertain situation, while at the same time 'thoroughly democratizing'—that is, purging—the military and bureaucracy of those 'anti-democratic elements' who had administered both for decades, while reckoning with a revolutionary movement that could conceivably have turned violent? This is highly debatable; at the very least, it would have represented an enormous risk that could have gone badly wrong at immense human cost. As Niess himself points out, Germany was

gerliche fears of a simultaneous Spartacist uprising and Red Army invasion; see Alex Burkhardt, 'A Republican Potential: The Rise and Fall of the German Democratic Party in Hof-an-der-Saale, 1918–1920', *Central European History*, 50/4 (2017), 1–22.

[11] See Michael Geyer, 'Zwischen Krieg und Nachkrieg: Die Deutsche Revolution 1918/19 im Zeichen blockierter Transnationalität', in Gallus (ed.), *Die Vergessene* Revolution, 187–223.

[12] The litany of problems faced by the provisional government is examined in Richard Bessel, *Germany after the First World War* (Oxford, 1993). The SPD's misjudgement of Polish separatism and the severity of the challenge they faced on Germany's eastern border is the subject of Jens Boysen, 'Simultaneity of the Un-Simultaneous: German Social Revolution and Polish National Revolution in the Prussian East, 1918/19', in Klaus Weinhauer, Anthony McElligott, and Kirsten Heinsohn (eds.), *Germany 1916–23: A Revolution in Context* (Bielefeld, 2015), 229–51.

spared a catastrophic famine during these months, but he does not mention that this was at least partly due to the Social Democratic deal with old elites in the military, bureaucracy, and industry (pp. 188 and 436–7). Käppner, too, fully recognizes the difficulty of the government's position as dictated by external factors, but he nonetheless describes Ebert's pact with Groener as the beginning of a 'nightmare' for the Republic (p. 220).

Also questionable is the link implied in these books between the SPD's perceived 'failure' to 'democratically reform' German society in 1918/19 and Hitler's so-called 'seizure of power' in January 1933. Both books, and the historiographical heritage they tap into, imply a crucial, causal relationship here. As Käppner most forthrightly puts it, the 'failure' of the revolution constituted a missed opportunity to remove the 'old elites' who 'delivered the republic over to Hitler', and thus to 'prevent Hitler's tyranny, the war, the road to Auschwitz, and millions of deaths' (p. 453). Is this a sustainable argument? In the first place, it is rather unfair to depict the 'elites' with whom the SPD aligned themselves (especially in the civil service and heavy industry) as homogenously composed of arch-reactionaries bent on the destruction of the republic, as suggested by, for example, the close co-operation between industrialists and trade unionists during the revolution (which Niess acknowledges, but Käppner views with scepticism) or the civil service's key role in confounding the 1920 Kapp Putsch (which Niess plays down in favour of an unsurprising emphasis on the working-class General Strike.)[13]

However, even if the elites had indeed all been monocle-wearing, moustache-twiddling anti-republicans plotting the enslavement of the working classes and imperialistic wars in dark, smoke-filled rooms, the argument that they were *primarily* responsible for 'delivering the republic over to Hitler' is far-fetched. Such an argument actually conceals a basic, rather Whiggish optimism, that *truly* democratic societies naturally obviate the potential for a dictatorship such as Hitler's, and that such dictatorships are, in the final analysis, reactionary constructs battling against democratic forces and the tide of progress. However, anyone who has observed with growing disqui-

[13] The burgeoning co-operation between labour and industry, which began during the war itself, as well as the role of the civil service, are the subjects of Conan Fischer, 'A Very German Revolution?', *German Historical Institute London Bulletin*, 28/2 (2006), 6–32.

et political developments in the western world over the last five years surely has good reason to question this rather rosy conception of democracy as something inherently liberal, or the straightforward positing of a battle between (progressive) democratic and (reactionary) undemocratic forces. Indeed, in his introduction, Niess makes mention of the national conservative regimes in Poland and Hungary and implicitly locates them in the camp of 'anti-democratic' forces, despite the fact that both currently enjoy resounding popular support and were, in fact, democratically elected.

This (admittedly disturbing) decoupling of the concepts of democracy and liberalism also carries implications for our understanding of Nazism which, though it was, of course, vehemently opposed to a parliamentary system, was also, in the end, the product of a democratic mass society, concerned not with preserving the power of the old elites, but with eliminating, sidelining, or integrating them in the construction of a new type of totalitarian polity based on the putative 'will of the people'.[14] The unpleasant fact is that the old elites only found themselves in the (from their point of view, rather uncomfortable) position of having to install Hitler as Chancellor because, in free and democratic elections, the NSDAP had become the biggest party in the Reichstag. The Nazis were certainly committed to the destruction of parliamentary democracy, but they also represented what Michael Mann has called the 'dark side of democracy', rather than some kind of reactionary force designed to preserve feudal power structures (whose representatives would have much preferred a prolongation of von Papen's cabinet of barons over Hitler's disconcertingly rebellious movement.)[15]

This is highly pertinent to the history of the November Revolution because, as Sebastian Haffner pointed out, though Nazism was an avowed enemy of the revolution, it was *also* the revolution's off-

[14] See Riccardo Bavaj, 'Pluralizing Democracy in Weimar Germany: Historiographical Perspectives and Transatlantic Vistas', in Paul Nolte (ed.), *Transatlantic Democracy in the Twentieth Century Transfer and Transformation* (Berlin, 2016), 53–73, at 70–3.

[15] Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (New York, 2005). For the extremely troubled relationship between the old elites and the Nazis during the seizure of power, see Hermann Beck, 'The Nazis and their Conservative Alliance Partner in 1933: The Seizure of Power in a New Light', *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 6/2 (2005), 213–41.

spring—a product of the age of democracy and 'mass society'.[16] The surest proof of this is that, in January 1933, Hitler did not, in fact, recall the Kaiser from his Dutch exile, which rather gives the lie to Niess's repeated insistence in his conclusion that Hitler's *raison d'être* was to 'roll back' everything that changed in November 1918. There was a much more complex relationship between the German Revolution and National Socialism than either Niess or Käppner allow for.[17]

Overall, then, these two books provide strikingly similar accounts of the German Revolution based on a tradition of writing which is underpinned by some debatable normative assumptions about the nature of both German history and democracy. To be sure, there are clear differences between the two books: Niess is more optimistic about the achievements of the revolution, emphasizing its positive legacy (the removal of the monarchy, the enfranchisement of women, a genuine parliamentary system) for the later Bundesrepublik, whereas Käppner is more negative, explicitly referring to the revolution as a 'failure' and 'German democracy' as its 'big loser' (p. 19). His version is a more tragic celebration of the courage and sacrifices of those who took to the streets or joined Councils in November and December 1918, but always with a view to the catastrophe that followed after 1933, whereas Niess's gaze is fixed on the period after 1945.

Nonetheless, whatever their differences, these fluently written and engaging books ultimately convey the same impression as the radical historians of the 1960s and 1970s—that whatever they achieved, and though they were not conscious traitors, the architects of Germany's forgotten revolution are still in need of forgiveness for their failures and limitations. As Käppner puts it, the Social Democrats 'gave their best, but their best was not good enough for this revolution, not by a long way' (p. 461). In fact, however, given everything we have learned about the German Revolution over the last half a century, it would be more reasonable to argue that the revolution actually 'reflected pretty accurately the reformist potential already present in Wilhelmine society and, beyond that, the more radical ambitions of the democratizing forces in that society'.[18] From the point of view of November 1918, there is nothing to forgive.

[16] Sebastian Haffner, *The Meaning of Hitler* (London, 1997), 11.
[17] This is the central argument of Fritzsche, *Germans into Nazis*.
[18] See Fischer, 'A Very German Revolution?', 31.

ALEX BURKHARDT was awarded his Ph.D. in June 2017 by the University of St Andrews. The resulting thesis, 'Democrats into Nazis: The Radicalisation of the *Bürgertum* in Hof-an-der-Saale, 1918–1924', examines the changing political culture of the middle classes in a single German town during the first half-decade of the Weimar Republic. He is currently preparing the manuscript for publication.

BOOK REVIEWS

PETER H. WILSON, *The Holy Roman Empire: A Thousand Years of Europe's History* (London: Allen Lane, 2016), lxvi + 942 pp. ISBN 978 1 846 14318 2. £35.00

This history of the Holy Roman Empire by the historian Peter H. Wilson, an Oxford professor since 2015, is a substantial work which addresses both a specialist academic readership and a wider interested public, as the cover makes clear. It depicts a sun breaking through the clouds, used as a symbol of the true faith and later to represent the spread of the Enlightenment. Above it, in a deliberate clash of styles, rides a medieval knight, carrying a yellow double-headed eagle standard, who could have sprung from a popular history website. Most consumers of such new media, however, would find themselves struggling with the breadth and complexity of this book, and the variety of perspectives that it offers.

There is no equivalent history of the Holy Roman Empire from around 800 in recent German historiography. The concept of a 'thousand year Reich' is so ideologically tainted that it is almost unimaginable that such a history could be written in Germany by one author. And any history of the Holy Roman Empire written in Germany would, rather, start with the Ottonian line. In addition, the division between the Middle Ages and the early modern period is still very clearly defined in German historiography. Thus we have numerous overviews of the history of the early modern empire—Peter Wilson has also written one (published in 1999), although it is by no means as extensive as that by his colleague, Joachim Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire (1493–1806)*.[1] But the difference between the medieval and the early modern empire is also strongly marked in Wilson's new work, reflected in the profound processes of change dating from around 1500 to which he frequently refers, and in the way in which he presents his subject.

Trans. Angela Davies, GHIL.

[1] Peter H. Wilson, *The Holy Roman Empire 1495–1806* (Basingstoke, 1999); Joachim Whaley, *Germany and the Holy Roman Empire (1493–1806)*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 2012).

Both works share a perspective on the history of the empire, but also on German historiography, which is to some degree that of an outsider. Both are very comprehensive. Whaley devotes almost 1,500 pages to the early modern empire, while Wilson writes almost 950 pages on the history of the thousand year Reich. For a reader interested in the early modern period it would be highly instructive to read them alongside each other. Whaley writes the history of an empire becoming ever more 'German'. Wilson, by contrast, takes a decidedly European approach in which the Holy Roman Empire as the 'Heart of Europe' (thus the more appropriate title of the US edition) is presented as a far-flung feudal association (*Herrschaftsverband*) whose longevity was the result of its flexibility, and without which the history of Europe would be unimaginable. While the structure of Whaley's volumes, which are divided into many chronological chapters and sub-chapters, makes them seem rather Germanic, Wilson's table of contents comprises just eighteen words. They could not—seemingly—be more different. In fact, however, Wilson's book, much like its subject matter, is characterized by a tendency towards particularization and fragmentation, which makes it possible to grasp the main outlines of the interpretation by skimming the text. A quick scan reinforces the impression that despite all conceptual and interpretative differences, the two works share a tendency: they convey a genuinely positive view of the Holy Roman Empire which clearly differs from the older, negative evaluations that still dominate the popular discourse.

Wilson's book is divided into four parts, each of which is subdivided into three chapters. Some of the terms used as headings are instantly comprehensible, such as 'Kingship', 'Territory', and 'Dynasty' in Part III; others less so, for example, 'Lands', 'Identities', and 'Nation' in Part II. The arrangement of the book reveals the shaping influence of the historian. To write a book with four parts, each with three chapters plus an introduction and a conclusion ('Afterlife'), is an aesthetic decision. Many people in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period would have associated this structure with Christian symbols with a claim to universal truth.

The book, however, does not follow a 'holistic' approach, which would make little sense, and is, in any case, unachievable. Rather, it has a clear orientation towards structural history with a genuinely enlightening aim. The author analyses; he does not narrate. His aim

is not to entertain, but to explain how the empire functioned (well, as a rule, on the basis of consensus-oriented political decision-making processes), why it existed for so long (because of its political and cultural diversity and the associated high potential for inclusion), and what impact it had on the history of Germany and Europe and assessments of them after it came to an end. Rightly, Wilson repeatedly warns against the unreflected use of modern concepts, such as 'federalism', in relation to the Old Reich (pp. 8–9). Given the extremely sophisticated level of argument and the stupendous knowledge of the literature displayed here, the discussion of the term *Imperium* (pp. 4–5) is a little disappointing. This could have been important because this term is also misused today for political agitation. It becomes clear, however, that a historiography which took the creation of nation-states as its criterion of historical progress misjudged the empire in evaluating it according to its degree (or lack) of state-formation, or refuting the idea that it was a state at all. The *Sonderweg* thesis is also disposed of in passing, likewise the idea that imperial rule fundamentally declined in the empire from the late Middle Ages.

In Part I ('Ideal'), which deals with the intellectual and symbolic foundations of the empire, the author emphasizes the significance of the medieval ideal of the rule of two swords, indicated by the symbolic act of Charlemagne's founding of the empire. Wilson also points to the conflicts which subsequently arose in the relationship between the papacy and the empire as a result of the role of the popes as dispensers of the imperial dignity. The imperial church system established by Charlemagne remained effective as something unique in European history. It was an essential prop of imperial rule and, given the current lack of separation between church and state in Germany, had long-term consequences. The idea of the emperor as the defender of Christianity was fundamentally challenged in the sixteenth century by the religious schism within the empire, although the Reformation and confessionalization are discussed mainly in terms of their political and constitutional consequences. The concept of sovereignty can only conditionally be applied to the first 700 years, which is why it is not introduced in its quality as 'fragmented and shared' (p. 171) until the end of Part I. In this context Wilson illustrates how the emperor, other European monarchs, and the empire as an 'international actor' (p. 171) had different patterns of behaviour

and forms of legitimizing foreign policy. These were based on a variety of concepts, as becomes clear if we look at important adversaries such as the French kings or the Ottoman sultans. Wilson particularly emphasizes the role of the Holy Roman Empire, neither expansive nor hegemonic, in securing the peace, although individual actors within the empire certainly pursued hegemonic and expansive interests.

Part II ('Belonging') looks at forms and ideas of belonging in a dominion that Wilson describes as a 'patchwork of lands and people' (p. 179) without a clear centre. He assumes that the empire's subjects—to the extent that these are visible beyond the elites—had overlapping, not contradictory, notions of the nation and fatherland. In the concept of 'multilayered identities' (p. 252), however, this reviewer misses religious identities, which played an important part in the early modern period, but also earlier, for example, among the Hussites, in combination with the idea of the nation. According to Wilson, the idea of 'teutsche Freiheit' (pp. 264–5), limited to the privileged estates, stabilized the empire, among other things because it was strengthened by imperial institutions whose institutionalization, in turn, it advanced. Wilson also regards the innovative potential of the empire as identity-creating based on the structural peculiarities of its constitution. This applies, for example, to its unique variety of periodical and non-periodical print media, and to the higher education sector with its many universities. Wilson sees the main reason for these developments as the high degree of territorial fragmentation and the forced processes of state-building at territorial level (pp. 276–7). Largely because the empire lacked any central representation in the form of architecture, Wilson attributes an important representative function to *Reichspublizistik*, which, apart from some well-known critical voices, was largely positive (p. 280).

In Part III ('Governance'), the longest because of the overall importance of the constitutional perspective, Wilson analyses the empire's important institutions of governance. The main thrust of his argument is revealed in the heading 'Governance not Government' (p. 295), which emphasizes the significance of consensual processes of negotiation between those with power in the empire. The emperor did not rule—if he tried, he generally failed—but relied on the consent of other bearers of power in the empire. Wilson emphasizes the transition from a dynastic succession to an imperial electoral constitution and the processes of internal territorialization and differentia-

tion of the feudal system as essential. He rightly sees the processes of reforming the empire around 1500 as crucial. These included the Hoftag gradually giving way to the Reichstag, and the concentration of power and political influence in the empire as reflected in the system of Curia and the distribution of votes in the Reichstag. The idea of a dualism of emperor and empire is rejected; rather, Wilson argues, the dynastically oriented policy of important imperial princes resulted in centrifugal developments. This caused a discrepancy, culminating in the eighteenth century, between the constitutional status of certain imperial Estates and their material power basis, which had clearly grown. A stabilizing effect on the imperial system is attributed to the Peace of Westphalia and the Immerwährender Reichstag as organs of governance. While the perception of the Peace of Westphalia as a 'catastrophe' in German history is pretty much out of date now, the pendulum can occasionally swing too far in the other direction.

The title of Part IV ('Society') implies a social history of the Holy Roman Empire, something that could hardly be written in the context of this book, as the author himself concedes. The social and economic life of the empire's subjects was determined primarily by local and increasingly territorial factors, but hardly imperial ones. Here it is striking that medieval developments are often presented in terms of emperors and their dynasties, which is by no means always convincing. Does it really make sense to speak of Carolingian or Staufer society? Wilson emphasizes the variety of local rights and privileges that existed for certain social groups, which he sees as a root of the imperial constitution. This, he says, was primarily directed towards the preservation of traditional structures. The increasing differentiation of society, accompanied by a variety of co-operative and hierarchical forms of organization and rule, is presented as characteristic of the period since the late Middle Ages. Beyond this, an important aspect is the development of urban societies. Processes of oligarchization have been observed in the emergent urban bourgeoisie since the late Middle Ages. Another important aspect is the development of early modern territorial states with central institutions which aimed to assert their rule by imposing norms of behaviour and sanctions. One focus, therefore, is on justice as a consensus-oriented instrument for regulating conflict, as the empire had many legal norms and authorities for the administration of justice. In line with recent research, the

author draws a (somewhat too) positive picture of imperial justice as an authority for keeping the peace, which also represented the interests of underprivileged actors, although with limited success.

The final chapter of Part IV looks at the end of the Holy Roman Empire, which is attributed both to the dynastic ambitions of its leading princes and to the empire's supposed inability to be reformed, although this has been questioned by recent research. Wilson also emphasizes a change in practices of political communication, which proved to be increasingly incompatible with the empire in its capacity as an association formed by ties of personal allegiance (*Personenverband*) and an instrument of rule designed to preserve long-standing privileges.

A conclusion looks at the afterlife of the empire in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It begins by relativizing the view that the empire disappeared without a trace, which, despite modern research, is still prevalent. After all, many social, political, and legal structures survived the end of the empire. Wilson suggests that it would have ended later without Napoleon, but still during the first half of the nineteenth century. Thereafter the author works through the positive or negative connotations of attempts to update our views of the empire; for example, there were the romanticized constructions of a brilliant empire and a supposedly harmonious medieval society dating from the nineteenth century, and the Third Reich's rather ambiguous way of dealing with this historical legacy, which was mostly mined for propaganda purposes only by individual actors such as Heinrich Himmler. Current references by politicians to the Holy Roman Empire as a model for European unity, or Charlemagne as its founder are rightly rejected. If the author assumed, however, that the Euroscepticism of Europeans is less than their dissatisfaction with their own governments, the referendum decision in favour of Brexit has taught him better.

The volume has a number of colour illustrations aimed at an anglophone market whose members are likely to be less familiar with the motifs, and a glossary that sensibly does not translate untranslatable German terms. In addition, there is a chronology of important events between the third century and 1806 which cannot necessarily be understood from reading the systematically organized main text. The maps are helpful, although looking at the map of Charlemagne's empire, one wonders whether this form of representation does not

obscure rather than illuminate the character of the empire as a loose *Personenverband* and a construct of historiography. But these are minor details. Wilson's *Holy Roman Empire* is an outstanding book: it displays the author's complete mastery of the huge amount of material and research literature presented; it is original in structure with its pithy central ideas; and it is courageous in its educational impetus, as the author does not hesitate to express his own political opinions. One of the book's main aims is to show why studying the Holy Roman Empire can offer illuminating perspectives on present-day politics for citizens of the EU (and for those who will soon no longer be). Anyone who is unable to understand this after reading Wilson's book is beyond help.

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JÖRG PELTZER, *1066: Der Kampf um Englands Krone* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2016), 434 pp. ISBN 978 3 406 69750 0. €24.95
DOMINIK WASSENHOVEN, *1066: Englands Eroberung durch die Normannen* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2016), 129 pp. ISBN 978 3 406 69844 6. €8.95 (paperback)

These two books, both from the stable of C. H. Beck and aimed at lay readers, were published to coincide with the 950th anniversary of the Battle of Hastings. Unsurprisingly, this anniversary precipitated commemorations in England too, including the long-awaited publication of David Bates's biography of William the Conqueror.[1] The annual Battle Conference, peripatetic since 2009, returned to Battle itself to mark the occasion. A major conference was also held in Oxford under the title 'Conquest: 1016, 1066'. This conference, the proceedings of which we await with anticipation, makes explicit the extent to which modern scholarship understands England's position on the eve of the Conquest as being firmly anchored within the North Sea world. Dominik Waßenhoven, whose scholarly publications include a book on Scandinavians in Europe in the high Middle Ages, and Jörg Peltzer, who declares that 'one cannot narrate the story of 1066 without 1016', are both well aware of this trend.[2] They embed their own narratives of the Conquest within the wider political context of north-western Europe and both present the Conquest and the events surrounding it with a nuance that is not always found in British popular histories of 1066.

Waßenhoven's book is part of the Beck 'Wissen' series (analogous to the Oxford 'Very Short Introductions') and although he manages to pack a great deal into a slender tome, inevitably a narrative of events dominates, with over two-thirds of the book devoted to this delineation. With a book over three times the length, Peltzer has the opportunity to be rather more expansive. His is an altogether more ambitious volume, and while the narrative of events is also prominent, Peltzer is able to broaden the study to draw a vivid picture of the experience of secular and ecclesiastical elites in the eleventh century. In this undertaking the influence of his recent work on aristo-

[1] David Bates, *William the Conqueror* (New Haven, 2016).
[2] Dominik Waßenhoven, *Skandinavier unterwegs in Europa (1000–1250): Mobilität und Kulturtransfer auf prosopographischer Grundlage* (Berlin, 2006).

cratic rank is evident.[3] While both aim at a lay readership these books appeal to different audiences; this is reflected in the inclusion of extensive footnotes and a comprehensive bibliography in Peltzer's volume. Waßenhoven, by contrast, provides only a short bibliography.

The starting point of both books is the medieval sources. Both authors begin their introductions by familiarizing the reader with relevant chronicles and texts, including the different versions of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, works of later chroniclers such as Orderic Vitalis, and celebratory texts, such as the *Gesta Guillelmi* of William the Conqueror's chaplain, William of Poitiers. Attention is also drawn to two famous and unique sources: the Domesday Book and the Bayeux Tapestry. The embroidery provides both cover images, almost mandatory on books about the Conquest, and a number of further illustrations. This initial focus on the diverse contemporary sources is indicative of the fact that throughout these books both authors are careful to present the competing descriptions and interpretations of the events as found in the medieval sources. The utilization of chronicles, annals, *vitae*, poetry, and the embroidery itself, to weave a nuanced account of events is a strength these books have in common. Their final chapters, on the consequences of the Conquest, also share much common ground. However, in the intervening chapters the volumes diverge. While the format of Waßenhoven's book requires the taking of a rather direct path, Peltzer provides a more scenic itinerary.

Waßenhoven opens his first chapter, on Anglo-Saxons, Norsemen, and Normans, with a description of the St Brice's Day massacre of 1002. He uses this attention-grabbing event as a stepping stone to take the reader both back in time, to the first Viking incursions of the late eighth century, and forwards in time to the reign of Cnut. In doing so he elegantly explains the complexity of interactions between

[3] In addition to his monograph on the counts palatine of the Rhine, two sets of conference proceedings have been published in English: Jörg Peltzer, *Der Rang der Pfalzgrafen bei Rhein: Die Gestaltung der politisch-sozialen Ordnung des Reichs im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert* (Ostfildern, 2013); Thorsten Huthwelker, Jorg̈ Peltzer, and Maximilian Wemhoner̈ (eds.), *Princely Rank in late Medieval Europe: Trodden Paths and Promising Avenues* (Ostfildern, 2011); Jörg Peltzer, *Rank and Order: The Formation of Aristocratic Elites in Western and Central Europe, 500–1500* (Ostfildern, 2015).

Anglo-Saxons and Norsemen, emphasizing that the Scandinavians did not merely raid and depart, but settled too, leading to the development of manifold Anglo-Scandinavian identities. He then briefly outlines Edward the Confessor's upbringing at the Norman court and the manoeuvrings of the Godwin family during his reign as king, before concluding the chapter with the Northumbrian rebellion, as a result of which Harold's brother Tostig was deposed as earl and exiled to Flanders. Scene set and leading actors introduced, Waßenhoven then moves headlong into the action scenes of 1066 itself.

Peltzer's book is, by comparison, a slow-burner, with seven chapters devoted to setting the scene before the battles commence. Like Waßenhoven, he opens by examining the connections between England and Scandinavia and the Anglo-Saxons and the Normans. Having situated the Anglo-Saxon kingdom in its North Sea context, Peltzer then describes the social and political structures within the realm. A discussion of Edward the Confessor's coronation at Easter 1043 illustrates both the international prestige of the English monarch and his pre-eminent position within his own kingdom. Peltzer devotes several pages to explaining the composition of secular and ecclesiastical elites in the Anglo-Saxon kingdom and concludes the chapter with a final section on fighting and military organization. In a memorable allusion to Tolkien, he tells the reader that Anglo-Saxon England was no peaceful hobbit Shire but instead a land characterized by weapons rather than ploughs.

Three biographical chapters provide information about the backgrounds of the main protagonists of 1066. In chapter three Harold Godwinson is presented as a slick political operator with military credentials confirmed by his successful Welsh campaigns. In the following chapter, Peltzer draws a vivid portrait of the life of William of Normandy, from his precarious minority to the duke's consolidation of his position as the most powerful figure in north-western France. A short chapter on Harold's excursion to Normandy offers a reading of events grounded firmly in German historiography and as such is of particular interest to an English audience. Peltzer views the events through the lens of symbolic communication, which enables a sophisticated reading of conflicting Norman and English reports of the affair. Further chapters follow covering relations within the Godwin family, particularly Harold and Tostig's tumultuous fraternal relationship, and describing William's preparations for the inva-

sion of England. In a final chapter before the three battles of 1066 take centre stage, Peltzer provides a fascinating narrative of the life of Harald Hardrada, whose exploits in Kiev and Constantinople extend the story well beyond the grey skies of the English Channel and the North Sea.

As historians of the Conquest well know, extracting an uncontested and straightforward narrative of the events of 1066, and particularly the Battle of Hastings, from the myriad competing and conflicting contemporary accounts is no easy task. Both Peltzer and Waßenhoven provide lucidly written accounts of the battles of Fulford Gate, Stamford Bridge, and Hastings, while gently leading the reader through the problems and possibilities of the various medieval witnesses to these events. Peltzer carefully constructs his account of the Battle of Stamford Bridge on the shifting sands of the medieval texts, from the cursory report of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, through the more decorative accounts of Anglo-Norman authors, to the later Scandinavian sagas, whose accounts most probably reflect the realities of warfare around 1200 rather than those of 1066 itself. In his account of the Battle of Hastings, Waßenhoven likewise informs the reader of divergent details found in different sources. In some instances, he goes beyond merely noting such disparities and considers the purpose of the inclusion of details within the texts themselves. This is the case, for example, where he discusses the unlikely assertion found in both William of Poitiers and the *Carmen de Hastingae Proelio* that William and Harold exchanged numerous messengers on the eve of the battle. Clear and comprehensive analysis of the medieval sources is a strength of both Peltzer's and Waßenhoven's narrative of the key events of 1066.

Both authors draw attention to William's coronation at Westminster on Christmas Day 1066. Peltzer devotes a short chapter to this event pointing to the importance of this multilingual inauguration, with its imperial pretentions, to consolidating William's new and elevated position as a ruler over multiple peoples. That the use of more than one language at the acclamation precipitated panic and violence, when the guards stationed outside Westminster Abbey mistook the shouts as signs of trouble, is indicative of the fact that William's coronation did not mark the conclusion of his conquest. Accordingly, resistance to the Norman monarch's rule is discussed by both Peltzer and Waßenhoven. Waßenhoven focuses on the

decade after the Conquest, in which uprisings broke out in the Welsh borders, Devon, Northumbria, and East Anglia, where resistance centred on Ely. In his discussion of the figure of Hereward, who escaped from Ely before William crushed the rebels gathered there, Waßenhoven once again brings the medieval sources into focus. His chapter on resistance to William's rule concludes with the 1076 rebellion 'of the three earls'. That the earls in question were an Englishman, an Anglo-Breton, and a Norman shows that this uprising was no simple rejection of Norman rule. Indeed, as Waßenhoven points out, there was never any co-ordinated national Anglo-Saxon resistance, but a series of regional uprisings that remained isolated thanks in no small part to William's swift actions. Peltzer's coverage continues until William's death in 1087, which enables him to pay increased attention to the continuing Danish threat and to that great monument of Norman rule: the Domesday Book. Waßenhoven briefly discusses this survey in a concise and well-constructed chapter entitled 'Legitimation and Interpretation', in which he also tackles Norman justifications of the Conquest.

The final chapters of both books are devoted to discussion of the consequences of the Conquest. The authors are in almost complete agreement on the main outcomes, as is reflected in the similarity of their chapter titles and subtitles. Both Peltzer and Waßenhoven consider the effect on land and people, particularly the almost complete eclipsing of the Anglo-Saxon elite, both lay and ecclesiastical, by newcomers from Normandy. They also outline the architectural and linguistic effects of the Conquest epitomized by the building of castles and cathedrals and the dominance of French as the language of the royal court. Waßenhoven points to the difference in the linguistic origins of words used to describe animals and their culinary manifestations (cow/beef; sheep/mutton; etc.) to draw a distinction between Anglo-Saxon producers and Norman consumers. This is an indication that for those below the level of the elite, life continued more or less as usual after the initial shocks of 1066 had subsided. Peltzer argues that the Conquest, for the most part, accelerated changes rather than initiating them—church reform, chivalry, and Romanesque architecture had already begun to cross the English Channel before 1066.

In his introduction Peltzer explains to his intended German lay audience that everyone who grows up in England grows up with

1066. He draws a comparison with German knowledge of the events of 1077, when Henry IV sought the forgiveness of Pope Gregory VII at Canossa. In German scholarship 'Canossa', while the dramatic meeting itself still excites attention, has come to stand for a whole process of change across the second half of the eleventh century.[4] Both Peltzer and Waßenhoven present the events of 1066 as momentous in themselves, but also as indicative of broader currents of change sweeping across the continent. Hastings and Canossa are thus not merely events of national interest, but of European importance. This reviewer grew up with 1066, a momentous year in 'Our Island Story', whose European significance was rarely alluded to.[5] These two books, written by historians who grew up outside this insular tradition, present 1066 as of intrinsic interest and relevance to their continental lay audience. While Waßenhoven provides a whistle-stop tour and Peltzer a more leisurely exploration, both authors deploy their knowledge of medieval and modern historiographies to guide the reader through the events, interpretations, and consequences of the Conquest with clarity and verve.

[4] See e.g. Stefan Weinfurter, 'Canossa als Chiffre: Von den Möglichkeiten historischen Deutens', in Wolfgang Hasberg and Hermann-Josef Scheidgen (eds.), *Canossa: Aspekte einer Wende* (Regensburg, 2012), 124–40.
[5] H. E. Marshall, *Our Island Story: A Child's History of England* (London, 1905).

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JOSEPH ISAAC LIFSHITZ, *Rabbi Meir of Rothenburg and the Foundation of Jewish Political Thought* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), viii + 266 pp. ISBN 978 1 107 00824 3. US$99.99. £64.99

Throughout the tenth century the Babylonian Talmud was introduced, step by step, into Europe. Soon several centres of rabbinical learning emerged at a number of places in Europe. With R. Shlomo ben Yitzhaq (better known as Rashi, *c.*1040–1105) the process of textualizing rabbinical knowledge reached its first climax and the Talmud became the standard written reference work for Jewish learning and jurisdiction. Soon copies of the Talmud with Rashi's comments were circulated. The next generation of scholars, the so-called Tosafists, added their own explanations to the Talmud and to Rashi's comments. One of the last authorities of these Tosafists was Rabbi Meir ben Baruch of Rothenburg (also known as MaHaRaM). R. Meir was born around or after 1220 in Worms, which at that time was still one of the centres of Jewish learning in Ashkenas (that is, the areas of German-speaking Judaism). In his writings he mentions twelve of his ancestors who were also rabbis. R. Meir studied Talmudic law and philosophy in the tradition of Moses Maimonides in Würzburg, Mainz, and Paris. It is quite likely that R. Meir was an eyewitness to the burning of the Talmud in Paris in 1242; at least he wrote a poem (*piyyut*) about this incident which, to the present day, forms part of the synagogical liturgy of the Tenth Av (the date on which the two Temples were destroyed in 587 BCE and 70 CE). In it he expressed grief for the loss and raised the question of God's will. After his return to Germany R. Meir founded his own school at Rothenburg ob der Tauber. He became one of the leading rabbinical authorities of his time and his comments on some Talmudic treatises became part of the Tosafists' comments on the Talmud. He also wrote more than 1,500 *halakhic responsa* (juridical decisions) which he or his students collected and transmitted as one collection. In 1286 R. Meir fled from Germany, but was arrested and imprisoned by the German king Rudolf I. On 27 April 1293 he died as the king's prisoner in Wasserburg am Inn. After payment of a hefty ransom in 1307, his bones were transferred to Mainz, where his tombstone is still visible today.

The author of the present study, which was submitted as a Ph.D. thesis at Tel Aviv University and originally written in Hebrew, is less

interested in biographical information than in R. Meir's teachings and the underlying theo-philosophical system, or, to be more precise, the political theory connected with R. Meir's legal theory (p. 19). He therefore proceeds in three steps. After introducing the historical context of R. Meir's teachings and identifying his authentic writings, he scrutinizes his political theory, which comprises two major aspects. First, he demonstrates that for R. Meir the Jewish congregation was a community of individual partnership, but also a sacred community (*qahal qaddosh*). Second, he expounds R. Meir's theological understanding of that community: every violation of a law regarding the community is also a violation of God's unity. Although the research hypothesis is not new and has been mentioned by several scholars of R. Meir, Lifshitz provides a careful and in-depth analysis. His book will be the standard reference for R. Meir's political philosophy.

This notwithstanding, some points of criticism have to be mentioned. First, in the Hebrew version Lifshitz used the vocalized text of the earlier editions as well as of the manuscripts. The English translation, however, does not quote the Hebrew texts. Confusingly for the reader, information concerning the Hebrew used in the original version is left in the translated text (pp. 22–3). Here and in similar cases more careful editing would have been desirable. This also applies to the transcription of Hebrew words and terms, for example, '*agadah*' (p. 23) vs. '*aggada*' (p. 24), '*agudah ehat*' (throughout the book) instead of the correct '*agguda ehad*', and so on. Second, not all titles mentioned in the footnotes appear in the bibliography (for example, p. 15 n. 34). The bibliography itself contains many mistakes. For example, the primary sources are divided into Hebrew and English sources, but the English sources are not, in fact, originally written in English, but English translations of Greek sources (p. 251). Among the Hebrew secondary literature, translations from the French and from the English are mentioned (for example, Graetz and Le Goff). Among the English secondary literature, German titles are listed (Germania Judaica; Güdemann; Zimmels), although there is a separate heading for German secondary sources. Throughout the text and the bibliography German place names in particular, but also book titles and names of authors are given incorrectly (for example, on p. 36 'Bohn' and 'Meersburg' instead of 'Bonn' and 'Merseburg'). Careful copy-editing by the publisher would have been indispensable.

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MATTHIAS POHLIG, *Marlboroughs Geheimnis: Strukturen und Funktionen der Informationsgewinnung im Spanischen Erbfolgekrieg*, Externa: Geschichte der Außenbeziehungen in neuen Perspektiven, 10 (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2016), 457 pp. ISBN 978 3 412 50550 9. €60.00 (hardcover)

A reader who only casually looks at this volume in a bookshop might well mistake both its importance and its subject. One could mistakenly assume that the issue at hand is an investigation into a well-worn topic in British political history. Both the opening and closing sections of Matthias Pohlig's book about 'Marlborough's Secret' refer to the events during the autumn of 1711 that culminated with the dismissal of John Churchill, first Duke of Marlborough, from his high military, diplomatic, political, and Court positions. At the time, Marlborough was one of the best-known individuals in the kingdom as the most senior military officer of the nation. He was simultaneously Captain-General of British forces on the Continent and allied forces in the southern Netherlands, the British ambassador to the Dutch Republic, as well as close personal adviser to Queen Anne and a member of her cabinet council. At that time a Parliamentary Commission was investigating charges that Marlborough had improperly used public funds intended for feeding allied troops and had diverted them for his personal use.

Some historians and biographers have studied this political controversy, but that is not the subject of this book. The relevance of the 1711 event is not the charges against Marlborough, but his defence when he explained that these funds were used to gather intelligence. Pohlig has examined the wider subject that Marlborough raised in his defence and has used it as the focal point to make insightful use of Marlborough's massive collection of Blenheim Papers at the British Library. He has also used complementary manuscript materials held at the National Archives in Kew and the British Postal Museum and Archive in London to document a new, innovative, scholarly understanding of the structure and function of information gathering during the War of the Spanish Succession. Even more, Pohlig brings to his study an in-depth understanding of military intelligence, information-gathering, and information exchange that makes this book of great significance to the general history and practice of such matters.

The book is a revised version of Pohlig's 2015 *Habilitationsschrift* at Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität in Münster. The author has divided the book into seven parts. The first defines the book's themes, concepts, and methodology. The second provides an excellent summary of the background to the war and to Marlborough as well as to British domestic and foreign politics and the machinery of British governmental organization and decision-making. This discussion is very firmly grounded in an impressively thorough grasp of the scholarly literature in several languages. The final sections of the book contain the list of archival sources and the extensive bibliography in part six as well as an index of personal names in part seven. The heart of the book lies in the 214 pages devoted to the structure of information-gathering in part three and the seventy pages in part four on the functions of information. A five-page general conclusion to the entire study follows in part five.

Pohlig's thorough study of the structure of information-gathering demonstrates the wide range of sources that Marlborough used. He begins his examination of this topic with a discussion of the general conditions, including the financing involved, the importance of reading and writing letters in this period, the international postal system and packet boats from England to the Continent, and the use of maps. With government organization, one sees Marlborough's relationship with the secretaries of state and other ambassadors, as well as the use of spies, interception of postal letters, and the deciphering efforts of the Post Office. He then turns to focus on two individuals, John Mackay and John Fonseca, who undertook espionage initiatives for the secretaries of state. Complementary to them were the reports from diplomats and military leaders. Marlborough also dealt in what Pohlig terms 'the grey zone' of formal diplomacy through his contacts with foreign officials such as Anthony Heinsius in the Dutch Republic, Colonel F. W. Grumbkow in Brandenburg-Prussia, and the Hanoverian secretary Jean de Robethon. A further, but subsidiary and often marginal, complement to these sources of information was the newspaper press and the handwritten news letters. While often having a distinct propaganda value, the print media spread information relatively quickly and provided notice of trends that could be confirmed later through private correspondence.

Turning to the subject of the functions of information, Pohlig first summarizes the theoretical aspects of the issue. He then goes on to

discuss the disputed role of information in the decision-making process, and also examines the function of information in patronage and representations of competence and legitimacy. Pohlig concludes that information-gathering was a central element in the political, diplomatic, and military practice of the early 1700s, showing that the War of the Spanish Succession was, in some respects, an information war. The emphasis on information-gathering led to the creation of specific types of organizations, infrastructures, and networks. At the same time, Marlborough's information system was not independent and private, but was closely tied to and interwoven with the machinery of the English government. The role of information in decision-making involved the minimization of uncertainty as well as contributing a means of supporting the competence of key leaders.

Pohlig concludes his important contribution to the scholarship on the subject with the observation that Marlborough associated the various methods of information-gathering with the different requirements of his formal and informal positions, regarding both the British government and the Grand Alliance. It involved an understanding of his character combined with an understanding of the governmental process in which he was involved. In these ways, Pohlig's book makes a highly significant scholarly contribution to understanding Marlborough and his times as well as providing an excellent case study of the structure and functions of information-gathering.

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MARK HEWITSON, *Absolute War: Violence and Mass Warfare in the German Lands, 1792–1820* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), xviii + 297 pp. ISBN 978 0 19 878745 7. £65.00
MARK HEWITSON, *The People's War: Histories of Violence in the German Lands, 1820–1888* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), xviii + 567 pp. ISBN 978 0 19 956426 2. £85.00

This review looks at the first two volumes of Mark Hewitson's projected trilogy, which deal with the violence of war in Germany from 1792 to 1888. The third volume has not yet been published, but has already been announced under the title *The Violence of War: Germany, 1888–1968*. The trilogy argues that wars and the violence associated with them played a crucial part in transforming German states and societies in modern history. Although peacetime clearly outweighed wartime in the period covered, warlike conflicts in the German lands in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries generally had a wide-ranging and long-term impact, and often represented a turning point for Europe as a whole. The attitudes of soldiers and civilians towards violence and war as shaped by the violence of war at that time, as well as contemporary concepts of war influenced by these attitudes, Hewitson argues, were directly connected to Germany's changing readiness to go to war and the policies this inspired.

The first volume, *Absolute War: Violence and Mass Warfare in the German Lands, 1792–1820*, investigates the impact of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars on the millions of people directly affected in the German lands. Hewitson covers both Prussia and Austria, as well as the middling and small German states. His analysis is based on a large variety of published sources (neither volume draws on archival documents), including letters, diaries, memoirs, official correspondence, press reports, pamphlets, essays, plays, and cartoons.

Hewitson uses the term 'absolute war' with reference to Clausewitz and in contrast to 'total war', which he reserves for the twentieth century. According to Hewitson, the term 'absolute war' indicates that conscription, which was practised by all German armies during the Napoleonic Wars, made these wars into 'people's wars'. Conscription, which resulted in 60 per cent of men in the period 1813

Trans. Angela Davies (GHIL).

to 1816 being called up—an even higher percentage than at the beginning of the First World War, when the figure was 55 per cent—he suggests, turned war into a mass experience. Added to this was that many German states were theatres of war, which meant that large numbers of civilians shared the experiences of violence, killing, and dying associated with war. Another factor in intensifying the war experience, Hewitson suggests, was that survival rates during the Napoleonic Wars were similar to those in the First World War, clearly lower than in the other nineteenth-century conflicts. The direct involvement of a majority of the population, he argues, means that the period was essentially shaped by war. Hewitson rejects the view put forward by Ute Planert, Leighton James, and others that the military conflicts of the Napoleonic era were essentially a continuation of early modern warfare and the state-building wars of the time as they had little national charge and the practices of war and their consequences had not fundamentally changed. On the contrary, Hewitson suggests that in the period from 1792 to 1815 the majority of German states underwent a military revolution.

In support of his views Hewitson outlines in detail the new forms of violence that developed during the conflicts. Warfare, he claims, had changed fundamentally since the eighteenth century as a result of conscription, quicker movement, and the greater weight given to battles. He also describes comprehensively how the war experiences of violence, killing, and dying, shared by many soldiers and civilians, influenced broader debates about military conflict, armies, and military policy during both wartime and peacetime. He argues that the Napoleonic Wars had changed the parameters within which the Germans saw military conflict, as the images of war in the public discourse responded to contemporary experiences of war. Hewitson points out that this insight is often dismissed in the research as self-evident, but suggests that its consequences have not yet been adequately considered. Fear, terror, and disgust were the formative emotions during war. Despite their instinctive rejection, however, the majority of people had got used to their circumstances. Their ongoing experience of war meant that people's hopes of a lasting peace had dwindled. As a result, 'people's war' was now seen as a dangerous but necessary means by which sovereign states conducted policy. Consequently, attempts to restructure armies into mass armies were widely accepted in almost all German states.

Hewitson divides the volume *Absolute War* into five chapters. Chapter one looks at developments from cabinet warfare to mass armies. He takes a critical look at the concepts of 'total war' and 'military revolution', and investigates the impact of the *levée en masse* and compulsory military service on the conduct of war in terms of tactics and strategy, and its ideological transformation. Chapter two analyses public opinion about the war and contemporary justifications. Hewitson cites philosophers, artists, and journalists, and considers to what extent the people at the time participated in the public discourse. Chapter three looks at the role played by violence in civilian life during the period under investigation. Here Hewitson highlights the significance of the internal pacification of the German states since the eighteenth century which, by the beginning of the nineteenth, had clearly altered attitudes to pain, injury, and death. Chapter four looks at the lifeworlds of soldiers during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, drawing primarily on soldiers' memoirs. Hewitson stresses the escalation of violence during the Napoleonic Wars, which was also reflected in ego documents. After 1805 in particular, soldiers' war reports were characterized less by heroism than by mourning for the suffering of war. The final, fifth chapter looks at the culture of remembering the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in the period of peace that followed up to 1820, at the ideas and patterns of interpretation that were predominant at the time, and at connections with the existing post-war order.

Hewitson's study of the impact of the Napoleonic Wars on the German states convincingly presents the experience of combat and conscription as the central parameter in the thinking of contemporaries. Drawing on many examples, he demonstrates that the threat of violence in war and the high human and financial costs of war between mass armies was of central importance in contemporary thought. The connection between warfare and patriotism and nationalism, by contrast, was only of secondary importance for contemporaries.

In his second volume, *The People's War: Histories of Violence in the German Lands, 1820–1888*, Hewitson presents a longitudinal study of how warfare was perceived in the German lands during the nineteenth century. His starting point is the argument that as the most violent military conflicts in European history up to that point, the Napoleonic Wars had a long-term impact on individuals and on

political developments that has so far been underestimated and hardly researched.

The most remarkable thing about the military conflicts and international crises since 1848, he suggests, is that conscripted soldiers and volunteers were always extremely willing to go to war, regardless of whether the conflict was seen as part of the national movement or not. Hewitson explains this by pointing out that the aims or origins of a conflict were not a decisive factor in shaping soldiers' ideas of a legitimate war. As a result, the role of nationalism in maintaining morale among the soldiers was limited. Rather, war and the army were generally accepted by wider society as integral, legitimate components of policy as conducted by sovereign states. Contemporaries accepted the necessity of conscription and 'people's wars' as a political means, and obediently performed their military service—a notion that had become established during the Napoleonic Wars, as Hewitson shows in the first volume of his trilogy. The social acceptance of war and the army in the nineteenth century represented a fundamental change by comparison with the eighteenth century, when resistance to military recruitment and mobilization had been much more common. This insight has not, as such, been discussed in the historiography so far.

Hewitson investigates German attitudes to the violence and suffering of war in the wake of the mass warfare of the years from 1792 to 1815, and the ideas and expectations of future military conflicts derived from them. He takes a long overview of the years from 1820 to 1888, which were marked by long periods of peace, and shorter phases of warfare. He justifies this by pointing out that only by looking at several generations is it possible to work out how the contemporary image of warfare changed as the result of the interplay and transformation of memory, emotions, experience, politics, institutions, events, and media.

In this case Hewitson's sources are contemporary press reports, war literature, paintings, lithographs, and photographs. Drawing on them, he asks how ministers, journalists, academics, artists, and ordinary people in the German states imagined war during the nineteenth century. Hewitson evaluates contemporary memoirs of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and relates them to press reports about wars that took place elsewhere in Europe and overseas, to political debates about compulsory military service and military

reforms in the German states, to experiences of revolution and counter-revolution, and to individuals' everyday experiences of violence and death. In addition, he analyses the reactions of soldiers and civilians to military conflicts in which their own states were involved during the period of investigation. It becomes clear that for most of the population of the German states, memories of past wars were also connected with expectations, hopes, and fears relating to the future.

Hewitson divides his volume *The People's War* into two sections, entitled 'The Romance of War, 1820–64' and 'The Horror of War, 1864–88'. Both sections contain five chapters. He explains the division into two by pointing out that the wars between 1805 and 1815 had a fundamentally different impact from those between 1864 and 1871. After 1815 a romantic, heroic narrative of the Napoleonic Wars established itself. It was spread by the authorities and the press, and also shaped ideas about a future war right up to the wars of unification. This did not have much to do with German nationalism, or the connection between warfare and nationalism, although research has so far concentrated on this connection. Rather, it can be attributed to the fact that in the years after 1815 the liberal myth of the 'wars of liberation' was widely accepted by the reading public. This myth overlaid painful memories of the war partly because after 1815, as a result of censorship, the testimonies of veterans which focused on the sufferings of war were less visible in public than the later testimonies of the veterans of the wars of unification. The late publication of most war memoirs also played a part here, as did the fact that many soldiers did not return from the war of 1812, which meant that they could not shape the discourse of memory.

The section entitled 'The Romance of War, 1820–64' starts with a chapter on contemporary narratives about military conflicts. The next chapter deals with daily life in the German armies in peacetime. In chapter three Hewitson analyses the significance of violence in the lives of civilians at the time, while in chapter four he investigates acts of violence and military operations connected with revolution and counter-revolution. In the final chapter of this section Hewitson examines war reports about the military conflicts during the period 1820 to 1864.

The second section, entitled 'The Horror of War, 1864–88', points to the fact that the romantic images of war dominant before 1864 had little in common with the brutal realities of war during the wars of

unification. In addition, while civilian life was increasingly pacified, military technologies of killing were becoming ever more destructive. This contrast reached a peak during the wars of unification. After they had experienced modern war in practice, many soldiers were clearly much less willing to continue fighting, or to go to war in future. While the press continued to disseminate heroic images of battles along with national justifications of the war, veterans left testimonies in which the horror of war was a leitmotiv and romantic notions of war were rejected. Unlike in the years after the Napoleonic Wars, in the decades after the Franco-German war of 1870–71, the reports and memoirs of veterans in which fear, disgust, sorrow, and grief were openly expressed as the formative experiences of war were juxtaposed with the narrative of a heroic national struggle, which dominated the press. This meant that in Imperial Germany, post-war discussions about the military conflicts were characterized by controversial interpretations and consisted of contradictory expectations of a future war. Thus until 1914, ambivalent ideas of war dominated Imperial Germany, uniting hopes of a national confrontation with scepticism about romantic notions of war.

Hewitson begins the second section with chapter six, in which he investigates political mobilization and public campaigns during the wars of unification. Chapter seven looks at contemporary justifications of military conflicts and wartime violence. Chapters eight and nine each deal with the experiences of war and violence in a specific armed conflict, the wars of 1866 and 1870–71 respectively. The final chapter turns to the culture of remembrance relating to the wars of unification, and the violence perpetrated at the time.

These two volumes are clearly structured, fluently written, and open up a broad panorama of contemporary German views on violence and warfare. In addition to historical analysis, Hewitson provides a treatise on classical and current theories of violence, critically reviewing the ideas of sociologists, philosophers, psychologists, and historians. Beyond this, the volumes provide a good survey of the older and more recent historiographical debates on the wars of liberation, the meaning of the concept of the citizen–soldier, and military and political continuities and discontinuities from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century. In all this, Hewitson reveals the potential inherent in approaching a general history of Germany via the history of wartime violence. As far as developing his argument goes,

Hewitson is less interested in regional differences than in presenting an overall picture which reveals large developments and major changes. This means that at times, regional differences in the German states do not get as much attention as they perhaps deserve. But Hewitson makes up for this by presenting clear opinions which any future studies on the subject will have to address.

An index of names, places, and subjects completes each volume. To conclude on a positive note, it should be said that instead of a simple bibliography, *The People's War* contains an annotated and thematic review of current literature, which provides easy access to the state of international research. We can look forward to the third volume in the trilogy.

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BRODIE A. ASHTON, *The Kingdom of Württemberg and the Making of Germany, 1815–1871* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), xviii + 221 pp. ISBN 978 1 350 00007 0. £85.00

This concise work draws attention to something that has long been overlooked in historical studies. After the Congress of Vienna, European politics were dominated by the major powers. Yet the smaller states in particular continued to stake their own claims to political agency in a variety of ways, while counting on public support to achieve their goals. This deserves a detailed analysis, and perhaps the most fruitful approach is by way of the middling and smaller-sized states of the German Confederation, who themselves were undeniably actors on the European stage.

A number of recent studies have emphasized the important role of this 'Third Germany' in creating the German nation-state in the nineteenth century. In focusing on the active nation-building policies of the German middling states, such studies swim against a teleological tide of thought which long held that only Prussia was capable of heeding the call to a nation-building destiny. They thus form the inspiration for this book about the Kingdom of Württemberg, which sets out to reveal the 'process of nation-building in action' (p. 2), or, more precisely, the role played by the Kingdom of Württemberg in the creation of a German nation-state, something that has been under-estimated in the past.

The book's succinct account of this process may perhaps be best understood as a prologue to future studies, rather than as setting a benchmark in terms of method or content. If we measure the work against its own aspirations—that is, to explore how new identities were created through an analysis focused on social movements or 'masses of the public' (p. 6), rather than on individuals—then it is bound to fall short. One immediately obvious problem lies in the author's selection of source materials, which consist primarily of accounts (including some from a British perspective) by leading statesmen and diplomats, while findings from the highly diverse national movements are almost entirely ignored. Primary sources include government records from Berlin, Darmstadt, Karlsruhe, London, and, especially, Stuttgart; over thirty contemporary news-

Trans. Emily Richards (GHIL).

papers from various states; a variety of contemporary speeches, letters, and diaries; and, finally, all manner of relevant printed materials. As a result, it is impossible to carry out a systematic interrogation of the historical material within this study's narrow confines. Quotations from the sources are used primarily to illustrate a collection of insights gained from secondary literature, which themselves form the basic premise for the author's argument.

The book is structured chronologically. Beginning at the end of the eighteenth century, it summarizes some of the well-known ideas about nationhood circulating towards the end of the ancien régime, for example, those explored by Moser, Schiller, or Goethe. However, it ignores another star of Weimar whose thoughts on this topic were probably even more influential—Herder, with whom originated the powerful concept of a *Kulturnation*, a nation defined by its culture. From this starting point, the book's focus quickly turns to Napoleonic Württemberg and the successful defence of its sovereignty orchestrated by Friedrich II/I as duke, elector, and finally king of an immensely strengthened middling state, a success attributed by the author to Friedrich's artistry in balancing national and state interests (p. 32).

The next chapter, on the consolidation of the Württemberg state after Napoleon's defeat, is devoted to the Congress of Vienna (along with the cautionary tale of Saxony's near-total destruction) and the contemporaneous constitutional battles of 1815 to 1819. The south German regionalism of the time is seen by the author as arising out of attempts at economic modernization, and he views the creation of the South German Customs Union (*Süddeutscher Zollverein*) as a significant milestone towards the Third Germany. Württemberg's provocative reactions to Metternich's policies, such as its reluctant implementation of the Carlsbad Decrees or its appointment of arch-liberal Wangenheim as its representative at the Frankfurt National Assembly, reflected its political ambitions within the German Confederation. Such enterprises sometimes failed, but had long-term effects, even beyond Württemberg, which here is intended to represent a 'microcosm for these national ideas' (p. 48).

The nation-building project, something originally confined to an elite, slowly began to gain considerable popularity, for example, in the form of the Schiller Festivals held on the anniversary of the poet's death. But this appears only as a marginal point at the beginning of

the next chapter, which sketches the various attempts, from the Congress of Vienna to the 1848 revolution, to create a German nation. Württemberg experienced opposition, for example from List, Pfizer, Mohl, and Römer; but Württemberg also practised opposition, for example to the Carlsbad Decrees (p. 57). On the basis of these examples, the author argues that a greater German solution was by no means the only option. Even Metternich attempted at one point to take on the role of advocate for the middling states, if only in order to avert the creation of a unified German nation at the last minute. When such plans were made, it was always with an eye to international relations; fear of renewed conflict with France was particularly intense in the early 1830s and again during the 1840s. Austria was so slow to react to this situation that it was inevitable that Württemberg's gaze should instead fall upon Berlin; not because of any natural political affinity, but out of calculated political necessity. After all, Württemberg's main objective was an agreement with the other German middling states, whose military resources were limited.

This is also considered in the section of the book dealing with the revolutionary years of 1848/49, which starts by looking at why Württemberg itself never experienced any radical uprising. The reason, according to the author, was that Wilhelm I was careful to instil in his people his own anxiety about the dangers that came from abroad, rather than within, insisting that a national political solution was needed that had to include Prussia and Austria (p. 76). Any opposition to this on the home front was nipped in the bud by the appointment of Friedrich Römer, while the king himself was active as one of the pre-eminent supporters of unification. Curiously, the author pays no particular attention to the fact that Württemberg was the first state to recognize the Frankfurt Constitution, all the more so since Stuttgart—albeit only for a short time—provided a home for the Paulskirche rump parliament, where those convicted of high treason in other German Confederation states were able to continue their nation-building efforts. Considering the implications of this, one can imagine that if things had turned out differently, Wilhelm I might have gone down in history as midwife to the nation.

The next section, examining the upheavals of the 1850s, shows how nation-building continued to play a prominent part in Württemberg politics. It begins with the failure of the Erfurt Union, a plan for unification initiated by Prussia, but sadly fails to enlighten the

reader as to Wilhelm I's attitude to this project for north German regional unification in opposition to the German Confederation (p. 87). This is a pity, as even during the Hesse-Kassel crisis the middling state of Württemberg continued to vaunt itself as the protector of middling state interests (p. 89) and, thanks to its constitution, as the model for a liberal and constitutional Third Germany. In this respect, it was not dissimilar to Bavaria, which liked to see itself as the most progressive state in this regard (and it would have been helpful if the book had included a short discussion of the rivalry between Bavaria and Württemberg; this could have shed light on their competing claims to be the leading state when it came to German unification). Württemberg now even began to present itself as a player on the world stage, bringing its own banner to the presentation of the German Customs Union (*Zollverein*) at the London World Fair in 1851 to lend visibility to its international ambitions (pp. 93–4). Furthermore, the author argues, Wilhelm I himself, aware of his own increasing age, and conscious of the fact that time was moving on—and with only a low opinion of his son, the heir to the throne—decided to make one last stand as a pioneer of national unification. But his hopes of using the Italian war of unification and, specifically, French opposition to Austria, to this end, were, of course, in vain; the idea of a Third Germany collapsed once again in 1859 (p. 101).

Nonetheless, it was precisely the middling states that took further steps along the path to German nationhood in the years before 1866, at the same time as industrialization and mechanization were now profiting from the *Zollverein*. Yet during this period it also became apparent that economic modernization had its limitations, as did the ability of the state to defend itself. These concerns, among others, led to the Wurzburg Conferences organized by the middling states. However, these were initiated neither by Württemberg nor by Bavaria, but by Saxony—another rival for the title of most important middling power—in the person of its foreign minister Friedrich von Beust. Plans to reform the confederal army became plans to reform the confederation itself, but without any tangible outcome; any potential reforms were blocked by the deadlock caused by Saxony's, Bavaria's and Württemberg's competing claims to leadership (p. 113).

Other groups and associations that played a significant early role in the creation of the German idea, such as the League of Singers, itself active in Württemberg, have thus far gone without mention.

But the book does now turn its attention to the German National Association. This movement had successes, for example, in Esslingen, and it was tolerated, perhaps even regarded with sympathy, by the government (p. 116), in spite of its failure to abide by the Carlsbad Decrees. The discussion of the Union sets the stage for two new protagonists—Bismarck, the Prussian minister president, and Karl von Varnbüler, Württemberg's foreign minister who, despite his initial opposition to Bismarck's national policies, turned out to be just as flexible, if not as cunning, a politician as Bismarck himself. Varnbüler had not yet given up hope of the Third Germany, believing that this could only be achieved by reining in Prussia's hegemonic ambitions and supporting Austria in the Schleswig-Holstein crisis. This was the reason for the alliance formed in the German Civil War of 1866, which, however, ended in unexpected defeat (p. 124).

The next section of the book describes the forming of the German nation state between 1866 and 1871, showing that Württemberg's ultimately pro-Austrian policy was the result of sophisticated calculation (p. 127). The author sees evidence for this in Württemberg's 'ineffectual and lethargic' (p. 128) participation in the Prussian–German War, and its negotiations to create a south German alliance in (mistaken) anticipation of a military stalemate between Prussia and Austria (p. 136). But the creation of the North German Confederation meant that the Third Germany was now reduced to a south German rump, with leadership now falling to Bavaria. Eventually Württemberg, too, gave in to the irresistible pull of unification—which need not necessarily be ascribed to any 'backwardness' of the south (p. 139)—partly also because of its vulnerability in relation to France. As a result, it moved closer towards Prussia, not least by entering into a 'Schutz und Trutz' (Protection and Defence) alliance with Prussia in 1866.

The last chapter offers a brief perspective on Württemberg's continued existence after unification, both as a state in Imperial Germany with numerous special prerogatives, and as an idea. Many Württembergers celebrated themselves as victors rather than losers in the unification process (p. 151), even though one may justifiably doubt whether they were really prepared to replace their Württemberg identity with a German one. Perhaps too much attention is paid here to the scandal surrounding King Karl I's lover, Charles Woodcock; for the purposes of better understanding Württ-

temberg's pride in its identity, it might have been more instructive to consider how its people viewed themselves (King Wilhelm II, known for walking his dogs himself, was a far more popular figure in Württemberg in the end than his namesake, the German Emperor).

The conclusion reiterates the warning not to succumb to teleology, and emphasizes the significance of Württemberg in the creation of a German nation-state. Here, Württemberg appears more as an agent of change than as its victim. According to the author, King Wilhelm I in particular was keen to make a virtue out of necessity by attempting to overcome class 'inertia' through close co-operation with Württemberg's neighbouring German states (p. 157; although this is a verdict that itself appears all too teleological). Sometimes he was successful, especially if we consider the customs unions; sometimes less so, if we think of the failure of a Third German confederation. The conclusion argues further that the failure of the 1848 revolution may have put an end to the liberal nature of the German unification project, but not to the project itself; Württemberg continued to be involved in numerous efforts to unite the middling states, in some ways even providing intellectual inspiration. In brief, Württemberg's intention was to be actively engaged in the formation of Germany and, like other south German states, it probably played a 'far more active role in the unification of Germany than has previously been allowed' (p. 160).

This is by no means a new insight. But it is an appropriate summary of a succinct book, whose valuable contribution to the transfer of knowledge across different historiographies should be acknowledged. There are no comparable studies in English on the subject of Württemberg, nor of any other middling states. The author's work of translation—in the broadest sense—may reveal some minor errors, but this has no direct effect on his argument. But it does show that not enough care has been taken. Siebenpfeiffer's *Der Bote aus dem Westen* is listed both in the end notes (p. 172, n. 63) and the bibliography (p. 192) as *Die Bote aus Westen*; the jacket shows a photograph of a steam locomotive in front of Rosenstein Castle with date given as '*c.*1840' although the railway line in question was not opened until 1845, as stated correctly in the text on p. 68; on the same page, however, the song cited as 'Auf der Schwab'shen Eisbahne' (*sic*!) is also mistakenly dated to this period, an absolute impossibility.

Gaps in the bibliography are problematic for researchers. Those with some knowledge of the subject will wonder why Dieter Lange-

wiesche's important studies have not been included; the same goes for the works of Wolfram Siemann (for example, *Vom Staatenbund zum Nationalstaat. Deutschland 1806–1871*) or Harm-Hinrich Brandt (*Deutsche Geschichte 1850–1870*). More recent specialist studies (such as Jonas Flöter's *Beust und die Reform des Deutschen Bundes 1850–1866* or the collection of essays *Der Wiener Frieden 1864*, edited by Oliver Auge, Ulrich Lappenküper, and Ulf Morgenstern) are missing. Even the *Handbuch der baden-württembergischen Geschichte* seems irrelevant for the purpose of his study as far as the author is concerned. As a result, the book is unlikely to make an impact on German research. Whether it can provide any new impetus for future English-language research also seems doubtful. There is, however, good reason to be grateful to the author of this book for at least giving the Third Germany the prominence it deserves.

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STIG FÖRSTER (ed.), *Vor dem Sprung ins Dunkle: Die militärische Debatte über den Krieg der Zukunft 1880–1914*, Krieg in der Geschichte, 92 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016), 406 pp. ISBN 978 3 506 78266 3. €54.00

This comparative study, which considers the military discourse on the war of the future in the period from 1880 to 1914, clearly draws its inspiration from an earlier volume, also edited by Stig Förster, which examined the debate over future war in the inter-war period.[1] Those who profited from the great breadth of coverage of the latter volume, which examined the debate on future war in no fewer than seven countries (Italy, France, Britain, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States), may be slightly disappointed with the scope of this long-awaited follow-up study. As the editor explains, the original intention was to consider five countries (Britain, Germany, France, Russia, and Austria-Hungary), but the chapters on Russia and Austria-Hungary were not completed (pp. 12–13). Thus, this book considers only Germany, France, and Britain, albeit in longer chapters than in the precursor volume.

The basic premise of this study is essentially the same, namely, that it is profitable to consider the published discussion about the war of the future in military periodicals, since these were an important part of a wider debate. While this editorial concept worked extremely well the first time round, mainly because of the opportunity to compare seven different national discourse cultures via specialist military journals, in this case the perspective is somewhat narrower. Still, with this reservation in mind, this book does nonetheless repay reading. The three lengthy studies come quite close to being stand-alone, individual monographs: Markus Pöhlmann examines German military journals;[2] Adrian E. Wettstein considers French

[1] Stig Förster (ed.), *An der Schwelle zum Totalen Krieg: Die militärische Debatte über den Krieg der Zukunft 1919–1939* (Paderborn, 2002). This volume also drew on the momentum generated by a series of conferences on the theme of 'total war'.

[2] Markus Pöhlmann, 'Das unentdeckte Land: Kriegsbild und Zukunftskrieg in deutschen Militärzeitschriften', in Förster (ed.), *Vor dem Sprung ins Dunkle: Die militärische Debatte über den Krieg der Zukunft 1880–1914* (Paderborn, 2016), 21–131.

journals;[3] while Andreas Rose concludes with his analysis of British military journals.[4]

As this study considers the military debate about the war of the future in north-western Europe rather than in the broader international framework which was pursued in the 2002 volume, one might have expected the source material to extend beyond simply the journals consulted. Pöhlmann and Wettstein generally keep their gaze directed towards the journals as their principal source, although Pöhlmann includes the civilian journal *Deutsche Revue* in his analysis, while Rose makes rather more use of British quarterlies. This difference raises an interesting question as to the value of considering military journals as the main source for each study. Pöhlmann makes the most convincing case for the usefulness of examining the development of military thought, as revealed in the journals, over a period of several decades. The founding of several new military periodicals before 1914 marks, itself, the emergence of a process of professionalization. He argues, further, that the focus in the research literature on popular and more sensational authors has distorted some of the claims made about military writing in the pre-war period. This is an important point, and one which demonstrates the value of the book as a whole. Indeed, German military historians appear to have shown more interest than their British and French counterparts in military journals as a source to be analysed in its own right.[5] That British military historians appear less interested in the *Quellengattung* of military journals is surprising, given the strong interest among literature specialists in both Britain and the United States in nineteenth-century periodicals.[6]

[3] Adrian E. Wettstein, 'Die Grenzen militärischer Prognostik: Die Diskussion um den Krieg der Zukunft in den französischen Militärzeitschriften', ibid. 133–243.

[4] Andreas Rose, ' "Readiness or Ruin": Der "Große Krieg" in den britischen Militärzeitschriften (1880–1914)', ibid. 245–389.

[5] See e.g. Helmut Schnitter, *Militärwesen und Militärpublizistik: Die militärische Zeitschriftenpublizistik in der Geschichte des bürgerlichen Militärwesens Deutschland* (Berlin, 1967); Markus Pöhlmann (ed.), *Deutsche Militärfachzeitschriften im 20. Jahrhundert* (Potsdam, 2012); and id., 'Anonyme und pseudonyme Militärliteratur im deutschsprachigen Raum, 1948–2000', *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift*, 69/1 (2010), 80–95.

[6] See here the seminal article by Margaret Beetham, 'Towards a Theory of the Periodical as a Publishing Genre', in Laurel Brake, Aled Jones, and Lionel

If one takes all three studies together, there are some significant differences in approach, however, which means that it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions. In fact, in terms of methodology, it is never really explained why the project begins in the year 1880 rather than 1871. It is even noted by Wettstein that the journal *Revue Militaire des Armées Etrangères* was founded in 1871 as a direct answer to the French defeat (p. 143), highlighting the apparently random choice of year in which the analysis begins. While the decade following the Franco-Prussian War was without doubt dominated by assessments of that war rather than reflections on the future, a clearer explanation either by each author, or in the editor's introduction, would have helped the reader in understanding the reason for the choice of 1880 rather than 1871. Indeed, because of the absence of the two other planned chapters, the reader is left in the dark as to whether the volume is intended to communicate any broader conclusions, or whether it has simply to be accepted as offering three stand-alone studies.

Nonetheless, these reservations aside, the book does succeed in raising an important question, namely, to what extent these three nations provide an indication of a definite trend in Western Europe towards increasing military professionalization. In fact, this can be seen in each of the three countries, with each one displaying a developmental upward curve, occurring in more or less the same time period. If this is, indeed, the case, it would imply that multiple factors contributed to this, rather than one side taking the lead, and so providing a stimulus to the other two nations. It is certainly true, as each chapter demonstrates, that two wars loomed large in each of the national military debates before 1914: the Boer War (1899–1902) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). Moreover, other subject matter—such as infantry tactics, new technology, and the future role of cavalry—can be seen to have received almost equal attention in the military journals of Germany, France, and Britain. Likewise, each national debate as reflected in the pages of the military journals took note of the debates in the other two nations; and, as Wettstein's chapter reveals, two French journals were devoted to examining develop-

Madden (eds.), *Investigating Victorian Journalism* (New York, 1990), 19–32. One example of research into nineteenth-century periodicals is James Mussell, *Science, Time and Space in the Late Nineteenth-Century Periodical Press* (Aldershot, 2007), while the full extent of research in this field can be seen in the journal, *Victorian Periodicals Review*.

ments in foreign armies. As such, then, the volume does demonstrate that a form of international epistemic community existed before 1914 among Europe's three most advanced military powers. It would, of course, have been interesting to have discovered whether this international debate included other nations' armed forces.

Another important observation to be distilled from all three contributions, although the point is argued most cogently by Pöhlmann, is that between 1880 and July 1914 naval and military writers should be located historically in a multi-faceted and complex inter-relationship with the print media, thereby rendering redundant the 'vulgar militarism theory, which restricts itself to manipulative media strategies', as Pöhlmann puts it (p. 28). Still, while each author does make clear the rich contours of the military journals published at the time, there are two aspects of the publication activities of officers which arguably could have been better woven into the respective analyses. First, military debates did not take place solely within the pages of military journals since, frequently, important controversies resulted from book publications. Second, military authors did not restrict themselves simply to military journals: quarterly journals and other highbrow periodical literature often contained articles on military subject matter, which was just as likely to have been read as contributions to the military journals. While Rose is more willing than the other two contributors to engage with these other publications (although, as already mentioned, Pöhlmann does include the civilian *Deutsche Revue* in his chapter), this may be a reflection of their broader function within the intellectual life of Britain in the three and a half decades under consideration. While reviews of specific books in the military journals do attract the attention of each author, there could perhaps have been more scope in the volume as a whole to consider the other literary locations in which the military debates were pursued. Or, even more, for some collaboration between the three authors, perhaps in a conclusion, to offer interpretations as to possible differences between each of the national discourses.

The authors could be forgiven, of course, for countering that the broader societal debate has already been assessed for Britain, France, Germany, and the United States in Jörn Leonhard's imposing study, *Bellizismus und Nation*, published a decade ago.[7] It would have been

[7] Jörn Leonhard, *Bellizismus und Nation: Kriegsdeutung und Nationalbestimmung in Europa und den Vereinigten Staaten 1750–1914* (Munich, 2008).

possible, though, to have related each of the national debates more closely to some of the major military theoretical achievements in each country. Pöhlmann in his study does mention some of the most important writers in Germany in setting the broader context for the debates of the time. Among the authors were Colmar von der Goltz, Friedrich von Bernhardi, and Alfred Graf von Schlieffen, whose writing is arguably essential for any understanding of the military 'discourse landscape' of the time. While the publications of some of the most important British theorists—names such as G. F. R. Henderson, Julian Corbett, Spenser Wilkinson, and Charles Callwell spring to mind—are referred to at least obliquely in Rose's chapter, since their books were reviewed and their ideas debated in the pages of the journals, their appearance in the analysis is rather incidental as the result of his clear focus on the journals.

In sum, these chapters taken together open up new possibilities for research and historical debate rather than providing any final verdicts on the military debates before the outbreak of the First World War. One of the issues which still requires investigation, and is not really addressed in this work, is whether or not British military theorists led the way in Europe by 1914. The extent of major theoretical works by British authors cannot be denied, with the publication of important works by Henderson, Corbett, Wilkinson, Callwell, and others before the outbreak of war. When it came to the most significant German theorists—von der Goltz, von Bernhardi, Schlieffen—they built their thinking on the strong traditions of the Prussian General Staff. While these intellectual traditions are reflected in many of the articles published in German military journals, the really interesting question is whether British military writing was influenced more by the largely civilian character of the British amateur military tradition, or whether by 1914 it had been decisively shaped by either German or French military culture. But to answer this question, each of the three authors would have needed to have cross-referenced their co-authors' work more closely and to have widened their source base to include more of the civilian literature, the quarterlies, and other non-military periodicals.

This final observation should not be taken, however, as a fundamental criticism of either the point of departure of the book, or the quality of each of the three chapters, since they all contain useful details and trenchant observations. What this volume reflects is a sig-

nificant segment of the broad picture of the military debates of the three decades or so before the outbreak of the Great War. But it remains for others to expose those dimensions which still lie in the dark to the light of historical investigation.

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MAREN JUNG-DIESTELMEIER, *'Das verkehrte England': Visuelle Stereotype auf Postkarten und deutsche Selbstbilder 1899–1918*, Studien zu Ressentiments in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 1, 2 vols. (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2017), 463 + 87 pp. ISBN 978 3 8353 3091 7. €49.90

Das verkehrte England is the first book by Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung and Museum Pankow scholar, Maren Jung-Diestelmeier. Keeping the author's professional affiliations in mind is important, because a thorough and ongoing appreciation of the interplay between visual culture and material culture (epitomized by these institutions) is key to the success of her fascinating book.

The picture postcard—a still-new medium in the period under investigation (1899 to 1918)—is yet another of those neglected sources of Anglo-German relations that have seen such fruitful investigation in recent years.[1] And it is a source that (as Jung-Diestelmeier makes clear) is ignored at its peril. For, even more so than the political cartoons and caricatures of *Kladderadatsch*, *Lustige Blätter*, or *Simplicissimus*, picture postcards standardized and disseminated, to an enormous extent, the stereotypical image of Britain in Germany (and beyond) in a critical phase of Anglo-German relations. German printers not only commissioned and produced anti-British images for a mass market, but the individuals comprising that market responded by purchasing and utilizing such postcards in order to communicate with one another on a regular basis. In Germany (as in Britain and France, and elsewhere), postcards also became collectors' items, and scrapbooks and folios were soon to be found in many middle-class drawing-rooms and libraries across Europe and beyond. Produced in a number of regional contexts (Jung-Diestelmeier's sample includes cards published in Leipzig, Munich, Saarbrücken, Dresden, Strasbourg, and Tübingen, as well as Berlin), these artefacts saw a convergence of imagery for what was fast becoming a national market, rather than a city- or *Land*-focused one. Such postcards should there-

[1] E.g. fine art: Matthew C. Potter, *The Inspirational Genius of Germany: British Art and Germanism 1850–1939* (Manchester, 2012); cartography, travel literature, literary and popular fiction, and political cartoons: Richard Scully, *British Images of Germany: Admiration, Antagonism & Ambivalence, 1860–1914* (Basingstoke, 2012); and other cultural forms: Dominik Geppert and Robert Gerwarth (eds.), *Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain: Essays on Cultural Affinity* (Oxford, 2008).

fore be considered as amongst the most remarkable ways that nationalism was harnessed by print capitalism (in Benedict Anderson's notable formulation) and therefore an effective means of perpetuating and building 'banal nationalism' (in Michael Billig's famous phrase) as the German nation moved towards its first great moment of crisis.[2] As the author shows, this began in peacetime, in a period of growing ambivalence, but sharpened and became a major underpinning of the German auto-image (as well as the image of the enemy) during the Great War of 1914 to 1918.

Following on from a detailed theoretical and methodological section, Jung-Diestelmeier structures the main body of the book into three sections of analysis, grouped around distinct periods of development of German images of Britain. Throughout, one finds good holistic analysis both of the content of the imagery (for example, the importance of John Bull and the British lion, as well as Queen Victoria and King Edward VII, as representative figures), as well as the mass media context for such images (including background information on the different publishing houses, the key cartoonists involved, and the development of the picture postcard as a cultural phenomenon as well as an inexpensive and practical means of mass communication).

The book's first section (1899–1905) shows how the image of Britain was central to German constructions of alterity as well as identity. Key moments—of collaboration over the Boxer Rebellion in China (1900); and tension over the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902)—combined with matters in which the two empires were not directly involved (the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–5), saw the production and dissemination of imagery that used Britain as a model for world power, but also provided Germany with a contrast. The second section (1904–14) shows how there was a decline in specifically anti-British imagery in postcards, but that this was continued in the dedicated satirical press to a great degree; and, of course, the cartoons from the satirical press were often, themselves, reproduced as postcards. Jung-Diestelmeier notes how a profusion of suffragist-themed postcards indicates the persistence of an indirect kind of *Schadenfreude*.

The rationale behind the third period of development is self-evident (1914–18): this was the time when laughing at the enemy; demonizing him as an underhanded and dishonourable foe; and sharing

[2] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London, 1995).

his misfortunes (a large number of postcards depicted captured British POWs) was part of a national war effort that relied on an effective postal system between front line and home front. The imagery explored therein is both familiar and startlingly new. Triumphant images of Zeppelins evading the searchlights of London and effective uses of photography from the front have probably never before seen the light of day (in a scholarly sense).

Jung-Diestelmeier's source base is extremely impressive. Archives from across Germany (public and private) have been mined to reveal as much as possible. The secondary literature is multilingual (with almost all of the major works in English standing alongside the considerable literature available in German). It is particularly gratifying to see reference being made to one of the earliest serious engagements with postcards as a historical source: that by Ian McDonald. His 1990 book, *The Boer War in Postcards*,[3] did not have the immediate impact on scholarship that it deserved.

The publishers, Wallstein, have produced the work in two separate volumes (*Bildband* and *Textband*), to allow readers to peruse the source material more readily while making their way through the analysis proper. In this they follow some good, established precedents,[4] and avoid the problems faced by others in requiring the reader constantly to flip backwards and forwards between visual material and analysis.[5] Although the postcards are reproduced in colour in the *Bildband* (and plenty of bibliographical material is provided throughout), the size of the reproductions is rather frustratingly small. One wonders whether reproducing the images at as close to their original size as possible might have improved the appreciation of these as documents.

Das verkehrte England is a valuable addition to the literature on this key period of Anglo-German relations, as well as, of course, to the literature on the development of German national identity. Well written and clearly structured, it is certainly a work that achieves its stated goals, and provides a model for other studies of its kind. It is also

[3] Ian McDonald, *The Boer War in Postcards* (Stroud, 1990). The same is true for id., *Vindication! A Postcard History of the Women's Movement* (London, 1989).

[4] W. A. Coupe, *German Political Satires from the Reformation to the Second World War*, 6 vols. (White Plains, NY, 1985–93).

[5] E.g. Jost Rebentisch, *Die vielen Gesichter des Kaisers: Wilhelm II. in der deutschen und britischen Karikatur* (Berlin, 2000).

the first volume in a new series, Studien zu Ressentiments in Geschichte und Gegenwart (produced by Jung-Diestelmeier's key affiliate institution, the Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung). If the standard of this, first study is anything to go by, then scholars will have much to look forward to from the series.

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PIERPAOLO BARBIERI, *Hitler's Shadow Empire: Nazi Economics and the Spanish Civil War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015), 368 pp. ISBN 978 0 674 72885 1. $US29.95. £22.95

Pierpaolo Barbieri, executive director of Niall Ferguson's Greenmantle advisory firm, has not written 'a book about Spain', as he himself states in the introduction. 'Rather it is a story of political economy and war in the tumultuous 1930s' (p. 2). In *Hitler's Shadow Empire* he traces the creation of an informal Nazi empire back to Germany's intervention in the Spanish Civil War and the trade benefits Germany was able to obtain in exchange for military support and munitions. At the centre of this study is Hjalmar Schacht, the temporarily ubiquitous German 'economic dictator', as the *Financial Times* called the Reichsbank president and minister of economic affairs in 1934.

The Spanish conflict turned out to be the only proxy war of the 1930s in which communism, fascism/National Socialism, and liberalism were engaged in an internationalized civil war—the third party only in Spain, as the liberal democracies preferred non-intervention. Barbieri eloquently describes the Spaniards' path to civil war and intertwines the Spanish, German, and Italian parts of the story. His essentially chronological analysis is combined with anecdotal miniatures.

Readers who do not know much about Spain in the 1920s and 1930s will profit from the first half of the book about the path to civil war and intervention. Barbieri examines the internal conflict in Spain; the problems the Spanish question posed for the already precarious international system; and, finally, Schacht's economic concepts and German economic policy up to the mid 1930s. It is only in the middle of the book that Barbieri announces his leitmotiv (pp. 133–4) and brings together 'the two hitherto distinct narratives of this study: Spain's path to civil war and Nazi Germany's road to recovery under the stewardship of Germany's "economic dictator"' (p. 138).

The sections about the political economy of Schacht's informal empire are the most interesting but also most debatable parts of the monograph. The Reichsbank president's biographer, Christopher Kopper, had already invoked the idea of 'informal empire' in the context of Schacht's plea for colonial expansion,[1] a rather fruitless thread

[1] Christopher Kopper, *Hjalmar Schacht: Aufstieg und Fall von Hitlers mächtigstem Bankier* (Munich, 2006), 295–305.

of the Nazi foreign policy discussion. Barbieri's merit is to extend this idea to trade relations with Spain.

Based on a thorough interpretation of Schacht's doctoral thesis, neglected by earlier scholars, Barbieri's study shows how Schacht's early academic work and experiences during the First World War shaped his political thinking. Schacht's 'imperial, mercantilistic strategy' (p. 168) involved disengaging from Anglo-American trade partners and reorienting Germany's attention towards the Balkans, Latin America, and, finally, Spain. With these partners, the political and economic asymmetry was reversed in favour of Germany, so that better terms of trade were possible. Drawing on various sources, especially private conversations and public interventions during the 1920s and 1930s, Barbieri reconstructs Schacht's economic and political position, summarized as *Weltpolitik*: centralized economic decision-making and state intervention at home up to the point of micro-management; colonial expansion; and a preference for trade with countries on which Germany could impose one-sided terms of trade. Barbieri seems undecided, however, whether to describe these ideas as 're-emerging mercantilism' (p. 117), 'neomercantilist' (p. 133), or 'pseudo-mercantilist' (p. 91).

The Spanish endeavour and its subsequent quid pro quo (Spanish raw materials for munitions and overt military intervention) fitted well into these concepts. German–Spanish trade soon reached new dimensions, as did Spanish debt to Germany. Political, military, and trade relations between Germany and Spain were clearly not a 'relationship of equals' (p. 149). As Barbieri shows, ideology was at most a secondary factor. This applied to Hitler's decision to support the Spanish army's rebellion, and, in particular, to back the Franco faction, which was not self-evident. Barbieri gives a precise and dense account of the decision-making process on 25 July 1936 in Bayreuth. The economic dimensions of this decision were clear. To organize the clearing of German–Spanish trade, two monopoly companies were founded at short notice, HISMA in Spain (replaced in 1939 by SOFINDUS) and ROWAK in Germany. They worked under the supervision of the Foreign Organization branch of the Nazi Party (NSDAP/AO), thus indirectly in the realm of Schacht's most important opponent, Hermann Göring.

Barbieri integrates these events into a larger evaluation of Nazi foreign policy in the mid 1930s, drawing a conclusion by analogy that

does not convince this reviewer. Hitler's interest in the economic exploitation of Spain does not mean that Schachtian *Weltpolitik* was ever a viable alternative to the *Lebensraum* objective. By contrasting the Reichsbank president's pragmatism on the one hand with seemingly surreal *Lebensraum* goals on the other, Barbieri implies a false opposition. Hitler had a functionalist view of economy and trade, which were not an end in themselves. All sources, from *Mein Kampf* to the speeches of 1 February 1933 and 5 November 1937, show that Hitler believed neither in economic imperialism and colonies nor in trade or an export economy. Although Barbieri postulates a reading of the 1937 Hossbach Memorandum 'through a different lens' (pp. 185–6), he is not, ultimately, able to give an alternative interpretation.

Barbieri accurately describes the 'policy struggle' (p. 131) in 1936 which pitted Schacht against Göring. Schacht's search for an 'exit strategy' (p. 157) from the misguided growth and armament overproduction of the first years of Nazi rule did not accord with the plans of Hitler and those around him. They did not share Schacht's diagnosis (too much armament) and would not have prescribed the same remedy (an economic slowdown). In this situation, Schacht was 'sidelined in Berlin as Hitler drifted [*sic*!] towards a wider war' (p. 9), an expression that, once again, gives a rather curious interpretation of Hitler's agenda. On the whole, Barbieri overstates Schacht's influence outside the economic sphere and especially on questions of principle, such as the long-term goals of foreign policy and war.

The chronological relationship of this policy struggle to the Spanish endeavour remains vague. Curiously enough, the *Vierjahresplan* memorandum was drafted under Göring's auspices at around the same time as Hitler decided in favour of intervention. This said, interpreting the following exploitation of Spain as an example of Schachtian informal empire is questionable. Barbieri himself states that even after Schacht was ousted, German–Spanish trade continued as before. He points out that Spain remained crucial for German imports even after 1939, as the 'formal' empire took shape. Against this background, strong *ex post facto* assumptions postulating a conditional nexus and a sequence instead of simultaneity are not convincing: 'Crafting the exploitative, genocidal, and ultimately ephemeral empire for which we remember the Nazis required [*sic*!] burying [*sic*!] the informal one on Iberian soil' (p. 245).

Contrary to what is suggested in the introduction, Barbieri does not present a 'useful counterfactual' by describing an 'Empire that could have been' (p. 3). He gives an explicit narration of an allegedly functional Schachtian 'informal empire' that was torpedoed by ignorant Nazis and their power games. In order to prove its supposed 'effectiveness' (p. 12), in his final chapters Barbieri contrasts the German experience with the return on investment of the Italian intervention in Spain and with later forms of German occupation in Europe. The outcome for Mussolini was modest, although the Italian investment of money, men, and *matériel* doubled the German effort. Barbieri argues convincingly that the Duce's focus on ideological friendship, propaganda, and Italian splendour prevented his officials from collecting trade-offs similar to those obtained by their German partner and competitor. The second comparison is less convincing. In the ninth chapter ('Formal Empire'), Barbieri contents himself with a survey of the standard literature on different annexed and occupied countries. The supposed superiority of informal rule, deemed more 'sustainable' (p. 13) than the overt exploitation of eastern Europe depends mainly on the fact that the German occupation regime after 1939 was short-lived.

The alleged effectiveness and sustainability of 'informal empire' can also be questioned by looking at the Spanish case itself. Barbieri himself concedes that Germany could not maintain political, military, and economic pressure in the long term. For some years German trade eclipsed the traditionally dominant Anglo-French trade with Spain, and HISMA/SOFINDUS even tried to perpetuate the situation by converting the growing Spanish debt into direct investments, especially in mines in Spain and Morocco. But the 'informal empire', in fact, was limited in time, scale, and scope, as Franco increasingly played for time instead of satisfying German demands. From the beginning of the Second World War he had more room for manoeuvre and gained autonomy from his former allies, whereas Germany's dependence on Spanish resources grew. Germany's economic 'penetration of Spain' (p. 147) relied on a contingent historical situation and thus remained incomplete.

This reviewer would have liked to know more about the HISMA/ROWAK complex. How did the clearing of German–Spanish trade work exactly? Who was involved? How was business done on the ground? How did the flow of information between German indus-

try, German economic bureaucracy, HISMA/ROWAK, and, finally, their Spanish counterparts work? As Barbieri privileges a top-down approach, the answers unfortunately remain abstract, although HISMA/ROWAK is the cornerstone of both Spain's integration into the German economic system and Barbieri's argument.

The bibliography is extensive, as the author is well-versed in the English-, Italian-, and Spanish-language research.[2] But a run-through of the footnotes shows that the German literature is sometimes quite outdated and cited in a rather unspecific way (e.g. ch. 6, nn. 44, 49, 52, 61, 68, 77, 81). Barbieri has used material from all the relevant archives in France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the USA, but he privileges published sources in his annotations, especially in the case of German sources. These observations may explain his debatable evaluation of the German policy discussion and his all too easy refutation of old-style research which saw German foreign policy 'on an "inexorable" road to war' (p. 3) and interpreted the quest for *Lebensraum* as a 'preordained path of Nazi rule' (p. 131). Some metaphors fit in with Barbieri's 'empire' terminology but seem misleading to this reviewer, for example, calling the German intervention a 'fully fledged colonial endeavor' (p. 134) or naming HISMA's managing director Johannes Bernhardt an 'effective viceroy' (p. 188).

The appendix of 'economic data' contains seven charts which are either of minor relevance to Barbieri's argument (for example, German hyperinflation 1922–6, German unemployment rates 1921–39, and so forth) or give only overall trends in Spanish imports and exports. Figure A.7 is particularly intriguing, as Barbieri illustrates the ratio of 'Cumulative German and Italian Intervention Costs' (33 and 67 per cent respectively) by presenting the two figures in a pie chart: 1,932 as against 3,914 million pesetas.

Barbieri is not the first scholar to integrate discussions on German and Italian intervention with the question of Nazi economic and trade policy, but he does so in a sophisticated and readable way that will probably reach a wider audience than earlier literature. The book, already translated into Italian (2015, Mondadori), presents a good overview of German and Italian intervention in the Spanish

[2] Unfortunately the bibliography was only available online on the website advertising the book and has since disappeared: <http://www.hitlersshadowempire.com/bibliography/>, accessed 1 Aug. 2016.

Civil War embedded in the international context. Emphasizing Schacht's role is important but, in the end, the argument by analogy (Schacht's programmatic texts correspond to forms of organizing German–Spanish trade) does not hold. Instead of opposing two mutually exclusive models of imperialism, the author might have found it more interesting to think of them as complementary forms of exploitation and exercising power. Finally, comparing the Nazi idea of European hegemony and empire with the status and the underlying idea of the European Union, its common market and common currency (pp. 246–7) is, at best, a distortion.

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TIM COLE, *Holocaust Landscapes* (London: Bloomsbury Continuum, 2016), 272 pp. ISBN 978 1 4729 0688 5. £20.00 (hardback)

For decades the Holocaust has been considered one of the seminal events of the twentieth century and has thus attracted great scholarly interest. In the book under review here, Tim Cole takes 'a fresh look at a familiar event' by analysing its spatiality (p. 6). In doing so, he takes his place in a steadily growing body of research on the spatial dimensions of history. In the book the Holocaust is understood as 'a place-making event that created new places . . . or reworked more familiar places' (p. 2). The places researched are (reflecting the order of the chapters in the book), the ghetto; the forest; the camp; places of refuge such as attics and cellars; the river; and the road. As the singulars imply, Cole refers only to one specific place in each chapter, for example, the Warsaw ghetto, the Danube river, or the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. Instead of touching on every chapter in detail, I will here discuss the three main research focuses which run throughout the book.

The book first suggests that the Holocaust cannot be considered as a monolithic event, but must be seen as a dynamic and multi-faceted one. As the timeline shows, between 1939 and 1945 there were different intensities and ways of killing. Thus from a spatial perspective it is possible to identify 'different genocides . . . in different places' in Europe (p. 2). As the author points out, during the death marches on the German roads in 1945, there was a recurrence of face-to-face killings of individual prisoners, behaviour which had also characterized the early phase of the Holocaust (p. 186). Using Timothy Snyder's concept of 'bloodlands', Cole states that the events of 1944–5 extended this zone as far as central Europe. This is a crucial distinction which leads to the idea that what is usually labelled as the 'Holocaust' should be seen as multiple and highly dynamic 'Holocausts', as the most recent research has suggested.

Second, and inextricably linked to this premise, Cole places the violent and highly dynamic spaces of the Holocaust at centre stage. Nearly all the chapters highlight the geography, boundaries, and social topography of the places being researched. Thus the spatial and social dynamics of the Holocaust become apparent. Jews trying to escape regularly chose the less mature parts of the eastern European forests as hideouts because hardly anybody went there to

collect firewood, and so they were less likely to be discovered. The need to survive in the wilderness meant that people who were hunters or craftsmen were quite quickly allowed to join one of the emerging fugitive groups living in the woods. What mattered for survival was what counted, and these were skills that were not prestigious in peacetime civilian societies. The author also rightly explains that nature matters in history because it affected the living conditions for those fleeing as well as in the camps.

All of this is interesting, but it raises a number of further questions. While Cole considers spaces such as ghettos, roads, and forests as given entities, it is left open how they came into being. It is almost as if the author creates them in order to systematize his topic, as Snyder did with 'bloodlands'. We learn a great deal about how the Jews behaved and thus shaped the 'Holocaust landscapes', but remarkably little about how they perceived them. Their conceptions of woods and trains—spaces that have a history of their own, if we think of romanticism and modernism—remain a fruitful field for research. Ghettos also were not first invented in 1939, but have a vividly remembered history. The cultural history of these spaces was reflected upon by contemporaries, but Cole rarely touches on these aspects.

Third, the book considers the Jews as 'victims' of the Holocaust, but at the same time points out their 'agency' in terms of survival and coping strategies (p. 7). In analysing their experiences the author relies heavily on survivors' accounts and oral histories of the Holocaust. These sources have many limitations for historical analysis, and these pitfalls are discussed in the book. Nonetheless, in some passages it would have been helpful if the author had included more figures and findings from the latest Holocaust research instead of drawing solely on eyewitness accounts and late oral history interviews (for example, on p. 121). This would have made it possible to evaluate more accurately whether the individual experiences so vividly developed in many chapters of the book can be generalized. More than once Cole leaves this question unanswered and uses phrases such as 'oftentimes' instead.

In considering the topics treated in this well-written book, this reviewer has many further questions. What about the place-making of other groups involved in the Holocaust, most notably the Germans, of course. Some of them drew up camp blueprints, ordered

the escaping Jews to be chased, or were involved in the Holocaust in many other ways, sometimes even as helpers in times of need. Other groups also made up the 'Holocaust landscapes'. On the part of those who were persecuted, we can mention the *Romani* people, homosexuals, 'asocial' groups as defined by the Nazis, those considered racially inferior, criminals, and the politically suspect. But local populations also played a part. These questions show that a spatial analysis of ostensibly well-known histories can have inspiring results, and Cole's book provides ample evidence of this.

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BRONSON LONG, *No Easy Occupation: French Control of the German Saar, 1944–1957* (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2015), xii + 256 pp. ISBN 978 1 57113 915 3. £60.00

The Saarland, which lies in south-western Germany on the border with France, is one of the most interesting territories for an investigation of transnational entanglements and confrontations in Europe. Under various different sovereignties for centuries until the Versailles Treaty specified that, as the Saargebiet, it was to be administered by the League of Nations for fifteen years (1920–35), with France in a strong position, it can be seen as an early precursor of possible territorial Europeanization. In the plebiscite held, as prescribed at Versailles, in 1935 to determine the future of the Saar Territory or Territoire de la Sarre, an overwhelming majority voted in favour of joining Germany, although this had been under National Socialist rule since 1933. From 1935 to the present day the area has been known as the Saarland. In 1945 it first formed part of the French zone of occupation in Germany and then, in 1947–8, it was placed under the supervision of a High Commissioner, separate from Germany. In an economic and currency union with France, its semi-autonomous political status was unclear.

When European integration received a strong boost in 1950 with the plan put forward by Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister, for the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the Saar was soon a central source of conflict between France and the Federal Republic of Germany, founded in 1949. From 1952 this unresolved problem increasingly blocked progress towards European integration. Only when the French and West German governments agreed in Paris, in October 1954, to hold another plebiscite on the Saar in 1955, did European integration take off again. It led, surprisingly quickly, to the Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic Community.

In 1954–5 the Saarland was to receive a European statute to establish its independence, but in October 1955 a two-thirds majority voted to reject this. Within hours, France accepted that politically, this represented a vote for integration with West Germany, although this choice was not, officially, on the ballot paper. Politically, the

Trans. Angela Davies (GHIL).

Saarland joined West Germany in 1957, followed in 1959 by integration in economic and social policy, providing an exciting example of how to deal with problems of integrating very different economic systems. Thus the Saarland payed a key role in the reconstruction phase after the Second World War, both as a blocking force and in a positive, constructive sense. To the present day, it remains institutionally and politically the most international of Germany's federal states, right down to the fabric of its everyday life, with a special emphasis on Franco-German co-operation in a European perspective.

In a detailed synthesis, based largely on the evaluation of a wide range of documents from France and the Saarland, Bronson Long traces the complex development of the Saarland in a number of political areas from 1945 to 1957 for anglophone readers; the last large synthesis in English, by Jacques Freymond, dates from 1960. Long's core thesis runs through the whole book and is explored in great detail: 'a near obsession with de-Prussianizing the Saar drove the actions of French officials. As the war had destroyed Prussia, France's Saar policy was thus backward-looking in nature from the very beginning' (p. 27). 'French officials did not comprehend how deeply traumatic Germany's defeat was for both Germans and Saarlanders alike' (p. 19) and 'formulated many policies on the basis of what amounted to outdated ideas about Germany' (p. 23). 'What French officials failed to comprehend was that if Germany had needed "de-Prussianizing," the war itself had largely accomplished the task' (p. 22). Here Long rightly stresses a misapprehension that was widely held in Europe for a long time.

The author first outlines France's general plans for the Saar and, in line with recent research, claims that France's goal was not an annexation of the Saar, although this was widely demanded by the general public. Gilbert Grandval, who had been a leading member of the French resistance to German occupation during the war and was Military Governor in 1945, High Commissioner from 1947, and French ambassador to the Saar from 1952, thought that the Saar should become independent; he often spoke of Luxembourg as a model. Long considers that Grandval's aim was an independent Saarland nation. In Paris, by contrast, while different positions were taken on individual points, the main interest was in economically exploiting the region. Significant sections of French private industry, especially in the mining sector, however, were less than enthusiastic

because they feared competition from the strong industry of the Saar. After the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, the Saar became a key problem in Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's policy for France and for Europe, and led to sharp domestic political clashes connected with the general problem of reunification. Since the end of the war it had become increasingly clear that independence for the Saar was politically feasible only as part of a Europeanization of the country. This gave rise to an impressive review of earlier steps towards Europeanization in local political practice.

Long gives a broad account of France's cultural achievements. An early cultural agreement between France and the Saarland, among other things gave the young people of the Saarland chances to travel and take part in exchange trips as far afield as the USA. Nothing comparable could, at that time, be offered by any other part of the former Reich. Guided by his main question concerning presumed nation-building in the Saar, Long pays particular attention to the churches, sport, the school system, which was rebuilt immediately after 1945, and the establishment in 1947–8 of a new university which was successfully oriented towards Europe and could boast an international teaching staff. He rightly sees these developments in the areas he reviews as thoroughly positive. As an example, we need mention only the more than 10 million new school textbooks that had been produced by 1948 for the whole of the French occupation zone, far more than in the British or American zones. Because of its potential for generating mass enthusiasm, sport (mainly football) drew the special attention of the High Commissioner, and thus also of the author. The Saarland's strong sports clubs aspired to enter the Fédération Française de Football but, after long internal debate, were rejected on grounds of nationality as well as competition. At the 1952 Olympics in Helsinki, the Saarland was represented by its own team. Finally, in the 1950s, they turned to the Federal Republic of Germany and in 1952 were runners-up in the national league, earning the enthusiastic support of the Saarlanders. Grandval, sharply critical of Paris, saw football as one reason for France's progressive loss of prestige in the Saar, and recent research supports this view.

Long also pays special attention to the churches. Within the Catholic Church, France wanted to create a new, unified bishopric of the Saar but failed because of the opposition of the Vatican and the the bishops of Speyer and Trier, both of whom had responsibility for

parts of the Saar. On the Protestant side, attempts to bring together the church in the Rhineland, which was more critical of French policy, and that in the Palatinate also failed because of theological differences (Lutheran versus United) that were largely incomprehensible to the Governor, and political opposition. Here, too, it appears that all the important issues relating to the Saar were closely entangled with the area's general but unclear political status, and with its international position.

At political level, Long pursues the meandering developments in the status of the Saar, which remained largely undefined while granting France extensive opportunities for control. The many differences between the various authorities in Paris and, until 1949, at the High Command in Baden-Baden are described in broad brush strokes; in reality, they were even more complicated. Regarding the constitution of 1947, it is surprising that Long does not mention that Grandval, on his own initiative, had the people of the Saar draw up a constitution in line with German tradition, although Michel Debré, head of the Saar Department in the French Foreign Office and an opponent of too much independence for the Saar, had explicitly prohibited this. He had ordered the adoption of a completely different model with a weak government and weak parliament. Grandval's action meant that when the Saarland was incorporated into the Federal Republic of Germany in 1957, the constitution of 1947—allegedly imposed by France—could largely be adopted, once the provisions for economic and monetary union with France had been deleted. Long cites colourful examples to demonstrate how little Debré knew about conditions in Germany and the Saarland. Grandval sought permanent confrontation with Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, who had already rejected the introduction of the franc in the Saar. For Schuman, European integration and co-operation with the Federal Republic of Germany soon gained priority over autonomy for the Saar as championed by Grandval. Europeanization, however, brought a dilemma for Paris: the aim of autonomy for the Saar seemed to be achievable only through Europeanization, but this would indirectly strengthen the Federal Republic within Europe (pp. 187 ff.).

Long provides a differentiated analysis of the politics of the pro-autonomy governments of Minister President Johannes Hoffmann, who was initially highly popular, but soon became a controversial figure. On the basis of his experiences of National Socialism and exile

from 1935, Hoffmann had grave doubts about the capacity of the Germans for democracy, agreeing with Grandval on this. Out of this grew a policy of control that was designed specifically for the Saarland, and which gradually alienated ever larger sections of the population from his government which, until about 1951–2, had enjoyed broad political support given its close ties with France. This shift was caused not least by government surveillance, motivated by this mistrust, of political organizations that were critical of autonomy, something that was incompatible with the goal of democratization.

By 1954 the majority of the population seemed to endorse a Europeanization of the Saar. Its rejection in the referendum of 23 October 1955 is explained by Long as a result of the control policies of the Hoffmann period. He also sees it as a vote against France because of its contradictory policies: in its colonial empire France acted against its own aims of democratization and in Europe, the European Defence Community proposed by France was rejected by its own parliament, while at almost the same time, a European statute was proposed for the Saar. The author gives a lively account of the complicated and soon acrimonious debates within the Saarland in the summer of 1955, which led to the rejection and end of French supremacy and integration into the Federal Republic in the period 1957 to 1959.

This book is based on a wide range of official documents from party and private archives in France, Germany, and Switzerland (Fondation Jean Monnet). Especially interesting is the additional information gleaned from some of the private archives which were not available to earlier researchers (Bidault, Debré). The sources have been thoroughly evaluated and the majority of references is to archival material. A carefully prepared index facilitates the use of this book.

Long's main argument provides ample material for discussion. To the extent that he draws general conclusions about the whole of French occupation policy and policy for Germany from his work on the Saar, some of their basic outlines are not convincing. This is unfortunate, given the thorough work he has done in the archives. Our knowledge of French politics has moved on considerably since the 1980s, and it would have been good to hear his possible counterarguments, all the more so as much of the archival material he uses has already been comprehensively evaluated in recent decades. Long quotes some of the many more specialized publications on the Saar and argues carefully and in great detail, whether he agrees with them

or comes to different conclusions. But apart from a few aspects of European policy, the basic research on the main lines of the European post-war order and French policy is only marginal to his analysis, and he therefore hardly engages with it discursively. He thus still takes positions, for example, based on the subjective political perceptions of contemporaries, or the partially erroneous interpretations of French policy by senior American decision-makers, such as the harsh but charismatic Deputy Commander in Chief, Lucius D. Clay, that have entered the research and been confused with France's actual positions. In the French files, as well as in the American files published since the 1960s, the necessary differentiations are clear. To take just one central example: the argument that France had pursued a policy of obstruction in the Allied Control Council and thus prevented the central economic administrations for the whole of Germany from working is inaccurate, as we have known for thirty years. France had an existential interest in German economic unity. But it demanded that the political decentralization of Germany as prescribed in the Potsdam Agreement should be implemented, and thus that 'German central agencies' (p. 32) should not be set up under German leadership, but that 'central agencies' should be created under Allied leadership—'bureaux alliés', 'allied agencies', in the terminology that Clay impatiently rejected as too complicated.

Still the most thorough work on French policy for Germany in the early post-war period, that by Dietmar Hüser, is occasionally mentioned by Long. But he does not discuss its basic findings, which contradict his main arguments. From 1945 France had pursued a 'dual policy for Germany': it may have used sharp rhetoric in public and towards Allied partners (as analysed by Long); but at the same time, in practice it followed a policy that was in many respects highly constructive, and whose core goals (decentralization and access to German raw materials in the mining sector) were realized in 1949. Hüser's work and the monumental volume by Armin Heinen on the Saarland (both published in 1996) offer a wealth of analyses even of the extremely complicated French decision-making processes, and they could have served Long well.

A number of errors that are seemingly small, but relevant to the interpretation, arise from the basic problem of contextualization. Under the League of Nations mandate the Saar region was not 'given to France' after 1920 ('Versailles . . . gave it to France', p. 2), but

France had a strong position within the international Governing Commission and as a consequence of French ownership of the mining industry in the internationalized territory. 'Saargebiet' was its official designation, not just what it was 'often simply called' (p. 35). The situation after 1945 was fundamentally different, and especially in Paris they learned from previous experience: France no longer had 'ownership' of the Saar pits as after 1920; Long mistakenly equates it with the sequester administration (pp. 41, 236, among others), but this was a decision not about ownership, but about administration and use; here the internal French fronts were again highly complicated and changeable. The author repeatedly confuses the *Arbeitskammer* (Saar Chamber of Labor) with the *Einheitsgewerkschaft* (unitary unions), a consolidation of all the trade unions in the Western zones. The *Arbeitskammer*, by contrast, was an original and important institution that existed only in the Saar and in Bremen and in which, completely against French tradition, unions and employers were represented on equal terms; it was not until the Saar's integration into the Federal Republic that it became a chamber of employees, which it remains to the present day. Nor did the USA put an end to the dismantling of industry in May 1946 (p. 30)—in individual cases, this carried on until 1951—but it stopped supplying reparations goods from its own zone to the Soviet Union.

These and other seeming details are probably connected with the author's main thesis in that they may contribute to a circular argument, for the strong focus on 'nation-building' in the Saarland allows the long-term successes of French policy to fade or disappear. In the area of culture, for example, which is Long's special interest, many further activities in museums, in modern music and art, art colleges, the media, theatre, film, and so on are overshadowed as a result of this approach. But they could have drawn attention to the fact that France's engagement in the Saar in these and many other fields was by no means a failure but, on the contrary, highly successful. Long repeatedly emphasizes that in 1945 France had revisited its aims of 1919, but this is not true. On the contrary, reflections on the failure of the Versailles peace order not only in the Saar, but in the whole zone of occupation since 1945 led to a variety of initiatives in a new policy designated 'democratization', which prepared the ground for future reconciliation after the establishment of the Federal Republic. At the same time, it was was often the act—recognized as such—of focusing

on old stereotypes that, in part conceptually but especially in practice, contributed to an attempt to change the allegedly aggressive 'German soul'. Long even refutes his own thesis that the majority vote against European status for the Saar had been a vote 'against France' when, on the final pages of his book, he describes the quick resumption of co-operation after 1955 and the consolidation of the French institutions built up in the Saarland in the decade after the war. Given that many of the factors described by Long clearly explain the result of the vote, it seems rather surprising that, in 1955, one-third of the votes nonetheless went to the vaguely formulated European Statute. This outcome reflects how strong the Saar's European orientation and its connections with France remained. The majority of the population saw the political future as lying in integration into the Federal Republic of Germany. But to the present day, the Saarland is the German Federal *Land* with the closest cultural, social, and institutional connections with France.

Such comments underline that Long's work stimulates very interesting discussions. His concisely written book provides information about many areas during these post-war years on the Saar, which were so exciting precisely because local, regional, bi-national, and international levels were always closely intertwined.

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SUSAN L. CARRUTHERS, *The Good Occupation: American Soldiers and the Hazards of Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016), 386 pp. ISBN 978 0 674 54570 0. £22.95

American policymakers generally tend to avoid speaking of military occupation, preferring instead to use the language of liberation or regime change to describe the activities of their military abroad. When they do talk of occupation, they usually like to present the United States as an exceptionally able and altruistic occupier. In such discourses, the American occupations of Germany and Japan after the Second World War have often featured prominently as particularly successful examples that demonstrate the American capacity to effect democratic transformation through benign military government. Such familiar narratives acquired a special urgency during the occupation of Iraq in 2003, when the Bush administration often referred to the occupations of Germany and Japan as model occupations to be emulated in the Middle East. As Susan Carruthers recounts in this fascinating book, it is therefore not surprising that a New York University law professor tasked with helping draft Iraq's novel constitution should have observed on his flight to Baghdad that seemingly everyone was reading books about the post-war occupation of Japan.

One would have wished that those very same passengers had been able to read Carruthers's lucid comparative anatomy of the US occupation of Germany and Japan, which forcefully demolishes the self-congratulatory and strikingly persistent myths surrounding the American experience of post-war occupation. Written against the grain of much recent commentary and political science writing on occupation that rather hopelessly seeks to unearth the magic formula that makes for successful occupations, her carefully researched book is a stringent reminder that simplistic accounts of 'good occupations' cannot be accepted at face value. Conversely, as this book well demonstrates, turning occupation into a success story, 'like so much else in the postwar world . . . required radical reconstruction'. That benevolence and success finally emerged as the key ingredients of the occupations' master narrative was not self-evident. Rather, as Carruthers convincingly argues, it took 'time and toil to smooth the rough edges of lived experience into the sleek veneer of national legend' (p. 312).

Drawing primarily on a large number of letters, diaries, and memoirs written by both 'ordinary' and more high-ranking servicemen and women, Carruthers tells her story through sources that have hitherto featured less prominently in the historiography of the post-war occupations. In an inversion of Wolfgang Schivelbusch's influential concept of 'cultures of defeat' that revolved around the experiences of the occupied population, she focuses on the impact of occupation on the occupiers themselves, exploring the often ignored 'psychology and phenomenology of victory' (p. 10) by putting the subjectivities of Americans centre stage. This is therefore not a history of the high politics of occupation, but an account of how occupation was experienced by its practitioners and how those very experiences were transformed and pressed into a narrative that rendered occupation something virtuous. The result is a novel, and in many respects provocative, reading of the two major US post-war occupations emphasizing above all the fractiousness and moral messiness of the whole endeavour.

To describe the 'transformation act' (p. 5) that produced the 'good occupation', Carruthers takes as her point of departure the training imparted to occupation personnel by the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. The School, Carruthers argues, faced a constant lack of top-down political direction, leading to the transmission of a narrow conception of occupation to its students. Recruits were instructed to carry out administrative oversight over pre-existing local governing structures and taught that occupation amounted to a form of '"government" without politics' (p. 23). At the same time, the Charlottesville faculty tried to invent a virtuous tradition of military government that dissociated occupation from imperialism. In doing so, they construed a lineage of military government that affirmed that Americans were particularly apt in governing territories overseas because they respected pre-existing customs and structures. More significantly, however, the USA had its own history of occupation closer to home to contend with, namely the occupation of the South after the American Civil War. As Carruthers shows in a highly innovative section, memories of the occupation of the South and tales about the presumably tyrannous rule of the North and its disrespect for local customs were very vivid among those involved in preparing for post-war occupation. This produced an emphasis on leaving 'indigenous traditions intact'

that owed much to an 'extrapolation from racially overburdened domestic history' and less to 'cultural sensitivity' (p. 27).

A frequent point of reference in Carruthers' story is John Hersey's 1944 novel *A Bell for Adano*, which was highly influential in propagating notions of benign American occupation and fittingly won the Pulitzer prize on VE day, setting the template for future accounts of the 'good occupation'. Set in occupied Sicily, the novel's hero Major Joppolo embodies the honourable and sympathetic American officer who, against a backdrop of post-war privation, works in the interest of the local community and in doing so imparts the virtues of democracy while respecting the way of life of the Sicilian population. As Carruthers well demonstrates, however, this idealized image contrasted markedly with practices of American officials on the ground who often used racially inflected discourses to describe Sicilians as backward people who did not conform to their idea of Europeanness. Abuses and rapes were widespread. Similarly, occupation officials did not see their job as that of teaching the lofty ideals of democracy, but thought instead they simply had to get basic services and institutions running again. *A Bell for Adano* thus stands throughout the book as an image for how the tale of the good American occupation was spun almost in real time while the multiple US occupations were unfolding.

In two tandem chapters on the end of the war and beginning of occupation in Germany and Japan, Carruthers shows how Americans experienced, enforced, and performed victory. She describes how some GIs were markedly uncomfortable with their role as conquerors, while others enjoyed the many luxuries that were now afforded to them by being part of an occupying power. Looting and theft were widespread. In Japan, the Americans performed a carefully staged surrender ceremony to impress on the Japanese the totality of defeat. While the American authorities construed the occupation of Japan from the outset as particularly virtuous through heavy censorship of the US and Japanese press, the initial period of occupation was marked by extreme levels of looting, rape, and vandalism. The occupation of Okinawa resulted in mass population movement, the burning of villages, and the concomitant destruction of much of the pre-existing local culture. In contrast to Germany, American soldiers also experienced Japan as a culturally and ethnically unfamiliar space. Many a GI turned into 'an amateur ethnographer, attuned to mark-

ers of difference' (p. 106), with the 'Japanese brain' (p. 103) targeted as the enemy that had to be defeated during the occupation. Similarly, as Carruthers shows, influenced by racializing and orientalizing discourses, occupation personnel often described both Japanese culture and Japanese bodies as inferior, with a frequent trope being the lack of cleanliness and the general backwardness of the country.

In fact, one of the main recurring themes throughout Carruthers's story is that occupation was, in many respects, a bodily experience. Human excrement, odours, and intimate contact with bodies both dead and living filled many pages of contemporary letters and diaries. One of the main loci of such experiences were female bodies. This is, of course, familiar territory for historians of mid twentieth-century occupations, but Carruthers's chapter on the multiple iterations of 'fraternization', and the various changes to official policy intended to keep it in check, shows how romantic and sexual relations between the occupiers and the occupied had significant repercussions at home, threatening the positive image the USA wanted to project about their occupations, with the high venereal disease (VD) rate remaining a constant sting. In response, German 'Fräuleins' were quickly construed in the US press as 'hyperideologized, hyperfertile, predatory' females (p. 126), and the role of coercion involved in some such encounters remained mostly in the dark. While non-fraternization rules were, to a large extent, intended to transmit to Germans the idea of collective guilt, Carruthers argues that orders issued in Okinawa to American troops to stay away from relations with the local population were grounded in racial concepts that relied on an 'American identity of pristine whiteness' (p. 133).

Human bodies are also at the core of Carruthers' discussion of displaced persons (DPs), which brings out the abusive treatment and racial hierarchies applied to different groups of DPs. In Germany, many American members of the occupation saw survivors of concentration and extermination camps as 'abstractly deserving but personally repellent' (p. 162), and many contemporary accounts dwellt on the filth and excrement surrounding DPs. This produced a dehumanizing portrayal of DPs, and in particular of Jewish survivors, an attitude exacerbated by the antisemitism that was widespread amongst American personnel. Carruthers argues that American encounters with DPs enduring dismal living conditions led to the paradoxical situation that many occupation officials had more sym-

pathy for their former German foes than for those who had suffered persecution or had been subjected to forced labour. In Japan, a similar racial hierarchy was in place, with the Japanese at the top and Korean DPs at the bottom, the latter being stigmatized as either communists or criminals. In both Germany and Japan, the occupiers consequently vilified specific groups of DPs for crimes such as theft and black market activities that were also carried out by the occupiers and the majority population.

While occupation work was posthumously beatified as a particularly worthwhile endeavour, Carruthers describes how a large number of occupation officials and soldiers regarded their jobs as particularly unrewarding, boring, and distasteful. Widespread demoralization led to large-scale protests in early 1946 in both Asia and in Europe, with soldiers demonstrating for their quick demobilization. In the USA, American wives and their children mobilized under the flag of 'Bring Back Daddy', invoking the restoration of family life, the threat of increasing divorce rates, and looming sexual impropriety as compelling reasons for a fast demobilization. The USA responded to this crisis in morale with what Carruthers fittingly describes as the domestication of occupation, flooding American troops with consumer goods, leisure activities, and travel opportunities. They also set up an almost entirely isolated world of American clubs and residential spaces, which commentators at the time criticized as an imperial practice of social segregation, captured in the striking formula of 'Hans Crowism'. Yet even the arrival of American families in April 1946 did not, in Carruthers's interpretation, contribute significantly to raising morale and morals, with the incidence of VD, alcoholism, and pilfering remaining high.

Carruthers debunks the various myths surrounding the inherent goodness of the post-war occupations with much brio and erudition, deploying her trademark evocative prose style to give colour to the bleak post-war world. The occupations that she describes do not fit neatly into the familiar story of democratization and re-education, but are stories of moral ambiguity that find their point of gravity around fraternization, violence, corruption, looting, and racism. Some may argue, of course, that historians should move beyond assessing whether an occupation was a good or bad thing, and concentrate on exploring how and in what ways American military occupation transformed the societies under their rule. Others may con-

tend that despite the multiple negative, and indeed often brutal by-products as well as the very top-down, conservative inflection of post-war 'democratization', the occupations did ultimately produce significant institutional and political changes after many years of authoritarian rule. Yet Carruthers's book is essentially a study of the occupiers, not of the occupation's socio-political impact on the occupied, and here her contribution is genuinely illuminating, for it brings to light the gulf between the often morally muddled experiences of occupation personnel and the crude representation of occupation as a virtuous project pervading public discourse today. In doing so, she has set the ground for a more extensive investigation of the construction of the memory of post-war occupation, a subject which has hitherto escaped historians, but which they would be well advised to take seriously in the future.

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CONFERENCE REPORTS

Cultures of Conservatism in the United States and Western Europe between the 1970s and 1990s. Conference organized by Martina Steber (Institute for Contemporary History Munich–Berlin), Anna von der Goltz (Georgetown University, Washington, DC), and Tobias Becker (German Historical Institute London), and held at the GHIL on 14–16 September 2017.

The decades from the 1970s to the 1990s are often seen as a time of revolutionary change triggered by economic crises, in which the parameters and conditions for our present times were set. Conservatism looms large in this narrative; after all, the Reagan and Thatcher governments in the United States and in Britain respectively implemented economic and social policies that fundamentally changed the welfare state economies of the boom years. Conservatism is therefore often interpreted as neo-liberalism in conservative guise, as the defining political ideology of finance capitalism. However, conservatism was a much more diverse phenomenon than these interpretations suggest. While economics and politics were certainly crucial in the fashioning of a new conservatism in Western Europe and the United States, conservatism was also a diverse cultural phenomenon, which is not adequately reflected in historical research to date.

The conference 'Cultures of Conservatism in the United States and Western Europe between the 1970s and 1990s' addressed this omission by questioning the primacy of economics and debating alternative interpretations of this age of change. Focusing on cultures of conservatism, the conference aimed to re-evaluate the general contours of conservatism. It paid close attention to the intersection between culture, politics, and economics in order to broaden our understanding of the processes of change that have unfolded since the 1970s. The conference was co-funded by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung, the GHIL, the BMW Center for German and European Studies at Georgetown University, and the Institute for Contemporary History Munich.

The full conference programme can be found under 'Events and Conferences' on the GHIL's website <www.ghil.ac.uk>.

After a conceptual and programmatic introduction by Martina Steber (Munich), Anna von der Goltz (Washington, DC), and Tobias Becker (GHIL), the first panel looked at 'Conservatism on Stage and Screen'. It began with a paper by Amanda Eubanks Winkler (Syracuse, NY) on 'Andrew Lloyd Webber and Thatcherite Arts Policy', in which she viewed the work of the British composer through the lens of Thatcherism and vice versa. Winkler asked whether it is possible to identify a 'Thatcherite aesthetic'. Analysing Webber's *oeuvre* and his identification with the Tories (he composed the theme tune for Thatcher's election campaign in 1987), she came to an ambivalent conclusion. While Lloyd Webber's mega musicals such as *Phantom of the Opera* can, indeed, be understood as 'Thatcherism in action', as Michael Billingham called it, his next project, *Aspects of Love*, which told the story of a bisexual love triangle, went against the conservative grain. It would be wrong, therefore, to see Lloyd Webber merely as a Thatcherite court composer. Winkler's paper was ideally complemented by Nikolai Wehrs's talk (Constance) on ' "Yes Minister": A Popular Sitcom as an Educational Medium for Thatcherism?'. On the surface a comedy about a government minister who is led on a merry chase by the Civil Service, the series reflected many controversial debates of the 1980s, not least about trade union power, and transmitted numerous Thatcherite ideas. Both papers emphasized the decidedly middlebrow appeal of these cultural forms that chimed with the anti-Establishment thrust of Thatcherism.

Television also occupied centre stage in the second half of the panel. In 'Longing for the Past: Conservatism and Changing US Family Values, 1981–1992', Andre Dechert (Augsburg) used popular US television sitcoms to study conservative reactions to changing family values and changing representations of family life at a time when the ideal of the nuclear family was being questioned by the women's movement, the gay movement, and the civil rights movement. It was followed by a look at the representation of Britain on German television screens in Michael Hill's (Heidelberg) paper, 'Old England: Constructions of Britain and Britishness in German Popular Conservatism, 1970– 2000'. Hill traced representations of Britain from the Edgar Wallace films of the 1960s to the Rosamunde Pilcher films of the 1980s and 1990s. He observed a shift from the swinging metropolis to the Cornish countryside complete with stately homes, aristocratic lifestyles, and what he termed crypto-feudal relationships,

which for Germans represented a safe form of conservative longing, because they were foreign and thus untainted by the Nazi past.

The first day of the conference concluded with a round-table discussion on 'Cultures of Conservatism in an Age of Transformation: Interpreting Conservatism between the 1970s and 1990s' with Andy Beckett (London), Frank Bösch (Potsdam), and Bethany Moreton (Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH). Whereas Bösch stressed the necessity and difficulty of defining the key traits of conservative culture—a specific emotional regime, aesthetics, habitus, and a set of spaces where conservatives socialized—Beckett was more concerned with understanding the British version of conservatism in this period, which he placed into a longer historical perspective. He argued that the politics of the Thatcher governments of the 1980s built on a much wider cultural change of the early 1980s that enabled Thatcherism to take root in the mainstream. Teasing out its importance for current politics, he stressed the role of media cultures in the dissemination and implementation of conservative ideas. Far from observing a return to Thatcherism in the present, Beckett underlined the failure of the conservative project and what he called the 'final breakdown of the Thatcherite hegemony in Britain'. Moreton commented on the situation in the United States by reviewing the history of the American culture wars and the overly binary way in which these had conceptualized the relationship between ideas and material interest as well as culture and politics. In keeping with the conference topic, she stressed the importance of culture to understanding conservatism.

The conference continued on the following day with a panel on 'Consumer Cultures' and a paper by Lawrence Black (York) on 'Handbooks of Conservatism'. Black used *The Official Preppy Handbook* and *The Official Sloane Ranger Handbook*, both bestsellers in the 1980s, to analyse urban conservative lifestyles and subcultures, presenting them as manifestations of a restored middle-class confidence and simultaneously as an educational tool for the Reaganite and Thatcherite vanguard. At the same time he argued that the rural and pseudo-aristocratic lifestyles conjured up by these handbooks were not entirely at ease with neo-liberalism and therefore in some way at odds with the Thatcherite project. Matthew Francis's (Birmingham) paper ' "The Spiritual Ballast which Maintains Responsible Citizenship": Property, Private Enterprise, and Thatcher's Nation' drew

attention to the importance of home ownership in Thatcherite ideas of conservative culture. Ownership, Thatcherites like John Redwood argued, was the last fulfilment of the promise of full citizenship and therefore the finest expression of democracy. This was also true for immigrants: Thatcherism offered them participation via ownership and individual enterprise. Race did not figure in this framework of British nationhood in conservative guise which was clearly in a relationship of tension with alternative—not culturally, but ethnically informed—notions of the nation in British conservatism. In her paper 'Conservative Practices: Lifestyles, Consumption, and Urban Protest in 1970s and 1980s West Germany' Reinhild Kreis (Mannheim) looked at a different manifestation of cultures of conservatism: people who wanted to conserve their material environment but did not necessarily see themselves as conservatives. Using examples such as the campaigns to save local corner shops, the ecological movement, and the squatters' movement, Kreis studied the intersections between conservation and conservatism in West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. This led to a fruitful discussion about the ways in which cultures of conservatism mapped on to party political alignments, and about the problems of definition if cultures of conservatism were constantly in flux in the period under examination.

The following panel on 'Business Cultures' probed the intersections between neo-liberalism, the financialization of the economy, related changes in social values, and cultures of conservatism. Moreton's paper 'Jesus Saves: Christians in the Age of Debt' examined how evangelical Christians squared their long-standing condemnation of finance with a financialization of the economy. Bible culture and finance capitalism were not a 'match made in heaven', Moreton argued, but Christian financial advisers and faith-based brokers managed to make neo-liberal finance morally acceptable to evangelical Christians while continuing to promote a debt-free life. Marcia Chatelain's (Washington, DC) paper 'Ronald McDonald, Richard Nixon, and the Fast Food Future of Black America' examined programmes that sought to bring marginalized populations into a corporate fold in the USA. Her focus was on the McDonald's Corporation, which increasingly began to target black consumers in the late 1960s by installing black franchisees at drive-thru windows and front counters. Chatelain analysed how Richard Nixon's 'black power conservatism' facilitated the unprecedented growth of the fast food

industry. Bernhard Dietz's (Washington, DC/Mainz) paper 'Old or New Values? The West German Economy, Conservatism, and "Post-materialism" in the 1980s' took a closer look at the ways in which West German managers and the Christian Democrats incorporated the findings of social science about widespread value change into their business and political strategies. In the 1980s human resources departments and political strategists alike adopted the theories of sociologists such as Ronald Inglehart and Helmut Klages about a turn towards post-material values and integrated their theories into business models and policy outlines.

Friday's final panel, 'Countercultures', discussed conservative responses to and adaptations of some of the major grassroots social movements that emerged in the 1970s, including gay liberation, the 'pro-life' movement, and Christian evangelicalism. It stressed the dynamics which movement cultures unfolded in conservatism. In his paper '"Gay Equals Left?" Conservative Responses to Gay Liberation in West Germany and the United States, 1969–1980' Craig Griffiths (Manchester) departed from the standard narrative on reactionary responses to gay liberation by homing in on conservative voices within the movement for gay liberation. Such actors were small 'c' conservatives, favoured assimilation into rather than a radical transformation of mainstream culture, and preferred to think of themselves as 'homophile' rather than 'homosexual' because it drew less attention to sexual practices as the key mark of distinction. While conservatives in the gay liberation movement remained part of a wider and politically heterogeneous movement, the American Pro-Life movement voiced its concerns vociferously and politically unambiguously, at least since they had declared their allegiance to the Republican Party in 1979. A social movement like its counterpart on the left, it established norms and ideas of a particular conservative lifestyle focused on the family model of the male breadwinner and was steeped in the culture of the Christian Right, as Claudia Roesch (Münster) showed in her talk 'From Right to Life to Operation Rescue: The Re-Shaping of Conservative Cultures through the Anti-Abortion Movement in the 1980s USA'. The claim to individual choice became one of the rallying cries of the American pro-lifers, which provides further proof of the fusion of liberal and social conservative languages in the decades between the 1970s and 1990s. While the US evangelical movement has been intensely studied, not

much is known about its West European manifestations. Gisa Bauer (Bensheim) addressed the West German *Bekenntnisbewegung* 'Kein anderes Evangelium' in her paper 'Evangelicalism in West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s'. It saw itself as a protest movement inside the Protestant church, and not as a social movement per se. Concentrating on theological questions rather than social problems, its outreach remained limited, especially by comparison with its US counterpart. Bauer's talk underlined the importance of church structures for the contrary developments of conservative evangelical cultures in Europe and the USA.

While conservatism is often associated with particular national cultures, the fifth panel, 'Cultures of Conservative Internationalism', shifted the perspective to conservative internationalism. Peter Hoeres (Würzburg) shared his insights into the journalistic culture of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in his talk on 'Thatcherism and Reaganomics in Germany: The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and the Conservative Revolutions in the Anglosphere'. Despite the generally friendly reception of the Thatcher and Reagan administrations and their economic policies by West Germany's leading conservative newspaper, their course of action was only reluctantly recommended as a model for West Germany. This was mirrored in the *FAZ*'s visual representations of Thatcherism and Reaganomics. Martin Farr (Newcastle) approached Thatcherism as a global brand in his take on 'Thatcherism and the Transnationalization of Conservatism, 1975–1997'. Much more than Ronald Reagan, the British conservative leader managed to sell her type of conservatism as a transnational force, and in so doing took recourse to notions of civilization and ideas about the Anglo-Saxon world. A very different kind of conservative internationalism was at the centre of Sarah Majer's (Potsdam) paper '"Un anarchico conservatore": Giuseppe Prezzolini and the Redefinition of Italian Conservatism in the 1970s'. Taking the Italian intellectual Guiseppe Prezzolini as an example, Majer introduced a transatlantic intellectual biography. Although Prezzolini spent many years of his life in the USA, his blueprint for conservatism, which he developed in the 1970s, clung explicitly to Italian traditions. For him, conservatism could only be conceived as a national creed. Finally, Johannes Grossmann (Tübingen) drew attention to 'Conservatism as a Lifestyle? Cross-Border Mobility, Transnational Sociability, and the Emergence of a Transatlantic Conservative Milieu since the Late

1960s'. Transatlantic networks of conservative politicians and businessmen figured as arenas of political discussion and facilitated the exchange of ideas. In clandestine and almost private settings, friendships and partnerships developed, and holidays were spent together in Franco's Spain or in Liechtenstein. Whether a recognizable conservative lifestyle was created in these settings was open to discussion.

Following a panel that had looked at conservatism in the light more of politics than of culture, the final discussion stressed the importance of bringing the two perspectives together and exploring their interconnections. There was little disagreement about the fact that political, economic, and cultural factors were interconnected, but there was less agreement about the nature of these interconnections and about how they are best grasped conceptually. Political conservatism (voting for a conservative party) could be accompanied by cultural conservatism (an aversion to same-sex marriage or a preference for Andrew Lloyd Webber) or not. Nor did cultural progressivism always go hand in hand with a left-wing party affiliation. However, to study such intersections, and frictions, requires openness both from political historians, who still often tend to ignore cultural factors, and cultural historians, who are often more interested in avant-garde and left-leaning subcultures than in conservative ones. In exploring ways to analyse the relationship between conservatism and culture through different case studies, the conference demonstrated that this approach has a great deal of potential.

TOBIAS BECKER (London), ANNA VON DER GOLTZ (Washington), MARTINA STEBER (Munich)

Medieval History Seminar, organized by the German Historical Institute London and the German Historical Institute Washington, and held at the GHIL, 12–14 October 2017.

All historians need their own take-home message. This only seemingly banal finding came out of the Medieval History Seminar (MHS) 2017, which brought together young medievalists from the three participating countries (Germany, the UK, and the USA). Fifteen junior researchers were selected and invited to send in a draft, chapter, or summary of their completed or advanced doctoral dissertations for discussion with their peers as well as established scholars. For this purpose, Ruth Mazo Karras (Minnesota), Paul Freedman (Yale), Dorothea Weltecke and Bernhard Jussen (both Frankfurt/M.), Len Scales (Durham), and, for the last time, Stuart Airlie (Glasgow) went to London as conveners. Cornelia Linde (GHI London) organized the seminar, attended the discussions, and supplemented the programme by arranging a gripping public lecture by Ruth Karras entitled 'Thou Art the Man: King David and Masculinity' and a useful introduction to the *Repertorium Germanicum* by Andreas Rehberg (GHI Rome).

But true to the MHS's accustomed format, the focus was on the papers. The procedure was the same as in previous years: each paper was submitted one month in advance. In London, the shared papers were first commented on by participants before being discussed in the plenum. Only then did the conveners offer criticism, suggestions, and further advice. The concentrated atmosphere and intense discussions, which often went beyond the parameters of the sessions, showed that the MHS 2017 was a three-day-meeting of passionate historians.

As always, the open remit of the seminar resulted in a wide range of recent research approaches being represented, from traditional history of the Empire and the Papacy, to the history of emotions, subaltern studies, and transcultural interactions, with a small focal point on Jewish history. Despite this variety of topics, unfortunately no paper was presented that went beyond Latin–Greek Europe to focus on Asia and Africa. It is regrettable that important recent discussions in these fields were missing from the seminar. Chronologically, the

The full conference programme can be found under 'Events and Conferences' on the GHIL's website <www.ghil.ac.uk>.

papers covered the spectrum from Carolingian times, specifically the ninth century, to the sixteenth century, not without occasionally questioning the common habit of defining historical periods chronologically.

The MHS 2017 opened with two papers on late medieval Italy. Giuseppe Cusa (Frankfurt/M.) analysed specific forms of local historiography. In his profound investigation of partly non-edited sources, he connected the meaning of clerical works with municipal political developments in Verona–Treviso from *comune* to *signoria*. Sarina Kuersteiner (New York) literally read between the lines of her texts, the Bologna *Memoriali* lists. What role did the variety of poems, poetic rhymes, and sometimes even drawings play in these notarial records? Is it possible to connect the motives of love and desire with new moralities created by the monetization of Italy in the late Middle Ages? The possible meanings of these images show how important it is also to consider visual sources in research. Contemporary images should not be an object of research only for art historians.

It was fitting that the seminar continued with Aaron Jochim's (Heidelberg) study of imagined coats of arms. Via Portolan charts, Jochim argued, motifs of Mamluk origin were transmitted to Western Europe and found their way into Latin–Christian heraldry. Finn Schulze-Feldmann (London), in his project, analyses the role played by the medieval legend of the Tiburtine Sibyl in the lay devotion of late fifteenth and sixteenth-century Europe. He argued that the medieval veneration of the Sybil was disrupted neither by contemporary humanist impulses nor by the new devotional practices introduced by the Reformation.

At the beginning of the third panel, Veit Groß's (Freiburg) paper explored the subject of social mobilization in the late Middle Ages. Taking the pilgrimage of Niklashausen in 1476 as an example, he explained this social movement as a form of rationally acting collective and connected it with new thoughts about subaltern protest. Christoph Haack (Tübingen) focused on more basic considerations about military organization in the Carolingian Empire. He confronted the previous literature about feudal systems (Bernard Bachrach, Timothy Reuter) with a new concept of personal networks. These networks provided the public contingents in Carolingian warfare and, in addition to their military meaning, also played a special role in the socio-political organization of the imperial structures.

Benedict Wiedemann (London) studied the papacy's financial administration at the end of the twelfth century and argued that papal revenue was discretionary and therefore both unpredictable and non-prescriptive. Leonie Exarchos (Göttingen) was the only participant in the MHS 2017 whose investigation focused on Constantinople. In her study she analysed Latin–Greek relations as shaped by individual actors whom she classified as experts in particular fields. Exarchos showed that these experts had not one, but several loyalties going in different directions, both to the Latin West and to the Greek East.

The fifth panel was dedicated to Jewish history in the Middle Ages. Building on Jeremy Cohen's concept of the 'hermeneutic Jew', Amélie Sagasser (Heidelberg) developed the concept of 'historical Judaism' that can also be expanded to include 'politicized Judaism'. Sagasser described the concrete treatment of Jews in Carolingian legislative texts in these terms. Franziska Klein (Duisburg-Essen) examined a specific case of welfare in England. In the thirteenth century the English kings undertook to care for Jewish converts, who were distributed between numerous religious houses. This practice, Klein argued, illustrates the multi-dimensional challenges facing conversion in general during the Late Middle Ages.

The penultimate panel of MHS 2017 dealt with kings and kingship in three completely different ways. Vedran Sulovsky's (Cambridge) paper was an attempt to ascertain the true meaning of the term *sacrum imperium*. He connected it with Charlemagne's memory programme in Aachen and argued that the Empire was already regarded as holy even while its name was still just Roman Empire. Marie-Astrid Hugel (Heidelberg/Paris) discussed the idea of *rex* and *sacerdos* based on the figure of the priest king Melchisedech. For this purpose, she drew on general theoretical concepts of priest kings in the Late Middle Ages as well as concrete references to Melchisedech in contemporary sources, where she found about 150 images of him. Unsurprisingly she, too, underlined the significance of images in historical research. Finally, in Manuel Kamenzin's (Bochum) paper, a real king was the focus. No certainty is possible about the circumstances of King Henry (VII) of Germany's death in the thirteenth century. The contemporary suicide theories of Emperor Frederick's II oldest son as well as new research by recent paleopathologists, who diagnosed death by leprosy, can both be refuted. Kamenzin advocat-

ed increased discussion of the various contemporary interpretations of the royal death—in written sources as well as in images—rather than looking for a true medical diagnosis.

The two papers in the final session dealt with monastic structures in early and late medieval Germany. Philipp Meller (Berlin) identified tenth-century monasteries as important spaces for conducting East Frankish foreign affairs with Muslims, Slavs, and Hungarians. His transcultural micro-approach showed that these diverse contacts, from Bavaria to Lorraine, were, for the most part, perceived not as a chance to discover or evaluate foreign parts and regions, but rather as an opportunity for a cohesive and confident community to present itself. Katja Mouris (Washington DC) looked at whether specific characteristics of female adherents of monastic rule in convents in late medieval Germany can be connected to the new impulses of Lutheran Reformation. The example of St Klara in Nuremberg shows that an insistence on the local observance under the dominant abbess Caritas Pirckheimer led to the slow but inevitable downfall of the convent in the Protestant sixteenth century.

In the final discussion, Stuart Airlie as the senior convener gave a detailed summary of the last three days, and commented on the diversity of the submitted papers. All participants appreciated the concentrated and passionate discussions throughout the whole seminar. For young medievalists, the MHS provides a unique opportunity to present their research in such a small group with an intense workshop atmosphere, which produces precise and fruitful comments on each paper. Especially for those who have not already finished their theses, these remarks are very relevant. In order to extend the range of submitted papers, the MHS in future will be opened up to junior researchers from Canada and Ireland. Although submissions from more historians working on non-European topics are encouraged, the basic principles of the format will be retained in future seminars.

Finally, the conveners drew attention to the general importance of historical research, especially in such uncertain times as the present, in each of the three participating countries. They argued that the participants of the MHS came to London not just as historians, but also as citizens representing their respective countries. Every historian bears a special responsibility with his or her work and research. The MHS 2017 ended with this more general take-home message. May its

success, irrespective of any external troubles, continue at the next seminar, which will take place in 2019, again in London.

PHILIPP MELLER (Berlin)

Shaping the Officer: Communities and Practices of Accountability in Premodern Europe. Conference organized by the German Historical Institute London and supported by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung für Wissenschaftsförderung and the Ludwig Maximilian University Munich (DFG Project 'Natur in politischen Ordnungsentwürfen: Antike—Mittelalter—Frühe Neuzeit'), and held at the GHIL, 8–10 November 2017. Conveners: María Ángeles Martín Romera (LMU Munich) and Hannes Ziegler (GHIL).

The key concept of 'state-building' has dominated European historiography on premodern state authority since the 1980s. It stresses institutional evolution from the medieval to the modern period, often initiated by the administration of public finances. In this context, officers' accountability has drawn attention to interactions between subjects and rulers in a top-down view, providing new perspectives for the analysis of public authority. Yet while traditionally the emphasis has been on office-holders as key agents of central authority, recent research has attributed a bigger role to popular influence in procedures and practices of accountability. The conference 'Shaping the Officer: Communities and Practices of Accountability in Premodern Europe' followed this trend and moved the focus from the officers and the logic of the state to influences from below. It underlined the strategies of communities as watchers who exerted tangible influence over the officers' behaviour. The conference focused on the ways in which local populations actively engaged in the task of ruling their territories and shaping political institutions. Drawing on political, institutional, anthropological, and prosopographical history, the conference covered a wide geographical and temporal range.

After a programmatic introduction by María Ángeles Martín Romera (Munich) and Hannes Ziegler (London), the first session assessed the inner logic of interaction between office-holders and communities in medieval accountability procedures. Alexandra Beauchamp (Limoges) questioned the efficiency of communities' influence on office-holders in procedures of accountability in late medieval Aragon. While local communities played an active role in end-of-term surveys by submitting complaints and petitions, these proce-

The full conference programme can be found under 'Events and Conferences' on the GHIL's website <www.ghil.ac.uk>.

dures generally had a time limit and rarely ended in a trial. Moreover, popular influence did not seem to affect officers' careers. Rather than resulting in outright opposition, accountability provided a medium of co-operation between communities and central authority. Laure Verdon (Aix-Marseille) reflected on the use of public inquiries in shaping officers' behaviour, taking the example of Jean d'Arsis, knight and sénéchal of Alphonse de Poitiers in Rouergue and the Comtat Venaissin during the thirteenth century. D'Arsis was accused of private enrichment in office but Verdon argued that accusations like this were routinely instrumentalized for political aims. His office made D'Arsis an important intermediary between local communities and central authority, but it also exposed him to political charges.

The second session turned to informal practices of accountability. Attilio Stella (St Andrews) looked at the bureaucratization of justice in communal Italy in the thirteenth century. He showed that authority and territorial control beyond the city-state were still rather limited and largely a matter of negotiation. Office-holders needed to achieve compromises in negotiating with local elites and often depended on popular support and kinship networks. Stella thus openly challenged the 'myth' of the city-state and its territorial control in medieval Italy. Philippa Byrne (Oxford) shifted the focus from secular officers to the realm of the church. Ecclesiastical representatives in medieval England had a number of responsibilities associated with their office. Focusing on official discourse, she showed that being a good judge was always a question of personal virtues attached to Christian values. Here the two biblical examples of Moses and Samuel served as models for bishops in the thirteenth century. In following these examples, she argued, bishops were exercising a role as intercessor between the people and authority.

Thierry Pécout's (Saint-Étienne) evening lecture looked at the nature of the state and the exercise of power in the short-lived political construct of the Angevin state. His conceptual lecture suggested dismissing the category of the 'state' in the study of premodern state-building. Rather than focusing on a fixed set of political structures, Pécout proposed a re-thinking of the state as a set of historically grown institutions. More focus needed to be placed, he argued, on the means of exercising power, the reproduction of administrative know-how, and personal political relationships. As a result, the

monarchy of Anjou–Provence–Sicily appeared less as the realization of an ideological programme than as the meeting of interests of a 'société politique'. The bonds and interactions between rulers and subjects formed an important basis for this process as they established sovereign legitimacy and collective political networks.

The second day started with a panel on formal and informal mechanisms of accountability. Adelaide Costa (Lisbon) examined the crown's systematic appointment of 'juizes de fora' to the most important municipalities of the kingdom of Portugal. These outside judges involved the communities as witnesses in judicial procedures. Their collaboration was a formal method of including popular opinion on legal standards but the communities' influence remained limited: despite being paid by the community, outside judges were not chosen by the urban subjects and their jurisdiction was larger than the city's territorial responsibility. Hipólito Rafael Oliva Herrer (Seville) looked at informal methods of exerting influence by showing how local elites in late medieval Castile affected political decisions by means of defamation, accusation, and rumour. He showed that complaints against officers were not necessarily based on a political charge, but could also relate to the officers' social reputation or moral actions (perjury, betrayal, adultery). Ultimately, these forms of resistance revealed collective expectations about legitimate government and, by extension, the definition of good office-holders.

But relations between rulers could also emphasize social harmony. Rebecca Springer (Oxford) explored the close interaction between local elites and episcopal power. In his pastoral care, the bishop of Exeter emphasized charity, Christian generosity, hospitality, and the necessity of intercession. Along with the citizens of Exeter he invested heavily in the foundation of a hospital, donations for lepers, and remembrances for the dead. The bishop and the community thus acted with a common purpose and Springer argued that the bishop, in fact, largely responded to the community's expectations. Jonathan Lyon (Chicago) came back to the problem of confrontation. He linked his reading of the Wilhelm Tell narrative to the creation of the Swiss confederacy and, more particularly, to the war of independence, led by local elites against the Habsburg's local representative, the territorial advocate. His behaviour towards families and their possessions was portrayed as a transgression of authority. In fact, Lyon argued that the legend of Wilhelm Tell was a powerful way of reminding

officers that extortion and violence defined the lines not to be crossed, thus establishing limits to the exercise of the officials' authority.

After a number of papers on medieval Europe, the conference moved to the early modern period. Marco Bellabarba (Trento) highlighted the influence of popular opinion in a number of Italian states and republics. Bellabarba stressed that while officers' accountability had a common origin in the 'sindacato' process, there were many different procedures in place on the peninsula in the following centuries. Generally, the limits on the exercise of authority by office-holders seem to have been increased. At the same time, office-holders often lost their affiliation with urban elites, resulting in a diminution of social status. Bellabarba argued that significant crises often occurred in the processes by which city-states were transformed into territorial states when office-holders acted as local mediators who relied on social bonds and clientelism. Johannes Kraus (Frankfurt/Main) explored a different context of resistance in the Upper Palatinate during the Thirty Years War. Presenting war as a social and economic threat, he argued that people developed different strategies of resistance to central demands. A refusal to co-operate and active opposition was preferred by local elites, but the common people found different ways. Bargaining with the tax collector for exemptions, filing supplications to the government, and co-operating with local officers are among these strategies. Federico Gálvez Gambero (Málaga) showed how increased public credit created a new theoretical basis for the fiscal practice of the Castilian Royal Treasury. By duplicating lines of command and flows of information, administrations were seeking new procedures for financial and fiscal control. This institutional evolution led to an increase in the power of middle and lower-ranking officers based on technical knowledge. Thus the Castilian administration was opened up to popular influence, employing new social groups.

The third day of the conference looked at corruption and languages of power in early modern Europe. Christoph Rosenmüller (Mexico City/Murfreesboro) examined the role of public authority and its normative standards in the empowerment of popular influence. He argued that the laws of office-holding provided standards of accountability which did not emanate only from above. Natives used *ius commune* precepts to challenge officers' qualifications and

behaviour. The law thus functioned as a weapon. In doing so, they relied on a common heritage of global regulations (customs, the Bible, royal orders) to protect themselves against bad officers. Spike Sweeting (London) also focused on corruption, in his case in the Port of London in the eighteenth century. His anthropological approach revealed close relations between corruption and biological life cycles among customs officers. He argued that life-cycle arguments were increasingly being used by customs officers in the late eighteenth century to justify certain forms of corruption. Especially with regard to the fundamental debate about remuneration by salary or fees, officers successfully exerted pressure on their superiors and on merchants in order to increase their profits.

The next session came back to formal accountability procedures. Sébastien Malaprade (Paris) looked at the Spanish 'Visita' as a judicial form of officers' accountability. It acted as a catharsis to purge social and political tensions by integrating popular opinion and socially exposing bad officers. In this context, Malaprade attributed an important role to public denunciation and social censorship. Collusion between subjects and rulers in holding officers' accountable in public or secret procedures was also highlighted by Martín Romera. The 'residencias' affected officers' behaviour by subjecting them to a trial and potential social humiliation. This legal system was regularly exploited, sanctioning the authority of communities and representing a consistent vehicle or forum for popular politics. The role of public performance in interactions was a political expression by communities, alternating between silent negotiation and public confrontation, and thus reflected the expectations of urban elites and popular demands.

The credibility of witnesses versus office-holders was discussed by Ziegler. He argued that informing by local populations was used as a deliberate tool by central governments to survey and reform local customs administrations. Interaction between representatives of central authority and local communities was based on a mutual understanding of what constituted a bad officer. By way of this mechanism, central authorities achieved a more thorough control of their office-holders in peripheral institutions. At the same time, informers were themselves exposed to social pressures in their communities, frequently affecting their social status. Niels Grüne (Innsbruck) also looked at communication from below. He analysed peti-

tions as a way in which early modern governments supervised local office-holders. Facing growing discontent among the territorial estates, the authorities in Hesse-Kassel and Württemberg in the eighteenth century temporarily expanded political participation to encourage complaints from below. These denounced the lack of governmental regulation of the fiscal system and external investigations against officers. Communities thus resorted to petitions as a source of legitimacy for the common good, making an impact on current political debates, legislation, and institutional procedures.

The closing lecture by Michael Braddick (Sheffield) examined narratives about officers' accountability during the English Revolution and Civil Wars. At this time, fiscal and military functions were essential to understanding the officers' social and political position within the communities of England. The self-presentation of officers responded to social expectations of legitimization and naturalization of power, defined as a natural hierarchy reflected in behaviour and social reputation. Within this framework, power was no longer a routine exercise of strength, but the internalizing of a legitimate way of life, discourse, and manners. Officers therefore feared public exposure and humiliation because charges against their behaviour or technical competence could result in long-term personal or familial damage, and also in criticisms of royal sovereignty. With a broad outlook on early modern England, Braddick showed to what extent the exercise of authority was a result of influences and pressures from below.

JUSTINE MORENO (TEMOS, Angers)

NOTICEBOARD

Scholarships Awarded by the GHIL

Each year the GHIL awards a number of research scholarships to postgraduate and postdoctoral students at German universities to enable them to carry out research in the United Kingdom and Ireland, and in some cases to postgraduates at British and Irish universities for research visits to Germany. The scholarships are generally awarded for a period of up to six months (only full months), depending on the requirements of the research project. Applicants from British universities will normally be expected to have completed one year of postgraduate research, and be studying German history or Anglo-German relations. Deadlines for applications are 31 March (for the period from July) and 30 September (for the period from January) each year. Applications should include a CV, educational background, list of publications (where appropriate), and an outline of the project, along with a supervisor's reference confirming the relevance of the proposed archival research. During their stay in Britain, scholars from Germany present their projects and initial results at the GHIL's Colloquium, and scholars from the United Kingdom or Ireland do the same on their return from Germany. For further information visit <http://www.ghil.ac.uk/scholarships.html>.

In the first allocation for 2018 the following scholarships were awarded for research on British history, German history, and Anglo-German relations:
Sören Brandes (Berlin), Der Aufstieg des Marktpopulismus: Die Medialisierung des Neoliberalismus in den USA und Großbritannien, 1940–1990
Felix Fuhg (Berlin), Growing Up in the Global Metropolis: London's Working-Class Youth Culture and the Making of Post-Imperial Britain, 1958–71
Ronny Grundig (Potsdam), Von der Leistungs- zur Erbengesellschaft? Politiken und Praktiken des Erbens und Vererbens und deren Bedeutung für soziale Ungleichheitsverhältnisse in Deutschland und Großbritannien (1949–1995)

Kristoffer Klammer (Bielefeld), Regelhüter für die Welt? Eine Kulturgeschichte des Schiedsrichters, *c.*1860–1980
Christian Koch (Heidelberg), Was ist Pagode in Britisch Burma? Eine religionswissenschaftliche und (trans-)kulturwissenschaftliche Genealogie
Felix Mauch (Munich), Die stille Revolution: Singapur als logistische Stadt, 1848–1914
Anam Soomro (Berlin), A Critical Inquiry into Freedom of Movement: Race, Colonialism, and the Making of International Law
Christine Strotmann (Berlin), Brot versus Bomben: Stickstoff für Düngemittel und Rüstungsindustrie im Zeitalter der Weltkriege
Annika Vosseler (Leipzig), The Visual Representation of Africa in European Missionary Drawings in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries
Sara Weydner (Berlin), The Internationalization of Criminal Law: A Transnational History of the Cambridge International Commission for Penal Reconstruction and Development
Andrea Wiegeshoff (Marburg), Von Erregern und Menschen: Eine Kulturgeschichte seuchenpolitischen Handelns im 19. Jahrhundert (1850–1920)

Joint Stipendiary Junior Research Fellow with IAS/UCL

The Institute of Advanced Studies, University College London, and the German Historical Institute London award a joint Stipendiary Junior Research Fellowship tenable for a period of six months. The purpose of the Junior Research Fellowship is to offer an outstanding early career scholar from a German university the opportunity to pursue independent research in the stimulating intellectual environment of the two host institutions. Applications are invited from postdoctoral academics with an excellent research record. The Fellowship is open to those working in any of the subjects that have a strong research base at the Institute of Advanced Studies and the German Historical Institute London (GHIL), such as history, art history, and literary studies. There are no restrictions on nationality. Applicants, however, must be affiliated to a German university or non-university research institution. They must also have obtained their doctorate and will normally have no more than five year' postdoctoral research

experience in an academic environment. Fellows will be expected to take up residence in London for the duration of the Fellowship and to present their research project at both institutions. To allow the Fellow to focus on carrying out research, there are no teaching or administrative duties associated with the Fellowship.

Applicants should send a CV, details of their proposed research project (maximum length 1,000 words), a sample of their written work, and the names of two referees in one PDF file to the Deputy Director of the GHIL, Dr Michael Schaich (schaich@ghil.ac.uk). For further details see: <https://www.ghil.ac.uk/scholarships.html>.

In 2017/18 the scholarship was awarded to: *Christina Brauner* (Bielefeld), Practices of Advertising in Early Modern Europe

Postgraduate Students Conference

The German Historical Institute London held its twenty-second postgraduate students conference on 11–12 January 2018. Its intention was to give postgraduate research students in the UK and Ireland working on German history an opportunity to present their work-in-progress, and to discuss it with other students working in the same or a similar field. The conference opened with words of welcome by the GHIL's Deputy Director, Michael Schaich. Over the next day and a half, thirteen speakers introduced their projects to an interested and engaged audience. Participants gave a short summary of their work containing general ideas, leading questions, sources, and initial findings, followed by discussion. Information was also exchanged about institutions that give grants for research in Germany. The GHIL can offer support by facilitating contact with German archives and providing letters of introduction, which may be necessary for students to gain access to archives or specific source collections. In certain cases it may help students to make contact with particular German universities and professors. The conference was preceded by a palaeography course tutored by Dorothea McEwan.

The GHIL is planning to hold the next postgraduate students conference on 10–11 January 2019. For further information, including how to apply, please contact the Secretary, Anita Bellamy, German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ.

Crawford Matthews (Hull), 'He Sets a Greater Value upon such a Ceremonial, Than upon Matters of Greater Importance': Frederick I, England, and the Adoption of Royal Ceremonial
Morgan Golf-French (London), History, Ethics and Revolution: Göttingen, 1789–1815
Christos Aliprantis (Cambridge), On the Traces of Revolutionary Emigrés: The International Activity of the Austrian Secret Police after 1848
Stuart Wrigley (London), Out of the Shadows: Life and Work in 1850s London for Émigré and Kindergarten Pioneer Bertha Ronge
Lucia Linares (Cambridge), German Political Thought and 'Jewish Questions', 1916–1926
Jan Stöckmann (Oxford), The Formation of International Relations: Ideas, Practices, Institutions, 1914–1940
Samantha Winkler (Manchester), Networks of Activists in Britain between the Wars: A Study of Relief Workers and Pacifists
Anita Klingler (Edinburgh), Negotiating Violence: Defining the Legitimacy of Political Violence in Interwar Britain and Germany (*c.*1918–1938)
Margarete Tiessen (Cambridge), German Literary Publishers and National Re-Orientation in the Twentieth Century: Samuel Fischer and His Successors
Nadine Tauchner (Leicester), Bund Neuland: The 'Unpolitical' Politics of a Catholic Youth Movement
Samantha Knapton (Newcastle), From Forced Labourers to Displaced Persons: Experiences of Poles in the British Zone of Occupation, 1945–1951
Emily Steinhauer (London), From Critical Theorists to Political Actors: Theodor W. Adorno's and Max Horkheimer's Role in West German Politics
Marlene Schrijnders (Birmingham), Endzeitopia: Dissonant Bodies and (Self-) Control at the Final Stage of 'Real Existing Socialism'
Jenny Price (Warwick), Learning Democracy? Democratization in Eastern Germany, 1989–1994

Prize of the German Historical Institute London

The Prize of the German Historical Institute London is awarded annually for an outstanding Ph.D. thesis on German history (submitted to a British or Irish university), British history (submitted to a German university), Anglo-German relations, or an Anglo-German comparative topic. The Prize is 1,000 euros. Former Prize winners include Simon Mee, Marcel Thomas, Benjamin Pope, Mahon Murphy, Chris Knowles, and Helen Whatmore.

To be eligible a thesis must have been submitted to a British, Irish or German university after 30 June 2017. To apply, send one copy of the thesis with

- a one-page abstract
- examiners' reports on the thesis
- a brief CV
- a declaration that the author will allow it to be considered for publication in the Institute's German-language series, and that the work will not be published before the judges have reached a final decision
- a supervisor's reference

to reach the Director of the German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ, by 31 July 2018. The Prize will be presented on the occasion of the Institute's Annual Lecture in November 2018.

For further information visit: <http://www.ghil.ac.uk>
Email: ghil@ghil.ac.uk Tel: 020 7309 2050

Forthcoming Conferences

Splendid Isolation? Insularity in British History. Conference organized by the German Association for British Studies and the German Historical Institute London, to be held at the Centre for British Studies (Großbritannienzentrum) at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 4–5 May 2018. Conveners: Wencke Meteling (Philipps-Universität Mar-

burg), Andrea Wiegeshoff (Philipps-Universität Marburg), Christiane Eisenberg (HU Berlin) and Hannes Ziegler (GHI London).

The conference will explore the interrelationship between isolation and connection on the British Isles in an epoch-spanning and interdisciplinary approach. Focusing on politics and cultures of insularity, it will discuss the place and specific meaning of the island situation from early modern times to Brexit looming today. The conference seeks to investigate contexts in which insularity was referred to, explore shifting meanings attached to this notion, and examine the actors who made use of the 'island argument', their specific interests and practices. This includes first, and at a general level, tensions between connectivity and isolation in the British context. We would like to chart the powerful but often consciously misleading claim of unity attached to the island idea. Either strategically employed or unconsciously adopted, the island notion is likely to obscure both the internal tensions on the British Isles and the actual dominance of England in questions of national identity and external tensions regarding geo-political expansion and colonization in the British Empire. A critical reading of the island idea in these contexts and in relation to specific projects, policies, and practices might provide new insights into the processes of nation-building and Empire-building.

Movable Goods and Immovable Property: Gender, Law, and Material Culture in Early Modern Europe (1450–1850). Ninth Conference of the European network 'Gender Differences in the History of European Legal Cultures', to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 19–21 July 2018. Conveners: Annette Cremer (Gießen) and Hannes Ziegler (GHI London).

The history of material culture offers important new ways of studying the significance of gender differences in the history of legal cultures by exploring new relationships between gender, law, and material culture. Material and immaterial possessions inform the self-image of individuals and societies, dynasties and families. A threefold legal distinction differentiates between (1) usufruct, (2) possession, and (3) property. Yet these relationships between individuals

and objects are not only relevant to civil law, but correspond to political regimes. While usufruct, possession, and property thus correspond to different forms of authority and society, they also have a bearing on gender relations at different levels of society. Usually, these gendered aspects of material culture are the products of traditional proximities between certain areas of activity and related groups of objects. Communities in early modern Europe can thus be said to have a gendered and often legally sanctioned relationship to the material world and the world of objects. This is the theme our conference is aiming to address. Our assumption is that this situation led to social rivalries and gender-informed conflicts between individual members of societies regarding usufruct, possession, and property. The action of taking possession of something is thus not just a way of achieving material security, but a form of social practice and self-assertion: in order to gain social status, as a way to accumulate social capital, or widen one's personal or dynastic room for manoeuvre. In this respect, the single most important event is the distribution of goods in generational succession. Despite their chronologically wide applicability, it is our aim to explore these questions with respect to early modern history.

Living the German Revolution 1918/19: Expectations, Experiences, Responses. Conference to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 18–20 October 2018. Conveners: Christopher Dillon (King's College London), Christina von Hodenberg (Queen Mary University of London), Steven Schouten (University of Amsterdam), and Kim Wünschmann (LMU Munich).

The German Revolution of 1918/19 marks a historical turning point when, following the catastrophe of the Great War, soldiers and civilians rose up to overthrow the German Empire's political and military leadership. The approaching centenary offers a timely occasion to re-evaluate its contested history and memory by focusing on the socio-cultural realm of expectations, experiences, and responses. The German Revolution was a key event in the era of seismic transnational upheaval which shook Europe between 1916 and 1923. An advanced industrial economy with the most powerful organized labour movement in the world, Germany was practically, strategically, and sym-

bolically critical to competing visions of the future in this new age of revolution. 'The absolute truth', wrote Lenin, 'is that without revolution in Germany we shall perish.'

The conference proposes to re-evaluate the history of the German Revolution by shifting attention to the practices and agency of protagonists and stakeholders beyond the political elites. It seeks to explore the subjective dimension of the events and to investigate the diverse expectations, experiences, and responses of Germans old and young, female and male, rural and urban, Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish. For despite its evident significance as a historical watershed, the German Revolution remains poorly understood. Scholarship has made faltering progress since the historiography of the 1960s and 1970s, which concentrated on the constitutional and high political course of the revolution. While the notion that historians have 'forgotten' the German Revolution is no longer entirely accurate, it remains one of the least-studied transitions in European history.

The conference's new perspective will register, among other topics, the revolution's popular mobilization and societal penetration, its impact on everyday life, its destruction of inherited patterns of authority, its generation of new affiliations, boundaries, and cultural expressions, and its complex and contested legacy for the Weimar Republican project. It will establish an intellectual toolkit for analysing the creation, performance, and experience of revolution and democratic citizenship, focusing on the dynamics of language, symbolism, practices, gender, emotions, and mentalities.

The Global Knowledge of Economic Inequality. Conference to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 15–17 November 2018. Convener: Felix Römer (GHIL).

Economic inequality has become one of the most contentious political topics of our time. Statistics on income and wealth disparities have come to play an increasingly important role in modern political culture, influencing public debates about distributional questions, societal self-descriptions, and perceptions of other societies. Global knowledge of economic inequality and poverty evolved incrementally, with important spurts occurring in the 1960s–1970s and then again during the 1990s–2000s. The first initiatives towards an inter-

national standardization of income and wealth statistics were launched by the UN and the OECD during the 1960s and 1970s, but made only slow progress. This contributed to delaying the debate about global inequality, which was long confined to measures such as GDP per capita, while comparisons in terms of personal income have only recently been possible as more data has become available. Both these debates and the underlying statistics have a history that is not yet fully understood.

Historians have recently begun to historicize the measurement of economic inequality and the changing public and academic interest in the subject since the post-war era. The German Historical Institute London will host an international conference in order to contribute to this growing field of research by bringing together historians and scholars from other disciplines working on the history of the knowledge of inequality. The conference will take a transnational perspective, but will also include comparative papers and case studies on individual countries that will help us to understand how global developments and entanglements are negotiated domestically.

LIBRARY NEWS

Recent Acquisitions

Abel, Esther, *Kunstraub – Ostforschung – Hochschulkarriere: Der Osteuropahistoriker Peter Scheibert* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016)

Adler, H. G., *Theresienstadt, 1941–1945: The Face of a Coerced Community*, trans. Belinda Cooper, afterword Jeremy Adler (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017)

Ahland, Frank, *Bürger und Gewerkschafter Ludwig Rosenberg 1903 bis 1977: Eine Biografie*, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Soziale Bewegungen, Schriftenreihe A: Darstellungen, 61 (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2016)

Althammer, Beate, *Das Bismarckreich 1871–1890*, 2nd rev. edn. (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2017)

Althammer, Beate, *Vagabunden: Eine Geschichte von Armut, Bettel und Mobilität im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung (1815–1933)* (Essen: Klartext, 2017)

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