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

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NATIONAL SECURITY AND HUMANITY: THE INTERNMENT OF CIVILIAN 'ENEMY ALIENS' DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR

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On 27 October 2017 Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull announced that his Liberal–National coalition government had lost its parliamentary majority. The reason was as simple as it was incomprehensible: Barnaby Joyce, leader of the National Party and Deputy Prime Minister of Australia, had to resign his seat in Parliament because he was a citizen of both Australia and New Zealand.[1] According to Section 44 of Australia's Constitution of 1901, Australians who hold dual citizenship are not eligible to sit in the House of Representatives or the Senate. The section is directed against any 'person who . . . is under any acknowledgement of allegiance, obedience, or adherence to a foreign power, or is a subject or a citizen or entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject or citizen of a foreign power: or . . . is attainted of treason, or has been convicted and is under sentence, or subject to be sentenced, for any offence punishable under the law of the Commonwealth or of a State by imprisonment for one year or longer.'[2] In the days and weeks that followed, more Members of Australia's Parliament realized that they held dual citizenships, and Turnbull now heads a minority government. He has announced that all MPs must prove that they have renounced any foreign citizenship to which they might be entitled.

Section 44 of the Australian Constitution reflected not only the White Australia Policy that was in force, but also the widespread xenophobia that led to the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901.[3]

This article is based on the Gerda Henkel Visiting Professorship Lecture delivered at the German Historical Institute London on 28 November 2017.

[1] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, no. 251, 28 Oct. 2017, 6.

[2] Parliament of Australia, Section 44 of the Constitution, <https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/archive/Section44>, accessed 6 Mar. 2018.

[3] Kay Saunders, ' "The stranger in our gates": Internment Policies in the United Kingdom and Australia during the Two World Wars, 1914–39', *Immigrants and*

Restrictive conceptions of citizenship such as those expressed in Australia's constitution were to reach unprecedented dimensions during the First World War. In fact, foreign nationals were oppressed in many belligerent states. 'Enemy aliens' (a designation enshrined in the British Aliens Act of 1905), in particular, became the object of hate propaganda, harassment, attacks, and, in some cases, even murder. As well as prisoners of war (POWs), civilian foreign nationals were targeted. Against the backdrop of nationalist mobilization and agitation against this group, governments imposed various restrictions on them. Internment and deportation were common. Before looking at these repressive measures and the propaganda campaign that accompanied them, this article will examine the context of total warfare and the role of civilian enemy aliens from 1914 to 1918. The third section will investigate the humanitarian engagement of the activists and organizations that opposed internment. The limitations on their activities and the contradictions inherent in them will also be highlighted. The article will conclude with a brief summary and some deliberations on the impact of the internment of civilian foreign nationals during the First World War in the twentieth century, and on anti-terrorist policies since the turn of the millennium.

I. *Introduction: Mobilization for War, 'National Security', and the Exclusion of 'Enemy Aliens'*

In general, perceptions of crisis and uncertainty have varied according to prevailing security cultures. These include the convictions, values, norms, and practices that shape perceptions of danger and influence decisions on measures to counter them, for instance, emergency legislation and imprisonment. On the basis of this definition, the perceptions and aims of specific individuals and institutions are topics of investigation in studies of security cultures. Emotions (in particular, fear and anxiety, but also trust and confidence) have to be taken into account as well. Specific actors usually perceive, imagine, define, accept, or reject security threats, most commonly resulting in count-

Minorities, 22/1 (2013), 22–43, at 28. In the meantime, Barnaby Joyce has announced his resignation as leader of the National Party in response to political pressure because of his relationship with a former assistant. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, no. 47, 24 Feb. 2018, 6.

er-measures, to be analysed in detail hereafter. Historical studies of security cultures, therefore, reconstruct and explain interpretations, imaginations, conceptualizations, and definitions of 'security' by specific actors, their emotive responses, as well as their agency and particular actions.[4]

The First World War, which left 17 million soldiers and civilians dead, was in many ways the first total military conflict. Overcoming the division between combatants and non-combatants as well as between the front line and the home front, it involved soldiers and civilians alike. The term 'home front' testified to the blurring of the previous distinction, while the mass killing of thousands of soldiers defied traditional ideas of heroic fighting and individual bravery. Trench warfare on the Western Front, in particular, frequently resulted in anonymous death, horrific physical injury, and lasting psychological strain. Fears, anxieties, and scares were the other side of national pride and conceptions of honour. In the words of Barbara Rosenwein, they constituted emotional communities that combined comprehensive inclusion with uncompromising exclusion.[5]

More particularly, fears of espionage, treason, and subversion that had increased in almost all major states in the early twentieth century reached unprecedented levels during the First World War, not without reason. After all, on 22 July 1913 the German Reichstag

[4] Christopher Daase, 'Sicherheitskultur: Ein Konzept zur interdisziplinären Erforschung politischen und sozialen Wandels', *Sicherheit und Frieden*, 29/2 (2011), 59–65; id., 'Die Historisierung der Sicherheit: Anmerkungen zur historischen Sicherheitsforschung aus politikwissenschaftlicher Sicht', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 38 (2012), 387–405; id., 'National, Societal, and Human Security: On the Transformation of Political Language', *Historical Social Research*, 35 (2010), 22–37; id., 'Wandel der Sicherheitskultur', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: Beilage zur Wochenzeitung 'Das Parlament'*, B 50/13 Dec. 2010, 12–14; Eckart Conze, 'Securitization: Gegenwartsdiagnose oder historischer Analyseansatz?', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 38 (2012), 453–46.

[5] John Horne, 'War and Conflict in Contemporary European History, 1914–2004', in Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger (eds.), *Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories* (New York, 2007), 1–95, at 84–5. On the concept of 'total war', see Alan Kramer, *Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War* (Oxford, 2007), 328, 331. See also Annette Becker, 'Paradoxien in der Situation der Kriegsgefangenen 1914–1918', in Jochen Oltmer (ed.), *Kriegsgefangene im Europa des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Paderborn, 2006), 24–31, at 29. On 'emotional communities' see Barbara

had lifted the ten-year rule that had allowed Germans living abroad to keep their German citizenship only for ten years. The new law allowed them to retain it for life. In those countries which had seen sizeable German immigration since the late eighteenth century, the change heightened fears of split loyalties, treason, and subversion. These were to become powerful emotional forces (and sometimes pretexts) governing the treatment of foreign nationals in the belligerent states from 1914 to 1918.[6]

Under the impact of total war, only remnants of civil society and humanitarianism remained in the major European states. In fact, governments and nationalist populists unleashed violence even against unarmed civilians, as this article will demonstrate. Taking the treatment of civilian internees as an example, it will highlight the advancement of concerns about 'national security' (as a genuine concern, an argument, or even a pretext for vested interests and specific aims) during the First World War. Citizens of antagonistic states and minorities were subjected to rigorous surveillance, interned, or even exterminated. This policy complemented the mobilization and utilization of all material and human resources for warfare. Not least, propaganda campaigns denounced 'enemies within' in order to keep up morale and provide an outlet for civilians' zeal to participate in the war. As so-called 'enemy aliens', citizens of antagonistic states (even if they were naturalized, and including stranded intellectuals and sailors) became victims of both an oppressive policy 'from above' and populist xenophobia 'from below'. Against this background, not only foreign nationals, but also those who seemed prepared to collaborate with the enemy were suspected and oppressed.

Rosenwein, 'Worrying about Emotions in History', *American Historical Review*, 107 (2002), 821–45.

[6] Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), 116–18, 136; Evgenij Sergeev, 'Die Wahrnehmung Deutschlands und der Deutschen in Russland 1914–1918', in Horst Möller and Aleksandr Čubar'jan (eds.), *Der Erste Weltkrieg: Deutschland und Russland im europäischen Kontext* (Berlin, 2017), 97–108, at 100; Annemarie H. Sammartino, *The Impossible Border: Germany and the East, 1914–1922* (Ithaca, NY, 2010), 22–3; Daniela Caglioti, 'Subjects, Citizens and Aliens in a Time of Upheaval: Naturalizing and Denaturalizing in Europe during the First World War', *Journal of Modern History*, 89 (2017), 495–530, at 516, 523; Saunders, 'The stranger in our gates', 30.

In particular, the internment of civilians was as an innovation of the First World War, as the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Gustave Ador, pointed out in 1917. In general, civilians in foreign countries were not protected by international treaties or conventions during the First World War. Nevertheless, some international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) defended basic standards of humanitarianism.[7]

Yet the treatment of civilian enemy aliens was largely shaped by a powerful and overwhelming need for outright military victory, the priority given to 'national security', and comprehensive political integration. On the home front, political dissent was therefore as rigorously suppressed as the foreign nationals who were widely suspected of being traitors, saboteurs, or spies. The policies and measures intended to safeguard domestic security led to the rise of 'national security states', which, in turn, mobilized dissent and protest among dissidents and pacifists. They demanded the preservation and protection of citizens' liberal and human rights for POWs and civilian internees. Although these critics of the obsession with national security were largely silenced and sidelined during the First World War, they effectively appealed to the governments' own interests, even in the short run. Pointing to the danger of reprisals, liberals and humanitarian organizations exploited the principle of reciprocity ('tit for tat') that rulers had to take into account. Moreover, in a long-term perspective these associations and their representatives contributed to improving the status of civilian internees in international law, paving the way for the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which were ultimately to protect civilians in belligerent states.[8]

[7] Matthew Stibbe, 'Ein globales Phänomen: Zivilinternierung im Erstem Weltkrieg in transnationaler und internationaler Dimension', in Christoph Jahr and Jens Thiel (eds.), *Lager vor Auschwitz: Gewalt und Integration im 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 2013), 158–76; Annette Becker, 'Captive Civilians', in Jay Winter (ed.), *The Cambridge History of the First World War*, vol. iii: *Civil Society* (Cambridge, 2014), 257–81, at 260.

[8] Peter Holquist, '"Information is the Alpha and Omega of our Work": Bolshevik Surveillance in its Pan-European Context', *Journal of Modern History*, 69 (1997), 415–50, at 417–19, 443, 445 (quotation at 443). For the wider context see Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception* (Chicago, 2005); Richard Thurlow, *The Secret State: British Internal Security in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford, 1994).

II. *'An Innovation of this War': The Treatment of Enemy Aliens*

In the First World War citizens of enemy states (POWs and civilians) were usually oppressed, and authorities also questioned the loyalty of minorities that they associated with enemy states. Although they were ordinary citizens, governments denounced, oppressed, and persecuted these 'foreigners'. At the same time, pacifists, socialists, and anarchists, who opposed their nations' war efforts, aroused suspicion, leading to harassment and oppression. In the 'official mind' as well as in the eyes of large sections of the population, these groups were a (potential) 'fifth column' of spies and saboteurs. Against the backdrop of these fears of subversion and treason, conspiracy theories proliferated in belligerent states such as Britain, Germany, France, and tsarist Russia. As a corollary, demands for national security gained legitimacy and urgency. Starting with efforts to deprive antagonistic states of male civilians as potential soldiers, nationalist politicians and 'concerned' citizens put pressure on governments and state authorities to control the mobility of the potential 'traitors', seize their possessions, and intern them. As rumours about 'hidden hands' spread, especially in the face of major defeats, military commanders and political elites, in particular, took measures that were intended to protect national security and prevent treason and subversion. In addition to enemy aliens and ethnic minorities, dissidents such as members of the pacifist Union of Democratic Control in Britain and the Bund Neues Vaterland (League of the New Fatherland) in Germany were targeted. Censorship and police raids deprived these organizations of vital resources. Governments justified these harsh measures by highlighting their obligation to protect the majority of citizens in a total war and thereby stabilize the home front.[9]

Yet these repressive policies restricted basic rights such as freedom of speech, assembly, and movement. In particular, they affected the treatment of POWs, civilian foreign nationals, and minorities. Among the groups that were targeted, POWs were fairly well protected, if by no means comprehensively. As early as 1863, the Lieber Code had obliged the troops of the North American states to treat

[9] Otto Lehmann-Russbüldt, *Der Kampf der Deutschen Liga für Menschenrechte vormals Bund Neues Vaterland für den Weltfrieden 1914–1927* (Berlin, 1927).

POWs from the Confederate States humanely in the bloody American Civil War. The Geneva Convention of 1864 confirmed this provision. Even more detailed regulations on POWs were passed by the conferences that were held in The Hague in 1899 and 1907. By contrast, the Hague Convention (of 1907) did not contain any explicit provisions for the treatment of civilians who were citizens of enemy states, apart from protecting them in war zones. The signatory states obviously did not foresee the scale of violence that was to occur in the First World War. Moreover, the implementation of the basic norms of international law remained in the hands of sovereign national governments, which had rejected any binding restrictions at The Hague. As soon as war was declared in 1914, the primacy of military victory and national security therefore meant that POWs and civilian enemy aliens were subjected to harsh restrictions promptly imposed on them by governments and the military. In multi-ethnic empires, in particular, minorities suspected of working for the enemy were also targeted. Measures taken against these groups ranged from isolation to forced labour, deportation, and internment in camps. In the case of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, repression peaked in outright genocide in 1915.[10]

All belligerent states declared a state of emergency at the beginning of the war. Reinforcing executive powers, special laws and extraordinary decrees allowed the authorities to restrict the basic human rights of enemy aliens and domestic opponents to the war. Most commonly, police and military authorities were empowered to arrest and intern enemy aliens. Furthermore, the freedom of speech

[10] Annie Deperchin, 'The Laws of War', in Jay Winter (ed.), *The Cambridge History of the First World War*, vol. i: *Global War* (Cambridge, 2014), 615–38, at 625; Becker, 'Captive Civilians', 260–1, 272, 280–1. On the Geneva Convention of 1864 see Uta Hinz, 'Humanität im Krieg? Internationales Rotes Kreuz und Kriegsgefangenenhilfe im Ersten Weltkrieg', in Oltmer, *Kriegsgefangene*, 216–36, at 218–19; Jochen Oltmer, 'Einführung: Funktionen und Erfahrungen von Kriegsgefangenschaft im Europa des Ersten Weltkriegs', ibid. 11–23, at 17; Alan Kramer, 'Kriegsrecht und Kriegsverbrechen', in Gerhard Hirschfeld et al. (eds.), *Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg* (Paderborn, 2003), 281–92, at 284–5; Becker, 'Paradoxien', 28. On the Hague Convention, see Stefan Oeter, 'Die Entwicklung des Kriegsgefangenenrechts: Die Sichtweise eines Völkerrechtlers', in Rüdiger Overmans (ed.), *In der Hand des Feindes: Kriegsgefangenschaft von der Antike bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Cologne, 1999), 41–59, at 50.

and assembly was severely restricted, not only in (constitutional) monarchies, but also in republics such as France, where citizens' and human rights had been declared as early as 1789 as a result of the revolution. All these repressive measures were to maintain the security of the indigenous populations. Governments and authorities also legitimized them by referring to similar steps that had (supposedly) been taken in enemy countries. This justification highlighted the principle of reciprocity, which characterized government policies vis-à-vis citizens of enemy states throughout the war. It resulted in reprisals, but also (though less frequently) in alleviations in internment camp conditions and exchanges of captives.

The internment of civilians was a particularly harsh measure which violated the basic principles of humanity enshrined in international law by 1914. In Germany alone, 112,000 internees were registered during the war. Most had been deported from Belgium and the western provinces of tsarist Russia. In the course of the First World War, German authorities recruited or forced 100,000 Belgian and French citizens to work in Imperial Germany and the occupied territories. In November 1918, 3,500 British civilians alone were still interned in Germany. In Britain, there were 32,000 interned civilians in mid 1915. Two years later 36,000 German and Austrian enemy aliens were held captive in camps, and 24,255 of them were still interned at the end of the war. In France, the authorities seized 60,000 Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians. In Romania 4,000 Germans and citizens of Austria-Hungary, and 1,000 Bulgarians had been arrested by 1916. Three hundred thousand citizens of the Central Powers and Russian Germans (that is, citizens of the tsarist Empire) were held captive in Russia.[11]

Internment camps for civilians (often incarcerated with POWs) were established in places ranging from Ahmednagar (India) to

[11] Figures taken from Matthew Stibbe, 'Civilian Internment and Civilian Internees in Europe, 1914–1920', in id. (ed.), *Captivity* (London, 2013), 49–81, at 73. Also see Tammy M. Proctor, *Civilians in a World of War* (New York, 2010), 76–129; Isabel V. Hull, *A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War* (Ithaca, NY, 2014), 125–40; Matthew Stibbe, *British Civilian Internees in Germany: The Ruhleben Camp, 1914–1918* (Manchester, 2008), 184; id., 'The Internment of Civilians by Belligerent States during the First World War and the Response of the International Committee of the Red Cross', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 41 (2006), 5–19, at 7–8.

Pietermarizuburg (South Africa), French Dahomey, and Liverpool (Australia). The policies that the belligerent states imposed on civilian 'enemy aliens' were also entangled on a global scale. With the exception of Japan, where a camp was established at Bando, governments reacted to each other in terms of both alleviations and reprisals. Several accords on exchanges testify to the central role of cross-border perceptions and interactions in the First World War. They immediately affected the lives of the civilians, who were often held as hostages. Especially the colonial powers Britain and France set up a global system of internment camps, and as a result, internees were frequently transferred between various regions of the world. The British Foreign Office also worked to control and regulate interment, even vis-à-vis the Dominions, thereby triggering frequent clashes between the governments.[12]

In Britain invasion scares, rumours about espionage, and fear of subversion had spread since the turn of the century. Starting in 1910, a subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial Defence had prepared for the internment of civilian enemy aliens in the case of war. Acting on these plans, the Liberal government of Prime Minister Herbert Asquith introduced the Defence of the Realm legislation to Parliament, which passed the bills with broad support on 8 August 1914. Under the terms of the Aliens Registration Act, which had been enforced five days earlier, all citizens of enemy states living on the British Isles had to register with the police and were not permitted to live in, or enter, any zones where they might pose a security risk.[13]

Police constables had arrested 12,381 foreign nationals by 12 November 1914, among them 8,612 Germans and 3,756 citizens of the Habsburg Empire.[14] After a German submarine torpedoed the ocean liner *Lusitania* on 7 May 1915, Germans were attacked in large-scale, violent riots, following accusations and defamation in the popular press. The editor of the weekly *John Bull*, Horatio Bottomley, for

[12] Mahon Murphy, *Colonial Captivity during the First World War: Internment and the Fall of the German Empire* (Cambridge, 2018), esp. 1–3, 6, 8–9, 13, 24, 26, 30–2, 39–60, 63–6.

[13] Becker, 'Captive Civilians', 262.

[14] Christoph Jahr, 'Zivilisten als Kriegsgefangene: Die Internierung von "Feindstaaten-Ausländern" in Deutschland während des Ersten Weltkrieges am Beispiel des "Engländerlagers" in Ruhleben', in Overmans (ed.), *In der Hand des Feindes*, 297–321, at 298.

instance, demanded a 'vendetta against every German in Britain whether "naturalised" or not'. He claimed: 'you cannot naturalise an unnatural beast—a human abortion—a hellish freak. But you can exterminate it. And now the time has come.' Emotives, to use William Reddy's term, reflected and heightened hostility and xenophobia. Ministers showed themselves impressed by the populist and nationalist propaganda. On 13 May Asquith ordered the internment of all non-naturalized male Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians who were liable for military service in their home countries. Women, children, and invalids were to be expelled immediately.[15]

Unlike the British government, the German authorities had not comprehensively prepared for the internment of civilians. Only when war became likely, on 31 July 1914, did the government draw on the law on the state of siege that had been passed in Prussia in 1851. It gave the German Emperor and the commanders of sixty-two military territories comprehensive executive powers. They could impose martial law that restricted the freedom of expression and assembly more comprehensively than in Britain.[16] Enemy aliens, indigenous minorities, and dissidents (especially socialists and pacifists) were subjected to military justice dispensed by forty extraordinary courts established by the military commanders. Authorities were given a free hand to arrest members of all groups that might

[15] Panikos Panayi writes about these events, but without relating them to human rights, in his *The Enemy in Our Midst: Germans in Britain During the First World War* (New York, 1991), esp. 283–91; id., 'Prisoners of Britain: German Civilian, Military and Naval Internees during the First World War', *Yearbook of the Centre for German and Australian Exile Studies*, 7 (2005), 29–43, esp. 29–30, 38. For xenophobia and antisemitism see id., 'An Embattled Minority: The Jews in Britain during the First World War', in Tony Kushner and Kenneth Lunn (eds.), *The Politics of Marginality: Race, the Radical Right and Minorities in Twentieth-Century Britain* (London, 1990), 61–81; id, '"The Hidden Hand": British Myths about German Control of Britain during the First World War', *Immigrants and Minorities*, 7 (1988), 253–72; id., 'Anti-German Riots in London during the First World War', *German History*, 7 (1989), 184–203; David Reynolds, *The Long Shadow: The Great War and the Twentieth Century* (London, 2013), 56; Jahr, 'Zivilisten als Kriegsgefangene', 299–300, 321; Kramer, 'Kriegsrecht und Kriegsverbrechen', 286. On 'emotives' see William M. Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge, 2001).

[16] Reynolds, *The Long Shadow*, 60.

endanger domestic security in the war without specific charges, hearings, or the right to appeal. Moreover, German socialists and pacifists who opposed the war could be forcibly recruited into the army. These government measures were fuelled by nationalist mobilization and large-scale populist propaganda.[17]

In October 1914 the Reich Ministry of the Interior, the Prussian Ministry of War and the Interior, and the German Admiralty decided to intern all Britons aged from 17 to 55, with the exception only of women, children, the elderly, pastors, and priests. This decision was influenced by the internment of German citizens in Britain and France, and early riots against them in those two countries. Britain had ignored a German ultimatum to free all interned Germans by 5 November 1914. As a consequence, British civilians were arrested and taken to the camp in Ruhleben (near Berlin). A similar camp in Holzminden was set up for French civilians. This interrelationship between internment in Germany and Britain highlights cross-border perceptions and reactions. It also points to the political power of German nationalists who put pressure on the authorities to lock up supposedly dangerous foreigners in the interests of preserving security on the home front.[18]

In France, too, citizens of Germany and the Habsburg Empire were largely perceived as a security risk. In addition to these potential spies and traitors, however, criminals and 'anti-social elements' were interned in French camps. All in all, 45,000 German, Austrian, and Hungarian civilians had been arrested by the end of 1915. The French authorities, however, proved unable clearly to identify the loyalties of citizens of the multi-ethnic Habsburg monarchy (in particular, of the Poles, the Czechs, and the Slovaks). The authorities also

[17] Christian Schudnagies, *Der Kriegs- oder Belagerungszustand im Deutschen Reich während des Ersten Weltkriegs: Eine Studie zur Entwicklung und Handhabung des deutschen Ausnahmezustandes bis 1918* (Frankfurt/Main, 1994).

[18] Jahr, 'Zivilisten als Kriegsgefangene', 299–301; Stibbe, *Internees*, 24, 27–30, 35–7, 40; Kramer, 'Kriegsrecht und Kriegsverbrechen', 286; Holquist, 'Information is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work', 442. On the rise of international law and the discussion about human rights in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870–1960* (Cambridge, 2002), 11–97; Paul Gordon Lauren, *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen* (Philadelphia, 2011), 43–77.

placed many Alsatians and Lorrainians under police surveillance, as they suspected them of pro-German loyalties. Only those who had clearly committed themselves to France (for instance, by serving in the army) were exempt from these oppressive measures in the region bordering on Germany.[19]

In the Habsburg Empire, security policies were directed not only against citizens of enemy states, but also against ethnic minorities charged with supporting Russia or Italy. Thus internees from tsarist Russia also included non-Russians in Austria-Hungary. As early as 27 August 1914 a special surveillance authority, the Kriegsüberwachungsamt, had ordered local police officers to intern individuals who seemed to pose a risk to the Habsburg Empire and threatened to impede its war effort. Wealthy suspects were confined to specific villages or communities, which restricted their mobility without them being put into camps. The distinction between confinement and internment was a special feature of the treatment of enemy aliens in Austria-Hungary.[20]

Against the backdrop of a successful offensive by Russian armies in late 1914 and early 1915, spy hysteria mounted in the Habsburg Empire, fuelled by fears of military defeat. In particular, minorities such as the Ukrainian Russians (Ruthenes), who were widely stigmatized as supporters of the Russian war effort, were subjected to random internment. They were held captive in camps such as Thalerhof (near Graz) without indictment or trial. After Italy entered the war in May 1915 the Austrian government ordered all citizens of that country to be interned too.[21]

The victims, as well as some liberal Austrian officials, had repeatedly protested against internment. In response to these complaints and charges of arbitrary decision-making, the government had established a commission of inquiry as early as November 1914. Its task was to investigate and reverse unjustified and ill-founded decisions on internment. Because of illness and epidemics that had spread in camps such as Thalerhof, however, the commission was not able to

[19] Claude Farcy, *Les camps de concentration français de la Première Guerre Mondiale, 1914–1920* (Paris, 1995); Kramer, 'Kriegsrecht und Kriegsverbrechen', 286. Figures taken from Becker, 'Captive Civilians', 267.

[20] Georg Hoffmann, Nicole-Melanie Goll, and Philipp Lesiak, *Thalerhof 1914–1936: Die Geschichte eines vergessenen Lagers und seiner Opfer* (Herne, 2010), 47.

[21] Ibid. 81.

start work until mid 1915. When the multi-ethnic Habsburg Empire faced collapse, the new emperor, Charles I, finally decreed a general overhaul of civilian internment in 1917. As a result of these inquiries, many interned civilian enemy aliens were set free or transferred from internment to confinement. Yet the authorities still banned them from military operation zones. According to the powerful generals, this restrictive measure was to avert any security risk for Austrian soldiers and civilians.[22]

Like Britain, the government (Council of Ministers) and authorities of tsarist Russia had taken precautionary measures against civilian foreign nationals even before the First World War broke out. Four days before partial mobilization, on 25 July 1914, General Mikhail Beliaev ordered the arrest of all men with foreign citizenship who were capable of serving as soldiers. As a result, the Russian authorities immediately interned 50,000 of the total of 600,000 civilian enemy aliens in the country.[23] In December 1914 the Council of Ministers banned all associations of foreign citizens in the Russian Empire. However, the authorities initially treated Austrians and Hungarians more leniently because they wanted to win over the Slav minorities in the Habsburg Empire, or at least to neutralize them. When German and Austro-Hungarian armies broke through the Russian front line in the battle of Gorlice-Tarnów in May 1915, however, the tsarist authorities imposed restrictive measures on Germans and citizens of Austria-Hungary. In the following weeks and months all civilian foreign nationals and members of minorities who were now generally suspected of disloyalty were deported from territories near the front line. In cities, too, (putative) spies and saboteurs suffered oppression. As these 'traitors' were publicly stigmatized and rumours about espionage and sabotage abounded, xenophobia spread like wildfire in the spring of 1915.

Against the backdrop of fears of military defeat, riots against Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians escalated into random lootings. In St Petersburg (which had been renamed 'Petrograd' as early as August 1914) and Moscow, civil activists (*obshchestvennost'*) promoted the nationalist and xenophobic campaign that the Council of

[22] Ibid. 29–46. Also see Steffen Bruendel, *Zeitenwende 1914: Künstler, Dichter und Denker im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Munich, 2014), 95; Stibbe, 'Internment', 58.
[23] Becker, 'Captive Civilians', 262.

Ministers had initiated in 1914. In the face of military disasters, propaganda was stepped up in May and June 1915, in order to mobilize all resources for the war effort.

In May 1915 the tsarist regime decreed that all citizens of nations Russia was fighting in the war had to be registered, and naturalization was abandoned. The Ministry of the Interior was obsessed with popular opinion about the war in the provinces and councils. A large-scale campaign against enemy aliens was undertaken to boost morale and demonstrate to its Western allies in the Entente that the tsarist Empire was determined to fight on. Not least, its punitive policies towards enemy aliens were intended to dispel any doubts held by Slavs in Austria-Hungary about Russia's solidarity with, and support for, them.[24]

Unexpectedly, the Russian authorities temporarily lost control of the campaign against enemy aliens. The riots that shook Moscow in May 1915 were similar to the unrest that had been directed against Germans in Britain a few days earlier, and some international communication is likely, though not documented. Yet the Council of Ministers failed to harness the xenophobic protests to support their official policy of war mobilization. In fact, the populist and nationalist agitation against enemy aliens ultimately turned against the rulers and thus backfired. Appealing to the widespread Russian nationalism in civil society and encouraging the formation of new patriotic organizations, the Council of Ministers involuntarily contributed to the breakup of the multi-ethnic tsarist Empire. The activities of these associations, which increasingly opposed official policies from 1915 onwards, highlight the ambivalent nature of the *obshchestvennost'* in the First World War. The abdication of Tsar Nicholas I in February 1917, which was to be followed by the installation of a liberal gov-

[24] Anastasiya Tumanova, 'Voluntary Associations in Moscow and Petrograd and their Role in Patriotic Campaigns during World War I (1914–February 1917)', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 62 (2014), 345–70, at 348, 354, 358; Becker, 'Captive Civilians', 269. For more details and the wider context see Thomas Porter and William Gleason, 'The Democratization of the Zemstvo during the First World War', in Mary Schaeffer Conroy (ed.), *Emerging Democracy in Late Imperial Russia: Case Studies on Self-Government (the Zemstvos), State Duma Elections, the Tsarist Government, and the State Council Before and During World War I* (Niwot, 1998), 228–42; Manfred Hildermeier, 'Traditionen "aufgeklärter" Politik in Rußland', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 276 (2003), 75–94.

ernment and, ultimately, the Bolshevik Revolution in October, eventually radicalized the demonization of suspected internal foes. Yet violence was no longer primarily directed against POWs and civilian internees, who represented about 5 per cent of the Empire's population in 1917. By contrast, class differentiation now overshadowed the previously dominant ethnic and national splits.[25]

Even neutral countries such as Switzerland sought to control foreign nationals. 'Internment' (legally impossible in a neutral country) was a special case there. Starting with a Franco-German agreement, Switzerland became a centre for the exchange of sick and wounded soldiers. A total of 67,700 combatants passed through the country from January 1916 until the repatriation of the last German soldier in February 1919. Women who had fled from the war and the wives of interned soldiers were admitted as well, with the result that 491 French, 809 German, 463 Belgian, and 380 Austro-Hungarian civilian internees lived in Switzerland on 31 October 1917. Xenophobia, limited resources, and concerns about the obligations of neutrality, however, meant that there were never more than 30,000 foreign nationals in Switzerland at the same time. The authorities initially lodged them in hotels and sanatoriums, not in camps. The foreigners were welcomed by the owners, who had suffered severely from plummeting demand after the outbreak of the First World War. Yet resentment against the refugees mounted as shortages led to poverty, unemployment, and unrest in 1917–18. Refugees from Russia, in particular, were suspected of being Bolshevik revolutionaries. Referring to 'national security', the Swiss government decided to restrict the ad-

[25] Eric Lohr, *Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I* (Cambridge, 2003), esp. 31–54, 166–73; Dietrich Beyrau, 'Mortal Embrace: Germans and (Soviet) Russians in the First Half of the Twentieth Century', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian History*, 10 (2009), 423–39, at 433–4; Tumanova, 'Voluntary Associations', 366–7; Matthew Stibbe, 'Introduction: Captivity, Forced Labour and Forced Migration during the First World War', in id. (ed.), *Captivity*, 2, 9–10; Holquist, 'Information is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work', 426–8; Heather Jones, 'Kriegsgefangenenlager: Der moderne Staat und die Radikalisierung der Gefangenschaft im Ersten Weltkrieg', *Mittelweg*, 36/4 (2011), 59–75. For the explosive force of the politics of nationalization in Russia under the tsars during the First World War see Mark von Hagen, 'The Great War and the Mobilization of Ethnicity in the Russian Empire', in Barnett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder (eds.), *Post Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State-Building* (London, 1998), 34–57.

mission of foreign soldiers and civilians. All in all, the internment was by no means exclusively motivated by altruistic humanitarian concerns that complied with the official glorification of Switzerland as a 'lighthouse of humanity'. In fact, providing a temporary refuge supported the ailing tourist industry. Moreover, between January 1916 and August 1919 the Swiss government received 137 million francs from the warring parties. It was also able to demand the delivery of more goods to the country from the Entente powers, which had sealed Central Europe off with their economic blockade. Not least, care for soldiers and civilians underpinned the humanitarian credentials of the Swiss elites and shielded their policy of (armed) neutrality from external interference.[26]

While the treatment of civilian foreign nationals had not been covered by international law before 1914, the internment of this group violated the contemporary understanding of humane treatment. Living conditions in internment camps such as that in Ruhleben were generally better than those for the POWs, and mortality was much lower than in the Second World War. In Germany, for example, only 3.2 per cent of internees died between August 1914 and May 1918. Yet internment ran counter to the standards of humanity that had been widely accepted by 1914.[27]

III. *Remnants of Civil Society in a Total War: Relief and Aid from International and National NGOs*

Despite their often strong bonds with the governments of the belligerent states, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),

[26] Thomas Bürgisser, *'Unerwünschte Gäste': Russische Soldaten in der Schweiz 1915–1920* (Zurich, 2010); id., 'Internees (Switzerland)', *1914–1918 Online: International Encyclopedia* <https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/internees_switzerland>, accessed 6 Mar. 2018. Figures taken from Anja Huber, 'The Internment of Prisoners of War and Civilians in Neutral Switzerland', in Stefan Manz, Panikos Panayi, and Matthew Stibbe (eds.), *Internment during the First World War: A Global Mass Phenomenon* (London, forthcoming 2018).

[27] Marc Spoerer, 'Zwangsarbeitsregimes im Vergleich: Deutschland und Japan im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg', in Klaus Tenfelde and Hans-Christoph Seidel (eds.), *Zwangsarbeit im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts: Bewältigung und*

other NGOs, such as the Society of Friends of Foreigners in Distress in London, and pacifists such as Ludwig Quidde and Bertrand Russell repeatedly criticized the frequently inhumane treatment of POWs and the random internment of civilians in the warring nations. They demanded the lifting of punitive measures, and called for relief. As early as 1914 the ICRC established an international information agency in Geneva that passed news about POWs and civilian internees to their relatives. The Agence internationale des prisonniers de guerre (AIPG, International Agency of Prisoners of War), which was directed by Frédéric Ferrière and had recruited no fewer than 1,200 mostly female volunteers by the end of 1914, received between 2,000 and 3,000 inquiries every day during the war years. In the last weeks before the ceasefire of 11 November 1918, the agency had to cope with a daily workload of no fewer than 15,000 to 18,000 requests. The files of the AIPG eventually comprised 4.9 million cue cards containing personal information. The organization also succeeded in obtaining lists of prisoners from the belligerents.

Even more importantly, the information agency published reports about POW and internment camps that had been inspected by committees of the ICRC. It organized aid for captured soldiers and interned civilians, especially parcels with much-needed provisions, such as food and clothing. By the end of 1915 the AIPG had sent almost 15.9 million packets to POWs and internees. Postal exchange provided relief and distraction, thereby preventing, or at least alleviating, 'barbed-wire disease'. Not least, the ICRC demanded and supported an exchange of captured soldiers, especially wounded ones, as well as old and sick civilians. The national Red Cross organizations in the neutral states of Switzerland, Denmark, and Sweden were especially active in this field. But even the governments of Germany and France in 1916, and Germany and Britain in the following year, agreed to set free civilian internees. Like punitive measures, relief was ultimately based on the principle of reciprocity between nation-states. International NGOs, however, were merely able to encourage and facilitate humanitarian aid in the First World War.[28]

vergleichende Aspekte (Essen, 2007), 187–226; Kramer, 'Kriegsrecht und Kriegsverbrechen', 286; Jahr, 'Zivilisten als Kriegsgefangene', 315–16 (figure), 318.

[28] Dieter Riesenberger, *Für Humanität in Krieg und Frieden: Das Internationale Rote Kreuz 1863–1977* (Göttingen, 1992), 61–82; Heather Jones, 'International

Within nation-states, too, civic associations and citizens' groups protested against the internment of civilian enemy aliens. In Germany the Bund Neues Vaterland in Berlin, modelled on the Ligue française pour la défense des droits de l'homme et du citoyen (French League for the Defence of Human and Citizen's Rights) of 1898, demanded that citizens of foreign states should be treated humanely, promoted understanding between the warring nations, and called for them to pursue a transparent foreign policy. The association, which was renamed Deutsche Liga für Menschenrechte (German League for Human Rights) in 1922, planned to set up a Zentralstelle für Völkerrecht (Central Agency for International Law). This organization also collaborated with the Quaker-led Friends Emergency Committee for the Assistance of Germans, Austrians and Hungarians in Distress in London. Swiss internationalist Elisabeth Rotten had established a branch in Berlin, the Auskunfts- und Hilfsstelle für Deutsche im Ausland und Ausländer in Deutschland (Information and Assistance Office for Germans Abroad and Foreigners in Germany) in October 1914. Rotten's agencies were supported by various individuals and institutions that worked across national borders, such as the ICRC and the ecumenical movement in Europe. Funded by philanthropists such as Aby Warburg, Rotten's agency also co-operated with the American Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) in providing relief for civilian internees. The YMCA was engaged in inspecting camps, especially in Russia and Germany, which the ICRC did not have access to. The Quakers tackled the plight of arrested enemy aliens. The Vatican, too, represented by Pope Benedict XV, attempted to reduce the burdens on the lives of interned civilians. Not least, women's organizations such as the International Women's Relief Committee in Britain contributed to the relief effort.[29]

or Transnational? Humanitarian Action during the First World War', *European Review of History*, 16 (2009), 697–713; Hinz, 'Humanität im Krieg?', 222–6.

[29] Daniel Roger Maul, 'American Quakers, the Emergence of International Humanitarianism, and the Foundation of the American Friends Service Committee, 1890–1920, in Johannes Paulmann (ed.), *Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford, 2016), 63–87, at 75–87; Matthew Stibbe, 'Elisabeth Rotten and the "Auskunfts- und Hilfsstelle für Deutsche im Ausland und Ausländer in Deutschland 1914–1919"', in Alison S. Fell and Ingrid Sharp (eds.), *The Women's Movement in Wartime: International Perspectives, 1914–1919* (Basingstoke, 2007), 194–210; Stibbe, *Internees*, 185; id.,

Altogether, the challenges of providing aid for civilian internees, which were usually closely related to similar efforts for POWs, promoted collaboration and networking between pacifist and humanitarian organizations that had campaigned for peace before the First World War. Humanitarian organizations such as the ICRC and the Quakers continued to support civilian enemy aliens. These associations exerted moral pressure on national governments that had to justify their policies. The ICRC, in particular, successfully lobbied for the recognition of mental illnesses (such as 'barbed-wire disease') that resulted from long-term and boring internment.

Yet the power of international humanitarian organizations ultimately proved to be limited. Battles disrupted contacts and co-operation between most humanitarian and liberal associations and societies. Their cross-border relations ultimately foundered on the rock of radical nationalism that opened international co-operation to the damaging charge of disloyal behaviour or even subversion and treason. By and large, national sovereignty and security trumped civil society and humanitarian concerns. National and international organizations that supported interned civilians and POWs had to strike a balance between the need for neutrality and their humanitarian mission. The ICRC, for example, had to take the policies of its national sections into account, as they were largely independent of the central organization in Geneva. The German Red Cross, for example, was primarily engaged in providing relief for Germans, while most civic organizations supported their own national war effort. For instance, patriotic women's associations cared for wounded soldiers under the supervision of the various supreme military commands.

The ambivalence of the advocates of humanitarian engagement in tsarist Russia is a case in point. Despite censorship by state authorities, it was not only the Germans who protested at the repressive policies imposed on them by the Council of Ministers in Petrograd. Some Octobrists and Constitutional Democrats in the Duma, too, defended the rights of German civilians. Yet their support was diluted and restricted by their Russian nationalism and strong support for their country's war effort. Instead of strengthening the norms of humanity and civil society, the activities of Russian civic organiza-

'Internment of Civilians', 14. For a retrospective view see Lehmann-Russbüldt, *Kampf*, 16–17, 63–4, 79, 168–81.

tions such as the associations of the Third Element professionals and the councils of the *zemstvos* fuelled a strong nationalist mobilization that targeted civilian enemy aliens, thereby contributing to their oppression. As these examples demonstrate, the official activities of governments and civic engagement by NGOs were by no means exclusively opposed to each other; on the contrary, they were frequently interrelated. In the last resort, humanitarian activists and societies did not succeed in putting pressure on governments, let alone forcing them to observe the rules and regulations of existing international law. As a result, the vast majority of POWs and civilian internees had to endure repressive measures and reprisals. It was not least the vicious circle of violence and reprisals against enemy aliens that lent the First World War its total nature and extreme brutality, even on the home front.[30]

All in all, the demands of national security and the principle of national sovereignty prevailed over the basic human rights of civilian foreign nationals, who were largely equated with captured soldiers. Against the backdrop of feelings of insecurity, 'internal foes' became the target of anxieties and scares. Strong emotions seemed to demand stringent measures against the hated 'enemies within', and 'better safe than sorry' was the order of the day. Rulers of the warring states therefore took advantage of loopholes in international law in order to arrest and intern civilian enemy aliens and prevent international humanitarian organizations from monitoring the treatment of civilian foreign nationals and supporting these victims of the war. For instance, the ICRC's efforts to inspect German camps near the front and in the occupied territories failed. Moreover, neutral states such as Sweden, Switzerland, and (until April 1917) the USA, which served as protecting powers, only reluctantly informed the ICRC about any maltreatment and abuse of POWs and internees that their inspectors had observed in the belligerent states. The neutral states thereby sought to prevent reprisals. Inspections by delegations of neutral protecting powers were based on the principle of reciprocity that ultimately reinforced national sovereignty in the treatment of

[30] Jean H. Quataert, 'Women's Wartime Services under the Cross: Patriotic Communities in Germany, 1912–1918', in Roger Chickering (ed.), *Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–1918* (Cambridge, 2000), 453–83, esp. 456–7, 465–6; Deperchin, 'The Laws of War', 633; Stibbe, 'Internment of Civilians', 15.

POWs and civilian internees. The warring states therefore sought to prevent their soldiers from deserting and being captured. The Italian government, for example, refused to send aid to its citizens held in captivity in Germany and the Habsburg Empire. The activities of the Red Cross were ultimately restricted to pragmatic care, while their national organizations actively contributed to the war effort of their states.[31]

Only rarely did the national sections of the Red Cross put pressure on their governments to at least lessen the rigorous control, repression, and internment of enemy aliens. Obviously for tactical reasons, they usually referred to the danger of reprisals against the nations' own citizens instead of defending the principles of humanitarianism. Pragmatic considerations of national interests trumped high-minded idealism. Undoubtedly, humanitarian organizations encouraged and promoted agreements about the treatment of foreign citizens, and they succeeded in restricting reprisals against POWs and civilian internees. Yet they remained weak vis-à-vis the governments of the various nation-states that held civilian foreign nationals as hostages. Indeed, some POWs and civilian internees themselves justified reprisals, as long as they were directed against civilian enemy aliens.[32] The all-embracing war culture prevailed over the minuscule civil society.[33] Faced with the need to safeguard political and social cohesion in total war, security policies and cultures took precedence over liberty, humanitarian concerns, and basic human rights until the end of the war, even in European democracies and the USA.[34]

[31] Hinz, 'Humanität im Krieg?', 227–30; Stibbe, 'Internment of Civilians', 17–18.

[32] See Becker, 'Paradoxien', 30.

[33] On concept of 'war culture' see Arnd Bauerkämper and Elise Julien, 'Einleitung: Durchhalten: Durchhalten! Kriegskulturen und Handlungspraktiken im Ersten Weltkrieg', in eid. (eds.), *Durchhalten! Krieg und Gesellschaft im Vergleich 1914–1918* (Göttingen, 2010), 7–28, at 12–14; Gerhard Hirschfeld and Gerd Krumeich, 'Wozu eine "Kulturgeschichte" des Ersten Weltkriegs?, ibid. 31–53; Stibbe, 'Internees', 185.

[34] Peter Gattrell, 'War after the War: Conflicts, 1919–1923' in John Horne (ed.), *A Companion to World War*, vol. i (Oxford, 2012), 558–75; Horne, 'War and Conflict', 90; Stibbe, 'Introduction', 11.

IV. *Conclusion: Humanitarianism under Pressure*

As the repression of innocent civilian enemy aliens in general and their internment in particular demonstrates, the First World War was a major disaster involving violence and extremism. Under the restrictive conditions of the war, national and international humanitarian organizations could only alleviate the plight of POWs and interned civilians to some extent. In particular, the ICRC at least occasionally succeeded in putting pressure on the warring states by appealing to their governments to comply with basic standards of humane treatment. As the rulers of the belligerent countries aimed to win over public opinion in neutral states and sought to avoid reprisals, this strategy was repeatedly successful. In the propaganda war, all states claimed moral superiority, which was an important incentive to comply with international law. Having influenced the agenda in international politics even before the war, humanitarian organizations and their national sections took advantage of these efforts from 1914 to 1918. Despite their failure to prevent some gross violations of humanitarian norms, they often managed to restrict punitive measures and reprisals against enemy aliens. They thereby questioned the doctrine of unreserved national security, and curtailed executive state action.

Overall, however, legal norms had largely proved powerless against the claims of 'national security' made by the belligerent states in the First World War. Demonizing the enemy, war propaganda nourished fears of 'aliens' (including minorities) and fuelled suspicion, resentment, and xenophobia. Emotional ties within communities on the home front were as strong and powerful as comradeship between soldiers. In particular, the mass internment of foreign civilians reflected the all-encompassing, radical quest for 'safety first', which shaped government policies in the warring states. Even helpless civilian enemy aliens represented the hated foe. In the multi-ethnic empires, minorities, too, were stigmatized as 'fifth columnists', as were dissidents, pacifists, conscientious objectors, socialists, and communists.

The 'enemy within' became the object of hate and fear, surveillance, repression, and internment. Punishing this reviled group was intended to compensate for war losses. Participation in violence against civilian foreign nationals also gave citizens the chance to

demonstrate their support for the national war effort, even though civilians in captivity were an easy and helpless target for self-appointed 'patriots' and their popular associations. Above all, however, the mass internment of civilians reflected the violent potential of a nationalism that was based on the conception of an ethnically homogeneous community. Furthermore, it signalled the enormous expansion of state power, especially with regard to the provision of security. With the exception of the (few) international organizations, humanitarian associations were divided by national borders that prevented interaction and exchange. In fact, civil society was largely harnessed to the national war effort, as the proliferation and expansion of patriotic societies and nationalist organizations demonstrate. In total war, they were to mobilize all available resources for the battles that, it was believed, were being fought for the very survival of the nation. When basic humanitarian provisions and human rights prevailed, this was due less to the norms of international law than to the strategies of national governments that sought to maintain their reputation in international politics and observed the principle of reciprocity, lured by the prospect of mutual benefits. Most importantly, fears of reprisals against the nation-states' own citizens were influential.[35]

The long-term impact of the internment of civilian enemy aliens proved to be ambiguous. On the one hand, pressure from humanitarian organizations gave rise to innovations in international law. The Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929, for instance, extended and specified regulations for the treatment of POWs. However, it was only the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (in particular, the fourth one) that adopted provisions for humane treatment. This departure from almost exclusive protection of combatants in international law mainly reflected the experience of the Second World War, especially Nazi atrocities and the Holocaust. Democratic states pursued a much less drastic policy against 'enemy aliens' that nevertheless affected 110,000 forcibly deported Japanese in the USA as well as thousands of Germans, Austrians, and Italians in the United Kingdom. Yet the turn towards more comprehensive protection of civilians after 1945 was also influenced by the lessons of total warfare from 1914 to 1918,

[35] Jones, 'Kriegsgefangenenlager', 65–7, 71, 74–5; Deperchin, 'The Laws of War', 628; Stibbe, 'Internment of Civilians', 18–19; Hinz, 'Humanität im Krieg?', 220, 228.

and attempted to remedy the failure of the ICRC to achieve an agreement at a conference in Tokyo in 1934. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 eventually became a pillar of international humanitarian law. In 1993 the United Nations Security Council eventually adopted the report of a committee of experts which had asserted that the Geneva Conventions had definitively and irrevocably passed into the body of binding customary international law.[36]

On the other hand, the violence of war continued to shape political and social developments after the armistice of 11 November 1918. Paramilitary organizations and veterans' associations mobilized sections of the populations in states such as Germany, France, and Britain. Although the First World War did not lead directly to a brutalization of politics, the experience of warfare contributed to the extreme violence in the post-war politics and societies of many European states. Moreover, war veterans were symbolically appropriated as heroes, not only within the confines of nation-states, but also in a transnational process. Retarding demobilization, paramilitary groups prevented a stabilization of the new post-war states that emerged from the collapse of multi-ethnic empires and autocracies. But even the victorious states were beset with unrest. In northern Italy, for example, frustration over the *vittoria mutilate* (mutilated victory) fuelled the violence of the fascist squads from 1919 on, before Benito Mussolini managed to convince the old elites (especially King Vittorio Emanuele III) to vest supreme power in him. Previously, the

[36] Rachel Pistol, *Internment during the Second World War: A Comparative Study of Great Britain and the USA* (London, 2017); Johannes Morsink, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent* (Philadelphia, 1999), esp. 36–91; Johannes Morsink, 'The Dawn of Human Rights: The Universal Declaration and the Conscience of Humanity', in Rainer Huhle (ed.), *Human Rights and History: A Challenge for Education* (Berlin, 2010), 25–36; Daniel Levy, 'Cosmopolitization of Victimhood: Holocaust Memories and the Human Rights Regime', in Annette Weinke and Norbert Frei (eds.), *Toward a New Moral World Order? Menschenrechtspolitik und Völkerrecht seit 1945* (Göttingen, 2013), 210–18; Thomas Buergenthal, 'International Law and the Holocaust', in Michael J. Bazyler and Roger P. Alford (eds.), *Holocaust Restitution: Perspectives on the Litigation and its Legacy* (New York, 2006), 17–29; William I. Hitchcock, 'Human Rights and the Laws of War: The Geneva Convention of 1949', in Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William I. Hitchcock (eds.), *The Human Rights Revolution* (New York, 2012), 93–112; Oeter, 'Die Entwicklung des Kriegsgefangenenrechts', 51–3.

Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 had unleashed a new wave of violence. Under the impact of anti-communist and antisemitic conspiracy theories, the fight against the national 'enemy within' paved the way to the 'red scare' that spread in countries such as Britain and the USA from 1917 to the mid 1920s. As the wartime emergency persisted after the armistice of 11 November 1918, militarism by no means subsided. Radical nationalists agitated against putative foes allegedly endangering national security. The repression of civilian enemy aliens from 1914 to 1918 significantly contributed to the post-war violence. It may even have had a lasting impact, as indicated by the internment of 'enemy combatants' in Guantanamo Bay and the restrictions on civil liberties in the USA since 2002 on the basis of the Espionage Act of 1917.[37]

[37] Robert Gerwarth, 'The Central European Counter-Revolution: Paramilitary Violence in Germany, Austria and Hungary after the Great War', *Past and Present*, 200 (2008), 175–209; id. and John Horne (eds.), *War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War* (Oxford, 2012); Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski, 'Europeanization through Violence? War Experiences and the Making of Modern Europe', in Martin Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel (eds.), *Europeanization in the Twentieth Century: Historical Approaches* (Houndmills, 2010), 189–209; Peter Gatrell, 'War after the War: Conflicts, 1919–1923', in Horne (ed.), *A Companion to World War*, 558–75; Stibbe, 'Internment', 66, 73. On Italy see Ángel Alcade, 'War Veterans and the Transnational Origins of Italian Fascism (1917–1919)', *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 21 (2016), 565–83; Martin Clark, 'Italian Squadrismo and Contemporary Vigilantism', *European History Quarterly*, 18 (1988), 33–49.

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