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ARTICLES

HARD TIMES: THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF AMERICAN CONSULS ON THE NORTH SEA COAST UNDER THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM

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I. *Introduction*

The history of consuls has until recently been overlooked by historians, receiving only marginal attention. This is particularly surprising in view of the fact that consuls, as intermediaries between politics and business, played an important role in transnational trade, and that their reports often contain a wealth of significant political and economic information.

The main task of consuls was to promote bilateral trade relations. In times of war, they faced particular challenges. They had to ensure that trade could continue as far as circumstances allowed, and that their own countrymen and countrywomen were safe and had access to essential supplies. Besides being obliged in law to look after prisoners, impoverished seamen, and sailors who had been shipwrecked, consuls also had notarial, judicial, and policing duties and dealt with ships that had been seized or damaged. In addition, one of their most important tasks was to keep channels of communication open, so that they could ensure government and business were up to date with the changing military situation.

Two collections of essays in recent years, both co-edited by Jörg Ulbert, offer an overview of the development of the consular service

I would like to thank the German Historical Institute Washington for a generous scholarship that allowed me to view the files of the American consular service. This article first appeared in German as 'Konsul und Kaufmann in schwierigen Zeiten: Die wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten der amerikanischen Konsuln an der Nordseeküste während der Kontinentalsperre', *Hansische Studien*, 24 (2017), 151–71. This translation is published by kind permission of the editors of *Hansische Studien*. Trans. Emily Richards (GHIL).

in a variety of countries.[1] While there is a relatively active research community working on the history of the French, Swedish, and (to a lesser extent) German consuls, the history of the American consular service in the first fifty years after American independence has received little attention.[2] This is true especially for the years 1792 to 1815, the period of the Coalition Wars. A short summary of the history of the service was recently published by Christoph Strupp, but his focus is the second half of the nineteenth century.[3] The most comprehensive discussion to date is still Charles Stuart Kennedy's 1990 study,[4] which for the Coalition Wars period concentrates on the problems encountered by American consuls in the Barbary Coast States. Kennedy also briefly discusses the history of certain consuls in Britain and Bordeaux, and Silvia Marzagalli has published a survey of historical sources available for the Bordeaux consulate.[5] However, to date there has been no study of the American consuls in north German port cities during the Coalition Wars, with the exception of Hamburg, for which two short studies exist. These, however, provide only outline data for the years of the Coalition Wars.[6]

[1] Jörg Ulbert and Gerard le Bouedec (eds.), *La fonction consulaire à l'époque moderne: l'affirmation d'une institution économique et politique (1500–1800)* (Rennes, 2006); Jörg Ulbert and Lukian Prijac (eds.), *Die Welt der Konsulate im 19. Jahrhundert* (Hamburg, 2010).

[2] On the Swedish consular service cf. Leos Müller, *Consuls, Corsairs and Commerce: The Swedish Consular Service and Long-Distance Shipping 1720–1815* (Uppsala, 2004); on the nineteenth century, see id., 'The Swedish–Norwegian Consular Services in the Nineteenth Century (1814–1905)', in Ulbert and Prijac (eds.), *Welt der Konsulate*, 261–70; on the French consulates see Ulbert and Prijac (eds.), *Welt der Konsulate* and Silvia Marzagalli (ed.), *Les consuls en Méditerranée, agents d'information XVIe–XXe siècle* (Paris, 2015).

[3] Christoph Strupp, 'Das US-amerikanische Konsularwesen im 19. Jahrhundert', in Ulbert and Prijac (eds.), *Welt der Konsulate*, 234–47.

[4] Charles Stuart Kennedy, *The American Consul: A History of the United States Consular Service, 1776–1914* (New York, 1990).

[5] Silvia Marzagalli, 'Les débuts des services consulaires des États-Unis: L'example de Bordeaux de la Guerre d'Indépendence américaine à la fin du Premier Empire', in Ulbert and Bouedec (eds.), *La fonction consulaire*, 279–96.

[6] Heiko Herold, 'USA in Hamburg: Die hanseatisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen seit 1790', *Zeitschrift für Internationale Politik*, 87 (2012), 59–63; id., *60 Years U.S. Consulate General Hamburg at the 'Little White House on the Alster'* (Hamburg, 2011), 4–6; J. K. Huddle, 'The First Half Century of the Consulate

The sources for this period are, in addition, sometimes very meagre. We are lacking many consular reports, not only because the consuls were unreliable when it came to submitting them (as was often alleged), but primarily because of the war itself. Blockades, piracy, and shipwrecks made it impossible to report back regularly to the government. This is evident, for example, in the case of the American consulate in Bremen, for which all reports are missing for the period from 1806 until 1812, when they recommenced. It has been impossible to locate the reports of the consul at Emden, and there are gaps even in the consul's reports for Hamburg.[7] Surviving consular files for the German Hanseatic League cities are often in very bad condition, making them difficult to use for research purposes. The situation is somewhat better for the Netherlands, as the consul there left a private archive of files containing significant information on not only the Netherlands themselves but also the activities of the American consuls in northern Germany.

As the American consular service on the north German coast has, until now, received only limited attention, I will use the following section briefly to set out the development of the consular service along the north-west European coast. The subsequent two sections examine efforts to expand consular districts and to obtain a salary for consuls. The fifth and sixth sections deal with problems caused by a lack of official guidance for consuls and with communication during the Napoleonic Wars respectively, although for reasons of space I am only able to set out some initial thoughts on these topics.

II. *The Development of the American Consular Service in Northern Germany*

In the eighteenth century most trading nations possessed an established consular network. The United States, which had only just come into being, was an exception. Before the American War of Independence, the interests of American traders abroad had been represented by British consuls, but in the course of that conflict first

at Hamburg', *American Foreign Service Journal*, 2 (1925), 289–352 (thanks to Dr Heiko Herold for bringing this article to my attention).

[7] This is applies especially to the years 1808 to 1811.

steps were taken that would gradually result in the development of an independent American consular service. During the Revolutionary Wars, for example, Congress had appointed agents in France, Cuba, and China to represent its interests. But it was not until the Coalition Wars that the network of consulates dramatically expanded, especially in Europe. In 1790 only eighteen American consulates existed, but by 1800 there were seventy.[8]

Article 2 (2) of the US constitution gave the President the right to appoint consuls. Vice consuls and agents, on the other hand, could be appointed independently and locally by the consuls themselves.[9] But in contrast to consuls, vice consuls and consular agents had no legal standing unless the consul applied for their formal recognition by the United States.

Historical literature regularly notes the fact that in early years foreigners could be appointed as consuls in the American consular service. John Parish and Joseph Pitcairn in Hamburg, like Frederick Jakob Wichelhausen in Bremen and Hans Rudolf Saaby in Copenhagen, were not Americans. The practice of appointing foreigners to the consular office was widespread during the Coalition Wars, not only on the part of the United States, but also of the German states and Britain. This was in part due to strategic considerations. Choosing respectable native merchants with good and close relationships to the local and regional political elites made it easier for governments to work with those elites and, in times of war, to prevent sanctions being subverted.

The first American consulate in Hamburg was established in the early 1790s, just before the start of the Coalition Wars. In 1790 the American government appointed John Parish, who was born in Britain, first as vice consul and then, in 1793, as consul. He was followed in October 1796 by the American Samuel Williams, who, however, did not stay in Hamburg for long, applying for the consulship in London a few months later in the summer of 1797 and receiving his appointment to that post at the beginning of the following year.[10]

[8] Walter B. Smith II, *America's Diplomats and Consuls of 1776–1865* (Washington, 1986), 8.

[9] Ibid. 6.

[10] The National Archives, Washington, DC (hereafter NA), RG 59 T 211, Consular Dispatches Hamburg, Sam. Williams to Timothy Pickering, 17 Aug. 1797 and 17 Feb. 1798.

Williams was followed in Hamburg by Joseph Pitcairn, a Scot. Pitcairn was not able to take up his office immediately, as he was still being used as a secret despatch bearer operating between Paris, Amsterdam, and Berlin. In the interim, consular duties were carried out by Georg C. Schütt, an employee who already worked at the consulate.[11] However, Pitcairn, too, when he eventually took up his post, remained in it for only a short period of time, passing the baton to John Murray Forbes in 1802. Nonetheless, he stayed in Hamburg throughout the Napoleonic Wars, maintaining a close relationship with the American consul in Amsterdam, Sylvanus Bourne, for the purpose of information-sharing, and eventually leaving Hamburg in 1815, when he moved back to the USA with his family. Forbes, who followed Pitcairn in the post, was born in 1771 in Florida, of Scottish parents. During his time in Harvard, he became a friend of John Quincy Adams. He remained in office as consul in Hamburg until the end of the Coalition Wars.

The USA established its first consulate in Bremen in 1794, appointing Arnold Delius as consul. He was accredited by the Duke of Oldenburg, but the Bremen Senate rejected his appointment nonetheless, on the grounds that Delius had been involved in an ongoing trial since 1786. Instead, Frederick Jacob Wichelhausen took up the post and remained in office for thirty-five years.[12] The first US consulate in Emden was opened in 1804.

Throughout the nineteenth century the American consular service was criticized for being badly organized and inefficient, and the consuls were accused of neglecting their duties.[13] However, whether it held true in general or not, this perception should be viewed with caution for the years of the Coalition Wars, when as honorary consuls (their status at the time) they were faced with the double challenge of meeting their consular obligations while also ensuring their own financial survival. And at least in the early years of the service, con-

[11] On Pitcairn's activities see *Diplomatic and Consular Instructions of the Department of State 1791–1801*, National Archives Microfilm Publications Pamphlet no. 28 (Washington, 1969); NA, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Sam. Williams to Timothy Pickering, 17 Mar. 1798.

[12] Franz Josef Pitsch, *Die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen Bremens zu den USA bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Bremen, 1974), 78.

[13] Strupp, 'Konsularwesen', in Ulbert and Prijac (eds.), *Welt der Konsulate*, 221, 223.

suls had no guidance as to what was expected of them in office. It was not until 1792 that the American government passed the first Act regulating consular activity.[14] A few years earlier John Adams had declared that a consul's first duty was '[to] explore new channels of commerce and new markets for our produce'.[15] In 1790 Thomas Jefferson had written to all the US consuls requesting that they submit regular reports. Every six months, he stipulated, they should set down the number of American ships that had put in at their harbours, along with a precise description of the ships themselves and the goods they carried. These reports were to include details of any events that might endanger the movement of goods, and ensure that the ships' captains were informed in good time of any such threats.[16] Jefferson had been urging the Senate and House of Representatives for legislation to regulate consular activity since 1790, and finally, on 14 April 1792, the first Consular Act was passed. Its provisions mainly regulated the support of ill, shipwrecked, or imprisoned seamen; duties in relation to ships, such as the rescue of stranded ships and their cargoes; the sale of ships; and the consul's notarial tasks if an American should die abroad.[17]

But the law did not foresee a salary for consuls. Instead, they were only able to receive compensation for their official services, which in practice meant the income from disembarkation fees and any money they might receive for acting as a notary in cases when Americans died abroad. Financial assistance for impoverished seamen was paid for by the Treasury at the rate of 12 cents a day. A supplementary Act was passed in 1803 which allowed consuls to charge other fees, including 2 per cent of the sum which ships' captains had to advance as provision for sailors released from duty, so that the latter could pay for their passage home.[18]

[14] U. S. Laws, Statutes. *An Act Concerning Consuls and Vice-Consuls Philadelphia: Printed by Andrew Brown* (Philadelphia, 1792). Pdf: <https: // www. loc. gov/item/rbpe.21800700/>, accessed 28 June 2018.

[15] Cited after Kennedy, *American Consul*, 12.

[16] Ibid. 21.

[17] Ibid. 22–3.

[18] Chester Lloyd Jones, *The Consular Service of the United States, its History and Activities* (Philadelphia, 1906), 5–6.

III. *Economic Situation*

French consuls had been public servants since the seventeenth century (which, however, meant that they were not allowed to trade on their own behalf). But US consuls were not paid until the service was reformed in 1856. There were a few exceptions; Thomas Barclay, appointed first US consul in France in 1781, was granted a salary of 1,500 US dollars (USD) per annum, and Samuel Williams received 2,500 USD per annum as consul in London.[19] The consuls in the Barbary Coast States (Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Tripoli) each received salaries of up to 2,000 USD; the US government could hardly do otherwise, given that relations between the US and these states were in a permanent state of tension and so consuls could not trade safely in these regions.[20] In 1810 the salaries of the Barbary Coast consuls were raised to 3,000 USD; at the same time they were absolutely prohibited from carrying out any trade.[21]

In economically flourishing ports, consuls could make a considerable amount from consular fees. They also enjoyed significant social prestige and a certain immunity, besides being privy to important information regarding local and regional developments. For distance traders, the office of consul had the additional advantage that many merchants in America did not have their own agents in Europe, but still wanted to participate in the lucrative European market. They would often send their goods out speculatively, asking only that they be sold on a profitable market. Often, captains who had such goods to sell approached consuls first for help, deeming them trustworthy partners.[22]

For less successful businessmen, or even those whose businesses had failed entirely, becoming a consul was an opportunity to improve their financial situation. Arnold Delius applied for the Bremen consulate to better his income after he was arrested in Bremen for allegedly owing 90,000 USD to the firm of Heymann & Tratta. Joseph

[19] Kennedy, *American Consul*, 9; NA, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Sam. Williams to Pickering, Hamburg 13 Feb. 1798.
[20] A detailed description can be found in Kennedy, *American Consul*, 29–40.
[21] Lloyd Jones, *Consular Service*, 7.
[22] Library of Congress, Washington, DC (hereafter LC), Bourne Papers, unnamed correspondent to Bourne, Amsterdam 31 July 1800.

Forman, who took up the position of consul in Rotterdam in the summer of 1800, had gone bankrupt in the global credit and sales crisis that began in Hamburg and went on to affect dozens of towns and cities on the US east coast at the beginning of that year.[23] John Murray Forbes also applied for the position of consul after getting into financial difficulties, trying first Bordeaux and then Marseille, before eventually being appointed consul in Hamburg in 1802. Although he had applied for consulships in the south of France for health reasons, economic considerations eventually led him to decide to accept Hamburg despite 'all the severities' of the local climate.[24]

The Hanseatic cities were very attractive for merchants of straitened means, as trade with America had increased considerably after French revolutionary troops occupied Holland in 1795.[25] In 1804 William Clark went to great efforts to establish a consulate in Emden for precisely this reason. In his request, Clark pointed out that shipping traffic with Emden was insignificant in times of peace, and that American ships had only called in there more recently because of the blockade imposed on the neighbouring rivers and the Dutch ports. Within the previous two months alone, he noted, a dozen American ships had put in at Emden.[26]

In the autumn of 1804 a number of measures were implemented to make things easier for ships travelling between Tönning and Hamburg and between the harbours on the Jade and at Bremen. This resulted in much of the shipping traffic moving from Emden to Eckwarden and Varel, and Clark therefore requested that these two ports should come under his consular authority. After the British ended the blockade in 1805, however, Clark could not see any future for himself

[23] LC, Bourne Papers, Pitcairn to Bourne, Hamburg 11 July 1800; for the Hamburg crisis of 1799/1800 see my ongoing project on the Hamburg speculation bubble of 1799 and its worldwide effects. See also Margrit Schulte Beerbühl, 'Tracing the Speculation Bubble of 1799 in Newspapers, Court Records and Other Sources', in Heikki Pihlajamäki et al. (eds.), *Understanding the Sources of Early Modern and Modern Commercial Law: Courts, Statutes, Contracts and Legal Scholarship* (Leiden, 2018), 315–36.

[24] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Madison, London 6 June, 20 Aug., 29 Aug. 1802.

[25] Pitsch, *Die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen Bremens*, 29 ff.

[26] NA, RG 59 T 566, Consular Despatches Emden 1782–1906, William Clark to Madison, Emden 28 June 1804.

in Emden, at least financially speaking,[27] and his correspondence breaks off after 1806. But from John Murray Forbes's reports, we know that Clark continued as consul at Emden under the Napoleonic continental system, probably because of the gradual development of East Frisia into a centre for covert trading.[28]

The authority of the American consul in Hamburg extended only to the city, and did not include the bordering Danish district of Altona. However, shipping traffic in Altona increased significantly after 1795, and during his short consulship in Hamburg Samuel Williams fought hard for an extension of his authority to cover all Danish ports on the Elbe.[29] The government refused, but this did not stop his successor carrying on the campaign.[30] Shortly after his appointment in 1802 Forbes, like Pitcairn before him, asked for the district covered by the Hamburg consular authority to be extended, this time to include the numerous minor principalities that lined the banks of the Elbe. In view of the location of these states, he saw the limitation of consular authority to Hamburg as a 'general imbecility', which made it extremely difficult for him to carry out his job. He noted that the authority of the other foreign consuls in Hamburg 'extend[s] "to the Circle of Lower Saxony" which is the only political division of the country, which embraces all the Sovereignties bordering the navigable Elbe'.[31]

Britain imposed a blockade on the Elbe and Weser rivers when war broke out again in the summer of 1803, and Forbes worried that the whole of British and American trade could shift to the Baltic. Fears for his economic future led him to consider moving his business to Lower Saxony, Lübeck, or Rostock in the event that he was not granted consular authority over Hamburg's neighbouring territories. He argued that

[27] NA, RG 59 T 566, Consular Despatches Emden, William Clark to Madison, Emden 18 Sept. 1804, 20 Oct. 1805.
[28] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Clark, Hamburg 4 May 1809.
[29] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Williams to Timothy Pickering, Hamburg 17 Aug. 1797.
[30] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Madison, Hamburg 29 Aug. 1802.
[31] Ibid.

> [w]ithout a particular local knowledge of this vicinity it is impossible to conceive of the embarrassing intersections of little dominions which one meets with—they are designated by posts and in riding five or six miles you may traverse a country owing allegiance to as many different Lords who recognize no common stile of regence but that of 'The Princes States and Cities composing the Circle of Lower Saxony'.[32]

For this reason, Forbes considered the limitation of his consular authority to Hamburg to be a 'nullity'.[33] As Denmark recognized the consular districts of other nations for the whole of Lower Saxony, Forbes demanded a corresponding ruling from the US government, asking at the same time that he be promoted to the position of General Consul. Were he to be appointed, he promised, he would appoint a suitable American to the post of consul in Bremen, where the consul at the time was Wichelhausen. Referring to his two predecessors, Parish and Pitcairn, he noted that they had made 'brilliant fortunes' while in office,[34] while his own situation as an American 'give[s] for the present only naked and hungry honor with a most remote and uncertain prospect of commercial success'.[35]

In October 1803, in view of his precarious financial situation, his health problems, and the complete collapse of trade in Hamburg, Forbes applied while on a short visit to London for the position of consul in Bordeaux, which he had already unsuccessfully applied for once before.[36] His application was no more successful this time. Although the feared shift of American trade to the Baltic region did not come to pass, trade traffic instead moved on to Tönning, beyond the bounds of his consular authority. As a result, he made a new

[32] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Madison, Hamburg 8 July 1803.
[33] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Madison, Hamburg 31 July 1804.
[34] Ibid.
[35] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Madison, Hamburg 31 July 1804.
[36] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Madison, London 22 Oct. 1803.

attempt in spring 1804 to extend his consular district, which was half-heartedly granted by the US government.[37]

Once the British blockade was lifted in 1805 his situation improved briefly. But in the spring, when Prussia, under pressure from the French, agreed to block its ports for British ships and goods, Forbes once again began to fear for his economic survival. The extension of his consular district, for which he had campaigned for so long, and his appointment to General Consul, finally took place in December after the imposition of the continental system,[38] and Forbes promptly installed a vice consul in Tönning. The vice consul, however, as far as we can tell from the consular correspondence, was not recognized by the Danish government.[39]

After Hamburg was occupied by French troops and the continental system was imposed, no more ships came to the city. Forbes turned to the French consul to try to negotiate an exception for American vessels, and at first, the consul told him that American ships could put into Hamburg as long as they went first to Glückstadt and declared this as their last port of departure. Forbes, however, was not on the best of terms with Bourrienne, the French envoy to Hamburg, and so concessions made by the French consul were repeatedly revoked.[40]

After 1807 ships increasingly went to Tönning, so that in 1809 Forbes finally decided to change his place of residence. But a long illness prevented him from moving quickly, and he complained that he was losing income as a result: 'We have flocks of our countrymen arriving at Tonningen . . . had I been on the spot, I should have done

[37] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Madison, London 27 Mar. 1804.

[38] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, anon. letter to Madison, undated [1807].

[39] Forbes had already set up a vice consul there on his own initiative in 1804. The American government permitted him an extension, but this had no validity, as the letter was only addressed to the Hamburg Senate and not the other regents (NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Madison, Hamburg 31 July 1804).

[40] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to John Armstrong, Hamburg 15 Feb. 1806, 12 Jan. 1807; Forbes to Madison, Hamburg 30 Jan. 1807, 24 Feb. 1807, and 18 Mar. 1807.

very handsomely . . . I regret the loss of good business.'[41] And indeed, within the first two weeks of his arrival in Tönning, no fewer than five American ships entrusted him with the sale of their cargoes.[42] According to his report, in 1809 alone over ninety American ships put in at the port, while no American ship had called at Hamburg since the Decree of Bayonne in 1808.[43]

Tönning belonged to Denmark, so Forbes could act there only in the capacity of deputy to the American consul in Copenhagen. As American ships also called at many of the smaller ports in Holstein and Schleswig besides Tönning, in 1809 he asked for a consulate to be established there whose district should integrate both regions, noting the presence 'in the different ports of Holstein & Schleswig upwards of one hundred & twenty American ships and a larger amount of property of the Citizens of the U.S. than was ever accumulated in any foreign country'. But he also pointed out that such trading was only temporary, the goods being destined ultimately for the Hamburg market;[44] he therefore wanted to retain his consulate in Hamburg as well.[45]

The situation became critical for Forbes in January 1811, when the Hanseatic cities were incorporated into the Napoleonic Empire. Napoleon's orders in 1811 were intended to prevent any kind of colonial trade. Among other measures, he forced Denmark to close the harbours on its west coast to American ships and prevent any ships already docked there from leaving. Only the Danish ports on the Baltic coast, along with the Russian ports, stayed open to American ships. Forbes shut the consulate in Tönning and returned to Hamburg, after trying in vain to persuade the US consul in Copenhagen to set up a consular agency for Kiel, Eckernförde, and other Baltic ports.[46]

[41] LC, Bourne Papers, Forbes to Bourne, Hamburg 18 Aug. 1809.
[42] LC, Bourne Papers, Forbes to Bourne, Hamburg 14 Sept. 1809.
[43] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Robert Smith, Tönning 29 Sept. 1809.
[44] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Robert Smith, Tönning 7 Nov. 1809.
[45] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Robert Smith, Tönning 1 Jan. 1810.
[46] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Robert Smith, Kiel 26 July 1810, Hamburg 3 Nov. 1810; Forbes to James Erving, Hamburg 16 Aug. 1811.

But on his return to Hamburg Forbes was faced with the fact that under the French occupation he was no longer recognized as consul and would have to be officially re-appointed to satisfy the French and the Hamburg Senate of his status. His difficulties in this regard, together with his financial position, led him to exclaim in July 1811: 'I am so completely disgusted with my present situation that I shall be well pleased to have a fair excuse for quitting it.'[47] As there was no sign of the government taking any steps to re-appoint him, he applied instead for the Lisbon consulate, but was disappointed. As a result, and after the American special envoy in Copenhagen, George W. Erving, left the Danish capital in 1811, Forbes repeatedly applied (between 1813 and 1816) for the post of chargé d'affaires and General Consul in Denmark.

In his campaign to extend his consular district, Forbes was not solely motivated by worries about his personal income. He was also trying to protect American trade. As early as the spring of 1804 he wrote to Madison

> that at present the trade of Hamburg being divided between several other ports and the Governments to which those ports belong, having determined that no foreigners shall have the benefits of a commercial residence & establishment among them, without some official character, I cannot have an opportunity of affording any assistance to my fellow citizens, and that my residence at Hamburg is equally without advantage to myself & my Country.[48]

The situation reached a crisis point in 1810. Lacking any proper authority from the American government, Forbes found it almost impossible to secure the release of ships captured by privateers.[49] In view of the dire plight of many stranded sailors, and the high costs of caring for them—which were far beyond his own small means or

[47] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, R. B. Forbes (Forbes's brother) to Robert Smith, Paris 8 July 1811; Forbes to Robert Smith, Hamburg 9 July 1811.

[48] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Madison, Hamburg 27 Mar. 1804.

[49] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Robert Smith, Hamburg 17 Mar. 1810.

even the official funds at his disposal—Forbes requested the appointment of a paid agent who would be employed solely for the purpose of looking after the ships' crews left stranded and impoverished in Hamburg. It tells us a good deal about Forbes's financial situation that he not only put himself forward for this role, but also offered to be paid at the level of a minor employee.[50]

IV. *The Fight for a Salary*

Forbes was not the only consul to campaign for proper remuneration during the Coalition Wars. Sylvanus Bourne had been trying to persuade the American government to offer consuls a regular salary since the mid 1790s. In the early 1790s Bourne and his colleague Fulwar Skipwith had been consuls on the French Caribbean islands of St Domingo and Martinique. As such, they had experienced the full economic effects of the French Revolution and slave uprisings. In addition, Skipwith's fortune was destroyed when his trading house burned down, and his financial situation was now just as precarious as that of Forbes and Clark. He applied to be appointed to a consular post in Lisbon, Bordeaux, Cadiz, or Marseille, but Jefferson sent him to Martinique instead.[51] Because of the unrest in the French Caribbean colonies, American merchants had more or less stopped all trade with the islands, and Skipwith saw no reason to expect an economic upturn. He therefore turned to Jefferson with a plea for government remuneration, but was refused.[52]

Bourne took up his post as consul in Amsterdam in 1794. Just a few months later, French revolutionary troops occupied the Netherlands, and trade in the ports of Amsterdam and Rotterdam collapsed. In view of the poor economic outlook, Bourne made a first request for a salary in 1795.[53] Little is known about his financial situation at the beginning of his career, although we know that he mar-

[50] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Robert Smith, Hamburg 3 Nov. 1810 and 18 Feb. 1811.

[51] Kennedy, *American Consul*, 23–4.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Worthington Chauncey Ford (ed.), *Writings of John Quincy Adams*, 7 vols. (New York, 1913–17), i: *1789–1796* (1913), Adams to Bourne, 15 Aug. 1795.

ried into a wealthy and influential American family of traders and bankers. In 1799 he joined the trading firm of Lange & Bourne as a partner. Although the British had lifted the blockade on Dutch ports in the same year, international trade was still suffering as a result of the severe credit and sales crisis triggered by a speculation bubble in Hamburg. The crisis affected not only half of Europe, but also the cities on the United States eastern seaboard. None of Bourne's agents, either in America or in Europe, gave him any grounds for optimism about commissions; in Hamburg, Pitcairn warned that in the crisis, merchants felt no particular inclination to 'recommend . . . enterprise to their friends'.[54] However, unlike Forbes, Bourne seems to have been extremely successful at finding clever ways around the trading restrictions and blockades of the Napoleonic Wars. When the trading crisis was over, he quickly built up close links to Hamburg and Bremen merchants and worked closely with Wichelhausen and Pitcairn. He was actively supported by two of his wife's American relatives, William Taylor and the banker George Salomon, and with their backing, he was able to enter the banking business in 1801.[55]

The effects of the global credit and sales crisis of 1799 had not yet died away when American consuls in Europe were shocked to hear that Congress had decided to reduce disembarkation fees by half, from two American dollars to one. The consuls based in Amsterdam, Hamburg, Bremen, and London all agreed that they would not accept this, and continued to charge two dollars. In Joseph Pitcairn's opinion, even this was too low, considering how much work was involved in the issuing of a disembarkation notice.[56] The American consuls in Europe were further dismayed by a court judgment in the USA that questioned the neutrality of the consuls and their trading houses. Pitcairn saw this as a 'hardship of mixing consuls with the Nation they reside in', and asked Bourne to use his connections to

[54] LC, Bourne Papers, Bohlen to Bourne, Bremen Dec. 1799; Wichelhausen to Bourne, Bremen 6 Dec. 1799; Delius to Bourne, Bremen 18 Dec. 1799; Pitcairn to Bourne, Hamburg 31 Dec. 1799.

[55] LC, Bourne Papers, Pitcairn to Bourne, Hamburg 10 Apr. 1801; Matthiessen & Sillem to Bourne, Hamburg 24 Apr. 1801.

[56] LC, Bourne Papers, Wichelhausen to Bourne, Bremen 6 Dec. 1799; Pitcairn to Bourne, Hamburg 20 Dec. 1799; G. Williams to Bourne, London 1 July 1800; Pitcairn to Bourne, Hamburg 1 July 1800.

Congress to get the judgment revoked.[57] Bourne duly turned to his relatives, William Taylor and the banker George Solomon, asking them to appeal on his behalf to Congress and the Secretary of State to stress the difficulties the decision would cause. The consuls also sent numerous letters of protest to congressmen demanding that the judgment be revoked and the neutral status of consuls confirmed.[58]

Bourne used this opportunity to revert to the question of pay, although an internal letter sent to Bourne by Wichelhausen shows how the latter was concerned about the possible effects of reviving this question. Wichelhausen feared that if Congress were again to turn down Bourne's request, this would be likely to make things more difficult for the consuls in future. He suggested that rather than tabling a formal proposal, they should adopt a more subtle approach and draw the attention of congressmen to the problem as the chance arose.[59] Bourne took no notice, and his application for a salary was once again declined after Jefferson took office.[60] Nevertheless, despite this setback, the consuls continued to fight for a salary, partly because their financial circumstances left them no other choice. Joseph Forman, for example, the Rotterdam consul, took advantage of a journey to the USA—which he had actually undertaken in order to sort out his debts—to talk to congressmen about the financial difficulties faced by consuls in Europe. On his return to Rotterdam, he complained that there was no consensus on the issue in Congress. Nonetheless, he was determined to bring the congressmen around to his way of thinking, being convinced that 'they must put the consulate on a footing more reputable'. He noted further that as he would be in Washington when Congress was next in session, he would use the opportunity to raise the subject again.[61] Although their next application, made in 1802, was also turned down, Bourne and the other consuls did not give up the struggle.

[57] LC, Bourne Papers, Pitcairn to Bourne, Hamburg 5 Aug. 1800.

[58] LC, Bourne Papers, W. Taylor to Bourne, Baltimore 10 Aug. 1800; Bourne to James Murray (consul in Liverpool), 22 Aug. 1800; Forman to Bourne, Rotterdam 23 Sept. 1800, stating that he has sent at least twenty letters to representatives.

[59] LC, Bourne Papers, Wichelhausen to Bourne, Bremen 30 Aug. 1800.

[60] LC, Bourne Papers, Heineken to Bourne, Philadelphia 21 Feb. 1801.

[61] LC, Bourne Papers, Forman to Bourne, Rotterdam 25 Dec. 1801.

As the blockade was imposed with increasing severity, the consuls not only lost sources of income. The cost of obtaining the release of confiscated ships, and caring for stranded and impoverished seamen, also rose rapidly. Money made available by the government for this purpose was not enough either to look after sailors in need or to send them home. The American consul in Paris, Ridgeway, ran out of money and could not pay the passage home of Americans released from custody.[62] The situation became particularly worrying for Forbes in 1810, when American ships were seized and held on the Danish coast. Within a short time he had spent 7,500 USD on helping sailors in Tönning who had lost their income, and it was likely that these costs would only increase as it became more and more difficult to send sailors home. As there was also no more money forthcoming from his creditors, he now faced financial ruin. He therefore wrote to the US government requesting that they transfer him the necessary funds without delay, as otherwise, 'I shall be in the greatest embarrassment, as the sum involves all the earnings of the short period of my prosperity and besides embraces a considerable advance of my friends'.[63]

Forbes suffered financial hardship more or less throughout the whole of the war. With no financial resources of his own, he made a first request for a salary in a letter to Madison in spring 1806, when Prussia, under pressure from France, prohibited the import of British goods. He explained to Madison that since his appointment as consul, he had more or less lived off his friends.[64] Seeking to ally himself with Forbes on this point, Bourne raised the subject again in 1808. 'I agree with you', Forbes wrote to Bourne in October of that year, 'that these are bad times for consuls without salaries, but when shall we see better? Should we not concert our attack on the liberality of Govt. to allow us Salaries?'[65] Forbes held out little hope for the success of Bourne's application to the US government early the following year, given the government's response in the past.[66] When he applied for

[62] LC, Bourne Papers, Curtis to Bourne, Rotterdam 27 Nov. 1808.

[63] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Robert Smith, Hamburg 3 Nov. 1810.

[64] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Madison, Hamburg 5 Apr. 1806.

[65] LC, Bourne Papers, Forbes to Bourne, Hamburg 11 Oct. 1808.

[66] Ibid. and 10 Mar. 1809.

the post of chargé d'affaires and General Consul in Copenhagen in 1813, Forbes again included a request for regular pay in his application, hoping for a salary of at least 4,500 USD: 'You know Sir, how essential it is in Europe to the influence of a public man that he should have the means of supporting a suitable standing and of reciprocating the ordinary hospitalities of society.'[67]

In part, Forbes' financial problems during the Coalition Wars were of his own making, as his behaviour towards traders and politicians had not always been of a kind calculated to gain their support. He did not even enjoy good relations with Bourrienne. The latter had a reputation for being open to bribery, which could have been advantageous to Forbes had he not held such behaviour 'incompatible with the dignity of our government, and not less revolting to my general feelings'. Bourrienne and his representatives made Americans, Forbes claimed, into 'victims of chicanery' so that they were 'exposed to heavy ransoms by way of bribery'.[68]

The continental system put American consuls in Europe in an extremely difficult position. On the one hand, they had to ensure that American neutrality was upheld and that their fellow Americans were protected. On the other, this was sometimes only possible if they disregarded the enemy's rules; captains of American ships often ignored the prohibition on putting in at British ports, partly because they had no other choice and partly for economic reasons, hoping for profitable sales. However, this meant that they ran the risk of having their ships confiscated. Often, the consuls found themselves in a legal grey area, where the lines between lawful and unlawful activity were blurred. In 1810, for example, Forbes incurred the criticism of both American traders and their German and Danish customers. He had long been concerned that English ships were misusing the American flag, and repeatedly complained that 'all kinds of tricks are practised and that English ships and subjects are daily seen under American protection'.[69] He believed that 'the honor of our flag' required 'the

[67] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes, Copenhagen 30 June 1813.

[68] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Madison, Hamburg 30 Jan. 1807.

[69] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Robert Smith, Copenhagen 2 Feb. 1810.

greatest vigilance to suppress these abuses'.[70] Acting on this belief, he brought several American captains to the attention of the authorities for holding forged papers. Besides angering his own countrymen, this also annoyed the trading community in Hamburg and Denmark.[71] In his application for the post of chargé d'affaires and General Consul at Copenhagen, he therefore hoped that besides a fixed salary, he would also be permitted economic and political independence. 'I have no hope of great mercantile patronage', he wrote to Madison, 'because my public conduct has not always quadrated with the views of interested and powerful individuals in that line. I wish therefore to own my means of existence only to the faithful & conscientious discharge of such duties as may be confided to me.'[72]

V. *'Want of Regulations'*

The 1792 Consular Act had stipulated only a few duties for consuls. As a result, the consuls had no instructions to fall back on when making decisions. Joseph Forman's letter to Bourne, for example, just after he had been appointed consul for Rotterdam, makes it clear that he had been given no information at all about the duties and tasks that awaited him. He did not even know whether he would have to buy his own stamps and seals, or whether he would have to obtain accreditation from the relevant government.[73]

The ever-fluctuating military situation repeatedly forced the consuls to make decisions without waiting for an answer from Washington. As a result, Forman suggested that the consuls should all meet together '[to] make some arrangement for a regular & established definitions [*sic*] of consular Privilidges [*sic*] & Rights'.[74] Sylvanus Bourne's correspondence shows that at times, there was a lively exchange of information between the consuls in the Hanseatic cities, Holland, and England.

[70] Ibid.

[71] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Robert Smith, Copenhagen 14 Jan. 1810.

[72] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Madison, Hamburg 31 Jan. 1815.

[73] LC, Bourne Papers, Joseph Forman to Bourne, Rotterdam 5 Aug. 1800.

[74] LC, Bourne Papers, Forman to Bourne, Den Hague 6 Apr. 1801.

An ongoing problem was the abuse of neutrality, or that this was simply ignored. Ships generally kept several flags on board for reasons of safety; these helped them both to escape privateers and to get around the blockade. In July 1800 Rohan, the American consular agent in Flushing, was faced with an awkward situation. A French privateer anchored in Flushing harbour was flying the American flag on the mainmast, but for the sake of the crew, the captain had also hoisted the French republican flag.[75]

The covert swapping of flags was common among all seafaring nations, leading France and Britain to tighten up the rules. Ships' captains were obliged to submit written confirmation of neutrality and that their papers were genuine. This confirmation had to be obtained both from their home authorities and the French or British consul. In 1807 Forbes complained that now, not even the tiniest package could be loaded on to a neutral ship without being signed off by the French consul.[76]

There were continual disputes relating to alleged forging of documents or other ways of concealing a ship's or a crew's national allegiance. Space does not permit a detailed discussion of this topic here, but it is useful to look at some cases where consuls were forced to make quick decisions. When papers were lost because of shipwreck or other events, it was almost impossible to prove the true nationality of captain and crew. Missing papers, or the smallest suspicion that papers might not be genuine, were used by the French and British as an excuse to seize ships and their crews. Even if someone could prove that they were American, the British often refused to recognize their passport if they were a naturalized American or had British ancestry. According to British law, a person born in Britain remained British for life, even if they took on the nationality of another country. Based on this understanding of the law, the British Navy forcibly pressed many sailors on American ships into its service.[77] This behaviour on the part of the British was one reason for the war that broke out between Britain and the USA in 1812.[78]

[75] LC, Bourne Papers, H. Rohan to Bourne, Flushing 13 July 1800.

[76] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Von Sienen, Hamburg 10 Mar. 1807.

[77] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes, Hamburg 8 July 1803, enclosure: 'Copy of my circular to the Americans leaving this port.'

[78] It was not until 1871 that Britain changed its laws, under pressure from the

A particularly complex situation arose where non-Americans were in charge of American ships and these were seized by British privateers. In one case, a captain of Irish birth asked for American protection after his ship, which was running under an American flag, was seized by British privateers and taken to Plymouth. The captain was able to flee to Holland, where he begged Rohan for protection so that he could return to the United States, but Rohan was not sure whether he was legally permitted to lend him the protection due to an American citizen while he was travelling to the USA.[79]

The nationality of ships that had been seized by privateers and sold to Americans at auction was also unclear. Rohan in Rotterdam, for example, asked Bourne if a ship taken as a prize, which had thereafter been bought by an American at auction, could legally sail under an American flag if all the papers relating to the sale were in order.[80] It was important to clarify this question because even in cases where the purchase of a ship was proven to be entirely legal, the warring parties did not always respect the change of flag, and defending such a claim in court was extremely expensive for the consuls.

Forged American passports were also a major problem. Many British citizens travelled with American identity documents, as people living on the European mainland often could not easily tell if someone was British or American. Nathan Mayer Rothschild, for example, the founder of the Rothschild banking house in England, sent one of his employees to Gothenburg with a forged American pass in 1807, to ensure the safe passage of goods to the European

American government, to require anyone taking a new nationality to give up the one previously held. Cf. Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others: Nationality and Immigration Law* (London, 1990), 86–7; also NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Erving, Hamburg 5 June 1803 and 10 June 1803; in his letter Forbes protested against the British Navy's attacks on American seafarers.

[79] LC, Bourne Papers, Forman to Bourne, Rotterdam 28 Aug. 1800. Wichelhausen reported a similar case. An American seaman, who had been pressed into the British service, managed to escape from a British ship in Bremen. Wichelhausen provided him with papers and sent him to Emden, where he was supposed to travel home on an American ship. See NA, RG 59 T 184, Consular Despatches Bremen, Wichelhausen to Madison, 10 Oct. 1803.

[80] NA, RG 59 T 184, Consular Despatches Bremen, H. Rohan to Bourne, Flushing 1 Feb. 1801.

mainland.[81] In the autumn of 1804 the French commanding officer in Hanover complained to Forbes that Joshua Jepson Oddy, author of the book *European Commerce* (1805), was travelling through German states on an American pass obtained from the Hamburg Senate. Forbes protested to the Senate's legal counsel (*Syndikus*), Von Sienen, and to the British consul, but was ignored. He was also prevented from publishing his protest in the Hamburg newspapers. Eventually he turned to James Madison, who was residing in London in his capacity as United States envoy, but Madison proved equally unhelpful.[82]

Until the beginning of the nineteenth century the Americans did not issue standardized ships' registration certificates and there were no laws obligating ship owners or captains to carry health certificates for their crews. When American ships and their crews arrived in Europe, they were therefore often subject to long periods in quarantine. Any certificates they did possess were written by hand and had no standardized appearance, so that it was easy to doubt their authenticity. It was only in 1801 that the American government instructed that ships' certificates must be set out in a specific way and that shipping companies must issue health certificates to their crews. In a letter to Madison in June 1802 Wichelhausen applauded the government's decision, even though it had taken so long, as he thought it would help avoid lengthy and unfair quarantine times. However, in the same letter he also regretted that the changes still did not include a requirement for captains to register their arrival and cargoes with the local consul. In his opinion, this made it impossible to create reliable lists of shipping that had put into the harbour. In 1802 he asked the American government to grant permission for consuls to force captains to submit their papers, in order to prevent fraud on the part of foreign nations.[83] In view of the limited means available to consuls, he also asked for precise instructions as to what circumstances per-

[81] Rothschild Archive London, XI/112/5, L. B. Cohen to Nathan Mayer Rothschild, London 19 Oct. 1807.

[82] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Von Sienen, Hamburg 5 Nov. 1804 and 15 Nov. 1804; Von Sienen to Forbes, Hamburg 27 Nov. 1804; Forbes to James Monroe, Hamburg 26 Nov. 1804, 30 Nov. 1804, and 4 Dec. 1804.

[83] NA, RG 59 T 184, Consular Despatches Bremen, Wichelhausen to Madison, Bremen 25 June 1802.

mitted them to give state aid to stranded and destitute sailors. He referred to the brutal way in which many ships' captains simply abandoned their sailors with no means of support, sometimes forcing them to resign their posts. But there were also many, he said, who stayed behind for no good reason.

At the beginning of 1803 the US government passed a supplementary law which obliged ships' captains to put down a security deposit of 400 USD to ensure that they brought back their entire crew when they returned to the US. The only exceptions were seamen who had died, run away or been pressed into foreign service, or released from their contracts early during the voyage home by mutual agreement and with knowledge of the consul. But such an early release was conditional on the consul receiving an advance payment of three months' wages, two-thirds of which was to be given to the sailor, while a third went towards a fund for sailors in need.[84]

When Forbes was appointed consul in Hamburg in 1802, one of his first demands was that support for impoverished seamen should be increased, as his predecessor, Pitcairn, had been forced to spend more than the statutory amount on this task.[85] After war broke out again in 1803, and especially after 1806, government funds for stranded sailors proved increasingly insufficient, and so Forbes repeatedly called on the American government to remedy the situation.[86] When in 1810 the Danish government, acting under pressure from France, confiscated all American ships in its harbours, Forbes asked the American envoy in Paris, General Armstrong, for financial assistance, as he had already paid out over 14,000 USD to help such sailors, and the captains of the few ships still permitted to sail demanded outrageous sums in return for taking sailors back with them to America.[87] He reported that they were asking for 30 USD or more a head, although the 1803 law only allowed for up to 10 USD.[88]

[84] Lloyd Jones, *Consular Service*, 6.

[85] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Madison, Hamburg 28 Aug. 1802. Pitcairn had paid nine Marks a week.

[86] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Madison, Hamburg 30 June 1803.

[87] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to General Armstrong, Tönning 9 Apr. 1810.

[88] Ibid.

VI. *Communication Problems*

Sending and receiving news could be extremely difficult in wartime. Yet early access to reliable information was essential for American consuls if they were to fulfil their task of protecting both their countrymen and their country's trade. Letters could be held up by blockades or intercepted. When it came to news, communication was just as difficult within Europe as it was across the Atlantic, and so any correspondence was likely to travel via complicated routes to make sure that letters arrived at their intended destination.[89] After French revolutionary troops occupied Holland, for example, letters between Amsterdam and the USA were frequently sent to London via the Hanseatic cities before being forwarded on to the USA from there. When it became impossible to contact the USA directly, the consuls in Europe tried to make up for this by sharing information; Mountference, the Paris envoy, for example, asked Sylvanus Bourne to tell him the outcome of the presidential election in the US after he was unable to obtain an American newspaper.[90]

The reliability, or otherwise, of news was also a cause for concern. In June 1800, for example, a rumour was going around that the Dutch ports had been blockaded. The captain of an English ship had told Pitcairn in Hamburg that he had been unable to call in at Amsterdam because of a blockade. Pitcairn then wrote to Bourne and to Williams, the American consul in London.[91] Both assured him that they had heard nothing about a further blockade of the Dutch ports. Williams added that he hoped 'there will not be another blockade—the other was sufficiently injurious to this country'.[92]

His concern was not unjustified. A few months later, Forman reported from Rotterdam that Britain had imposed a general embargo stretching from the Baltic region to the Mediterranean. It was not clear to what extent the American flag was affected. But by the begin-

[89] LC, Bourne Papers, C. Mountference to Bourne, Paris 12 Jan. 1801: correspondence was sent via Paris and La Coruña.

[90] LC, Bourne Papers, Mountference to Bourne, Paris 28 Apr. 1800 and 30 Dec. 1800.

[91] LC, Bourne Papers, Pitcairn to Bourne, Hamburg 17 June 1800.

[92] LC, Bourne Papers, G. Williams to Bourne, London 1 July 1800; Pitcairn to Bourne, Hamburg 1 July 1800.

ning of April 1801 Forman was able to report that the embargo did not apply to American ships, warning, however, that 'our situation is extremely critical at this moment. Great Britain is absolutely desperate & as a nation they are as mad as their King, & with a mad King & a mad people there can be no calculation.'[93] Shortly afterwards, a message came from London that both the American and the Prussian flag would be respected and that numerous ships sailing under the Papenburg flag had reached their destination.[94]

Newspapers were not always a reliable source of information. Early in 1807 many European newspapers reported that British squadrons were holding neutral ships in the Adriatic. The American consul in Trieste, William Riggins, turned to Bourne, asking him to correct the newspaper reports, as ships belonging to neutral countries were not affected.[95]

Getting messages to the USA became more and more difficult after 1806. Finding his correspondence increasingly subject to French interception, Forbes sometimes made as many as four copies of his letters, sending them by different routes in the hope that at least one of them would reach the other side of the Atlantic.[96] When all communication with London stopped in September 1807 Forbes promptly decided to take the next ship to England so that he could obtain reliable information to pass on to American traders and captains. Once he had got the most up to date news, he travelled back to Hamburg via Kiel and Tönning.[97]

Relations between Britain and the USA had been continually worsening since 1807. Previously, letters had regularly been sent to Washington via London, but now they were increasingly forwarded via Amsterdam or Gothenburg.[98] Writing to the US Secretary of State James Monroe, Forbes spoke of how 'extreme difficulty and compli-

[93] LC, Bourne Papers, Forman to Bourne, Rotterdam 30 Mar. 1801 and 5 Apr. 1801; Mulquetier to Bourne, 30 Mar. 1801.

[94] LC, Bourne Papers, Williams to Bourne, London 3 Apr. 1801.

[95] LC, Bourne Papers, Riggins to Bourne, Trieste 16 Mar. 1708.

[96] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Madison, Hamburg 24 Feb. 1807.

[97] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Madison, London 19 Sept. 1807, Hamburg 13 Nov. 1807.

[98] LC, Bourne Papers, Pitcairn to Bourne, Hamburg 30 July 1809.

cated risks which attend all correspondence with the U.S. at present almost discourage the attempt'.[99]

Messages sometimes also arrived dangerously late. The news about the embargo on the Dutch ports, and that it would apply to American ships in 1810, did not reach America for three months. Unaware of the situation, numerous ships had left the USA in the late autumn of 1809 and were on their way to Europe. Forbes was extremely worried as he could not think how to get a warning to them before their arrival:

> I am much embarrassed to know how to communicate to these vessels the distressing and gloomy aspect of our affairs in this quarter and regret more that is has not been deemed expedient to employ three or four small and fast sailing vessels in different parts of Europe to give information of the great and sudden changes which in later times have brought such immense sacrifices on our foreign commerce.[100]

He therefore urged the US government to consider using fast sailing ships to protect their merchant navy, pointing out that the British were nearly always the first to hear of any changes, to the disadvantage of neutral countries: 'they push their collusive trade so unblushingly here to such an amount . . . before the honest American can arrive in Europe.'[101] Furthermore, he continued, the new agreement between Sweden and France permitted neutral trading, but the British had been the first to profit from it—the very first ship to call in at Stralsund had been British, trading on a British account.[102]

Following the Fontainebleau edict of October 1810 trade shifted to the Baltic region. Smuggling on the German North Sea coast came almost to a standstill. Vice-Admiral Saumarez had been ensuring the safe passage of the British merchant fleet in the Baltic since 1808. According to Forbes, the British navy was blocking the Sund to the point where

[99] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to James Monroe, Copenhagen 9 Oct. 1813.
[100] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Robert Smith, Hamburg 17 Mar. 1810.
[101] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Robert Smith, Tönning 16 June 1810.
[102] Ibid.

American ships could not put in at Helsingör to pay their fees. Danish privateers took advantage of this to seize American ships.[103]

The news of Napoleon's defeat in Russia only partly improved the situation for American shipping. War had now broken out between the USA and Britain, and American ships which had previously sailed as far as Russia under the protection of the British Navy in the Baltic now became targets for British privateers. In response, the Americans sent two privateers of their own to the North Sea and the Baltic, which seized over twenty British ships carrying tar, wood, and wheat.[104] Thanks to Forbes' efforts on their behalf, the Danish government offered the American ships protection in their harbours.

Improved relations with Denmark in the final years of the war eventually led Forbes to apply for the two positions of Consul and chargé d'affaires in Copenhagen:

> I have been peculiarly the sport of political circumstances and after thirteen years of arduous service, find myself without a resting place—dearly had I formed a domestic establishment at Hamburg in 1811, when I was forced to abandon it, with considerable loss, I have since that time been here and just at the moment when I hoped to have something like a charmant and agreeable employment, having expended considerable sums in furniture & I am again in doubt if my wishes for an appointment as consul general & Chargé d'Affaires at this Court will be realized or if I must again return to Hamburg.[105]

After the war was over, he received accreditation for the position of General Consul for Stettin and Stralsund and was appointed to the Copenhagen consulate in 1817.[106] But only two years later he left Europe for good, having never really taken up his role in Stettin and

[103] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to Robert Smith, 26 July 1810.
[104] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Despatches Hamburg, Forbes to James Monroe, Copenhagen 6 Nov. 1813.
[105] NA, RG 59 T 211, Consular Dispatches Hamburg, Forbes to James Monroe, Copenhagen 11 Apr. 1815.
[106] Smith II, *America's Diplomats*, 74, 77.

Stralsund.[107] After a brief stay in the USA, he went to Argentina as chargé d'affaires, and died there in 1831.

VII. *Conclusion*

The financial difficulties experienced by Forbes, and the consuls' fight for a salary, clearly demonstrate the problems faced by consuls during the Napoleonic Wars. They had to walk a tightrope between securing their own economic survival and fulfilling their consular duties. The lack of proper instructions was an additional burden for consuls already dealing with a heavy workload and obstructive wartime conditions.

Much maritime trade during the Napoleonic Wars took place in a legal grey area, and merchants exploited this to bring their colonial goods to the mainland during the blockades. Up to a point, the consuls could tolerate and even support this practice. With no salary of their own, some of them were prepared to help undermine the blockade to safeguard their own incomes, but they also had to protect and, if necessary, assert the neutral status of their own country and its legal rights, which meant preventing illegal practices which could damage American trade. While free traders and captains could react quickly to changing circumstances and move to other ports if necessary, consuls were restricted to their own areas of authority.

The political fragmentation of the north German region also placed significant geographical limits on their official capacities. Forbes, for example, could not officially assist his own countrymen outside the narrow borders of his consular district, or if he did, his assistance would not have been recognized. This limited mobility meant that consuls lost important sources of income, as we can see from Forbes's campaign to extend the area of his consular authority, and his demand for the establishment of a consulate (if only on a temporary basis) in Tönning. His eventual failure was a result of the difficult path he had to tread between exercising his official duties—in

[107] Cf. Wolf Karge, 'John M. Forbes und der Beginn der konsularischen Beziehungen zwischen Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Stralsund, Stettin und den USA 1816', in Wolf Karge, Heiko Herold, and Florian Ostrop (eds.), *Stier und Adler: 200 Jahre zwischen Mecklenburg-Schwerin und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika 1816–2016* (Rostock, 2017), 30–45.

the course of which he had annoyed various merchants, along with the political elite—and the necessity of securing an adequate, appropriate income to meet his own needs.

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POLICING THE PORTS: THE REGIONAL DIMENSIONS OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CUSTOMS ACTIVITY IN ENGLAND AND WALES

SPIKE SWEETING

The English and Welsh Customs service of the eighteenth century has generally been seen as a failure, unable to raise revenue and representative of unenlightened attitudes to public service. Historians have couched this as a bureaucratic problem, often with explicit reference to Max Weber's views on office-holding, with the implication being that only top-down reform of the service and the fiscal system more generally was likely to improve receipts. This article uses evidence of national and regional Customs expenditure to suggest the importance of a complementary set of factors limiting the effectiveness of the Customs rooted more in protean economic circumstances than questions of state-formation. Before the advent of the railways moving bulk goods without the aid of waterways was enormously expensive because the best source of motive power was the horse and cart, and even these struggled when roads were in poor repair. As Adam Smith explained, maritime freight was *the* great engine driving the division of labour:

> Coastal areas, and cities on rivers have been the fastest to develop, as their goods can be very cheaply transported across water versus land. Thus while cities on water will develop, those landlocked will be stifled, as land transportation is vastly more expensive than sea transportation. And since landlocked areas are limited in their potential for wealth by the neighbouring land, those with navigation available are not so limited.[1]

This fundamental constraint makes 'ecologies', or how the spatial relationship between economic agents was conditioned by energy

[1] Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations*, 2 vols. (London, 1776), i. 22–3.

resources, in particular, seas, winds, rivers, and coalfields, central to understanding economic growth and taxable trade.[2]

Smuggling was acknowledged by the Commissioners of the Revenue to be a major reason why receipts from indirect taxes, which they were obliged to send to the Exchequer, were only a fraction of what they could have been. For the eighteenth-century Customs, the problem was particularly acute. Unlike the Excise, who largely taxed domestic trade and industry in fixed breweries, tanneries, and warehouses, the Customs taxed goods on inherently mobile vessels. Many vessels could bypass the ports where Customs officers were stationed and land their goods in coves or beaches in order to avoid duties. To be sure, the Customs employed armed cruisers and 'riding officers' to police the coasts, but their effectiveness in dealing with large, well-armed smuggling gangs at land and sea was limited. In this respect, raising Customs revenue relied to no small degree on the compliance of ships' captains and, ultimately, the merchants they worked for choosing to unload their cargoes at Customs-licensed ports. Patrick O'Brien situated this problem within the context of a war economy, which drove up taxes and hence further diminished the incentive of these actors to submit to Customs regulations. O'Brien wrote:

> throughout the period no Chancellor could have been other than deeply aware that the enforcement of customs legislation upon a society where almost everyone, high and low, connived at the sale and purchase of smuggled goods was problematical. Thus when they imposed or augmented tariffs their calculations involved them not merely in estimating the probable response of consumers to prices augmented by higher duties but also in considering the added incentives their policies afforded to smuggle and to buy contraband.[3]

[2] E. A. Wrigley, *Continuity, Chance and Change: The Character of the Industrial Revolution in England* (Cambridge, 1988); id., *Progress, Poverty and Population* (Cambridge, 2004), ch. 3; Paul Warde, *Ecology, Economy and State Formation in Early Modern Germany* (Cambridge, 2006); and Astrid Kander, Paolo Malanima, and Paul Warde, *Power to the People: Energy in Europe Over the Last Five Centuries* (Princeton, 2013), parts I and II.

[3] Patrick K. O'Brien, 'The Political Economy of Taxation, 1660–1815', *Economic History Review,* NS, 41/1 (1988), 25.

Noting the sophistication of the smuggling gangs and that Customs officers were easily bribed, O'Brien concluded that 'there is no evidence that the government managed to raise the share of taxable imports falling into the net for government revenue, until the Royal Navy at sea and the militia on land came to the aid of the Customs Service during the long wars with France from 1793 to 1815'.[4]

The conclusions O'Brien drew in 1988 were expanded by John Brewer in his *The Sinews of Power* (1989), in which he argued that war debts accrued after 1694 meant an increase in the number of revenue-raising officers and a dramatic modernization of attitudes to office-holding in central government. The need to secure taxes saw the Excise grow faster than any other branch of government and collect the lion's share of revenue between 1710 and the introduction of income tax in 1799, precisely because they could be relied upon to tax an unwilling population harder. Brewer wrote: '[t]he English excise more closely approximated to Max Weber's ideas of bureaucracy than any other government agency in eighteenth-century Europe.'[5] Uniquely, the Excise distanced themselves from the corruption, venality, sinecurism, and embezzlement that tarred most branches of government through a series of carefully constructed regulations that set their officers apart. Officers were examined on entry for mathematical proficiency; they were remunerated in wages and pensions by their commissioners, rather than fees from the tax-base, to improve discipline; officers were frequently 'removed' from the districts they taxed to new ones to stop them fraternizing with the locals; officers had to be married on appointment; using a sophisticated trail of paperwork, each officer was strictly supervised and actively disciplined by those of higher rank; those who detected frauds or collusions were rewarded.[6] By the 1780s the relative efficiency of the Excise as compared to the other branches of government was well marked and increasingly the Customs—well known for its absentee sinecurists at the upper end of the service—were being asked to con-

[4] Ibid. 26.

[5] John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State 1688–1789* (London, 1989), 56.

[6] Ibid. 82–93 and id., 'Servants of the Public—Servants of the Crown: Officialdom of Eighteenth-Century Government', in John Brewer and Echhart Hellmuth (eds.), *Rethinking Leviathan: The Eighteenth-Century State in Britain and Germany* (Oxford, 1999), 127–47.

form to their administrative standards in order to produce more revenue.[7] Such is the force of Brewer's assessment that the establishment of the otherworldly Excise man, the Treasury's preference for the rites of the Excise, and the slow conversion of unreformed departments to this gospel has become one, if not the only, grand narrative of English revenue history.[8]

Without wishing to claim they were as arrestingly modern as the Excise's administrative or fiscal achievements, I suggest that the activities of the Customs are not without interest precisely because they were so easily manipulated by their political patrons and tax-base, much like the majority of office-holders. Julian Hoppit has recently argued that the foundation of a coherent, centralized political economy in eighteenth-century Britain was inhibited by

> the challenges of reconciling very different interests (personal, local, sectional, and national), the absence of an agreed paradigm of economic discourse, the shortages or imperfections of information about some areas of economic life (all the more important given rapid change in some parts), and the problems of balancing legislative ambition and administrative realism. Such difficulties were real and substantial, making it very hard for contemporaries to act consistently.[9]

This position coincides with that taken by Aaron Graham and Patrick Walsh, who have noted that the 'Weberian bureaucratic reform and central diktat' characteristic of the fiscal-military state required 'the

[7] See Elizabeth E. Hoon, *The Organisation of the English Customs System, 1696–1786* (2nd edn., Newton Abott, 1968).

[8] See Michael Braddick, *The Nerves of State: Taxation and the Financing of the English State, 1558–1714* (Manchester, 1996); Miles Ogborn, *Space of Modernity: London's Geographies 1680–1780* (London, 1998), ch. 5; William Ashworth, *Customs and Excise: Trade, Protection and Consumption in England, 1640–1845* (Oxford, 2004); Earl A. Reitan, *Politics, Finance and the People: Economical Reform in England in the Age of the American Revolution, 1770–92* (London, 2007); D'Maris Coffman, *Excise Taxation and the Origins of the Public Debt* (London, 2013).

[9] Julian Hoppit, *Britain's Political Economies: Parliament and Economic Life, 1660–1800* (Cambridge, 2017), 6.

local interest groups' active cooperation or tacit consent' in order to operate.[10]

We might think of eighteenth-century Customs officers as constantly negotiating the demands of the central fiscal authorities and the economic expectations of their immediate social networks. Insofar as smugglers could elicit widespread support from the communities they emerged from and supplied, and given that officers were so badly regulated, we might expect that the state came off worst in these trade-offs. Nevertheless, William Farrell has shown that some institutions could militate against smuggling even when other sections of the community might support it. For instance, the London Weavers' Company was instrumental in policing the silk trade in order to flush out contraband Lyon ware.[11] Hoppit's work on national incidences of taxation also points to the fact that some regions paid considerably more Customs duties per head than others, and that enclaves of taxpayers did exist.[12] Pinpointing the successes of the Customs in raising revenue, tackling smugglers, and policing the coastal communities they inhabited is a useful exercise to gauge the economic contexts of these competing forces.

For the most part, this analysis of Customs revenues is based on a manuscript account of the Revenue of the English and Welsh Customs drawn up by Sir William Musgrave around 1790.[13] Musgrave was the pivotal figure in efforts to reform the Customs under Lord Shelburne and William Pitt the Younger, and his account was clearly an attempt to reflect upon the history of the Revenue in order to reshape it.[14] His manuscript is unique in that it details the takings of the Customs in London and all seventy-two other ports in England and Wales at intervals of a decade from 1710 to 1770 and for 1777 to

[10] Aaron Graham and Patrick Walsh, 'Introduction', in eid. (eds.), *The British Fiscal Military States, 1660–c.1783* (London, 2016), 2–3.

[11] William Farrell, 'The Silk Interest and the Fiscal-Military State', in Graham and Walsh (eds.), *British Fiscal Military States*, 113–30.

[12] Hoppit, *Britain's Political Economies*, ch. 10.

[13] British Library, London (BL), Add. MS., 8133A.

[14] BL, Add. MS., 8133C, fo. 118. On Musgrave and reform see C. J. Wright, 'Sir William Musgrave (1735–1800) and the British Museum Library', in G. Mandelbrote and B. Taylor (eds.), *Libraries Within Libraries: The Origins of the British Libraries Printed Collections* (London, 2009), 202–21; Reitan, *Politics, Finance and the People*, 123–6; Brewer, *Sinews of Power*, 71.

1787. The 1814 fire at London's Customs Houses means that it is hard to verify all the outport figures against the archive originals from which they were extracted, but the aggregate figures match surviving Treasury receipts and other audits of the revenue collected by Treasury-affiliated politicians.[15] More excitingly for historians, Musgrave's figures break down the Customs revenue for each port under several heads. 'Gross Receipt' represents the annual sum raised on imports, exports, and domestic coals. Crucially, Musgrave recorded how much of this money was disbursed locally in the form of 'drawbacks and bounties' paid on re-exported goods or subsidized exports, 'management' costs, and additional 'allowances' for damages. The remainder, termed 'Net Produce' or 'Receipt', was sent to Customs House in London and then the Exchequer. Combined with national measures of trade and reports on the services' performance, these categories are the most analytically consistent mechanisms we possess for measuring the scale and geographical distribution of Customs activities in England and Wales.

Musgrave's survey allows for an assessment of the activities of Customs officers at a regional level using a set of fairly standardized monetary metrics. Whilst measuring officer activity solely in terms of cash is crude in that it loses much of the personal character of administrative life (and its corruption), Musgrave's figures facilitate a meso-level analysis that can connect Treasury policy with local circumstances across England and Wales. Consequently, it is hoped the data presented here will be useful in grounding closer studies of regional trade, taxation, and smuggling in a more systematic way. Although it shows that the Customs were not always as flaccid as has often been suggested, this data should not be construed to infer that smuggling was negligible in supplying English and Welsh consumers. The figures used here show growth in legitimate taxation, *not* the contraction of the black economy, the depths of which will probably never be fathomed with any precision. Specifically, they show that legal trade in a few bulky commodities grew in a handful of ports in a manner that suggests local manufacturing demand contributed much to the success of the Customs before 1780.

Investigating the Customs duties raised by each port and the Customs local expenditure in detail certainly gives historians some

[15] See Part I, below.

scope to revise the rather gloomy assessment of the Customs as the perennial stooges of the fiscal-military state. The first part of this article demonstrates that the considerable difference between the gross and net receipts of the Customs stemmed not from any failure of the service, as most historians imply, but from the perfectly legal disbursements they made to merchants re-exporting goods called 'drawbacks', the 'bounties' paid to merchants exporting strategic domestically produced products, and the salaries paid to their own officers. Customs officers undertook a high volume of bureaucratic activity as a result of Treasury policy, which has subsequently been understood as inefficient because of its failure to swell the coffers of the Exchequer. This was a structural problem for the Customs, driven by the competing political economies of the centre, not by weakness on the part of the officers. Moreover, the declining importance of drawbacks preceded their reform as manufactures grew, suggesting economic developments were more influential than the Treasury's commitment to bureaucratic efficiency in improving the net receipt.

The second part of this article looks at the dynamic between net revenue receipts and expenditure on staff in more detail in order to assess where and when net receipts grew between 1710 and 1785. It highlights the success of ports with good transport links inland and well developed industrial hinterlands, such as Bristol, Liverpool, and Hull. These regions need not have been inundated with factories, but were 'industrious' in the sense used currently to mean that their residents were intensively engaged in market-orientated, largely secondary-sector economic activity. Their populations grew, required large quantities of raw materials to work up, and spent their generally high wages on consumer goods, all of which improved Customs receipts.[16] Other ports expanded more slowly, particularly in the south and east of England. The shift in legal trade to the north and west was not matched by a concomitant shift in Customs resources because large 'industrious' ports were easier to tax and required fewer staff. Rather, the Europe-facing ports of the south had relative-

[16] Jan de Vries, *The Industrious Revolution: Consumer Behaviour and the Household Economy, 1650 to the Present* (Cambridge, 2006); Craig Muldrew, *Food, Energy and the Creation of Industriousness: Work and Material Culture in Agrarian England, 1550–1780* (Cambridge, 2011); E. A. Wrigley, *The Path to Sustained Growth: England's Transition from an Organic Economy to an Industrial Revolution* (Cambridge, 2016), esp. ch. 5.

ly large numbers of staff, but devoted much of their time to chasing smugglers rather than taxing retained imports. A major aim of this section is to highlight the increasingly varied and often stratified markets that ports serviced as trade and industry became more sophisticated. Policing the ports could involve quite different activities depending on where in the country an officer was stationed.

The third part explores the distribution of Customs receipts in terms of the respective transport costs of legitimate traders and smugglers in order to connect these figures with qualitative accounts of illicit trade. The cost of transport, especially on land, was a major incentive to utilize riparian ports and pay taxes, though this incentive was greater in the bulk trades, such as coal, where value per ton was lowest. For the luxury goods favoured by smugglers, such as tea, silks, and tobacco, higher values per ton mitigated the problem of transport costs to some extent. There is nothing to suggest that the strategies developed by the Customs effectively dealt with this problem, though their use of preventive officers at sea did seem to stop smugglers cultivating industrial markets.

Moving from description to analysis, the conclusion reflects briefly on what is to be gained from seeing the Customs in terms of ports conditioned by flows of goods, local industries, and the infrastructure joining both, as opposed to bureaucratic regulations.

I. *Customs Policies and Drawbacks*

Paying back to merchants taxes raised on goods that were subsequently re-exported occupied Customs officers in most of Britain's largest ports. Sir Robert Walpole and William Pitt the Younger both tried to transfer this complicated procedure to the Excise on the basis that they were less easily corrupted than the Customs. While historians have seen this facet of Customs procedure as an engine of bureaucratic reform, none have examined its scale, which was the most important measurable determinant of net Customs revenue for much of the century. This section examines legislative, administrative, and fiscal aspects of the re-export system to argue that it was chiefly this policy that contrived to make the Customs look inefficient.

Throughout the eighteenth century Customs policy was developed by the Treasury in consultation with the Customs Commission

in London and, occasionally, the Board of Trade. Raising new taxes or extending the scope of old ones required parliamentary assent, and from 1696 legislation proceeded by building on two overlapping mechanisms. Most Customs duties were calculated on the basis of the 'tonnage and poundage' legislation brought in at the Restoration, which applied to the commodities coming from 'over the seas' as listed in the Book of Rates. This baseline was supplemented by a series of additional 'subsidies' used to fund specific loans from the Bank of England that added a fixed fraction or percentage of duties to the tonnage figures. For the most part these revisions were driven by war. Ralph Davis has identified the 1690s and 1700s as the pivotal decades that saw a relatively low rate of taxation vastly inflated, and this shift also had an overtly protectionist element.[17]

To align England's, then Britain's, position within the European and Imperial trading patterns inherited from the seventeenth century necessitated a second, large category of legislation applied to commodities that were deemed especially load-bearing in fiscal terms, were particularly tricky to administer, or could bolster some other aspect of economic policy. Items that competed with British manufacturing could be heavily penalized and certain exports were subsidized by the Customs through a system of bounties. Notable among this second group of goods were those coming from outside Europe, either under the auspices of the East India Company or from the flourishing plantation colonies. Calicos were thought to compete directly with British textile manufacture and were prohibited outright, and European sailcloth, leather hides, linens, and silks suffered from high taxes. 'Groceries' such as sugar or tobacco were more problematic. Insofar as they were 'luxuries' imported into Britain in vast quantities as a result of the Navigation Acts, it was thought that they might bear the weight of higher taxes while still encouraging colonial enterprise. However, high taxes shut off trans-shipment to European markets, which would have slowed the development of British ship-

[17] Ralph Davis, 'Rise of Protectionism in England, 1689–1784', *Economic Historical Review*, 19/2 (1966), 306–17. See also O'Brien, 'The Political Economy of Taxation'; David Ormrod, *The Rise of Commercial Empires: England and the Netherlands in the Age of Mercantilism* (Cambridge, 2003); Ashworth, *Customs and Excise*; id., *Industrial Revolution: The State Knowledge and Global Trade* (London, 2017); Martin J. Daunton, *Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799–1914* (Cambridge, 2001).

ping and commercial services. In order to compensate for this problem and create an entrepôt system, merchants re-exporting many goods were entitled to claim or 'drawback' from the Customs a large proportion of the import duties they had paid.

Tobacco was the mainstay of English and Welsh re-exports until American Independence because it was a commodity that few European states could compete with directly through their East India Companies or imperial networks, unlike sugar, calicos, or spices.[18] Consequently 75 to 80 per cent of imports from Chesapeake were sent directly to the European mainland or Ireland. The trans-shipment of finished goods, especially lighter textiles such as linens and cottons, from Europe and India to Africa, the Thirteen Colonies, and Caribbean plantations was a second branch of the re-export trade. As the quality of British manufacturing rose, it was these goods that came to be replaced with domestic alternatives, leading to a decline in re-export and a rise in domestically produced exports.[19] Those commodities that the British could not copy, particularly tropical groceries, were crucial in galvanizing the smuggling activity described below.

William Ashworth's recent analysis of the Industrial Revolution has put great weight on British Customs policy, arguing that protectionist tax walls, a strategy borrowed from the French, stimulated certain kinds of manufacturing at the same time as the Dutch-inspired entrepôt model, facilitated by the drawbacks, fostered imperial markets dependent on finished goods produced in the metropolis.[20] Inspired as it might have been, the policy was not particularly

[18] G. N. Clark, *Guide to English Commercial Statistics, 1696–1782* (London, 1938); E. B. Schumpeter, *British Overseas Trade Statistics, 1697–1808* (Oxford, 1960); Ralph Davis, 'English Foreign Trade, 1700–1774', *Economic History Review*, NS, 15/2 (1962), 285–303, Appendix 1.

[19] C. H. Lee, *The British Economy since 1700: A Macro Economic Perspective* (Cambridge, 1986), 108–12, summarizes the findings of Phyllis Dean and W. A. Cole, F. Crouzet, and N. R. F Crafts based on the 'Ledgers of Import and Export', The National Archive (TNA), London, CUST 3 series; J. Cuenca Esteban, 'The Rising Share of British Industrial Exports in Industrial Output, 1700–1851', *Journal of Economic History*, 57/4 (1997). For Scotland see Philip Rossner, *Scottish Trade in the Wake of Union (1700–1760): The Rise of a Warehouse Economy* (Stuttgart, 2008).

[20] Ashworth, *Industrial Revolution*, chs. 2–5.

efficient to administer. Guides to navigating Customs House bureaucracy were a staple of eighteenth-century publishing, and the political economist Malachy Postlethwaite summed up the mood in his 1766 *Dictionary of Trade and Commerce*, stating that without wishing to 'enumerate' all the changes in taxes since Queen Anne's reign, 'which is too tedious',

> we may see what a maze our merchants must be about when they come to their computation. If likewise we consider the many exceptions and exceptions to exceptions and regulation and regulations to regulations, for collecting the customs we must conclude it is no easy matter for any merchant in this country to be a master of this branch of the business, if he be what we call a general merchant.[21]

Although Postlethwaite approved of drawbacks on commercial principle, he devoted more pages to explaining how to file for a debenture for a drawback than to explaining commercial relations with most European states. For the Customs, drawbacks were equally arduous work because they involved unloading cargoes from ships, weighing and measuring them, calculating and paying the duties, then essentially doing the same again in reverse when they were sent abroad. This involved twice mobilizing a whole retinue of tidewaiters, landwaiters, weighers or gaugers, warehousemen, searchers, collectors, and various clerks on land and sea.

Much early Hanoverian economic policy rested on refining the basic fiscal rationale of the Customs and extending the bonded warehouse system that allowed tropical commodities to lie in storage for as long as the importing merchant could secure his liabilities on another trader's credit. Less cash changed hands by administering drawbacks this way, but the system was still open to abuse because

[21] 'Customs', 'Debentures', 'Drawbacks', in Malachy Postlethwaite, *Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce*, 2 vols. (London, 1766), i; See also William Edgar, *Vectigalium Systema: Or a Complete View of that Branch of the Revenue of Great Britain Commonly Called the Customs* (London, 1718); Henry Crouch, *A Complete View of the British Customs* (1st edn. London, 1725); Henry Saxby, *The British Customs* (1st edn. London, 1757); Samuel Baldwin, *A Survey of the British Customs* (London, 1770); Edward James Mascall, *Consolidation of the Customs* (London, 1787).

Figure 1: Customs Revenue, Expenditure and Administration Costs, Christmas 1711–1763



Source: BL, Add. MS., 29990, 'The Gross and Net Produce of his Majesty's Customs in England, together with the adjustment of the Net Produce with the Payments into the Exchequer, annually from Christmas 1710 to 1763' (*c.*1764).

merchants misestimated their imports, spirited away or adulterated goods in warehouses, bribed officers, or claimed drawback on goods that actually got smuggled back into Britain.[22] Such were Sir Robert Walpole's reasons for shifting the administration of East India tea, coffee, and chocolate to the Excise in 1722, and for his hopes of extending the bonded warehouse system to wine and tobacco in 1733. He argued that minimal Customs duties could then be paid with the shortfall being made up by an Excise on goods entering inland to British consumers. The spectacular implosion of Walpole's later 'scheme', after hysterical opposition scaremongering centred on the trope of an unconstitutional 'general excise', put paid to administrators publicly espousing this logic for two generations. Nonetheless, the clunky,

[22] Papers of the House of Commons (PHC), 'The Report, with Appendix, from the Committee of the House of Commons Appointed to Enquire into the Fraud and Abuses in the Customs' (1733), *passim*.

piecemeal system of drawbacks remained in place until the Warehouse Acts of 1802.[23]

The alacrity with which merchants exploited the drawback system after 1715 is remarkable. A Treasury digest formatted similarly to Musgrave's, detailing Customs receipts from 1711 to 1763, is shown in Figure 1. This paints a comprehensive picture of the money involved. It shows that money paid back to merchants via drawbacks rose in advance of that collected as part of the gross receipt, meaning that by the 1740s more money was being refunded to merchants re-exporting goods than was being sent to the Exchequer. Expenditure on drawbacks stopped rising after the War of Austrian Succession, when a greater gross receipt saw net receipts begin to nudge ahead of drawbacks as a proportion of expenditure.

In order to push the story forward a few decades, Figure 2 shows the aggregated gross receipt of the Customs that Musgrave recorded for each year, distinguishing how the money was disbursed between 1710 and 1785. Like the Treasury data used in Figure 1, one can clearly see the gross receipt growing throughout the century, and quite rapidly in 1785, when trade between Britain, the rest of Europe, and the United States rapidly flourished following the end of hostilities that had suppressed or disrupted commercial life for most of the previous decade. Musgrave's figures also show that it was ports with, first, easy access to Europe and the Atlantic and, second, robust commercial facilities, that bore the brunt of the administrative burden that re-exports caused. Bristol, Whitehaven, Liverpool, and London paid 94 per cent of all drawbacks. More importantly, as Table 1 indicates, much earlier growth in the gross receipt was eaten up by payments back to merchants on re-exported goods through drawbacks, which meant that the net receipt sent to the Treasury remained fairly stagnant until 1750. That year less than 50 per cent of the money collected by the Customs was reaching the Exchequer as a result of payments made in drawback, bounties, and management costs. Thereafter, re-exports bottomed out relative to gross receipt, resulting in the net receipt rocketing between 1750 and 1785.

The scale of drawback payments eclipsed a general rise in gross receipt and contrived to make the Customs service look ineffective in terms of capturing more net revenue. O'Brien's influential views on

[23] Paul Langford, *The Excise Crisis: Society and Politics in the Age of Walpole* (Oxford, 1975); Ashworth, *Customs and Excise*, 172.

Figure 2: Customs Revenue, Expenditure, and Administration, 1710–1785 (£000s)



Source: BL, Add. MS., 8133A; Bounties are distinguished from Musgrave's figure for 'Drawbacks and Bounties' using Hoppit's figures in his *Britain's Political Economies: Parliament and Economic Life, 1660–1800* (Cambridge, 2017), Table 8.1 (my thanks to him for sharing the spreadsheet), based on data Shelburne gathered. (Shelburne had no bounties figures for 1785 so drawbacks for that year are based on Musgrave's figure alone and include bounties.)

the subject have already been quoted, and it is vital to recognize that his conclusions were based on net revenue figures extracted from Treasury papers in the nineteenth century, which allowed him to compare the Customs, Excise, and Land Tax. No doubt the stagnant Customs appeared far less efficient than the steadily expanding Excise based on this measure, but it only reveals half the story because it overlooked the massive repayments made back to merchants.

Assessing the Customs on the basis of gross receipt suggests the service had rather more integrity than has been imagined. For instance, between 1718 and 1722, and 1748 and 1752, the gross receipt grew from an average of £2.8 million to £3.7 million per annum, or by about 30 per cent, a rate similar to the Excise. During this period only the subsidy of 1747 was added to the general tariff structure, increasing the cost of rated goods by about 25 per cent, although this varied

Table 1: Customs Expenditure and Administration Costs as a Percentage of Gross Receipts, 1710–1785

Gross Revenue (£000s)		*Drawbacks (%)*	*Bounties (%)*	*Allowances (%)*	*Management (%)*	*Net Revenue (%)*
1710	£2,155	24	2	3	7	64
1720	£2,437	35	3	2	7	53
1730	£2,980	38	2	1	7	52
1740	£2,628	43	2	1	8	46
1750	£3,677	42	9	1	6	43
1760	£4,205	35	5	1	6	53
1770	£4,545	29	4	1	6	61
1780	£3,986	20	5	1	7	67
1785	£7,817	25*	-	1	3	71

* Shelburne had no bounties figures for 1785 so drawbacks for that year are based on Musgrave's figure alone and include bounties.

Source: BL, Add. MS., 8133A; Bounties are distinguished from Musgrave's figures for 'Drawbacks and Bounties' using Hoppit's figures in his *Britain's Political Economies*, Table 8.1 (my thanks to him for sharing the spreadsheet), based on data Shelburne gathered.

because of the special duties laid on many of the most important commodities. Upward adjustments in the region of 35 per cent were put on tropical groceries. Export duties on British manufactures were also removed in 1722 and calicos prohibited, further diminishing the tax base. Given this varied picture, a gross rise of 30 per cent seems a fairly good return for the Customs, and suggests that they were capable of increasing the scope of taxation on trade. However, in the same period re-exports from England and Wales grew by 73 per cent, severely depressing net revenue and making these gains invisible, albeit in a manner that was perfectly legal. In purely fiscal terms, policing trade through the redistribution of taxes rendered the Customs highly unproductive, gnawing at the net receipt for the early part of the century.

Abandoning drawbacks would have meant scotching a large portion of English and Welsh re-export trade to the extent that any sav-

ing in administration costs would, in theory, only have allowed Parliament to revise downwards a tiny fraction of the tariff structure. Indeed, the wages paid to all officers represented only about 7 per cent of the gross receipt annually. Well-informed politicians did, however, feel that reform along the lines of the Excise was appropriate and this was certainly the tenor of the many Parliamentary reports which formed the blueprint for the service after 1783, when the national debt had alarmingly escalated since Walpole's day. Yet Pitt's decision to pass inland tobacco duties to the Excise in 1787 was as much recognition that the newly independent United States were likely to start trading directly with Europe as enduring fiscal rationalism. Similarly, passing wine duties to the Excise came at the same time as a short-lived liberalization of trade with France. Drawbacks represented just 15 per cent of the gross receipt around 1790.[24] Moreover, it was an emerging manufacturing base that appears to have mitigated this problem structurally from 1750, when drawback declined as a proportion of the gross receipt, leading to greater net returns. Such a development was outside the Treasury's direct influence in a number of ways we will turn to next. Nonetheless, if we were to identify an observable factor that hobbled the Customs in the eyes of historians, it would have to be the commitment of MPs in Westminster to the drawback system.

II. *The Productivity and Costs of Regional Customs Establishments*

Musgrave's detailed regional figures will be pursued in this section in order to analyse which ports were profitable to the Customs. We find that London was easily the chief port in England and Wales in absolute terms. Over the course of the century London's dominance did decline relative to the seventy-two outports, but no other single port began to approach the capital's contribution. London was a trading centre on a scale and of a complexity that dwarfed the rest of the country. However, the capital shared characteristics with its most successful competitors, namely, as an urban centre on a river that gave it easy access to a populous, relatively wealthy hinterland. Very

[24] TNA, CUST 17/11–14, States of Navigation, Commerce and Revenue, 1789–92.

few ports produced 1 per cent or more of the Customs' net revenue, and many were little more than way-stations for the coastal trade with little direct engagement in overseas trade. As we shall see, southern ports that had previously serviced England's wool exports to Europe began to look like hangovers from a bygone age, even by 1760. Yet the Customs Commission recognized that it was vital to maintain a strong presence in these sleepy port-towns lest they become overrun by smugglers. Whether their efforts were adequate will be considered in the next section. What needs stressing here is that the demands of newly 'industrious' regions concentrated and grew the flow of taxable goods into a few ports, which made the Customs officers deployed in them hugely productive compared to those elsewhere.

Table 2 displays the combined net produce and management costs of the leading ports of England and Wales at three intervals across the eighteenth century, and what those totals represented as a percentage of the aggregates for both countries. Despite some fluctuations, London stands out as the cornerstone of the Customs revenue, contributing about two-thirds of the receipt across the period, with the next largest provincial ports still an order of magnitude lower in their remittances. Of these, Bristol was already well established as a commercial centre by the end of the seventeenth century and doubled its net take over the course of the eighteenth century after accounting for inflation. Liverpool was the great success of the period for the revenue, spectacularly leaping from a net take of £69,000 to £452,000 in real terms. Hull also emerged as a major vent for West Riding textiles.

Where primary sector agriculture or mining predominated, larger ports also increased their share of the contributions to the revenue, although without the fireworks of Liverpool. This included the east coast ports of Yarmouth, Lynn, Newcastle, and Sunderland. Taxable trade was hard won and many ports on the south coast stagnated or slipped down the Customs' rankings. Exeter was ideally placed to contribute to the Atlantic economy but, having produced revenues behind only London and Bristol, drastically fell away as the local woollen industry declined after 1720. The sixty remaining ports produced very little revenue for the Customs, on average making between a sixth and quarter of 1 per cent of the net revenue each. So precariously situated in commercial networks were many of them that the cost of paying the local Customs establishment outweighed

Table 2: Net Revenue and Management Costs of the Chief Ports of England and Wales

	Net Revenue (£000s and % of Agg.)			Management (£000s and % of Agg.)		
	1770,1720, 1730	*1740, 1750, 1760*	*1770, 1780, 1785*	*1770,1720, 1730*	*1740, 1750, 1760*	*1770, 1780, 1785*
Aggregate	£5,008	£6,301	£11,954	£620	£840	£914
London	£3,476	£3,947	£7,893	£302	£396	£440
%	69.4	62.6	66.0	48.7	47.1	48.1
Newcastle	£31	£54	£119	£9	£12	£14
%	0.6	0.9	1.0	1.5	1.4	1.6
Sunderland	£11	£29	£88	£2	£3	£3
%	0.2	0.5	0.7	0.4	0.4	0.4
Hull	£71	£152	£319	£9	£14	£16
%	1.4	2.4	2.7	1.5	1.7	1.8
Lynn	£49	£88	£168	£4	£7	£7
%	1.0	1.4	1.4	0.6	0.8	0.8
Yarmouth	£29	£63	£76	£8	£11	£10
%	0.6	1.0	0.6	1.3	1.3	1.0
Whitehaven	£16	£84	£43	£4	£6	£10
%	0.3	1.3	0.4	0.7	0.8	1.1
Liverpool	£69	£243	£452	£11	£16	£22
%	1.4	3.9	3.8	1.8	1.9	2.4
Bristol	£360	£467	£708	£24	£26	£25
%	7.2	7.4	5.9	3.9	3.1	2.7
Exeter	£110	£44	£58	£8	£12	£12
%	2.2	0.7	0.5	1.2	1.5	1.3
Plymouth	£25	£28	£62	£8	£13	£15
%	0.5	0.4	0.5	1.4	1.6	1.6
Portsmouth	£15	£35	£63	£6	£12	£14
%	0.3	0.6	0.5	1.0	1.4	1.6
Southampton	£27	£40	£76	£6	£9	£11
%	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.9	1.0	1.2
Other Ports	£493	£1,029	£1,835	£218	£302	£316
%	9.8	16.3	15.4	35.1	36.0	34.6
Net Losses (no. ports)	95	64	51			

Source: BL, Add. MS., 8133A deflated using the price index in B. J. Mitchell, *Abstract of British Historical Statistics* (Cambridge, 1988), Prices Table 1B, 'Consumers' goods', to 1709 prices.

the revenue they generated, resulting in net losses for the Customs. Welsh ports were consistently problematic in this regard, rarely repaying their cost of upkeep. As such, the growing share of the revenue these ports provided from the mid eighteenth century onwards was simply a result of more of these ports breaking even. A single additional taxed cargo could make a substantial difference to most.

The uneven picture of legal trade presented by Musgrave owes much to geography and geology. All the large and growing ports were on navigable rivers that made marketing goods to communities upstream relatively easy. Bristol on the Severn and Avon, Liverpool on the Mersey, Hull on the Humber and Trent, and even Lynn's position as gateway to the Fens and Cambridge bear this out. Ports largely confined to coastal communication could not establish themselves as commercial centres in quite the same way because overseas merchants would gladly bypass them in favour of the port nearest their target market in order to keep land carriage costs to a minimum. Consequently, natural endowments meant that most ports were not well suited to take large quantities of imports, precisely the category of goods on which the Customs raised their revenue. The increasingly marketable finished goods that Bristol, Liverpool, and Hull could access were equally useful in bolstering their trade in a manner that bustling Lynn or Yarmouth could not compete with. Manufacturers on the Severn, Mersey, and Trent/Humber were amply supplied with coal, which kept the cost of energy and wages low compared to London.[25] As the Inspector of Import and Exports explained in 1799: 'the commerce of the ports of Liverpool and Hull, particularly the former, has rapidly encreased of late insomuch that I believe the export of British manufactures at present from those two ports alone exceed in value the exports of the port of London.'[26]

Textiles and metalware from the North and Midlands were in ample demand across the Atlantic and had some traction in Europe, underpinning exchanges for regional specialities overseas and boost-

[25] Robert Allen, 'Technology', in Roderick Floud, Jane Humphries, and Paul Johnson (eds.), *Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain*, i: *1700–1870* (Cambridge, 2014), 300 and table 10.4; William M. Cavert, *The Smoke of London: Energy and Environment in the Early Modern City* (Cambridge, 2016), 126–30.

[26] PHC, 'Second Report from the Select Committee upon the Improvement of the Port of London' (1799), 514.

ing inward demand for raw materials. Rivers, of course, facilitated this two-way movement, particularly when it came to trafficking bulky goods such as timber, ore, the oils, dyes, and ashes used in textile production, or coal itself to towns. The Collector at Cardiff, only ten kilometres from the South Wales coalfield, reinforced this point to the Commission in London stating: 'we have no Coals Exported from this Port, nor ever shall, as it would be too expensive to bring it down here from the internal part of the Country.'[27] In addition, merchants favoured inland waterways whenever possible in order to ensure their coals did not travel by sea and become liable for coastwise duties.[28] Canals aimed to alleviate both problems but did not take hold in the south because agriculture remained too extensive for them to be cost-effective and coastal shipping remained a matter of necessity.[29] Bulk transport infrastructure allowed even inland towns such as Stoke to develop 'punctiform' (point-to-point) relationships with their industrial partners in addition to the 'dendriform' (tree-like) routes that facilitated agricultural supply.[30] That Hull, Liverpool, London, and Bristol all expanded their port facilities at great expense between 1780 and 1810 further underlines the regard in which slick distribution was held.

In order to clarify the importance of productive hinterlands, it is useful to recognize that smaller ports *could* compete with the better connected ports when exploiting what Philip Rossner calls the 'warehouse economy' of drawbacks.[31] Whitehaven provides a striking example. Measured by net receipts, Whitehaven's contribution to the revenue appears to be the story of a rise from obscurity in the early eighteenth century to some fleeting success in the mid century before falling back to third-class status. However, even these measures

[27] 'Custom House Records: Letter Book, 1732–42', in John Hobson Matthews (ed.), *Cardiff Records*, ii. (Cardiff, 1900), 12 July 1782.

[28] J. C. Jarvis (ed.), *Customs Letter Book of the Port of Liverpool* (Manchester, 1954), 362; PHC, 'An Account of the Duties on all Coals Exported Coastwise' (1786).

[29] P. A. Vine, *London's Lost Route to the Sea* (Newton Abbott, 1986).

[30] Wrigley, *The Path to Sustained Growth;* id., 'Urban Growth in Early Modern England: Food, Fuel and Transport', *Past and Present*, 225 (2014), 79–112; Warde, *Ecology, Economy and State Formation,* 286–8; Lee, *British Economy*, 119–24.

[31] Rossner, *Scottish Trade.*

obscure a vast level of commercial activity based on its ability to act as hub for the trans-shipment of tobacco from Chesapeake to France and Ireland. At its peak in the years 1740, 1750, and 1760 Whitehaven's gross receipt amounted to an astonishing £690,000, rivalling nearby Liverpool's £695,000. Yet 85 per cent of this money was refunded to merchants in drawbacks, compared to 61 per cent at Liverpool, resulting in markedly smaller net receipt. By 1770, 1780, and 1785, it is evident that Liverpool was weaning itself off trans-shipment as a strategy and retaining far more taxed goods, re-exporting only 50 per cent of £1.05 million gross takings, where Whitehaven was still re-exporting 74 per cent of a significantly smaller £225,000 gross. Whitehaven struggled to capture trade permanently, unable to embed a mercantile culture, and the multiplier effects that this bestowed, beyond opportunistically exploiting the entrepôt system. The importance of inland commercial networks that offered an accompaniment to overseas markets is nicely illustrated in this comparison.

Regional urbanization and secondary sector employment were extremely beneficial for the Customs insofar as they boosted demand whilst channelling goods through cities on rivers that were relatively easily to police. The vast majority of the Customs' 'management' costs were spent on personnel rather than facilities or stationery, meaning that we can use Musgrave's figures as a rough index for the costs of collection.[32] Table 2 indicates that London, as home to the national administrative staff and many aristocratic sinecurists, was the most expensive port to run by a wide margin. Owing to the strong concentration of commercial activity in well-connected ports, even middling towns might spend more money on staff than lesser ports raised in gross revenue. Yet in a port with rivers and industrious consumers, staffing costs were easily recouped through large revenues, principally London, Bristol, Liverpool, Hull, Newcastle, and Sunderland, especially in the later period. Overall, English and Welsh ports found that taxable trade rose faster than additional outlays in staffing costs across the century. Nevertheless, the well-placed ports were incredibly cost-effective, often far in advance of the

[32] PHC, 'Fifteenth Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Examine, Take and State the Public accounts of the Kingdom' (1786), Appendixes 16, 17, and 19.

Table 3: Productivity of Chief Ports (£Net Revenue/£Management)

	1710, 1720, 1730	*1740, 1750, 1760*	*1770, 1780, 1785*
England and Wales	8.1	7.5	13.1
London	11.5	10.0	17.9
Newcastle	3.5	4.7	8.7
Sunderland	4.6	9.5	25.3
Hull	7.7	10.5	19.5
Lynn	12.5	12.4	23.1
Yarmouth	3.5	6.0	8.0
Whitehaven	3.7	13.0	4.4
Liverpool	6.1	15.2	21.0
Bristol	14.9	17.8	28.7
Exeter	14.5	3.5	4.8
Plymouth	3.0	2.1	4.3
Portsmouth	2.4	3.0	4.4
Southampton	4.6	4.6	7.2
All other ports	2.3	3.4	5.8

Source: BL, Add. MS., 8133A deflated using the price index in Mitchell, *Abstract of British Historical Statistics*, Prices Table 1B, 'Consumers' goods', to 1709 prices.

national mean, and this tendency accelerated as the century progressed. Almost all the other ports grew at a rate far slower than London, and thus than the national average. Table 3 simplifies these data in terms of an efficiency rating that shows how many pounds of net revenue were sent to the Exchequer in each town for every pound spent on management (net receipt/management).

Seemingly the majority of ports in England and Wales could not justify their existence on revenue-raising capacity alone. Tables 2 and 3 show how Exeter's efficiency declined precipitously in the early eighteenth century, as more staff were employed to administer less trade. Plymouth, Portsmouth, and Southampton also exhibited simi-

lar signs of stagnation in terms of income whilst witnessing greater expenditure on staff. In fact, this was a problem for the entire south coast because the ports between Bristol and London were some of the least efficient in the country. Unlike other regions which had one or two chief ports situated on a river, the south-eastern and south-western coastlines were studded with many small to middling ports serving limited coastal markets. Thus the problem afflicting Exeter was repeated in no fewer than thirty-four towns, accounting for 47 per cent of all Customs ports. Table 4 shows the aggregated net revenue and management costs for England and Wales broken up by major river basins, in order to emphasize the disparity between these regions and others; much money was spent on raising relatively small sums simply because coastal shipping was the chief means of transporting goods.

At first sight the Customs seem to have been overstaffing in some regions but this was not the case because, as Welsh Collector in 1650 informed the Commission, each port 'must have an officer or more in them, more for the provention of fraud than for receipt'.[33] The outports were organized on the basis that a series of 'headports' should act as administrative hubs for the smaller 'member' ports, employing customers, comptrollors, collectors, and searchers to mediate between these subdistricts and London. These crown patentees would appoint deputies to fulfil their functions in the member ports they were responsible for, albeit at much reduced salaries. The types of officer the Commission settled in ports formed the majority of staff and typically comprised a core of land-bound administrative and metrological staff, a larger pool of 'tidewaiters' and boatmen who would actually board vessels, and squadrons of riding officers charged with monitoring the nearby coasts.[34] The numbers of officers working in a given port expanded according to its size with some important variations in terms of type. Tidewaiters constituted a large proportion of the staff and salaries at each port, no doubt because rowing out to incoming ships in order to draw up manifests of taxable cargoes was a laborious process made doubly so by the necessity of deploying pairs so that the officers did not fall foul of bullying or corrupt ships' captains. The physical dimensions of individual ports may have had

[33] Stephen K. Roberts (ed.), *Letterbook of John Byrd: Customs Collector in South-East Wales, 1648–80* (Cardiff, 1999), letter 100.
[34] PHC, 'Fifteenth Report', Appendix 6.

Table 4: Net Revenue and Management Costs of English and Welsh Ports by River Basin (£000s)

		1710–30		*1740–60*		*1770–85*	
	No. of Ports	Net Revenue	Manage-ment	Net Revenue	Manage-ment	Net Revenue	Manage-ment
Thames	1	£3,963	£345	£4,501	£451	£8,999	£505
North East (Tees, Tyne and Wear)	5	£58	£20	£108	£26	£251	£28
Humber	3	£85	£14	£186	£22	£401	£25
East Anglia	14	£115	£33	£268	£60	£418	£56
North West (Mersey)	6	£126	£28	£408	£41	£627	£52
Wales	8	-£4	£13	-£7	£23	£12	£21
Severn	2	£410	£28	£532	£31	£810	£29
South East	12	£39	£76	£109	£98	£237	£105
South West	22	£217	£63	£195	£88	£199	£95

Source: BL, Add. MS., 8133A deflated using the price index in Mitchell, *Abstract of British Historical Statistics*, Prices Table 1B, 'Consumers' goods', to 1709 prices.

an influence but, in the main, Customs procedures were labour-extensive, which meant running a port was costly.

The employment of preventive officers further added to the Customs' costs, and their deployment was driven more by the geography of illicit trade than revenue-raising, substantially shaping expenditure in the south. Running tea, calicos, brandy, and tobacco had been recognized as endemic on the Kent and Sussex coast since the much publicized and violent activities of the Hawkhurst gang forced the Pelham administration into action in the late 1740s.[35] Con-

[35] Nicholas Rogers, *Mayhem: Post-War Crime and Violence in Britain, 1748–53*

sequently the area became the epicentre of Customs policing activity, and by 1784 the Chichester establishment spent £3,580, or 50 per cent of its annual salary expenditure, on fifty-six riding officers in coastal villages, with Rye's twenty-six officers accounting for £1,600 alone. In 1784 riding officers added 25 per cent to the salary costs of the ports between London and Southampton—the equivalent of staffing both Newcastle and Sunderland that same year.[36] All riding officers were entitled to a share in the sale of any seized goods they had a hand in confiscating, though personal danger and the necessity of keeping a horse meant that riding officers were some of the best paid outside London, earning salaries of £50 to £60 per annum in the south east. Further west of Southampton, riding officers were paid £40 or less and were often commissioned to combine preventive tasks with administrative roles. Seemingly, this reflected their declining effectiveness where the density of smugglers' trails dissipated outside London and the increasingly varied coastline became too tricky to police. Riding officers accounted for just 6 per cent of staffing costs in the south west. Instead, the Commission opted to utilize the coastguard to harass smuggling operations at sea.

Coastguarding contracts were significantly more financially onerous than payments to riding officers, especially in the south west, with well-armed craft costing individual ports £1,000 per annum on average. Table 5 shows the distribution of Customs cruisers, their annual expense, and the seizures registered at each port in 1784. The intensity of Customs efforts to police the seas was most obviously felt in the Channel, a hotspot for smuggling activity from France and a major artery for the intercontinental fleets that frequently disgorged illicit cargoes into the seaways. Previous years had seen cruisers stationed at Whitehaven, but the Irish Sea and Bristol Channel were neglected by comparison, and the North Sea coast north of London was only moderately better policed. However, there had been rapid expansion of the coastguard since 1763, when only twenty-two cruisers patrolled English and Welsh waters and this had seen the Com-

(London, 2012), 119–31; Calvin Winslow, 'Sussex Smugglers', in Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John G. Rule, E. P. Thompson, and Calvin Winslow, *Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century England* (London, 1977), 119–66.

[36] PHC, 'Fifteenth Report', Appendix 6.

Table 5: Cost of Revenue Cruisers and Value of Seizures, 1784

	Cruisers (Establishment)		Cost	Value of Seizures		Cruisers (Establishment)		Cost	Value of Seizures
London	**2**	**(2)**	**£1,683**	**£62,042**	Weymouth	1		£594	£1,722
					Poole	2		£2,600	£2,749
Rochester	2	(2)	£1,407	£1,648	Exeter	1		£1,051	£3,924
Faversham	1	(1)	£868	£1,100	Dartmouth	1		£1,301	£5,585
Sandwich	1		£1,555	£6,533	Plymouth	2	(1)	£1,716	£8,857
Deale	1		£2,147	£5,751	Looe	1		£980	£1,157
Dover	3	(1)	£3,125	£13,202	Falmouth	2		£2,346	£8,799
Rye	2	(1)	£2,419	£4,988	Penryn	1		£1,070	
Newhaven	1	(1)	£1,288	£473	Scilly	1		£1,251	£496
Shoreham	1	(1)	£726	£2,649	St Ives	2		£2,568	£10,919
Chichester	1	(1)	£1,212	£2,886	**South West**	**14**	**(1)**	**£15,477**	**£44,208**
Portsmouth	2	(1)	£1,271	£3,323					
Southampton	1	(1)	£1,310	£6,980	Hull	1	(1)	£848	£413
Cowes	2		£1,904	£10,356	Newcastle	2	(2)	£1,808	£1,482
South East	**18**	**(10)**	**£19,232**	**£59,889**	Colchester	1	(1)	£1,552	£2,886
					Harwich	2	(1)	£1,585	£6,887
Milford	1		£529	£597	Yarmouth	1	(1)	£893	£4,741
					Boston	1	(1)	£674	£251

Value of all outport seizures £130,338

Percentage taken in ports with cruisers 93

Source: PHC, 'Fifteenth Report of Commissioners Appointed to Examine, Take and State the Public Accounts of the United Kingdom' (1786), Appendix 20.

mission resort to subcontracting rather than relying on antiquated ex-naval vessels.[37]

Unlike 'establishment' craft, those paid for through subcontracts drew money from outside the normal revenue stream by diverting cash raised on the sale of seized goods. Musgrave's figures do not seem to have accounted for this ingenious form of financing, akin to privateering, though it was as good a way to incentivize their crews as regular payment, yielding approximately three pounds in seizures to every one spent on upkeep. It is impossible to know what proportion of smuggling vessels the cruisers intercepted, but they were extremely effective in improving the chances of officers apprehending illicit goods, with outports employing them accounting for 93 per cent of seizures. Only a fraction of this sum made its way to the Treasury as a result of legal costs and rewards, but holding the corridor into London seems to have been the Customs' priority with the result that revenues generated in the Channel ports were more likely to be spent on preventive officers and their allies than anywhere else.

The detailed survey of 1784 shows that the costs of repelling smugglers were not distributed evenly around the country, but fell disproportionately on ports in the south, especially near London. These struggled to attract trade in the same way as river-facing towns elsewhere. As a result, the scarce taxes collected in southern ports were increasingly diverted away from the exchequer and to officers on the ground, although sharing seizure does seem to have motivated officers too. This expenditure on policing exacerbated the appearance of some ports being unproductive in revenue-raising terms, but seems to have been part of a concerted Customs strategy to forgo revenue in some ports in the hope of funnelling trade into others. Whether this strategy was effective in preventing smuggling is discussed more fully in the next part. What needs underlining at this juncture is that policing a port involved a great deal of labour and only in a small number of towns was this expenditure rewarded by taxing the growing volume of imports. Bulk demand from industry and consumers willing to pay for lightly taxed sugars or Portuguese wines was crucial.

[37] PHC, 'First Report on Illicit Practices Defrauding the Revenue' (1783), Appendix 1.

III. *Distribution and Smuggling*

Historians have typically suggested that the Customs failed to win the battle against smuggling, citing repeated parliamentary reports and a growing corpus of draconian legislation as evidence for their lacklustre performance. However, Musgrave's figures show that net receipts were rising at a rate faster than the population of England and Wales was expanding at the end of the century, which meant that more Customs revenue was paid per capita. Large proportions of these revenues were raised on highly taxed goods such as tobacco that were a mainstay of the smugglers too. In order to reconcile these seemingly contradictory trends this section describes where consumers paid taxes and how licit and illicit goods were transported to these regions. By focusing on the logistical affordances of specific commodities, the section suggests trade operated in a two-tier system depending on the value-to-weight ratio of the goods in question. Desire for tea, tobacco, calicos, and brandy was limited largely by the extent to which the non-payment of taxes offset smugglers' transport costs. The gangs emerged most noticeably in the south and doubtless spread elsewhere as taxes rose and made investment in this form of distribution more profitable.

By contrast, demand for raw and semi-finished goods was limited, and posed problems of bulk distribution and co-ordination with the industrial cycle that, according to the observations of Customs officers, smuggling gangs did not try to tackle.[38] Rather, it made sense to move these goods through ports with good inland transport links, not least rivers and canals, and pay duties for the privilege. In this respect, it was again industrialists who deserve credit for improving the Customs revenue, not only by sparking consumer demand but by concentrating those consumers in locations that legitimate traders could easily access through bulk distribution infrastructure.

[38] In addition to the cited reports see Theodore Jansen, *Smuggling Laid Open* (London, 1763); TNA 30/8/283, William Pitt the Younger's Papers on Tea, *c.*1783; BL, Add. MS., 38462–3, Liverpool Papers Relating to Smuggling in the Channel and Isle of Man, *c.*1660–1830; Jarvis (ed.), *Customs Letter Book of the Port of Liverpool*, *passim*; 'Custom House Records', in Hobson (ed.), *Cardiff Records*, ii. 368-407; G. Hampson (ed.), *Portsmouth Customs Letter Books, 1748–50* (Winchester, 1994), esp. Appendix 1.

The quantities of goods the Customs recorded as imported into England and Wales for home consumption speak eloquently of industrious patterns to manufacturing and consumption. Per capita consumption of semi-refined sugar, bar-iron, pitch, cotton wool, and coal grew significantly in the eighteenth century, whereas expensive finished goods from Europe came to be substituted for British (and Irish) alternatives. The quantities of goods with higher taxes per unit and that were also suitable for immediate domestic consumption, such as tobacco, tea, and prohibitively taxed French alcohol and textiles, barely rose.[39] These last were prime candidates for smuggling. E. A. Wrigley's recent estimates for county populations allow us to view the net revenue raised by the Customs in per capita terms at a regional level, which further supports the link between industrious activity and improved revenues.

Figure 3 shows the mean net receipt per 100,000 persons in each river basin. The rapid gains in the later part of the century were tied to British merchants' slackening use of drawbacks, resulting in a 50 per cent rise in payments between the middle and last period. Figure 3 also underscores the unevenness with which revenue was raised in England and Wales, with Londoners bearing the heaviest burden, although some of these taxes were passed on to consumers elsewhere as goods were landed there then shipped coastwise, particularly to North Sea ports. Several industrious regions were able to tax their residents as highly as those on the Severn, whereas this was less pronounced in largely agricultural districts in the south and east. Whilst Wales just managed to contribute positively to the revenue by 1770, it was the south west that stands out as the biggest problem insofar as consumers were paying less Customs duties per person at the end of the century than at the beginning.

Pointing out that consumers in the rural south paid less tax than others is quite different from suggesting that they were not consuming at all. The great cost of arming cruisers and riding officers around the Channel clearly indicates that smugglers provided an alternative, tax free distribution network. The scale of smuggling operations rose in tandem with Customs duties, meaning that the market for smuggled goods expanded rapidly in the mid to late eighteenth century as

[39] Schumpeter, *British Overseas Trade Statistics*, Tables 13, 17, and 18; M. W. Flinn, *The History of the British Coal Industry,* ii: *1700–1830* (Oxford, 1984).

Figure 3: Average Annual Net Customs Receipts per 100,000



Source: BL, Add. MS., 8133A; Deflated using the price index in Mitchell, *Abstract of British Historical Statistics*, Prices 1B 'Consumers' goods' to 1709 prices. County Populations from E. A. Wrigley, 'Rickman Revisited: The Population Growth Rates of English Counties in the Early Modern Period', *Economic History Review*, 62/3 (2009), 711–35; London populations from L. D. Schwarz, *London in the Age of Industrialisation, 1700–1850* (Cambridge, 1992), Table 5.1. The population of Wales is estimated to be 7 per cent of the English population.
East Anglia: Bedford, Cambridgeshire, Essex, Huntingdonshire, Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Suffolk; *Humber and Trent*: Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Northamptonshire, Rutland, Staffordshire, Yorkshire (all three Ridings); *North East*: Durham, Northumberland; *North West*: Cheshire, Cumberland, Lancashire, Westmorland; *South East*: Hampshire, Kent, Sussex; *Severn*: Gloucestershire, Herefordshire, Shropshire, Warwickshire, Worcestershire; *South East*: Cornwall, Devon, Dorset, Somerset, Wiltshire; Thames: Berkshire; Buckinghamshire, Hertfordshire, Middlesex, Oxfordshire, Surrey, City of London.

Britain went to war on the basis of loans partly underpinned by the additional duties of 1747, 1759, 1779, and 1781. Tea, which was subject to Customs *and* Excise duties, was a leader here.[40] By 1783 the Commissioners of the Customs and Excise opined

[40] Lorna H. Mui and Hoh-Cheung Mui, *Management of Monopoly: A Study in the East India Company's Management of the Tea trade in Britain, 1784–1833* (Van-

> That the illicit Practices used in defrauding the Revenue have increased in a most alarming Degree: That those Practices are carried on upon the Coasts, and in other Parts of this Kingdom, with a Violence, and with Outrages, which not only threaten the Destruction of the Revenue, but are highly injurious to regular Commerce and fair Trade, very pernicious to the Manners and Morals of the People, and an Interruption of all good Government.[41]

Larger ships signalled to the Treasury that smuggling gangs were increasingly well financed but it was widespread collusion that made combatting them highly problematic. Magistrates, gentlemen, and others in positions of authority were prone to overlook lesser misdemeanours, especially if they were beneficiaries of some part of the trade. The gangs also offered an important stream of casual income to the mostly farming and fishing communities on the coasts on which they operated that easily translated into popular loyalty. Outright violence was another means of ensuring that gangs were not troubled by informers. Revenue officers were frequently intimidated or bribed into compliance. Arguments defending the system of taxation fell on deaf ears, the Ordinary at Newgate explained, because for most poor people running goods was only a (minor) crime against the king, not God.[42] Illicit running meant that the degree with which the official statistics reflected real consumption was increasingly strained.

couver, 1980), esp. 127–44; eid., 'Smuggling and the British Tea trade before 1784', *American Historical Rreview*, 74/1 (1968), 44–73; eid., 'The Commutation Act and Tea Trade in Britain, 1784–1793', *Economic History Review*, 16/2 (1963), 234–53.

41 PHC, 'Illicit Practices', 25.

42 Old Bailey Online, *Ordinary's Account*, OA17470729 (1747), at <https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp?div=OA17470729>, accessed 2 Aug. 2018; Rogers, *Mayhem*; Winslow 'Sussex'; Huw Bowen, '"So Alarming an Evil": Smuggling, Pilfering and the English East India Company, 1750–1810', *International Journal of Maritime History*, 14 (2002), 1–31; id., 'Privilege and Profit: Commanders of East Indiamen as Private Traders, Entrepreneurs and Smugglers, 1760–1813', *International Journal of Maritime History*, 19/2 (2007), 43–88; Frank McLynn, *Crime and Punishment in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1994), ch. 10.

On the one hand, the deep structural reform advocated by Commissioners and analysts of the revenue in the 1780s evidently reflected a profound dissatisfaction with the fiscal and social circumstances of Revenue officers during the ever-widening war on smuggling. On the other, the reports drafted in evidence of this contention, backed up by other testimony, were quite clear in suggesting that the gangs operated within geographical constraints.

Smugglers could acquire cargoes from shipping in the Channel but this involved co-ordination problems, resulting in the establishment of smuggling centres at convenient off-shore bases, often with the tacit consent of the territorial sovereign insofar as smuggling could black the eye of a local rival. The Dutch shipped tea and textiles directly from the Maas into eastern England as well as France. Boulogne was where

> The smugglers from the coast of Kent and Sussex pay English gold for great quantities of French brandy, tea, coffee, and small wine, which they run from this country. They likewise buy glass trinkets, toys, and coloured prints, which fell in England, for no other reason, but that they come from France, as they may be had as cheap and much better finished, of our own manufacture. They likewise take off ribbons, laces, linen, and cambrics; though this branch of trade is chiefly in the hands of traders that come from London, and make their purchases at Dunkirk, where they pay no duties.[43]

The Channel Islands provided easy access to the south west of England and were stocked by French merchants, and the enterprising Dutch and British Atlantic ships entering the Channel. The Isle of Man formed the centre of a lively trade in brandy, wine, tea, calicos, and tobacco smuggled out of Glasgow and Liverpool.[44] Crucial to the

[43] Tobias Smollett, *Travels Through France and Italy* (London, 1766), 60–1.

[44] Renaud Morieux, *The Channel: England, France and the Construction of a Maritime Border* (Cambridge, 2016), ch. 7; Gavin Daly, 'English Smugglers, the Channel and the Napoleonic Wars', *Journal of British Studies*, 46/1 (2007), 30–46; id., 'Napoleon and the City of Smugglers', *Historical Journal*, 50/2 (2007), 333–52; Alan G. Jamieson, 'The Channel Islands and Smuggling, 1650–1850', in id. (ed.), *People of the Sea: The Maritime History of the Channel Islands* (London, 1986), 195–220; Frances Wilkins (ed.), *George Moore and*

success of these warehouse bases was their convenience for small craft setting out from England and Wales on short voyages that were hard to police, especially when camouflaged by a local fishing fleet of 30 to 50 ton vessels. Cargoes run into England and Wales would be landed on remote patches of coastline where large groups of armed men would assemble to spirit away goods on horseback, which was a crude form of insurance against Customs seizures on land. This technique necessitated forgoing the standardized packaging used in overseas trade to add to the speed at which a cargo could be dispersed, and the tea chest and hogshead were replaced by the much smaller 'oilskin' and 'anker'.[45] Further, breaking up bulk allowed smugglers to sell goods to domestic customers such as itinerant packmen in rural regions.

What smugglers gained in terms of concealment and flexibility by adopting these methods in dendriform environments they paid for in their ability to benefit from economies of scale in punctiform transport, and thus their geographical reach. This was a particularly rigid constraint in moving goods inland, where the cost per ton per mile on moving lawful commodities was easily three times higher on horseback than on navigable waterways.[46] Routes where the threat of seizure was greater probably cost smugglers more because the obvious precaution was to employ larger numbers of lightly loaded horses and incur a greater wage bill. Only goods with a high value per ton were profitable to transport under these conditions and only through rapid upward increases in Customs duties could these be brought further inland to compete with legal imports carried safely and cheaply

Friends: Letters from a Manx Merchant, 1750–1760 (Kidderminster, 1994); Chris Nierstrazs, *Rivalry for Trade in Tea and Textiles: The English and Dutch East India Companies, 1700–1800* (London, 2015).

[45] BL, Add. MS., 74055, Walpole papers, fos. 123–8, 'A Bill for preventing the infamous practice of smuggling' [*c.*1745]; fo. 129, 'An exact account of the goods smuggled into the county of Suffolk alone, from the first of May 1745 to the first of January 1745'.

[46] Dan Bogart, 'The Transport Revolution in Industrialising Britain', in Floud, Humphries, and Johnson (eds.), *Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain*, i. Tables 13.2 and 13.3. In general, see P. S. Bagwell, *The Transport Revolution from 1770* (London, 1974); Derrick Aldcroft and Michael Freeman (eds.), *Transport in the Industrial Revolution* (Manchester, 1983); John Armstrong, *The Vital Spark: The British Coastal Trade, 1700–1930* (St John's, NF, 2009), ch. 2.

by legitimate carriers. Preferential treatment was routinely given to the materials used in industry when Customs duties were adjusted, further militating against experimentation in the smugglers' repertoire of goods away from luxuries easily consumed domestically. Flax was simply not as easy to market as more heavily taxed lace, where the potential saving passed on to the buyer was correspondingly greater. Industrial demand also imposed limits on the smugglers' attempts to widen markets inasmuch as specific seasonal and or technological forces meant that orders of inputs needed to be delivered to time. A six-month project with a blast furnace required a steady supply of ores, not one likely to be seized en route.

The ability of the Customs to prevent smuggling was limited and preventive officers succeeded only in confining the gangs to expensive or inefficient transport choices, which limited their inland reach. Employing cruisers meant Customs had the chance of seizing whole cargoes, and forced smugglers into using small craft that were easily disguised among fishing vessels at sea or, alternatively, large and well-armed vessels that could simply out-muscle the coastguard. While the latter option looked increasingly viable with tax rises of the later eighteenth century, it shifted the distribution problems gangs faced onto the land because moving large cargoes by pack-horse was slow and expensive. In these cases, taking illicit cargoes to existing distribution hubs and disguising them as legal was by far the best option. It is possible that smuggling went from the blue-collar pursuit of running goods past the Customs to the white-collar activity of fraudulently passing cargoes through busy ports by bribery or falsification in the late eighteenth century, although this is extremely hard to prove. Goods such as tobacco continued to be run into Britain in the 1820s and 1840s, even when they were administered by the incorruptible Excise.[47] Ultimately, when it came to policing long coastlines or extensive territories, the state had few technical advantages that could not be replicated or overcome by the gangs.

IV. *Conclusion*

The fortunes of the Customs were grounded as much in the economic considerations outlined by the classical economists as in the con-

[47] PHC, 'Report of the Select Committee on the Tobacco Trade' (1844).

cerns about office-holding outlined later by Max Weber. Moving things around the early modern world was gruelling work and evidently determined much Customs activity as well as the smugglers they aimed to thwart. The horse-and-cart was a great improvement on the barrow but, even where roads were in good repair, costly to use. Water-borne transport was essentially the only means of bulk distribution, despite putting cargoes and vessels at the risk of irretrievable loss at sea. Eighteenth-century Customs receipts expanded impressively in areas where cheap transport prompted a high degree of urbanization, demographic expansion, and, eventually, industrialization. Where administrative choices did demonstrably curb the net receipt in the form of drawbacks, reform emerged within a shifting imperial framework. Furthermore, the structural decline of the re-export economy occurred as a result of British manufactures establishing themselves in export markets—and at home—some thirty years before Pitt moved to alter the situation.

Compared to the relatively scattered and small-scale innovations in ship-building and dock construction, the canal boom of the mid century facilitated a flow of goods and energy that the Revenue Commissioners did not overlook. By extending access to coal and raw materials to districts where labour was cheap they underpinned the export boom emanating from Liverpool, Hull, Newcastle/Sunderland, and Bristol so apparent after 1750. Albeit slow and highly localized, the consolidation of manufacturing regions made revenue significantly easier to collect by expanding demand, creating new demands, and concentrating it in a few well-connected ports. Ports without these advantages were equipped to disrupt the smuggling networks that thrived in rural regions and were hard to police because of their extensive coastlines, large surface areas, and the relative ease with which the gangs could co-opt their impoverished inhabitants. To the extent that fixed industries attracted bulk goods in such a way as to allow Customs officers to converge on those routes and tax them, we could say that the service was bailed out by infrastructure well in advance of substantial bureaucratic interventions.

The regionally diverse Customs establishments outlined in this article are not designed to supersede the themes central to histories of state formation—office, jurisdiction, accountability, corruption—because there can be no doubt that these galvanized much political activity in the eighteenth century. Doubtless, a better drilled revenue

service could have captured a greater portion of overseas trade for the Exchequer. However, the varied commercial and administrative contexts that Customs officers and smugglers worked in draw attention to the ecology of ports. Understanding their geography, the quantities and qualities of the goods that passed through them, and the technologies that accomplished these moves means that the exhortations, rumours, and occasional legal proceeding against officers and smugglers alike can begin to be weighted against objective measures that suggest the likelihood that similar infractions occurred elsewhere.

In some senses this context offers a complement to older revenue histories, insofar as energy constraints that applied to commodities applied only to a lesser degree to the paper trail that flowed between the Customs Commission in London and elsewhere, and which made disciplining officers, collecting information, or changing policy at a distance extremely arduous. Finally, while more robust concepts than industriousness will be of use in refining this model, the changes apparent in Customs revenues around 1750 do pose questions as to the extent to which fiscal policy was conducive to improving manufacturing output. The protectionist policies instituted in the decades around 1700 operated at two speeds, whereby those merchants utilizing drawbacks were able to exploit the system far more quickly and more spectacularly than manufacturers were able to claim bounties or increase output in ring-fenced industries. It was only around the mid eighteenth century that secondary sector producers formed a critical mass capable of checking the drawback economy or supporting the urbanization and demographic growth we associate with that type of economic activity. While these latter trends might be chalked up as a victory for protectionism, it is difficult to imagine that the hunger, inflation, and protest that they unleashed between 1793 and 1820, let alone the turn towards coal power, was what the Treasury had in mind. As such, it seems useful at this stage to recognize that while the Customs could regulate industry at a national level, they lacked the insight to direct these shifts in their increasingly various local iterations.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

CULTURES OF THE EDGE? THE PLACE OF THE COAST IN MARITIME HISTORIOGRAPHIES OF BRITAIN

HANNES ZIEGLER

NICHOLAS ALLEN, NICK GROOM, and JOS SMITH (eds.), *Coastal Works: Culture of the Atlantic Edge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), xvi + 292 pp. ISBN 978 0 19 879515 5. £55.00 (hardback)

DUNCAN REDFORD (ed.), *Maritime History and Identity: The Sea and Culture in the Modern World*, International Library of War Studies, 20 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014), x + 336 pp. ISBN 978 1 78076 329 3. £62.00 (hardback)

JONATHAN SCOTT, *When the Waves Ruled Britannia: Geography and Political Identities, 1500–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), xviii + 227 pp. ISBN 978 0 521 15241 9 £22.99 (paperback); ISBN 978 0 521 19591 1 £58.00 (hardback)

RENAUD MORIEUX, *The Channel: England, France and the Construction of a Maritime Border in the Eighteenth Century*, Cambridge Social and Cultural Histories, 23 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2016), xiv + 404 pp. ISBN 978 1 1070 3949 0. £74.99 (hardback)

TRICIA CUSACK (ed.), *Framing the Ocean, 1700 to the Present: Envisaging the Sea as Social Space* (Abingdon: Ashgate, 2014), xl + 265 pp. ISBN 978 1 4094 6568 3 £110.00 (hardback); (London: Routledge, 2016), ISBN 978 1 13 82 4796 3 £37.99 (paperback)

W. B. STEPHENS, *The Seventeenth-Century Customs Service Surveyed: William Culliford's Investigation of the Western Ports, 1682–84* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2012; Abingdon: Routledge, 2016; paperback 2017), xx + 233 pp. ISBN 978 1 138 11034 2 (paperback) £34.99. ISBN 978 1 4094 3837 3 £65.00 (hardback)

PHILIP PAYTON, ALSTON KENNERLEY, and HELEN DOE (eds.), *The Maritime History of Cornwall* (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2014), xviii + 461 pp. ISBN 978 0 85989 850 8. £65.00 US $110.00 (hardback)

The study of maritime history has become increasingly popular in recent years. This interest has been fed by environmental views of the state of the oceans, both past and future, as much as by the implicit or explicit claim that a study of the sea is an indispensable part of global and world history.[1] At the same time, the repercussions of maritime aspects for specific social groups in domestic settings, regardless of whether they are local, regional, or national in scale, continue to be studied. Curiously, however, the transnational search for the cultural, economic, and political impact of the oceans also seems to have sparked a new interest in maritime themes 'at home', generating new approaches. This is particularly striking in the British case. Here the idea and awareness of an island situation and the imperial setting of colonial rule, both with seafaring implications, have traditionally provided starting points for maritime research. Unsurprisingly, therefore, questions of national or imperial identity have recently attracted fresh attention in relation to maritime matters. Somewhat less straightforward, at least at first glance, is the noticeable trend towards engaging with littoral and coastal themes. Both, however, have been stimulated by the global dimensions of maritime research, and are also intricately connected to each other in interesting and perhaps productive ways. This brief article will illustrate these points by surveying recent examples of maritime research on Britain from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century.

It has recently been noted that 'coasts are still an unmarked category in both history and geography'.[2] Based on this observation, calls have been made for a 'New Coastal History'.[3] Obviously, claims such as this beg the question of to what extent the coast can be seen as something distinct enough to allow for specialized historical research,

[1] Maria Fusaro and Amélia Polónia (eds.), *Maritime History as Global History* (Liverpool, 2010); Glen O'Hara, '"The Sea is Swinging into View": Modern British Maritime History in a Globalised World', *English Historical Review*, 124 (2009), 1109–34; Alison Bashford, 'Terraqueous Histories', *Historical Journal*, 60 (2017), 253–72; John Gillis and Franziska Torma (eds.), *Fluid Frontiers: New Currents in Marine Environmental History* (Cambridge, 2015).

[2] John Gillis, *The Human Shore: Seacoasts in History* (Chicago, 2012), 8.

[3] David Worthington (ed.), *The New Coastal History: Cultural and Environmental Perspectives from Scotland and Beyond* (London, 2017). See also Jerry H. Bentley, Renate Bridenthal, and Kären Wigen (eds.), *Seascapes: Maritime Histories, Littoral Cultures, and Transoceanic Exchanges* (Honolulu, 2007).

both conceptually and practically. The few existing studies that engage with coasts directly offer a variety of answers. John Gillis, in his monograph on the shore in human history, has employed the term 'edge species' to describe societies whose way of life is intricately connected with the water's edge.[4] Michael Pearson, meanwhile, has 'no doubt that there is such a thing as a littoral society'.[5] It is perhaps no coincidence that both scholars have repeatedly looked at islands to identify societies whose identity is palpably marked by littoral influences, and it is here that their ideas tie in with views of a distinctly British island identity. On the scale of the nation, the British case is perhaps exemplary for the study of a maritime or littoral identity. On a somewhat smaller scale, however, recent research on cultural representations of the sea coast in literature and art has also claimed that there is something distinct about the ways in which social groups and individuals engage with the shore. Tricia Cusack, for example, has described the water's edge as 'a marginal territory or borderland that becomes invested with cultural and historical meanings'.[6] Once again, this interpretation of cultural engagement with the coast is seen as informing the identity of these social groups and individuals.

Finally, in many recent contributions there is a sense that the nature and patterns of littoral activity in terms of habitation, occupation, and social structures are what makes the coast distinct. To a certain extent, these are variations on the well-established characteristics of borderlands in general, which recent research sees as mobility and exchange rather than impenetrability.[7] But it is more than that. According to Isaac Land, coasts, the points where land and water meet, are 'messy, intermediate places' that engender meetings and exchange, and are thus more open to external influences than inland

[4] Gillis, *The Human Shore*, *passim*.

[5] M. N. Pearson, 'Littoral Society: The Case for the Coast', *The Great Circle*, 7 (1985), 1–8, at 7.

[6] Tricia Cusack, 'Introduction: Exploring the Water's Edge', in ead. (ed.), *Art and Identity at the Water's Edge* (Farnham, 2012), 1–20, at 1.

[7] T. M. Wilson and H. Donnan (eds.), *Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers* (Cambridge, 1998); Darshan Vigneswaran and Joel Quirk (eds.), *Mobility Makes States: Migration and Power in Africa* (Philadelphia, 2015).

societies.[8] Gérard le Bouëdec, on the other hand, has specifically stressed the 'pluriactivity' of people living on the shore, who make use of both the terrestrial and maritime features of their environment as a matter of course.[9] Aspects such as these, according to Yogesh Sharma, give coasts a 'particular identity and specific regionality'.[10] And for Michael Pearson, 'it is this mixture of maritime and terrestrial influences that makes a study of littoral society a paradigm for maritime history in general'.[11]

In the following pages I will explore these themes of maritime identity, littoral imageries and representations, and coastal activity in relation to recently published scholarship. It should be noted that I am not trying to suggest that coastal history is what these authors intend to do, or, indeed, what they should be doing. Most of the books discussed here have a different agenda. My aim is simply to assess whether these individual strands of maritime research make a case for coastal history, and, if so, to explore what such a coastal history might look like.

I *Maritime Identities*

A recent collection of essays edited by Nicholas Allen, Nick Groom, and Jos Smith puts the coast at the very centre of the narrative.[12] Thirteen case studies in literary criticism draw attention to coastal narratives and perceptions of the Irish and British Atlantic edge from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. In adopting a 'littoral per-

[8] Isaac Land, 'Tidal Waves: The New Coastal History', *Journal of Social History*, 40 (2007), 731–43, at 740.

[9] Gérard Le Bouëdec, 'La pluriactivité dans les sociétés littorales XVIIe–XIXe siècle', *Annales de Bretagne et des Pays de l'Ouest*, 109 (2002), 61–90. See also his earlier monograph, *Activités maritimes et sociétés littorales de l'Europe atlantique, 1690–1790* (Paris, 1997).

[10] Yogesh Sharma, 'Introduction: Facets of Ecology and Society in Coastal India in the Premodern Phase', in id. (ed.), *Coastal Histories: Society and Ecology in Premodern India* (Delhi, 2010), pp. xv–lxi, at p. xv.

[11] M. N. Pearson, 'Littoral Society: The Concept and the Problems', *Journal of World History*, 17 (2006), 353–73, at 354.

[12] Nicholas Allen, Nick Groom, and Jos Smith (eds.), *Coastal Works: Cultures of the Atlantic Edge* (Oxford, 2017).

spective',[13] the collection explores the coast as a rich and dynamic area of exchange, rather than seeing it as 'the dwindling and petering out of an edge'.[14] But the essays also have a larger agenda. For once, they do not put the spotlight on something that is marginal or peripheral. Their aim is permanently to recover the coast from its marginality by disputing the conceptions of space that inform its marginality. The angle from which they do this is the concept of the archipelago. Originally coined to circumvent nationalism's limitations in making sense of the composite nature and web of relationships that structured the British Isles politically during the seventeenth century, the concept has subsequently gained importance in doing away with Anglocentric perspectives on the British Isles in a wider sense.[15] The authors appropriate this archipelagic perspective to question existing 'entrenchments of national identity' and to stress the spatial fluidity of processes of cultural identity. This, in turn, allows them to conceive of coasts as areas of intensified cultural activity, as 'points or moments of cultural exchange and consequent replottings of identity'.[16] Accordingly, their perspective highlights the importance of place without essentializing it, and looks for meaning and identity at the margins and on a local scale.

This cautious replotting of traditional narratives of national identity is, of course, nowhere more relevant than in the British case. In a context where Britain's geographical situation as an island and England's political dominance over other parts of the British Isles have traditionally been overstated to the point where they could be seen as determining the course of British history and the identity of its people, any constructivist reading and questioning of this determinism is especially necessary. This trend is visible in more than one strand of maritime research and new interpretations of British identity are currently being put forward from maritime or coastal perspectives. In a recent edited volume, Duncan Redford has specifically aimed to address questions of identity in relation to the maritime

[13] Nicholas Allen, Nick Groom, and Jos Smith, 'Introduction', ibid. 1–18, at 5.
[14] Ibid. 6.
[15] J. G. A. Pocock, *The Discovery of Islands: Essays in British History* (Cambridge, 2005); John Kerrigan, *Archipelagic English: Literature, History, and Politics, 1603–1707* (Oxford, 2008).
[16] Allen, Groom, and Smith, 'Introduction', 5.

dimension.[17] Taking a broad outlook, the essays in this volume mostly address British identity, but also include helpful comparisons with other nations. The volume, according to Redford's introduction, sets out to explore something hitherto neglected, namely, the connection of identity and maritime history, and it does so with a clear constructivist notion of how identity was historically created and shaped. As a whole, the volume thus helpfully complicates traditional understandings of identity. This process of complication begins by identity being examined at different levels of society. The essays are organized to provide insights into national, regional, corporate, individual, and imperial aspects of identity.

While the first section on national identity is perhaps a little too occupied with navies, it also highlights an important point, namely, that naval issues were often deliberately used to promote a sense of 'Britishness' among the various peoples who formed this nation. James Davey's chapter on the eighteenth-century naval hero is especially instructive in this respect, and the same is true of Redford's analysis of the changing place of the navy in the self-image of the British nation in the later nineteenth century.[18] What is obscured by these historically located grand narratives of national identity, however, becomes clearer in subsequent chapters on regional, individual, and corporate identities. Beyond the empire and the nation, we frequently find smaller units adopting bits and pieces of what is offered on a national scale, but also clinging to other elements more immediately relevant to their own social experiences. This is as apparent in Cori Convertito's chapter on tattoos and expressions of individuality in the Victorian navy as in Britt Zerbe's study of the Royal Marines in the eighteenth century.[19] Seafarers, in particular, as Richard Blakemore shows, needed to adapt their experiences of community to their lived transitional experiences and, as a result, found identity in a variety of places and at different levels. More importantly, Blake-

[17] Duncan Redford (ed.), *Maritime History and Identity: The Sea and Culture in the Modern World* (London, 2014).

[18] James Davey, 'The Naval Hero and British National Identity 1707–1750', ibid. 13–37; Duncan Redford, 'The Royal Navy, Sea Blindness and British National Identity', ibid. 61–78.

[19] Cori Convertito, 'Defying Conformity: Using Tattoos to Express Individuality in the Victorian Royal Navy', ibid. 205–29; Britt Zerbe, 'The Other Side of an Amphibian's Identity: British Marines on Land, 1755–1802', ibid. 163–82.

more shows that their constant movement between land and sea also to a certain extent transformed their homes into transitional spaces, most strikingly in the case of the Thames parishes below London Bridge.[20] This shows that, beyond the truisms that the coast is where land and sea meet and that there are people moving to and fro, transitional experiences on the coast also translated into distinct social settings.

Quite a different challenge to traditional narratives of national identity has recently been put forward by Jonathan Scott from the perspective of intellectual history. In a slim yet powerful volume on geography and political identities in Britain from 1500 to 1800 Scott essentially challenges the popular myth of Britain's island identity by firmly locating its emergence within the political thought of the early modern period, studying what he calls geographical language as a component of the history of political ideas. He looks at a wide range of genres, such as accounts of travel and exploration, cartography, geography, and early marine science, as well as more properly political texts about the British nation's relationship with the sea, the Continent, and naval policies.

In his sometimes excursive discussion of these texts, ranging from those by well-known writers such as Richard Hakluyt, Walter Raleigh, and Daniel Defoe to those by the less famous, Scott has two interrelated aims. The first is to find the political behind the geographical language employed by these writers, who 'frequently turn out to be talking, not about geography, but about politics, history or religion'.[21] The second, which also informs much of the subsequent narrative of the book, is to analyse not only how 'a rural, aristocratic and monarchical grain-growing society'[22] such as sixteenth-century England came to be a maritime power, but also how it came to imagine itself as an island nation to such a degree that this was seen as a 'natural fact' rather than the outcome of a long and uneven political process.[23] Skilfully, yet sometimes elusively, Scott shows that many

[20] Richard J. Blakemore, 'The Ship, the River and the Ocean Sea: Concepts of Space in the Seventeenth-Century London Maritime Community', ibid. 98–119.

[21] Jonathan Scott, *When the Waves Ruled Britannia: Geography and Political Identities, 1500–1800* (Cambridge, 2011), 11.

[22] Ibid. 3.

[23] Ibid. 6.

writers were aiming 'to drive the nation into a dynamic relationship with the sea and its mobility', frequently by employing models derived from ancient Athens and Carthage, as well as by pointing to the ever-present threat and example of the Dutch.[24]

Perhaps because Scott is concerned more with ideas than specific policies, we find only passing mention of actual physical geographies. Yet it is interesting to see that many of the authors he looks at, such as William Temple, Henry Sheres, and Daniel Defoe, were directly concerned with the physical features of the adjoining areas of land and sea, whether relating to fortification, navigation, or more broadly cultural aspects. Yet this ultimately suggests that beneath the layers of imagined national identity there was also a process of revising an understanding of the importance of the coast in Britain's relationship with the sea—both its physical and cultural features—that remains unexplored in Scott's account.

This engagement with the coast as a barrier and frontier is perhaps more than just a latent feature of British society in the early modern period, as Renaud Morieux's recent biography of the English Channel suggests.[25] While Morieux shares Scott's concern to question British national (and island) identity, his challenge is launched from a different perspective. Scott attempts to dismantle the myth of the island situation as a geographical, that is, natural feature and argues instead that it was culturally and politically constructed under specific circumstances. Morieux is at first sight engaged in a similar task in seeing the Channel as a border and military frontier between England and France. In contrast to Scott's concentration on the realm of ideas, however, Morieux takes ideas merely as a starting point to go well beyond and below that level, down to micro histories on a local scale.

Working his way through geographical, legal, and political writings of the early modern period, Morieux argues that the border was anything but natural. Rather, he suggests, it was a product invented for political and ideological purposes on both sides of the Channel. Firmly rejecting narratives of Anglo-French rivalry as a starting point for understanding the Channel as a military frontier, Morieux pays attention to the Channel itself, and to the activity on its fringes, thus

[24] Ibid. 53.

[25] Renaud Morieux, *The Channel: England, France and the Construction of a Maritime Frontier in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, 2016).

uncovering numerous stories of fluidity, contact, and exchange at local level. Whether involving the fishermen of both countries, smugglers and privateers, or ordinary travellers attempting to cross the borders of the two realms, his explorations are largely coastal in that they analyse the comings and goings on the Channel's northern and southern shores. Morieux in fact adopts a point made earlier by Michael Pearson, namely, that 'littoral societies share characteristics which distinguish coastal areas from inland areas, in terms of economic activities, social structures, interrelations with foreign worlds, diets, environmental hazards and religious beliefs'.[26]

Morieux thus starts by assuming that coastal areas on both sides of the Channel may be much more akin to each other than they each are to their own inland counterparts. We will see below what this means in terms of coastal activity. But as far as this relates to questions of identity, what Morieux achieves is, once again, a helpful complication of the picture. Claims of identity based on geography that are formed at national level and on a grand scale utterly fail to grasp (in the methodologies of the historian) or to represent (in the rhetoric of contemporary politicians) the minute exchanges, adaptations and, as Allen, Groom, and Smith would have it, 'replottings' of identity on a local scale.

II *Littoral Imageries*

If we take the lesson for coastal history to be that we need to look more closely to assess its significance for matters such as identity, the question remains: what does this closer look produce in terms of new insights? Most research in this area has come from studies of literature and art, rather than from historiography. After her monograph on *Riverscapes and National Identities* (2010) and her edited volume on *Art and Identity at the Water's Edge* (2012), Tricia Cusack now engages with the oceans more intensively in a volume on the sea as a social space as represented in visual depictions from 1700 to the present.[27] The coast itself features far less prominently here than in her earlier

[26] Ibid. 25.

[27] Tricia Cusack, *Riverscapes and National Identities* (Syracuse, NY, 2010); ead. (ed.), *Art and Identity at the Water's Edge* (Farnham, 2012); ead. (ed.), *Framing the Ocean, 1700 to the Present: Envisaging the Sea as Social Space* (Farnham, 2014).

volume, but because she conceives of the ocean as a liminal space, we frequently encounter the littoral as a decisive site of activity. Once again, identity figures prominently in the structure of the volume as oceans are considered to be spaces 'conducive to the modification and formation of identities'.[28]

The volume is divided into four sections, the first of which explores representations of ocean crossings and their meaning for travellers. In the second section, the ship is considered as a 'microcosm' and a liminal space in its own right, before the third section addresses narratives of shipwrecks and jetsam. In the last section, the book explores the importance of natural features of the oceans as portrayed in art and natural history. A major strength of the volume is that its contributions approach the topic from a wide variety of angles, focusing on representations in contemporary maps as well as in drawings, paintings, writings, and objects. While the coast may appear thematically marginal in this concentration on the ocean, its importance is undeniably axiomatic to many chapters. In fact, in several of the contributions the reader gains an immediate sense of the importance of the shore in trans-oceanic encounters.

In Emily Burns's chapter on Atlantic crossings as represented by writers and artists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the transformative experience of travelling between the old and the new world is sharply evoked, not so much by the crossing itself as by the departure and, a genuinely coastal experience, the first sighting of land. Burns goes on to call the void between Europe and America a 'littoral space'.[29] This transformative experience is equally important to earlier forms of travel. Elizabeth C. Childs explores the longing for 'an age of first encounters' in the art of Gauguin, La Farge, and Barnfield in the nineteenth century and finds that the 'beaches of encounter', studied earlier by Greg Dening, especially attracted their attention and fascination.[30] In this view, 'the border of shore and land

[28] Ead., 'Introduction: Framing the Ocean, 1700 to the Present: Envisaging the Sea as Social Space', ibid. 1–20, at 8.

[29] Emily Burns, 'The Old World Anew: The Atlantic as the Liminal Site of Expectations', ibid. 27–54, at 50.

[30] Elizabeth C. Childs, 'Second Encounters in the South Seas: Revisiting the Shores of Cook and Bougainville in the Art of Gauguin, La Farge and Barnfield', ibid. 55–67, at 55; Greg Denning, 'Writing, Rewriting the Beach: An Essay', *Rethinking History*, 2 (1998), 143–72.

is thus not empty space, or the site given over to leisure, but rather may be read as the site of historic encounter between Islanders and strangers'.[31]

The significance of these encounters, going beyond the experience of the individual, can be glimpsed in Carla Lois's 'cartographical biography' of the Atlantic Ocean.[32] In this highly innovative reading of cartographical representations of geography, the very shaping of what we term the Atlantic Ocean is partly attributed to the inner logic and perspective of colonial expansion and empire-building. Here we can see that early modern geographical knowledge was heavily shaped by the fact that early imperial projects were essentially coastal in nature, a point made by John Gillis, who coined the term 'alongshore empires' to describe the phenomenon.[33] Remarkably, therefore, the coast emerges here as both defined in terms of space (whether imperial or otherwise) and undefined, intermediate, and 'messy' when itself considered as a place.

Perhaps it is the realization of this twofold importance of the colonial shore and the imperial coast for the exercise of authority and the instigation of exchange—an insight we owe to scholars of global encounters—that has helped us to think about European shores in new ways. Here, too, as other chapters in the same volume demonstrate, littoral experiences are not as homogeneous as the idea of a continuous shoreline neatly separating land and sea might suggest. At the same time, however, this neat separation of land and sea is highly instructive for cultural imageries. Unsurprisingly, this applies most of all to those operating on both sides of the tideline, as a contribution by Geoff Quilley on sailors in British visual culture in the eighteenth century demonstrates.[34] Once again, and much as in Richard Blakemore's chapter mentioned above, sailors are represented as belonging to a different social setting from their land-based contemporaries, occupying a distinct social space. This makes them, as Quilley goes on to show, an easy target for satire by drawing on a

[31] Childs, 'Second Encounters in the South Seas', 55.

[32] Carla Lois, 'From Mare Tenebrorum to Atlantic Ocean: A Cartographical Biography (1470–1990)', in Cusack (ed.), *Framing the Ocean*, 23–36.

[33] Gillis, *The Human Shore*, 83.

[34] Geoff Quilley, 'Sailors on Horseback: The Representation of Seamen and Social Space in Eighteenth-Century British Visual Culture', in Cusack (ed.), *Framing the Ocean*, 85–100.

land/sea dialectic. While the shoreline is profoundly blurred by social experiences, that fact that it is overemphasized in literary and artistic representations generates creative potential. The same mechanism, applied humorously in this case, can also be observed in more tragic narratives. Carl Thompson, for instance, explores this tension between land and sea in relation to narratives of eighteenth-century shipwrecks. He argues that their allegorical meaning exposes 'general social and political anxieties' in contemporary Britain as the wreck can be taken to represent the state of society and the state in general.[35] In this sense then, the shore, where the wreck is washed up and the sailor is shipped, is the locus and stimulus of a specific creative potential.

This potential is especially pronounced in the chapters of *Coastal Works*, edited by Allen, Groom, and Smith. Yet its essence remains surprisingly elusive. According to many of the contributors to the volume, it rests firmly on uncertainty and ambiguity. In Fiona Stafford's essay on the Solway Firth, this is explored through the literary works of men such as John Ruskin and Walter Scott, who, in their writings, were heavily impressed by the seemingly empty space of the Solway. Rather than from any strict sense of place or firmly established meanings and identities, however, this resulted from the shifting meanings attributed to and associated with this particular stretch of shore, which is, according to Stafford, 'in perpetual motion, where nothing rests safely'.[36] Throughout her essay, Stafford likens the art of writing to the physical features of the shore itself, where shapes (like narratives or, for that matter, identities) are constantly discernible and yet perpetually shifting.

A similar argument is put forward by Nicholas Allen in his discussion of contemporary Irish literature. The shore as a 'mutable and evocative' border between land and sea is of particular importance for this because it functions as a 'permeable barrier through which a series of cultural exchanges, literary, historical, political, and environmental, take place'.[37] Other chapters explore this theme for Norman

[35] Carl Thompson, 'Shipwrecks, Mutineers and Cannibals: Maritime Mythology and the Political Unconscious in Eighteenth-Century Britain', ibid. 133–48, at 134.

[36] Fiona Stafford, 'The Roar of the Solway', in Allen, Groom, and Smith (eds.), *Coastal Works*, 41–59, at 48.

[37] Nicholas Allen, 'Ireland, Literature, and the Coastal Imaginary', ibid. 61–75, at 63.

Nicholson and Cumbria (Andrew Gibson), and for Louis MacNeice (John Brannigan).[38] Most strikingly, however, this point is illustrated by Daniel Brayton's analysis of Erskine Childers's *Riddle of the Sands*. Like other authors in the volume, Brayton understands the coast as a 'transformative zone where language, culture, politics, and the imagination meet to become constitutive dimensions of a physical geography that is distinctive and difficult to define'.[39] He suggests that Childers's spy thriller, which he places in the genre of coastal navigation, incorporates this understanding of the coast in telling a tale of the relationship between the individual and the nation-state. By likening coastal navigation to a hermeneutic activity, Brayton compares the individual's exploration of the 'indeterminacy of coastlines' to the complicated exploration of national affiliations and individual identity.[40]

The extent to which the shape of identity and the course of history are liable to shifts and respond to the shapes of the shore is, finally, revealed in an unexpected yet persuasive way by Nick Groom in an essay on an eighteenth-century (satirical) proposal to drain the Irish sea.[41] This satire, playing with the counter-factual and giving it a political and cultural twist, and Grooms's subsequent explorations of this idea, perhaps most vividly illustrate the archipelagic perspective to which the authors subscribe, and which is celebrated in a separate essay by Jos Smith.[42] As far as cultural and political imageries are concerned, there is, indubitably, a coastal edge effect. And it may well be that its most basic trait is the multiplication of narratives (whether of identity or otherwise) because of the coast's distinct yet elusive nature.

[38] Andrew Gibson, 'At the Dying Atlantic's Edge: Norman Nicholson and the Cumbrian Coast', ibid. 77–90; John Brannigan, 'Felt Routes: Louis MacNeice and the North-East Atlantic Archipelago', ibid. 93–109.

[39] Daniel Brayton, 'The Riddle of the Sands: Erskine Childers between the Tides', ibid. 111–28, at 111.

[40] Ibid. 118.

[41] Nick Groom, 'Draining the Irish Sea: The Colonial Politics of Water', ibid. 21–39.

[42] Jos Smith, 'Fugitive Allegiances: The Good Ship Archipelago and the Atlantic Edge', ibid. 243–60.

III *Coastal Activities*

The question remains, however, whether this edge effect was translated into distinct coastal activities in the past. If we believe Gillis, this was certainly the case. He claims that coastal areas became more sharply differentiated from inland regions by 1500, largely because of what might be called the presence of the state on the periphery. While inland territories became thoroughly feudalized and increasingly controlled, coastal areas retained a higher degree of autonomy throughout the early modern period, in part as a result of neglect by the authorities, in part because of resistance to them. Gillis argues that coastal populations became what he calls 'Souls of the Edge', distinguished by the patterns of their economic activities, social structure, and political culture.[43] Given the current state of research, this observation is arguably more a claim than a statement backed by empirical evidence. But maritime history, especially with a local and regional outlook, can with some legitimacy claim to have worked along these lines for a fairly long time. Ultimately, therefore, the question is whether coastal history's agenda with its specific set of questions can usefully be combined with more traditional maritime histories. Is there something coastal in maritime history—economically, socially, politically—that warrants particular attention?

In terms of a distinctly coastal economy, a number of activities come to mind that can be distinguished, if only at first glance, as legal (fishing, trading, shipbuilding) or illegal (smuggling, wrecking, pirating). In the case of early modern Britain, privileged insight into all these matters can be gleaned from customs records. Just how intimate the historian's knowledge of these coastal operations can be is richly demonstrated by W. B. Stephens's recent monograph on the seventeenth-century customs service in the West Country.[44] An investigation into the customs service in the western ports from 1682 to 1684 by the gentleman and experienced customs officer William Culliford is the starting point for an analysis that is thoroughly regional, yet whose findings have much wider implications. Culliford's investigation was designed to combat fraud, embezzlement, collu-

[43] Gillis, *The Human Shore*, 75.

[44] W. B. Stephens, *The Seventeenth-Century Customs Service Surveyed: William Culliford's Investigation of the Western Ports, 1682–84* (Abingdon, 2016).

sion, corruption, and other vices among the customs officers of the western ports. In the course of his investigation, however, Culliford naturally encountered the broader issue of smuggling in various shapes and forms. The wider significance of Stephens's analysis, therefore, is that he is able to uncover if not the exact extent, then certainly the widespread nature of clandestine trade among the coastal populations, and the central authorities' weakness in making their agents comply strictly with the Crown's interests in the localities. Perhaps the most striking feature revealed by Stephens's account is the astonishing flexibility which the system of controlling trade, both legal and clandestine, displayed along the shores of the kingdom.

If we look beyond the governmental rhetoric employed by Culliford, who was naturally concerned with the efficiency and integrity of the customs service, the weaknesses in administration that he stumbled upon can also be read as a distinctly coastal adaptation of fiscal and economic enforcement. The many forms of collusion between officers and merchants, fishermen and smugglers, and the equally numerous forms of pressure put on customs officials by informing, bribery, and blackmail suggest not only that smuggling enjoyed wide popular support among coastal populations, something that is widely recognized in the research, but perhaps also hints at something more significant.[45] Throughout Stephens's book and Culliford's report we find that within local populations social roles and economic occupations changed frequently and with astonishing ease. Although any one person could, of course, always be both merchant and smuggler, officer and merchant, the quick and seamless blending of different roles suggests something in the sense of Gérard le Bouëdec's 'pluriactivity' in these areas.[46] Regardless of whether this involved smugglers turning informers turning officers, or fishermen turning officers turning smugglers, people worked just as easily on both sides of the line between official and clandestine business as they routinely did on both sides of the tideline.

Once again, Gillis provides a term for the main features of this economic setting. By analogy with the process of proto-industrialization that took place inland during the early modern period, he calls

[45] Cal Winslow, 'Sussex Smugglers', in Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John G. Rule, E. P. Thompson, and Cal Winslow (eds.), *Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England* (London, 1975), 119–66.
[46] Le Bouëdec, *Activités maritimes et sociétés littorales*.

what happened along the shores the rise of a 'protomaritime economy'.[47] Gillis argues that this process was decentralized and based on activities that varied by season and location, with individuals and families engaging in different forms of employment on land and sea according to circumstances. Ample evidence for this is supplied by the voluminous first-ever maritime history of Cornwall, edited by Philip Payton, Alston Kennerley, and Helen Doe.[48] The book covers a deliberately wide spectrum of maritime aspects in an attempt to adopt 'inclusive definitions of maritime history' that go beyond more traditional and perhaps obvious naval and commercial themes.[49] Equipped with thorough introductions to each of the chronologically structured five parts of the book, the volume also contains more specialized chapters on individual maritime issues, sometimes in the form of a case study, sometimes with a more general outlook. In many of these chapters, especially those on smuggling and wrecking, coastwise and international trade, and fishing and mining, Gillis's main assumption regarding the flexibility of littoral economic activities is confirmed. For coastal populations in medieval and early modern Cornwall especially, seasonally and socially induced shifts of occupation between farming and fishing, pirating and privateering, trading and smuggling can easily be identified as a key characteristic. Even the tin miners occasionally went pirating. Doe, Kennerley, and Payton call these occupational patterns 'bi-employment',[50] while John C. Appleby attributes the attraction of piracy and privateering to 'irregular employment patterns among seafaring communities'.[51] Finally, N. A. M. Rodger observes in a chapter on Cornwall's relations with the Royal Navy that 'those who went to sea were very often part-timers; typically farmers and fishermen, or miners and fishermen, according to season and opportunity'.[52] Because the book covers Cornwall from the earliest times to the twenty-first century,

[47] Gillis, *The Human Shore*, 76.

[48] Philip Payton, Alston Kennerley, and Helen Doe (eds.), *The Maritime History of Cornwall* (Exeter, 2014).

[49] Eid, 'Introduction and Acknowledgements', ibid. 1–5, at 3.

[50] Doe, Kennerley, and Payton, 'Introduction' [to part II], ibid. 75–96, at 87.

[51] John C. Appleby, 'Plunder and Prize: Cornish Piracy and Privateering during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', ibid. 97–105, at 97.

[52] N. A. M. Rodger, 'Cornwall and the Royal Navy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', ibid. 171–81, at 171.

the introductions can also trace long-term trends. Apart from a general economic decline after an age of prosperity and truly international trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it also emerges that occupations, like the economy itself, became more specialized during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nonetheless, for the medieval and early modern periods at least, coastal livelihoods in Cornwall, and presumably also elsewhere along Britain's shores, seem to have been gained in ways that routinely bridged the tideline.

The editors' decision to apply a wide definition of maritime history—one that considers a maritime dimension in 'almost every facet of human knowledge'—means that this *Maritime History of Cornwall* also covers more properly land-based activities and social aspects.[53] Leaving aside the view that any attempt to separate economic and social aspects of life is futile in any event, this decision is particularly commendable as it is not typically applied in other volumes on maritime history. Quite a number of specifically coastal economic activities, such as smuggling or wrecking, cannot, as this and other volumes demonstrate, be understood in strictly economic terms.[54] While there is a clear bias towards economic interpretations throughout the volume, many chapters, and especially the carefully balanced introductions, relate these activities to the social situation of Cornish people. While coastal settlements, for instance, are categorized primarily along economic lines into different types of coastal communities in at least two cases in the volume, there is also a clear understanding of the social factors driving economic change and the resulting social dynamics in these communities.[55]

The volume is especially strong in this regard. Whether this relates to the networks of the merchant communities and their social cohesion in port towns, or to the poorer sections of society resorting to farming, fishing, and unlawful activities in the havens and hamlets

[53] Payton, Kennerley, and Doe, 'Epilogue', ibid. 421–2, at 421.

[54] John G. Rule, 'Wrecking and Coastal Plunder', in Hay, Linebaugh, Rule, Thompson, and Winslow (eds.), *Albion's Fatal Tree*, 167–88; Cathryn Pearce, *Cornish Wrecking 1700–1860: Reality and Popular Myth* (Woodbridge, 2010).

[55] Maryanne Kowaleski, 'Coastal Communities in Medieval Cornwall', in Payton, Kennerley, and Doe (eds.), *The Maritime History of Cornwall*, 43–59, at 44; Doe, Kennerley, and Payton, 'Introduction' (to part IV), ibid. 233–62, at 241.

along the shore, the volume addresses these problems as much as waves of emigration in the nineteenth century, upper-class leisure pursuits, and the state and fate of the native Cornish language. This social and cultural background to economic activities is not only important as a topic in its own right, but also provides a neat link with the question of Cornish identity and other political aspects of coastal communities. After all, the question of whether coastal people really are an 'edge species' or 'Souls of the Edge' can hardly be answered by looking at economic patterns and social structures alone.

A lesson that can be drawn from Stephens's book on the customs service in western England is that the Crown's political grasp on counties such as Cornwall was not particularly strong. This is not very surprising as Cornwall is the prime example of a region that preserved a distinct regional identity well beyond the early modern period.[56] Despite the rapid decline of the Cornish language, Cornwall's reputation for lawlessness and unruliness gained from episodes such as the eighteenth-century food riots or the Newlyn Riots at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It had, in any case, already been firmly established by the earlier risings of 1497 and 1549, and Cornwall's Royalist yet separatist role during the Civil War.[57] To this can be added the county's notoriously independent stance on royal and parliamentary legislation concerning coastal issues such as wrecking and pirating. This resulted in a sizeable body of representations in Victorian literature vividly romanticizing these issues, as Simon Trezise shows.[58] Cornwall emerges as a region that was, in many respects, at the forefront of developments in international trade and industrialization, especially in the eighteenth century, while still displaying a lack of law and order in the eyes of Whitehall officials and the general public. Much of this can, perhaps convincingly, be attributed to Cornwall's geographical remoteness and to the fact that, according to the editors of this volume, it was 'quintessentially a maritime region'.[59] Yet Cornwall is perhaps too exceptional to permit

[56] Mark Stoyle, *West Britons: Cornish Identities and the Early Modern British State* (Exeter, 2002).

[57] Doe, Kennerley, and Payton, 'Introduction' [to part II], *passim*.

[58] Simon Trezise, 'The Smuggler and the Wrecker: Literary Representations of Cornish Maritime Life', ibid. 318–28.

[59] Payton, Kennerley, and Doe, 'Introduction and Acknowledgements', ibid. 1–5, at 1.

generalizations on whether there was a distinctly coastal problem with law and order.

Leaving the case of Cornwall aside, therefore, and coming back to a book discussed earlier, we can also look at how these social and economic underpinnings of coastal life contributed to a genuine political culture. Here, the monograph by Renaud Morieux on the Channel in the eighteenth century, despite following its own agenda, provides an interesting starting point. As mentioned above, Morieux chooses to approach the coast as a border region not from the perspective of central authorities and on a national scale, but focuses instead on more regional and local stories. This first becomes visible in his analysis of the Channel coasts as military frontier regions. Rather than imposing his own understanding, he looks at how contemporaries envisioned this border. Crucially, it was not quite the same in England and France. In the French case, the littoral was understood to be the border and was therefore heavily fortified, but in England this notion developed late. It was not until the Napoleonic era, for example, that the coast began to be more heavily fortified, while an understanding that naval defence was properly conducted at sea prevailed for most of the eighteenth century. These different notions of the maritime border, Morieux goes on to show, developed out of different legal concepts regarding sovereignty at sea.

With greater relevance to coastal politics, however, Morieux also analyses the local agents of border defence in both countries. This analysis of the *garde-côte* (in France) and the militia (in England) serves the wider purpose of allowing the coastal populations' loyalties to their local areas versus the nation to be assessed. Tellingly, the results are not straightforward. While a 'growing sense of nationhood' can be detected among local populations,[60] Morieux's analysis also shows a considerable amount of reluctance and even resistance on the part of English coastal counties to be enlisted for a purpose beyond the locality. Morieux's book is full of such stories and gains much of its narrative tension and explanatory potential from relating local attitudes to national agendas, which he also traces in a number of other issues. Whether this involves the harvesting of seaweed by coastal populations, fishery rights as defined by international (customs) borders, or the activities of smugglers and privateers, the vol-

[60] Morieux, *The Channel*, 139.

ume illustrates that populations were not only subjected to legal norms and treaties, devised by central authorities, that contributed to a territorialization of the border in a national sense, but also developed and followed their own agendas on the ground. These were sometimes openly contrary to those of the centre and, at times, appropriated the rhetoric of the central authorities to further their own goals.

The book thus demonstrates that fishermen were able to influence the government authorities in their own interests, most notably in the negotiation of fishing truces that often ran counter to the factions of international warfare. At the same time, smugglers were able to continue plying their trade throughout periods of war across the Channel by adapting to the proto-nationalist game of identities that the authorities created and played. According to Morieux, all of this resulted in categories of (national) identity on the coast and at sea acquiring a degree of 'fuzziness'.[61]

In all these cases, national identities remained elusive and flexible at local level and did not easily conform to ideas expressed by the central government authorities. In fact, Morieux's book vividly demonstrates that local interests, mostly economic in nature, usually retained the upper hand among local populations. As a result, innumerable schemes for eluding the grasp of the central authorities were developed. Going beyond the more specialized question of whether this independence could successfully be used by local populations 'from below' in adapting to a distinctly coastal border situation, the sheer quantity of specifically coastal regulations imposed on these regions also suggests a politically distinctive space. Whether we observe coastal populations pursuing their own socio-economic agenda (successfully or not), or national governments attempting to enforce specific coastal policies, therefore, it is clear that these influences to a certain extent contributed to a politically distinct situation.

This is evident both in the surveillance mechanisms and institutions of border control created at the time of the French Revolution, and in the forms of jurisdiction and legislation to which coastal regions were constantly subjected. Regardless of whether this related to the Admiralty's jurisdiction over wrecking and privateering, or to customs legislation regarding the legal confines of ports and the hovering limits of ships at sea, in the eyes both of local communities and Whitehall officials, the coast was a distinct region that required dis-

[61] Ibid. 194.

tinct political approaches. These characteristics make coasts and maritime frontiers, according to Morieux, 'territories worth studying in themselves'.[62]

This book's breadth and thematic range, however, also demonstrate that this sort of argument requires an inclusive approach. Even if there are distinctly coastal economic activities, social settings, and political circumstances, the significance of the coast as a space does not become plain in any single one of these aspects. As the politically informed socio-economic situation of fishermen and smugglers, merchants, and privateers suggests, an understanding of the coast must strive to combine economic, social, cultural, and political aspects. It is apparently only in the ways in which these are intertwined that we can with any confidence discern a coastal edge effect and speak of coastal communities as unique.

IV *Cultures of the Edge?*

What follows from all of this for the notion of 'coastal history'? As in every historiographical enterprise that considers itself 'new', we must, of course, be careful not to overstate the case. Maritime research has a long tradition and there is abundant work on themes and topics that certainly can but do not necessarily have to be considered 'coastal'. Yet there seems to be something behind this notion. The shore, as much of the research discussed here shows, is a liminal place, a contact zone open to meetings and relations of every sort, violent and otherwise. To characterize the shore as an ecotone—a concept borrowed from ecology—that is, as a zone of transition between different, overlapping ecosystems producing increased diversity, is therefore certainly an apt metaphor for social life in historical communities at the water's edge.[63] The shore is a distinct space, for it produces distinct edge effects. Because it can be imagined as an edge, it triggers the imagination both artistically and politically at individual, regional, and national levels. Because it can be demarcated as an edge, it produces closures and confrontations, but also engenders new and creative exchanges. And because it imposes

[62] Ibid. 22.

[63] John Gillis, 'Afterword: Beyond the Blue Horizon', in Allen, Groom, and Smith (eds.), *Coastal Works*, 261–68, at 262.

itself as an edge materially, it demands adjustments, variations, and adaptability in economic, social, and political terms.

The volumes discussed in this article make a strong case for paying attention to something that manifests itself historically in such distinct and remarkable ways. What the research discussed here also shows, however, is that as a location, an area, or a line on a map, the coast is a cultural construct, whose shape and value changes over time. What the coast is, where the coast is, and what the coast does, is open to interpretation both then and now. In other words, rather than a historiographical subject in its own right, the coast is perhaps more a perspective that emerges when one chooses to look for it. To what extent adopting this perspective is a historiographically fruitful enterprise is, as always, a different question.

Perhaps the most important factor in applying a new perspective to historical sources is whether it reveals things previously unknown. Does it produce questions with sufficient analytical drive to reach beyond its immediate thematic range? To date it seems that coastal history is more occupied with establishing the existence of its subject than considering ways in which it can usefully relate to more established research fields, narratives, and angles such as naval or maritime, social, or political history. Much will depend, therefore, on the questions that this coastal perspective can ultimately generate. As for the British case, for instance, the question is whether the concept of coastal history has anything to offer for established narratives of national and imperial, colonial and maritime history. As has become apparent in some of the strands of research discussed above, this seems to apply to issues of cultural identity on an individual and a national scale, and to the patterns in the social life of local and regional communities at the water's edge. In both cases, the coastal perspective may well be able to contribute to research problems in relation to empire- and nation-building, and state-formation and social change. For the moment, however, we need more empirical research on the British case. As examples from France, India, and the Americas show, this is certainly feasible.[64] It has already become apparent that this coastal perspective, in the case of Britain at least, may be par-

[64] The following is by no means an exhaustive list: Le Bouëdec, *Activités maritimes et sociétés littorales*; Frédérique Laget, Philippe Josserand, and Brice Rabot (eds.), *Entre horizons terrestres et marins: Sociétés, campagnes et littoraux de l'Ouest atlantique* (Rennes, 2017); Christophe Cérino, Aliette Geistdoerfer,

ticularly relevant to questions of national identity, especially as it relates to Britain's maritime, island, and archipelagic situation. At least to date, however, what new interpretations this perspective may ultimately produce and what new insights can be gleaned from it are still moot points.

Gérard Le Bouëdec, and François Ploux (eds.), *Entre terre et mer: Sociétés littorales et pluriactivités (XVe–XXe siècle)* (Rennes, 2004); Yogesh Sharma (ed.), *Coastal Histories: Society and Ecology in Premodern India* (Delhi, 2010); Andrew Lipman, *The Saltwater Frontier: Indians and the Contest for the American Coast* (New Haven, 2015); Christopher L. Pastore, *Between Land and Sea: The Atlantic Coast and the Transformation of New England* (Cambridge, Mass., 2014); for current research on the Scottish case see Worthington (ed.), *The New Coastal History*; id., 'Ferries in the Firthlands: Communications, Society and Culture along a Northern Scottish Rural Coast, *c.*1600 to *c.*1809', *Rural History*, 27 (2016), 129–48.

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BOOK REVIEWS

INGRID REMBOLD, *Conquest and Christianization: Saxony and the Carolingian World, 772–888*, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, Fourth Series, 108 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), xviii +277 pp. ISBN 978 1 107 19621 6. £75.00

This book is based on the author's Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, which was supervised by Rosamond McKitterick and submitted in 2014. The author, Ingrid Rembold, is now a Junior Research Fellow at Hertford College, Oxford, but following her Ph.D. submission, she obtained postdoctoral funding from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) to carry out research at the Georg August University, Göttingen. It is important to mention this because it is clear that Rembold's work has benefited immensely from her postdoctoral studies; in contrast with other English publications in the field, her book shows not only an awareness but a profound and critical grasp of relevant research published in German, with which she is fully up to date. The bibliography alone (pp. 245–73) is ample proof of the author's intensive engagement with the literature, as are her thorough footnotes, which number nearly a thousand. Indeed, sometimes one can have too much of a good thing; this reviewer feels that it was not really necessary, for example, for the author to list so many of Hedwig Röckelein's publications in footnote 123, only to repeat them all again in the bibliography (pp. 268–9).

The author correctly notes at the beginning of the study that 'Saxony represents an important test case for the nature of Christianization and Christian reform in the early medieval world' (p. 3). This is the reason, of course, why so many historians have been interested in this topic and why it is almost impossible to keep abreast of all the relevant literature. Hence Rembold—and the reader—is aware of the need for a new perspective: 'With a fresh reading of a wide range of Latin and Old Saxon sources, [this book] explores the manner in which Saxony was incorporated into the Carolingian political order and the Christian ecclesia' (p. 4). In contrast to most studies to date,

Trans. Emily Richards (GHIL).

she argues that 'the brutality of the Saxon wars did not preclude acceptance of Christianity and Carolingian rule' (p. 4). Elegantly bringing together political and ecclesiastical strands, she presents us with 'a case study of social transformation' (p. 4). In a comprehensive introduction (which in part refers to another publication by the author, cf. p. 28, n. 100), she sets out why the process 'by which Saxony was incorporated into the Carolingian Empire and the Christian church following its violent conquest by Charlemagne' (p. 36) requires a re-evaluation. And in attempting this ambitious goal, Rembold fully succeeds.

Part 1, 'Politics of Conquest', covers the Saxon wars (pp. 39–84) and the *Stellinga* uprising (pp. 85–140). Chronologically speaking, therefore, it actually goes beyond the time of the mission itself. But through a close reading of the sources, Rembold is able to argue convincingly that the uprising 'was not the return to pagan observance' that many have believed, especially as '*Stellinga*'s goals were more modest than has previously been supposed, [and] so too were their effects less pronounced' (p. 139). Among these effects were clear signs that 'Saxon society became increasingly stratified, and literary sources betray a much clearer demarcation of the orders of Saxony' (p. 140).

Part 2, 'Conversion and Christianization', takes the form of a detailed source analysis addressing the topics 'Founders and Patrons' (pp. 143–87) and 'Religion and Society' (pp. 188–242). Rembold carefully traces the impressive creation of the Saxon dioceses (which are listed and mapped on Map 2, p. x), an achievement which is unlikely to have been solely due to the wishes of Carolingian and Frankish rulers: 'These structures are the result of gradual development, made possible above all by local support' (p. 186). Rightly, Rembold debunks the view that the introduction of Christianity and the establishment of its institutions was a violent act of colonialism; this may have been the case when the mission first began, but does not explain, she thinks, the efforts made to embed the Christian faith and the structures of its church among the Saxon people. Even if Saxon authors claimed otherwise, Rembold argues that Carolingian rulers did not play a leading role in developing Saxon ecclesiastical institutions, although not everyone is likely to agree. The important point, according to Rembold, is that 'Saxon religious institutions were not . . . the product of some top-down strategy. Rather, they developed

gradually and drew primarily upon local support, both in the form of donations and of tithes' (p. 187). It is therefore only logical that in Part 2, the author addresses 'Religion and Society' as two sides of the same coin. Given that by comparison with Carolingian Christianity, Saxon Christianity could be idiosyncratic in some of its practices, the author hopes to show the significance of local Christian identities, leading to the conclusion that one might expect: 'Saxon Christianity was both different and the same. It was simultaneously a micro-Christendom and a beacon of Christian universalism' (p. 242).

Overall, Rembold's study shows that the usual explanation focused on a 'top-down' Christianization is inadequate. Instead, she wants 'to highlight the potential for similar diversity within Carolingian Christianity and the structures that underpinned it' (243). Thus the *Stellinga* revolt, for example, was not, according to Rembold, genuinely anti-Carolingian, but should rather be seen as an expression of regionalism within the imperial political order. The author sums up: 'Power was not delegated through institutions and officials to be applied uniformly across the length and breadth of the empire; rather, governance was predicated upon extant power relations and local networks, and rulers relied upon local elites, and vice versa, for the routine exercise of their power. The resultant picture of Carolingian governance is one of regional diversity writ large' (p. 243).

At all events, Rembold's study is sure to play an important role in future discussions about Saxons in the Carolingian world.

LUTZ E. VON PADBERG was Professor of Medieval History at the University of Paderborn. His main research interests are European history in the early Middle Ages, in particular, the Christianization of Europe. His many publications include *Die Inszenierung religiöser Konfrontationen: Theorie und Praxis der Missionspredigt im frühen Mittelalter* (2003) and *Christianisierung im Mittelalter* (2006).

GEORG SCHMIDT, *Die Reiter der Apokalypse: Geschichte des Dreißigjährigen Krieges* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2018), 810 pp. ISBN 978 3 406 71836 6. €34.00
GEORG SCHMIDT, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1995; 9th rev. edn. 2010), 128 pp. ISBN 978 3 406 72196 0. €9.95

The tercentenary of the outbreak of the Thirty Years War has prompted a flood of new publications, media coverage, conferences, and exhibitions. University libraries were certainly not short on books about the war but, as Georg Schmidt rightly points out, the old clichés have proved surprisingly persistent and remain deeply embedded in the popular memory of this conflict. Chief among these is that the war represented the lowest point in German history between the Reformation and unification in 1871. He seeks to correct this through two books; one is a substantial new general history of the war, while the other is an updated version of his short textbook which first appeared in 1995. Unlike several of the competing books published in 2018, Schmidt's major new study is not simply a work of synthesis, but a clear statement of his own interpretation of the war's causes and consequences. It builds on arguments already partly rehearsed in earlier versions of the textbook, the latest edition of which serves as an admirably clear and succinct summary of his interpretation and scholarship on the war more generally.

Central to this interpretation is Schmidt's conception of the Holy Roman Empire as the first German nation-state, which he has articulated in other works since the early 1990s, most notably in his *Geschichte des Alten Reiches: Staat und Nation in der Frühen Neuzeit* (1999). The Peace of Augsburg of 1555, the deficiencies of which are often blamed for causing the war, is regarded by Schmidt as stabilizing the imperial constitution and integrating the north German imperial Estates (*Reichsstände*) more closely within the Empire. The result was what he terms the 'Complementary Empire-State' in which the imperial Estates shared key powers with the emperor. The political balance was expressed in the language of 'German liberties' and the constitutional order increasingly became the focus for what Schmidt interprets as a 'German' national identity.

This approach tends to treat the Austrian Habsburg monarchy, the Burgundian lands, and imperial (northern) Italy as already separate from the mass of smaller imperial Estates represented in the key

institutions like the Reichstag and the imperial Circles (*Reichskreise*). While this is problematic when considering the Empire's history more broadly, it does add analytical clarity to Schmidt's characterization of the war as a distinct Central European conflict and not a general European war. Here he is arguing against the mainstream Anglophone scholarship, which has tended to follow Geoffrey Parker's line and see the Thirty Years War as part of a wider struggle over Spanish claims to continental hegemony.

He is also dissenting from the majority view among German historians, and voiced elsewhere by others like Sir John Elliott, that the war began in the Empire and expanded outwards in concentric circles to become a European war. This 'European war school' suggests that the Empire's problems either rapidly lost importance once the Spanish–Dutch war resumed in 1621, or that events in the Empire were largely determined by external actors, making it 'a European war fought in Germany' as Johannes Arndt and others have claimed.[1] Schmidt restores agency to the Empire's political leadership, as well as assigning them responsibility for the horrendous conflict which ensued. This is a bold step in the current political climate, given the drift implicit in the 'European war school' back towards the older conservative nationalist characterization of the Thirty Years War as a national disaster inflicted on an innocent Germany by evil foreigners.

Die Reiter der Apokalypse is divided into three parts. The first explores the war's origins as a constitutional conflict which escaped control and which centred on a struggle between German freedom and Habsburg monarchical authority. As Schmidt rightly argues, external intervention was determined by this, not the other way round, since each foreign power joining the conflict did so either to support or oppose the Habsburgs. He strikes a middle course between those, like Axel Gotthard and Geoffrey Parker, who see the war as inevitable, and those, like Johannes Burkhardt, who argue there was a real chance that a serious conflict could have been avoided. Schmidt remains reserved towards the current history of mentalities, which has grown steadily since the linguistic turn in the 1990s and the subsequent surge in new cultural history. When applied to the Thirty Years War, this approach argues that the impact of Humanism, science, the Reformation, and responses to climate change and various

[1] Johannes Arndt, *Der Dreißigjährige Krieg, 1618–1648* (Ditzingen, 2009), 12.

political and economic problems combined to make war inevitable by creating a climate of fear. This view has now largely displaced the earlier structuralist explanation of the war's causes, based on a 'General Crisis' caused either by a change in mode of production from feudalism to capitalism, or a political shift related to the fragmentation of Spanish Habsburg hegemony. Schmidt disputes claims that 'mass psychosis' caused the war and prolonged it by reigniting it after each peace attempt. There was, indeed, a general sense of anxiety, but not everyone accepted fate passively and there were still those who called for a peaceful resolution of the problems. However, he does argue that 'crisis management' failed repeatedly, because each party felt convinced that God and justice were on their side and hoped that a show of force would compel their opponents to back down.

The book's second part tackles the question of why the war lasted thirty years. This develops the argument about repeated failures to defuse, or at least contain, a succession of crises. Presentation of the material is fairly conventional, following the customary chronological structure adopted to explain the war, though Schmidt varies this a little as he enters the 1630s, and he dissociates the different phases from their usual linkage with the successive intervention of Denmark, Sweden, and France. More might have been said about how the methods used to fund the war made its termination harder to achieve. The discussion also suffers from the usual compression of events after the Peace of Prague in 1635, which are covered in just 86 pages, compared to the 492 devoted to narrating the first half of the war. The text does draw on the rich range of contemporary personal testimonies, such as the soldier's diary presumed to have been written by Peter Hagendorf, but these do not feature as prominently as in some of the other recent books on the war.

The final part deals with the Congress of Westphalia and evaluates the peace settlement in line with the book's argument that this was a 'German' war. Schmidt stresses that the religious clauses of the settlement successfully defused confessional tension and contributed to the post-war stability of the Empire. This was far from being a 'national' humiliation but, on the contrary, pointed towards modernity, especially in how the treaty enshrined a great variety of individual and corporate liberties within the imperial constitution. The war's demographic, social, economic, and cultural consequences are covered only briefly, with more attention paid to its commemoration

and place in subsequent German national identity. Overall, Schmidt balances a general synthesis of recent research with his own, distinctive interpretation, and achieves his goal of providing an accessible, lucid account of what was an extremely complex conflict.

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CORNEL ZWIERLEIN, *Imperial Unknowns: The French and British in the Mediterranean, 1650–1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 412 pp. ISBN 978 1 107 16644 8. £64.99

This book is a highly ambitious, complex, challenging, and genuine attempt at engaging with interdisciplinary developments within the investigation of the 'history of ignorance(s) in late medieval and early modern times'. Cornel Zwierlein proposes this approach as an alternative to the more traditional 'empire and science' historiography, focused on 'the infrastructure, aims and impacts of knowledge accumulation'. Zwierlein's volume aims instead to 'shift the focus to the other side of knowledge—its absence—and therefore to the enduring relationship between ignorance and knowledge' (all p. 1). This is a project which Cornel Zwierlein has been pursuing for some time. In this volume he develops his analysis through an interesting comparative discussion of the intellectual discourses on 'ignorance' in England/Britain and France, and on how these fostered and interacted with actual political strategies and actions on the ground.

The stated goal of the volume is to see how 'these imperial actors cope with the multiple forms of ignorance within the four epistemic fields of politics and economics, religion, general knowledge and history of the Levant region, and science' (pp. 1–2). The argument is then developed in four corresponding sections tracing developments in France and England between the mid seventeenth and mid eighteenth century, a period when Zwierlein argues there was a substantial change of approach towards confronting 'ignorance'.

The first section, dedicated to political economy, especially on the French side of the narrative displays a remarkable level of erudition, and a very careful reading of the contemporary intellectual debates on these issues. Still, it is not particularly convincing in analytical terms as it meanders and does not properly contextualize some of the arguments developed. It is probably just a reflection of the present renaissance of early modern Mediterranean history, which makes it hard to keep up with the literature, that some crucial recent studies are ignored in this analysis. This is a shame, as taking them into account would have strengthened the volume and avoided some outdated generalizations on the organization of English trade in the Levant.

Zwierlein's development of the 'history of ignorance' interpretative framework is a kind of approach that necessarily limits the scope

to governmental/institutional upper echelons (p. 198), which is perfectly fine, and fully in line with the final goal of the volume of presenting the French and English/British empires as agents of institutional action towards 'ignorance'. However, this type of analysis by its own nature does not allow an investigation of those 'everyday cognitive processing phenomena' (p. 83) which are stated as the aim of this section's attempt to trace the birth and development of the concept of 'national'. Furthermore, the nuanced and detailed analysis of the genealogy of legal arguments going back to the Middle Ages, and the way authorities shaped the development of the medieval and early modern debate on *dominium maris* should delineate, in his wording, how 'those different textual interpretations and semantics served to nationalize the concept of sea use and shipping itself' (p. 101). But here the argument is not developed in a convincing manner, in part due to the frequently convoluted writing style, and in part because the topic is in itself massive and has generated an equivalently daunting literature which is not fully taken into account here.

A good example is the section on Venice. The legal discussion of the Venetian maritime empire is followed only through the eyes of the 'civilists' (e.g. p. 98). Moreover, the author does not engage with the literature on Venice (including Filippo De Vivo's sharp synthesis of Venice and the Adriatic[1]) and thus ignores how the peculiarities of its constitution and legal framework shaped its imperial form. Another good example of this negligence is Frederic Lane's discussion of 'protection costs',[2] which would have better supported both Zwierlein's general discussion of transaction costs at the beginning of the first section (p. 36), and his considerations on the interconnectedness of maritime and naval issues, a strong topos within French historiography, which only now is emerging in relation to the study of England (pp. 103–4).

The sections which follow are all substantially stronger. The one on 'religion' convincingly connects theological debates in the West with those in the East, arguing both for the importance of biases of observation in the evaluation of their reporting, and also for their impact on focusing observers' and scholars' interests, and in some

[1] Filippo de Vivo, 'Historical Justifications of Venetian Power in the Adriatic', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 64/2 (2003), 159–76.

[2] See e.g. Frederic C. Lane, *Profits From Power: Readings in Protection Rent and Violence Controlling Enterprises* (Albany, NY, 1979).

cases fostering policy development and sharing communications across different national channels (p. 127). Particularly interesting are those pages dedicated to the French consular network's activities in protecting Catholicism in the Levant, and their role in reflecting and embodying religious and political disputes at home. Here the comparison with their English equivalent works particularly well, and Zwierlein's distinctive analytical perspective provides real insights especially within the religious–political sphere, where the author highlights the strong connection of the French consular network with the Crown, whilst religious divisions in England shaped consular activities in a rather different way (p. 179).

Equally stimulating is the section on 'history', which is particularly well suited to allow the argument on retracing the history of ignorance to emerge powerfully from Zwierlein's retracing of the large chronological gaps in French and English narratives of the Levant. This section, and the nature of the evidence here analysed, also allows him properly to highlight the 'divide between the practical culture of the consular network . . . and the academic culture of Orientalists' (p. 198), in this way effectively discussing that 'everyday cognitive processing' which was somewhat missing in the first section. Here the author's argument of the impact of administrative practices on the 'perception and production of "History" ' (p. 233) is strong and convincing, although ideally these developments within the Anglo-French worlds would have been contextualized within the general contemporary changes in the production of 'histories', a Eurasian cultural phenomenon throughout the entire early modern period, which has produced a wealth of stimulating studies precisely on the engagement of bureaucrats and intellectuals with the production of new histories in both Christian and Muslim countries.

It is most fitting that the concluding section is the one dedicated to 'science', where Zwierlein's approach was originally conceived, and the spectre of Thomas Kuhn looms large. As the author himself acknowledges, the methodological structure of the book 'resembles a universalising of an approach more common within the narrower field of "empire and science" ' (p. 255). Here the analysis is developed through effective use of case studies, especially the riveting narrative of the search for the 'petrified city' and its connection with the development of cartography. In the concluding chapters, the non-linear way in which a scientific approach slowly develops is effectively con-

veyed, as Zwierlein openly confronts the 'disturbing co-presence of highly efficient Enlightenment instrumental science with a comparative speculative method that endeavoured to bring unwritten history to light from the traditions and collective memory of "the people"' (p. 304).

Throughout the text there is an attempt at categorizing neatly both fields of ignorance/knowledge and governmental attitudes—regarding the latter, for example, on protectionism/'free trade'—which betrays a very contemporary view, whilst in the concluding chapter the view is much more nuanced, and one wonders whether the conclusion would not have been better positioned as an introduction instead. Here, directly confronting the limits of the system theory he employed in the text (p. 300) strengthens the author's argument. Bringing together the different strands of his analysis, Zwierlein builds a convincing argument on how '(non-) knowledge was processed and how it was the European demand for scientific knowledge and curiosities that created the story rather than the other way around—that it was the European encounter with the story that created a demand for further investigation' (p. 305). It is to be hoped that this will stimulate a debate to delineate further the boundaries of the 'knowledge/non-knowledge/nescience' distinctions here developed, and which are certainly worthy of continuing investigation.

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SHANE NAGLE, *Histories of Nationalism in Ireland and Germany: A Comparative Study from 1800 to 1932* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), vii + 259 pp. ISBN 978 1 4742 6374 0. £85.00

By focusing on the era in which the modern idea of nationalism emerged as a way of establishing the preferred political, cultural, and social order for society, Shane Nagle demonstrates that across different European societies, the most important constituent of nationalism has been a specific understanding of the nation's historical past. Analysing Ireland and Germany, two largely unconnected societies in which the past has been peculiarly contemporary in politics and where the meaning of the nation has been highly contested, this work examines the narratives of origins, religion, territory, and race. All of the investigated historians were actively engaged in the politics of their respective countries and all were in some way influenced by the reality of confessionalized society during this period. These historians made conscious efforts towards authenticity, or at least authority, to establish definitive interpretations of national history. The historians investigated in this work include for Ireland Thomas D'Arcy McGee (1825–69), Thomas Davis (1814–45), John Mitchel (1815–75), A. M. Sullivan (1830–84), Standish O'Grady (1846–1928), W. E. H. Lecky (1838–1903), Eoin MacNeill (1867–1945), and Alice Stopford Green (1847–1929); and for Germany Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886), Heinrich von Sybel (1817–95), Johannes Janssen (1829–91), Felix Dahn (1834–1912), Gustav Freytag (1816–95), Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–96), and Johannes Haller (1865–1947).

Nagle emphasizes that a national historical narrative inevitably commences with a story of origins. The challenge in the representation of origins for historians is how to depict historical periods generally thought to be distinguished by disunity and dynastic and ethno-religious conflict, as the foundation of a coherent national historical narrative. In German and Irish national historiography, narratives of origins were located in these foundational epochs in which the nation had failed to secure its own unity, resulting in inevitable defeat and catastrophe both immediately and over the course of centuries. As Nagle points out, the views held by these historians of the nation's origins were linked with those of the significance of the nation's geographic nature: Irish insularity and Germany as *Mitteleuropa* (Central Europe) had determined each nation's political and

cultural history from its origins. Generally it can be said that in both contexts, the cultural achievements and mission of the early medieval nation were positively emphasized; medieval kings and princes and early modern heroes were seen as being constitutive of the nation's historical character.

Historians in both countries considered the significance of religion in the nation's political and cultural history. In Germany, according to Nagle, the historical role of Protestantism appeared to offer an ideal and graspable foundation for modern German culture and state power. It had formed the intellectual foundation and core for the German significance of Prussia, formed the foundation for the modern *Kulturnation*, and had given expression to a distinctively German form of religiosity and Christianity.

In Ireland, in Nagle's opinion, it was advantageous for both Catholic and Protestant historians to maintain the particularly Catholic character of the Irish nation. It was not so much the finer points of Catholic doctrine that made Catholic identity important to the historical narrative as the apparent ease with which Catholicism could be presented as a central part of the Irish nation's resistance to persecution and one of the few, if not the only, truly continuous elements of Irish national life through history. In both Ireland and Germany the linking of confessional allegiance and the nation's history was a means of establishing continuity of national character in the midst of a national past of frequent discontinuity, rupture, and disturbance. Yet, according to Nagle, the importance of the early modern era for the historical nationalization of religion meant that the national religious identity became closely associated with resistance to foreign aggression, defence of unity, and national revival after some period of decline or defeat, or simply endurance, of the nation.

In the course of the nineteenth century political language became saturated with racial idioms and distinctions, as did the language of nationalism. If nationalist historical narratives worked to define who was to be included within the nation, they also had the function of defining who and what was to be excluded. National communities inevitably define other groups as the negation of their own self-image, with history being a most powerful means of framing this definition. In both Ireland and Germany the demarcation of the national community vis-à-vis external others was entwined with internal

delineations against certain social, linguistic, cultural, or religious groups whose traditions and customs made them seem in some way alien to the core community. 'Othering' had as much to do with indirectly defining the national community as with what was not of that community. In Ireland the historical conception of race in relation to the nation was always caught between notions of an Irish originality and distinctiveness, and the reality of different ethno-cultural communities in Ireland. In Germany, during the course of the nineteenth century, originality came to be regarded in terms of continuity and purity, and an increasingly uneasy attitude towards foreign influences and cultural mixing. This explains the absence of the Jews as a theme in Irish national historical narrative: there was simply no minority community in the Irish context that carried the role of the Jews as in the German context.

Nagle finds in his study that the representation of Irish and German national histories has been, in many respects, quite similar in the period under consideration. Historians in both contexts have proceeded from a sense of their nation as possessing a fractured past, a belated or arrested development, a past of historical weakness vis-à-vis its powerful neighbours, the absence of a nation-state since the Middle Ages or even earlier, and manifesting serious religious and regional heterogeneities. The enterprise of nationalist history-writing in these two countries, as different as they and their historical experiences were, was nonetheless driven by parallel concerns and took parallel forms in discourse and narrative. As Nagle has shown in both contexts, the professionalization of national history-writing was closely linked with medieval historiography in particular, as the search for reliable, historically authentic primary sources upon which a national history could be built was directed towards the earliest period in which such sources could be found, the Middle Ages. In both contexts the relationship between scientific and amateur forms of national historiography was a complex one, but unscientific historiography maintained dominance in Ireland for far longer than in Germany. Or, to put it another way, professionalization came much later in Ireland, and this naturally influenced the way Irish history was written and influences historical writing to the present day. Revisionist controversy over Irish political history during the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period has framed the Irish historical debate and stayed captive to the dictates of 'methodological nation-

alism'. German historiography, by contrast, contains much more in the way of comparative or theory-based study.

This monograph mainly focuses on the historical writing of the nineteenth century, and only approximately a quarter of the book deals with the time period of 1900 to 1932. Only four of the fourteen investigated historians would have impacted on this time period. It would have been of great interest to read of a comparable female German historian, such as Clara Viebig (1860–1952), to contrast/compare with the case study of Alice Stopford Green. I believe that chapter five, the comparative and the transnational aspect of historical writing, is too brief in comparison to other chapters, which is a shame as it is a strong assessment of transnational historical connections and the account would give us a better idea of just how much we can speak of a common European path for the intellectual development of national thought in modern Europe. Despite the brevity of the chapter, I was pleased to find Leopold von Ranke and his transnational writing was mentioned but, more surprisingly, not at all in chapter four on race, descent, and national enmity in the nation's history. This is something on which most international and, in particular, German scholarship usually references Ranke as a nationalist– monarchist historian.

The aim of producing a more or less hegemonic national historical narrative in Germany and Ireland is fraught with difficulty in four fundamentally important areas: establishing a narrative of origins that could historically mandate nation-statehood; overcoming the legacy of the confessional divide; integrating historicist race thinking and historical narratives of the nation; and historically mandating the territorial outline of the nation. Nagle has had to battle with scarce literature on comparative history. For this reason alone, credit must be given to him for presenting us with this book. His publication draws attention to cultural and intellectual links between the Irish and the Germans, and what this meant for how people in each society understood their national identity at a pivotal time for the development of the historical discipline in Europe. His investigation of a common form of nationalism in Europe's writing of transnational history has given us new insights into the development of nationalism, defining nationhood as well as historiography. I believe that Nagle's work will open new pathways in the approach of historical and international studies. His book will become an important standard work in

a field of historical study that is under-researched and under-published at present.

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PANIKOS PANAYI, *The Germans in India: Elite European Migrants in the British Empire*, Studies in Imperialism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), xix + 286 pp. ISBN 978 1 5261 1933 9. £80.00 (hardback)

The field of Indo-German entangled history is not new, but it is certainly an ever-growing one, opening perspectives that not only offer novel views of the histories of India and Germany but also expand the horizon of our understanding of global history. The long tradition of German Orientalism was institutionalized in Indology departments and still dominates the study of India in German universities. Scholarly interventions, however, most notably in the form of works by Joachim Oesterheld, Ravi Ahuja, Heike Liebau, Gerdien Jonker, and Kris Manjapra, have brought to light both elite and subaltern pasts of the entanglements of modern South Asians in German archives and histories.[1] Other scholars have also recovered the minor but crucial role played by German-speaking actors and ideas in South Asia.[2] Such actors include not just well-known missionaries, military actors, Orientalist scholars, businessmen, and professionals, but also lesser known individuals—German Jewish refugees, for example, fleeing from Hitler's war-torn, fascist Germany to South Asia as a place of refuge.

Elite actors and networks consciously create documentation that is often institutionalized as archives and canonized as histories. These rich archival materials from India, Germany, and Britain inform this new book by Panikos Panayi, *The Germans in India: Elite European Migrants in the British Empire* (2017). Panayi highlights that his explo-

[1] Joachim Oesterheld, 'Indians in Berlin: Past and Present', in Klauss Voll and Doreen Beierlein (eds.), *Rising India: Europe's Partner?* (Berlin, 2006), 901–9; Ravi Ahuja, Heike Liebau, and Franziska Roy, *'When the War Began, We Heard of Several Kings': South Asian Prisoners in World War I Germany* (Delhi, 2011); Gerdien Jonker, *The Ahmadiyya Quest for Religious Progress: Missionizing Europe 1900–1965* (Leiden, 2016); Kris Manjapra, *Age of Entanglement: German and Indian Intellectuals across Empire* (Cambridge, Mass., 2014).

[2] Annemarie Schimmel, *German Contributions to the Study of Indo-Pakistani Linguistics* (Hamburg, 1981); Margit Franz, *Gateway India: Deutschsprachiges Exil in Indien zwischen britischer Kolonialherrschaft, Mahradschas und Gandhi* (Graz, 2015); Kenneth X. Robbins and Marvin Tokayer (eds.), *Western Jews in India: From the Fifteenth Century to the Present* (Manohar, 2013).

ration of Germans in India was conceived as an aspect of his larger work on prisoners of Britain.[3] Thus Panayi's entry into Indian archives and histories of Germans is contextualized within a global history of German movement and control in the age of imperialism and wars.

The book begins in 1815 with the burgeoning presence of Germans in the Basel Mission and concludes in 1920, a year which, according to the author, marked the 'totality of the ethnic cleansing which took place at the end of First World War' (pp. xiii–xiv). Paying attention to the global and transnational aspect of these histories allows us to appreciate Indo-German histories beyond nationalist frames and categories, prompting a reappraisal in relation to complex transnational connections and outcomes.

Moving beyond the analytical taxonomy of 'nation' would enable an appreciation of German-speaking actors within the wider South Asian context which is not possible within a narrow focus on pre-Partition India. It would allow us to include specific local identities and histories of Germans from specific states, something that Panayi notes in his insightful commentary on the dominant role played by Württemberg and Saxony in Basel and Leipzig German missionary histories (p. 59). However, a focus on micro histories should not be limited by national boundaries and should include the identities of German-speaking Swiss and Austro-Hungarians, among others, in colonial South Asia.

One of the key argument in this book is that while Germans were part of European communities, they retained their distinct German and religious identity (p. 30). Panayi maintains that this amalgamation of civic and religious identities marked and defined Germans during the First World War. Yet other scholarly works have highlighted that questions of class, social function, and services rendered to British imperialism were also material considerations.[4] It is not surprising that colonial officials were willing to hire and appoint German-speaking actors, especially in the field of Oriental knowledge production, as they were qualified to provide useful services in

[3] Panikos Panayi, *Prisoners of Britain: German Civilian and Combatant Internees during the First World War* (Manchester, 2012).

[4] Harald Fischer-Tiné, *Low and Licentious Europeans: Race, Class and White Subalternity in Colonial India* (New Delhi, 2009).

the fields of Indian language learning and the translation of texts for the colonial administration. Imperial rivalry in the interwar period affected this policy, but communities of knowledge and interest continued to guide British policy towards German-speaking actors.

In six chapters Panayi weaves a complex narrative of the histories of highly educated elite actors, most notably missionaries, travellers, and scholars. He uses rich archival material gleaned from institutional missionary and colonial state archives as well as personal accounts left in the form of autobiographies, travel documents, memoirs, and other ego documents (p. 66). These diverse sources allow him to reconstruct myriad histories of 'passages to India', as the title of chapter two has it. In this chapter, along with some wonderful individual life trajectories, Panayi draws some important larger conclusions. First, he shows that proselytizers such as German missionaries were pioneering global actors who established sites of knowledge production (p. 9). While Panayi acknowledges the religious dimension of their role, he also highlights their individual agency (p. 52). Instead of regarding missionary histories as conversion narratives, Panayi illustrates the role they played in secular knowledge production in the fields of Oriental studies, ethnography, travel literature, and visual archives about India in Germany (pp. 147–62).

In chapter three Panayi reconstructs the connected domains of everyday life histories, which were shaped by experiences of travel and settlement, and issues with work, education, health, survival, and death. Panayi offers a rare insight into how these everyday life experiences and connections contributed to missionary knowledge and shaped their practices, turning them into agriculturalists and industrial innovators to address not just the spiritual but also material concerns of their Indian subjects (p. 96). The nature of German community formation and transformation are analysed in chapter four. Panayi explores secular, religious, racial, and spatial aspects in the making of the multi-ethnic but hierarchical German community (p. 138).

Intercultural encounters and attendant perceptions are analysed in detail in chapter five. Panayi examines the interaction between missionaries and converts without shrinking from discussing the power dynamics and social boundaries that remained. This is an important point that needs to be considered, and suggests limits to transformation (p. 146). Entanglements did not mark the absence or end of bias; ideologies of religion, race, and Orientalism continued to

shape interactions, as is most evident in the few marriages between Germans and Indians which Panayi contrasts with the 'regularity of unions between Britons and Germans' (p. 179). The main argument here, already flagged up in the book's first chapter, is that Germans did not marry natives and remained separate elite European migrants in colonial South Asia under British imperialism.

These long-term histories, however, were suddenly severed by the consequences of the First World War, when Germans were reduced from their elite migrant status to being the enemies of the Raj. Far from being sought out by British imperial authorities for furthering its colonial enterprise, Germans became prisoners of the British empire. This history of disentanglement and subsequent re-entanglement is an important one, and is examined in chapters six and seven, which map the impact of the Great War by looking at prison and internment camps. Panayi's mastery of the issue is on display here. He skilfully traces the discourse and practices of 'Germanophobia' that ensured that '[t]he Germans become German' (pp. 187–90). From being useful 'servants of the Raj' in various fields, Germans now became the 'enemy' of the British Empire and lost their multiple identities. This was manifested in the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914 and other legal and economic regulations and exclusions (pp. 193–200). It was also institutionalized in the internment camps, most notably at Ahmednagar, which produced a new form of community, the 'prison camp society' (p. 211). Panayi notices the ruptures caused by the First World War with the end of the German story in India (p. 219). He insightfully concludes that the end of existing entanglements also marked the beginning of new forms of entanglement.

Despite promising possibilities, Panayi concludes his account with the end of the First World War. This is rather disappointing. In the light of the temporal and archival framework of the book, and given Panayi's interest and expertise in histories of civilian and combatant internees, it would have been a major advance if he had extended his study to the end of the Second World War. This would have opened the detailed archives about German Jewish internment camps, most notably, Purandhar camp, illuminating complex histories of German-speaking refugees who were incarcerated in these camps. Internment camps were sites of control and regulation, but they also inadvertently promoted connections and entanglements where the detainees often created new intellectual, political, and per-

sonal relations that found their way into their lives, memories, and work.

The intellectual and personal histories of German refugees and internment camps reveal a fascinating history of exile, suffering, and trauma that is simultaneously marked by resilience, survival, and creativity. It is here that the role of subaltern memories and archives can and should be brought into conversation with the current narrative, as the elites and subaltern were also put together in the internment camps. While marginal, subaltern actors play an important role. Although not enshrined in archives, they too shape histories in ways that need to be mapped when we are writing histories of entanglements and globalization. Indeed, subalterns are the first actors who migrate under the pulls and pressures of globalization as migrant labour and refugees. In fact, the rich archival material and Panayi's meticulous research direct our attention to such possibilities. In conclusion, Panayi's *Germans in India* is a valuable addition to our existing knowledge of connected Indo-German histories even as it suggests new avenues to explore.

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JASPER HEINZEN, *Making Prussians, Raising Germans: A Cultural History of Prussian State-Building after Civil War, 1866–1935* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), x + 376 pp. ISBN 978 1 107 19879 1. £90.00 (hardback)

Endorsements by four established historians praise this book on Prusso-German state-building as setting new standards. The publisher's blurb also makes ambitious claims, noting that by drawing on transnational comparisons with Italy, Switzerland, and the United States it challenges conventional views of German national unification; integrates regional, national, and world historiography; and encompasses a broad range of themes appealing to historians hitherto unfamiliar with Prussian history.

This revised Cambridge dissertation supervised by Brendan Simms, with Christopher Clark and Abigail Green acting as dissertation examiners (p. vii), deals primarily with the former Kingdom of Hanover as a province of Prussia after the annexation of 1866. As far as this core story is concerned, Heinzen has delved deeply into archival sources.[1] Six chapters (pp. 27–295) treat five distinct areas: the military, the politics of memory, the press/print sector, primary education in schools, and women's charities. The last chapter is a lengthy consideration of the attempts at territorial reform and the dissolution of Prussia in the republican era, from 1918 to 1932. Each chapter ends with a two-page summary. In his conclusion (pp. 296–302), Heinzen points out that, overall, developments in Prussia were not 'anomalous', and he argues that multiple historical continuities—right up to today's *Bundesländer*—should be recognized, rather than seeing only the vanishing point of the Nazi dictatorship. This argument builds on ideas first put forward by Thomas Nipperdey in 1978,[2] and can be said to belong to the revisionist strand in Anglo-American historical scholarship on Prussia and Germany.

To start at the beginning: the central idea that the German War of 1866 was an important factor in the state-building process in the fol-

[1] The author has also presented his main findings in a German-language article: Jasper Heinzen, 'Hannover als preußische Provinz im Kaiserreich: Ein Kampf gegenläufiger Traditionen in Niedersachsen?', *Jahrbuch für niedersächsische Landesgeschichte*, 86 (2014), 49–70.

[2] Thomas Nipperdey, '1933 und die Kontinuität der deutschen Geschichte', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 227 (1978), 86–111.

lowing decades is intriguing, albeit not entirely new. For some time it has been widely held that because four German kingdoms and a dozen smaller states sided with Austria, the battles of 1866 cannot be understood as a Prussian–Austrian War, but represented a German civil war. Moreover, both the legitimist Guelph movement and the efforts of the newly established Prussian administration to come to terms with the recently conquered Hanoverian lands are well known and have been researched by historians (Hans-Georg Aschoff, Dieter Brosius, Gerhard Schneider, and Ernst Schubert, among others) named by Heinzen in his bibliography.

Heinzen does, however, offer a sophisticated treatment of the five distinct areas mentioned above. In each case the initial conflict yielded to some form of accommodation with the Prussian government. In the military (ch. 1), the memories of Prussia's Hanoverian regiments (Waterloo, Langensalza) were fused with old Prussian traditions and there were also allegiances outside the army (pp. 83–4). Rites of memory, such as war memorials or public ceremonies, remained contested, but the administration became increasingly lenient (ch. 2). Moreover, the main political competitor of the Guelphs, the bourgeois National Liberals, supported monuments celebrating German unity, as well as the construction of Hanover's pompous new town hall. Around 1900 a separate regional identity as a lower Saxon *Stamm* was developed through the burgeoning historical associations and the *Heimat* movement. Basically, the Prussian state was left out. The idea of having two fatherlands—one small and regional, the other large and German—had been popular since before 1848. In 2004 Siegfried Weichlein demonstrated that in Bavaria and Saxony new communication devices, regional migration, and self-government (as well as primary schools and the monarchical cult) worked in favour of national integration.[3]

Turning to the print sector (ch. 3), Heinzen places Prussia between the more rigid Italian and the more lenient Swiss and American approaches. But he records many attempts to bribe journalists or editors to spread official view via news digests (for example, *Provinzial-Correspondenz*), and to use around 700 subsidized local libraries to educate newer generations of loyal Hohenzollern subjects. Because Heinzen stresses the counter-force represented by libraries estab-

[3] Siegfried Weichlein, *Nation und Region: Integrationsprozesse im Bismarckreich* (Düsseldorf, 2004).

lished by Catholic or later Social Democratic associations and the *Eigen-Sinn*[4] of readers, the message of this chapter is ambiguous. The question remains: how strict and how successful was the Berlin government in managing the mass media (pp. 161, 175)?

Looking at primary school education, in particular at textbooks (ch. 4), Heinzen relates an incident that occurred in 1868. When the Minister of Education decreed the use of only one basic textbook for the province, local school authorities did not comply and alternative *Lesebücher* had to be permitted. But because these depended on ministerial authorization, their authors took pains to discuss the Guelph era as little as possible, praising instead the rise of Prussia and its inherent German mission. Since the 1890s the idea of *Heimat* had played a role in the development of a partially symbiotic relationship between Hanoverian regional identity as the lower Saxon *Stamm* and the Prussian-led German nation-state. Heinzen notes that this development was promoted by reform-minded pedagogues, the localized approach to textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education, and (in typically convoluted style) 'the growing readiness of the populace to integrate into their lives the cultural and practical resources placed at their disposal by mass education' (p. 215).

The gendered aspect of state-building is examined in chapter 5 on the charity and philanthropy of women as practised by four religious orders/institutions. Again, the story after the *Kulturkampf* is one of gradually making peace with the Hohenzollern dynasty. They themselves tried to supplant the Guelph dynasty by patronizing diverse provincial institutions and making donations to them. Overall, women barely feature as confident actors with their own agenda. Rather, they appear as the object of governmental strategies whose acceptance of the Hohenzollern regime increased in proportion to how far they saw their deeply embedded conservative Christian values threatened by modernity.

The last chapter attributes post-war attempts to restore an independent Hanover—a petition of 600,000 signatures in 1918, the *Welfenputsch* in 1920, and the failed referendum of 1924—less to the traditional Guelph movement than to newer resentments. These

[4] For an English explanation of this term, which is used in a special sense, see Thomas Lindenberger, 'Eigen-Sinn, Herrschaft und kein Widerstand', *Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte*, 02.09.2014 <https://docupedia.de/zg/ Linden berger_eigensinn_v1_de_2014>, accessed 30 May 2018.

developed during the Great War and its aftermath when Berlin's monarchical and later republican governments were viewed with anger in rural areas. Food shortages, unemployment, and economic crises all played a part when some defenders of Guelph legitimism, the *völkisch Heimat* movement, and adherents of right-wing Prussianism alike were attracted to the Nazi propaganda idea of *Volksgemeinschaft* after 1930. In terms of state-building, Heinzen sees Prussia as steering not a special, but a middle, path between the USA, Italy, and Switzerland up to 1932. At the same time, he asserts that Nazi violence and crimes were unparalleled (p. 295). Thus the study ends at the starting-point of all seminal *Sonderweg* historiography: how is it that Nazi barbarism was possible in Germany but in no other western country? The debate about this trajectory has been a fundamental feature of (West) German democratic development and the topic obviously remains unavoidable.

With regard to Heinzen's findings, this reviewer would have liked to see a systematic and weighted enumeration of the main factors that contributed to the gradual decline of Guelph resistance and the partial reconciliation of Hanoverians with the Prussian regime. In this context one fundamental fact is underrated, namely, that the Hanoverian liberals, unlike the Guelph movement, accepted the dethroning of the Guelph dynasty with which they had been in conflict for decades. Prussia profited from this split in attitudes. Over time, the Berlin governments applied more de-escalation strategies towards the territories gained in 1866, and economic growth, habituation, and generational change further mitigated the relationship between the conqueror and the conquered. The basis for this is to be found, above all, in the shared experience of the victory of 1870–71. The Guelphs always wanted Hanover to be part of the German nation-state. After 1871, therefore, Hanoverians could harbour Guelph attachments or nostalgia and quasi ignore the Prussian state. A parallel development characterized the Rhineland. To this extent, Heinzen's *ex post facto* appraisal is teleological; for although the turmoil and conflicts of decades were eventually smoothed over, the process remained incomplete and under changed circumstances the idea of—Hanoverian, Rhenish, or Hessian—independence could re-emerge.

Throughout the text there are reflections on analogous developments in Italy after 1861, Switzerland after the *Sonderbundskrieg* 1846–47, and the United States after the Civil War of 1861–65. To this

end, Heinzen cites from a wide range of literature with a specific thematic focus and from some theoretical works. Indeed, the bibliography of contemporary and modern titles dealing with four countries—Prussia, Italy, Switzerland, and the United States—runs to 60 pages. There are many comparative passages but they are often too short to allow for a full comparison to be drawn. In some cases, Prussian uniqueness is admitted. Heinzen lists the fervent anti-militarist criticism of the official cult of weapons (p. 67), the observation of an American visitor in 1914 that the obedience of the Prussian people to their king was a result of the rigid public education system (p. 209), and the hegemony of the state as a category above liberal individualism (pp. 286–7). Some historians have identified these long-term features as prerequisites for the Nazis' rise to power and violent practices. The relative weight of post-1918 and short-term contingency factors remains open to discussion.

In general, Heinzen stresses the similarity of post-civil war problems in Prussia, Italy, Switzerland, and the United States, but his contentions about the equality of approaches and of results do not always convince this reviewer. As this reviewer is unable to check all of these cases, the task is left to experts in each field. Several examples, though, suggest that a different interpretation is possible. Heinzen himself recognizes that in all four countries under scrutiny patriotic pedagogy 'displayed significant similarities, even if the specific content varied' (p. 178). In this context he states that Swiss primary school textbooks stressed the rights, not the duties of Swiss citizens, and praised direct democracy. Also different was the American Progressives' aim of educating pupils to form their own opinions rather than engage in flag fetishism. And in popular French textbooks the humanist spirit of France was personified not by kings and statesmen, but by conciliators, scientists, and philanthropists (pp. 197–8, 201, 208). These examples indicate that the crucial factor here is not the similarity of the problems, but the different solutions found. Also, on the basis of a few examples in the military field (*Sedantag, Kriegervereine*) (pp. 115–23), Heinzen claims that Prussian memory rites were non-divisive, but this runs counter to the thrust of detailed scholarship on official memory rituals.[5] Crucially, from the

[5] Fritz Schellack, *Nationalfeiertage in Deutschland von 1871 bis 1945* (Frankfurt/M., 1990), 17 ff., 67 ff.; Jeffrey R. Smith, 'The Monarchy versus the Nation: The "Festive Year" 1913 in Wilhelmine Germany', *German Studies Review*, 23

standpoint of this reviewer, the differences in the political systems of the four countries are neglected, yet it is precisely these differences that are important in arriving at a well-rounded judgement. Because of the author's aim to get involved in theoretical controversies such as those on nationalism, space, and memory, factual developments are sometimes left too far in the background. One speculation seems exaggerated, namely, that 'the language of race' in the USA, Germany, and Italy after 1900 can be read as a rationalization of the trauma of civil war in mid century (p. 151).

This book is not an easy read. Many sentences are far too long and sometimes only a comma indicates that a new line of thought is being followed. Qualifications or explanations added at the end of a main clause tend to dilute the message. The argument often has a rather complicated structure and this, as well as the style, at times make it difficult for the reviewer to pin down definite statements. For informed readers, however, the book is inspiring and often offers distinctive interpretations. As already noted, this reviewer does not share all of Heinzen's conclusions on the formation of Prussian statehood in a comparative perspective.

(2000), 257–74; Bernd Sösemann, 'Hollow-Sounding Jubilees: Forms and Effects of Public Self-Display in Wilhelmine Germany', in Annika Mombauer and Wilhelm Deist (eds.), *The Kaiser: New Research on Wilhelm II's Role in Imperial Germany* (Cambridge, 2003), 37–62; Michael B. Klein, *Zwischen Reich und Region: Identitätsstrukturen im Deutschen Kaiserreich (1871–1918)* (Stuttgart, 2005), 265–84; Eberhard Demm, '"Sic volo sic jubilo": Das 25. Regierungsjubiläum Wilhelms II. im Juni 1913', *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte*, 93/1 (2011), 165–207; Wolfgang Hardtwig, 'Der bezweifelte Patriotismus: Nationales Bewusstsein und Denkmal 1786 bis 1933', in id., *Politische Kultur der Moderne: Ausgewählte Aufsätze* (Göttingen, 2011), 29–45; Gerhard Schneider, 'Kaiser Wilhelm II. in Hannover 1913', in Cornelia Regin (ed.), *Pracht und Macht: Festschrift zum 100. Jahrestag der Einweihung des Neuen Rathauses in Hannover* (Hanover, 2013), 267–90. Divisive memory rituals in the Prussian monarchy will be analysed in my forthcoming book: *Preußen – Eine besondere Geschichte: Staat, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Kultur 1648–1947*, ch. 6.

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FRANZISKA MEIFORT, *Ralf Dahrendorf: Eine Biographie* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2017), 477 pp. ISBN 978 3 406 71397 2. €38.00

A biography which includes a photograph of a young man in the uniform of the Hitler Youth in the summer of 1944, and another of the same man dressed up (differently) on his admission to the British House of Lords in 1993, in itself indicates that we are dealing with an exceptional life. The young man is plain Ralf Dahrendorf; the older man is a British subject, Baron Dahrendorf of Clare Market in the City of Westminster. How could such a transmogrification have occurred and how are we to interpret it today? Is it a shining example of a life lived 'across borders' to use the title chosen by Dahrendorf for his memoirs published in 2002?[1] Or, more contentiously, in the world of Brexit, may a certain popular discontent with cross-border living unwittingly have played a small part in bringing questions of borders and identity back into the forefront of contemporary concerns?

Franziska Meifort, the author, does not address these questions directly but she is well aware that they are not far below the surface (indeed, in his repeated autobiographical attempts (one unpublished), in German and in English, Dahrendorf wrestled with them himself). His intellectual life did not exist in a vacuum but was constantly influenced by the people he met and the places where he met them. This is not a biography, therefore, which gives a narrative of Dahrendorf's life on the one hand and then provides an exposition of his sociological and political writing on the other. Chapter by chapter, the two aspects of his life belong together.

The scholarship is admirable. In some final remarks, Meifort engagingly notes that it is unusual for what was written originally as a scholarly dissertation (for which she won the Wolf-Erich-Kellner-Gedächtnispreis in 2016) to be taken on by a publishing house with a broader public than an academic readership in mind. She therefore helpfully sets out her stall for this wider readership, drawing attention to the sources she has used—and the difficulties they present, particularly with regard to interpreting autobiographical writing—and the array of other studies which exist on particular periods and aspects of Dahrendorf's career. Her list of relevant secondary litera-

[1] Ralf Dahrendorf, *Über Grenzen: Lebenserinnerungen* (Munich, 2002).

ture amounts to twenty-seven pages. There is a helpful timeline to guide the reader through the details of Dahrendorf's locations and professional appointments. Meifort interviewed two of her subject's former wives (he was married three times) and a small number of men in Britain and Germany who were alongside Dahrendorf in one context or another. She has read pertinent transcripts of interviews he gave but she has not sought out the observations of those who directly experienced him at the helm (at the LSE or St Antony's, for example), who might have taken a more critical stance in relation to his stewardship.

She is not unaware, however, of the criticisms that may be made of biography as a genre, and acknowledges its demotion in the wake of the emphasis on social and structural history in mid twentieth century Germany (it proved more resilient in Britain). Now, however, she thinks we can move on from an either/or in these matters. She believes that it is possible to absorb wider social and structural insights into biography. The wider processes of cultural transfer can be seen most clearly when an individual is in focus.

Dahrendorf's life, after all, was pre-eminently an individual one. That is to say, this book could not have had a subtitle such as 'Biography of a Sociologist', 'Biography of a Politician', or 'Biography of a Public Intellectual'. He was all of these (and more), but if one were asked to say how he should be described 'fundamentally', it would be difficult to know how to answer. Meifort's thesis title referred to him as a German–British intellectual 'zwischen Wissenschaft, Politik und Öffentlichkeit'. 'Between' is the key word. The author's extensive list of Dahrendorf's published writings, from 1946 to 2013, does not resolve the matter. It is, of course, a list containing items which are very different in form, substance, and weight. And that was how Dahrendorf wanted it to be. Quite apart from any consideration of the individual merits of these writings, therefore, it is their author's ability to write for different audiences which stands out—and, of course, his unrelenting energy in doing so.

Meifort's task is to explain how all this came about. She starts with his parents and his schooling under National Socialism. Born in 1929 in Hamburg, Dahrendorf grew up in Berlin, in a socialist household in opposition to the regime; and then his father went to prison. Dahrendorf spoke of his father, a democrat who held the Fatherland, Law, and Socialism to be inseparable, as embodying all that was good

in German tradition, even though he himself opted for what he called a Western liberal tradition, and he himself had his own experience of imprisonment at the age of 16. The author threads her way carefully in interpreting what he experienced and how his early thoughts and ideas emerged. Later, he placed some different emphases in the different accounts he wrote.

After the war, his family returned to Hamburg. There, as had also been the case in Berlin after the end of the war, his father's political activism and journalistic work brought him into contact with the British occupiers. Such contacts spun off on Ralf. As an 18 year old it brought him to Wilton Park in the UK to attend a 'Re-education Camp' and to meet the British on home ground. He studied at the University of Hamburg (grappling with Marx) and started on journalism. He fitted in a trip to the United States. Noel Annan, with whom he had become acquainted in Germany, got him into the London School of Economics (LSE), or so Annan said. It was at the LSE that Ralf encountered an English way of doing sociology in David Lockwood and T. H. Marshall. There was also Karl Popper. During the course of his two years at the LSE he learnt English fluently and, we read, absorbed English culture and found an English wife, Vera. His experiences, of course, cannot be rehearsed here in detail (nor can they be in relation to later chapters). The fundamental point is that a nexus of relationships, personal and intellectual, established at the LSE, framed Dahrendorf's life, though with outcomes that could not have been accurately forecast.

The trajectory looked set. We follow the 'Wunderkind der deutschen Soziologie' (p. 57) on the path which took him to a professorship at the Academy of Social Enterprise (Akademie für Gemeinwirtschaft) in Hamburg. Prior to this appointment he spent time at the Centre for Advanced Study in the Behavioural Sciences at Stanford, a period that he described as a 'paradise'. This brought with it a largely congenial encounter with the American Way of Life. The intellectual stripling was surrounded by great names, not least that of Milton Friedman. After Hamburg came Tübingen, a period of great productivity and no little controversy concerning the nature and methods of sociology. Then came a big shift. In the West Germany of the 1960s Dahrendorf wanted to make a direct and personal contribution to the deepening of its democracy, which also meant its liberalization (though the meaning and associations of the word 'liberal' were to be

endlessly problematic). His ambitions led to the foundation of the University of Constance and into involvement with the planning of higher education in Baden-Württemberg: neither case turned out to be straightforward. This in turn led him, not without reservations, into federal politics in the shape of the liberal FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei). Here, the intellectual was forced to confront 'real', experienced politicians on the one hand and the world of the student movement on the other (Dutschke *v*. Dahrendorf?), along with the world of the Foreign Office and Brussels (and the limitations placed on an intellectual by virtue of his office). Was this period a political flop? Meifort would not wish it to be seen in such simple terms. For Dahrendorf it was an experiment which had to be made.

Then came his 'original and welcome appointment' (p. 204) as Director of the LSE in 1974. Despite his deep love of the institution, kindled two decades earlier, it was not a straightforward position for him to fill. The LSE still harboured strong memories of the student activity of less than a decade earlier and the ensuing reactions. The relationships between the colleges which made up the University of London could be strained. Perhaps, above all, what was inescapably complicated was the question of what the Director's job, in Dahrendorf's eyes, was actually for. He was in a position which gave him entrée to the higher reaches of British government, but the Thatcher government was not necessarily inclined to listen to him. So there were disappointments as ambitious plans in some instances did not come to fruition. Another ambition was to see the LSE get 'out and about' in making contacts in the City, Fleet Street, and Whitehall. But minds in such matters did not always meet. The pursuit of excellence, by all parties, is easily proclaimed but never simply delivered.

It is perhaps particularly appropriate in a review in this *Bulletin* to dwell a little, in conclusion, on Dahrendorf's 'British years', years which saw him become a British subject, receive a knighthood and, finally, a life peerage. What does this mean? What did he want it to mean? Until he took this step, and received these honours, he could still be thought of as a 'German in exile', one, it was sometimes rumoured, not altogether without substance, who one day might again be 'called home' to Germany to occupy some position of unimaginable importance. It was still the fact that he was an outsider that lent his contributions on radio and television, which were given great prominence, their special character and an aura of detached

authority. But as time passed, where was home? As early as 1977 he was writing to Noel Annan to say that he felt himself 'almost frighteningly at home [in England] considering that it is after all not my home' (p. 223). He came to feel that his decade at the LSE had been the luckiest in his life and had given him 'more satisfaction and pleasure than any other position which I have held' (p. 224).

In all of this was he not in serious danger of becoming more British than the British? He seemed not to speak English in the way most Germans spoke English. It might even be the case that he liked buttered crumpets for tea (as some supposed Englishmen invariably did). Meifort quotes the *Guardian* in 1978 suggesting that he was praising the British way of life in a way no Englishman would dare to. But if he was giving the British a boost (always supposing they needed one), he was also very busy writing about Britain for the serious German press. The position of cultural broker which he had come to assume had not been acquired by accident. A non-metropolitan reviewer may perhaps be forgiven, however, for noting how limited his direct experience actually was of the 'Britain' that he spoke about with such apparent authority. He was certainly in one sense crossing borders all his life, but the milieux in which he moved, wherever he was, tended to be very similar.

St Antony's College in Oxford, of which Dahrendorf subsequently became Warden, was only founded in 1950 and had therefore not had time to accumulate much tradition. At St Antony's, however, he found himself having to engage with tasks which he was rather inclined to feel were beneath him. Nevertheless, this gave him a decade of exposure to the wonders of a collegiate university, representing another step in his long march through hallowed British institutions. In the end, however, Germany did call to Dahrendorf again, partly no doubt through his third marriage to a German wife. It was in Germany that he died in 2009 at the age of 80, in Cologne.

In retrospect, in changed political circumstances, the kind of career which Dahrendorf had may now seem a one-off, a product of a particular set of circumstances, personal, social, and nationaI. The great merit of this book, however, is that it allows us to see this public intellectual in the round.

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CHRISTOPH NONN and TOBIAS WINNERLING (eds.), *Eine andere deutsche Geschichte 1517–2017: Was wäre wenn ...* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2017), 298 pp. ISBN 978 3 506 78788 0. €29.90

What if the Reformation had never happened? Could the Industrial Revolution have originated in Germany instead of the United Kingdom? What would the world look like without Hitler? These and other counter-factual scenarios are discussed in the book under review. Leading experts in their fields investigate the question of 'what might have happened' if history had turned out differently, presenting scenarios from early modern to contemporary times. Nevertheless, the title of the volume is somewhat misleading, since its contributors discuss implications not only for the regions that later became Germany but in a broader focus also for the whole of Europe, South America, the USA, and other parts of the globe. It is not possible to limit the Reformation or European integration to 'Germany' alone, and the authors do not try, instead presenting wider considerations where appropriate.

In their introduction, the editors highlight the value of counter-factual history. While others have attacked this approach for being speculative, unnecessary, and nostalgic,[1] Christoph Nonn and Tobias Winnerling insist that it is a 'corrective' (p. 13) to historical research. Counter-factual history, they argue, offers at least two benefits: an evaluation of the impact, first, of coincidences and, second, of individuals or structures in history. Both perspectives, they believe, can contribute to a better understanding of historical scopes of action and can provide new insights into established interpretations of history and controversies among historians. Its potential for teaching in schools and universities is mentioned elsewhere (Johannes Dillinger touches on it in his essay, p. 37), but not in the introduction. This omission is astonishing; discussing counter-factual scenarios with students might well be the most effective application given that the problems raised are key topics in nearly every seminar or lecture. Moreover, the editors complain about the ignorance and even hostility mainstream history displays, but although they view counter-factual history as being 'proscribed' (p. 9), more than one of the essays

[1] For the most recent account going in this direction see Richard J. Evans, *Altered Pasts: Counterfactuals in History* (Waltham, Mass., 2013).

in their book mentions counter-factual arguments put forward by other authors regarding their topic (for example, in early modern and modern economic history or twentieth-century political history). A more in-depth analysis of where the counter-factual approach might be perceived as acceptable, at least to some extent, would have been desirable.

The twelve essays present classic counter-factual scenarios, such as the assassination of powerful politicians, but also themes that are rarely considered in counter-factual investigations. Given the broad temporal and thematic range of the topics covered, it is not possible to report on every article extensively. Instead, it might be useful to discuss several aspects important for the book as a whole, such as the outcomes of the counter-factual scenarios presented, and the perspective, methodology, and limits of counter-factual history in turn.

In his essay on a world without the Reformation, Matthias Pohlig suggests that different confessions would not have emerged, but that instead the Catholic Church would have undergone moderate reforms. Also, the emergence of a mass public would have been delayed, and there would have been no division of state and religion within the Holy Roman Empire. However, Pohlig hesitates to predict that the Thirty Years War would not have happened.

The next essay, by Johannes Dillinger, considers several alternatives to Luther's actual life and circumstances. Dillinger believes that the Reformation would have been possible with Zwingli as its leading figure instead of Luther, but that it would always have had its point of origin in the German countries, such as Switzerland for example. In addition, he sees no alternative as possible for the time around the 1520s, because in this period the Catholic Church was most vulnerable to reformist critiques.

Addressing the subject of the Thirty Years War, Tobias Winnerling argues that the conflict could have ended ten years earlier had the Swedish army been defeated at the battle of Wittstock in 1636. The Swedish government, as well as the Swedish Lord High Chancellor, were prepared to agree to a peace treaty in the event of such a defeat. Unfortunately, Winnerling stops there, devoting the whole essay to the question of whether the outlined scenario was actually likely, thus forgoing the opportunity to examine what its repercussions would have been. Except to note that a treaty in 1637 would have functioned as a precedent, making later peace agreements easi-

er, and that Spain might have used its troops engaged in German territories to deal with its internal problems, he regrettably offers no reflections on the potential impact of a shorter war on the second half of the seventeenth century.

Marian Füssel discusses the death of Prussian King Friedrich II in the Battle of Kunersdorf in 1759 and the delayed death of Empress Elizabeth of Russia as the 'debacle' (p. 89) of the House of Brandenburg. He finds that in these circumstances, an earlier peace treaty would probably have led to victory for Austria. Such an outcome would have had consequences for the international order, making it possible, but not inevitable, that Austria rather than Prussia could have been the leading player in the foundation of what would then have been a Greater German nation-state.

Michael C. Schneider offers the theory that there was enough encyclopaedic and tacit knowledge in continental Europe for industrialization to have originated in German countries. This holds true for important sectors such as the water economy or mining, based not least on the rapidly growing journal market which provided the necessary knowledge. Schneider concludes by stating that industrialization could have begun outside the United Kingdom, but that it was more likely to have started there, as Britain provided the most favourable context.

Dieter Langewiesche argues that the German Revolution of 1848 could have followed the example of Britain's Glorious Revolution 160 years before. It would have been a 'crowned revolution' (p. 126) making Germany one of the most progressive nation-states of its time as a confederation of monarchical states with parliamentary systems. Highlighting the European dimension, he stresses that a successful German revolution would have required wars between Prussia und Denmark to gain Holstein, and between Prussia and Austria to force the Austrian Emperor to accept the solution of a Lesser Germany. Despite the fact that in this scenario a conflict with France does not play a role in the formation of Germany, Langewiesche believes that there would still have been a rivalry between the two countries for European hegemony, which might have led to the First World War anyway.

In his essay on Bismarck Christoph Nonn argues that he was less important than generally assumed. If he had really drowned in the Atlantic in August 1862, two alternatives existed for the post of

Minister President of Prussia, arch-conservative Edwin von Manteuffel and reforming conservative Robert von der Goltz. In Nonn's view, both would have handled the internal conflicts and external confrontations in almost the same way as Bismarck, which leads him to the conclusion that Bismarck was not an indispensable figure.

Werner Plumpe describes a scenario in which the Weimar Republic was not doomed. The economic situation was severe during the finance and banking crisis in 1931, but if France and the USA, the only two players who were able to do so, had intervened and supported Austria and Germany, this might have resolved the situation and prevented the catastrophic economic outcome that led to the resignation of Chancellor Heinrich Brüning. Alternatively, Reich President Hindenburg had the power to continue his support of Brüning in May 1932 and allow him to benefit from the probable success of his economic policies. This could have prevented Hitler from becoming head of government and would have ensured that the economic upturn that in fact took place was ascribed to a democratic regime.

Wolfgang Schieder, in his take on attempts on Hitler's life, concludes that his early death in the Munich Putsch in 1923 would have smashed the NSDAP, while other assassinations during his government would have transformed Hitler into a political martyr, only underpinning the claim to power of any National Socialist successor. If Georg Elser's attempt on the lives of Hitler and other Nazi leaders at the Bürgerbräukeller in Munich on 8 November 1939 had been successful, Schieder argues, the absent Hermann Göring would have become Reich President and Chancellor. Following a successful assassination by Stauffenberg on 20 July 1944, the conspirators would have installed a military dictatorship under Erich Hoepner (only because Erwin Rommel had been seriously wounded a few days before), which would have had to confront Hitler's Diadochi. Göring, supported by Heinrich Himmler and Joseph Goebbels, would have triumphed in the end and continued the war.

Guido Thiemeyer thinks that the rejection of the Schuman Plan, which proposed the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), by one of the involved parliaments would not have meant the end of European integration. He believes the consequence would have been bilateral co-operation and that further European partners, such as Italy or Belgium, would later have asso-

ciated themselves with it. He sees a strong path dependence and is only unsure about the institutional structures of the ECSC, the European Commission, and the European Parliament.

In the following essay Wilfried Loth argues that German reunification would have been possible in the early 1950s if the West had accepted the Stalin Note suggesting the creation of a unified but non-aligned Germany. Loth believes that this could have led to peace treaty negotiations between the victorious powers and a then united Germany. The outcome would have been not the end, but a relaxation of the Cold War, because the resolution of the 'German question' would have allowed the USA and the Soviet Union to contain ('Einhegung', p. 238) their rivalry and enter disarmament talks. His vision is a non-aggression pact between the USA and the USSR, signed after the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

In his second empirical essay, which closes the volume, Christoph Nonn discusses the possibility of a massacre in Leipzig in 1989 if the phone had been answered not by Egon Krenz but by Erich Honecker, and the latter had decided the next steps during the vital moments of the Monday demonstrations in the GDR on 9 October. He claims that Honecker was ready to take a hard line—with severe consequences. It would have meant hundreds of casualties among the demonstrators, and, pointing to the example of the fate of Romania's socialist dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu, Nonn suggests that the deployment of military force would also have hastened the end of Honecker's power because such an order would have erased the Socialist Unity Party's authority entirely.

Regarding perspective, in the essays mentioned above, all authors share the understanding that counter-factual history must focus on implications for the short or medium term. It is telling that Pohlig mentions this explicitly (p. 36), yet deals with the longest perspective; all the other essays follow more or less the same line. None discusses consequences beyond a couple of decades, because such an attempt would become even more speculative. Despite this common ground, it is remarkable how diverse the field of counter-factual history is. What kind of history is its focus? There is no consistent answer in this volume, which makes it interesting to compare the essays. It is not easy to match them to categories, but three of the essays look at alternative courses of history for individuals (Dillinger, Nonn on Bismarck, Schieder), seven for events (Winnerling, Füssel, Langewiesche,

Plumpe, Thiemeyer, Loth, Nonn on Leipzig 1989), and two for processes (Pohlig, Schneider). These classifications are not as strict as they seem because they partly merge into each other, or are complicated in themselves since it is imperative to take whole constellations of supporters and opponents into account when discussing the historical role of individuals, as Dillinger emphasizes (pp. 49–58). While not all essays offer unfailingly surprising results, the most revealing come from different categories—Nonn's demolition of Bismarck and Schneider's history of industrial knowledge.

When it comes to methodology, the collection represents at least three different approaches. Some of the essays consider the altered conditions of a given history and others look into changed outcomes of actual developments. These are the two standard ways of doing counter-factual history and are equally accepted, and often combined. Langewiesche adds a new approach with a slightly different treatment of his topic, limiting the historian's fantasy to the imagination of the protagonists of the day. This means that he does not accept *any* potential alteration to the historical truth, but only those alternatives which were discussed at the time, which he calls unrealized or 'not exhausted' alternatives (p. 122). In this way, it is not the historian who creates the counter-factual conception of history but the contemporary actors, which contributes to a reconstruction of inconclusive interpretations of the past. Such an approach is not only clever in fully reconstructing historical discourses and decision-making processes, but is distinguished by its closeness to the historical sources.

Regarding the limitations of counter-factual history, a simplistic cause-and-effect approach is frequently criticized. In the present volume, all of the authors are aware of this problem and argue cautiously, adducing comparable cases or related historical developments. Another problem remains. The volume demonstrates that counter-factual history seems to privilege the history of events and the history of great men. This is true for all contributions except Schneider's essay, but there is hardly any reflection on this fact. What is missing is the application to further subjects such as the history of ideas, cultural history, or gender history. And this has consequences; not only does the volume attract negative attention through its non-inclusive, gendered language (most obviously in the introduction), but it also limits historical agency to great men and situations of

political decision-making. To include the history of ideas, cultural history, or gender history might be challenging because it is more difficult to identify concrete *Abweichungspunkte* ('points of deviation', Winnerling, p. 64) in the fields mentioned. But this goes for the history of religion or economic history as well, as Pohlig (pp. 21–2) and Schneider (p. 104) observe. Nevertheless, their essays show that a counter-factual historical approach is possible even in these more complicated circumstances, and if counter-factual history does not want to drop behind the current state of the art in a critical and plural historiography, it is important that it widens its scope in this regard.

Despite these reservations, this book is a thought-provoking read. Even if one does not accept all the counter-narratives offered, the intellectual richness of nearly all the essays justifies a recommendation anyway. None of the essays is a 'provocation' or has even a 'latently aggressive' character (p. 38), as Dillinger fears. At the very least, after reading the volume one knows better than before how convincing factual interpretations are, or where their limits lie. And this is not a marginal benefit.

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RESPONSES

Response to Mr Barkow's Review of *Theresienstadt 1941–1945*

JEREMY ADLER

May I comment on the review of the translation of my late father's book on *Theresienstadt 1941–1945* in your latest issue? It is most gratifying to read Mr Barkow's encomium. He has written finely and generously about this great book, and his essay must count as one of the first scholarly appreciations of the work in an English journal. He is surely right to class this monograph as a work from the 'heroic age' of scholarship on the Shoah—an era which created Holocaust Studies. Yet while this assessment shows him finely attuned to the book's qualities, offering your readership a welcome insight into its achievement, his judgement goes curiously adrift when reviewing the English-language version. Thus I find myself bound to comment on the latter part of his review.

After his adulatory opening, Mr Barkow launches an unparalleled attack on the award-winning English edition of a book brought out by the world's oldest academic publisher, Cambridge University Press (CUP), and one of the world's premier academic institutions, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM). CUP has an experience and a set of quality controls second to none. The USHMM is equally rigorous when it comes to its imprimatur. Yet Mr Barkow damns the book in every respect, ranging from the pricing to the design, binding, editing, inclusion or exclusion of sundry material, down to the title, the translation and even the index. There is not a single aspect of the book that escapes his censure. This is not so much a review as a demolition. It is hard to believe that an edition

Editorial Note: In the last issue of the *GHIL Bulletin* we published a review of the English translation of H. G. Adler's *Theresienstadt, 1941–1945* (*GHIL Bulletin*, vol. XL, no. 1, May 2018, pp. 86–98). After publication we received a communication from Jeremy Adler which we publish here. We offered our reviewer the opportunity to reply and his response is also printed below.

brought out by CUP and USHMM and which owes its appearance in English to the support of the great father of the discipline, the late Raul Hilberg, could really be so bad. The translation was enabled by the labours of Amy Loewenhaar-Blauweiss, who tirelessly promoted H. G. Adler's work through the Terezin Publishing Project, New York, long before his novels were translated, and thus created the context for the reception of this book, as well as ensuring its passage to publication. In so doing, she won over the American academic community, which invested its intellectual capital in the venture. Can it really be so riddled with faults? Does it really lack even a single redeeming feature?

Let us begin with the book's author. It is regrettable that in just one sentence of about two lines the reviewer makes five mistakes about H. G. Adler's life. An accurate appreciation of the heroism of his wife and the details of the camps where he was detained are essential to the book's context. Mr Barkow also mocks two of the acknowledged masters of the social sciences, Georg Simmel and Franz Steiner, whose writings contributed seminal ideas that helped H. G. Adler shape the complex monograph that laid the foundations for Holocaust studies—an achievement Mr Barkow praises so highly. These errors raise doubts about the accuracy of the rest of the review.

Now let us consider the placing. The book appeared in 1955, after many years when H. G. Adler sought a publisher in America, England and Germany. To describe it as being from '1960' is quite a *faux pas*. That was the second edition. True, this was greatly expanded, but all of the important arguments are already present in the original. To give the latter date skews the nature of the achievement, and presents the work as if it were quite a latecomer, rather than of the first moment. It was in fact the very first account of the camps to use the principles for historical research laid down by Leopold von Ranke in the early nineteenth century, involving the exhaustive use of documentary evidence of every kind. It was not until Saul Friedländer's *magnum opus* almost exactly half a century later that anything comparable was attempted. Why not say so?

Next the historical context. The review sets it in the Cold War. As is well known (and as Mr Barkow could have read in the afterword), *Theresienstadt 1941–1945* was originally conceived in late February 1942, just a few weeks after Adler was first imprisoned. The war then raging, by all accounts, was pretty hot. The first draft was finished in

1948. Although H. G. Adler revised the text, in no way can it be regarded as typical of the Cold War. This was a voice and witness from the camps—but also a work of history, fully formed.

Now, consider the genesis. Mr Barkow states that it was indebted to archival research. But the book was written long before the days of the archive-jetting scholar. What enabled Adler to write this work (as it says in the afterword) was his own archive, including many materials taken from the camp administration while he was incarcerated, but preserved on his behalf by Rabbi Leo Baeck when he was shipped to Auschwitz. It is this small collection, now in the Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies in Amsterdam, which gave the author such an insight into the workings of the camp. The other archives he consulted were the Jewish Museum in Prague and the Wiener Library in London. It was Mr Barkow's own predecessors, Dr Alfred Wiener and Dr Eva Reichmann, who encouraged Adler's research.

Then let us consider the publication history. The Wallstein edition of 2005 is not—as Mr Barkow wrongly states—out of print. The book is currently available from the publisher in a printing dated 2018 and at the bargain price of Euros 40. It is therefore incorrect to say that it is only available second-hand and 'much more expensive'. For a few clicks, it can be bought anywhere. It is unfortunate that your review should be marred by such incorrect bibliographical information. Furthermore, whilst it is true that the second volume of this book, *Die verheimlichte Wahrheit: Theresienstädter Dokumente* of 1958, has never been translated, it is misleading to say that it has never been reprinted. It never needed to be. For the simple reason that it has never been out of print. It is obtainable from the publisher (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen) or via Amazon or ZVAB. All of this information is readily available online and can easily be accessed.

Mr Barkow also assails the decision not to translate the glossary. However, this would have led to an absurd conclusion: the translator would have had to explain a lengthy list of German words to an English native-speaker, unfamiliar with the German language. This would have provided a serious barrier to the book, unnecessarily detracting from its readability. Consider the comparable case of *Lingua Tertii Imperii*. This book arraigning the language of the Third Reich in a manner very similar to Adler was originally published in German in 1947. Yet it took until 1998—over 50 years!—for an

English edition translated by Dr Martin Brady to appear. That became possible not because the British public had miraculously learned to read arcane German words, but because its author, Viktor Klemperer, had become famous worldwide after the publication of his diaries, *I Shall Bear Witness*, in 1995. The public was ready to read *LTI* because it was already fully familiar with Klemperer. The opposite is the case with H. G. Adler. He is still an unknown quantity to most readers in England and America. To open this very demanding book with a technical glossary would surely have hindered the reception—and would have prevented the very thing Mr Barkow would like to achieve. That is a risk no sensible editor could take. For this reason both the Czech and the English editions have quietly dropped the word-list—*pro tem*. No doubt once the book has established itself, it will be appropriate to add the glossary, too.

Let us now turn to the accompanying matter. Mr Barkow is particularly troubled by the alleged absence of a plan of the Ghetto. He claims that this is only printed in a reduced format on the cover. If he had actually examined the edition, however, he would have found it printed on pp. 275–6. The plan has indeed been provided with a translation into English of all key terms, to make it accessible to an Anglophone audience.

Even the index comes in for censure. Yet the present index follows standard practice as found in countless works on the Holocaust and the Third Reich. The books by Christopher Browning, Peter Longerich, Götz Aly, Martin Broszat, Ian Kershaw, Richard J. Evans, Ulrich Herbert, Otto Dov Kulka, Yehuda Bauer, Saul Friedländer, Wolfgang Benz and many others are much the same. Why heap censure on this particular index when it is just like any other? The luxury days when publishers had the funds and scholars the time for triple indexing are a thing of the past.

The title particularly upsets Mr Barkow, who is vexed about certain supposed faults in the translation; but this critique is linguistically inaccurate. The German word '*Antlitz*' in the sub-title '*Das Antlitz einer Zwangsgemeinschaft*' is not, as Mr Barkow claims, 'slightly archaic' in this context. It is standard in modern titles such as '*Das Antlitz des Krieges*', '*Das Antlitz des Bösen*' or '*Das verschüttete Antlitz*', all of which are of recent origin. Using an elevated English term like 'visage' or 'countenance', as he proposes, makes no sense, and would give quite the wrong impression. He also criticizes the English for-

mulation 'coerced community' for '*Zwangsgemeinschaft*'. He notes that English cannot render H. G. Adler's remarkable neologism but then berates the translator for not finding a more appropriate version—yet has nothing to offer by way of a suggestion. He also claims that the English word 'coercion' does not exactly reflect the nature of the force imposed on the inmates of the camp. Once again, he is on shaky ground. He wrongly believes that in English 'coercion' only signifies 'social pressure'. OED is clear that it means 'the application of force to control an action' and hence a community. It can be the product of governmental action, too. The term is commonly employed in sociological writings in English in the same way as it is used here. The translation of the title proposed in your review is as inaccurate as it is misleading. In light of OED and standard usage in modern English-language sociology, there is nothing semantically wrong about the sub-title in this edition.

Mr Barkow uses a quite inaccurate image of the deportations to justify his interpretation, stating that the Jews were forced into camps 'at gunpoint'. This is doubly wrong: both as a description of the deportations, and as an account of the relevant vocabulary. The action he envisages would in fact not be '*Zwang*', but '*Gewalt*': once again he misconstrues the title. He is offering a cliché reminiscent of a Spielberg movie of the very kind this book deconstructs. We have records of the deportations. Sometimes, soldiers held weapons at the ready; sometimes, they carried rifles over their shoulders; sometimes, loosely in their arms; and sometimes, they had none at all. It all depended on the actual circumstances. Quite often there was no need for firearms—the victims were terrified enough. In Berlin if two policeman appeared at an apartment in the middle of the night, drawn pistols were hardly needed. When Prague Jews were detained for several days at the collection point, there was no need to intimidate children and the elderly, the sick and the frail, with a gun. It was a special feature of Theresienstadt, which H. G. Adler stresses in this book, that there was a surprisingly low number of armed guards. 'At gunpoint' therefore gives quite the wrong impression of deportations to Theresienstadt—we are not dealing with the terrifying deportations of huddled masses from the Warsaw Ghetto to a death camp, but of Jews transported from their bourgeois homes in Prague or Berlin or Vienna to a site that the authorities were trying to make them believe was a 'holiday spa' or a 'sunset home'. Under such cir-

cumstances the avoidance of a display of firearms must have been part of the Nazis' policy of deception. It was a remarkable feature of the deportations from Prague to Theresienstadt and of life in the camp itself that they managed without the kind of omnipresent naked violence invoked in the review.

Mr Barkow's main argument rests on his view of the translation, but, for all that he finds to berate, he offers barely a shred of evidence. His judgement is damning. Yet he only quotes one example of a paragraph he wrongly claims to make no sense, although it is perfectly comprehensible, being easy to grasp by parsing the complex syntax; and he offers only one other instance of a supposed error to support his allegations – a trivial mistake which has no bearing whatsoever on the main argument of the book. This is just one mistake in a total of 880 pages. That is a ratio of *ca*. 0.00378787 per cent. By any standard that would be an exceptionally accurate version.

Mr Barkow compares the translation unfavourably with the new edition of Primo Levi, the Collected Works. But today's translators of Primo Levi can draw on the resources of two scholarly institutions exclusively devoted to Levi and can check their versions against those in forty other languages. Indeed, the new edition of Levi builds on decades of research, was prepared by about fourteen translators and scholars, over 100 advisors, enjoyed the support of the Nobel laureate, Toni Morrison, and subsidies from three exceptionally well-endowed grant-giving agencies, the Guggenheim, the Rockefeller, and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr Barkow even distorts the price comparison by citing the Amazon list, which discounts the Levi edition by about 30 per cent, and not the actual figures from the publishers' catalogues. The only sound basis for a comparison is to use the official prices. *Theresienstadt 1941–1945*, like any other such academic book, had only a fraction of the budget and scholarly input of the Levi. It is unfortunate that your review should contain such a biased and misleading comparison.

The translator Belinda Cooper is an acclaimed specialist in her field, noted for her versions of such leading intellectuals as Dieter Grimm, who, as a teacher at Princeton, is well placed to assess her ability. The text has been examined word-by-word by a noted expert in Holocaust studies. Do his views count for nothing? Others have found much to commend. Consider the notices in *Choice* and the *New York Review of Books*. These trusted outlets lavished rare praise on the

very book your reviewer trashes. If anyone is standing in the way of the book's reception in the English-speaking world it is not CUP or USHMM but Mr Barkow.

The acclaim accorded this English edition, which sold out in about three months, hardly supports his account. The translator, editor, copy-editor, expert reader, referees and publishers must have done something right. At the very least they deserve a fair and balanced review. Such is the success of this translation that a new edition is already in preparation. It will of course include any necessary corrections that its readers may supply.

JEREMY ADLER is emeritus Professor and Senior Reseach Fellow at King's College London.

Reply to Jeremy Adler

Ben Barkow

My review has evidently caused Professor Adler distress and I regret that.

I will not deny fallibility and wherever my review contains factual errors, I take responsibility.

Prof. Adler's response to my criticism of the English language edition I find unsatisfactory. It strikes me as amounting to little more than saying that large, rich and powerful institutions cannot get things wrong; that well-connected translators and editors cannot get things wrong; and that a book bearing his father's name cannot be faulted. That is, in my personal view, problematic. What I did was to respond to what I found rather than bow to reputations. I believe that a comparison of the Cambridge University Press (CUP) edition with the 2005 Wallstein edition supports my view of the problems with the former. (Information about the availability of the Wallstein edition came from the publisher's website.)

I am happy for Prof. Adler that the book is selling well and hope that a new CUP edition will offer an opportunity to address some of the weaknesses I believe are [self-]evident in the current one.

While writing about H. G. Adler turns out to be bothersome, reading him remains very much worthwhile (for now, in the original).

BEN BARKOW is Director of the Wiener Library, London.

CONFERENCE REPORTS

European Democracies: Origins, Evolutions, Challenges. A Workshop in Memory of Peter Blickle, held at the German Historical Institute London, 23–24 March 2018. Conveners: Beat Kümin (University of Warwick), Andreas Gestrich (GHIL), and Wolfgang Behringer (Universität des Saarlandes).

Peter Blickle, former Professor of History at Saarbrücken (1972–80) and Berne (1980–2004), was one of the leading specialists on early modern European history, and his research on the political agency of the common people has fundamentally transformed our understanding of politics in pre-modern Europe. His monographs *The Revolution of the Common Man* (original edition 1975) and *The Communal Reformation* (1987) have inspired research well beyond Germany and Switzerland, especially in the anglophone world. This workshop, held to commemorate Blickle's work following his death in 2017, sought to honour his achievements with a close focus on one particularly influential strand of his research, namely, popular participation in decision-making processes. This theme, prominent in Blickle's studies on petitions, popular involvement in representative institutions, and early modern forms of resistance, was combined with another important concern of his work, most fully developed in his conceptual survey *Kommunalismus* (2003). In this line of research Blickle stressed the importance of communal self-government for the development of modern democracy alongside other factors such as the intellectual traditions of Renaissance and Enlightenment political thought. This workshop was thus intended to provide a forum for discussions on the foundations of modern democracy at a time when

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The full conference programme can be found under 'Events and Conferences' on the GHIL's website <www.ghil.ac.uk>.

democracy faces new challenges in Europe and elsewhere. Attended by former colleagues, pupils, and researchers working on similar themes, the workshop was supported by the German History Society and the University of Warwick's European History Research Centre.

Andreas Gestrich (London) opened the workshop by welcoming participants, with a special welcome extended to Renate Blickle, the event's guest of honour. Beat Kümin (Warwick) introduced the theme of the conference, combining this with personal memories of academic life in Berne, Blickle's *Doktorandenkolloquium*, and a memorable field trip to the former GDR. Supported by clips from a 2014 interview recorded in Gersau, a 'peasant republic' in medieval and early modern times, Kümin noted some important features. Besides interests in communal organization, local politics, constitutional autonomy, and political agency 'from below', Blickle was committed to working 'at all levels' of social organization. Both in his own work and in the research he encouraged, Blickle's view always encompassed micro-historical settings at village level as well as major structural ruptures and changes at the macro-historical level of constitutional history. It is not least in this approach, Kümin argued, that the significance of Blickle's explanation of the emergence of modern democracy and the influence of his work on other scholars can be found.

This train of thought was neatly taken up by Wim Blockmans (Leiden) in his keynote lecture on political participation in Europe before 1800. Very much in line with Blickle's conviction that the writing of history must pay attention to present problems in order to contribute to their explanation, Blockmans started by correlating declining approval rates for democratic institutions in contemporary Europe with factors such as income levels and the perception of political corruption. Observing that trust in democracy and the rule of law was considerably higher in western European countries, he asked why, historically, this should be the case. Blockmans argued that firm democratic convictions were based on stronger traditions of political participation in some western European political regimes, which manifested themselves in factors such as the existence of free communes and strong countervailing powers, the existence of institutions of civil society, and a highly integrated territory. Blockmans then set out to develop a framework of analysis for the study of such traditions. Attempting to link local, regional, and higher forms of

political organization and to account for mobility beyond borders as well as socio-economic influences, he proposed that we study geographical context, the formation of political communities, social/economic characteristics, and the composition of elite groups. In these forms of political participation—tending towards oligarchization in cases of economic decline and institutional innovation in cases of growth—Blockmans identified a gradual ritualization of participation ultimately accounting for differences in attitudes to participation in modern democracies.

Engaging with Blickle's ideas by taking them one step further proved to be the unofficial theme of the first session of the conference. This session focused on his concept of communalism, put into context by Claudia Ulbrich (Berlin). In delineating how this concept developed in Blickle's work, Ulbrich stressed its originality by pointing to the academic context prevailing at the time when he first came up with the idea of communalism. His contemporaries tended especially to focus on feudalism as an interpretative model for political organization in pre-modern Europe. This focus, in turn, tended to marginalize influences from below. Ulbrich, however, also addressed criticisms levelled at Blickle's concept, for example, that it entailed a process of modernization that was too linear, and that it was too homogenous to account for conflict and mechanisms of exclusion within communities. She also expressed personal views on how the concept might be developed further, for example, by focusing on family units below the level of communities to allow for a broader view of social practices.

A different direction was proposed by Daniel Schläppi (Berne), whose paper looked at political participation at the level of communities in early modern Switzerland. By taking up Blickle's notion of the common good as the central idea for the legitimation of community government and action, Schläppi argued that this was not simply an abstract idea but referred to a variety of economic practices. With examples from the early modern Swiss Confederation, he argued that these practices organized the distribution and redistribution of wealth within the community as a means of pooling resources among full burghers (especially common lands such as pastures), avoiding conflict, and securing government action co-operatively. In showing that the legitimation of power itself rested on the redistribution of wealth and the rotation of office-holding, he ultimately argued

that communities 'co-produced' states rather than seeing them as antagonists to the formation of the modern state.

Finally, Wolfgang Behringer (Saarbrücken) also took a critical stance on Blickle's concept of communalism by arguing that it portrayed a too harmonious picture of early modern local relations. With examples from modern Africa and India (where other, unrelated concepts of 'communalism' are discussed), he showed that community action can also have a darker side, especially when it comes to apparently irrational/violent behaviours. Illustrating this with a case study of witch-hunting in Bavaria and Switzerland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Behringer showed that communities could justify the hunting of witches with such normative ideas as the *bonum commune* and that communal persecutions were especially high in regions with high levels of political participation. The question, therefore, he argued, was whether the concept of communalism painted too idealized a picture of communes and their resistance to authorities.

The second session opened with a paper by Johannes Dillinger (Oxford), who concentrated on rural communities in seventeenth-century Massachusetts with a particular focus on the political representations of the communes in the governing apparatus of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. In view of the fact that all towns and villages in the colony enjoyed equal rights of representation and were able to defend the right to choose their own deputies as representatives, Dillinger argued that despite its Puritan tendency and allusions to divine right in the royal charter of 1629, the colony tended towards representative government over the century with a notable propensity to secularism. Rather than being a direct predecessor of republican forms of government, however, these developments, in Dillinger's view, contributed to the growth of an administrative apparatus and the emergence of an 'expertocracy'.

Peasant communities were also prominent in Henry Cohn's (Warwick) paper. In an attempt to re-evaluate the dynamics of mobilization and revolt in the German Peasants' War, Cohn argued that in line with the beliefs of E. P. Thompson and Blickle, the peasants were not, in fact, a mindless mob. Using the example of various episodes from the 1525 rising, Cohn showed that the crowds possessed their own moral economy and frequently based their actions and decisions on inherited patterns of village life, traditional forms of justice, and experiences of regular military organization. The peasants, he argued,

were thus appropriating traditional forms of justice in a ritualized way for the enactment of what they saw as natural justice.

The second day started with a session on urban politics. Daniel Hinchey (Edinburgh) analysed the proceedings of the Bristol Town Council during the crucial early years of the Civil War. In a close reading of council minutes, he showed how the town council adapted to the wartime situation and its limitations in coping with the demands of the two opposing parties. The councillors were, Hinchey argued, most interested in maintaining elements of normality during the upheaval and in stabilizing economic activities and trade. For this reason they attempted to pursue a neutral course and tried to enlist popular participation, which resulted in a remarkable ability to exercise civic duties even in wartime. But the strategy ultimately failed when the city was captured.

Mary O'Connor (Oxford) moved the focus two and a half centuries forward and looked at the activities of the Shoreditch parish vestry at the beginning of the nineteenth century. She illustrated how the parish vestry gradually gained in influence at the beginning of the century, started to engage with parliament on matters of legislation, and was thus able to intervene on the parish's behalf in crucial political matters at the level of national politics. While other parishes were dominated by oligarchic elites at the time, Shoreditch parish vestry successfully claimed to represent all parishioners and defended the policy of open parish meetings and participatory ideals in highly inclusive language, even against parliamentary opposition.

The last session was opened by Charlie Chih-Hao Lee (Cambridge) with a paper on the Workers' Educational Association, which originated at Oxford University in the early twentieth century. He showed that idealistic and democratic ideas were at the core of this movement, which was set up to educate young workers in order to empower the working-class movement and spread the ideals of participatory government. Over the course of its existence, however, the movement encountered problems. Increasingly, students were denied the right to choose their own tutors, and teachers dismissed ideas of teaching empowerment as propaganda, preferring an educational standard of impartiality instead. At the same time, academic classes were increasingly out of touch with the grassroots nature of local political organization, ultimately reflecting strong tension between democratic movements and university culture.

Finally, in the last paper of the conference, Harm Kaal (Nijmegen) proposed a re-examination of democratic culture in the post-Second World War period. Instead of looking at collective action such as party politics and political movements to measure participatory cultures in western democracies, he suggested examining individual actions instead. In an attempt to map the repertoire of such forms of participation, Kaal proposed various lines of research, such as, for example, personal letters to politicians as platforms for communication, interviews of 'ordinary' people on popular opinion, and opinion polls as creators of new expectations regarding politicians' behaviour. A new understanding of the features that guided political participation in this period was needed, he argued, in order to allow us to comprehend interactions between politicians and the people.

The sessions were followed by a final panel discussion with Wolfgang Behringer, Andreas Gestrich, Tom Scott (St Andrews), and Claudia Ulbrich, moderated by Beat Kümin. The individual comments and the ensuing discussion were particularly helpful in connecting the individual themes of the papers to larger questions pertaining to Blickle's work and legacy. Beyond apparent gaps in his works relating to family structures and economic practices underpinning the inner life of communities, or the necessity of incorporating a global dimension to encourage wider comparisons, it was also clear to many participants that although Blickle's ideas have something very important to offer in addressing the emergence of modern forms of democracy and political participation, the nature of the transition from early modernity to modernity needs to be understood in a more differentiated fashion. Nationalism was one factor that, according to Scott, needs to be addressed more systematically and Behringer stressed that the ambivalence of participatory regimes needs to be faced more openly. Ultimately, however, it seems that the real challenge to Blickle's work is not so much a particular thematic or methodical gap or deficiency, but the course of history itself. As Ulbrich pointed out, Blickle's historical work was always informed by the present; and yet the present, as several comments regarding the rise of nationalism, the ambivalence of democracies, and the impact of global crises illustrated, is not only different from what it was in the 1960s or 1970s, but is also constantly changing. A highly topical challenge to Blickle's work thus seems to be that the premisses for his research, informed by a different present, have changed. That may,

however, be something that Blickle himself would have easily acknowledged. The value of his ideas and his work may then lie, as could be observed from many papers and comments, in the way that these can still help us to get those new questions right.

Hannes Ziegler (German Historical Institute London)

Understanding Brexit: Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century. Conference organized by Andreas Wirsching and Martina Steber (Institute for Contemporary History, Munich-Berlin) and Andreas Gestrich (German Historical Institute London), and held at the Institute for Contemporary History, Munich on 19–20 April 2018.

In the run-up to the United Kingdom's referendum on European Union membership in June 2016, all the polls predicted a close outcome. Nevertheless, the decision by a narrow majority of voters that Britain should leave the European Union seems, with hindsight, to have taken almost everybody by surprise. Historians once again proved to be no better prophets than anyone else. The two-day conference 'Understanding Brexit: Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century', organized by the Institute for Contemporary History (IfZ) Munich and the German Historical Institute London (GHIL), was a way of responding to this failure and the challenge which Brexit poses to our established narratives of twentieth-century history. In the light of Brexit, which of these narratives now need revision? How shall we in future conceive of Britain's place within European history? And what does Brexit mean for our understanding of European integration since 1945? To reflect on these questions, the conference brought together twenty-two historians from the UK and Germany, and one from the USA.

To begin with two short observations of a more general political nature: first, the mere fact that this conference took place in Germany, although its subject was Britain's place in Europe, itself contained a political message. Nobody pretended to be neutral on Brexit; all participants were like-minded in their sorrow, if not outspoken anger, at the referendum outcome and the British government's attempts to implement the vote. Second, if some conversations over the two days reflected a hope that Brexit might still be reversed, it was expressed

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The full conference programme can be found under 'Events and Conferences' on the GHIL's website <www.ghil.ac.uk>.

mainly by German scholars who live and work in the UK (or who have done so for many years). British colleagues seemed much more fatalistic in this respect.

But back to the question of why we got it so wrong. In their introduction, the conference organizers Michael Schaich (GHIL) and Martina Steber (IfZ Munich) did not hold back from sharp criticism of the profession's short-sightedness on both sides of the Channel. Steber noted the paradox that British history, which in the context of the German *Sonderweg* debate had once appeared as a positive antithesis, is in a sense now itself treated as a case of exceptionalism. In most universities British history and European history are separate faculties. Scholars of the former much more frequently compare their findings with US history or, since the 'imperial turn' of recent decades, even with the history of Commonwealth states, than with the history of the UK's European neighbours. In short, in the recent past British historiography has been anything *but* European. At the same time European historians have tended to describe European integration mostly as a success story of 'ever closer union'. In this Whig version of history, UK differences have at best been located within a narrative of the UK as 'the awkward partner'. So has this state of affairs caused us to misinterpret the long-term direction of British–European relations? The conference had barely got underway when Klaus H. Goetz (Munich), who chaired the first panel, asked the provocative question of whether we could find much explanation in long-term factors at all. In view of the fundamental but unforeseen political shifts of recent years, should we not emphasize short-term factors instead? Does the world nowadays follow any consistent patterns? Or is it that the rules have radically changed and we do not understand the new ones yet? It was no accident that this challenge came from one of the few political scientists attending the conference. For historians, of course, contingency must be the most depressing of all answers. Even if Goetz is right, they will continue to take long-term developments into account in identifying the more profound causes of Brexit.

The most significant long-term factor usually cited by Brexit supporters is the whole question of sovereignty. In their narrative this is closely linked to the exclusive exercise of sovereignty by national parliaments and a corresponding rejection of the increasing power of 'unelected bureaucrats in Brussels'. In developing overriding pow-

ers, so the narrative goes, the EU has unilaterally changed the 'marriage contract' that was agreed when Britain first entered the Common Market in 1973. In Munich, this narrative was represented only at the public panel held at the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities, where, as might have been expected, Gisela Stuart (former chair of the Vote Leave Campaign) and, less predictably, Sir Paul Lever (former ambassador to Germany) both adopted a strong anti-European stance.

At the conference sessions, however, there was little support for this narrative as an explanation for Brexit. On the contrary, in his paper Piers Ludlow (LSE) underlined the very constructive role that Britain has, on the whole, played as a member of the European Community since 1973. In listing specific British contributions to European integration, from the Single Market to its invigoration of the European Parliament, Ludlow at least complicated the 'awkward partner' narrative. Nonetheless, he acknowledged that all these achievements had been overshadowed in British public opinion by a fundamental dislike of Brussels. In fact, as Ludlow put it, the majority of British people would probably prefer to be an 'awkward partner' than a 'good European'. In a retrospective look at the debates on Britain's entry into the Common Market in the 1960s, James Ellison (Queen Mary, London) highlighted how even at that time political leaders failed to create any enthusiasm for Europe. Labour Eurosceptic Barbara Castle in 1967 famously accused the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, of trying to 'bor[e] our way into Europe'.[1]

But does a lack of European idealism really make the British case exceptional in the history of European integration? Given previous experience with referendums on the European constitution, such as those that were held in France and the Netherlands in 2005, a majority of the people in other European states may, if asked, turn out to be eager to 'take back control' of national sovereignty as well. Dominik Geppert (Bonn) pointed out in his paper that in June 2016 almost every poll showed stronger Eurosceptic attitudes in Germany than in Britain. The crucial difference, Geppert argued, lay in different constitutional contexts. He sharply criticized the use of referendums as a political weapon of last resort by British prime ministers, but praised the German institution of the Federal Constitutional Court, whose

[1] Barbara Castle, *The Castle Diaries 1964–70* (London, 1984), 242.

judges were able to give constructive responses to problems too complex for the simple alternative of yes or no answers.

So was there nothing special about British–European relations other than the tools used to measure Euroscepticism? Andreas Wirsching (IfZ Munich) claimed in the discussion that one long-term factor indisputably unique to the UK among European countries was its special global role in the past. Dane Kennedy (Washington) stressed that Britain joined the Common Market at around the same time as it lost its Empire, and illustrated the divisive potential of the imperial legacy for British debates on national identity. While the imperial past increasingly became a source of embarrassment for politicians and diplomats who had to issue public apologies for colonial atrocities, a large part of the electorate held the view that the Empire had actually been a good thing and was in favour of overcoming 'post-colonial guilt'.

Empire nostalgia also played a crucial part in Ben Jackson's (Oxford) diagnosis of a British national identity crisis in the last half-century. According to this analysis, the political left has lost its formerly strong 'constitutional patriotism' in the face of counter-cultural influences since the 1960s, while the political right in the same period has lost its former sensitivity to the fragility of Britain's socio-economic situation. With the success of Thatcher, the Conservatives began to believe their own marketing message of a 're-awakened nation', but ironically paid little attention to the fact that, after a decade of economic decline, the UK's comeback set in after it had joined the Common Market. Finally, after the Brexit referendum of 2016, Empire nostalgia rose to new heights with the Tory government's soundbite of an independent 'global Britain'.

The shaky foundations of this message, however, became clear during Eckart Conze's (Marburg) paper on transatlanticism. As Conze argued, at least since 1945 the UK's foreign policy had depended as much on the USA as had the foreign policy of any other Western European state. The much cited 'special relationship' was purely symbolic from the outset. In fact, during the Cold War the architecture of the US-led transatlantic security alliance was built on the premise of Britain's close integration into Western Europe. Martin Daunton (Cambridge) considered British post-war debates on monetary policy along similar lines. After decolonization, traditionalist economists had hoped to maintain the sterling area as a self-sufficient

'non-dollar world' and even envisaged the GBP as the lead currency of a united Europe ('two worlds approach'), whereas less sentimental Treasury economists advocated a more or less complete currency union with the USA ('one world approach'). As it turned out, Britain joined the Common Market after the sterling devaluation of 1967, but at the same time restored the City of London on the basis of 'Eurodollars' held by US banks outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve. To preserve this implicit one world economy, the UK therefore had to reject any suggestion of a European currency union. 'Global Britain', Daunton concluded, is merely a delusion concealing Little England sentiments.

In fact, most speakers at the conference doubted whether, rhetoric aside, there was a real belief in British exceptionalism in the UK at all. Laurence Black (York) tried hard but failed to find much evidence of Euroscepticism in British popular culture. On the contrary, even the once notorious anti-German stereotypes appear to have been on the retreat for some time now. Euroscepticism, Black therefore concluded, is almost exclusively a political and economic phenomenon, not a cultural one.

It therefore seemed only natural that many papers focused on the socio-economics of Brexit. Jim Tomlinson (Glasgow) examined the economic problems of those (mainly English) de-industrialized regions where the Leave vote was higher than average. Regarding the causes of unemployment in these regions, he warned that the impact of globalization should not be overestimated. Using the steel industry as an example, he argued that the increase in productivity had, on balance, caused even more job losses. Although this claim was challenged in the following discussion, where participants referenced the dislocation of whole industries in the wake of globalization, nobody disputed Tomlinson's overall picture of the devastating effects of unemployment in these areas. While the effects were for some time cushioned to some extent by the growth of public sector work and an increase in supplementary low-paid jobs, the cuts to in-work benefits under the austerity policy from 2010 soon destroyed this 'new Speenhamland'.

Looking essentially at the same regions, Mike Kenny (Cambridge) confirmed the diagnosis of a resurgence in a Little England mindset. As polling shows, the more people identified themselves as English (as opposed to British), the more likely they were to have voted Leave.

Kenny underlined that the parochial sentiments of Little England communities were to a considerable degree driven by hostility towards London, and he made a good point in reminding us that England beyond London is today the last remaining part of the UK without devolved regional political representation. But this, of course, does not diminish the share of ethnic nationalism in these sentiments. As Kenny also pointed out, voters self-identifying as English were also most likely to view immigration as society's major concern.

This, finally, led the workshop to the topics of immigration and racism. Elizabeth Buettner (Amsterdam) recounted how fears of immigration had already overshadowed discussions on Britain's entry into the Common Market in the 1960s and 1970s. Back then, even Harold Wilson suggested restrictions on freedom of movement for migrants from southern Italy. Only because it had already become apparent by the mid 1970s that the fierce predictions of mass migration had not materialized did the issue fail to influence the first referendum on the UK's Common Market membership in 1975. In the last decade, however, Islamic terrorism and growing labour migration from Eastern Europe after the expansion of the EU have led to a new resurgence of xenophobic fears. Christina von Hodenberg (Queen Mary, London) gave an overview of the British tabloids' coverage of the referendum campaign that left no doubt about the lack of journalistic ethics in the way in which the pro-Brexit media exploited fears that had spread during the refugee crisis of 2015. Constant newspaper images of refugees camping on the beaches of Calais and headlines such as 'The Invaders' simultaneously stirred up ancient fears of foreign invasion associated with the Channel, as Emily Robinson (Sussex) indicated. Many participants at the conference were ultimately inclined to regard fears related to immigration as the most important single factor leading to the Brexit vote.

But this finding only lends more urgency to the question of how exclusively 'British' the Brexit vote was. There was broad recognition at the conference table that popular xenophobic moods had swung elections and referendums in the past in other European states, and could do so again in the very near future. Concerns were expressed throughout the conference that the European Union could fall apart even more in the next few years as a result of populist right-wing movements. This, in the end, was the rather disquieting bottom line of the conference—even these informative and inspiring two days in

Munich, among like-minded friends could not dispel the anxiety with which many scholars of contemporary history view the fragile state of liberal democracy in Europe today.

NIKOLAI WEHRS (Constance)

Contested Borders? Practising Empire, Nation, and Region in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. International conference organized by Levke Harders (Bielefeld University) and Falko Schnicke (German Historical Institute London), and held at the GHIL, 26–28 April 2018.

'Contested borders' is a topic that even, or perhaps especially, today is of immense importance, as all around the globe borders are (re)-defined, weakened, or strengthened. Borders are intended to limit, but they can also change, and have done so throughout history. This conference examined the question of contested borders in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, taking into account different types of boundaries between empires, states, nations, and regions. It aimed to define 'belonging' as a research concept while exploring 'the region' as a research category and combining this perspective with nation-state and postcolonial perspectives. It also aimed to use trans-regional and transnational approaches. How are inclusion and exclusion created not only by physical, but also by mental borders? What conflict lines are thus revealed, and what actors help to create belonging by creating borders? These and other questions were discussed in seven sessions and two keynote lectures. The conference's potential for innovation could be seen in this linking of regional questions with international perspectives; and many of the papers focused not only on how borders are (passively) perceived, but also on how they enable active agency, showing how historic actors reacted to, created, or subverted them.

The first session focused on the conceptualization of identity and belonging. Rather than giving answers, Timothy Baycroft (Sheffield) raised questions, presenting five models of belonging: Imagined Communities (1983), Invention of Traditions (1983), Concentric Circles (1989), Hierarchies of Otherness (2001), and Assimilation and

Trans. Emily Richards (GHIL).

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The full conference programme can be found under 'Events and Conferences' on the GHIL's website <www.ghil.ac.uk>.

Appropriation (2008). While these models were originally developed in historical studies dealing with relatively stable borders, the paper asked to what extent they are challenged when applied to an area of contested borders.

Taking the spatial turn in historical research as a starting point, Ursula Lehmkuhl (Trier) discussed practices of place-making and place-related belonging with reference to the Red River Settlement of the Canadian Métis that was Europeanized in the nineteenth century. Her paper introduced transcultural space as an outcome of place-making shaped by the actors within it and their interactions. She especially emphasized the importance of conflicting narratives used by opposing groups to create belonging and to claim spaces for themselves, thus constructing a 'homeland'. The subsequent discussion stressed the fact that areas with migratory movements are always areas of conflict in terms of politics and belonging.

The second session discussed representational border crossings in the context of British royal travel. Cindy McCreery (Sydney), whose topic was the British Imperial Royal Tour of 1901, chose not to focus on the crossing of actual political borders. Instead, she examined the significance of spatial, racial, and technological borders and their infringement. The traditional narrative of a seemingly endless journey through British and, therefore, in a sense, 'home' territory gave way, in her re-telling, to the sense of unfamiliarity and uncertainty that dominated each participant's view of events. In terms of racial border crossings, she especially highlighted the fact that the areas visited on the tour turned out to be far less 'foreign' than the travellers had anticipated.

Falko Schnicke (London) analysed the first post-Independence state visit by the Queen to India and Pakistan in 1961. He examined the United Kingdom's attempts to find an appropriate way of dealing with its colonial past and honouring the independence of the new states, while at the same time using the visit ostentatiously to demonstrate a united Commonwealth front in the context of the escalating Cold War. One particularly fascinating aspect of the visit was the route, as the Queen travelled first to northern India then, interrupting her state visit to India, crossed into Pakistan before returning to India again. Schnicke interpreted this as a strategic decision, designed to show the need for peace and unity within the Commonwealth.

The first keynote lecture, delivered by Floya Anthias (London), again touched upon the question of belonging, but from a sociological

perspective. Starting from the recent debate about the 'Windrush generation', she introduced and discussed various arguments that, in her opinion, shape the general debate about migration and belonging in the United Kingdom. She eventually proposed that the term 'belonging' should not be used as a substitute for 'identity', but should be seen as a mode that is framed by political and normative uses.

The third session featured two different approaches to the concepts of belonging, nation, and boundaries. Michael Rowe (London) studied the Rhineland in the nineteenth century as an area of contested borders with several conflict lines running through it. However, although Rowe defined the Rhineland as a 'war zone' with all the negative implications of that term, he also argued that the Rhinelanders living within the region could profit from these conflicts. War could not only be a source of employment, for example, in infrastructure projects and fortress building, but could also lead to investments in cultural heritage. Conflicts were thus also a force that contributed to the creation of belonging.

Maiken Umbach (Nottingham) presented the history of the Jewish diaspora after emigration from Nazi Germany as a de-centred German history, arguing that the process of emigration was perceived, at least by some Jews, as part of the German migration. She supported this argument with findings from a German Jewish emigrant family's photographic archive that present a picture of the family as active German migrants going to America, and not as passive Jewish victims. She argued that the process of emigration did not necessarily lead to the shattering of secure identities, but could result in the formation of an imagined 'German identity' that was no longer framed by the nation-state. Despite the apparent differences between Rowe's and Umbach's papers, the discussion showed that both revealed adaptation to new circumstances, and that in both cases multiple layers of identity that help with the process of adaptation can be detected.

The papers presented in the fourth session dealt with questions of belonging and otherness that influence the treatment of migrants in areas where there are contested borders. In her case study of Alsatian migrant Simon Altschul, Levke Harders (Bielefeld) put forward the hypothesis that borders were created not only by states, but also by the migrants themselves, thus stressing the importance of imagined borders. Factors such as class, kinship, local and regional interests, and religion played a part when decisions about the naturalization of

migrants had to be made. As a result, not only state norms but also local administrative traditions and their contestation led to concepts of bordering, belonging, and region- and nation-building.

Anne Winter (Brussels) also stressed the importance of local administration in her case study of the early years of the Kingdom of Belgium, concentrating on Antwerp and Brussels. Her twofold approach to the topic focused first on the interaction between national and local authorities in decisions about the status of migrants. Second, she highlighted that groups of migrants were variously perceived as 'more' or 'less' familiar or different in their 'otherness', leading to differences in how they were treated. The interaction of these factors led to a treatment of non-national migrants based on local perceptions of belonging and deserving. The discussion again touched upon the role of the local in migration decisions, coming to the conclusion that the importance of the nation-state was (in part) diminished, while local and rural traditions were extremely important for questions of belonging.

The fifth session was dedicated to border practices. Benjamin Hopkins (Washington) presented his thesis that the border regions of former empires which are plagued by violence and instability, such as the activities of terrorist groups in Kenya, Pakistan, and Nigeria, are historically defined by their liminality. All three countries named, formerly border regions of the British Empire, were subject to similar border practices, which made these regions particularly vulnerable. While at one level they were left to fend for themselves, on another level they were still in a dependent relationship with the imperial system.

Sarah Frenking (Göttingen) looked at how new border practices were adopted on the German–French border in Altmünsterol (French Montreux-Vieux) in southern Alsace around 1900. She focused on the question of how far local actors, especially the border police, were responsible for creating the frontier between Germany and France, both engaged in nation-building during this period. From 1888, new surveillance and monitoring practices that were quantitatively and qualitatively quite different from what had existed before were put in place at the border. The new practices were implemented by the police but discussed widely, especially in newspapers, which meant that the public became far more aware of the border. This forced people to deal with the issue of their own territoriality, a subject which is inextricably bound up with questions of belonging and its definition.

In the second keynote lecture, Philip Murphy (London) looked at the issue of British nationality on the basis of the various Nationality and Immigration Acts passed in the UK since 1945 and how they were negotiated within the Conservative Party. The struggle to create legislation that adequately reflects historical reality in the context of a former empire is echoed in the discussions which have been going on for decades, at both political and public level, about what British nationality actually is. These discussions reveal that the lack of a definition of 'British nationality' is problematic, which in turn highlights that nationality and citizenship are by no means the same thing.

The sixth session, on (post)colonial regions, turned to Africa. Julio Decker (Bristol) characterized German colonial rule in German South-West Africa between 1884 and 1914 as both spatial ordering and a spatial regime. The German idea of an 'empty' space, as Namibia was perceived to be, led to a spatial ordering based on German ideals in which 'emptiness' was to be filled productively with a new infrastructure (including railways), the building of concentration camps, and educating the native population to embrace German virtues. In practice, however, this meant responding brutally whenever the native workers rebelled against what were often fatally dangerous working conditions.

Anne-Isabelle Richard (Leiden) discussed the question of African–European commonalities in the African–European debates of the 1940s from a postcolonial perspective. At the heart of these was the idea of 'Eurafrica', based on the notion of a particular connection between Europe and Africa as a result of (colonial) history. In the 1940s the representatives of African nations used European institutions, such as the Consultative Assembly, as a platform to demonstrate that 'European' values such as democracy and human rights should not be limited to Europe, singling out France in particular in their arguments. The 'Eurafrica' vision included geopolitical and economic considerations, but most importantly, it raised questions of belonging and equality in relation to Africa and Europe.

The last session of the conference dealt with questions of empire and imperialism from two different perspectives. Amanda Behm (York) examined the dominating character of 'Britishness' in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century California. She explored settler campaigns and the rise of anti-colonialism as two key processes for positioning California within the Anglo-Saxon world on the one

hand, and creating a notion of exclusion on the other. Ultimately, she argued, the British rule in India, which was acknowledged and observed in practice by the anti-colonial South Asian diaspora in California, showed itself as un-British, especially in the treatment of non-white migrant groups.

Almuth Ebke (Mannheim) followed British imperialism into the late twentieth century, viewing events of 1981, especially the riots of April and July in several English cities and the introduction of the British Nationality Act, as drivers of public debates about questions of belonging, especially in terms of what 'Britishness' was supposed to mean. She traced the various concepts of belonging discussed at the conference and came to the conclusion that they reflected a division within British politics and society, where the term 'British' is applied to differing concepts of belonging, nationality, and society simultaneously. During the discussion it was pointed out that the term 'Britishness' is problematic, and will probably continue to be so, as different actors may not necessarily share the same understanding.

The conference discussed borders from a variety of perspectives. Often, rather than political borders, this meant social, cultural, racial, or emotionally perceived borders and transgressions and their significance in terms of inclusion and exclusion. Over the course of the conference, it became clear that the idea of 'belonging' is at the heart of many of our questions about borders. The conference focused both on regions as geographical units and the supranational level, calling on historians to think beyond regional and national approaches and to include a trans-regional point of view in their work. Generally, it could be seen that much current research takes a micro-historical approach ('history from below'). The question of practices, whether in crossing borders, in place-making, or belonging, was discussed many times.

One important aspect that was not covered was a theoretical consideration of the term 'border' itself, and how this differs from similar concepts such as 'frontier' or 'boundary'. Discussions often did not stop to clarify exactly what was meant by 'borders', as the 'psychology' of the border was generally of more interest in the context of the specific research projects under discussion. A publication of selected papers is planned.

CHRISTINA NEUBERGER (Heidelberg) and LARISSA KRAFT (Passau)

'Splendid Isolation'? Insularity in British History. Conference held at the Centre for British Studies at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 4–5 May 2018. Conveners: Christiane Eisenberg (Berlin), Wencke Meteling (Marburg), Andrea Wiegeshoff (Marburg), and Hannes Ziegler (London).

'Our story centres in an island, not widely sundered from the Continent.' The well-known opening line of Winston Churchill's *History of the English-Speaking Peoples* is a reference to insular geography of the sort that is frequently found when British history and identity are debated. 'Those who dwell there', Churchill continues, 'are not insensitive to any shift of power, any change of faith, or even fashion, on the mainland, but they give to every practice, every doctrine that comes to it from abroad, its own peculiar turn and imprint.'[1] Churchill's islanders are well connected and informed, yet distinct. To trace such ideas of islandness in British history was the aim of a conference held at the Centre for British Studies in Berlin and supported by the German Historical Institute London, the German Association for British Studies, and the Fritz Thyssen Foundation. It was preceded by a public panel held at the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities, which evaluated the referendum of 23 June 2016 in the light of long-term and short-term socio-political developments on both sides of the Channel.[2]

The conference was opened by Christiane Eisenberg and Wencke Meteling, who briefly introduced the Centre for British Studies and its research aims. Subsequently Andrea Wiegeshoff and Hannes Ziegler outlined the conceptual framework of the undertaking. Wiegeshoff suggested that on the British Isles the geographical fact of inhabiting an island had been connected with historical, political, or economic

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The full conference programme can be found under 'Events and Conferences' on the GHIL's website <www.ghil.ac.uk>.

[1] Winston S. Churchill, *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples*, vol i: *The Birth of Britain* (London, 1956), p. viii.

[2] A recording of the panel is available at <http://voicerepublic.com/talks/abschied-vom-kontinent>, accessed 30 May 2018.

developments at least since the eighteenth century. She explained that the connection between ideology and geography, integral to the notion of insularity, has traditionally informed discourses of British national and imperial identity, a well-known recent example being David Cameron's Bloomberg Speech of January 2013.[3] Like many British politicians before him, the former Prime Minister argued that 'geographical circumstances had shaped the psychology of the islanders'. One of the historian's tasks, according to Wiegeshoff, is to question such deterministic interpretations of otherness.

Ziegler then opened up another perspective in characterizing the conference theme as closely linked to questions of transnational and global history. From this perspective, tracing discourses of insularity brings maritime exchange and networks to the fore. Ziegler listed three main lines of inquiry that the contributions to the conference would centre around. First, he said, they would trace the historical contexts of British island ideas and their manifold forms and applications. Second, 'the connection between popular and cultural representations of insularity and their visible and tangible impact on political, social, and cultural practices' would be addressed. This entailed identifying the 'groups [who] referred to the island idea to further their specific aims' with 'different degrees of impact'. Third, the idea of insularity would be investigated critically. The claim of unity inherent in many references to islandness, which obscures internal and external tensions, Ziegler said, requires deconstruction. This is particularly relevant where the island idea '[casts] silence on regions or groups perceived as different, backward and not an integral part of the "island nation"'.

The first session of the conference focused on 'Cultural Imaginations of the "Island Nation" and Competing Conceptions of National Belonging'. Ross Aldridge (Gdansk) discussed Dover and the Channel Tunnel in relation to Britain's island identity, reconstructing references to the famous cliffs of Dover in contemporary political debates and literary texts. Aldridge argued that the use of cliff and tunnel imagery in Cameron's Bloomberg Speech aligned with metaphors used in the recent campaigns of the UK Independence Party. Throughout, the cliffs of Dover served as a signifier for the sovereignty of the

[3] David Cameron, EU speech at Bloomberg, delivered 23 Jan. 2013. For the script of the speech see <http://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg>, accessed 24 June 2018.

nation, the Channel Tunnel being identified with the threat of invasion from the Continent. The sentimental atmosphere that surrounded the cliffs of Dover in nineteenth-century literary texts and in the context of the world wars, Aldridge said, has been replaced by one of hostility. He concluded his talk with reference to Daljit Nagra's 'Look we have coming to Dover!' of 2007, a poem that reveals the migrants' perspective on the 'chalk of Britannia'. In this postcolonial literary imagination, Dover appears as a problematic and hostile arrival point.

Patrick Bahners (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*) focused on insularity in the Whig interpretation of history, especially in Thomas Babington Macaulay's popular five-volume *History of England*, published from 1800 to 1859. Bahners pointed out that according to Macaulay, the British had only become 'emphatic islanders' in the thirteenth century when the Normans and Anglo-Saxons became one nation. This was the first demonstration of islandness uniting the British. The tradition of a strong parliament also went back to the thirteenth century in Macaulay's account. Along with a firm belief in the authority of the constitution, Parliament had preserved the British nation's 'island identity'. The imperative of a strong parliament and its island identity became driving forces for the nation's progression towards ever greater liberty. Underlying this account was the conviction that constitutional history was self-sufficient; in their constitution and Parliament, the British possessed the means to work out their own destiny. From this Whig perspective on British history, islandness served as an emblem for the unifying strength of constitution and Parliament.

Almuth Ebke (Mannheim) spoke on 'Changing Conceptions of Britain since 1981'. She argued that the outcome of the Brexit referendum needed to be placed in the context of decades-long discussions on belonging, migration, and national sovereignty. To exemplify this, Ebke reconstructed competing ideas of belonging in debates of Britain's recent history, most importantly in the debates of the 1960s around legislation relating to nationality which led to the Immigration Act of 1971 and the British Nationality Act of 1981. Ebke juxtaposed this with the debates on Scotland's political autonomy, in which the question of national belonging had also been at the centre of interest. The outcome of the referendum in 2016, she suggested, should be understood as part of this larger struggle to define collec-

tive belonging, a process of national soul-searching. These debates also revealed that Britain was shaped by competing notions of national belonging and that the British were not as unified as the image of the island suggested.

The keynote lecture was delivered by Julia Angster (Mannheim), who exposed a shift within the understanding of islandness that was closely linked to the experience of imperial expansion in the nineteenth century. She outlined how, by 1815, Britain had established a clear hegemony among the European powers. It possessed the strongest naval forces and dominated world trade. The British Empire was a boundless global network shaped by British concepts and values, but was not subject to tight administrative control. It was a space loosely connected by seafarers' excursions, disparate and heterogeneous in character. The Empire was built outside the realm of state relations, and the aim was to navigate the world by curiosity and to map it in a scientific manner. Its rulers were guided by a firm belief in rationality and progress. The Empire brought into being a sense of the universal validity of liberal values, and a sense that European cultures formed a superior unit compared to their global counterparts. It was this perspective that informed British conceptions of insularity before the 1840s; more than a locus, the island was the home base for a global network, the vehicle from which the Empire operated. Analysing the geographical language of the 1860s, Angster reconstructed the decline of this idea of insularity. With the disruption of the balance of powers on the European Continent, national rather than imperial interests began to govern discourses across the European lands and the British Isles. Territory rather than knowledge was now conceived as conveying global power. Angster argued that this turn from an imperial to a national rationale evinced how closely intertwined British and European histories of the time had been. Throughout her talk and in the discussion that followed, Angster emphasized that she was referring to a shift in rationale and narrative of legitimating imperial rule rather than to a shift in the practices of this rule. In this context, it was important to remember how long the narrative of the Empire as one of well-connected seafarers had served to justify and disguise the violent repression and exploitation that the 'excursions' led to.

The second session centred on conflicts between British and Irish references to islandness. James Stafford (Bielefeld) reconstructed po-

litical discourses of insularity in the Kingdom of Ireland in the decade before the French Revolution. At this time the idea emerged that Ireland could replace Britain as the centre of trade between Europe and the United States. These utopian discourses were largely informed by Ireland's economic prosperity at the time, and were furthered by the relatively long period of domestic peace that the Irish could look back on. Meanwhile, the British government, afraid of 'another American experience' even closer to their borders, was eager to bind the Kingdom of Ireland institutionally into their economic and political system, through tariffs and trading barriers.

Pamela Linden (London) spoke on 'The Fragmentation of British Jewish Identity in the Interwar Period'. She first described the arrival of Jewish migrants in Ireland and how they adapted to the island's mentality, their religious life being overseen by the Chief Rabbi in London. Linden showed how Jewish life in Ireland could only be understood within this triangle of oversight through London, traditional Jewish culture in the immigrants' home, and encounters with the native communities in Ireland. Linden exemplified this by reconstructing the case of Rabbi Yitzhak HaLevi Herzog, the first Chief Rabbi of Ireland, who went to Dublin during the Irish War of Independence. By following Herzog's conflicts with his successor in Belfast, Rabbi Jacob Schachter, Linden exposed the frictions between Belfast and Dublin and with their London supervisors respectively as another dimension of complexity in the Irish Jews' quest for identity.

Stuart C. Aveyard (Chichester) followed responses to the Northern Ireland conflict in the newspapers of England, Scotland, and Wales, arguing that the British had been keen to distance themselves from Northern Ireland throughout the Troubles. Aveyard showed that this hostility was noticeable in newspaper reports and cartoons from all political camps. Throughout, the British public were depicted as suffering from the conflict on the island nearby and as being forced to get involved in a senseless battle between local fundamentalists. Aveyard also reconstructed the debates on a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland. Altogether, the British perception of the conflicts in Northern Ireland lacked recognition of the latter as an integral part of the UK.[4]

[4] See also Stuart C. Aveyard, 'The "English Disease" is to Look for a "Solution of the Irish Problem": British Constitutional Policy in Northern Ireland after Sunningdale 1974–1976', *Contemporary British History*, 26/4 (2012), 529–

The final session of the conference juxtaposed 'islandness' and 'interconnectedness' in contemporary British politics. Benjamin Bland (London) presented an excerpt from his research on 'Nationalist Imagination and Far-Right Political Identities in Post-War Britain', thereby introducing the variety of references to islandness as a means of exclusion in contemporary political discourse. Bland analysed speeches and articles from across the conservative and far-right political camps, including the opinions of Colin Jordan, Enoch Powell, Roger Scruton, Margaret Thatcher, and John Tyndall, arguing that their references to islandness shared a common theme of fear of invasion and the destruction of the island through migration. A racially defined notion of the 'island nation' was prevalent throughout, he suggested.

Simon J. Moody (London) employed the concept of insularity to assess British defence policy and strategic planning and the British army's preparations for nuclear combat in the context of the Cold War. Moody pointed to the historic tension in British defence policy between establishing oneself as separate from the continent and seeking a connection, visible in the changing emphasis on maritime or land forces. Maritime forces were the prime concern for the longest period of British history. The 1945 decision to provide forces against the perceived Communist threat on the European Continent, therefore, marked a critical juncture in British history. The introduction of nuclear weapons signified the beginning of this new period. They seemed to be the only means of defence against Communism and the only way to ensure that the UK remained at the high table of global politics after the Empire had disintegrated. But the nuclear age also led to new fears of invasion, the island being a particularly vulnerable target for Soviet attacks. The arrival of nuclear arms gave the invasion fears of the islanders a more apocalyptic aspect.

Charlotte Lydia Riley (Southampton) provided an in-depth analysis of British newspaper reports of spending on overseas aid and development, thus disclosing the UK's post-imperial international connectedness. Riley focused on the 1960s, a decade that marked the peak of newspaper circulation in the UK. She reconstructed the characterizations of the recipients of foreign aid and their relationship

49; id., '"We couldn't do a Prague": British Government Responses to Loyalist Strikes in Northern Ireland 1974–77', *Irish Historical Studies*, 39/153 (2014), 91–111.

with the UK, but also traced the disputes about what purposes development spending should serve. Riley revealed that attitudes towards foreign aid were closely aligned with the different political camps' perceptions of the British Empire. The creation of the Ministry of Overseas Development by the Labour government of 1964 to 1970 could be regarded as the first attempt to redefine the UK's relationship with its former colonies. Although support for foreign aid spending was a distinctive feature of the Labour Party and the left-wing press, the Conservative camp occasionally also argued in its favour, perceiving it as a way of securing political stability in the receiving countries and maintaining imperial ties through continuing relationships with the former colonies.[5]

Altogether, the contributions showed how employing insularity as an analytical category can cast light on the study of Britain's past and contemporary politics and culture. Yet the final discussion also left room to problematize the analytical potential of insularity. It was noted that in present-day political discourse references to the UK as an island were dominated by Conservative and right-wing activists' attempts to redefine the nation's identity as separate from the Continent. The fact that British islandness had always formed the background for a keen interest in internationalism and connectivity, and that it had laid the foundations for a very specific British cosmopolitanism was somewhat disguised by the current political climate. Furthermore, it was argued that result of the referendum on 23 June 2016 had tinged perceptions of British insularity with an anti-European teleology. The public panel that had preceded the conference had also warned against the tendency to interpret British discourses of national identity in this teleological way. The panellists and the contributors to the conference were far from regarding the Brexit vote as an inevitable result of the islanders' search for distinctiveness. Yet the fact that contemporary developments seem to mislead contemporaries from all political camps into interpreting British discourses of islandness in a deterministic way makes it even more important for historians to interrogate insularity in British history in a critical and diverse way, perhaps even in a comparative perspective and in connection with questions of class or gender. As Churchill put

[5] See also Charlotte Lydia Riley, 'Tropical Allsorts: The Transnational Flavor of British Development Policies in Africa', *Journal of World History*, 26/4 (2016), 839–64.

it in the preface to his *History of the English-Speaking Peoples*: 'Knowledge of the trials and struggles is necessary to all who would comprehend the problems, perils, challenges, and opportunities which confront us to-day.'[6]

[6] Churchill, *Birth of Britain*, p. xvii.

MARGARETE TIESSEN (Cambridge)

Fourteenth Workshop on Early Modern German History, organized by the German Historical Institute London in co-operation with the German History Society and the German Historical Institute Washington, and held at the GHIL on 11 May 2018. Conveners: Bridget Heal (University of St Andrews), Katherine Hill (Birkbeck, University of London), David Lederer (NUI Maynooth), Alison Rowlands (University of Essex), and Hannes Ziegler (GHIL).

This workshop on early modern German history—the fourteenth since 2002—was held at the German Historical Institute in London and brought together scholars from England, Scotland, Ireland, the United States, Israel, and Germany. As in previous years, an open call for papers was issued and a few invitations were extended to scholars from Germany. The one-day workshop was attended by as many guests and discussants (including visitors from Oxford and Nottingham universities) as active participants. True to the ideals of the workshop, the setting was fairly informal and focused on the open discussion of ongoing research, methodological problems, and projects (as well as books) in the making. Rather than being pressed into a coherent framework, the ten papers presented were loosely organized into thematic sections around topics such as news and the newspaper, political culture, religious cultures, and communal cultures. One particularly welcome feature was that several papers also ventured outside the period usually denominated as early modern and thus presented the opportunity to discuss transformations and changes from the late medieval to the modern period.

The day started with a session on news chaired by Alison Rowlands (Essex). Richard Calis (Princeton) presented part of his doctoral dissertation in a paper on the credibility of news from the Ottoman Empire in the micro-historical setting of the household of the Tübingen scholar Martin Crucius (1527–1606). Drawing on the extensive documentation of Crucius's interviews and conversations with travellers and pilgrims from Ottoman-controlled Greece, Calis developed the notion of an 'economy of trust' that regulated—through various formal and informal codes and conventions, often in written form—the exchange of news in cross-cultural encounters within the

The full conference programme can be found under 'Events and Conferences' on the GHIL's website <www.ghil.ac.uk>.

Crucius household. Calis focused on material culture in particular because, he suggested, it indicated the ways in which Crucius aimed to establish trust in individual Greek travellers and the news they brought. Calis concentrated especially on Crucius's astonishing scrutiny of personal appearance (dress, language, and so on) and material evidence, such as seals and letters of recommendation.

The exchange of news was also the focus in Jan Hillgaertner's (St Andrews) paper, albeit in the more formal setting of printed newspapers. In recounting the history of written newspapers from their invention in early seventeenth-century Strasbourg, Hillgaertner aimed to emphasize the often overlooked advantages of newspapers as historical sources while highlighting the limitations of working with these documents. After presenting a statistical analysis of the spread and development of newspapers throughout the seventeenth century and patterns in the reporting of British news in German and Dutch newspapers, Hillgaertner emphasized potential problems and limitations. These included the subsequent loss of seventeenth-century newspapers and obvious omissions and errors in reporting at the time. Errors, however, also present an interesting starting point for further research as they are indicative of the speed of travelling news, patterns of reporting, reader experiences, and potentially even orchestrated false news campaigns.

The second session, chaired by David Lederer (Maynooth), evolved around symbolic communication and political culture. Ulrike Ludwig (Frankfurt/Main) presented a synopsis of her recently published monograph on the duel in the Holy Roman Empire. She argued that the concept of the duel familiar to modern observers is a product of the nineteenth century rather than a suitable model for early modern conflicts of honour. Thus the duel as an analytical concept is of little use in making sense of the varieties of these conflicts, as it denotes a narrow idea of conflict with highly standardized and formalized features that fails to grasp early modern realities. Ludwig therefore chose to start from the word itself rather than applying a problematic analytical concept. She pursued the idea of the duel from early sixteenth-century Italy to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Germany, highlighting French influences in narrowing the legal definition of a duel. This subsequent narrowing and formalizing of the concept in the nineteenth century went hand in hand, she argued, with the invention of a tradition that is still influential in current debates.

Crawford Matthews (Hull) presented part of his ongoing research on British–Prussian relations in the context of the acquisition of royal status by Frederick I of Prussia. In a close focus on the 'Dreikönigstreffen' held in Potsdam and Berlin in 1709, Matthews argued that Frederick aimed to use the occasion of a visit by the kings of Denmark and Poland to enact his royal status in the presence of the two visitors. In doing so, he relied especially on the British ambassador, Baron Raby, who developed various ceremonial occasions to highlight the king's royal rank, such as a christening in Potsdam, seating arrangements at the dinner table, and the presentation of valuable objects in the residence of the ambassador. In addition to demonstrating Frederick's equal rank vis-à-vis the two other monarchs, Matthews argued that the ceremonial expenditures at Raby's residence, and his status as a representative of the British monarch transformed the meeting—albeit only temporarily—into a meeting of four monarchs.

The final paper of this session also focused on a Prussian monarch. Adam Storring (Cambridge) analysed the motives of Frederick the Great of Prussia in portraying himself as personally in charge of the leadership of his army throughout his early reign, especially during the Silesian campaign in 1740 and in the War of the Austrian Succession. He argued that Frederick followed ideas of traditional kingship, as represented particularly by Louis XIV of France, while at the same time reacting to Enlightenment ideas formulated and transmitted by Voltaire. Beyond his well-known emulation of Louis's cultural patronage, Frederick was also influenced by military ideas of traditional kingship discussed by Voltaire. In seeking to achieve Voltaire's notion of the *grande homme*, Frederick explicitly sought recognition on the basis of his military success, which was most explicitly attached to the idea of personal leadership in battle.

Catherine Hill (London) opened the third session of the day with a focus on religious cultures in early modern Germany. Ahuva Liberles Noiman (Jerusalem) presented findings from her ongoing Ph.D. research on the problem of conversion to Christianity in the fifteenth-century Jewish community of Regensburg. She asks how conversion affected the relationships between Jews and Christians in a late medieval urban microcosm and how the converts' ties with their social networks changed and were re-arranged through the act of converting. Through the micro-historical lens of a biographical study

of Kalman, the cantor at Regensburg before 1470, Noiman illustrated the difficulties faced by converts on the threshold of baptism. In a liminal position between Christianity and Judaism, Kalman was perceived as a spiritual threat to the Jewish community. Yet his position also offered distinct advantages, for example, as a composer of religious polemics based on his intimate knowledge of both religions. Cases such as Kalman's thus offer valuable insights for understanding Jewish community life and the problems of religious and social belonging in the midst of a predominantly Christian society.

Social and religious ties in the context of a religious community were also the focus of Edmund Wareham's (Oxford) paper. Drawing on a unique collection of surviving letters written by the Benedictine nuns of Lüne, comprising a corpus of 1,800 letters dating from between 1460 and 1555, Wareham analysed the reaction of the Lüne nuns to the introduction of the Reformation by the Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg in the 1530s. Apart from providing valuable insights into women's writing in relation to the Reformation, this process also sheds light, Wareham argued, on the problematic concept and critical status of religious vows in the tumultuous years of the early Reformation period. Looking at various aspects such as the performative and transformative function of vows, especially in the context of religious life in sixteenth-century Germany, Wareham ultimately outlined first ideas for a broad study of vows in early modern Germany drawing on various social contexts that can be fruitfully analysed by looking closely at how vows were conceptualized, rejected, or re-affirmed.

The final paper in this session, delivered by Yanan Qizhi (Pennsylvania State University), focused on dreams and dream interpretations in early modern Lutheranism. Following the career of individual Lutheran preachers from six generations of German Lutheranism, from the early Reformation period to the late Pietist movement of the mid eighteenth century, Qizhi proposed to study dreams within the cultural and historical contexts of these writers and their everyday experiences rather than in a grand narrative of a history of ideas as in existing research. One aim of her research is to explore the discrepancy between the public dismissal of the value of dreams by early reformers (Luther and Melanchthon, among others) and the immense value these writers attached to dreams personally. For the purpose of her study, Quizhi highlighted the value of ego-

documents for researchers studying the meanings and interpretations attached to individual dreams as this type of writing was particularly relevant to the Lutheran communities.

The final session on communal cultures, chaired by Bridget Heal (St Andrews), opened with a paper by Philip Hahn (Tübingen) on a forthcoming book about sensory communities. Taking the early modern town of Ulm as a case study, he illustrated how discussions in both urban and sensory history can benefit from a micro-historical analysis of urban sensory cultures. The 'urban sense-scape', Hahn argued, was highly instrumental in ritual performative community-building. He stressed the importance of understanding senses as subject to historical change, and not only embedded in specific contexts but intricately connected to each other in a way that could be termed 'inter-sensoriality'. Hahn then outlined the structure of his monograph, in which he highlights the changing patterns of perceiving and sensing the city, changing forms of sensory perceptions, especially in terms of perceived dangers, and the community's reactions to this in matters of policy. The senses, Hahn concluded, thus not only contribute to the understanding of urban community-building, but also offer opportunities to study long-term changes beyond established chronological boundaries of historical research.

Finally, Ansgar Schanbacher (Göttingen) offered insights into his post-doctoral project on natural hazards and resource management in early modern cities. In explicitly combining scholarly discourses on technical and medical solutions and everyday practices of city authorities and inhabitants, Schanbacher aimed to evaluate the reactions of various actors to natural hazards and scarcity. As a focus of his research, Schanbacher chose the three medium-sized cities of Braunschweig, Utrecht, and Würzburg, whose different social, economic, and political settings offer opportunities for comparisons. While the project encompasses issues such as gardens and urban agriculture, and natural disasters such as floods, fire, storms, and disease, Schanbacher presented his initial findings concentrating on the supply of firewood and peat. Here he showed how the authorities of the three cities reacted to problems of scarcity in very different ways during the same period, from 1650 to 1800, ranging from free trade policies to specific ordinances and regulations in times of crisis. Sharnbacher ultimately portrayed early modern cities as eco-systems subject to specific contexts and historical change.

All told, the papers presented at the workshop reflected different phases of research from the very early stages to recently completed projects and monographs. At the same time, they indicated major findings, addressed methodological problems, or pitched new conceptual ideas. In doing so, they fully lived up to the basic idea of the workshop, which is to provide a platform for discussing ongoing research on early modern Germany and encouraging exchange between scholars working on different areas and themes. Unsurprisingly, this focus helped to stimulate an open and lively discussion that highlighted connections and contradictions between the papers in a critical and fruitful way. As in previous years, it was an interesting and productive day providing much food for further thought and debate.

HANNES ZIEGLER (German Historical Institute London)

NOTICEBOARD

Scholarships Awarded by the GHIL

Each year the GHIL awards a number of research scholarships to German postgraduate and postdoctoral researchers to enable them to carry out research in Britain, and to British postgraduates for research visits to Germany. The scholarships are generally awarded for a period of up to six months, depending on the requirements of the research project. British applicants will normally be expected to have completed one year of postgraduate research and be studying German history or Anglo-German relations. Scholarships are advertised on H-Soz-u-Kult and the GHIL's website. Applications, which should include a CV, educational background, list of publications (where appropriate), and an outline of the project, along with a supervisor's reference confirming the relevance of the proposed archival research, should be addressed to Dr Felix Brahm, German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ, stipendium@ghil.ac.uk. During their stay in Britain, German scholars present their projects and the initial results of their research at the GHIL Colloquium. In the second allocation for 2018 the following scholarships were awarded for research on British history, German history, and Anglo-German relations:

Christos Aliprantis (Cambridge), The Prussian and Austrian International Secret Police and Intelligence Operations, 1848–1870
Karen Froitzheim (Augsburg), Nachhaltigkeit in Unternehmen nach der Rio-Konferenz 1992: Zur Ökonomisierung des Leitbildes nachhaltige Entwicklung in Deutschland und Großbritannien
Anne Göpel (Hildesheim), Gab es eine konservativ-revolutionäre Jugendbewegung? Britische und deutsche Jugendbünde zwischen den Kriegen
Justus Nipperdey (Saarbrücken), Early Modernity: Periodization and the Emergence of the Modern World in British Historiography
Alexander Olenik (Bonn), Die Alliierte Kommandantur Berlin 1945–1955

Agnes Maria Piekacz (Bielefeld), The Colonists' Old Clothes: Altkleiderhandel im British Empire, *c.*1850–1910
Vidhya Raveendranathan (Göttingen), Urban Working Lives and the Production of Space in late Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Madras, *c.*1790–1870
Christina Sasse (Gießen), Trade Directories und die Konstruktion städtischer Räume in England, 1760–1830
Gil Shohat (Berlin), Antikoloniale Begegnungen: London, die Linke und Dekolonialisierung in Großbritannien, 1930er–1960er Jahre
Katharina Simon (Marburg), Friedensprozesse und Konfliktlösungsstrategien im sozialen Nahraum des frühneuzeitlichen Englands
Vojinović Miloš (Berlin), Policy-Making in a Global Framework: Ideas of Imperial Federation in Politics of the British Empire, *c.*1900–1914

Forthcoming Workshops and Conferences

The Global Knowledge of Economic Inequality: The Measurement of Income and Wealth Distribution since 1945. Conference to be held at the GHIL, 15–17 November 2018. Convener: Felix Römer (GHIL).

Economic inequality has become one of the most contentious political topics of our time. Statistics on income and wealth disparities have come to play an increasingly important role in modern political culture, influencing public debates about questions of distribution, societal self-descriptions, and perceptions of other societies. Global knowledge of economic inequality and poverty has evolved incrementally, with important spurts occurring in the 1960s and 1970s, and then again during the 1990s and 2000s. First initiatives towards an international standardization of income and wealth statistics were launched by the UN and the OECD during the 1960s and 1970s, but they made only slow progress. This contributed to delaying the debate about global inequality, which had long been confined to measures such as per capita GDP, while comparisons of personal income have only been possible since more data has become available. Both these debates and the underlying statistics have a history that is not yet fully understood.

Historians have recently begun to historicize the measurement of economic inequality and the changing public and academic interest

in the subject since the post-war era. The German Historical Institute London will host an international conference to contribute to this growing field of research by bringing together historians and scholars from other disciplines working on the history of inequality knowledge. The conference will take a transnational perspective, but will also include comparative papers and case studies of individual countries that will help us to understand how global developments and entanglements are negotiated domestically.

An Era of Value Change: The 1970s in Europe. Conference to be held at the GHIL, 14–16 March 2019. Conveners: Fiammetta Balestracci (Queen Mary University of London), Martin Baumeister (German Historical Institute Rome), Ulf Brunnbauer (University of Regensburg), Christina von Hodenberg (GHIL), Gerd-Rainer Horn (Sciences Po), Claudia Kraft (University of Siegen), and Detlef Siegfried (Copenhagen University).

In the historiography of many European countries, the 1970s are seen as a caesura. It has been claimed that this was a period of swift cultural transformation and structural change, the turning point from post-war society to a world 'after the boom' characterized by the crisis of high industrial society. This was the time when the post-war emphasis on reconstruction and economic growth faded, and our current world began to take shape. The historians Eric Hobsbawm and Arthur Marwick speak of a 'cultural revolution' to underline the importance of the cultural change, while political scientists such as Ronald Inglehart have posited a 'silent revolution' and the birth of 'post-materialist society'. They describe the ethical re-orientation of citizens as a value change towards individual self-realization rather than the acquisition of material goods.

The value change of the 1970s was a transnational phenomenon with local, national, and global causes. In the different countries and regions of Europe these factors combined in specific ways to produce nationally specific profiles of cultural change, social restructuring, and political democratization. We want to explore international similarities, national peculiarities, transnational connections, and variations in timing with regard to value change in different sectors and countries. Depending on local timing, we take the 'long 1970s' as

starting sometime in the 1960s and ending in the early 1980s at the latest. The aim of the conference is to compare processes of change across different European countries. These changes transcended the political divisions of the Cold War, and those between the northern democratic states and the dictatorial regimes of southern Europe.

The conference will address the 1970s as a turning point of contemporary history and locate the decade within the continuum of twentieth-century history in order to explore the peculiarities of the period.

Security and Humanity in the First World War: The Treatment of Civilian 'Enemy Aliens' in the Belligerent States. Conference to be held at the GHIL, 11–13 April 2019. Convener: Arnd Bauerkämper (Berlin).

In the First World War politicians and officials had to strike a balance between the demands of security and humanitarian requirements, not only in democracies such as Britain, but also in authoritarian states such as the German Empire and Tsarist Russia. The conference will deal with this intricate and multi-layered relationship, concentrating on repressive measures taken against civilian 'enemy aliens' on the one hand and humanitarian efforts made on their behalf on the other. Government policies ranged from restrictions on mobility to the internment of 'enemy aliens' and the annihilation of minorities that were either citizens of enemy states or associated with them (in the case of the Armenians). While many governments, nationalist elites, and populist movements pressed for the wholesale internment of these citizens, national and international humanitarian organizations worked to protect their basic rights. Pointing to the danger of reprisals, these associations exploited the principle of reciprocity that rulers had to take into account. Ranging from the International Committee of the Red Cross to the Society of Friends (Quakers) and the YMCA, these associations provided civilian internees with relief. Apart from universalist and humanist aspirations, international humanitarian organizations were also driven by vested interests. Not least, the conference will deal with neutral powers such as Switzerland and the Netherlands that served as mediators and powers protecting civilian internees.

Workshop on Medieval Germany. Conference organized by the German Historical Institute London in co-operation with the German Historical Institute Washington and the German History Society, to be held at the GHIL, 17 May 2019. Conveners: Len Scales (Durham University) and Cornelia Linde (GHIL).

This one-day workshop on medieval Germany will provide an opportunity for researchers in the field from the UK, continental Europe, the USA, and Canada to meet in a relaxed and friendly setting, and to learn more about each other's work. Papers will be given by researchers at all career stages and deal with many aspects of the history of medieval Germany. Contributors will introduce current work in progress, focusing on research questions, approaches, and unresolved problems.

Early Modern Marketing. Workshop organized by the German Historical Institute London in co-operation with the Junges Kolleg of the North Rhine-Westphalian Academy of Sciences, Humanities, and the Arts, to be held at the GHIL, 30–31 May 2019. Convener: Christina Brauner (Berlin).

Advertising has long been interpreted as a hallmark of modern capitalism. As such, it plays a prominent part in different narratives about the birth of modern capitalism and the rise of the consumer society, viewed both as an indicator of processes of economization and as a catalyst for them. At the same time, human activities of persuasion and promotion are characterized as a basic anthropological feature that may be traced back to the walls of stone ages caves or to the graffiti of Pompeii. Indeed, discourses about advertising's role in modern capitalism appear to be intimately tied up with different and controversial assumptions about human nature and universal workings of 'the market'.

Advertising stirs emotions, both intentionally and unintentionally. Advertising scandals play on a calculated break with existing norms and standards, while the moral ambiguities of persuasion draw boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate economic practices, and put unwelcome competitors beyond the pale. Debates about the history of advertising are obviously connected to divergent

attitudes towards the market economy and judgements about its inevitable rise or equally inevitable failure.

Such inherent tensions in both popular and scholarly discourse call for a more thorough historicization of advertising. Focusing on the period between 1450 and 1800, the workshop sets out to bring together recent attempts at rethinking early modern economic history beyond narratives of revolution and the ongoing re-assessment of the history of modern capitalism. It will also draw on the current interest in markets and market practices in economic sociology which coincides with a renewed interest in historical analysis.

From the Ruins of Preservation: *A Symposium on Rethinking Heritage through Counter-Archives.* Conference to be held at the GHIL, 11–12 July 2019. Conveners: Rodney Harrison (UCL) and Mirjam Brusius (GHIL).

Colonial legacies in heritage preservation have intersected and clashed with local realities since their inception. Heritage sites have often been created by processes which segregate them both temporally and geographically from the contemporary world, and the people who live with and amongst them. This might result in restrictions on habitation and cultivation, religious and ritual practice, and the removal of entire local settlements from natural and cultural heritage sites and their surroundings. Individuals and communities, however, have always had their own ways of preserving and engaging with material and immaterial significances. Objects, places, and landscapes continue to be embedded and reactivated in the domains of contemporary life. These realities defy and challenge disciplinary baggage, canons, and categories as well as the prevailing methods, discourses, concepts, and practices of heritage studies. These have, in many cases, proved unhelpful in engaging such records outside 'the archive' as it is conventionally understood.

The problem of adequately engaging the histories of these intersections has been exacerbated by methodological challenges. Historians have long ignored the gaps and unspoken emotions and bodies in written and visual archival sources. Visual analyses often lack the methods to engage with different iterations of the diverse and heterogeneous agency of humans and non-humans outside the

scope of official archives—the locals going about their lives in ancient ruins; the workers who labour on archaeological excavations; those often nameless individuals who serve as human scales next to an excavated building; the local guides who help 'open up' landscapes to preservationists; or the agencies and affordances of forms of material culture themselves. A turn against the forms of authority empowered in conventional archival sources means that critical heritage studies have largely denied the usefulness and significance of archives for the study of such non-official forms of heritage preservation, which has led to the de-privileging of historical and visual analysis. This frustration has resulted in researchers within heritage studies generally turning away from such sources to focus on contemporary issues and their accompanying methods, especially oral history and ethnography. However, this move has frustrated historians who have seen heritage studies as a field in which the historical contexts of the contemporary phenomena which such scholars study have effectively been written out of the picture.

The symposium addresses these issues and aims to reconstruct new histories and viewpoints in order to re-examine the 'ruins of preservation' and, using new conceptual and methodological approaches, to rethink the varied agencies—human and non-human—which surround both natural and cultural heritage preservation practices.

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