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EDITORIAL

WORDS MATTER: OUR THOUGHTS ON LANGUAGE, PSEUDO-SCIENCE, AND 'RACE'

Writers, academics, editors, and translators put words to work in order to convey the arguments they are trying to make. Using the right words often means making a political choice. As historians and editors of an academic journal, we have followed with great interest the discussion among publishers and in newsrooms in the USA as to whether the words 'Black' and 'White' should be capitalized. Debates over language in connection with political discourses about 'race' are not new. A few years ago, similar discussions were held with respect to the right wording for hatred towards Jews. Should it be 'anti-semitism' as opposed to 'anti-Semitism', in order to acknowledge the fact that 'race theory' is pseudo-scientific, and there is no such thing as a 'Semitic race'?¹

Sitting in a larger context of changing social structures prompted by the ongoing Black Lives Matter protests and current debates about antisemitism in German, British, and US politics, we revisited these older debates to understand their meaning in the context of the present discussion. In both cases, we are confronted with the unresolved and problematic legacies of the idea of 'race science', at a time when these ideas are once again on the rise.² So how can we recognize and take a stance against racial inequalities while at the same time undermining the false idea that biological 'races' exist?

These discussions matter considerably for the future of our field. As historians of German, British, and global history, mentioning racial identification and ethnic background in an appropriate way is

¹ IHRA Committee on Antisemitism and Holocaust Denial, 'Memo on Spelling of Antisemitism', International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, Apr. 2015, online at <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/sites/default/files/memo-on-spelling-of-antisemitism_final-1.pdf>, accessed 11 Aug. 2020. The Memo emphasizes that unlike 'Black' as a form of identity, there is no common *social* understanding of 'Semitism' either.

² Angela Saini, *Superior: The Return of Race Science* (Boston, 2019).

particularly important when we publish research to which these distinctions are relevant. This may include the history of civil rights, the history of slavery, the history of colonialism, the history of race, racism and Jew hatred, and the problems or achievements of people of colour and Jews, to name only a few examples. For us as a bilingual team, translating racial discourse between English and German is also often a challenge, since words such as ‘race’ do not have the same connotations in both languages. When translators have to opt for a term that might not cover the full range of meanings in the original, translation can become even more of a vehicle of interpretation than it normally is. The German term ‘Rasse’, for example, has a different meaning from the English ‘race’, since it carries its own historical charge and is detached from the critical discourse surrounding the term ‘race’ in the United States. Some therefore choose not to translate ‘race’ into German at all.³ As historians, we are aware of the historical trajectories of racial categories, and should therefore show adequate awareness of their constructive nature rather than treating them as neutral, let alone scientific terms.

Our most recent reflections on the right kind of language in relation to racial discourse were also prompted by two submissions to this issue of the *Bulletin*: Eve Rosenhaft’s review of Fabian Klose’s book *In the Cause of Humanity*’ and Juliane Clegg’s review of Almuth Ebke’s *Britishness: Die Debatte über nationale Identität in Großbritannien, 1967 bis 2008*,⁴ where the terms Black and White are used. Many style guides – including the *New Oxford Style Manual*, on which our own style guide is modelled – stipulate lower case for both, but increasing numbers of publications are moving away from that model, and capital-B ‘Black’ is now becoming a new standard as a means of highlighting that Blackness ‘is not a natural category but a social one – a collective identity – with a particular history’.⁵ This follows the con-

³ Some of these issues are helpfully addressed by the editors and translators of Stuart Hall, *Vertrauter Fremder*, trans. Ronald Gutberlet (Hamburg, 2020), 9–12. In critical Whiteness and race discourses in Germany, ‘White’ is sometimes written as *weiß* (in lower-case and italics) to point to its constructive nature without signposting it as equal to ‘Black’.

⁴ See the reviews by Eve Rosenhaft (pp. 73–9) and Juliane Clegg (pp. 101–6) in this issue of the *GHIL Bulletin*.

⁵ Kwame Antony Appiah, ‘The Case for Capitalizing the B in Black’, *The Atlantic*, 18 June 2020, online at <<https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/>

vention of capitalizing other terms denoting social, cultural, and ethnic identities, such as Afro-Caribbean, Hispanic, Native American, and so on. Like many outlets and publishers, we decided to capitalize the B in Black going forwards when using the term as a cultural or ethnic identifier.⁶

However, the real debate is over what to do with ‘White’. Some outlets feel that ‘Black’ denotes a shared cultural background in a way that ‘White’ does not, and therefore capitalize ‘Black’ while leaving ‘White’ in lower case. Others choose to capitalize both words to reflect the fact that they both refer to artificial, socially constructed categories. There is also concern in some quarters that upper-case ‘White’ would inadvertently endorse the White-supremacist practice of capitalizing ‘White’ and leaving ‘Black’ in lower case, although treating both terms consistently equally ought to avoid that connection. Indeed, some argue, if used with social awareness and critical discourse, might this policy even help make such usage by ‘White supremacists’ redundant one day?⁷

As scholars and translators of German, British, and global history, we find using upper case for both Black and White appropriate. It sets a symmetry inasmuch as it indicates that White people also have a racial identity. This could therefore mark an important shift: White people will have to deal with the consequences of being categorized by race.⁸ Sociologist of race Eve Ewing argues: ‘White people . . .

archive/2020/06/time-to-capitalize-blackand-white/613159/>, accessed 11 Aug. 2020.

⁶ See e.g. WashPostPR, ‘The Washington Post Announces Writing Style Changes for Racial and Ethnic Identifiers’, *Washington Post*, 29 July 2020, online at <<https://www.washingtonpost.com/pr/2020/07/29/washington-post-announces-writing-style-changes-racial-ethnic-identifiers/>>, accessed 11 Aug. 2020.

⁷ For background reading, see Mike Laws, ‘Why We Capitalize “Black” (and not “white”)', *Columbia Journalism Review*, 16 June 2020, online at <<https://www.cjr.org/analysis/capital-b-black-styleguide.php>>, accessed 11 Aug. 2020; Kwame Anthony Appiah, ‘The Case for Capitalizing the B in Black’; Post Reports, ‘Capital B for Black’, *Washington Post*, 31 July 2020, online at <<https://www.washingtonpost.com/podcasts/post-reports/capital-b-for-black/>>, accessed 11 Aug. 2020.

⁸ Nell Irvin Painter, ‘Why “White” Should be Capitalized, Too’, *Washington Post*, 22 July 2020, online at <<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opin->

move through the world without ever considering the fact of their Whiteness. This is an incredible feat, through which White people get to be only normal, neutral, or without any race at all, while the rest of us are saddled with this unpleasant business of being racialized.’ Whiteness, in other words, is not actually neutral or ‘standard’. ‘As long as White people do not ever have to interrogate what Whiteness is, where it comes from, how it operates, or what it does’, Ewing writes, ‘they can maintain the fiction that race is other people’s problem, that they are mere observers in a centuries-long stage play in which they have, in fact, been the producers, directors, and central actors.’⁹ Treating White as a neutral adjective, as the Center for the Study of Social Policy points out, allows ‘White people to sit out of conversations about race and removes accountability from White people’s and White institutions’ involvement in racism’.¹⁰ In sum, we feel the upper case provides an opportunity to reflect on how Whiteness operates in our institutions and in society at large.

That said, there will always remain unresolved issues and ambiguities. ‘Language and racial categories have some important things in common: They are fluid, they are inherently political, and they are a socially constructed set of shared norms that are constantly in flux as our beliefs and circumstances change.’¹¹ What about texts whose authors give good reasons to keep the word White in lower case?¹²

ions/2020/07/22/why-white-should-be-capitalized/>, accessed 11 Aug. 2020.

⁹ Eve Ewing, ‘I’m a Black Scholar Who Studies Race: Here’s Why I Capitalize “White”’, *Zora Medium*, 2 July 2020, online at <<https://zora.medium.com/im-a-black-scholar-who-studies-race-here-s-why-i-capitalize-white-f94883aa2dd3>>, accessed 11 Aug. 2020.

¹⁰ Ann Thúy Nguyễn and Maya Pendleton, ‘Recognizing Race in Language: Why We Capitalize “Black” and “White”’, Center for the Study of Social Policy, 23 Mar. 2020, online at <<https://cssp.org/2020/03/recognizing-race-in-language-why-we-capitalize-black-and-white/>>, accessed 11 Aug. 2020.

¹¹ Ewing, ‘I’m a Black Scholar Who Studies Race’.

¹² For a different position against capitalizing ‘W’ as an act of decolonization, see e.g. this social media discussion by Jenn Jackson (@JennMJacksonPhD), ‘I talked to @eveewing about this but I disagree with this ethos wholesale. . .’, *Twitter*, 2 Aug. 2020, online at <<https://twitter.com/JennMJacksonPhD/status/1289887251179200512>>, accessed 11 Aug. 2020. Jackson argues: ‘Capitalizing the “w” is only a performative act for white people. The rest of us are

By adopting new coinages as standard, might we one day become complicit in constructing categories and thus falling into the trap of imposing racial categories where we are supposed to critique them?¹³

As we continue to listen to the wider discourse, we recognize our policy needs to be adaptable, and that these regulations cannot be fixed rules. We acknowledge that some authors might be uncomfortable with the idea of capitalizing ‘White’ when discussing White supremacism. Some might express fear of inadvertently lending weight to racist ideology and ‘White concerns’, instead of decentring them. We will always give authors the opportunity to discuss their concerns with the editors, or to be more specific in order to acknowledge the different shades of Whiteness.

What about ‘antisemitism’? Many major style guides mandate it to be spelt with a hyphen and a capital-S ‘anti-Semitism’. But we need to remember that the term was originally coined in 1879 by the German journalist Wilhelm Marr, who sought to establish a (pseudo-) scientific basis for longstanding anti-Jewish sentiments in order to make these more widely acceptable.¹⁴ In accordance with the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, we will therefore favour the unhyphenated spelling ‘in order to dispel the idea that there is an entity “Semitism” which “anti-Semitism” opposes’.¹⁵ This echoes the

already aware that whiteness is *not* invisible. Not capitalizing the “w” in white is a systemic disruption which decenters whiteness with respect to other groups. That should be the purpose of capitalization.’ See also Laws, ‘Why We Capitalize “Black” (and not “white”)’.

¹³ We are, for instance, aware of the need to reflect on the question of how far to go in naming colour categories, while at the same time asking whether there are compelling editorial and scholarly reasons to impose further categories. The recent coinage ‘Brown’ is increasingly cited as both a racial category and a form of identity, for example. While it might offer some scholars a useful contemporary way of thinking about the past, we would argue that it cannot be related back to historical contexts to the same extent as Black or White. See e.g. Silva Kumarini, ‘Brown: From Identity to Identification’, *Cultural Studies*, 24/2 (2010), 167–82.

¹⁴ Stephen Smith, ‘Since we’re Debating Labels, Stop Calling it anti-Semitism: It’s Jew Hatred’, *Forward*, 7 July 2020, online at <<https://forward.com/opinion/450209/since-were-debating-labels-stop-calling-it-anti-semitism-its-jew-hatred/>>, accessed 11 Aug. 2020.

¹⁵ IHRA Committee on Antisemitism and Holocaust Denial, ‘Memo on Spelling of Antisemitism.’

IHRA's concern that 'the hyphenated spelling allows for the possibility of something called "Semitism", which not only legitimizes a form of pseudo-scientific racial classification that was thoroughly discredited by association with Nazi ideology, but also divides the term, stripping it from its meaning of opposition and hatred toward Jews'.¹⁶

We consider these two policies as going hand in hand. All racial categories are a construct. As such, we must not let these categories 'disguise themselves as common nouns and adjectives'. Instead, we should, as Kwame Anthony Appiah proposes, 'call them out by their names'.¹⁷ In other words, the concept of race is the result of racism, 'not its prerequisite', as the Jena Declaration stated in 2019 in recognition of the University of Jena's historical responsibilities in the establishment of pseudo-scientific racial theories.¹⁸

While 'race' does not exist, racism still does. From the under-representation of ethnic minority authors in journals and academic presses to the lack of diversity in historical institutions and the absence of Black History from the curricula of German and British schools and universities, we are aware that academic publishing, and the field of history itself, stand within, not outside, institutional structures that reproduce inequalities.¹⁹ The use of appropriate language is a small but important signal for the kinds of histories we want to write, publish, and promote.

The Editors

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Appiah, 'The Case for Capitalizing the *B* in Black'.

¹⁸ Martin S. Fischer, Uwe Hoßfeld, Johannes Krause, and Stefan Richter, 'Jena Declaration: The Concept of Race is the Result of Racism, not its Prerequisite', Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, online at <https://www.uni-jena.de/en/190910_JenaerErklaerung_EN>, accessed 5 Oct. 2020.

¹⁹ Royal Historical Society, 'Race, Ethnicity & Equality Report' (London, 2018), online at <<https://royalhistsoc.org/racereport/>>, accessed 11 Aug. 2020.

ARTICLE

THE SHORT AND THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY: GERMAN AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

ULRICH HERBERT

Fifteen years ago, a group of historians came together to discuss writing a history of Europe in the twentieth century in the form of coordinated national histories held together by common issues and transnational perspectives. We quickly realized that the relationship between national history and transnational processes is complicated, especially in Europe, and that it raises questions about both the historical processes themselves and the appropriate form for their historiography. Can anything like a specifically European history be written? What would hold it together beyond the topographical? To what extent does this apply to the twentieth century? What lines of interpretation would predominate and how would they manifest themselves?

One of the central questions from the outset was that of periodization. Since periodization is only the temporal expression of patterns of interpretation, it is always about the main categories and emphases of historical analysis. This article will present some of the results of this group's work, which has been published in nine volumes.¹ Despite all efforts to co-ordinate them, the individual volumes differ considerably due to the subject as well as to the authors – and certainly not all the authors would agree with all of my

This is the text of the 2019/20 Gerda Henckel Visiting Professor's inaugural lecture, delivered at the German Historical Institute London on 10 Dec. 2019.

¹ *Europäische Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert*: Walter L. Bernecker, *Geschichte Spaniens im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2010); Marie-Janine Calic, *Geschichte Jugoslawiens im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2010), pub. in English as *A History of Yugoslavia* (West Lafayette, Ind. 2019); Franz-Josef Brüggemeier, *Geschichte Großbritanniens im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2010); Włodzimierz Borodziej, *Geschichte Polens im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2010); Hans Woller, *Geschichte*

remarks here. The result, however, is revealing and challenging, albeit, as always, somewhat subjective.

Contemporary history is the history of contemporaries. Their categories and evaluations are necessarily those of the period that contemporary history describes, and it often takes a long time for it to distance itself from them. Contemporary history concentrates on great political events—mostly belligerent or revolutionary—and divides the decades much like how other historians divide centuries: ‘From the Reformation to the Thirty Years War’—the sixteenth century; ‘From the French Revolution to the First World War’—the nineteenth century. Long-term shifts—economic, social, and cultural changes—usually reveal themselves much later because their effects are often imperceptible and not related to a single moment.

The history of the twentieth century in Europe and large parts of the world is marked by three events: the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the Second World War, and the fall of the Soviet empire in 1990–1. The formative significance of these events is beyond doubt. From them emerged the notion of the twentieth century in contrast to the ‘long nineteenth century’, which, from this perspective, lasted until 1914—from the French Revolution to the First World War. This was the bourgeois century, whose order was suddenly destroyed by the gunshots at Sarajevo. What followed was the ‘short century’ of catastrophes, of the world wars, and of the Cold War.

I. *The Great Acceleration*

In the historiography of twentieth-century Europe, the First World War has been seen as dividing two eras, and there are good reasons for regarding it as one of the most important turning-points in the continent’s modern history. From this perspective, it was only with

Italiens im 20. Jahrhundert (Munich, 2010); Dietmar Neutatz, *Träume und Alpträume: Eine Geschichte Russlands im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2013); Ulrich Herbert, *Geschichte Deutschlands im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2014), pub. in English as *A History of Twentieth-Century Germany* (Oxford, 2019); Jakob Tanner, *Geschichte der Schweiz im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2015); Matthias Waechter, *Geschichte Frankreichs im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich, 2019).

the First World War that the nineteenth century really came to an end.

With the fall of Imperial Germany, the Habsburg monarchy also collapsed. A year earlier, the February revolution had put an end to the rule of the Russian Tsar, and the Ottoman empire was also about to disappear. The end of the war saw the collapse of four monarchically ruled empires, whose chief features were the dominant role of premodern forces, the prominent position of the military, and the oppression of national minorities.

Similarly, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 undoubtedly marked a watershed that would determine the face of the twentieth century almost until its conclusion. At the end of the First World War, a profound political and social dichotomy came about between the Western liberal capitalist states and communist Russia, which meant competition between the powers on a global scale. But that competition also manifested itself as a confrontation within the Western states between radical left-wing labour movements and the liberal, capitalist bourgeoisie: a worldwide antithesis between two powers in the structural form of social antagonism.

These new conditions laid the basis for several decades of dictatorship, civil war and revolution, expulsion and genocide, economic collapse, and political catastrophe—a period that ended in 1945 in Western Europe, but not until 1990 in Eastern Europe, with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this sense, the First World War was, in the words of the American diplomat George F. Kennan, ‘the great seminal catastrophe of this century’.²

Other arguments, however, which I shall briefly outline, oppose the metaphor of the ‘short twentieth century’. For one thing, the unleashing of the First World War was connected with an attempt by three European military monarchies to revive their already obviously declining power and legitimacy. Since the end of the nineteenth century, the Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian empires had been hard hit by the onslaught of nationalist movements and liberal forces aiming to achieve democracy and parliamentary rule. The power of these empires was clearly limited and their end could be foreseen. The First World War accelerated their decay, but did not bring it about.

² George F. Kennan, *The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875–1890* (Princeton, 1979), 3.

Moreover, to define the twentieth century as running from 1917 to 1990 – that is, from the beginning to the end of communist rule in Russia – is to see the characteristic feature of the period as the conflict between communist and capitalist societies triggered by the October Revolution. The authoritarian and right-wing extremist regimes, by contrast, and National Socialism in particular, are perceived from this perspective as subordinate to the main contradiction. To see the antagonism between communism and bourgeois rule as the main conflict of the period is to endorse the communist view that fascism and National Socialism are variants of the capitalist order, and thus to suggest that the contradictions between ‘different forms of bourgeois rule’ – that is, between democracy and National Socialism – are of secondary significance. This would compel us to interpret the Nazi regime, its war against the Soviet Union, and the Holocaust as subordinate aspects of history, or as side effects of the conflict between East and West. In Ernst Nolte’s interpretation, this view turns the murder of the Jews into a kind of putative self-defence measure against Bolshevism on the part of the German bourgeoisie, standing for the European bourgeoisie.³

In order to avoid such a disastrously reductive approach, we must seek out the historical situation from which the twentieth-century movements driven by radical ideology originated, and go back to the period before the October Revolution and the First World War. The destabilization of European societies had begun with high industrialization and its associated fundamental social changes at the turn of the century. All the political mass movements that left such an indelible mark on the twentieth century began at that time. With the October Revolution, the conflict between capital and labour became the defining motif of the new century, but it had already taken shape in the final third of the previous one. The formation of the German workers’ movement as a programmatic and organizational response to this conflict was largely complete by the 1890s; the radical variant associated with the names of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht came only ten years later. At this time, anti-liberal and antisemitic radical nationalism also emerged, becoming a powerful movement long before the Bolshevik Revolution.

³ Ernst Nolte, *Der Europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917–1945: Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus* (Berlin, 1987), 524.

These processes occurred at different times in different European countries. In the United Kingdom, industrial society had been established since the middle of the nineteenth century, while in eastern central Europe this happened much later, and then mostly in isolated spots. The same was true of Russia. In the western European countries, by contrast, the transition from agrarian to industrial society came between the mid 1880s and 1914.

This largely follows existing interpretations. In his great study of the nineteenth century in Europe, Christopher Bayly stresses that even in Britain, the fundamental changes took place in the years after 1890. Bayly is here arguing against Arno Mayer and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, for example, who insist that the *ancien régime* lasted until 1914; and also against the majority of British historians, who emphasize the longevity of British imperialism and industrial society.⁴

Bayly, on the other hand, like others, such as Lothar Gall and most recently Ian Kershaw, sees the similarities between European countries in terms of economics, social structures, international relations, political discourse, art, and literature.⁵ Everywhere, Bayly writes, the twenty-five years before the First World War were a ‘melting pot of modernity’. Agrarian crisis, new imperialism, international co-operation, new nationalism, the crisis of liberalism: new, dramatic developments of great significance were beginning everywhere, which is why Bayly calls the last chapter of his book ‘The Great Acceleration: c.1890 to 1914’.⁶

This is consistent with the arguments in most of the volumes in our series. The twenty-five years before the First World War are seen as a period of intense change, unprecedented in scale and speed, which affected large sections of European societies directly, and almost all others indirectly, with long-term consequences extending into the last third of the twentieth century.

⁴ Christopher Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons* (Malden, Mass., 2004); Arno Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War* (New York, 1981); Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte 1849–1914: Von der ‘Deutschen Doppelrevolution’ bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Munich, 1995).

⁵ Lothar Gall, *Von der ständischen zur bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (Munich, 2012); Ian Kershaw, *To Hell and Back: Europe, 1914–1949* (New York, 2015).

⁶ Bayly, *Birth of the Modern World*, 451.

What was new compared with previous decades was that the trends inherent to modern industrial society in the most developed countries were no longer limited to specific groups and a few regions, but transformed the lives of almost all the people in these countries. These transformations all happened within a single generation and were more fundamental than ever before in history. They played out in processes of advanced industrialization, urbanization, and mass migration; the comprehensive mechanization and rationalization of all areas of life; scientization; and, above all, the triumph of the natural sciences. The latter competed with religion in making a comprehensive claim to explain the world. Finally, transformations also took place in mass culture and the mass public.

This dynamic of change was centred on the economically advanced countries of Western and central Europe. Between 1880 and 1914, around 35 to 40 per cent of the rural populations of Continental Europe west of Poland and north of the Balkans (in many regions more than 50 per cent) moved to the cities and formed the urban proletariat, with specific working and living conditions, and increasingly similar lifestyles.

In the eastern and southern countries, agricultural structures were still largely predominant and long-lived. Yet the pull of the modernization processes in Europe's large industrial countries also changed the societies of the periphery for good, especially in many of the sub-regions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in the Polish regions, in later Czechoslovakia, and in what was to become Yugoslavia.

For the Western and central European regions, and to some extent also the Scandinavian countries, the most striking feature was the extraordinary speed of economic, social, and cultural change in these decades. The flight from the country to the city led to the loss of traditional religious values, a rapid change in gender and generational roles, and the destruction of traditional social hierarchies.

Restless activity, unprecedented politicization, and a myriad of political and social experiments were expressions of the feverish search for answers to new challenges. The political, social, and cultural movements that emerged in the following decades—some extremely radical—were attempts to respond to these challenges, which were perceived both as representing unprecedented progress, and as profound, existential crises within traditional societies. The fact that these new conditions and their inherent tendencies had

never been experienced before, and that no existing traditions or models had yet proved themselves, explains the intensity of these reactions, which can be understood in abstract terms as processes of seeking or learning.

In the political field, two varieties of radical criticism in the confrontation with the 'new world' (to borrow a common contemporary expression for these profound changes) emerged in the years before the First World War. They were based on the view that liberal bourgeois society had failed in the course of the change experienced in recent decades, and that a completely new version would have to be developed.

In abstract terms, the left and, later, its more extreme form, the radical left, drew on the categories of social inequality and internationalism, and declared the class system in general, and the working class in particular, to be the true subject of history. The radical right-wing counter-proposal, on the other hand, was based on the principle of descent and nationalism, and declared the *Volk* ('the people'), not the individual, to be the true subject of history, defining it in relation to culture and heritage.

Both sides believed that they could explain the crisis of bourgeois society with the help of these tools, and that they had recognized the underlying laws of history and nature. These ideological concepts suggested that any problems could be solved quickly if the required conditions were met. Their adherents were convinced that subscribing to such a doctrine of world explanation meant they were in harmony with the laws of nature and history. This gave their political practices their own peculiar dynamic, as well as their characteristic ruthlessness and brutality.

Above all, however, the political mass movements that originated in the industrialized countries also prevailed in the less industrialized regions on the periphery. Henceforth, and often mixed with regionally specific traditions, they shaped the political map on the left as well as on the right. This applied to Russia more than to any other country. In Russia, the dynamic growth in urban centres and the increased number of industrial workers, although relatively few in absolute terms, confronted a vast majority consisting of the traditional and isolated rural population.

Everywhere, however, the First World War was a radicalizing factor. It strengthened the conviction among both the Bolsheviks and

the extreme right in Europe that Western liberal society was coming to an end. But only in those countries that emerged defeated from the war—Germany, Austria, Russia, and Italy (which saw itself as a loser)—did radical, anti-liberal movements turn into brutal, ideological dictatorships. The conclusion that these countries drew from the experience of the war was that the impact of the new, industrialized world had proved so destructive, the only way to deal with it was by totalitarian means and violence.

For them, the world of liberal capitalism, by contrast, seemed weak and outdated, and this impression was reinforced by the world economic crisis. In the 1930s, only a minority of European states held on to democracy and the free market; all others, in some form, developed new right-wing dictatorships based on the Italian and German models.

National Socialism and Bolshevism as regimes, therefore, represented alternatives to the liberal capitalist path to modernity. Rather than being ‘anti-modern’ social formations, they provided alternative blueprints for the organization of the industrial world, in which the liberal triad of free economy, open society, and value-based universalism had been broken down in specific ways. Both should be seen as condensed responses to the dynamic of change since the onset of advanced industrialization at the turn of the century, radicalized by the experiences of the First World War and by confrontations with competing concepts of order.

II. *Climax: Industrial Society at its Peak*

The victory of the anti-Hitler coalition in 1945 put an end to one of these radical alternatives. This resulted in the complete delegitimization of the right-wing extremist counter-proposal, while the other radical alternative to the liberal system, Soviet communism, was considerably boosted by its co-operation with the West, its victorious war against Germany and, above all, by the USSR’s devastating losses. It also seemed to have a great future as a model for ordering the world. The Cold War—political and ideological antagonism on the world stage—formed the matrix of world history for the next forty years. In it, two concepts for ordering the industrial world that had emerged since the turn of the century confronted each other once again.

Paradoxically, as a result of the Second World War and its consequences, industrialism asserted itself as the dominant economic and social force across almost the whole of Europe, despite the devastating destruction wrought over the continent. As early as the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviet model had superimposed the principle of heavy industry and the industrial mass worker on to the traditions of the peasant economy by means of terror and mass violence. This allowed it to win the war against Nazi Germany. The violent transformation of the Soviet Union from an agrarian society into an industrial one within a single generation was henceforth regarded as a model for transforming 'backward' societies, not least in the decolonized countries of the Global South and, above all, in China. However, it also provided the model for the socialist economies in the countries of central and eastern Europe, including the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

In Western countries, too, widespread industrialism was a result of the war. In Nazi Germany during the last years of the war, more than 50 per cent of the workforce were industrial workers, almost half of them foreign forced labourers. The number of industrial workers was similarly high in Britain, and somewhat lower in France, Italy, and the Benelux countries. While this did not change immediately after the war, the number of people working in the primary sector fell rapidly in the following years, and the unskilled or semi-skilled industrial worker became the emblematic social figure.

Many contemporaries, however, were surprised that the liberal option prevailed in the now emerging West. In previous decades, it had been considered outdated in much of Europe and was believed to have been superseded by 'modern' dictatorial systems. Nevertheless, the superior military and economic power of the West, especially of the USA, resulting in its victory, had reactivated the principles of capitalist and democratic liberalism and made it attractive in a way that was inconceivable before the war.

Emergent industrialism in Europe peaked in the first half of the 1960s, when the share of gross national product generated by manufacturing industry lay between 45 and 55 per cent, with the highest levels in East and West Germany because of their considerable need to catch up as a result of war damage. In most western European countries, this orientation towards industry was reflected in a high proportion of unskilled and physical labour, relatively low numbers

of female employees, and the importance of trade unions. The traditional family model was still almost unrivalled in the mid 1960s, and the number of divorces was low. The same applied to education: at the beginning of the 1960s, the proportion of children attending secondary school was only slightly higher than before the war, although there were some differences across European countries. Two-thirds to three-quarters of adolescents received only a basic schooling of eight to nine years: 70 per cent in Italy, 55 per cent in Britain, and just under 60 per cent in Germany and France.

The first counter-tendency, however—one which expanded over the years—was already visible here. The service sector, with its increased demand for qualifications, began to grow, and the number of employees, and of women in employment, increased rapidly and significantly, as did improvements in educational attainment. At the end of the 1970s, the proportion of students with university entrance qualifications in the Federal Republic had risen from less than 7 per cent to almost 20 per cent. It was even higher in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland, as well as in France and Britain. This reflected the declining importance of unskilled mass labour and the trend towards higher vocational qualifications on a broader scale.

Nevertheless, the 1960s marked the climax of industrialism and of thinking in terms of the categories of industrial progress. Individual use of cars, the development of large motorway networks, and the construction of huge housing estates were expressions of an extraordinarily optimistic vision of the future—one which underpinned the considerable growth figures achieved mainly by industry for decades to come. Nothing marks this optimistic attitude towards progress as clearly as the euphoria about the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This raised hopes, not only among entrepreneurs but especially in workers' parties, that social hardship could, once and for all, come to an end in Europe, and, indeed, the whole world. At a party conference on the nuclear programme of the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 1956, a party official declared: 'But if we succeed in using nuclear energy in a planned and meaningful way, we can increase the wealth of a people, reduce social tensions and even prevent wars.'⁷

⁷ Leo Brandt, *Die 2. industrielle Revolution* (Bonn, 1956), 3–6.

III. *Downfall: The Decade of Discontent*

The shock of the early 1970s, when the previously unchallenged position of industry and industrial mass labour as the basis of European societies began to slip, was all the more severe. The demand for industrial mass goods from the coal and steel industries had largely been satisfied. Oil replaced coal, and countries with lower wage levels were able to use simple technologies to produce goods much more cheaply than Europeans.

In Britain, the process of deindustrialization had already begun in the mid 1960s, and strongly impacted the coal and steel regions of Wales and central England. Coal mines were closed down, the shipbuilding industry was in decline, and the textile industry almost disappeared. With the oil price crisis of 1973–5, Britain's already difficult situation got worse. The 1970s was a decade of permanent crisis, peaking in the 'winter of discontent' of 1978–9, when unemployment figures rose to 1.6 million and the industrial system seemed to have come to an end. Similarly in France, Italy, the Scandinavian countries, and the Federal Republic, growth figures fell, unemployment increased, and the national debt rose.

It was, above all, a crisis of industry, especially heavy industry. In Germany, the number of people employed in industry fell by 1.4 million between 1973 and 1976; this affected mainly semi-skilled and unskilled workers, in some cases almost exclusively. Between 1970 and 1983, gross value added in mining fell by 42 per cent, in shipbuilding by 13 per cent, and in the iron and steel industry by 10 per cent.

In the large industrial regions of Europe, structural change brought about profound social and topographical changes. Whether in the English Midlands, northern France, southern Belgium, the Ruhr area, or the Saarland, abandoned factories, industrial wastelands, and desolate inner cities were to be seen everywhere. Municipalities ran into acute financial difficulty, and working-class districts near abandoned facilities were soon occupied largely by the unemployed and early retirees. Some cities lost more than a third of their population in under fifteen years. Others succeeded in establishing new industries and developing a new dynamic based largely

on the service industries, finance, and science—but this was a slow process. Most of the former coal and steel regions in western Europe and the USA, however, remained pockets of decay for decades.

It was a long time before it became clear that this was not an economic slowdown that would soon be replaced by an upturn, but a fundamental structural change—the beginning of an erosion of existing economic structures. This was the end not of the ‘boom’—that is, the European economic miracle of the post-war period—but of the classic industrial society based on heavy industry that had shaped Europe for more than eighty years.

As a consequence, a process of forced change began in western European societies, and individual governments took different steps to mitigate it. In France and Germany, a reduction in heavy industry, a change in the socio-political model of industrialism, an expansion of the service sector, and the promotion of new technologies were phased in and heavily subsidized by the state. The British government, by contrast, pushed through a reduction in the coal and steel industry, and especially in the mining industry, within a few years and established a model based on high tech and finance. A result of both models, however, was the radical dismantling of heavy industry, the disintegration of the old industrial regions, and the dissolution of the working class.

At the same time, the political, social, and cultural foundations of the older social formation also began to falter. That formation had its origins in the two decades before the turn of the century, and political disputes had concentrated on its form and order in the eight or so decades since. Even the Social Democratic and trade union configuration, which aimed for growth, progress, and Keynesian economic governance, and which had celebrated successes in previous years, was now clearly exhausted.

The break that the 1970s represented in the history of industrial societies becomes even clearer if we look at developments in the socialist states, where the strong focus on heavy industry in the post-war years had brought considerable success, but at the cost of neglecting other sectors of the economy. As early as the 1960s, it became apparent that, contrary to hopes and expectations, the technological gap between the socialist economies and the capitalist economies of the West was widening. Attempts to compensate for this by concentrating on future technologies led to a further deterior-

ration, especially in the consumer goods sector. From the late 1960s, this led to a marked increase in popular dissatisfaction that was particularly noticeable in Poland and Czechoslovakia. The attempt to compensate for these failures by increasing social benefits quickly reached its financial limits, especially since the gigantic military apparatus consumed most of the state's funds. The GDR, as well as Hungary and Poland, tried to plug the gap with loans from the West, to be repaid by increased exports. As a result, the Comecon countries' indebtedness to the West rose to hitherto unprecedented levels. As early as 1980, the economists of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) internally declared the GDR insolvent. From then on, it relied for its existence on loans drip-fed by the Federal Republic.

The structural crisis of heavy industry after the early 1970s hit the socialist states even harder than the Western ones, because their economic model had been geared almost exclusively to heavy industry. They were unable fundamentally to change this model, which was built on the industrial working class—not only economically, but also politically. At least after Leonid Brezhnev's death in 1982, the Soviet Union's economic decline could no longer be concealed, having reached proportions that could no longer be offset by the conventional means used by the Soviet state. The Soviet Union's economy was geared to mining and steel, and it was simply unable to switch to post-heavy industrial, technologically innovative economic forms. This became apparent as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, which accelerated the Soviet economy's decline, ending in the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire.

If we compare developments in the East and West, it becomes clear that the system of industrial order that had developed in the three decades before the First World War came to an end in the 1970s. But while the West, using methods that were sometimes harsh, was able to transform itself to such an extent that the capitalist economy could survive without a heavy industrial base, the Soviet, socialist part of the world was unable to do so. Without classic industry, there were no industrial workers; without industrial workers, there could be no socialism.

A comparison with China is illuminating here. The Chinese communists gave up communism, but retained power and continued their dictatorship on the basis of a technological capitalism that was both dynamic and brutal. The Soviet communists, on the other hand,

saw the decline of communism as a defeat and final collapse, and did not defend their power—or only very timidly. A Soviet Union without communism was unthinkable. The same applied to the GDR. In 1988, an East German official expressed it as follows: ‘What right can a capitalist GDR have to exist alongside a capitalist Federal Republic? None, of course.’⁸

IV. *Pre- or Post-? The Present*

If we regard the decades between 1890 and 1990, with all due caution, as a unit, then the question of how we should classify the period after 1990 remains open. There have been many attempts to find a label: postmodernism, post-industrialization, second modernity, for instance. All of these, however, differentiate themselves from previous industrial modernities and do not develop their own positive content. Other possible labels include the era of globalization, digitalization, or neo-liberalism. Let us leave the labelling to the specialists, the sociologists, for now, and instead look at the late 1980s and early 1990s from today’s perspective to identify what has changed.

The traditional working class, of course, has disappeared and been replaced by large groups forming an individualized precariat, especially in the service sector. The same applies to globalization, although the tendency towards regional dissolution has been apparent since the 1970s, albeit by no means on this scale. This includes transnational and transcontinental mass migration. Another change is the extent of the globally networked finance economy, culminating in the global financial crisis of 2008 that almost led the world into the abyss. There is also the ecological threat, to the extent that it is recognized as a threat to existence. Further, there is the privatization of functions that were previously the purview of the state—in general, the complex referred to by the fuzzy concept of ‘neo-liberalism’. Finally, there is social democracy’s loss of significance and the decline of trade unions in most countries. Here, the political impact of industrial structural change is tangible.

⁸ Otto Reinhold, speaking on Radio DDR, 19 Aug. 1989. Quoted in *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 34 (1989), 1175.

The most visible changes are probably to be seen in the cultural sphere: the huge reduction in the importance of the traditional family; the greatly altered role attributions of the sexes, especially of women; and the large expansion of education, which already affects most societies. European societies are also much more diverse. This is nowhere more evident than in British cities like London; yet even in Germany, a quarter of the population now has a 'migration background', which includes descendants of families in which one or both parents are migrants. Directly connected with this are the enormous increase in xenophobic movements, the return of nationalism, the rise of radical right-wing groups, and the crisis of the classic democratic parties – not completely unknown thirty or forty years ago, but quite unthinkable on this scale.

All of these developments, which characterize the past thirty years, clearly reveal differences from previous decades, which already seem strange to us. These differences become even clearer when we look at the 1960s. We can scarcely remember the Cold War and the suppressed but constant fear of nuclear war, while the unquestioning exploitation of natural resources that was regarded as normal in those days is almost unimaginable today. That the air was bad and the rivers poisoned was once accepted as a sign of progress, as was the fact that in 1970, 21,000 people died in traffic accidents in the Federal Republic; today the figure is 3,500, with twice as many cars on the roads.

The circumstance that men controlled their wives' money was taken for granted, as was the fact that workers' children did not attend university. The life of a working-class family in French Lorraine, in the coal regions of northern England, or in the Ruhr area was economically better in 1960 than in 1920, but the basic structures were the same: long working hours, low wages, the father as sole breadwinner, the mother working outside the home only in an emergency. Workers led their lives largely in the proletarian milieu, which for generations was organized in social democratic, communist, or Catholic associations, in clear opposition to the middle-class world.

To conclude, looking at the long twentieth century – or, to be more precise, the period from the 1890s to the 1980s – we discover new connections: the links between the emergence of industrialized society and the great ideological dictatorships; the structural connections between fascism and communism as radical answers to the

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challenges of the industrial society; the similarities and differences between Western and socialist societies as two versions of industrialism; the relationship between economic and social structures; and changes in ways of life, traditions, and the relationship between the sexes. We understand why the 1968 movement took place precisely at the end of classical industrial society (and why it referred to the socialist labour movement as the only model for the future). We recognize that the fall of the Soviet empire was one consequence of the downfall of industrialism, and neo-liberalism another. We recognize a world that is still half-familiar, yet has perished. Our present is the time after, and we do not know how it will later be historically classified – as ‘pre-’ or ‘post-’.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

POLITICAL RELIGION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: TWO NEW STUDIES ON THE GERMAN AWAKENING MOVEMENT

HANS-CHRISTOF KRAUS

DAVID L. ELLIS, *Politics and Piety: The Protestant Awakening in Prussia, 1816–1856*, Studies in the History of Christian Traditions, 186 (Leiden: Brill, 2017), xii + 337 pp. ISBN 978 90 04 30808 4. €189.00

ANDREW KLOES, *The German Awakening: Protestant Renewal after the Enlightenment, 1815–1848*, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), xvi + 328 pp. ISBN 978 01 90 93686 0. £64.00

Although the nineteenth century was by no means a ‘second confessional age’ in Germany, as is sometimes claimed,¹ religion still played a prominent role and profoundly shaped everyday life in social, societal, and political terms. Despite the general process of secularization taking place across Europe (albeit slowly and in various forms),² there were repeated periods of rechristianization—especially in the wake of particularly brutal and violent phases of dechristianization.³ The German Protestant Awakening movement arose

* Trans. by Jozef van der Voort (GHIL).

¹ See e.g. Olaf Blaschke (ed.), *Konfessionen im Konflikt: Deutschland zwischen 1800 und 1970. Ein zweites konfessionelles Zeitalter* (Göttingen, 2002).

² For further detail, see the masterly and still seminal study by Owen Chadwick, *The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1975); more recently also Rudolf Schlögl, *Alter Glaube und moderne Welt: Europäisches Christentum im Umbruch 1750–1850* (Frankfurt am Main, 2013).

³ See Hartmut Lehmann, ‘Zwischen Dechristianisierung und Rechristianisierung: Fragen und Anmerkungen zur Bedeutung des Christentums in Europa und in Nordamerika im 19. und im 20. Jahrhundert’, *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte*, 11/1 (1998), 156–68.

partly in response to the years of conflict under the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and the German Campaign of 1813 (as established over one hundred years ago in a famous study by Karl Holl),⁴ and it spread sporadically from 1815 onwards, with a particularly strong presence in northern and eastern Germany. During the decades leading up to 1848, it exerted a significant influence on the development of German Protestantism, particularly in Prussia—although that influence was certainly controversial at the time. The movement also played a fundamental part in the rise of political conservatism during the Vormärz, as well as in early attempts at Christian social reform. There is already a substantial body of scholarship on these topics, which raises the question of what new findings and insights these two recent monographs have to offer.

The confessional situation in Prussia after 1800, which forms the main focus of both studies, was highly complex. In the wake of the territorial expansion of 1815, which saw Prussia gain control over the mainly Catholic provinces of Westphalia and the Rhineland, the opposition between majority Protestantism and minority Catholicism expanded into an ecclesiastical and political problem that came to an initial head with the Cologne church dispute between 1837 and 1840. Meanwhile, the conflict between Reformed and Lutheran denominations may have been settled by the Evangelical union in 1817, but Old Lutheran opposition to the Prussian Union of Churches founded by Frederick William III caused significant unrest within Prussian Protestantism until 1840. Nor had the consequences of the older conflicts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries been resolved—by which I mean the multiple rivalries between Lutheran orthodoxy, enlightened theology ('Neology'), and Pietism.

To a certain extent, the post-1815 Protestant Awakening movement arose at the interface of all these developments, and it has now been closely examined and re-evaluated by two American authors: David L. Ellis and Andrew Kloes. The question of the relationship between the Awakening movement and the modern world is central to both studies, though Ellis views it more through the prism of political history, while Kloes leans towards a perspective rooted in social

⁴ Karl Holl, 'Die Bedeutung der großen Kriege für das religiöse und kirchliche Leben innerhalb des deutschen Protestantismus', in id., *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte*, 3 vols. (Tübingen, 1928), iii. 302–84.

and religious history. Both are at pains to treat the Awakening movement not as a purely German, or even a purely Prussian, phenomenon, but as part of an international rechristianization process that encompassed and shaped the whole of Europe and North America (albeit to varying degrees in different regions). And both keep their distance from certain early, undifferentiated, materialist approaches to understanding this religious, social, and political movement. In the process, it becomes clear that they do not see the Awakening solely as a backward-looking movement that politically and intellectually served the interests of a reactionary elite, as often used to be claimed, but that they recognize certain 'modern' elements within it.

Ellis presents a well-founded, chronologically organized overview of the movement's emergence and development, keeping a steady eye on its political effects. He begins with an international comparison before narrowing the scope of his study to focus primarily on 'Prussia's heartland'—the provinces of Brandenburg and Pomerania—which he rightly identifies as forming the centre of the neo-Pietist Awakening in the Kingdom of Prussia from 1815 onwards. After reconstructing the origins and early development of the 'pious conventicles' (*fromme Konventikel*), which were still apolitical and unconcerned with worldly affairs during the 1820s, he goes on to acknowledge and build upon my own research as he charts the increasing politicization of the 'Awakened'.⁵ These 'silent ones of the land' (*Stillen im Lande*), as they were known at the time, gradually transformed themselves into a religious and political community of conviction and soon began to engage with the ecclesiastical and political debates of the time by harnessing cutting-edge methods of religious-political public communication—in particular through the influential *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* and *Berliner Politisches Wochenblatt* newspapers (the latter of which was financed by members of the aristocracy).

Ellis also scrupulously traces Awakened Christian political activity during the late Vormärz, the revolution of 1848–9, and the subsequent period of political reaction that lasted until 1857–8. He commendably sheds light on the 1850s and re-examines the disputes over

⁵ Hans-Christof Kraus, *Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach: Politisches Denken und Handeln eines preußischen Altkonservativen*, 2 vols. (Göttingen, 1994), i. 74–113, 137–84 ff.

the new church constitution in Prussia, the municipal code (*Gemeindeordnung*) and the revised state constitution of 1850, and Prussia's role in the Crimean War (1853–6). In this respect, the span of Ellis's study exceeds that of Kloes's. Politicians, diplomats, and journalists who had been influenced by the Awakening movement before 1848 were deeply involved in all of these controversies—including none other than Otto von Bismarck—and Ellis is able to show in detail how religiously inspired mindsets and arguments contributed to the political debates of the time. This is made particularly clear through the example of the vehement controversy over Prussian neutrality in the Crimean War, which was led by followers of the former Awakening movement who consistently harnessed mainly moral and religious arguments.

Another important output of Ellis's study is the recognition that the devout, Awakened, conservative forces were in fact able to modernize politically, and were open to many of the challenges of their time. Ellis sums up their use of modern communication and public relations techniques, their formation of political parties post-1848, their gradual acceptance of parliamentarianism and the constitutional state, and the beginnings of modern social policy with the well-founded argument 'that Prussia's religious revival, which intertwined with new forms of advocacy for political conservatism, actually helped to create a more modern society. Through its theological egalitarianism and its neo-Pietist emphasis on the individual's direct experience of God, the Prussian Awakening was, however unintentionally, a powerfully transformative force which in practice enhanced individual agency' (p. 3). In this sense, as Ellis himself notes, his research fits seamlessly into the reinterpretation of Prussia's development that has been ongoing since the early 1990s. Even in English-language scholarship, the history of the Kingdom is now increasingly studied as a *sui generis* phenomenon, and is no longer seen solely as a precursor to the German catastrophe of the twentieth century.⁶ In this way, the study of history is increasingly moving out of the long shadow of the post-war era, and the simplistic confrontation between 'progressive' and 'reactionary' touted by GDR historiography has now been consigned to the past.

⁶ e.g. Christopher Clark, *The Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947* (London, 2006).

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By contrast, Andrew Kloes's book situates the Awakening movement more in the context of the religious and theological debates and social changes that took place following the Napoleonic Wars and during the Vormärz. Yet he too distances himself from earlier interpretations of the movement that dismissed it as a 'premodern' and solely 'backward-looking' historical phenomenon. Instead, like Ellis (although differing somewhat in terms of emphasis and reasoning), he stresses the clear and significant contribution that Awakened Pietists made both to Prussia's socio-political development and to the processes of intellectual transformation taking place at the time, as many followers of the movement took up prominent positions within Prussia's churches and universities. Although Kloes studies a shorter timespan than Ellis, he also looks at the external impacts of the Prussian-German Awakening movement, whose developments were closely followed in the English-speaking world (for instance, by Edward Pusey in Oxford), in the Netherlands (by Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer), and at times even in France. Periodicals such as the *Neueste Nachrichten aus dem Reiche Gottes* in Berlin (1817–56), the *Evangelical Magazine and Missionary Chronicle* in London (1793–1904), and the *Parisian Archives du christianisme au dix-neuvième siècle* (1818–58) spread the religious, social, and political ideas of the Awakening movement into neighbouring countries, as well as North America.

Church reform and social reform in the context of the German and European Awakening form the central focus of Kloes's study, who announces from the very beginning his intention to concentrate on the four 'distinct areas of Protestant religious life: preaching, academic theology, organized evangelism, and caritative initiatives' (p. 17). He also goes into great detail and draws on many sources to reconstruct the religious and socio-political origins of the Awakening movements in the pre-1789 controversies between old Pietism, new devotional movements, and the rationalist Enlightenment. Kloes is equally well-informed on both the theological developments of the decades following 1815 and the 'New Religious Societies for Evangelism', which are often neglected in this context (pp. 147 ff.). He quite rightly points out the significance of the Awakening movement not only from a religious and denominational perspective, but especially in terms of social reform, as manifested in the active association life surrounding the movement. This included healthcare and

nursing associations; organizations dedicated to caring for neglected children, prisoners, the poor, and the deaf; societies to distribute the Bible and religious tracts; and associations that combated alcoholism, gambling, and cruelty to animals. We should also make special mention here of the highly active missionary societies (including the now little-known mission to the Jews), though there were many other examples.

Finally, Kloes highlights five key characteristics of the German Awakening in the context of the Protestant renewal after the Enlightenment (p. 223 ff.). The first of these is the fundamental *orthodoxy* of the Awakening movement, which rested on the core elements of Christian doctrine. The internal consistency of that orthodoxy stemmed from an intense, decades-long confrontation with the theological rationalism of the Enlightenment, which regularly came in for sharp criticism. Second, the Awakening movement, and especially its Prussian incarnation, saw itself as staunchly *Pietist*. It expressly understood itself as following in the tradition of August Hermann Francke and Philipp Jakob Spener, and focused on the inward renewal of individual faith and, ultimately, of the church itself. Third, Kloes emphasizes the movement's *ecumenical* outlook, with particular reference to its active efforts to settle the conflict between Protestantism and Catholicism as part of a general renewal of the Christian faith after 1815. That said, the movement continued to express strong criticism of theological rationalism, both within Protestantism and beyond.

According to Kloes, the fourth key aspect of the Awakening movement was its *internationalism*. Previous work by scholars such as Gerhard Kaiser argued for close links between Pietism and patriotism,⁷ and therefore that the Awakening movement was associated with early German nationalism in the context of the German campaign against Napoleon in 1813. Yet Kloes relativizes this hypothesis by examining the at times very close contacts between Awakened Protestants in the German-speaking areas and the United Kingdom – although it is naturally important to remember that both sides were allies in the war against France. Fifth and finally (and this is where Kloes's findings overlap with those of Ellis's book), the

⁷ Gerhard Kaiser, *Pietismus und Patriotismus im literarischen Deutschland: Ein Beitrag zum Problem der Säkularisation* (Wiesbaden, 1961).

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Awakening movement proves itself to be *modern* in a certain specific respect—provided that secularization is not counted as one of the key aspects of modernity, in any case. As Kloes convincingly argues, the Awakening movement modernized itself and its aims in part by taking advantage of the new opportunities presented by the post-1800 reforms: ‘Awakened Protestants benefited from the greater degree of liberty that the Enlightenment had brought to German society, which enabled them to act publicly upon their religious beliefs in new ways’ (p. 225).

These two works may not present an entirely new picture of the north German Awakening movement, but they offer a nuanced and thus more accurate account than previous scholarship. Both books analyse the Awakening movement from different perspectives, but come to very similar conclusions. They do so not only by illuminating particular details more clearly than before, but by decisively doing away with old prejudices and clichés. For instance, the authors demonstrate that Christian revival, even when acting in opposition to rationalism and secularism, is in no way equivalent to backwardness or anti-modernism. As the history of the Prussian Awakening shows, social and political change can still be wrought by people acting under Christian convictions and from religiously inspired motives. Socio-political progress and religious secularism are in no way identical, in any case. To take another example: the German Awakening movement in the first half of the nineteenth century shows that religion has been an important shaper and driver of socio-political developments not just in the premodern era, but in the modern age too. As such, it must not be neglected by historians. Whatever the personal motivations that have underpinned recent scholarship in religious, ecclesiastical, and denominational history—whether pure academic interest or religious conviction—the paramount importance of this research field is no longer in any doubt.

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recently *Versailles und die Folgen: Außenpolitik zwischen Revisionismus und Verständigung 1919–1933* (2013); *Bismarck: Größe – Grenzen – Leistungen* (2015); *Der Wendepunkt des Philosophen von Sanssouci* (2017); and (as ed.) *Fritz Hartung: Korrespondenz eines Historikers zwischen Kaiserreich und zweiter Nachkriegszeit* (2019).

BOOK REVIEWS

MIHAI DRAGNEA, *The Wendish Crusade, 1147: The Development of Crusading Ideology in the Twelfth Century* (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2020), viii + 68 pp. ISBN 978 0 367 36696 4. £45.00 (hardback)

Anyone who picks up Mihai Dragnea's book *The Wendish Crusade* expecting to find a concise account of the titular conflict will soon be disappointed. We learn little about the political context that led the Saxon princes to take up arms against the pagan Elbe Slavs instead of following Konrad III to the Holy Land. Nor does the book pay much attention to the course of the crusade, or to the various parties involved and their differing interests. Instead, the study is rooted in the history of ideas, and aims to demonstrate how the crusader impulse came to be linked to other concepts during the Wendish Crusade. These included notions drawn from the Old Testament concerning the need to exact divine vengeance on the enemies of Christ, as well as the desire to convert non-Christians. Dragnea shows how this produced a warlike complex of ideas that would later be used to call for and to justify violence against pagans, especially during the conquest and forced conversion of Livonia.

In order to elucidate this development, the author begins by examining the crusader ideology promoted by the Cistercian abbot and preacher Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) in his book *De Laude novae militiae*, a treatise written in praise of the Knights Templar, and again on the eve of the Wendish Crusade. Dragnea largely subscribes to the views of Friedrich Lotter,¹ who holds that Bernard's battle cry 'Baptism or death' ('Tod oder Taufe') was not a call to put to death any pagans who refused to convert, but a threat to shatter the political and presumably also the ethnic autonomy of the Elbe Slavs. In

Trans. by Jozef van der Voort (GHIL).

¹ Friedrich Lotter, *Die Konzeption des Wendenkreuzzugs: Ideengeschichtliche, kirchenrechtliche und historisch-politische Voraussetzungen der Missionierung von Elb- und Ostseeslawen um die Mitte des 12. Jahrhunderts* (Sigmaringen, 1977).

this way, Bernard's ideas are situated in the context of the relationships between the Saxon nobility, the church of Hamburg, and the Wends.

Next, Dragnea turns his attention to contemporary developments in canonical thought on the subject of forced conversion, exploring in detail the significance of theologically founded concepts of religious fervour, divine vengeance, and the idea of apostasy in the context of the Wendish Crusade. In a further short chapter, he identifies the call to crusade in the Magdeburg Letter of 1108 as part of a wider effort to sanctify the Elbe Slavic territories and thus encourage their conquest. The extended final section of the book then examines the ideas and concepts used to justify the conversion and conquest of the Baltic region from the late twelfth century onwards. Here, Dragnea maps out the gradual transition from peaceful proselytism to forced conversion, with the latter becoming bound up in the idea of the crusade and legitimizing the use of violence primarily as a means of combating apostasy.

Overall, the author makes a plausible case that the crusader impulse was gradually imbued with the goal of forced conversion from the twelfth century onwards. Dragnea does not construct a linear progression, but pays due attention to the contradictory views expressed by successive popes. As such, he also includes a detailed account of the position adopted by Pope Innocent III, who only accepted the war against the pagans as a form of retaliation for violent acts perpetrated against Christians. At the same time, however, Dragnea highlights the papacy's limited sway over ideas circulating locally, which were much more strongly influenced by the bishops directly involved in conversion and conquest. The author also rightly emphasizes that Bernard of Clairvaux's preaching of the Wendish Crusade represented a turning point, since this was the first time that the concept of crusade and the idea of mission were explicitly brought together. Bernard's call to arms paved the way for the idea of violent evangelism and furnished secular warlords such as Henry the Lion with an ideology they could use to justify their conquests, as Dragnea argues with some justification. We need only think of the charter issued by Henry the Lion for the church of Lübeck in 1163 (and unfortunately overlooked by Dragnea), in which the Duke of Saxony explicitly presents his military operations against the pagan Slavs as a bloody contribution to their conversion to Christianity.

The author also convincingly demonstrates that certain other concepts beyond the missionary impulse which later helped give rise to crusader ideology were articulated as early as the first half of the twelfth century. The first of these was the idea, drawn from the Old Testament, of the need to take vengeance on the enemies of Christ in the name of God; the second was the concomitant notion of holy fervour or wrath, which spurred the crusaders on; and the third was the idea that new territory could be acquired as a reward for the crusaders' divinely sanctioned acts of violence.

Yet doubts set in when Dragnea attempts to prove that this body of thought had already solidified into a consistent and determinant ideology by the time of the Wendish Crusade. All in all, the little we know about the beliefs held by the crusaders of 1147 suggests the opposite conclusion. Most contemporary sources are ignorant of any form of religious enthusiasm whatsoever among the crusaders, let alone religious fervour. They portray the crusaders as primarily motivated by the desire to secure claimed territory or acquire new land, suggesting that they had no interest in propagating Christianity. In fact, chroniclers of the Wendish Crusade specifically avoid presenting the idea of exacting retribution on the pagans as a mark of religious fervour, which in their view was wholly lacking among the crusaders. Interestingly, the priest and chronicler Helmold of Bosau (c.1120–after 1177) only sees signs of religious fervour and its ensuing violent excesses among the pagan Slavs in their attacks on Christians.

Moreover, contrary to Dragnea's arguments, the idea that the pagans' apostasy gave a licence to convert them by force did not yet play a role in the context of the Wendish Crusade. No mention is made of an *apostatica gens* in contemporary justifications for the war, so the author must have read more into the sources than is actually there. As an example: the Danish writer Saxo Grammaticus (c.1160–c.1220) tells us that the people of Rügen were forced to pay tribute, which Dragnea argues was a punishment for their rejection of Christianity. In fact, this tribute is not related to any form of faith.² As

² Saxo Grammaticus, *Gesta Danorum*, ed. Karsten Friis-Jensen, trans. Peter Fisher, 2 vols. (Oxford, 2015), ii, 1293: 'Meanwhile every year they were to contribute 40 pieces of silver for every single yoke of oxen they possessed, and yield the same number of hostages as a guarantee that they would abide by those terms.'

in previous centuries, violence against pagans was justified by Helmold of Bosau and others as retaliation for atrocities committed against Christians. This in turn allowed them to view crusading, violence, and conquest on the one hand and missionary efforts on the other as two distinct activities, which—as we see in the case of the Wendish Crusade—they felt it would be unproductive to mix.

Ultimately, this goes to show how new Bernard of Clairvaux's ideas were, and how much they struggled to find acceptance. As such, it is misleading to consider the Wendish Crusade in light of the Magdeburg Letter of 1108. That document exhorts to violence against the pagans as a means of paying them back for their own acts of violence and depravity (which the Letter describes in lurid detail), whereas Bernard of Clairvaux does not cite the supposed crimes of the Wends as justification for going to war against them. It is true that his call to crusade speaks of the vengeance that must be exacted on the enemies of Christ; yet it does so solely in reference to the crusade to the Holy Land and not the Wendish Crusade, for which Bernard offers only the conversion of the Slavs as an objective. Nor does he talk of a holy war. In the end, Bernard—like Helmold of Bosau—assumes that the Saxon crusaders lack religious fervour, which is why he does his utmost to impose a missionary purpose on them.

In other words, the ideas of 1108 certainly played an important role in the subsequent justification of crusades as tools for both conversion and conquest—but they did not do so in the case of the Wendish Crusade, for which the only thing we can say with any certainty is that it was largely unmotivated by any ideology. More than anything else, it solved an acute political problem: that of tasking the Saxon nobility (who for various reasons had refused to participate in the crusade to the Holy Land) with a similar duty of their own in order to avoid jeopardizing the Second Crusade. For historical reasons, the obvious recourse was to elevate the mission to the Slavs—an undertaking that had been tried and failed on numerous occasions since the rule of Otto I—into the object of a crusade. But this was problematic from a canonical perspective, encouraged the crusaders to harbour ambitions of secular conquest, and was considered counterproductive by missionaries such as Helmold of Bosau. Against this backdrop, we can hardly speak of a consistent crusader ideology in the context of the Wendish Crusade. Even to speak of a 'concept' seems excessive. In short, it is debatable to what extent the Wendish

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Crusade itself was underpinned by the same ideas that were used to justify the later wars of conversion and conquest waged as crusades in the Baltic region.

All the same, Mihai Dragnea reveals how the connection made in 1147 by Bernard of Clairvaux between crusades and forced conversion promoted a particular understanding of crusading, in spite of all theological or canonical obstacles and objections. Bernard approved the unrestricted use of violence in the name of spreading and defending the faith, provided that such violence took the exclusive form of divinely inspired vengeance as part of the struggle against apostasy. That revelation is the key merit of this short history of ideas, and also the reason why its subtitle ought to be promoted to its main title.

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REIMA VÄLIMÄKI, *Heresy in Late Medieval Germany: The Inquisitor Petrus Zwicker and the Waldensians*, Heresy and Inquisition in the Middle Ages (Martlesham: Boydell and Brewer, 2019), 352 pp. ISBN 978 1 90 315386 4. £75.00

Reima Välimäki's book analyses the life, work, and legacy of Petrus Zwicker – called 'the awakener of sleeping men' by the author in the title of his original dissertation – who was an inquisitor active around the turn of the fifteenth century. By all accounts, Zwicker was an intriguing figure who challenged traditional roles and categories. He was an inquisitor, yet he was neither a Franciscan nor a Dominican, but a Celestine (one of only two known cases, the other being his assistant). He was also a religious hermit who travelled extensively across German-speaking Europe. As a Catholic author, his anti-heretical writings stressed the sufficiency of the Scriptures in doctrinal matters. As an inquisitorial official, he was interested in understanding the actual religious beliefs held by the Waldensians and in seeing them converted. Yet these very qualities and life experiences are probably what account for Zwicker's success. He was suited to the task, and his legacy speaks to that fact. By the same token, Välimäki's study also defies classification in many ways. It presents the profile and legacy of a premodern author, maps out the historical perception of heretics and specific polemics against them, seeks to attribute the authorship of an anti-heretical text, and undertakes intense archival research and *Überlieferungsgeschichte* (history of transmission).

This book traces the novel approach to the Waldensian heresy taken by Zwicker and his contemporaries, from its origin in prior treatises and its development in Zwicker's work and pastoral method to its broader reception and dissemination among groups of ecclesiastical officials and prelates throughout German-speaking areas. Innovative in his approach (alongside Martinus of Prague), Zwicker, as Välimäki shows, was one of a new brand of inquisitors who concentrated on the nature of heresy itself and on rooting it out by means of conversion, rather than on quashing the dissident spirit of a rebel group. For previous generations of inquisitors and the society and culture that produced them, to be in discord with the Church was to be in discord with Christ. Consequently, perpetrators were punished in accordance with the divinely instituted means of justice entrusted to the Church. Zwicker and his peers regarded heresy or false belief

as a treatable illness, ‘an almost imperceptible poison working invisibly’,¹ rather than demonizing the Waldensians as an unruly sect. His focus was on combating false belief and not explicitly on fighting heretics as such. It is this process that constitutes the thematic focus of Välimäki’s study, something that he terms the ‘pastoralization of heresy’. This is a revised and expanded thesis from his dissertation, where he refers to ‘retheologization’.

The study is structured around the various products and vehicles of the pastoralization process in relation to inquisitorial views and praxes in German-speaking Europe. Välimäki examines Zwicker’s biography, bibliography, homiletic and inquisitorial practice, theological points of emphasis, and legacy. Three sources in particular form the study’s textual epicentre: the *Refutatio errorum*, *Cum dormirent homines*, and the compilation of inquisitorial materials known as the *Processus Petri*. Välimäki’s profound grasp of these texts, their use, and the history of their transmission is evident and commendable. With an astute combination of codicological and palaeographic know-how, theological and sociological observations, and personal synthetic proficiency, the author provides insights that demand attention and offer a timely contribution to our understanding of the shifting landscape of late medieval Europe. At this transformative point in history, marked by deep conflicts within the Church and a society eager to exercise control and find scapegoats, Zwicker’s voice was distinct and efficacious in shifting attitudes towards the Waldensians, as Välimäki clearly shows.

Zwicker’s existence as an eremitic monk absorbed in constant prayer and study of the Scriptures, and steeped in liturgical practice, doubtlessly prepared him to bear heartfelt witness and show conviction to those whom he felt had gone astray in their beliefs. This attitude, as Välimäki demonstrates, is clear from Zwicker’s writings. He held the office of inquisitor and, as such, was responsible for the persecution of recalcitrant heretics. His writings, however, exhibit a pastoral and homiletic rather than coercive or condemnatory tone, and

¹ Reima Välimäki, ‘Imagery of Disease, Poison and Healing in the Late Fourteenth-century Polemics against Waldensian Heresy’, in Christian Krötzel, Katariina Mustakallio, and Jenni Kuuliala (eds.), *Infirmity in Antiquity and the Middle Ages: Social and Cultural Approaches to Health, Weakness and Care* (Abingdon, 2016), 137–52, at 152.

display a biblical essentialism intended better to reach the minds and hearts of his intended audience, themselves devotees of 'literal biblicism' (p. 61). Yet Zwicker had an even broader purpose, to which Välimäki perceptively draws attention. Zwicker's ultimate goal was not only to convert the Waldensians but, more importantly, to 'bypass the struggles and factions of his times by stressing the fundamental unity of the Church' (p. 35). Given the virtually insurmountable rift that vexed the Church of Zwicker's time, Välimäki observes that the Celestine provincial and his like-minded contemporaries opted to devote their powers of persuasion to ending disunity in the Church on an individual basis, as seen in his comparatively pastoral stance toward the heterodox sect of the Waldensians.

In terms of further merits and faults, a few issues should be addressed. The author writes admirably for a non-native speaker. His effective prose and skilful style (barring the occasional hiccup, for example, in places where 'and', 'of', and 'the' are missing) benefit the reader. In addition to the author's well-founded thesis, specialists will greatly appreciate his description and appraisal of the available archival material. On the whole, given the specificity of the subject matter, *Heresy in Late Medieval Germany* is most useful as a stand-alone piece of scholarship for specialists in the field, as opposed to a general overview or contextualizing analysis—a point revisited below. This tendency is in part unsurprising for a reworked dissertation, but it opens the study up to critique. I should like to focus on three main points of contention: the arguments concerning the *Refutatio errorum*, the matter of historical and historiographical context, and the implications of the book's title.

Concerning the *Refutatio*: the work itself, to which Välimäki devotes twenty-five pages, occupies a somewhat curious position in the study and contributes little of value beyond arguing for Zwicker's authorship. The author begins by claiming that this anonymous text of unknown origin contains a similar view of Waldensians to that put forward in Zwicker's well-known treatise *Cum dormirent homines*. Välimäki also states that the two texts are from the same era and reflect the same state of knowledge. He then goes on to bridge the gap between the affinity and attribution of the two texts, positing that Zwicker was the author of the *Refutatio*. While his arguments appear to hold at least in part (despite the absence of any argument to counter the theory that Zwicker might have consulted the *Refutatio*

as a source), the section adds little to the overall thrust of his thesis and would have been better suited to an independent article. The ink devoted to this matter could have been put to good use in providing much needed context, a point to which we now turn.

Välimäki's book is rather lacking in context, in terms of direct and related historical developments and historiography – a fact reflected in the author's choice of secondary literature. The history of the medieval Waldensian movement and other heterodox sects receives unsatisfactory consideration, with the space dedicated to prior research on these topics totalling a single page spread out between pages nine and eleven. As the stage is inadequately set for the epoch treated in the study, the reader is left stuck with a narrow scope. This fact is compounded by major gaps in the secondary literature – in English, Italian, and, most importantly, German – a list of which would exceed the limits of this review. Since the author includes a bibliography and not a works cited section, one must assume either neglect or intentional omission, neither of which seem reasonable. Most importantly, there is no mention of the ground-breaking standard works by Giuliano Volpe, Herbert Grundmann, and R. I. Moore, or the shifts in approach regarding heresy and otherness more broadly in the Middle Ages that these authors heralded. Discussion of such works is not merely a question of giving credit where credit is due or paying homage, but also, and most importantly, of providing valuable context for the reader. In that respect, an exemplary study is that by Martin Schneider.²

Finally, Välimäki's title is incongruous and misleading in a number of ways. The book itself is not primarily about heresy, heretics, or even the Waldensians as such (as mentioned above, the amount of information presented on the Waldensians in this or any other historical context is almost trivial). Rather, it is about the perception of, and response to, heresy. It is about – and this is one of its strong suits – the change in perspective and approach on the part of a persecuting people in relation to a specific, persecuted, heterodox sect. It revolves around a shift in attitude towards the not-so-distant other – one that views them not as enemies, but as lost brethren. In addition, the anachronistic term 'late medieval Germany' is problematic and

² Martin Schneider, *Europäisches Waldensertum im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert: Gemeinschaftsform – Frömmigkeit – Sozialer Hintergrund* (Berlin, 2011).

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requires qualification, which the author does not provide. He uses designations such as German regions, German-speaking Europe, and the Empire, none of which he equates with 'late medieval Germany'. The anachronism of the title implies either that Germany was a clearly definable historical region in the period, or that the study focuses on the territory of modern-day Germany. If the latter is the case, Välimäki should account for that decision. Zwicker and his companions, along with their message, travelled throughout German-speaking Europe, so it would be more accurate to use that term. More fundamentally, if it is important to recognize anachronistic sentiments, it is equally important not to codify them and, more to the point, to avoid the pitfall of 'rise of nations' narratives. With its chosen title, the study presents itself as a book for non-specialists – almost a popular history. I can relate to the temptation of punchy titles that aim to attract a wide readership, but that should never come at the expense of the historian's pursuit of accuracy.

All in all, *Heresy in Late Medieval Germany* represents a fine addition to the Heresy and Inquisition series, one whose merits far outweigh its demerits. The critique given here is intended not to denigrate a successfully executed mixture of textual source work and cultural history, but to provide an honest analysis based on standards of international scholarship.

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RANDOLPH C. HEAD, *Making Archives in Early Modern Europe: Proof, Information, and Political Record-Keeping, 1400–1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), xviii + 348 pp. ISBN 978 1 108 47378 1. £90.00

A valuable method of ascertaining the status of a discipline is to see whether it has produced landmark works, capable of shedding new light on the results of current scholarship. From this standpoint, the new research field of the ‘history of archives’ – something profoundly different from the traditional archival science (*Archivkunde*) practised by nineteenth-century archivists – has certainly passed the test with great success. In recent years, works such as those by Markus Friedrich and Filippo De Vivo have shown the epistemological relevance as well as the wealth of data and perspectives that the study of record-keeping and archives can offer.¹ Randolph Head’s volume offers new insights into this field of study and also provides a learned overview of the ways European chancelleries organized and stored documentation from the High Middle Ages to the modern era. In particular, the book focuses on how these archives transitioned from ‘treasuries of legitimation’, which primarily served to collect proof of the time-hallowed legitimacy of political authorities, to repositories of administrative information. In order to achieve this larger goal, Head brilliantly intertwines erudite analysis of archival methodologies, focused on the practices employed to handle data, with a broader cultural history of politics, combining long-term perspectives with fine-grained examples drawn mostly from the German-speaking world (Austria, Switzerland, and south Germany).

The book is organized into two introductory chapters and four sections of varying lengths and ambitions. The first two chapters summarize the subject of the book and, in particular, the scholarly debate over recent developments in the history of archives. These preliminary observations aim, on the one hand, to bring order to the

¹ I refer here to Markus Friedrich, *The Birth of the Archive: A History of Knowledge* (Ann Arbor, 2018), and, among Filippo De Vivo’s works on the history of archives, to ‘Coeur de l’Etat, lieu de tension: Le tournant archivistique vu de Venise (XVe–XVIIe siècle)’, *Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales*, 68/3 (2013), 699–728, and ed. with Maria Pia Donato, *Scholarly Practices in the Archive (16th–18th Centuries)*, special issue of *Storia della Storiografia*, 68 (2015).

numerous works that have appeared on the topic over the last few years and, on the other, to pave the way for a new comparative history of record-keeping. In Head's view, the time has come to abandon Eurocentric terminology and to focus on the 'archivality' of different societies—on the ways in which different political and social constellations around the globe collected documents attesting to the rights of dominion and possession held by individuals and political authorities. This book is a first attempt to identify a pan-European form of archivality, which subsequent research will be able to compare with record-keeping modalities in different cultural contexts.

After these introductory remarks, the core argument of the volume is presented in the first two parts, each consisting of four chapters: two of analysis and two describing specific case-studies. Part one explains how, following the rediscovery of Roman legal culture, medieval authorities engaged in gathering and preserving legally binding documents for the future. Chancelleries prepared cartularies and registers containing a selection of documentary testimonies about the rights and privileges of institutions, while letters, records of trials, depositions, reports, and so on started to be collected as sources of information and governmental knowledge. This focus on copying and collecting documents was the consequence of a deep change in the relationship with written culture. During the late Middle Ages, a new trust in the transmission of written texts, certified by public authorities, slowly replaced older record-keeping technologies based on customs and oral testimonies. Part two focuses on the outcomes of this new situation. From the fifteenth century onwards, it became evident that the volume of documentation was growing; consequently, new organizational systems were needed to keep the 'information overload' under control. Archives were separated from working chancelleries and equipped with new finding devices: inventories, authenticating marks, and, within each register, indexes and *rubricae*. The new organizational structure of these archives did not respect the institutional subdivisions of early modern administrations or preserve all the books produced by a single institution in one place, as would be the case today. On the contrary, it was rooted in subject-based criteria, which attempted to mirror the general order of the medieval world. Documents were collected according to general categories, irrespective of their provenance: whether they dealt with popes or emperors, or whether they per-

tained to relationships with different monarchs, with local vassals, and so on. In other words, premodern forms of record-keeping reflected a different understanding of power and the nature of archives.

Part three can be seen as a departure from this medieval situation. Without denying continuities, chapters eleven and twelve show how things took a different turn in the early modern period. The most prominent example of this change of pace is famously offered by the Spanish archives of Simancas, founded by Charles V in 1540 and organized according to new rules under the reign of his son Philip II. Through his projects of record-keeping, Philip, *el rey papelero*, intended to impose a new image of sovereignty: the ideal of a 'fully informed' king, who knew everything about his dominions and to whom his subjects could always address their complaints. It does not matter that Philip's plans were doomed to failure by their complexity and the distance between Simancas and Madrid, the centre of the political decision-making process, as the new Spanish royal archives remain a milestone in the history of record-keeping and constitute the beginning of a new era characterized by new goals and new technologies of knowledge. Instead of relying on copies and cartularies redacted *ex post*, early modern governments decided to produce documents with a view to preserving them for future reference. In other words, governmental authorities started to keep track of their activity 'in the making', by storing and copying the papers that accumulated each day in dedicated registries, which were destined to be kept in archives from the outset.

Part four describes the further consequences of these developments. The last two chapters abandon the closed and dusty spaces of the archives to show how the state-controlled activity of record-keeping was perceived in the political and cultural arenas of the early modern period. First of all, a new literature on the organization of archives started to be published throughout Europe. As a result, documents acquired new importance in both the political confrontations and scholarly debates of the period. The concept of law itself was changing: statutory law, based on regulations officially promulgated by authorities, gained the upper hand over customary laws and other forms of political negotiation. In this context, it became very important to know exactly what was dictated by treaties, charters, and other legal documents, and whether they were actually authentic.

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Religious historians such as the Jesuit Daniel Papenbroeck and the Benedictine Jean Mabillon debunked hundreds of forgeries that had previously been considered authoritative documents. At the same time, this research helped set out strict rules for distinguishing truth from falsehood in the analysis of historical sources. This debate on the characteristics of ancient diplomas and the veracity of written documentation contributed to a broader reconsideration of the legal value of archives. Legal discussions on the *ius archivi*, the law of archives, linked the authenticity of a document to the authority that issued it and strengthened the prerogatives of European states, now considered the only recipients of such an 'archiving power'.

This summary of the results of Head's research covers only the main lines of his argument and sacrifices his beautiful analysis of the numerous case-studies that punctuate the volume. It is, however, important to underline that the main merit of the book lies in its finely calibrated balance between a general discourse on the role played by archives in the formation of European statehood and the presentation of specific documents, archives, and inventories. This interconnection between historical practice and historical discourse helps to highlight the potentialities of a field of study open to different research perspectives: from the history of material culture to the investigation of spaces and cultural memory. Thanks to his interdisciplinary approach and his broad view of many European archives, Head successfully offers a valuable instrument for general historians and specialists alike.

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THOMAS MUNCK, *Conflict and Enlightenment: Print and Political Culture in Europe, 1635–1795* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), xii + 368 pp. ISBN 978 0 521 87807 4 (hardback) £64.99. ISBN 978 0 521 70180 8 (paperback) £22.99

The market for non-fiction and academic books on the early modern period has boomed in response to two events: the four-hundredth anniversary of the outbreak of the Thirty Years War (1618–48) in 2018; and the five-hundredth anniversary of Luther posting his ninety-five theses in Wittenberg (1519) in 2019. Recent years have seen the publication of many studies examining the denominational and political context of the emergence, course, and impact of the Reformation, re-evaluating traditional research results, and generating new knowledge. They have also cast new light on the causes of the Thirty Years War—the complex spheres of political and military action at the time of the war—and its impact on the different confessions in Europe. Recent work has pursued new methodological ideas, such as research into globalization, and explored them more deeply with a clear comparative approach. Meanwhile, other historians are calling for greater use of computer-aided methods drawn from the field of digital humanities, not least in order to answer one of the most difficult questions, namely, how quantitative data on population density, the economy, and early modern consumer behaviour can be collected.

Britain played a large part in these historical processes, and especially in the development of a European print culture, the subject of Thomas Munck's book. During the Tudor and Stuart period, Britain developed, by stages, into an early modern state. Unlike in the German-language area, the Reformation was a state matter in Britain from the start, and it played an important part in opening up public discourse. The English Civil War, marked by ongoing political and confessional conflicts accompanied by a diverse and lively journalistic debate, unleashed a flood of newspapers and pamphlets, resulting in the creation of a market for the press much earlier than in the rest of Europe. The dynamic capital, London, the country's commercial, financial, and economic centre, also became the focus of the press and the publishing industry, and played a crucial part in the spread of political ideas via the media. It was not only in England, however,

Trans. by Angela Davies (GHIL).

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that the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were characterized by protracted religious and political unrest, revolutionary movements, and military conflicts. Since the invention of book printing, significant religious and political events and trends had stimulated the production and trading of printed media all over Europe. Early, temporary forms of a journalistic public emerged, which were certainly not yet comparable to the literary public that was to develop in the course of the eighteenth century. Yet the political and confessional conditions meant that a more professionally organized market for the press came into being earlier in England than in the rest of Europe.

And this is where Munck's study begins. He mentions the current Brexit debate and the determinedly anti-European course pursued by Britain as one factor motivating his study, which demonstrates the economic and cultural effectiveness of the former Commonwealth with its international relations and networks. His other motive in writing this book is to look at one of the most important and almost insoluble questions about the economic relevance of individual branches of industry in the early modern trade and traffic in goods. The focus of his study is the economic importance of the European printing trade and book business by comparison with other branches of industry. In this context, Munck sees a research potential that is far from exhausted, especially in relation to new computer-aided methods of analysis.

Munck's study covers the period from the Thirty Years War, during which Britain was largely spared the experience of direct military conflict, to the French revolutionary period; that is, from 1635 to 1795. One of the aims of the study, according to the author, is historically to reconstruct the confessional and political ideas and debates, the contexts in which they came about, the forms they took, and their actors, as well as their reception and social impact. Munck's research perspective is that of media and press history, and the history of the book. He focuses on the European communication and information system of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, its trading and distribution systems, and the circulation as well as consumption of print media of any content and format. Munck always keeps an eye on cross-border reception processes, as well as on the intensity of the reception of print media in a gradually expanding early modern republic of scholars. Macro and micro studies are skilfully interwoven as Munck traces transnational reception processes, taking the ex-

ample of discourse-stimulating key texts of the early Enlightenment (such as the works of John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, John Toland, and others), while also reconstructing in detail literary trading and distribution systems; market mechanisms in the print industry; the workflow, organizational processes, and economic and staffing resources in a print shop; and the running costs and output of individual print works. The premiss behind the whole study — one which makes it relevant for the historiography of the book and of publishing as a whole — is the idea that literature cannot be thought of without its distribution, so that the perspective of the printing and publishing industries must always be taken into account. As such, Munck's work draws on the methodological approaches of the social history of literature, recent research on materiality, and experimental attempts at computer-aided data collection and analysis.

In the first chapter, Munck examines the quantitative dimensions of the early modern book market. He investigates the economic capacities and resources of the printing and publishing industry, and identifies the question of its economic relevance by comparison with other branches of industry, as well as the share of the book trade in comparison to the overall market for consumer goods, as gaps in the research that have still not been dealt with exhaustively. In this context, however, he has hopes for the methodological tools of digital humanities in the medium term, although the availability of sources and materials proves to be extremely complex. After all, as Munck points out, it is not only a question of incorporating all the works printed during the period of investigation into a database, but also pirated editions, compilations, and adaptations, and, finally, all translations, in order to generate any reliable statements about the production, distribution, and reception of individual ideas and printed works. Munck's own attempts to collect this sort of data in order to indicate trends in the European republic of letters are limited to sampling the catalogues of national libraries and listing keywords and subject fields in working titles. This allows him to present some initial quantitative results. As just one example, I mention his finding that around two-thirds of Dutch book production in the seventeenth century was distributed to more than thirty European cities. In the context of the trade wars fought between England and the Netherlands in the struggle for colonies, these figures may gain relevance.

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The transnational distribution of printed media as reflected in the number of reprints and translations that were published, as well as their reception in various European countries, territories, and regions, also guaranteed the authors a high degree of recognition for their work. Munck's decision to concentrate on a canon of oppositional writings makes sense in this case, as these key texts, which were read and discussed across national borders, allow reception processes to be reconstructed in greater detail. Within European scholarly society, enough documents relating to the reception of these works have survived, including letters, verbatim or paraphrased excerpts of key texts, and discussions of philosophical positions, as Martin Mulsow's recently published two-volume study on the radical early Enlightenment shows impressively.¹

The second chapter charts the development of a cross-border literary information and distribution system in the decades of intense politicization and political-religious instability between the 1630s-1640s and 1677. This period in England was dominated by the struggle between monarchy and Parliament, which played out not only in military terms, but also in the press. On the Continent, the printing industry faced huge economic constraints and all kinds of epidemics and plagues during the Thirty Years War. At a time of constant political upheaval, changes of government, and of forms of government, the printing industry had to secure the production and distribution of print media, especially of propaganda material related to current events, and of visual material in particular (including leaflets illustrated with woodcuts). Genuinely successful publications were generally not commercially profitable as they were pirated soon after publication, so while they attracted attention in the media, the original publishers received no remuneration for these reprints. All in all, a large number of political pamphlets and brochures were in circulation, and were bought in large numbers, mostly from hawkers and street vendors. While pamphlets were typically distributed regionally, political and philosophical works dealing with the legitimacy of absolutist rule or questions of political freedoms were read across Europe.

¹ Martin Mulsow, *Radikale Frühaufklärung in Deutschland 1680-1720*, 2 vols. (Göttingen, 2018).

The complex political and military events of the Thirty Years War resulted in the emergence of subversive models of cross-border distribution for printers who operated illegally. One example of this is the Cloppenburg Press, a Dutch printworks which was presumably secretly controlled from London. One of its most important authors was Richard Overton (1640–64), who advocated a radical parliamentarism in the 1640s. He alone was responsible for 250 publications and reprints. Other significant authors discussed by Munck include John Lilburne (c.1614–57), whose writings gave rise to the Levellers, and Thomas Hobbes, whose *Leviathan*, published in 1651, was one of the most influential books on the seventeenth-century European book market. While Hobbes took a great risk by releasing his *Leviathan*, Baruch Spinoza worked entirely clandestinely in the European intellectual milieu that developed from the 1660s. A crucial force in the process of distributing these radical philosophical texts were the Huguenots, who were expelled from France at the end of the seventeenth century and settled throughout Europe, including in London, Amsterdam, Berlin, and Copenhagen, establishing an extensive distribution network for print media that were critical of religion.

From the second half of the seventeenth century, Europe experienced a large number of political and military conflicts. While these stimulated the trade in information, they also caused part of the business to move to the literary underground. Closed, clandestine intellectual networks came into being, which conspired about natural law, proofs of God's existence, and atheism. These personal contact networks stretched from London via the Netherlands and western and central Europe to Venice and Basel. Here, too, Munck supports his findings with quantitative data. He searches the catalogues of national libraries for relevant keywords, including 'liberty', 'papist', 'popery', 'heretic', and 'atheism', thus discerning trends in national book markets.

It therefore makes sense that Munck's third chapter looks at the distribution channels and discourses of this subversive milieu. In the seventeenth century, radical texts of the early Enlightenment were preferentially circulated in the underground, although it is necessary to keep a critical eye on the economic relevance of this branch of the trade. For the protection of authors and printers, radical writings were produced in countries and regions where the monitoring and censorship of literature was more liberal or less efficient. Thus the

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Netherlands was one of the most powerful hubs in Europe for the production and distribution of radical writings, although the relocation of production to the provinces was also an effective method. Exeter, for example, became a veritable bastion for the production of radical philosophical and political literature. Without exaggerating the extent and effectiveness of the literary underground, therefore, Munck establishes that in the period from 1685 to 1721 a public sphere emerged, encouraged especially by the many journals and newspapers that now enriched the market for literature, and accompanied by subversive information channels and distribution systems.

The function of translations as a catalyst for literary texts can hardly be overestimated. It is not surprising, therefore, that in chapter four, Munck turns his attention to the early modern market for translations. The transnational reception of information, ideas, and print media happened largely through translations—often only of excerpts of works, but also through compilations and adaptations. A segment of this market (and one that is challenging to examine quantitatively) consisted of the pirated editions of original works and translations, a problem Munck mentions in the first chapter. Pamphlets of merely regional relevance were not generally translated, while dictionaries, technical and specialized lexica, and encyclopaedias became the main carriers of information and knowledge. These formats transported political and philosophical ideas across Europe, and were made freely available for use in coffee houses, journal clubs, and libraries. Taking as an example the work *On Crimes and Punishments* (1764) by the Italian legal philosopher and political reformer Cesare Beccaria (1738–94), which was widely read throughout Europe, Munck demonstrates this process of transmission across all borders. Beccaria's work, which demanded proportionality of punishment and categorically rejected torture and the death penalty, was clearly a product of the Enlightenment. These demands were picked up and discussed in various Enlightenment writings, and in this way became socially acceptable by the time of the French Revolution at the latest.

In chapter five, Munck focuses on the huge dynamism of political and philosophical discourses in Europe during the second half of the eighteenth century. He points to rising production figures in print works and publishing houses stimulated by political events (the

intensification of transatlantic exchange and the American War of Independence had an impact on European political discourse), the quicker circulation of print media, and the intense discussion of ideas of social reform—a progression that culminated in the French Revolution. Reform debates were conducted both in periodicals (newspapers, journals) and in the many recently established coffee houses, reading societies (*Lesezirkel*), clubs, and lending libraries. These issues were no longer the preserve of a networked European republic of letters, but were also debated by a bourgeois readership, with its literary societies. Radical ideas, such as expressions of sympathy with the French Revolution, circulated in the literary underground, which became more professional against a background of increasing bureaucratization and more efficient censorship. Munck registers a crucial dynamic in the shift in political thought during the second half of the eighteenth century from absolutist self-assertion to republican forms of government in the context of the French Revolution.

The final chapter focuses on the French Revolution and its actors. It emphasizes the special role of women in the revolution and the printing industry and, taking case studies, establishes the impact of radical political texts on revolutionary events. Munck stresses that an evaluation and comparative analysis of all radical print media in Europe would certainly make a valuable contribution to our knowledge. But in this context, too, he suggests, the first thing to do is systematically to record and digitize the extensive text corpus—that is, to generate a corpus of texts including all later editions, reprints, and translations.

Two main themes pervade Munck's study: first, the reconstruction of an increasingly expansive printing and publishing industry in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, accompanied by a discussion of reception processes based on the examination of individual key texts of the early Enlightenment that were read widely throughout Europe; and second, an explicit plea for the use of computer-aided methods of analysis in systematic research on these political and philosophical texts. Munck skilfully combines observation and classification at the meta level, and presents the interaction between political events and the production, distribution, and reception of print media, whose format allowed them to adapt to different political conditions. In terms of the argument, he underpins

these observations using case studies, which engage seriously with the materiality of the printed works by investigating the biography of an individual print medium or the paper quality, typography, illustrations, and format of a text in the context of a particular publication event.² In his book, Munck outlines the dynamic interactions between political events and turning points on the one hand, and the printing industry and print media on the other. The printing and publishing industry experienced an economic boom with each new political event and controversy: the quantity of print media in circulation increased, sales channels became more professional, and the republic of letters expanded. We can discern early forms of the bourgeois public sphere that came into being in the second half of the eighteenth century.

While Munck focuses on the distribution and reception of print media, measuring the intensity of reception mainly in terms of reprints and translations, Mulsow's substantial study casts light on reception processes and the detailed impact of ideas on the basis of an impressive knowledge of the texts.³ Like Munck, Mulsow investigates key texts; however, he is able to show where individual passages and chapters of a particular text were copied in others, and he presents the content of discussions and how discourses were developed further in personal networks in the German-language area in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He is thus able to explain which political ideas and radical Enlightenment currents prevailed in the medium term. In this way, Mulsow's history of ideas, with its almost archaeological methods, links directly to Munck's investigation, and offers some initial approaches to the analysis of different national reception processes in early modern Europe.

The historical reconstruction of the early modern European publishing business and book trade, and the examination of individual actors, from printers, publishers, and booksellers to authors, still represent something of a gap in research, not least because sources are so difficult to access.⁴ Numerous studies were produced to mark the

² Cf. Constanze Baum, Ulrike Gleixner, and Jörn Münkner (eds.), *Biographien des Buches* (Göttingen, 2018).

³ Mulsow, *Radikale Frühaufklärung in Deutschland*.

⁴ This is also illustrated by Julia Bangert, *Buchhandelssystem und Wissensraum in der Frühen Neuzeit* (Berlin, 2019). While this recently published Ph.D. thesis

anniversaries of the Reformation and the Thirty Years War, but research on the book market in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries comes up against limits simply because production, distribution, and reception were not centrally organized in Europe. In the sixteenth century, for example, transnational companies with extensive trading and contact networks frequently handled the distribution of print media. Merchant families operating within Europe and beyond would transfer a branch of business in their trading consortia—for example, that of book sales by peddlers and street traders—to a printer or publisher in the family (often via a strategic marriage). The transnational trading systems and transport routes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have already been mapped out by Fernand Braudel in his seminal works.⁵ To penetrate these and other micro levels of the everyday life of booksellers in early modern Europe, and to produce case studies of printers, publishers, and booksellers operating at this time and in this field, however, requires reliable source material. Yet the only remotely satisfactory initial results achieved so far have been produced by integrating the macro and the micro levels, and by presenting a skilful combination of general trends and case studies. Munck demonstrates this in his book. He has also long recognized the research potential of computer-aided analysis based on the comprehensive digitization of text corpora from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

offers an instructive overview of the development of the early modern book market, it contains no new discoveries in relation to sources or the academic positioning of this research field.

⁵ Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et la Monde Méditerranéen à l'Époque de Philippe II*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1949).

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ment of publishing from the early modern period to the twentieth century. Her most recent publications include (ed. with Johannes Frimmel and Helga Meise) *'In Wollust betäubt': Unzüchtige Bücher im deutschsprachigen Raum im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert* (2018) and (ed. with Thomas Bremer) *Verlegerische Geschäftskorrespondenz im 18. Jahrhundert: Das Kommunikationsfeld zwischen Autor, Herausgeber und Verleger in der deutschsprachigen Aufklärung* (2018).

ALEXANDER SCHUNKA, *Ein neuer Blick nach Westen: Deutsche Protestanten und Großbritannien (1688–1740)*, Jabloniana: Quellen und Forschungen zur europäischen Kulturgeschichte der frühen Neuzeit, 10 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2019), 570 pp. ISBN 978 3 447 11260 4 (hardcover) €98.00. £106.40

This substantial study, a revised version of Alexander Schunka's *Habilitationsschrift*, explores relationships between German Protestants, mostly in Brandenburg-Prussia, and British, mostly English, Anglicans, with a focus on 'British-German (and German-British) mobility' (p. 20). Schunka's account begins in 1688, the year Frederick III succeeded as Elector of Brandenburg-Prussia; in 1701 he was crowned King in Prussia, becoming Frederick I. He was succeeded in 1713 by his son Frederick William I. The year 1688 also saw the abdication—or removal—of James II/VII from the thrones of England and Scotland, to be succeeded by his daughter Mary Stuart and her husband and first cousin, the Reformed Prince William of Orange (both grandchildren of Charles I). Mary died childless in 1694. In 1701, the Act of Settlement was passed. Confirming the provisions of the 1688 Bill of Rights, under which William and Mary had succeeded to the throne, the Act stipulated that no Catholic, and no one married to a Catholic spouse, could ascend to the throne. Should both William and Mary's sister Anne die without a direct heir, the Crown would pass to their cousin, Sophia, Electress of Hanover, granddaughter of James I/VI by his daughter Elizabeth, and first cousin to Charles II and James II/VII. In 1707, during the reign of Queen Anne (1702–1714), the Union of England and Scotland created Great Britain. Although Anne's marriage to the Lutheran Prince George of Denmark resulted in seventeen pregnancies, they too had no surviving children, and in 1714, Sophia's Lutheran son succeeded to the British throne as George I. The end date of Schunka's study, 1740, marks the death of Frederick William I, but in Britain falls during the reign of George I's son George II, also Elector of Hanover.

The confessional complexity of British dynastic politics during this period is apparent from this historical summary. It is this complexity—the succession of first a Reformed and then a Lutheran king to the English throne, and thus, *ex officio*, to the role of Supreme Governor of the Church of England—which forms the context of Schunka's analysis. The position of the Reformed churches in the ter-

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territories of the Holy Roman Empire in the latter part of the seventeenth century was also complex. The Reformed confession had been excluded from the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and was first legally recognized in the Empire by the Peace of Westphalia (1648); Brandenburg's rulers were Reformed while a significant proportion of their subjects was Lutheran. German Reformed rulers felt pressurized by both Lutherans and Catholics, and the Reformed Church of England provided an important potential partner. Schunka also highlights the role of migration and the influence of trans-confessional dynastic marriages in Reformed–Lutheran relations in the German territories.

All this gives a good sense of the confessional complexity of the German situation. The introduction to the British context is, however, less satisfying. In particular—and very strangely—Schunka appears not to take any account of the fact that from the accession of James I/VI in 1603, the English and Scottish crowns were united in one person, who ruled over Scotland, with its Presbyterian church, and England, with its Anglican episcopal church. That this union of the crowns had earlier in the seventeenth century been regarded in Europe as a significant step of reconciliation can be illustrated by Johannes Kepler's dedication of his *Harmonices Mundi Libri V.* (1619) to James I/VI, who, Kepler wrote, had 'from the combination of both provinces . . . produced one kingdom and one harmony' and 'removed in the happiest way the hereditary discord between two extremely hostile nations'.¹ Likewise, a key aspect in the ascension of William and Mary, under whom Presbyterianism was reintroduced into the Church of Scotland, was that they would not only rule over both England and Scotland, but in doing so would maintain two different Reformed churches with two different polities. This is surely relevant for Schunka's discussion, but he considers only the Church of England's relationships to the English Free Churches. Scotland scarcely merits a mention, and the complex relationships between the Church of Scotland and Church of England, by which some of his 'English' protagonists were shaped (such as the Scottish-born Gilbert Burnet) and in which they were closely involved, do not inform his

¹ Johannes Kepler, *Harmony of the World*, trans. E. J. Aiton, A. M. Duncan, and J. V. Field, *Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society* (Philadelphia, 1997), 4.

argument. It is unclear whether it was Schunka's research question or his sources (or perhaps both) which caused this important aspect of inner-British Protestant relationships to be ignored.

The main body of Schunka's study falls into four sections. The first, and for me, due to my own ecumenical interests, the most satisfying, focuses on what Schunka describes as 'irenic projects': visions for and ideas about Church union, formal and informal approaches to union and to confessional tolerance (at least amongst Protestants), and the changing use of terms such as evangelical and Protestant. Schunka highlights the role of the Brandenburg court preacher, Daniel Ernst Jablonski (1660–1741), who supported efforts towards union between Brandenburg's Reformed and Lutheran churches, and who saw the Church of England as offering a potential model for a Reformed—or perhaps more generically Protestant—state church. Jablonski's contacts in England included successive archbishops of Canterbury, Thomas Tenison (r. 1694–1715) and William Wake (r. 1715–37). Schunka shows that Jablonski took a mediating approach to theological differences, proposing a universalist understanding of the theology of predestination and regarding mutual Eucharistic hospitality as a witness to confessional tolerance. This contrasted with the approach of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, who saw intercommunion—the sharing of the Eucharist—as evidence for a unity that pointed beyond confessional difference. These discussions were rooted in actual practice; Prince George of Denmark, for instance, received the Eucharist according to the Lutheran rite in private services at the English court, but in public he received the sacrament celebrated according to the Church of England's *Book of Common Prayer* communion service (1662). Jablonski regarded the *Book of Common Prayer* as a mediating liturgy between Lutheran and Reformed positions on the Eucharist, and in 1704 commissioned a German translation, although this had minimal impact in the German context.

The English Church also proved instructive when it came to the coronation of Elector Frederick as King in Prussia: not only did it offer a Protestant coronation liturgy, but the Anglican episcopacy also provided a useful Reformed model when it was agreed that in the Prussian coronation liturgy, the new king must be anointed by a bishop. The drafting of the coronation liturgy thus proved a decisive factor in the naming of the Lutheran Bernhard I von Sanden and the Reformed Benjamin Ursinus as titular bishops in Prussia.

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These debates about Reformed episcopacy also led indirectly to the establishment of the Moravian Church in Britain. However, the question of whether clergy from Continental Protestant churches—Lutheran or Reformed—must be (re)ordained in order to minister in the Church of England, and the requirement that they must be, became particularly acute after the accession of George I, sparking the Bangorian Controversy. For Schunka, the question of episcopacy represents a ‘failed cultural transfer’ (p. 250), but here, too, his presentation of the British context is weakened by the lack of any reference to the intractable discussions of episcopacy with the Church of Scotland and between the Churches of Scotland and England.

The second section considers the role of migration in international Protestantism, and particularly of groups of Reformed refugees such as the Huguenots and Waldensians, the *Orangeois* who fled Orange for Brandenburg-Prussia after the banning of the Reformed Church there, and the ‘Poor Palatines’ who took refuge in England, many in the hopes of travelling on to America. For Schunka, these show the interplay between irenic theological approaches and international politics, thus providing ‘a litmus test for the relevance of Protestant attempts at unity to real political and social life’ (p. 252).

Mobility is also the theme of the third section, which focuses on the movement of books and people between Britain (in reality England) and ‘Protestant Germany’ (mostly Brandenburg-Prussia but also Hanover), showing an expanding genre of travel literature, increasing numbers of translations of English-language works into German, and a growing interest in English language learning. This marks the beginning of the German love of the English, or British; indeed, Schunka argues that ‘irenic Protestant communication around 1700 to some extent represents an antecedent to the Anglophilia of the Enlightenment period’ (pp. 329–30).

The final, and by far the shortest, section considers German-English co-operation in the mission field, particularly in China and India, demonstrating the conflicts of interest and theological complexities that arose from the employment of German missionaries by both the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (SPG) and by the Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge (SPCK).

This is a wide-ranging consideration of a broad set of relationships, primarily between Brandenburg Protestants and English Angli-

cans. It is not always easy to ascertain what conclusions Schunka wishes his reader to draw from the mass of evidence he presents. He offers particularly interesting insights into German responses, both in Brandenburg and in Hanover, to the succession of first the Reformed William of Orange and then the Lutheran George of Hanover to the English/Scottish/British throne, as well as into the confessional opportunities that were associated with these dynastic developments from the German perspective. However, as already indicated, Schunka's account lacks nuance in its presentation of the British context. He neglects the Scottish Presbyterian angle of British ecclesiastical politics, and his (very brief) discussion of the Union does not draw out the intense debates about its implications for the Church of Scotland. This lack of nuance may reflect a reality in which many English churchmen also failed to engage with Scottish theology and ecclesiastical politics, but it would have been helpful to know whether that was the case. This sense that his treatment of the British situation remains somewhat superficial is boosted by Schunka's irritating habit of referring to Britain as 'die Insel' (the island), entirely eliding distinctions between England and Scotland, and by his frequent references to 'crossing the Channel', even though almost every journey he describes clearly took the traveller across the North Sea.

These gripes aside, Schunka's study makes a valuable contribution to literature on the period. It sheds considerable light on relationships between German Protestant churchmen and leading figures of the Church of England, particularly those of the High Church Party; on the political and theological interests which informed those relationships; and on the forms of communication that made them possible.

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Reformation as an international movement, and Continental influences on the Reformation in England and Scotland. Among her books are *Luther and Calvin: Religious Revolutionaries* (2011) and *Science and Theology in the Reformation: Studies in Theological Interpretation and Astronomical Observation in Sixteenth-Century Germany* (2008).

STEFANO CONDORELLI and DANIEL MENNING (eds.), *Boom, Bust, and Beyond: New Perspectives on the 1720 Stock Market Bubble* (Berlin: de Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019), viii + 355 pp. ISBN 978 3 11 059056 2. €89.95

The year 2020 is the tercentenary of the Stock Market Bubble of 1720. To mark the event, Stefano Condoirelli and Daniel Menning have produced this handsome edited volume. Many, but not all, of the chapters proceed from a conference on the Bubble Year held in 2018. As such, the book has the usual strengths and weaknesses of the conference volume genre. On the plus side, it brings out genuinely new and interesting work on a familiar topic. It is heartening to note that there is still so much to say about the famous Bubble Year. On the minus side, the chapters deal with very different aspects of an expansive research area, varying in length, approach, and writing style. Although some of the writers reference other chapters in the volume, this is essentially a collection of stand-alone pieces. The same introductory information keeps re-appearing. There are thirteen chapters in all, as well as an introduction, but there is no conclusion. Readers who are already interested in the Bubble Year will find it well worth buying, since, as the subtitle states, the book genuinely offers new perspectives on the bubbles. However, it also assumes that the reader is already familiar with older perspectives. It fills in various lacunae in the scholarship, and occasionally points the way to productive new areas of research. It also requires the reader patiently to wade through some material which is irrelevant and would be better cut or published elsewhere.

In the fateful year of 1720, the Paris stock market experienced a financial bubble (the Mississippi Bubble) as did the London market (the South Sea Bubble). The stock markets of Amsterdam and Hamburg were also affected, although to a lesser extent. The French economy had been reorganized by the radical economic thinker, John Law. Law's ideas may have been prescient, but his implementation was disastrous, and he ended up fleeing for his life with his reputation in tatters.

This year, 2020, is the year in which to publish books on the bubbles. No doubt a number of popular historians will inflict the traditional gambling mania story on the reading public, which posits that people took to the streets to gamble heedlessly in shares. Various

vague claims about fraud are also usually bandied about. Whilst entertaining, these overviews are not particularly credible, tending to rely on the most outlandish claims made in the political debates or commentaries of the period. Revisionist historiography, particularly by economic and financial historians, seeks to uncover the multiplicity of ways in which investors dealt with the market without going 'gambling mad'. It also discusses how French and British economic policies worked in practice and the extent to which the crashes had real effects on the economy. Many of the academic accounts of the era centre on London and Paris, whereas this volume broadens the geographical scope considerably. This is one of its chief strengths.

One of its weaknesses is the assumption that the reader is well informed about the Bubble Year. Plus, there are some idiosyncrasies which do not seem to add much to the volume. For example, the introduction begins by discussing King Frederick William I of Prussia (at length), which would be acceptable if the opening chapter also had a clear outline of the Bubble Year itself. Instead, much of the basic historiography keeps reappearing in later chapters. The volume as a whole would be more coherent if the spadework was done in the introduction, as the other chapters could then be trimmed of their repetitive elements.

The introduction sets up the structure of the book. The first section is entitled 'Broadening the Geographical Frame', the second is called 'Engaging with Traditional Narratives', and the third is 'Understanding Speculation: Micro to Macro'. However, this choice of structure does not really seem to add anything. We jump about between geographic regions and from literary studies to discussions of financial instruments. Work based on archival scholarship or historical data is scattered between chapters on literary tropes or the history of economic thought. A reordering might give a better sense of the volume's purpose. In addition, the first two chapters are somewhat heavy going for those who want to know about the bubbles. The first chapter, by Peter Ericsson and Patrik Winton, is about financial innovations in Sweden, and not really about bubbles per se. Its technical discussion of Swedish policy-making might have been better placed later in the volume. This is followed by a chapter by the editors themselves, which, unusually, takes the form of a dialogue between the two of them. Whilst some interesting points emerge, such a transcript is much better suited to a blog or a podcast. There is a lot of toing and

froing which would be cut if the dialogue were simply presented as a chapter. It makes it difficult to fish out the genuinely interesting ideas hidden therein. I began to wonder how avant-garde the rest of the book was going to turn out to be.

We are on firmer ground with Eve Rosenhaft's chapter on Germany. She discusses the role of English investors in two schemes in Braunschweig (otherwise known as Brunswick to English readers). She shows how investors based in London were involved in a proposed Linen Company. This venture might have worked, but the other scheme was merely a fraud. It was a lottery and basically a bubble company. Rosenhaft's careful analysis of who the main players were shows how closely the European financial centres were linked. She also stresses the role of the Hanoverian elite and its own political and social networks, providing clear evidence of extensive financial activity in an under-researched geographic area.

Similarly, Malick W. Ghachem provides an important corrective to the Eurocentric view of the bubbles. He details how Saint-Domingue (modern-day Haiti) was pulled into John Law's schemes for the French economy and places the slave trade firmly within Law's *Système* (the reordering of the French economy planned by Law). Even after Law fled Paris, the aftershocks of his schemes were yet to be fully felt in Saint-Domingue.

This type of work fits well with two later chapters. Daniel Menning analyses the Sound Toll Registers of Denmark, arguing that the London crash had a notable, if short-lived, effect on London-based shipping to the Baltic region. And Amy M. Froide provides a detailed and useful account of a slightly later financial scandal involving the Court of Orphans, an institution intended to support the orphaned children of London merchants. All of these chapters, and one or two of the others, have something new and important to say about the Bubble Year.

Richard A. Kleer's chapter on the role of South Sea Company officials is a useful, if highly technical, analysis which unpicks some of the popular ideas about the Company. However, as Kleer himself points out, it is essentially a summary of two previously published journal articles. We then jump to Abigail Swingen's chapter on the Atterbury Plot of 1722. Swingen links the South Sea Company's post-crash activities to wider anxieties about Jacobitism. This is also a very useful chapter, but the juxtaposition of sub-topics and approaches

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becomes increasingly jarring. Swingen's chapter is followed by Menning's Baltic shipping chapter and then by Froide. Next, Marlene Kessler discusses the thought processes of one French investor in the Mississippi Bubble. As many official French documents were destroyed, this was a commendable trawl through the archives. However, as the sole example of micro history in the volume, it is somewhat marooned here. Then there is another awkward jump to a more philosophical approach, as Dror Wahrman posits that there was a 'crisis of causality' (p. 239) occasioned by the Bubble, in which people saw a breakdown in the linkage between cause and effect.

Anne L. Murphy's chapter discusses the wide literature on women investors, providing a variety of interesting depictions of financial activity from the material culture of the period. Some will be familiar, but Murphy has also come across one or two more unusual specimens. This might have been better placed earlier in the volume. In the penultimate chapter, Jean-Yves Grenier discusses the lack of financial theory available to contemporary investors and commentators. He covers the material which does exist and also discusses the later developments in financial theory. Finally, Christine Zabel shows how the Mississippi Bubble was conceptualized in the French Revolutionary period. It is sometimes stated that the French retained a lasting hatred of financial innovation due to Law. Zabel's chapter gives a more nuanced approach. Financial innovators and their opponents both harked back to Law's *Système*, but for very different reasons. There then follows a useful bibliography and index, but no concluding chapter.

Overall, this volume will be of great interest to those already interested in the Bubble. There are substantive pieces of new scholarship. The book also includes many interesting ideas and will encourage Bubble enthusiasts to think differently about 1720. However, the book's structure could be reorganized to group together chapters with similar methodologies. Some of the chapters are far more relevant to the topic than others, and, although interesting, one or two chapters do not really fit into the volume particularly well. There also needs to be a conclusion. Despite these caveats, the book will be a fine addition to many a library. It is something which anyone working on the Bubble Year should read and, for the most part, will enjoy.

THE 1720 STOCK MARKET BUBBLE

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MORITZ VON BRESCIUS, *German Science in the Age of Empire: Enterprise, Opportunity and the Schlagintweit Brothers*, Science in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), xiv + 414 pp. ISBN 978 1 108 42732 6. £90.00

If you were to ask people in Germany or Britain today whether the name Schlagintweit rings any bells, you would probably encounter many puzzled faces. Historian Moritz von Brescius tells the story of a largely forgotten scientific expedition to India and central Asia between 1854 and 1858, led by three German men of that name and co-financed by the East India Company (EIC) and the Prussian king. The expedition was a fiercely contested news story at the time, and Brescius uses the controversies about the legitimacy of the expedition and its leaders as the starting point for a detailed and highly skilled contextual analysis. Far from telling a heroic tale of scientific exploration, the author points out the colonial infrastructures which facilitated the mission and the brothers' dependence on indigenous assistants, and critically illustrates their knack for maximizing their personal profit throughout their journey.

Brescius previously co-curated an exhibition on the Schlagintweit expedition, which resulted in a substantial accompanying volume in German.¹ The new book under review is based on his Ph.D. thesis and offers the first comprehensive treatment of the expedition for an English-language readership. This is a highly welcome addition as the brothers themselves moved between German and British elites with ease, and both are adequately represented in the book. To Brescius, the brothers' contract with the EIC was, in fact, part of a longer history of non-British personnel employed by entities of the British Empire. This 'imperial sojourning' (p. 8), practised not only by German citizens, was a sign of the British Empire's general permeability and of transnational mobility. Yet the case of the Schlagintweits shows that it also gave critics an opportunity to summon cultural or national prejudices in personal conflicts with those perceived as foreigners. Brescius tells the story of the Schlagintweits in roughly chronological order while unfolding a different theme in each chapter.

¹ Moritz von Brescius, Friederike Kaiser, and Stephanie Kleidt (eds.), *Über den Himalaya: Die Expedition der Brüder Schlagintweit nach Indien und Zentralasien 1854–1858* (Cologne, 2015).

In the first three chapters, Brescius lays the groundwork by explaining how the expedition came about. The reader learns about the early lives of Hermann, Robert, and Adolph Schlagintweit in Bavaria, their university training in physical geography and geology at German universities, and their sympathy for comprehensive data collection in the Humboldtian style. Their personal connections with Alexander von Humboldt himself proved decisive in procuring the financial support for their costly undertaking. Not just in these chapters, but throughout the book, it is as much a story about the Schlagintweits as about Humboldt, who deftly and persistently pulled the necessary strings to make it all possible. He mobilized his London allies, including the Prussian ambassador Christian Karl von Bunsen and the geophysicist Edward Sabine, to support the Schlagintweits' plea for funding from the EIC. The eventual success of the brothers' application angered rival British naturalists, most of all the botanist Joseph Hooker. In one of his letters to the Company's Court of Directors, he expressed his indignation that 'comparative strangers' such as the three Bavarians were granted 'a carte blanche for unlimited credit on the local treasuries' (p. 73), while a British subject like himself had previously been denied financial support for his own travels in India.

The next two chapters cover the activities of the brothers and their various assistants over the course of the expedition. To abbreviate this conveniently as 'the Schlagintweit expedition', we learn, is a misnomer for at least three reasons. First, the brothers often travelled separately, resulting in several distinct expedition groups and routes. Second, they frequently used empirical data produced by other EIC servants and incorporated them into their own findings, and they also depended on the Company's infrastructure while travelling and for surveying the landscape. Finally, to focus on the brothers alone is to ignore the significant contributions made by many Indian and central Asian assistants, who took measurements, translated, collected samples, kept botanical journals, and navigated through mountain ranges.

In the last three chapters, Brescius engagingly tells us what happened after the brothers returned to Europe. The fact that the Indian Rebellion of 1857 resulted in the nationalization of the EIC greatly complicated the managing of the expedition's legacy. More than ever, Brescius shows, the brothers ingeniously played both their patrons, the unravelling EIC and the Prussian king, in order to ex-

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tract ever increasing sums. While the British press openly criticized the brothers' tendency to overspend and exposed some of their financial duplicity, German newspapers for the most part sought to defend the brothers' achievements. Although the brothers failed to open their own India Museum in Berlin, they were able to snatch the collection of roughly 40,000 objects (including fabrics, botanical journals, rocks, photographs, sketches, plaster casts of Indian prisoners, and human bones) from their patrons, who were the contractual owners of all acquired materials. They stored them in a Bavarian castle, occasionally selling off parts of the collection. Though their academic accomplishments after the expedition were rather modest, the eldest brother, Hermann, made an impressive career out of delivering public lectures on their travels. This, Brescius argues, fed a growing sentiment among the German public that glorified scientific achievements as part of German national identity, even superiority, and served to underpin demands for a colonial empire that were eventually met in 1884.

This larger argument about the long-term effects of the expedition and its treatment in the press is presumably one of the reasons why Brescius chose *German Science in the Age of Empire* as the book's main title. Other justifiable reasons may include the strong reputation of German universities for training in the field sciences, and the remarkable number of German citizens formally or informally involved in the structures of the British Empire. Yet readers looking for an overview of the role of science in German colonialism, which the title would seem to suggest, will be disappointed. Some historians of science may also cringe because the phrase 'German science' could be falsely interpreted as alluding to the somewhat outdated historiography on 'national styles' in the sciences.² Furthermore, Brescius only discusses the travellers' actual scientific undertakings relatively briefly in the fourth chapter. Other chapters explore scientific patronage, the fate of the collections, and discussions in the press on what constitutes valuable science for state institutions. While these are certainly worthy subjects in their own right, readers may have had different expectations due to the prominence of 'science' in the title, rather than, for example, 'scientists' or 'scientific patronage'. The sub-

² For a recent reflection on this tradition see Michael Gordin, 'When National Styles Were Stylish', *Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences*, 50 (2020), 11–16.

title does clarify the subject matter, but the overall impression remains that the contents of this otherwise superb book could have been more accurately advertised with a different title.

Once you know what to expect, it is a real joy to follow Brescius' thoughts, which are meticulously researched and cast in elegant prose. This applies especially to his outstanding chapter on the indigenous assistants. His portrayals of the lives of Mani Singh (pp. 169–79), Mohammad Amin (pp. 191–9), and Chibu Lama (pp. 202–5), for example, are more vivid than any I have read elsewhere in the historiography on scientific expeditions in colonial contexts. To their credit, the Schlagintweit brothers acknowledged the contributions of their hired helpers with relative generosity. This gave Brescius a unique opportunity to research and tell individual stories, one he seized with great resolve and resourcefulness. Thus the power structures between the European travellers and their guides or translators, as well as amongst the group of helpers, who were from very diverse backgrounds, emerge as complex and fluid. When one of the expeditions advanced into mountainous regions beyond British India, the Europeans depended on Amin's expertise to identify appropriate disguises, feasible passages, and possible trading routes. His case also shows that his work for the expedition, though handsomely paid, in effect forced him to give up his livelihood as a caravan merchant because he had divulged his trade secrets and committed treason against the Chinese government. After escaping from the turmoil around Adolph Schlagintweit's death in Turkestan in 1857, Amin resettled in India and successfully pleaded for employment with the British colonial government. This story brings life to the abstract concept of the 'go-between' and is therefore a highly relevant contribution to the field.³ It is also encouraging for future research because it shows what sources may be available if, like Brescius, one is willing to invest time and energy in locating them.

Wisely, Brescius declines to make any clear-cut judgement on the Schlagintweits' achievements. He remains determined not to portray the brothers as any one thing, whether fraudsters, heroes, adventurer-entertainers, or somewhat mediocre scientists. With the help of an

³ The concept was first introduced by Simon Schaffer, Lissa Roberts, Kapil Raj, and James Delbourgo (eds.), *The Brokered World: Go-Betweens and Global Intelligence, 1770–1820* (Sagamore Beach, Mass., 2009).

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impressive array of primary materials, he paints them from many angles and with appropriate nuances, all while maintaining a critical distance. Similarly, because he comprehensively contextualizes many different aspects of the expedition, he offers readers a wide variety of potential entry points. These include, among others, the inner workings of a scientific expedition, trans-imperial mobility, modes of scientific patronage, popular travel lectures, the fate of various parts of the collection, and national stereotypes in contemporary British and German media. May the book therefore receive the multifaceted audience it deserves.

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FABIAN KLOSE, *'In the Cause of Humanity': Eine Geschichte der humanitären Intervention im langen 19. Jahrhundert*, Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz, 256 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019), 516 pp. ISBN 978 3 525 37084 1. €70.00

As Fabian Klose points out in the introductory section of this meticulously researched and closely argued study, the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have generated a considerable body of scholarship on the past and future of humanitarian intervention. Much of this was prompted by the 'arrival' in (or return to) Europe of conditions of brutal civil war and genocide in the 1990s, particularly in the Balkans, which resonated in international public opinion with the Rwandan genocide and were followed closely by the chain of wars and civil conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa touched off by the 'War on Terror'. These events provoked new reflection on the whole range of categories of human rights and crimes against humanity established in law and practice since 1945. They also invited new scrutiny of the terms on which individual states or groups of states have claimed the right to take action on the territory of others 'in the cause of humanity': to protect civilian populations threatened by (usually) physical abuse of some kind. Starting from the observation that much of this scrutiny has lacked a historical perspective, this book locates the origins of that claim at the beginning of the 'long' nineteenth century, and traces the emergence of a modern practice of humanitarian intervention through key episodes over the century.

Klose's central argument is that the notion and practice of humanitarian intervention proper began with the movement against transatlantic slavery in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. An object of popular campaigns that was finally brought about through joint actions by the European powers, the abolition of the slave trade would become the 'humanitarian gold standard' (p. 303) for future international relations and a precedent for subsequent interventions. For Klose, 'humanitarian intervention' is to be distinguished from the defence of co-religionists that drove conflict in Europe in the century before the Peace of Westphalia. Similarly, while humanitarian intervention may aim to end certain kinds of war (most often civil wars) and to relieve their consequences, it is different from intervention to

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preserve or restore peace itself—the rationale for counter-revolutionary and anti-liberal interventions under the post-Napoleonic settlement. It is also distinct from action to protect human *rights*, in that the objects of intervention are people whose very humanity has been violated through bodily abuse and/or the forcible denial of the power to dispose over their own bodies, and whom ‘we’ are obliged to rescue by virtue of our common membership of the human race. They need not be perceived as having a claim to rights equal to those of their rescuers. Enslaved Africans, whose post-emancipation claims to citizenship or self-determination were widely denied even by abolitionists, can thus be seen as the paradigmatic objects of humanitarian concern.

Klose follows a well established historiographical consensus in identifying humanitarianism as a new and characteristic moral discourse of late Enlightenment Europe. Its motivating force was generated and sustained by emerging media with new powers to mobilize public sentiment, and the abolitionist movement was its first and most characteristic political expression. In what is essentially a deft and detailed study of international relations with humanitarian objects, Klose proceeds to trace the legacy of the foundational anti-slave trade actions and arguments through subsequent episodes in which intervention was called for and carried out ‘in the cause of humanity’.

Following a general introduction, the book opens with a relatively short section establishing the preconditions for concerted humanitarian action in international law and the conventions of inter-state relations. Klose elaborates a vision of the nineteenth century as the ‘age of internationalism’, offering an account of the development of rationales for interventionism in legal opinion and treaty practice in the wake of the Congress of Vienna. Here, he lays down an important marker for the subsequent discussion by pointing out that the premiss for this internationalism was a distinction between the civilized peoples who were the proper subjects of international law and those still awaiting civilization. He goes on to explore the conditions for the growth of a humanitarian sensibility and its deployment as a rationale by the abolitionists—‘the first to construct a bridge between the two concepts of emerging humanitarianism and the state practice of interventionism’ (p. 82).

The historical account that follows is organized into two substantial sections marking key phases in the development of humanitarian

intervention. The first section focuses on the beginnings of the fight against the trade in enslaved Africans. It opens with a study of the origins of the abolitionist movement in Britain and follows the progress of abolitionism from the mobilization of public opinion to its installation as a central concern for the British state. Culminating in domestic politics with the legal prohibition of the trade in 1807, his narrative of the British commitment to abolition continues at the level of international relations in the search for multilateral agreements to end the trade (initially in the form of a series of bilateral treaties) and the commitment of naval resources to active intervention against it. Increasingly, this is a story of the working out of the tension between a pan-European moral consensus against the trade, expressed in principles elaborated at Vienna in 1815, and the varying interests and capacities of states in their enforcement. What often features in the historiography of slavery and abolition as ‘aftermath’ appears here as an originary and breakthrough moment in international relations – a test bed for future international co-operation.

The second substantive section is tellingly entitled ‘the consolidation of humanitarian intervention as an imperial and colonial practice’. It begins with an account of the operational next steps entailed by the commitment to abolition, driving a dynamic by which the European powers penetrated the continent of Africa and the fight against slavery became a rationale for empire. The actions of the European powers – still primarily Britain – first to control the transatlantic trade through naval action on Africa’s west coast and then, from the 1860s, to end the intra-African trade from its hub in the Sultanate of Zanzibar, produced the combination of treaties with African political actors and armed interventions that would come to define modern imperialism. Notoriously, the Berlin agreement of 1885, which temporarily settled the ‘Scramble for Africa’ by confirming the continent as a space for European empire, committed all parties to ending the slave trade.

This section also explores the resonances of the campaign against the slave trade in other episodes of humanitarian intervention during the period. The model and discourse of humanitarian obligation forged there informed intervention in defence of Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire, beginning with the Greek War of Independence (1821–27) and the mobilization of international sentiment around the massacre on Chios. That first, and successful, inter-

vention on European territory in turn became a precedent for other interventions over the century—yet Klose’s key point here is that it should not be seen as originary in itself, but rather as a continuation of discourses and practices tested and proven in the (still ongoing) fight for abolition.

The subsequent cases of intervention against the Ottoman Empire discussed by Klose are the intervention in Lebanon (1860–61) and the response of the European powers to the Great Eastern Crisis of 1875–78 and the ‘Bulgarian Horrors’. The Great Eastern Crisis ended with a political reordering of the Balkan territories based on an international treaty (Berlin, 1878) which enshrined the principle of protection from religious discrimination. Klose characterizes this principle as ‘humanitarian’; it might equally be characterized as part of a package of now familiar practices of justice, truth-seeking, peace-keeping, and stabilization in the wake of humanitarian interventions, which he also shows us emerging in these crises. These included early proposals for the separation of contending communities through forced population exchange. The Balkan interventions also generated new discussions about humanitarian intervention among scholars in international law, with an emerging (though not complete) consensus in its favour.

The last substantive chapter focuses on the case of the United States. The initial response of the new republic to the emerging practice of interventionism was to adopt a defensive position in respect of European interventions in the Americas—what would come to be called the Monroe Doctrine (1823)—while maintaining a principle of non-intervention in its own international relations (increasingly in the face of the counter-mobilization of public sentiment, for example in the Greek case). Via a process in which the Monroe Doctrine came to be interpreted as an exclusive licence to intervene in the affairs of Central and Latin America, the century ended with the Spanish–American War, legitimized as humanitarian intervention in favour of Cuba’s civilian population and resulting in America’s no less brutal annexation of the Philippines. What this story traces is, of course, the shift in the status and self-image of the United States from newly post-colonial state to aspiring empire—first continental and then trans-oceanic. Here, too, Klose provides evidence of the continuing legitimizing power of the abolitionist model over the course of the century, even in the antebellum period.

Each of these episodes has been studied by other scholars, as Klose's very full references and bibliography acknowledge. What Klose does here is to identify them as constituent phases in a continuous development, in which rhetorics and practices mobilized to serve one campaign were adopted in the next and at the same time adjusted or extended in response to the new circumstances, such that each became a precedent for the next. On the central question of the shifting relationship between humanitarian motivation and colonial/imperial ambitions in that trajectory, his position is in line with that of much contemporary scholarship, but he effectively signposts the switchbacks and dead ends as well as the direction of travel. Beyond the convincing evidence he offers that the (anti-)slavery topos continued to recur as a leitmotiv, Klose's contribution is in teasing out and elaborating very concrete connections between one episode or phase and the next, drawing on his own investigations in British, French, Spanish, Austrian, and American archives and published sources. Even examples of innovation or repurposing in strategic practice (blockade, boycott, and sanctions) or 'mission drift', like the move in campaigns on both African coasts from capturing slavers at sea to pursuing them inland, add an important dimension to our understanding of the genealogy of today's practices and dilemmas.

The legacy of this history for contemporary developments is addressed in an epilogue, which summarizes the emergence of new frameworks for humanitarian intervention in the twentieth century. At its centre are initiatives for global governance, the failed experiment of the League of Nations, and the United Nations' shift away from non-intervention towards the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in the wake of the Rwandan and Balkan genocides. Klose concludes in sceptical mode; underlining how the experience of the nineteenth century demonstrates the *unmanageability* of humanitarian intervention, he cites Ulrich Beck's warnings against 'human-rights colonialism' and 'military humanism' (p. 441).¹

In this context, Klose reminds us that Global South states are similarly sceptical about principles like R2P, and in so doing, he provokes a question which a study of this kind cannot answer, but which

¹ Ulrich Beck, *Der kosmopolitische Blick, oder: Krieg ist Frieden* (Frankfurt am Main, 2004). On manageability, see Gary J. Bass, *Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention* (New York, 2008).

nevertheless haunted this reviewer's reading of it: the question about the identity and agency of those who have historically been the objects of humanitarian intervention. One development that Klose illustrates, but could hardly unpick in a study of international relations, is the shifting racialization of victims and perpetrators over the century, from African victims of European slavers to Black African and White Christian victims of 'off-White' Muslims (with the Catholic Spanish in Cuba occupying a similarly intermediate position for American Protestants).² At one level, this is so familiar as to need no further analysis, but it actually goes to the heart of what constitutes 'humanitarian'. What is the force of the claims of universal 'humanity', as public opinion becomes sensitized to multiple inhumanities and needs to prioritize between them? And does this partially explain the compulsive recurrence to the abolitionist narrative, with its ostensibly self-evident discourse of absolute dehumanization? The question extends beyond representations to concrete actors: humanitarian intervention was invented in Europe, and as Klose points out, its origin in the self-acknowledged crime of Europe against Africa still prejudices its conception in international relations. In all its ambivalence, though, it is now 'owned' by a global community. In this account of intervention's past, non-European actors who are not victims to be rescued generally feature as the European principals saw and treated them: as second-class allies at best, and as objects rather than subjects of policy. How would this story read if it were told from their perspective too – as genuinely global history?

² See Maria de Guzmán, *Spain's Long Shadow: The Black Legend, Off-Whiteness, and Anglo-American Empire* (Minneapolis, 2005).

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'Gypsy' and Holocaust studies, the history of financial practices, and race and colonialism. She is the co-editor, with Felix Brahm, of *Moralizing Commerce in a Globalizing World: Multidisciplinary Approaches to a History of Economic Conscience (1600–1900)* (forthcoming).

ANDREW H. BEATTIE, *Allied Internment Camps in Occupied Germany: Extrajudicial Detention in the Name of Denazification, 1945–1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), xii + 248 pp. ISBN 978 1 108 48763 4. £75.00

Camps in general, their associated problems, and their possible solutions became a particularly topical issue during the European refugee crisis in 2015–16. The accommodation of refugees in camps was the subject of extensive political debate, and in Germany, the idea of building ‘reception camps’ in North Africa was even floated. The associations carried by the term ‘camp’ are still rather negative, although camps in Germany are no longer instruments of terror, suppression, and annihilation. Instead, they are a place to temporarily accommodate those threatened by war or subject to political persecution, and they are also to a certain extent the mirror image of Germany’s democratic constitution and its free society, which seeks to guarantee humane living quarters for all.

The question of what political decision-making processes led to the formation, repurposing, and establishment of camps is a historically important one. While camps built before 1945 in Germany were primarily used for the purposes of terror, imprisonment, deterrence, labour, and not least the murder of their inmates, their function changed under Allied occupation. Immediately after the war, the Allies used camps to isolate potentially dangerous German civilians, before going on to identify civilian groups that bore political responsibility for the German war machine and reign of terror, hold them accountable, and exact punishment or redress.

Camps, and especially the experience of internment, are therefore an important component of both German and European post-war history, and one that has been relatively neglected by previous research in this field. Only the internment camps in the Soviet occupation zone have been studied in any detail over the last twenty-five years.¹ Similar studies of the Western occupation zones are almost entirely absent, as are comparative studies.

¹ See e.g. Sergej Mironenko et al. (eds.) *Sowjetische Speziallager in Deutschland 1945 bis 1950*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1998); Bettina Greiner, *Verdrängter Terror: Geschichte und Wahrnehmung sowjetischer Speziallager in Deutschland* (Hamburg, 2010); Bodo Ritscher, *Speziallager Nr. 2 Buchenwald: Zur Geschichte des Lagers*

Andrew Beattie's recently published book now aims to fill these striking research gaps and seeks to offer 'the first detailed, systematic, comparative study of the subject' (p. 2). In fact, his book represents the first ever English-language monograph on the topic of internment in Germany after the Second World War. The few existing studies are almost exclusively doctoral dissertations written in German and dealing with just one occupation zone.² Only a handful of studies of the Soviet occupation zone have been translated into English so far.³ Beattie's study not only makes the topic linguistically accessible to a potentially broader public, but is also the first monograph to set itself the task of systematically comparing all four occupation zones. He argues that internment was 'a central element of the Allies' effort to secure their presence in Germany, to destroy Nazism and punish those deemed responsible for it, and to allow the construction of a new Germany' (p. 23).

Beattie's book is split into four main chapters, each dealing with a different aspect of internment. He starts with the Allied preliminary planning in 1943 before addressing the implementation of internment from 1945 to 1950 and the categorization, processing, and release of the internees. Chapter three is concerned with the camp

Buchenwald 1945–1950 (Weimar-Buchenwald, 1995); Kirsten Holm, *Das sowjetische Speziallager Nr. 4 Landsberg/Warthe* (Göttingen, 2005); Peter Reif-Spirek and Bodo Ritscher (eds.), *Speziallager in der SBZ: Gedenkstätten mit 'doppelter Vergangenheit'* (Berlin, 1999); Petra Haustein, *Instrumentalisierung, Verdrängung, Aufarbeitung: Die sowjetischen Speziallager in der gesellschaftlichen Wahrnehmung 1945 bis heute* (Göttingen, 2006); Gudrun Lenzer, *Frauen im Speziallager Buchenwald, 1945–1950: Internierung und lebensgeschichtliche Einordnung* (Münster, 1996).

² See Heiner Wember, *Umerziehung im Lager: Internierung und Bestrafung von Nationalsozialisten in der britischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands* (Essen, 1991); Kathrin Meyer, *Entnazifizierung von Frauen: Die Internierungslager der US-Zone Deutschlands 1945–1952* (Berlin, 2004); Christof Strauß, *Kriegsgefangenschaft und Internierung: Die Lager in Heilbronn-Böckingen 1945–1947* (Heilbronn, 1998).

³ Bettina Greiner, *Suppressed Terror: History and Perception of Soviet Special Camps in Germany* (Lanham, Md., 2014); Adrian Preissinger, *From Sachsenhausen to Buchenwald: Death Camps of the Soviets, 1945–1950* (Ocean City, Md., 1994); Ulrich Merten, *The Gulag in East Germany: Soviet Special Camps, 1945–1950* (Amherst, Mass., 2018).

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inmates themselves, approaching them mainly through extensive use of statistics. Beattie examines the occupancy rates of individual camps over time, as well as the widely varying numbers of internees in different occupation zones at different points in time. Questions concerning the internees' individual level of involvement in National Socialism and their demographic make-up also play an important role. Finally, Beattie looks at life in internment camps and discusses their main functions under Allied occupation and in the context of post-war policies. He also focuses on key topics such as work, re-education, violence, and external contacts, which, given the scale of his project, are not dealt with in detail, but used to illustrate the complexity of camp life.

As we might expect from the intricacy and diversity of his subject, Beattie draws on extensive source material. The study is mainly based on pre-existing research, various published sources, and archive material. Many of the Soviet sources were not available to earlier authors, but have since been published in German or English translation (p. 24), so it seems that the Soviet aspects of his study are based solely on published sources. The bibliography lists only German and British archives, as well as published editions of American, French, and Soviet sources. An ambitious study of this kind, covering at least six different countries, will for practical reasons be subject to strict research limits. Nonetheless, it would have been preferable for such a broad project, which explicitly claims to offer a comprehensive, systematic, and balanced history of internment camps in Germany, to include at least some primary sources from American and French archives—especially since Beattie himself states that his work is based on research carried out in more than forty different archives and memorials (p. x) that go unmentioned in the book's bibliography. All the same, this minor criticism does not affect his overall research results.

The considerable number of archives consulted is doubtlessly due to the broader research context of the study. The book originated from an inquiry into the reception of Soviet internment in Germany that developed into a larger, as yet incomplete project intending to address the reception of internment camps in all four occupation zones of Germany. During the course of the project, it proved necessary to write two separate books—the first on internment in general, and the second on the reception of internment camps, as originally

planned (p. ix). As such, we can expect follow-up publications in the near future.

The present study is intended to serve as a general history, and offers an overview of internment in post-war Germany. According to its subtitle *Extrajudicial Detention in the Name of Denazification, 1945–1950*, one of its main goals is ‘to highlight the multiple, often mutually antagonistic dimensions and aims of transitional justice in general and of particular measures such as internment’ (p. 14). In addition, Beattie seeks to answer a whole series of questions pertaining to the three major themes of the immediate post-war period: regime change, occupation, and ‘transitional justice’. Beattie is primarily interested in analysing the role of internment camps in relation to the Allied goal of permanently eliminating National Socialism, but he also looks at the nature of the camps and how they can be distinguished from other types of camps. In a spirit of comparative analysis, Beattie also asks why the four occupying powers used internment to such a varying extent and opens his study with a list of questions, each of which would justify a monograph in its own right—or perhaps even a whole series. To deal with them all in one monograph is ambitious, but Beattie tackles the project confidently—first by examining the current state of research, and then by formulating his own theses and bringing up supporting examples. In particular, he argues for a more sensitive and, above all, more reflective use of terminology, as well as the need to introduce clear definitions of key terms in historical studies (p. 18). In this sense, one substantial problem is that there is still debate among contemporary historians on the putatively simple question of how to define a Nazi and where to draw boundaries, since Nazi Party membership alone ‘constitutes neither a sufficient nor a necessary criterion’ (p. 106). For this reason, ‘considerable care and precise criteria are needed to distinguish different types of camps’ (p. 4). This applies even more to the distinction between different types of camps and their demarcation from (National Socialist) concentration camps, since even in these cases there are no ‘consensual definitions or understandings’ (pp. 201–7).

Against the backdrop of these semantic problems, Beattie also emphasizes that it would be more appropriate to speak of ‘collective suspicion’ than ‘collective guilt’—not just in the context of internment camps, but also the German post-war period in general (p. 14). He refers to the long-standing debate over ‘whether the Allies ever

accused the Germans of collective guilt for Nazism, its crimes, or the war' (p. 12). Opinions vary on whether and to what extent the Allies focused on individual guilt or placed all Germans under general suspicion. In this context, denazification is often seen as part of the 'collective guilt' thesis (p. 12).

Notwithstanding this discussion, the question of perspective arises here too. The narrative of 'collective guilt' aligned very well with the internees' own self-understanding, and was a useful tool both for presenting themselves as a cohesive community of victims and especially for drawing a line between themselves on the one side and the Allies, with their supposedly arbitrary victor's justice, on the other. Clearer semantic differentiation is nevertheless necessary and may offer a useful instrument for more far-reaching analysis.

However, it would have been equally desirable for Beattie consistently to apply his call for more reflective use of terminology to his own work. In particular, when he characterizes internment as 'extrajudicial', it would be well for him intensively to examine the overall legal framework beyond the directives, instructions, and manuals issued by the Allies. In particular, this should include a detailed analysis of international law (the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and the Hague Conventions of 1907). It is not sufficient merely to mention these agreements in passing and thus reduce them to a footnote in the history of internment (p. 43). We also need an analysis of which operations and policies were covered by international law in the event of war and the subsequent or simultaneous occupation of any third countries; at the very least, there needs to be a discussion of military necessity in this context. Only once all these factors are taken into account can we determine whether the allies circumvented, bent, or even broke international law, deliberately or otherwise, by implementing internment in Germany; and whether that internment can therefore really be characterized as 'extrajudicial'.

After all, internment is located at the intersection of international law, occupation law, and the law of war. Beattie explains in detail the numerous Allied directives, memoranda, and orders that were implemented both during the preliminary planning of the internment camps and throughout their existence. Less informed readers, who may not be familiar with the complex interplay of law, internment, and occupation, would be forgiven for thinking that the Allies created their own legal framework for the implementation of intern-

ment, which might make the overall Allied approach seem less 'extrajudicial' – especially since the Allies officially deemed internment to be not only permitted, but also necessary for the (democratic) reconstruction of Germany. Beattie refers to the Geneva Conventions solely in connection with the status and treatment of POWs, without going into more detail about their actual content and, above all, without considering their relevance for internment as a whole and its potential unlawfulness.

Despite these criticisms, Beattie's study will undoubtedly remain a key reference in the field for many years to come, and with good reason. Overall, it is a well-structured and very well written book that provides an excellent introduction to a topic that has long been neglected by historical research. He offers a condensed picture of the state of research that goes far beyond simple summary and allows researchers quickly to get to grips with the field. Experts on the history of internment will gain little new knowledge from Beattie's book, but we cannot criticize him for this, since his primary aim is to offer a comprehensive history and overview of the topic. However, experts will be drawn to Beattie's work for its concise presentation and meticulous statistical approach, which has been noticeably absent from most previous research on the topic. Considering the complexity of the subject matter, the enormous range of sources, and the diversity of current research, Beattie has managed to produce an impressive book.

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PETER E. FÄSSLER, ANDREAS NEUWÖHNER, and FLORIAN STAFFEL (eds.), *Briten in Westfalen 1945–2017: Besatzer, Verbündete, Freunde? Studien und Quellen zur Westfälischen Geschichte*, 86 (Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2019), x + 388 pp. ISBN 978 3 506 79250 1. €49.90

In the last few years, numerous books, edited collections, and articles have appeared considering, in some form or another, the history of the Allied occupation of Germany and its aftermath. This is a welcome change for a field that has remained on the fringes of mainstream debate for too long. Finally, it seems, scholars are reckoning with the long-term impact of the immediate post-war period on the history of modern Europe. Yet significant gaps in our knowledge remain, particularly with regard to the British Army's continuous presence in Germany since the end of the Second World War. Peter E. Fäßler, Andreas Neuwöhner, and Florian Staffel's edited collection on the historical significance of the British in Westphalia since 1945 makes significant strides in this direction.

This set of essays originates from a conference held at the University of Paderborn in March 2017. The conference was part of a larger research and exhibition project initiated by the city of Paderborn and intended to recognize a momentous juncture in the history of Anglo-German relations, namely, the withdrawal of British forces from their bases in north-west Germany after more than seventy years. As noted in this volume's introduction, it is a story often told as if written by a Hollywood screenwriter: two bitter enemies forced together become allies and even friends. This impressive collection of sixteen essays by scholars from Britain and Germany uncovers the hidden complexity underlying the history of Anglo-German rapprochement.

The book's first section, on British policy in Westphalia during the years of military occupation, explores the formulation and implementation of policies such as re-education, denazification, and dismantling. Benedikt Neuwöhner's chapter considers how British experiences in Germany in the aftermath of the First World War shaped the post-1945 occupation. The early 1940s, we learn, saw a series of publications by veterans and experts outlining Britain's supposed mistakes during the occupation of the Rhineland from 1918 to 1930. These ideas were certainly influential in Britain, where the lega-

cy of the Rhineland occupation resonated with a war-weary public. But as Neuwöhner shows, they also informed official preparation for the occupation and instilled a 'hard peace' ethos in the rules and regulations of occupation life. J. H. Morgan's *Assize of Arms* is shown to have been particularly influential amongst the British military and civil administration, helping to establish concerns that the Germans would once again seek to organize sympathy.¹

Kerstin Schulte and Jens Westemeier both consider British implementation of denazification and re-education. Schulte's detailed study of Westphalian internment camps is an important addition to existing work on internment in the Soviet Zone. She convincingly argues that these camps were a vital component of Allied policy, intended to help minimize security risks to British troops and to expunge Nazism from German society. But she also shows their long-term impact to be quite different: internees came to see themselves as victims, while scandals such as Bad Nenndorf dogged Anglo-German rapprochement. Westemeier's study of Werl prison draws similar conclusions, illustrating how this institution, which housed convicted Nazis, including *Wehrmacht* and SS Generals, became an irritant in the Anglo-German relationship and a key part of Adenauer's early *Vergangenheitspolitik*. The chapter would have benefited from further probing into the decidedly dubious procedures used to justify releases on medical grounds in the 1950s, a political compromise that avoided controversial amnesties or pardons. But both of these essays fruitfully illuminate the multifaceted influence of the Cold War upon Anglo-German relations in the immediate post-war period. While political leaders could alter their rhetoric in line with new political priorities, the practical reality of dealing with internment camps or convicted prisoners was much more troublesome.

Next, Philipp Erdmann takes a different approach to the impact of British occupation policy on Westphalia by considering the democratization of local politics in Münster. He argues that the British successfully constructed an institutional framework prioritizing the local level as a 'school of democracy', with a legacy still visible to this

¹ See J. H. Morgan, *Assize of Arms: The Disarmament of Germany and Her Rearmament (1919-1939)*, with a Preface by Lieut.-General Sir G. M. W. Macdonogh (New York, 1946).

day. An interesting follow-up may be a more direct comparison of democratizing programmes across the various zones of occupation. The final essay in this section, Maria Perrefort's study of dismantling in Hamm, is a useful case study of an underexamined aspect of the Allied occupation. This chapter illustrates how the inconsistent character of British occupation policy could be a major strain on relations with the German populace. Yet there remains much to be said about the actual economic impact of dismantling and its role in facilitating political consciousness in north-western Germany and in Cold War *realpolitik*.

The second set of essays considers a fundamental part of British occupation policy: youth work. Marcus Köster uncovers the missionary zeal with which British youth officers went about their work, as they attempted to instil tolerance and democratic awareness in young Germans. Köster manages to underline the way in which British expectations of Germany were skewed by years of mutual antagonism, with youth officers often uncritically accepting Nazi propaganda about the supposed ideological discipline of German teenagers. But the chapter could have explored how the youth work programme was also a key facet of British post-war propaganda. It was commonly touted as the archetypal long-term project in occupied Germany, without easy solutions but nevertheless integral to Britain 'winning the peace'. The essay by Barbara Stambolis thoughtfully considers encounters between British and German children on youth exchange programmes, making the multifaceted and intergenerational nature of 'coming to terms with the past' abundantly clear.

Sarah Paterson's chapter on children's experiences of Operation Union, the relocation of British families to post-war Germany in the late 1940s, is a vital contribution to existing scholarship on the social history of the occupation. Paterson's detailed research ranges from stationery allocations to school meals. But perhaps her most significant contribution is in the conclusion that British preparations for schools in the zone of occupation were somewhat hamstrung by the lack of clarity on how long British soldiers would be stationed in Germany. It is certainly true that at the end of the war, estimates amongst commentators, administrators, and politicians ranged from six months to fifty years. The unexpected longevity of the British presence in Germany is perhaps a useful context for all of the essays in this volume.

The next section concentrates firmly on British-German rapprochement and begins with Christopher Knowles's informative study on the history of marriages between British personnel and German women. The detailed research into this intriguing facet of the occupation is valuable, not least for adjusting our existing estimate of marriages between 1947 and 1951 from 10,000 to around 15,000. This is an important and often overlooked facet of the Anglo-German relationship since the Second World War, yet Knowles's historiographical summary lacks some subtlety: the notion (p. 224) that feminist historians have interpreted 'all women in an occupied country' as 'suffering victims' is perhaps an unfair characterization. Likewise, Knowles's phrasing regarding the evidence of rapes perpetrated by Allied troops is unhelpful: the suggestion (p. 224) that sexual assaults were committed 'even, it has to be said, by some British soldiers' belies a sense of unwarranted British exceptionalism. It obscures the author's crucial point, namely, that while much attention has, rightfully, been given to the heinous acts perpetrated by Soviet forces, there are also countless examples of British, American, and French personnel responsible for acts of sexual violence in this period.

Peter Speiser and Thomas Küster's essays both focus on the place of the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) in Westphalian society and within the broader history of Anglo-German relations. In three case studies, Speiser shows how requisitioning, ineffective communication, and hostile incidents served to undermine rapprochement throughout the 1950s. In a particularly entertaining episode, we learn how national reporting of a comical bar fight in Hameln served to inflame local tensions. Küster's chapter presents a broader sweep of the BAOR's history in Westphalia from the 1960s to the present day. This study demonstrates an impressive amount of research into various phases of deployment and the changing role of the British Army in Westphalia. Yet Küster warns us not to overstate cultural contact and rapprochement 'on the ground', but rather emphasizes that the British in Westphalia lived in a parallel society to that of their German neighbours. This relationship, he continues, depended on mutual goodwill to see through moments of conflict.

Oliver Zöllner's study of British Forces radio offers an original take on German relations with the occupying powers that looks beyond primary arenas of interaction. Zöllner argues that British Forces radio, by inadvertently gaining a widespread listenership

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amongst the local population, became a facet of public diplomacy. It was, he suggests, a means of 'relationship building' through the introduction of a 'friend from abroad' to German listeners. This essay demonstrates the importance of further research into the British influence upon post-war German society, given the overstated focus on 'Americanization' rather than a broader process of 'Westernization'.

The final set of essays offers a more experimental, interdisciplinary assessment of Anglo-German relations in Westphalia. Michael Girke's essay on Stephen Spender's 1946 travel book, *European Witness*, is a testament to the value of literary writing in historical inquiry.² Indeed, Spender's book was one of several published in this period that presented British readers with an image of post-war Germany and now stand as vital sources for historians. These travelogues are some of the most detailed explorations of life at a time of great upheaval. Also taking a touristic theme, Fred Kaspar's essay on the British confiscation of Westphalian spa buildings between 1945 and 1955 illustrates the breadth of influence that the early years of the occupation had upon German society. The short and long-term impact of this history is a fascinating case study for the reconstruction of Westphalia's social and physical environment in the aftermath of war.

Jana Flieshart's sociological and almost psychogeographical study of the German civilian workers in the British Army's Dortmund garrison demonstrates how historical changes at a macro level can have significant personal, psychological, and emotional ramifications. And last, but certainly not least, Ulrich Harteisen's chapter offers an enchanting history of the moorlands and sand dunes which make up the Senne. We learn how British Army manoeuvres on the Sennelager Training Area have served to craft a unique natural habitat, preserving biodiversity amid piles of spent tank shells. Harteisen's concluding remarks on the uncertainties and opportunities for the future of the habitat as the British military leaves Westphalia is an apt endpoint for a thoughtful collection of essays.

What is perhaps most striking about Fäßler, Neuwöhner, and Staffel's book is the interrelatedness of its constituent essays. Evidently, no policy stood alone in the British scheme of military occu-

² Stephen Spender, *European Witness* (London, 1946).

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pation and the subsequent period of Anglo-German cohabitation. Even more significantly, this collection of essays ably shows how Britain's presence in Westphalia since 1945 has been a multifaceted story defined by success *and* failure, hope *and* fear, optimism *and* pessimism, antagonism *and* friendship. While this story ultimately became one of rapprochement and growing affinity, it certainly did not follow the linear development of a classic Hollywood film. Rather, the history of interactions and relations in Westphalia serves to complicate such a simplistic narrative, originally constructed as part of Cold War *Vergangenheitspolitik*.

At the same time, this work does suffer somewhat from an overriding focus on the immediate post-war period. Less than half of the essays directly engage with the social, political, economic, and military interactions of the British Army with Westphalia after 1949, an odd shortcoming for a book with an explicit interest in a seventy-year stretch. Nevertheless, its findings still help to contextualize more recent international events as British relations with Germany, and Europe as a whole, have turned away from any notion of an ever-closer union. As this volume proves, it is possible for a mutual affinity to emerge even amid irritations, antagonisms, and bitter memories of what came before.

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REINHART KOSELLECK/CARL SCHMITT, *Der Briefwechsel: 1953–1983*, ed. Jan Eike Dunkhase (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2019), 459 pp. ISBN 978 3 518 58741 6. €39.25

‘Will you come to visit me again?’ (p. 252). So reads Carl Schmitt’s meek request to Reinhart Koselleck in the autumn of 1973. Schmitt, aged 85, lamented the ‘complete decision-making inability of old age, a wretched condition’ (p. 252), but sought to maintain his personal relationship with Koselleck. The collection of letters published here begins twenty years prior in 1953, with Schmitt already in his so-called ‘inner exile’ in Plettenberg; meanwhile, Koselleck was a student in Heidelberg, acquainted with Schmitt through Nicolaus Sombart. The correspondence follows Koselleck’s ascent through German academia and stops shortly after the death of Schmitt’s daughter, Anima, in 1983. As such, it contains a remarkable trove of information for conceptual historians interested in the development of Koselleck’s work, as well as intellectual historians of the Bundesrepublik more broadly. Indeed, given the recent upturn in interest in Reinhart Koselleck, from Sebastian Huhnholz’s *Von Carl Schmitt zu Hannah Arendt?* (2019) to Sean Franzel and Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann’s edition of *Sediments of Time* (2018), Jan Eike Dunkhase’s edition of Koselleck’s correspondence with Schmitt is a tremendous resource.

There are passages of Koselleck’s letters that might sound oddly familiar to the contemporary early-career historian: the feeling of self-doubt and anguish surrounding his impending viva voce, the uncertainty created by the precarity of the academic job market, and the difficulties of teaching undergraduates basic source criticism. At the start of the correspondence, Koselleck repeatedly emphasizes his concerns to Schmitt. His adviser, Professor Johannes Kühn, was sick and unable to review the final draft of his dissertation, and Koselleck was forced to begin his first academic appointment abroad without having completed the oral examination. Koselleck, like many young researchers, was hired on a one-year contract as an assistant lecturer at the University of Bristol in 1953; the contract was subsequently extended by a further year before he returned to Heidelberg. Koselleck wrote to Schmitt on 6 July 1955, ‘As concerns my future, I do not yet know what lies ahead of me’ (p. 95). Koselleck’s early letters further detail the revisions and attempts at publication that went into transforming his dissertation, *Critique and Crisis*, into the even-

tual monograph. Although Schmitt's influence on Koselleck is by now a well-worn talking point, it is nevertheless striking to read the dedication inscribed on Schmitt's personal copy of Koselleck's dissertation: 'In grateful memory of the conversations without which this dissertation could not have been written' (p. 81).

At the same time, there are a number of humorous anecdotes buried in the correspondence. For example, Koselleck writes to Schmitt in July 1956 recounting a visit from the Cambridge historian Herbert Butterfield, who delivered a lecture on 'The Role of the Individual in History'. As Koselleck reports, 'For the British, it is less important *what* they say than *how* they say it. And Butterfield is, with all his absentmindedness and awkwardness, a brilliant orator (what Englishman doesn't flirt with absentmindedness!?)' (p. 121). Schmitt, who for decades directed polemics against the English, would surely have enjoyed this characterization. Likewise, the opening letter, dated 21 January 1953, begins with Koselleck thanking Schmitt for secretly filling his petrol tank before he had to leave Plettenberg. While some of the correspondence published in this collection has already been the subject of extensive scholarly commentary, particularly within Niklas Olsen's magisterial *History in the Plural: An Introduction to the Work of Reinhart Koselleck* (2012) and its ensuing discussion,¹ it is nevertheless of benefit to have the materials gathered in one place.

Indeed, the scope of the correspondence is wide ranging, with references to historians such as R. G. Collingwood, Arnold Toynbee, and Friedrich Meinecke; philosophers such as Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, Karl Löwith, and Hans-Georg Gadamer; and members of the Ritter School, as well as those typically associated with Schmitt's orbit. It is clear that Koselleck, the junior scholar, was the more enthusiastic partner in their correspondence, writing, in regard to *Critique and Crisis*, 'I would be all the more thankful to hear an appropriate judgement from you, esteemed Professor, who basically instigated my central research question and who magisterially monitored its progress' (p. 26). As the editor of the volume, Jan Eike Dunkhase, has noted, the early correspondence is highly asymmetrical. Koselleck writes

¹ See Javier Fernández Sebastián, 'Against History (in the Singular): A Review of Niklas Olsen, *History in the Plural: An Introduction to the Work of Reinhart Koselleck*', *Contributions to the History of Concepts*, 7/2 (2012), 132–42.

not only more often, but also at much greater length than his counterpart. As such, the correspondence is most useful for illuminating the thinking behind a range of Koselleck's works, from asymmetrical counter-concepts and temporal structures to his later writings on war memorials.

For the Schmitt scholar, however, it is unfortunate that we will never know the details of the conversations that took place during Koselleck's thirteen visits to Plettenberg, as it seems this was when Schmitt was most active in leading the conversation. The correspondence can only provide a broad idea of the topics discussed. For example, in a letter to Koselleck dated 22 August 1958, Schmitt muses that 'world history is not a river, but rather a sequence of quanta accumulating around a constant core situation—hence the unbelievable repetition of questions—until the quanta suddenly migrate to completely new core situations' (p. 150). That Schmitt would abandon the river metaphor, after having approvingly cited it in the foreword to *Positionen und Begriffe* in 1939, is surely of interest to the intellectual historian, and one can recognize the influence of his post-war reception of Collingwood in his reference to the question-answer logic of history. However, Schmitt's one-sentence characterization of world history remains rather obscure, as he immediately goes on to wish Koselleck a wonderful holiday. Indeed, Schmitt's contribution to the correspondence remains rather disappointing, as he often seems—like many emeritus professors—to be replaying his 'greatest hits'. Those seeking hidden insights or keys to interpreting Schmitt's work are better off looking elsewhere.

The editor of this collection, Jan Eike Dunkhase, deserves particular praise for the exceptional editorial apparatus included with the volume. While some of Schmitt's correspondences have been published in a haphazard manner, Dunkhase proves a most astute editor. Each letter comes with a set of clarifications of the individuals, texts, and events referred to by the author. Dunkhase notes when and where the recipients annotated their letters, revealing a commentary that is not expressed in subsequent letters. Where Schmitt and Koselleck exchanged publications, the personal dedication that went with the texts is also reproduced after the accompanying letter. Each letter further contains a statement on its transmission, and those originating from the Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen also include the individual document number. For those not intimately familiar with

the range of Schmitt's and Koselleck's work, Dunkhase's clarifications are a useful addition; for the specialist scholar, his thoroughness and transparency are most welcome.

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TOBIAS GERSTUNG, *Stapellauf für ein neues Zeitalter: Die Industriemetropole Glasgow im revolutionären Wandel nach dem Boom (1960–2000)* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016), 439 pp. ISBN 978 3 525 30086 2. €59.99

In recent years, historians have increasingly turned their attention to the period between the early 1970s and the late 2010s. While the opening of the archival record has played a part, the upsurge of interest in the recent past has also been driven by a recognition that the forty years between the end of the post-war boom and the world financial crisis are essential for understanding the interlocking political and socio-cultural crises that are convulsing our present. Scholars in Germany and the UK share a common interest in the period, but they tend to operate with separate sets of analytical categories and frameworks. In the UK the concept of 'de-industrialization' takes pride of place. An influential article by Jim Tomlinson suggests that 'de-industrialization' can be considered a new metanarrative for post-war British history.¹ In Germany, by contrast, scholars tend to speak of 'structural change' or 'structural rupture' in their attempts to historicize the period 'after the boom'.² The difference is not without significance. Whereas 'de-industrialization' emphasizes what gets lost and foregrounds political agency, 'structural change' sees underlying processes at work which operate, to a large extent, independently of human intervention.

The book under review offers an analysis of the Scottish port city of Glasgow in the period from 1960 to 2000. The study is based on a Ph.D. dissertation that formed part of a research cluster at the universities of Tübingen and Trier, which is at the centre of this new German historiography of the recent past. The study offers a fascinating example of the benefits that accrue from a model of scholarship, now under much pressure in the UK, in which the author is positioned outside the community that is being studied. Gerstung's viewpoint is that of the dispassionate scholar. As he tells the reader in a postscript, he first visited Glasgow in 2008 for his research.

¹ Jim Tomlinson, 'De-industrialization Not Decline: A New Metanarrative for Post-war British History', *Twentieth Century British History*, 27/1 (2016), 76–99.

² Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Lutz Raphael, *Nach dem Boom: Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970*, 3rd edn. (Göttingen, 2012).

Gerstung looks at the city as an outsider who brings the conceptual framework of 'structural change' and 'rupture' to bear on his subject matter. The result is an empirically rich and methodologically nuanced study that situates Glasgow's recent past in the *longue durée* since the early nineteenth century and embeds the case study in the broader history of the UK. In doing so, Gerstung makes a good case for regarding 'de-industrialization' as an interpretation put forward by partial observers, rather than as a valid analytical concept. It captures, at best, an incomplete reality (pp. 178, 265).

The study falls into two parts. Part one traces developments from the mid nineteenth century to the 1960s. Glasgow's rise from a provincial town to 'second city of the Empire' was inextricably linked to colonial expansion and industrialization. In its Victorian heyday, the city's pre-eminence rested on the port economy and heavy industry, with shipbuilding and locomotive construction at its centre. Glasgow was both a port city and an industrial city. But its rapid development had also led to formidable problems of poor housing, overcrowding, and a dangerously unbalanced economic structure, which preoccupied urban planners long before de-industrialization brought problems of its own. As part one demonstrates, the very remedies that were proposed to solve the problems of the industrial city—slum clearance, suburbanization, high-rise tenement blocks, the introduction of a branch plant economy—created unintended consequences that came to exacerbate the city's woes, as Glasgow's socio-economic foundations began to disintegrate from the 1960s onwards. Containerization and the reorientation of trade towards the European Continent undermined the port economy. Meanwhile, competition from the Far East in shipbuilding and steel-making eroded the city's heavy industrial base.

While the broad outline of this story will be familiar to students of British history and of the industrial city, Gerstung demonstrates convincingly that it is too simplistic to think of these changes in terms of a linear trajectory from an industrial golden age to a period of crisis and eventual renewal. The example of Glasgow shows clearly that urban planners and decision-makers were faced with multiple interlocking crises—some of them a consequence of industrialization and of long standing, others of more recent nature and resulting from de-industrialization. They created a syndrome that proved extremely difficult to ameliorate. Gerstung could, perhaps, have gone further in

marshalling evidence from his case study to query the framework of 'industrial rupture' within which the Tübingen research cluster operated. The disintegration of the old industrial port city began long before the post-war boom came to an end in the 1970s (p. 109). What are the implications for periodization, and for demarcating a boom period from a period 'after the boom'?

Part two looks at Glasgow's attempts to reinvent itself in the three decades between the 1970s and the 2000s. It pays particular attention, first, to the built environment, with an emphasis on the rejuvenation of the inner city and the port area; and second, to the city of the mind—the images that circulated about the city among Glaswegians and in the national and international public. The chapter on the 'city of stone' traces, in chronological order, the history of several regeneration initiatives that put derelict areas and former brownfield sites to new uses—sometimes temporarily, sometimes more permanently. In rich empirical detail, Gerstung tells the story of the creation of the Scottish Exhibition and Conference Centre on the grounds of the disused Queen's Dock (completed in 1985); the staging of the Glasgow Garden Festival on the site of the Prince's Dock (1988); and the redevelopment of the Merchant City and the building of the Clyde Auditorium (completed in 1997). Between the mid 1980s and the mid 1990s, the office came to replace the factory floor as the foundation of the city's economy and, after decades of suburbanization, the city centre itself became a place to work, shop, and, for the affluent few, also to live (pp. 301–2).

Early regeneration efforts still operated on the assumption that Glasgow would remain a major centre of industry. From the mid 1980s onwards, however, urban planners and decision-makers came to identify the service sector as the engine of the city's future growth (p. 265). Here, too, the study could have done more to tease out the implications of its empirical findings for broader historiographical problems such as, for example, the significance of the political caesura of 1979. The study appears to lend weight to recent interpretations that emphasize the continuities between the Callaghan government's approach to Britain's inner-city problem and the policies of the first Thatcher government. The mid 1980s, rather than 1979, appear as the tipping point when the service economy, rather than the industrial sector, came to be embraced as the nation's future.³

³ Otto Saumarez Smith, 'Action for Cities: The Thatcher Government and Inner-City Policy', *Urban History*, 47/special issue 2 (2020), 274–91.

In an intriguing concluding chapter on ‘the city of images’, Gerstung analyses attempts by municipal bodies to shape the ideas and associations that crossed people’s minds when they thought of the city on the Clyde. Gerstung notes that Glasgow’s identification with industry and heavy manual labour, as well as urban squalor and municipal socialism, lived on long after the industrial and port economy had disintegrated. He is adamant that this disjuncture should not be understood as a contradiction between representation and social reality, but as ‘two different kinds of socially constructed reality’ (p. 304). Regardless of whether one is inclined to follow Gerstung all the way down the constructivist road, the municipal authorities realized from the 1970s that Glasgow’s regeneration efforts were hampered by the city’s association with urban decay, drunkenness, and violence. To counter such widely held perceptions, they sought to fix in people’s minds a number of slogans—most notably ‘Glasgow’s miles better’, which was in use from 1983 to 1990. The city also successfully took part in the selection procedure for European City of Culture 1990. Such attempts, however, also provoked dissent and opposition, as Gerstung details in an illuminating section on left intellectuals who insisted that Glasgow’s rebranding erased working-class history from the city’s image. Gerstung emphasizes the significance of marketing campaigns in an age when cities increasingly came to compete for the talents of a footloose ‘creative class’. He also notes wryly that it was less expensive to mount public relations campaigns than to tackle the underlying social problems that had given rise, at least in part, to negative perceptions in the first place. Regrettably, the social history of Glaswegians in this time of transformation remains outside the scope of the study.

Gerstung has written a well researched, methodologically informed, and empirically rich case study whose findings will be of interest to students of contemporary British history and comparative urban history alike. It demonstrates the considerable potential of the conceptual framework developed by the *Nach dem Boom* research cluster for better understanding the transformations of British cities and society since the 1970s. It is to be hoped that the major findings of this fine study will be made accessible to an English-speaking readership.

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ALMUTH EBKE, *Britishness: Die Debatte über nationale Identität in Großbritannien, 1967 bis 2008*, Ordnungssysteme, 55 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019), x + 372 pp. ISBN 978 3 11 062405 2. €64.95

The cohesion of the United Kingdom has seemed fragile over the last few years. The UK European Union membership referendum in 2016 revealed internal divisions resulting in majorities for Remain in Scotland and Northern Ireland, but majorities for Leave in England and Wales. The UK's withdrawal from the EU has renewed the pressure for Scottish independence and Irish unification, and raised concerns about the viability of a British nation and the concept of British national identity. Challenges to the Union, predictions of a 'break-up of Britain', and far-ranging reflections on the nation state, however, did not start with Brexit. British politicians, academics, and journalists had widely discussed Britishness in the 1990s and 2000s. Almuth Ebke's stimulating thesis on Britishness and the debate on national identity from 1967 to 2008 is a timely reminder of this.

A speech delivered by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, to the Fabian Society in January 2006 marked a high point of the debate on Britishness. He called for a clear statement of British values, arguing that these could foster a new patriotism going beyond ethnicity, race, and institutions. Starting with Brown's speech, the study traces the origins of the debate on Britishness back to the 1960s. After the Second World War, in the words of Dean Acheson, Britain had lost an empire and not yet found a role. According to Ebke, the ensuing search for a new self-understanding pertained not only to international affairs, as Acheson had in mind, but also to the domestic political debate. Discussions about national identity, which culminated in the 1990s in the search for 'Britishness' and British values, she suggests, reflected this search (p. 310). From the perspective of a new history of ideas, the book draws on a broad range of published and archival sources: in addition to the classic documents used in culturally inspired political histories (parliamentary minutes, government documents, diaries, speeches, articles in newspapers and magazines), it also considers contemporary research in history and the social sciences. On this basis, the study shows how political, public, and academic debates on national identity interacted and brought together different—and sometimes contradictory— notions of nation and belonging. The author is careful to place each strand of the

debate into its historiographical context, allowing the reader to contextualize the findings in current research.

Based on the concept of the 1970s as a time 'after the boom',¹ Ebke interprets the decade as a threshold to a problem-orientated history of the present (*Problemgeschichte der Gegenwart*). Based on this concept, she sees the debate on British nationality as a comprehensive renegotiation of the social order, triggered by a sense of crisis and far-reaching economic, political, and demographic transformations from the 1960s onwards (pp. 12–15). Ebke analyses the debates addressing these changes, focusing on those she considers as precursors to New Labour's Britishness project: societal affiliation and citizenship, nationalism and devolution, and the renegotiation of concepts of class, race, and identity in academia. Ebke also examines the changes in terminology used to describe national and societal affiliation. From this perspective, she historicizes analytical categories, such as 'national identity', which are still in use today. Her interpretation of Britishness as not only a spatial but also a socio-political concept enables her to grasp the social imaginary – the dominant image of social order (pp. 17–20).

Covering an impressive forty years and bearing in mind relevant developments beyond this period, the study identifies two phases: first, the debates on societal affiliation, citizenship, and nationalism in Scotland and Wales between 1967 and 1983, deliberately bridging the 'classic' caesura of 1979; and second, the years from 1988 to 2007–8, when commentators on national identity explicitly used the term 'Britishness' (pp. 9–10). In order to address the relevant strands of debate, the presentation proceeds in three chronological steps (pp. 24–6).

The first part discusses post-colonial immigration and devolution as the historical roots of the Britishness debate from the 1960s. Both show that the social imaginary – the accepted 'normal' order of things – was challenged by decolonization, migration, and calls for devolution (p. 101). Debates on the 1981 riots in English cities and the British Nationality Act of the same year serve as case studies to show how immigration from the 'new Commonwealth' was handled. Ebke finds that decolonization as a broad historical process was complex,

¹ Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Lutz Raphael, *Nach dem Boom: Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970*, 2nd edn. (Göttingen, 2010).

generating various competing ideas of community and belonging. She identifies three different and partly conflicting factors that constituted belonging to society: adherence to social norms and values, work, and shared culture (pp. 35–6). Debates about the British Nationality Act 1981 saw the collision of two profoundly different ideas: a widely held view imagining the kingdom to be ethnically White, and an imperial territorial approach to citizenship. The Nationality Act was an attempt to reconcile these conflicting views. However, a definitive concept of cultural community and consensus on the definition of national affiliation were still lacking (pp. 99–101).

The electoral successes of the SNP and Plaid Cymru in the late 1960s brought up the question of Scottish and Welsh devolution. The ‘constitutional settlement’, which had hitherto provided a balance between various economic, political, and cultural claims, was challenged by emerging nationalisms. Two different approaches to dealing with nationalisms existed, as can be identified in reports by the Royal Commission on the Constitution (1969–73). The widely accepted majority report presented Britain as a centralized nation state, underpinned by a sovereign central parliament. However, this interpretation acknowledged the existence of different regions with claims to nationality and self-government, and thus recommended devolution. The Home Rule debate of the late nineteenth century served as an important backdrop to this interpretation (pp. 135–44). In contrast, the minority report failed to generate far-reaching support. It negated Welsh and Scottish national aspirations and recommended comprehensive constitutional reform based on regional principles instead. When the Labour government’s devolution legislation failed in the Scottish and Welsh referendums in 1979, devolution was removed from the political agenda. New Labour’s devolution legislation of the 1990s, however, took up the issue of constitutional redefinition once more (pp. 159–60).

The second part of the book looks at how history and the social sciences dealt with the processes of transformation. It traces the introduction and emergence of national identity as an analytical concept. As established concepts could no longer adequately explain the changes underway, social scientists increasingly questioned the hitherto central category of class, while other approaches, such as identity and race, gained in importance (p. 166). The combination of new questions from cultural studies, conceptual reorientation, and crisis

awareness explained both the incipient debate on British national identity and its emergence as a category in historical research (p. 170). From the late 1970s, Anglo-American research introduced national identity to the arsenal of British historical and social studies (p. 201). This set the stage for historical research on the British multinational state. Works on the construction of British identity, such as Linda Colley's seminal *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837* (1992), laid the foundations for the Britishness debate of the 1990s, reflecting the close exchange between scientific and political debates (pp. 214–15). The political environment of the early 1980s—especially the Falklands War, but also the debate on the value of British cultural heritage—stimulated this conversation (pp. 215–34).

The third part deals with the political debate on Britishness under New Labour. Ebke treats the term 'Britishness' as a source and examines its terminology. Until the late 1980s, it described rather unspecific cultural affiliations in territorial conflicts. From the 1990s, it served mainly as a synonym for British national identity, and it has been applied to specific British values and symbols since the 2000s. As such, it became the term for communicating concepts of belonging to the British nation (p. 239). Ebke identifies two phases in the treatment of Britishness under New Labour. First, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown's programme of reform used British national symbols and rhetoric to market its politics. Britishness was used to communicate an ambition to strengthen the social cohesion of British society by emphasizing citizenship and community. In this way, national identity became a malleable political commodity (p. 246). At the same time, an official discourse on multiculturalism acknowledged the previously marginalized claims of immigrants (p. 316). Beyond the casual use of British symbols, however, academia and politics reflected on the implications of new constitutional arrangements, especially devolution, for the different national identities. The position of England and Englishness in a devolved kingdom was of particular concern. Ebke traces how an opposition arose between English and European identity, and how Englishness merged with a growing Euroscepticism. She observes that the Conservative Party aligned itself with Englishness and Euroscepticism, while Labour, Plaid Cymru, and the SNP adopted a pro-European stance (pp. 271–6). The second phase began with the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, after which concerns about ethnic diversity and the integration of

Muslims in particular marked the debate (pp. 286–7). It was against this background that Gordon Brown called for the development of genuinely British values to serve as the glue of society. The aftermath of the financial crisis, however, put an end to such efforts (p. 305). Ebke points out that the question of Britishness persists, but has recently shifted to the European dimension. However, this shift does not belong to the author’s period of study (p. 318).

Ebke is not the first person to examine ‘Britishness’, but she is the first to study its origins systematically from a longer historical perspective, delivering a new and important contribution to the historiography of the debate. She shows convincingly how ideas and topics from the late 1960s on shaped debates in the 1990s and 2000s, drawing on an informed selection of long-term debates that reveals unexpected connections. However, this selection also means that she has decided against other options, and in a work of such wide scope, it is to be expected that readers will question Ebke’s priorities. This reviewer finds three points strange. First, the book focuses on domestic debates. This is perfectly legitimate, as it provides an impressive depth of perspective and offers a point of reference for further comparative research. However, further evidence from other countries, or more detailed references to them, are required to substantiate Ebke’s claim that the British debate on national self-assertion exemplifies similar debates in other western European countries (p. 9).

Second, the book devotes a chapter to Wales and Scotland, but Northern Ireland is not treated separately. This is justified by pointing to the ‘othering’ (*Alterisierung*) of Northern Ireland, which was considered an alien and negative comparative foil in the debates of the 1990s and 2000s (p. 26). Admittedly, some aspects of the Irish dimension appear elsewhere—for example, in the chapter on home rule since the 1880s (pp. 135–44). However, one wonders whether a focused examination of public discussions regarding the other, ‘foreign’ part of the UK might not have allowed some conclusions to be drawn on Britain’s self-image.

Third, the book treats European integration before 1990 rather marginally. Except for the last chapter on New Labour, it presents Europe as a mere motivator, rather than as the subject of debates on national identity. This stems from the author’s assumption that although Europe played an important role in the debates on Britishness, it was not until the 1990s that this issue had a significant

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impact (p. 26). Recent research on the UK-wide referendum on EC membership in 1975, however, indicates that a whole array of themes on British political, social, cultural, and historical identity were strongly connected to debates on European integration.² This suggests that a closer look at the pre-1990 discussions of European integration might add further insights to the renegotiation of British identity. Britain's controversial accession to the EC in 1973, for example, marked the failure of Britain's erstwhile global strategy. The polarizing debate on European Monetary Union in the late 1980s raised pressing questions about British sovereignty and the value of national symbols, such as the currency. This was not only controversial within the Conservative Party, but was also an issue between Gordon Brown and Tony Blair.

I should like to mention a further, minor point. Occasionally, the author has the habit – not uncommon in the history of ideas genre – of merely enumerating collective attitudes, which makes it difficult to identify the actual actors behind them. However, it would be uncongenial to dwell on the gaps in a book that covers so many areas, and this objection does not detract from the merits of the work. Historians interested in contemporary British history – whether from the perspective of the history of ideas, or social or political history – will find this book immensely useful.

² Robert Saunders, *Yes to Europe! The 1975 Referendum and Seventies Britain* (Cambridge, 2018).

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Winter School on Global History: Challenges and Opportunities.

Organized jointly by the GHIL India Research Programme (IRP), the Heidelberg Centre for Transcultural Studies, and the Max Weber Stiftung India Branch Office (MWS IBO), and held on 17–21 Feb. 2020 at the India International Centre, New Delhi. Conveners: Felix Brahm (GHIL), Monica Juneja (Heidelberg University), Indra Sengupta (MWS IBO and GHIL), Debarati Bagchi (MWS IBO), and Pablo Holwitt (South Asia Institute of Heidelberg University, New Delhi).

The Winter School brought together postdoctoral and early career scholars from Germany and India working with the methods and approaches of global history. The week-long event was divided into three thematic teaching sessions. In the final session, held over the last two days, the participants presented their own research, taking into account the concepts and methods discussed in the three teaching sessions. An excursion to the Mehrauli Archaeological Park was organized as a part of the event. The thematic sessions dealt with three areas of global history: the history of pedagogic practices, the history of peripatetic objects, and the history of labour. There was also a panel on *The Languages of Global History* (see separate report).

The Winter School opened on 17 February 2020 with a welcome address by Indra Sengupta, followed by a brief introduction by Monica Juneja and Felix Brahm. The first session initiated the discussion on global history with a focus on education. Parimala V. Rao (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) delivered a lecture on 'Global Entanglements and Colonial Education Policies in India', in which she sketched a broad picture of how global ideas left a mark on the colonial education system in India. She began with a brief introduction to the England–Scotland relationship and pointed out that, as a result of the Scottish Enlightenment, Scotland had a more secular, regularized, and egalitarian education system than England. Many Scotsmen appointed in India contributed to educational experiments there, and Rao cited the expansion of school education in Etawah under two Scottish officials: H. S. Reid and A. O. Hume. The American War of Independence and the loss of British colonies in

North America made officers of the East India Company overly cautious about retaining power in India. Elite British officers like Lord Cornwallis, who fought and lost in the American colonies, believed that the establishment of seminaries and colleges in America was one of the causes of the loss of the colonies there, and hence he wanted to keep Indians insulated from English education. Fear of losing India through the spread of radical ideas was acute: the hoisting of the flag of the French Revolution in Calcutta in 1830 or the popularity of Thomas Paine's *The Age of Reason* among students in the city unnerved the officials of the East India Company. Yet the Scottish officer Charles Grant strongly opposed this attitude.

The second thematic session on 18 February 2020 was Monica Juneja's lecture on 'Peripatetic Objects'. Juneja noted that art history as a discipline had been fairly slow in responding to the 'global turn', and it was only now aiming to 'catch up' by building upon ongoing debates. Juneja drew our attention to the ideas of the 'globe' and the 'world'. The 'globe', she said, is an abstract and imagined space; yet it also implies a spherical, interconnected space containing zones of mobility. In comparison, 'world' indicates an inhabited place containing lived memories, providing contexts for relations transacted on global levels. Juneja cautioned that the terms should not be conflated, since art historians have to deploy them depending on how they are addressing the question of 'scale' in doing global art history. Juneja also stated her preference for the analytical category of 'transculturation', explaining that it implies long-term cultural relationships that transcend the boundaries of modern nation states. Drawing upon art historical methodologies that account for the portability and materiality of objects, Juneja emphasized that objects were exchanged through trade, consumption, travel, and diplomacy. The mobility of objects from their production to their transportation and assimilation in other regions, cultures, and time periods – as well as their reappearance in the present day, particularly through exhibition spaces and museums – enables the tracing of object biographies through the lens of transcultural relationalities. By means of case studies, Juneja examined connected histories shaped by travelling objects. She referred to exotic and fragile objects (such as porcelain, chinoiserie, or jades) that arrived from Asia, and the 'encounter' between these objects and European collectors in the heart of Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These objects came

to represent European collectors' imagination of 'exotic' Asia, which did not necessarily align with the territorial boundaries of Asia.

The theme for the third day (20 February 2020) was the concept of labour in global history. Prabhu Mohapatra (University of Delhi) discussed the emergence and spread of 'informal labour' as a relatively new concept in the global history of labour. He reminded the audience that to understand the growth and spread of informal and precarious labour, we need to understand the trajectory of the rise and eventual transformation of formal labour. Referring to Marcel van der Linden's work, he started the lecture with the story of the emergence of 'labour' as a Eurocentric concept perceived as a configuration of industrial, male, unionized wage labour in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This definition was both geographically and temporally specific to Europe and North America. Mohapatra explained the ways in which historians have tried to locate heterogeneous forms of labour from across the globe in order to break away from the Eurocentric definition. He then traced the genealogy of informal labour through its relation with other cognate terms like informal sector, informal economy, and the two crucial ideas of informality and precarity. The massive expansion of global wage labour and a recognition of workers outside this labour force led to an understanding of 'informal work' as a global phenomenon—work that remained excluded from the traditional definition of wage labour. Breaking away from the Eurocentric definition of formal labour, historians attempted to bring geographically and temporally diverse forms of informal labour together under the rubric of labour history. Mohapatra argued that this heralded a fundamental shift in the global history of labour.

In the last one and a half days, seventeen early career scholars presented their research on various themes of global history. Arun Thomas (University of Hyderabad) presented on the subject of intoxicants as cultural commodities in the social life of British Malabar. Heeral Chhabra (University of Delhi) engaged with animals as colonial subjects, legalizing 'cruelty' to animals for military purposes, and transnational debates on humane or non-cruel methods of culling 'strays'. Julian zur Lage (University of Hamburg) problematized the writing of histories without travelling to the locations referred to. Sandipan Mitra (Presidency University, Kolkata) discussed how anthropology as a university discipline facilitated research by Indian

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authors on caste and race. Om Prasad (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) spoke on the scientific workers' movement in India, mapping the place of science and technology in nation-building. Stella Kneifel (University of Erfurt) traced the migration of Arab students to universities in the German Democratic Republic and explored how they behaved and related to each other in the university space. Agnes Piekacz (Bielefeld University) spoke on the history of British military clothing and the ban on the sale and distribution of second-hand uniforms from Britain to South Africa. Susanne Quitmann (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich) spoke on the transregional history of child migrants to Australia and Canada from Britain in the period between 1870 and the 1960s. Nokmedemla Lemtur's (University of Göttingen) project focused on high-altitude mountaineering expeditions in the Himalayas as transcultural encounters between European explorers and indigenous communities. Akash Bhattacharya (Azim Premji University, Bengaluru) looked at the relationship between education and the making of a suburb, focusing on nineteenth-century Uttarpara in light of wider discourses on education. Johanna Ziebritzki (Heidelberg University) discussed two pioneering figures of Indian art history and traced their roles as educators, collectors, and intellectuals in the process of nation-building in early twentieth-century India. Frederik Schröer (Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin) examined the sense of community and new systems of knowledge creation among Tibetan refugees during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Saumya Agarwal (Heidelberg University) shed light on the extensive wall paintings of Shekhawati, which are found on cenotaphs, temples, shops, wells, and houses. Josefine Carla Hoffmann (University of Göttingen) explored the collaboration between India and Germany in training workers for the rapidly growing steel, engineering, and automotive industries in post-Independence India. Maria-Daniela Pomohaci (University of Göttingen) presented a social history of sanitation workers in late colonial Calcutta (now Kolkata). Samuel Sathya Seelan's (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) presentation focused on an ethnographic study of sanitation workers in Bangalore. Norman Aselmeyer (European University Institute, Florence) explored the spatial and social transformations in Nairobi that came with the construction of the Uganda Railway in 1895.

WINTER SCHOOL ON GLOBAL HISTORY

The presentations opened up lively conversations and interesting engagements with the thematic sessions of the Winter School. The senior scholars reflected on the presentations and helped the participants sharpen their engagement with the methods of global history.

DEBARATI BAGCHI, YAMINI AGARWAL, AND DIPANWITA DONDE (MWS IBO, New Delhi)

Winter School Group Photo



Credits: Max Weber Stiftung, India Branch Office, New Delhi

Panel Discussion on *The Languages of Global History*, held at the India International Centre, New Delhi, on 18 Feb. 2020, 6.30–8 p.m. Panellists: Felix Brahm (GHIL); Monica Juneja (Heidelberg University); Joachim Kurtz (Heidelberg University); Dhruv Raina (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi); and Rekha Vaidya Rajan (Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, Hyderabad). Chair and Moderator: Neeladri Bhattacharya (New Delhi)

A panel discussion on *The Languages of Global History* took place on the evening of the second day of the Winter School. Neeladri Bhattacharya opened the discussion by briefly reflecting on the historical trajectory of the 'global turn' in history writing. The first speaker, Felix Brahm, pointed out at the very outset that the selection of terms and concepts was one of the most crucial challenges of doing global history. He highlighted that global historians had a clear preference for all things connected, which is reflected in their lavish use of the terms 'connections' and 'entanglements'. Brahm argued that global history addressed various kinds of relations and thus it was a challenge to decide which metaphor would capture a particular relationship when deployed on a transnational and transcultural scale. He used the example of the term 'commodity chain' to illustrate his argument, questioning whether it could be used to understand production relations on a global scale.

The second speaker, Monica Juneja, discussed the usefulness of certain global history concepts in art history. She emphasized the need to give up the myth of 'origins' and look more into the processes of transculturation: how concepts travel, take root in other cultures, and are reappropriated. She emphasized that transculturation as a concept could enable art historians in South Asia to engage with the pressing contemporary issue of a globally connected field of art, and also with the metropolitan gallery spaces that turn objects into museumized art. It could also help art historians to understand the transactions between textual and artistic practices.

The third panellist, Rekha Vaidya Rajan, addressed the subject from the perspective of German literary studies. She reflected on the possible intersections between literary and cultural studies on the one hand, and the methods of global history on the other. Given Germany's short colonial history, German literature followed a very different trajectory from its British or French counterparts, and so-

called 'postcolonial literature' never became a part of German literature. From the 1970s onwards, works by authors who were migrants in Germany started being published. The language of the establishment, through various exclusionary categories such as 'literature by guest authors', 'literature of the foreigners', or 'literature of the migrants', tended to keep these transcultural works outside the pale of German literature. Rajan argued that this transcultural literature brought about a qualitative change in the literary landscape of Germany as it questioned the homogeneity of German culture.

Dhruv Raina focused on the rise of the concept of 'indigenous sciences' in the 1980s and how that eventually led to an interest in 'indigenous knowledge' as a subject of postcolonial science studies. The 1980s saw the conjuncture of post-Kuhnian science, postcolonial science studies, feminist philosophies, and the attempt to deconstruct positivist science. Postcolonial science studies in India and China, for instance, started to focus on 'alternatives' to the universalist notion of the 'indigenous'. Raina also highlighted that this epistemological shift went hand in hand with certain shifts in the discourses of institutions like UNESCO, a key player in the mainstreaming of the 'indigenous'. He concluded with the thought that in times of global environmental crisis and diminishing returns, science studies needs to reimagine its analytical language.

The final speaker of the panel, Joachim Kurtz, discussed the writing of global history in East Asian languages. He spoke about how these languages have often challenged the hegemony of Western languages and used terms that are specific to their cultural sensibilities. He cited the example of a Chinese word that connotes 'all under heaven', which is increasingly being used in Chinese international relations to refer to ancient Chinese civilization. There is another school in Chinese studies that advocates the complete rejection of Western languages and a return to indigenous languages and vocabularies in order to write the histories of non-Western civilizations. However, Kurtz argued, the real challenge lay in conceptualizing a methodology that could make all sorts of meaning-making processes accessible under the rubric of global history. Both Rajan's and Kurtz's presentations raised important questions concerning the idea of 'translation' in the field of global history.

Afterwards, Neeladri Bhattacharya teased out the tropes and categories that the five panellists associated with the practice of global

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history, and highlighted how their papers creatively spoke to each other. To conclude, he emphasized the necessity of reversing the lens and focusing on the 'local', without which it would be impossible to imagine the constitution of the global. The presentations were followed by a lively discussion with the audience.

DEBARATI BAGCHI (MWS IBO, New Delhi)

Panel on The Languages of Global History



Panellists (L-R): Neeladri Bhattacharya (Delhi, Chair), Felix Brahm (London), Monica Juneja (Heidelberg), Rekha Vaidya Rajan (Hyderabad), Dhruv Raina (Delhi), and Joachim Kurtz (Heidelberg)

Credits: Indra Sengupta

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Scholarships Awarded by the GHIL

Each year the GHIL awards a number of research scholarships to German postgraduate and postdoctoral researchers to enable them to carry out research in Britain, and to British postgraduates for research visits to Germany. The scholarships are generally awarded for a period of up to six months, depending on the requirements of the research project. British applicants will normally be expected to have completed one year of postgraduate research and should be studying German history and/or Anglo-German relations. Scholarships are advertised on <www.hsozkult.de> and the GHIL's website. Applications should include a CV, educational background, list of publications (where appropriate), and an outline of the project, along with a supervisor's reference confirming the relevance of the proposed archival research. Please address applications to Dr Hannes Ziegler, German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ, or send them by email to stipendium@ghil.ac.uk. During their stay in Britain, German scholars present their projects and the initial results of their research at the GHIL Colloquium. In the second round of allocations for 2020 the following scholarships were awarded for research on British history, German history, and Anglo-German relations:

Oscar Broughton (Berlin), Guilds at Home and Abroad: Guild Socialism Reconsidered from a Transimperial Knowledge Perspective

Matthias Büttner (Göttingen), Verrat im spätmittelalterlichen England aus sozial- und kulturhistorischer Perspektive

Christian Feser (Essen), A Gentleman on an Elephant: Thomas Coryate and the Uses of Eccentricity in Early Modern Travel Writing

Jenny Hestermann (Frankfurt), Europa als Krise und Chance: Zum Spannungsverhältnis von nationalen Dekadenz-Diskursen und Europa-Bildern im 20. Jahrhundert

Martin Jähnert (Berlin), Die Vermessung des Instabilen: Die 'dry plate revolution' in London, Berlin und Wien um 1880

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Paul Labelle (Hamburg), *Opportunity and Occasion: New Music for the Aldeburgh Festival*

Vicente Pons Marti (Frankfurt), *Politische Parteien in Krisenzeiten: Perspektiven aus dem 19. Jahrhundert*

Rike Szill (Kiel), *Konstantinopel 1453—Eroberung oder Fall? Geschichtskonstruktionen in den Hauptwerken der spätbyzantinischen Historiographie*

Jan Tattenberg (Oxford), *The Structural Transformation of the Military Public Sphere: War, Knowledge, and Military Elites in West Germany, 1940–1989*

Summer Lecture Podcast Series: Feminist Histories

The Feminist Histories podcast series, produced by the German Historical Institute London, invites listeners to reflect on the historically produced meanings of feminism and on practices of women's activism. Originally planned as a lecture series, lockdown measures have brought the series to a wider audience. The three episodes feature scholars from the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland and explore different facets of the history of feminism and feminist histories. The following episodes are available for download on the GHIL website:

Chiara Bonfiglioli (Cork), *Internationalist Waves and Feminist Waves in Italy, Yugoslavia, and Cuba from the 1950s to 1970s*

Jane Whittle (Exeter) and Laura Schwartz (Warwick), *Understanding Women and Work from the Early Modern Era to the Present: A Roundtable*
Maud Bracke (Glasgow), *Inventing Reproductive Rights: Sex, Population, and Feminism in Europe (1945–1980)*

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Forthcoming Workshops and Conferences

Please consult the website for updates on forthcoming conferences and dates, as these may be subject to change owing to Covid-19-related restrictions.

Archiving, Recording, and Representing Feminism: The Global History of Women's Emancipation in the Twentieth Century. Second Meeting of the International Standing Working Group on Medialization and Empowerment, to be held online, 10–12 Dec. 2020. Convenors: Christina von Hodenberg and Jane Freeland (GHIL). Partners: Max Weber Stiftung India Branch Office, GHI Washington, GHI Rome, Orient Institute Beirut.

Since the 1960s, feminist historians have sought to rewrite women into history, recovering their voices and restoring them within a discipline that continues to prioritize the actions of men. Yet the task of recovering women's voices and feminist activism is complicated by normative forces that shape our access to women's histories. Typical sites of historical research—the mass media and the archive—are built upon and reflect systems of imperial and patriarchal power. By collecting, cataloguing, and structuring knowledge, both archives and the media have pacified and obscured women's political engagement. At the same time, the emergence of grassroots feminist media and archives may offer an opportunity to challenge this relationship. 'Archiving, Recording, and Representing Feminism' will explore the extent to which feminist historians can question normative forces when relying on archival and media sources. Do alternative archives and media really allow historians access to different stories? Or do these counterpublic spaces also conform to the conditions and norms imposed by the mass media and the archive? And how have changes in the media and archiving over time shaped historical work?

The Classics at the Pulpit: Ancient Literature and Preaching in the Middle Ages. Conference to be held at the GHIL, 29–30 Jan. 2021. Convener: Bernhard Hollick (GHIL).

When Thomas Bradwardine held his victory sermon after the battles of Crécy and Neville's Cross in 1346, he not only referred to the Bible

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and the church fathers as authorities for his theological ideas, but also quoted Aristotle, Plato, and Ovid. Bradwardine's preference for classical allusions in preaching was by no means exceptional. Medieval preachers regularly introduced their clerical and lay audiences to the world of ancient literature, which provided them, amongst other things, with mythological and historical examples, philosophical arguments, and rhetorical models. Of course, such stylistic devices did not necessarily imply any direct acquaintance with classical sources. Preachers could rely on a variety of manuals, collections of exempla, and similar texts in which the respective material was already prepared for homiletic purposes (for example, by providing allegorical interpretations of poetic narratives). The combination of pagan and Christian elements in preaching is an interesting phenomenon in itself; however, it also had an immense cultural impact far beyond the narrower field of pastoral care. Reactions were not always positive, ranging from mockery (Chaucer) to open hostility (Wycliffe). At the conference, international experts from different disciplines will shed new light on this striking practice. They will deal with topics such as the reasons and occasions for the use of the classics in preaching, the hermeneutic and literary strategies used to adapt pagan mythology to homiletic needs, the social and educational background of preachers and their audiences, the connections between classicizing sermons and vernacular literature, and the discourse they provoked within the clerical milieu.

The Legacies of Feminism in Germany and India: A Roundtable Discussion. Online event, 19 Mar. 2021, 1 p.m. GMT/2 p.m. CET/6:30 p.m. IST. Organized by the Max Weber Stiftung India Branch Office and the International Standing Working Group on Medialization and Empowerment at the GHIL.

What does feminism mean in different political, social, and historical contexts? How has women's activism in the past shaped how we think about feminism and women's rights today? And what does this mean for women's rights in the current political climate, when right-wing movements and authoritarian tendencies are on the rise? This roundtable will bring together scholars from India, Germany, and the UK to explore the legacies and meanings of feminism in the contem-

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porary world. In particular, the panel will examine how feminist activism has intersected with other rights-based movements and issues, including decolonization, race and ethnicity, labour, and LGBTQ.

Chronopolitics: Time of Politics, Politics of Time, Politicized Time. Conference to be held at the GHIL, rescheduled for 20–22 May 2021. Conveners: Tobias Becker (GHIL), Christina Brauner (University of Tübingen), and Fernando Esposito (University of Constance); organized in co-operation with the Arbeitskreis Geschichte+Theorie.

Time is so deeply interwoven with all aspects of politics that its importance is frequently overlooked. Politics takes place in time, needs time, and brings forth time; time can be an instrument and also an object of politics. Political actors use time as a resource both to legitimize and delegitimize policies and politics—for instance, when differentiating between conservatives and progressives, or when constructing ‘primitives’ who exist outside of (modern) time as objects of civilizing missions, development aid, and modernization projects. More generally, politics aims to create futures in the present—or to prevent them. The politics of time is strongly connected to the question of how social change is understood and managed. The international conference ‘Chronopolitics: Time of Politics, Politics of Time, Politicized Time’ will engage with these issues and questions in an interdisciplinary framework and attempt to produce an initial systematization of debates on chronopolitics, temporality, and historicity. The emphasis on chronopolitics will connect traditional fields of historical inquiry—politics, society, the economy—with the history of temporalities, thereby demonstrating the importance of reflections on time and temporality for all historians and historiographical practice. We also wish to further discussions on the chronopolitics of historians and historiography—not least our own. How do historians and other scholars create and contribute to what Charles Maier has called ‘images of history and temporal order’? Both time and history have their own histories and are thus in need of historical investigation.

A sortable list of titles acquired by the GHIL Library in recent months is available at:

https://www.ghil.ac.uk/library/collections/recent_acquisitions.html

For an up-to-date list of the GHIL's publications see our website:

<https://www.ghil.ac.uk/publications.html>