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CONTENTS

MEMORY CULTURES 2.0: FROM *OPFERKONKURRENZ* TO SOLIDARITY

INTRODUCTION

MIRJAM SARAH BRUSIUS

The post-war German concept of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* has been contested in recent years. Prompted by appeals for Germany, like Britain and other European nations, to revisit its own colonial past,[1] the question of whether the Holocaust should play a singular role in future memory culture has emerged as one of the most controversial issues in recent debates. Should it retain its unique status in German memory as the country engages with hitherto neglected layers of its colonial history? Why are these histories thought of as binary—even competing—rather than as historically entangled, thereby suggesting a hierarchy of victimhood, an *Opferkonkurrenz*, when it comes to forms of commemoration? What connections are there between colonial atrocities and the Holocaust, and what can the former teach us about the latter? How should the memory landscape change in an increasingly diverse and multicultural society, in which different minoritized groups relate differently—or not at all—to Germany's past and demand their own forms of commemoration?

I would like to thank the contributors to the round table in this special issue, as well as Christina von Hodenberg, Matthew Vollgraff, Angela Davies, and Jozef van der Voort, for critical comments on previous drafts of this introduction.

[1] Early criticism and activist pressure on Germany to engage with its colonial pasts came from initiatives, collectives, and projects such as Initiative Schwarze Menschen in Deutschland (ISD Bund e.V.), Berlin Postkolonial e.V., Savvy Contemporary, No Humboldt 21!, and Barazani.berlin, where some long-standing activists are still involved in these matters today. See also Helma Lutz and Kathrin Gawarecki (eds.), *Kolonialismus und Erinnerungskultur: Die Kolonialvergangenheit im kollektiven Gedächtnis der deutschen und niederländischen Einwanderungsgesellschaft* (Münster, 2005).

While *Opferkonkurrenz*,[2] the focus of this special issue, has a long history in the aftermath of the Holocaust, the question of which groups saw themselves as victims at what moment in time is not straightforward. German perpetrators and fellow travellers of the Holocaust, for example, initially saw themselves as victims of the war—a view which held sway for decades. Germans denied guilt by presenting themselves as oppressed by the system of Nazi rule. What is now read as an attempt at German self-victimization, however, can be better understood in terms of the continuous construction of a larger historical narrative. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) both indirectly encouraged competition for the status of victim within the framework of *Opferkonkurrenz* during the post-war period, not least because the state distributed welfare money to victims. Victims, however, were clearly hierarchized. The early FRG, for example, privileged German 'victims' over foreigners, soldiers over civilians, and men over women.[3] In the GDR, communists were privileged over Jews and other victims. As the category of victim expanded

[2] The term *Opferkonkurrenz* has also been widely used for the competition between Western and Eastern European memory cultures with respect to the Second World War in the last two decades. In the round table in this special issue, Patricia Piberger and Hannah Tzuberi show that what we understand as victimhood today was not yet fully formed in the years after the Second World War, when 'identitarian victimhood' as a concept did not exist. See Jean-Michel Chaumont, *Die Konkurrenz der Opfer: Genozid, Identität und Anerkennung*, trans. Thomas Laugstien (Springe, 2001), originally published in French as *La concurrence des victimes: Génocide, identité, reconnaissance* (Paris, 1997). On *Opferkonkurrenz*, see also Aleida Assmann, *Das neue Unbehagen an der Erinnerungskultur: Eine Intervention* (Munich, 2013; 4th edn 2021), 142–80. The expansion of the category of victimhood was initially unconnected to the National Socialist memorial context. See Svenja Goltermann, *Opfer: Die Wahrnehmung von Krieg und Gewalt in der Moderne* (Frankfurt am Main, 2017).

[3] For the hierarchies of victimhood, see Robert G. Moeller, *War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley, 2001); Wulf Kansteiner, 'Losing the War, Winning the Memory Battle: The Legacy of Nazism, World War II, and the Holocaust in the Federal Republic of Germany', in id., Richard Ned Lebow, and Claudio Fogu (eds.), *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe* (Durham, NC, 2006), 102–46, at 109–10; Anna Schnädelbach, *Kriegerwitwen: Lebensbewältigung zwischen Arbeit und Familie in Westdeutschland nach 1945* (Frankfurt am Main, 2009); and Norbert Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik*: *Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Vergangenheit* (Munich, 1997; paperback

in post-war Germany (especially in the FRG) in response to demands by LGBTQ, Sinti and Roma, Black, and disability rights groups, different notions of plurality prevailed.[4] Yet who was included in this conversation and on what premises, and what role did the German state play in organizing supposed hierarchies in these transformations and reconfigurations? It is therefore important to understand the diversification of Nazi victims in the memorial context since the 1980s in connection with the formation of the notion of passive victimhood, the rise of trauma, and newly emerging concepts of victimhood.[5]

In 2019 we organized a round table in London which approached different forms of commemoration not as exclusive, but as mutually informative, looking at how colonial history, the Second World War, and the Holocaust intersect. At the time, these were pressing questions for the UK: calls had been made for institutionalized forms

2012); published in English as *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration*, trans. Joel Golb (New York, 2002).

[4] More generally on post-war memory culture, see e.g. Moeller, *War Stories*; Edgar Wolfrum, *Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Der Weg zur bundesrepublikanischen Erinnerung 1948–1990* (Darmstadt, 1999); Harald Welzer, Sabine Moller, and Karoline Tschuggnall, *'Opa war kein Nazi': Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im Familiengedächtnis* (Frankfurt am Main, 2002); Alon Confino, *Germany as a Culture of Remembrance: Promises and Limits of Writing History* (Chapel Hill, 2006); A. Dirk Moses, *German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past* (Cambridge, 2007); Martin Sabrow (ed.), *Der Streit um die Erinnerung* (Leipzig, 2008), 9–24; Frei, *Vergangenheitspolitik*; Frank Biess, *Republik der Angst: Eine andere Geschichte der Bundesrepublik* (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2019); and Ulrich Herbert, *A History of Twentieth-Century Germany*, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York, 2019), esp. part IV.

[5] Patricia Piberger and Felix Axster, 'Multidirektionale Erinnerung: Wege aus der Erinnerungskonkurrenz', workshop held as part of the conference 'Blickwinkel: Von Strippenziehern & Terroristen. Ressentiments gegen Jüdinnen und Juden und Muslim*innen in der postnationalsozialistischen Gesellschaft', 7–8 Dec. 2020, organized by the Bildungsstätte Anne Frank (Frankfurt am Main) in co-operation with the Stiftung 'Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft' (EVZ), the Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (BPB), the Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung der TU Berlin, the Akademie für Islam und Wissenschaft in der Gesellschaft (AIWG), and the Gesellschaften für Christlich-Jüdische Zusammenarbeit. See the report at [https://www.bs-anne-frank.de/fileadmin/content/Tagungsbericht_Blickwinkel_2020.pdf], accessed 28 July 2022. With thanks to the workshop organizers for sharing content.

of commemoration, monuments, and museums regarding Britain's historical involvement in slavery, colonialism, and their legacies, and the country had also embarked on the project of creating a National Holocaust Memorial.[6] Our event was informed by Michael Rothberg's *Multidirectional Memory*, published in 2009, which argues that Holocaust remembrance also has the potential to open up routes for commemorating different victimized groups and contested national pasts (though the opposite can be true as well).[7] What does it mean, for instance, if formerly persecuted groups themselves become problematic actors, such as when Jewish exiles from Nazi Germany found refuge on land that was originally owned by indigenous populations, as in Australia? How does colonial history in South Asia intersect with that of forced migration from Europe since the 1930s? Creating a dialogue between scholars of the Holocaust, colonialism, and the British Empire—Avril Alba, Yasmin Khan, and Tom Lawson respectively—to reflect on national and transnational legacies, we published the round table in 2020.[8]

While this is thus not the first time that the *GHIL Bulletin* has contributed to discussions on the future of memory cultures, the context of this debate has changed considerably since our 2020 publication. Although the topic hit a nerve, we as organizers could not predict that Germany would see a number of debates about the memory of the Holocaust and colonialism—some of them divisive and acrimonious—which continue to this day. One key event was the release of the German translation of Rothberg's *Multidirectional Memory* in 2021,[9] which, despite having been published in English twelve years earlier, was controversially discussed in the German media. While our round table was perceived by readers as a straightforward scholarly contribution that moved research forward by building on Rothberg's

[6] David Tollerton, '"A New Sacred Space in the Centre of London": The Victoria Tower Gardens Holocaust Memorial and the Religious–Secular Landscape of Contemporary Britain', *Journal of Religion & Society*, 19 (2017), 1–22.

[7] Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford, Calif., 2009).

[8] Stefanie Rauch (ed.), 'Multidirectional Memory? National Holocaust Memorials and (Post-)Colonial Legacies', *German Historical Institute London Bulletin*, 42/1 (2020), 2–25.

[9] Michael Rothberg, *Multidirektionale Erinnerung: Holocaustgedenken im Zeitalter der Dekolonisierung*, trans. Max Henninger (Berlin, 2021).

framework, the German reception of Rothberg's book laid bare the gulf between contemporary international research and its translation into public history and debates on memory culture.

The German reception of this book cannot be detached from the wider discussions on collective memory that surrounded it in post-war Germany, which had slowly intensified since 2019.[10] They touched on the centrality and comparability of the Holocaust,[11] its relationship with colonial history, its meaning today for national identity, domestic and foreign politics (in particular, Germany's relationship with Israel), the governance of Jewish–Muslim relations, and definitions of antisemitism. These debates had become more frequent since the legally non-binding 2019 Bundestag resolution declaring the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement and criticism of the state of Israel to be inherently antisemitic.[12] In recent years, the

[10] For a different contextualization of the debate, see Michael Rothberg, 'Lived Multidirectionality: "Historikerstreit 2.0" and the Politics of Holocaust', in *Memory Studies*, special issue on 'Mnemonic Wars' (forthcoming, 2022).

[11] See e.g. Michael Rothberg and Jürgen Zimmerer, 'Enttabuisiert den Vergleich! Die Geschichtsschreibung globalisieren, das Gedenken pluralisieren: Warum sich die deutsche Erinnerungslandschaft verändern muss', *Die Zeit*, 4 Apr. 2021, at [https://www.zeit.de/2021/14/erinnerungskultur-gedenken-pluralisieren-holocaust-vergleich-globalisierung-geschichte], accessed 27 July 2022, on the reluctance to think about the Holocaust in comparative terms. Most recent claims seem to accept comparison, but only to prove the uniqueness of the Holocaust. For the reluctance to compare between racism, antisemitism, and Islamophobia in public debate, see Farid Hafez, 'Public and Scholarly Debates on the Comparison of Islamophobia and Anti-Semitism in Germany', *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte*, 32/2 (2019), 277–90.

[12] The 2019 Bundestag resolution: 'BDS-Bewegung entschlossen entgegentreten—Antisemitismus bekämpfen' meant the end of funding for projects that directly or indirectly support the BDS campaign; see [https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2019/kw20-de-bds-642892], accessed 27 July 2022. In an effort to create awareness of the potential marginalization of disregarded voices and the oppression of cultural diversity and critical perspectives, the decision was opposed by Initiative Weltoffenheit, who stressed reliance on a 'public sphere that allows for disputatious and controversial debates in accordance with the norms of the German constitution.' See the full statement at [https://www.gg53weltoffenheit.org/en/statement/], accessed 27 July 2022. Unlike the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of antisemitism, the more recent Jerusalem Declaration detaches criticism

German state has introduced different measures to define the terms of these debates, and these have had fundamental consequences for the actions of institutions, initiatives, and individuals.[13]

In 2019, for instance, the Jewish Museum Berlin, which had initiated programmes to encourage Jewish–Muslim dialogue, was accused of transforming itself into a forum for BDS.[14] In 2020, Germany saw the Mbembe Debate, in which a German Free Democratic Party politician accused the Cameroonian historian and theorist Achille Mbembe of antisemitism—a charge that has since been levelled at a number of intellectuals, academics, artists, and journalists, and which in a number of cases has itself led to racist and antisemitic discrimination.[15] The

of Israel from antisemitism. See 'The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism', at [https://jerusalemdeclaration.org/], accessed 27 July 2022.

[13] These include the appointment of Felix Klein as Beauftragter der Bundesregierung für jüdisches Leben in Deutschland und den Kampf gegen Antisemitismus (Federal German government commissioner for Jewish life in Germany and the fight against antisemitism) in 2018.

[14] See the letter of 21 Dec. 2019 from Yasemin Shooman, former director of the Jewish Museum's Academy Programme, to Jürgen Kaube of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, in which she sets the record straight, at [https://rat-fuer-migration.de/richtigstellung-yasemin-shooman-faz-artikel/], accessed 27 July 2022.

[15] The assumption that these accusations curtailed marginalized voices—in this case Mbembe as a Black and African voice in Germany—was not adequately discussed. For an interpretation of the Mbembe Debate, see 'Forum: The Achille Mbembe Controversy and the German Debate about Antisemitism, Israel, and the Holocaust', *Journal of Genocide Research,* 23/3 (2021), 371–3. For an overview of articles, see Serdar Güneş, 'Wer zuerst . . . sagt, hat gewonnen: Die Achille Mbembe Debatte—Eine Artikelliste', *Serdargunes' Blog*, 18 May 2020, at [https://serdargunes.wordpress.com/2020/05/18/wer-zuerst-x-sagt-hat-gewonnen-die-achille-mbembe-debatte-eine-artikelliste/], accessed 27 July 2022. The most recent example is an 'antisemitism debate' in relation to documenta fifteen, curated by the Indonesian collective ruangrupa. This debate was initiated by a right-wing blog long before any artworks were put on display, and at the time of writing has not been settled. For an overview, see Hans Eichel, 'Jetzt geht es immer weniger um die Kunst, die auf der documenta fifteen gezeigt wird', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 18 July 2022, at [https://www.fr.de/kultur/kunst/jetzt-geht-es-immer-wenigerum-die-kunst-die-auf-der-documenta-fifteen-gezeigt-wird-91674434.html], accessed 29 July 2022, and Eyal Weizmann, 'In Kassel', *London Review of Books*, 4 Aug. 2022.

discussion in 2021 evolved in particular from Dirk Moses's essay on 'The German Catechism',[16] which argues that the Holocaust's uniqueness provides the moral foundation of official (state-led) German identity, from which a specific responsibility for Jews and the state of Israel is derived. This also ties it to broad definitions of antisemitism. The result, Moses claims, is a tacit but binding 'catechism'—a dogma—as a result of which institutions, the media, establishment intellectuals, and government bodies in Germany become the gatekeepers of memory culture. Moses argues that challenges to these points, including those that reflect pluralistic Jewish viewpoints, are subject to public censure; however, this observation was largely ignored in the media debate that followed. Instead, media responses to the essay focused on the uniqueness of the Holocaust—a framework that invites competitive victimhood—rather than engaging with other key points, such as the plea to consider more inclusive histories that are under-represented precisely because of the lack of diverse voices. These latter points were soon confirmed by the homogenous media debate which, ironically, largely denied the existence of such a 'catechism'.[17] As it evolved, the debate was also driven not primarily by historians, but by journalists, so it seems inaccurate to call it a *Historikerstreit*.[18] While it returned, albeit from a very different

[16] The essay by the historian and comparative genocide scholar Dirk Moses was published on the website *Geschichte der Gegenwart*, 23 May 2021, at [https://geschichtedergegenwart.ch/the-german-catechism/], accessed 27 July 2022. For an overview of the debate, see Serdar Güneş, 'Holocaust, Historikerstreit, (Post-)Colonialism, Memory Debates', *Serdargunes' Blog*, 4 June 2021, at [https://serdargunes.wordpress.com/2021/06/04/a-debate-german-catechism-holocaust-and-post-colonialism/], accessed 27 July 2022. See also Jürgen Habermas, 'Der neue Historikerstreit', *Philosophie Magazin,* 60 (2021), 10–11.

[17] While the controversy initially featured contributions from a wide range of international and diverse scholars on a US blog, including authors who had a personal stake in the issue, these voices were quickly sidelined in the monolithic and less nuanced media debate within Germany itself. See the *New Fascism Syllabus Blog*, May–Aug. 2021, at [http://newfascismsyllabus.com/category/opinions/the-catechism-debate/], accessed 27 July 2022.

[18] This suggests a resumption of the original *Historikerstreit* ('historians' debate') as initiated by the German historian Ernst Nolte in 1986, which centred on the singularity of the Holocaust. See *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? Original Documents of the Historikerstreit, the Controversy Concerning the Singularity of the Holocaust*, trans. James Knowlton and Truett Cates (Atlantic Highlands, NJ,

angle, to the questions that had prompted the original *Historikerstreit*, including that of the Holocaust's singularity, the debate was also fundamentally different in that it questioned the status of memory culture in Europe's increasingly diverse societies. It also highlighted a current crisis in public history, marked by a widening gap between historical research, memory culture, and public debate. This will present a particular challenge in Germany in the coming years, prompting pressing questions about what the future institutional venue should be for nuanced public debates undergirded by historical research, and what role we as historians should play in them.

At the heart of this discussion—on a meta-level that is rarely mentioned—is not simply the question of singularity and who deserves to be remembered by the dominant memory regime, but also that of who gets to speak and be heard, and can do so without taking a risk. The German dogma of 'never again' has slowly produced a climate of fear, according to some, in which only those who belong to the majority, and those with secure posts, have the privilege of expressing their thoughts freely. However, for historian of Islamic art Wendy Shaw these issues are not unrelated to Germany's difficult past:

> If my colleagues are the *Nachwuchs* of the Nazis it was not because of their birth as Germans, but because many had not rethought the nature of authority and exclusion and replaced the white–patriarchal hierarchy at the heart of universities with a working system of diversity and inclusion.[19]

That said, there are larger structural issues that directly impact on how memory cultures are discussed. The #IchBinHanna debate that highlighted the precarious working conditions in German academia, for example, was a frequent and pivotal point of discussion between

1993); Rudolf Augstein et al., *Historikerstreit: Die Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung* (Munich, 1987); Kansteiner, 'Losing the War'; and Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge, Mass., 1988).

[19] Wendy M. K. Shaw, 'Cannibalising the Foundations of Western Civilization', in Staci B. Martin and Deepra Dandekar (eds.), *Global South Scholars in the Western Academy: Harnessing Unique Experiences, Knowledges, and Positionality in Third Space* (New York, 2021), 77–91, at 85.

the editor and authors of the round table included in this special issue, all of whom are early or mid-career and non-tenured academics.

Yet how new were these discussions, and to what extent was the media debate simply a pushback against changes that were already happening? The criticism that Holocaust commemoration has become too ritualized and lost its moral significance to contemporary forms of discrimination has been expressed for some time.[20] Others have called for more serious engagement with different victimized groups and for their demands to be heard.[21] Existing forms of commemoration, so the criticism goes, mainly grant absolution to those whom Sinthujan Varatharajah und Moshtari Hilal call *Menschen mit Nazihintergrund* (people with a Nazi background), an epithet deliberately chosen to make rhetorically visible a group of actors who have gone largely unremarked over the decades, despite dominating the politics of commemoration.[22] However, just as the Legacies of British Slavery project has looked into the economic benefits which racial systems of exploitation bring for the ruling classes in Britain, this aspect has recently

[20] According to Robert Meister, the end of the Cold War turned the Holocaust into a closed and unreachable event. See Robert Meister, *After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights* (New York, 2011). For more recent critical approaches to memory culture, see Max Czollek, *Desintegriert Euch!* (Munich, 2018); Susan Neiman, *Learning from the Germans: Confronting Race and the Memory of Evil* (London, 2019); Mohamed Amjahid, 'Die deutsche Erinnerungsüberlegenheit', *SPIEGEL Kultur*, 6 Mar. 2021, at [https://www.spiegel.de/kultur/holocaust-gedenken-die-deutsche-erinnerungsueberlegenheit-a-056d10a7-2b3c-4383-804e-c2130ed6581d], accessed 27 July 2022; Natan Sznaider, *Fluchtpunkte der Erinnerung: Über die Gegenwart von Holocaust und Kolonialismus* (Munich, 2022).

[21] See Sultan Doughan and Hanan Toukan, 'How Germany's Memory Culture Censors Palestinians', *Jacobin*, 16 July 2022, at [https://jacobin.com/2022/07/germany-israel-palestine-antisemitism-art-documenta], accessed 27 July 2022.

[22] See Instagram post by Moshtari Hilal, posting as mooshtariii, 15 Feb. 2021, at [https://www.instagram.com/tv/CLU2dZiqvMG/?igshid=13lw2jn283o89], and the playlist of videos on YouTube at [https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLSMnbItgwLfmhgAK6NBvwhHGDFI-VAhJ_], both accessed 27 July 2022. See also Michael Rothberg, '"People with a Nazi Background": Race, Memory, and Responsibility', *LA Review of Books*, 20 May 2021, at [https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/people-with-a-nazi-background-race-memory-and-responsibility/], accessed 27 July 2022.

become a point of discussion in Germany that is likely to invite deeper research in future.[23]

As even the current German president Frank-Walter Steinmeier has recently concluded, memory culture is not fit for purpose in a post-migration Germany whose migrant groups have their own modes and forms of commemoration that are entangled with German history in myriad ways.[24] Recent research has also argued that memory culture has not put a stop to the discrimination and violence that has been going on since 1945. In fact, there has been a troubling correlation between the 'ritualization of Holocaust remembrance and the rise of the far-right', as participants in a recent conference pointed out.[25] One group of victims is thus remembered at the expense of others—in particular Muslim immigrants—creating competing forms of commemoration.[26] It begs the question of what lessons can be drawn

[23] See Centre for the Study of the Legacies of British Slavery at [https://www.ucl.ac.uk/lbs/], accessed 27 July 2022; David de Jong, *Nazi Billionaires: The Dark History of Germany's Wealthiest Dynasties* (London, 2022).

[24] Speech by Bundespräsident Frank-Walter Steinmeier, 'Festakt zur Eröffnung der Ausstellungen des Ethnologischen Museums und des Museums für Asiatische Kunst der Staatlichen Museen zu Berlin im Humbolt-Forum', Office of the Federal President Berlin, 22 Sept. 2021, at [https://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Frank-Walter-Steinmeier/Reden/2021/09/210922-Humboldt-Forum.html], accessed 27 July 2022.

[25] The conference, entitled 'Hijacking Memory: The Holocaust and the New Right', was held at the Haus der Kulturen der Welt in Berlin, 9–12 June 2022. See details at [https://www.hkw.de/en/programm/projekte/2022/hijacking_memory/start.php], accessed 27 July 2022, and the conference report by Joshua Leifer, 'The Challenge of Defending Memory in Germany', *Jewish Currents*, 7 July 2022, at [jewishcurrents.org/the-challenge-of-defending-memory-in-germany], accessed 27 July 2022. See also Valentina Pisanty, *The Guardians of Memory and the Return of the Xenophobic Right*, trans. Alastair McEwan (New York, 2021).

[26] See the interview with Sultan Doughan in this issue. See also Michael Rothberg and Yasemin Yildiz, 'Memory Citizenship: Migrant Archives of Holocaust Remembrance in Contemporary Germany', *Parallax*, 17/4 (2011), 32–48; Esra Özyürek, 'Export–Import Theory and the Racialization of Anti-Semitism: Turkish- and Arab-Only Prevention Programs in Germany', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 58/1 (2016), 40–65; ead., 'Rethinking Empathy: Emotions Triggered by the Holocaust among the Muslim-Minority in Germany', *Anthropological Theory*, 18/4 (2018), 456–77;

from that history if it is not repurposed for current struggles against inequality.

Opferkonkurrenz will be employed here as an analytical term to be historicized and scrutinized—as a framework constituting German politics that often continues to force minoritized groups to position themselves in relation to dominant state perceptions of what constitutes victimhood. Relationships between groups, as the contributors show, are excluded and ignored by this state dramaturgy. Yet the current situation is more nuanced, as Steinmeier's speech showed. While German governance may exclude and ignore solidarity, it has also been observed that the state has become increasingly interested in overcoming competition. This has become visible in the context of the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin, and in the funding of groups that encourage solidarity between victim groups.

The authors writing in this special issue will explore pathways from Jewish studies, memory studies, European and colonial history, anthropology, and art history. The special issue combines two dynamic formats: interviews and a round table. It opens with an interview with Michael Rothberg on the pitfalls of using victimhood as a concept, his reflections on the two years since the publication of our last round table, and the argument of his new book, *Memory Citizenship: Migrant Archives of Holocaust Remembrance*, co-authored with Yasemin Yildiz. The centrepiece is a round table on *Opferkonkurrenz* with commentaries and responses by Manuela Bauche, Patricia Piberger and Hannah Tzuberi, and Sébastien Tremblay, who have published and presented widely on this topic, and who all generously shared input in conceptualizing this special issue.[27] This is followed by an interview

and Anna-Esther Younes, 'Fighting Anti-Semitism in Contemporary Germany', *Islamophobia Studies Journal,* 5/2 (2020), 249–66.

[27] For their recent and forthcoming publications, see e.g. Manuela Bauche, 'Die Figur des "Mischling" in der Deutschen Anthropologie (1900–1945)', in Matthias Böckmann, Matthias Gockel, Reinhard Kößler, and Henning Melber (eds.), *Erinnerung, Politik, Solidarität: Internationale Debatten und Perspektiven* (Berlin, forthcoming); Manuela Bauche, Danna Marshall, Volker Strähle, and Kerstin Stubenvoll, 'Geschichte der Ihnestraße 22: Remembering the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity, and Eugenics', in Michelle Gordon and Rachel O'Sullivan (eds.), *Colonial Paradigms of Violence: Comparative Analysis of the Holocaust, Genocide, and Mass Killing* (Göttingen,

with Sultan Doughan about her research on questions of citizenship and religious difference in contemporary Germany, with an emphasis on relations between Jews and Muslims.[28] The special issue closes with a conversation with classicist Jaś Elsner, who approaches the topic of *Opferkonkurrenz* through physical sites of memory culture, taking Berlin's Humboldt Forum and Museum Island as prisms through which to look at questions related to competing forms of commemoration. All contributors reflect on where memory culture could go in the future and see grounds for both pessimism and optimism. Can we historicize solidarity while also living it today, for example, in the research we do and in the approaches we choose? How can we analyse memory discourses while participating in German civil society? How can we frame research on the past historically when interpretations of history are at the centre of the current debates? What are the material repercussions of these debates for intellectuals in Germany, and what conditions do they face?

One aim of this special issue is to complicate and refine notions of *Opferkonkurrenz*. While this is deployed as an analytical framework, the authors also problematize any notion operating with clear-cut categories of perpetrator and victim that defy lived realities.[29] Current discussions focus on the assumption that victimhood is inherently competitive—something that the authors in this special issue challenge. While competition between different views of history was key to the formation of German Holocaust memory, neither competition nor solidarity are inherently positive or negative. One could, for instance, regard homonationalist queer alliances against Muslims as a

2022), 255–64; Hannah Tzuberi, '"Reforesting" Jews: The German State and the Construction of "New German Judaism"', *Jewish Studies Quarterly*, 27/3 (2020), 199–224; Sébastien Tremblay, 'Homosynchronism and the Temporal–Memory Border: Framing Racialized Bodies, Time, and Mobility in German Queer Printed Media', *SCRIPTS Working Papers*, 21 (2022), at [https://www.scripts-berlin.eu/publications/working-paper-series/Working-Paper-21-2022/index.html], accessed 26 Sept. 2022; and id., 'Visual Collective Memories of National Socialism: Transatlantic HIV/AIDS Activism and Discourses of Persecutions', *German History* (9 Sept. 2022), at [https://doi.org/10.1093/gerhis/ghac045].

[28] See also Sultan Doughan's publications on this topic as cited in her interview.

[29] Michael Rothberg, *The Implicated Subject: Beyond Victims and Perpetrators* (Stanford, Calif., 2019).

case of solidarity at work. In other words, solidarity can lead to exclusion while competition can also lead to inclusion.

Historically speaking, it is also worth mentioning that victimized groups did not necessarily subscribe to *Opferkonkurrenz*. Instead, they often came together to put questions of victimhood at the heart of their lived realities in post-1945 Germany, as this special issue shows. The contributions illustrate how victimhood morphed into a valued asset which went hand in hand with power, including a desire for minoritized collectives. Since the 1990s, such collectives have had to fight for state recognition of their victimhood—sometimes against each other, sometimes with joint agency. Either way, these struggles resulted in collective agency. Looking at such historical alliances can also illuminate and support educational purposes today. Recent research has shown, for instance, that engagement with the Holocaust can have a strong pedagogical and inclusive function if other victimized groups, including recent Muslim immigrants, are allowed to express empathy through their own experiences of victimhood.[30] Victimized and minoritized groups did, indeed, often compete with each other, but there was always room for solidarity between Jews, Muslims, Black people, queer people, and other minoritized groups. This is hardly reflected in current debates. Why have these histories of alliances been neglected in historiography and public debate, and whom did this erasure serve? What were the conditions governing this solidarity? In other words, what spaces were available for minoritized groups? Such groups themselves not only rejected simple categorizations, but have also expressed this rejection more publicly over the years.

The fact that memory culture is increasingly being questioned should also invite us to examine its history in more depth. The new demands for a more inclusive memory culture with respect to the Holocaust and other atrocities have unsurprisingly affected previous

[30] See anthropological studies such Özyürek, 'Rethinking Empathy' and Jonathon Catlin, 'A New German Historians' Debate? A Conversation with Sultan Doughan, A. Dirk Moses, and Michael Rothberg', *Journal of the History of Ideas: Blog*, 2–4 Feb. 2022, at [https://jhiblog.org/2022/02/02/a-new-german-historians-debate-a-conversation-with-sultan-doughan-a-dirk-moses-and-michael-rothberg-part-i], accessed 27 July 2022.

political generations who felt the need to defend older models of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, in themselves a remarkable achievement. On the other hand, more recent research has addressed the intergenerational silence in post-war West Germany—a fact that undermines the persistent myth of a 1968 generation that thoroughly confronted and came to terms with the Nazi past.[31] This, as well as the continued presence of Nazi perpetrators in institutions, including universities, and society raises the question as to whether memory culture itself needs to be revisited. This is not to question its achievements, first and foremost the recognition by society that atrocities in the past were morally wrong. The question is more how this recognition of failures in the past failed to be translated into anti-racist and anti-antisemitic practices in the present. Like public resistance to the idea of continuities between colonialism and the Holocaust,[32] the idea of post-war continuities defies normative frameworks of memory culture, for they rely on the idea that the end of the Second World War represents a moment of historical rupture. Although the idea of 1945 as *Stunde Null* (zero hour) is obsolete as a concept, it will also be necessary to fill the gaps in the research on racism and antisemitism in post-war Germany, a field that has been slowly growing in recent years. This will present opportunities to examine memory cultures against the backdrop of tacit—that is, supposedly unnoticed—ideological continuity. The recent antisemitic and racist attacks in Halle in 2019 and Hanau in 2020 are stark reminders of this. In this context, it is necessary to remember that *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*—a term with overtones of mastery and control, which was used ironically when it was first coined—was opposed to 'real' *Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung*. This 'ironic edge'[33] was lost over time,

[31] Christina von Hodenberg, *Das andere Achtundsechzig: Gesellschaftsgeschichte einer Revolte* (Munich, 2018), 45–76. See also Welzer, Moller, and Tschuggnall, *'Opa war kein Nazi'*; Ulrike Jureit and Christian Schneider, *Gefühlte Opfer: Illusionen der Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (Stuttgart, 2010); Robert Gildea, James Mark, and Anette Warring (eds.), *Europe's 1968: Voices of Revolt* (Oxford, 2013); and Anna von der Goltz, *The Other '68ers: Student Protest and Christian Democracy in West Germany* (Oxford, 2021).

[32] See e.g. Jürgen Zimmerer, *Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz? Beiträge zum Verhältnis von Kolonialismus und Holocaust* (Münster, 2011).

[33] Kansteiner, 'Losing the War', 102.

replaced by a self-congratulatory memory culture which at times obscured knowledge about historical continuities that were instead seen as clear-cut ruptures.[34] In other words, the 'self-satisfied arrogance intrinsic to the culture of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*'[35] was not necessarily accompanied by an immediate and thorough epistemic denazification (for example, in the humanities and history writing itself) or political solutions for the constant discrimination and violence against minorities in post-war Germany.

Yet one model need not entirely replace the other. Instead, we can turn to history and look at how memory culture itself can be historicized and framed differently. This would entail considering frictions and the transformation of memory culture not as a sudden move towards more pluralistic forms of commemoration, but as a logical continuity and adjustment of an already ongoing process in which minoritized communities, including those from the Global South, while never fully escaping discrimination, have always had agency.

This special issue therefore focuses on the historical trajectory of *Opferkonkurrenz*—yet also looks at how it relates to positive histories of solidarity between victimized groups in post-war Germany, foregrounding Jewish, Black, queer, and other under-represented voices from an interdisciplinary historical angle and thereby pluralizing memory culture itself against the backdrop of normative and state-governed templates of commemoration. The authors examine the genealogy of governing moral paradigms. Was *Opferkonkurrenz* the result of memory assemblages inherited from perpetrators, or did it derive from other social and cultural regimes of the post-war era? As the German state and its drive for rehabilitation proceeded from perpetrator to beneficiary, from antisemitism to anti-antisemitism, to what extent did *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* inform, impact on, and even encourage *Opferkonkurrenz*?[36] *Opferkonkurrenz* might not even be possible without the implementation of Holocaust remembrance and the legal codification of human rights after the Holocaust. When,

[34] See e.g. Heide Fehrenbach, *Race after Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America* (Princeton, 2005); ead., Rita Chin, Geoff Eley, and Atina Grossmann, *After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe* (Ann Arbor, 2009).

[35] Kansteiner, 'Losing the War', 102.

[36] See also Meister, *After Evil*.

for example, has the fight against antisemitism been a result of this longing for rehabilitation, or even of aggressive racism framed as rehabilitation? Was self-sacrifice on the altar of *Opferkonkurrenz* an essential condition of integration into the German idea of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*? That is, was inclusion only achieved when collectives entered the memorial arena in a competitive mode? What examples are there of solidarities standing against this tide—against the centring of the emotions of the perpetrators' descendants?

Finally, *Opferkonkurrenz* has also been indirectly addressed in Germany's most recent antisemitism debate concerning the global art exhibition documenta fifteen, which is still running at the time of writing. In a speech addressing the Bundestag to apologetically explain and rebut accusations of antisemitism, Ade Darmawan of ruangrupa, the Indonesian collective that curated documenta fifteen with the objective of showcasing positions from the Global South, explained the artwork that lay at the centre of the controversy by pointing to the global dimensions of antisemitism that have returned to haunt Germany. The problematic iconographical elements, they explained, were the result of antisemitism that lived on as a colonial legacy and had become 'deeply embedded in Indonesian history and visual language'. Dutch colonial officers—it is crucial to know that the Netherlands were occupied by the Nazi regime in 1940—'introduced originally European antisemitic ideas and images to portray Chinese in the way Europeans have portrayed Jews, and to draw a connection. This in a shocking and shameful way has come full circle in the artwork.'[37] This history continued when Western secret services supported a violent and genocidal regime in 1965, which also entailed Germany's complicity in Suharto's dictatorial rule.[38] The 'boomerang' effect of antisemitism reflected in the artwork has since undergone a

[37] Speech by Ade Darmawan (ruangrupa) in the Committee on Culture and Media, German Bundestag, 6 July 2022, at [https://documenta-fifteen.de/en/news/speech-by-ade-darmawan-ruangrupa-in-the-committee-on-culture-and-media-german-bundestag-july-6-2022/], accessed 27 July 2022.

[38] One of the earliest contributions to consider the global context of the history of colonialism and Nazism was by Monique Ligtenberg and Bernhard C. Schär, 'Eine Debatte über das koloniale Konstrukt', *Die Wochenzeitung*, 30 June 2022, at [https://www.woz.ch/-c8e4], accessed 27 July 2022.

variety of interpretations, possibly with more to come.[39] This shows the urgent need for histories that interrogate the differential, dialectical effects of colonialism, including 'exported antisemitism', on entangled ethnic and social groups on a global scale. For the German context it would entail pluralizing the history of Nazism beyond a parochial framework.

Darmawan ended his speech by explaining that the Global South is not a separate entity, but one that has 'been living door to door' with Europe for centuries.[40] Scholars, too, in particular historians of Black Europe, have rejected misleading juxtapositions between the Global North and South, stressing historical entanglement not just in the colonies, but also within Europe itself, where minority groups have also formed alliances.[41] Germany's long history of migration, and in particular the arrival of different multireligious Middle Eastern communities over time, yields vast potential to move from models of *Opferkonkurrenz* to those of alliance—past and present—by showing how historical events are inextricably entangled. This aspect is addressed in the interview with Sultan Doughan. A particularly pertinent case in this context is the entanglement—rather than comparison—between the Holocaust and the Nakba, the destruction of the Palestinian homeland and society in 1948. While historical research has indeed moved this particular field of inquiry forward in recent years, it has only tentatively been discussed in public debate, stressing that German responsibility must also extend to Palestinian

[39] See Michael Rothberg, 'Learning and Unlearning with Taring Padi: Reflections on Documenta', *New Fascism Syllabus Blog*, 2 July 2020, at [http://newfascismsyllabus.com/opinions/documenta/learning-and-unlearning-with-taring-padi-reflections-on-documenta/], accessed 27 July 2022; A. Dirk Moses, 'The Documenta, Indonesia, and the Problem of Closed Universes', *New Fascism Syllabus Blog,* 24 July 2022, at [http://newfascismsyllabus.com/opinions/documenta/the-documenta-indonesia-and-the-problem-of-closed-universes/], accessed 27 July 2022; Weizmann, 'In Kassel'.

[40] See speech by Ade Darmawan.

[41] See e.g. Fatima El-Tayeb, *European Others: Queering Ethnicity in Postnational Europe* (Minneapolis, 2011), German translation published as *Anders Europäisch: Rassismus, Identität und Widerstand im vereinten Europa* (Münster, 2015); Sharon Dodua Otoo, *Dürfen Schwarze Blumen Malen? Klagenfurter Rede zur Literatur 2020* (Klagenfurt, 2020), 19–21.

displacement and its victims inside and outside the country.[42] While the Holocaust is not the sole reason for the foundation of the state of Israel—the global persecution of Jews, from Germany to the Arab world, preceded the Holocaust—it would hardly have taken place without the European colonial powers that ruled the region through French and in particular British mandates. This makes it necessary to take a closer look at European colonial legacies in relation to Holocaust remembrance rather than approaching them separately. In other words, these are parts of the same history, not separate ones. A particular challenge will be to impart the deeper knowledge gained by historical research to public history, which will itself then impact memory culture. The following contributions offer a diverse history of ideas for such an undertaking, underlining the power asymmetries at the core of German memorial debates, while focusing on moments of unity and disunity in the public sphere. In the process, they point to new opportunities in writing about memory culture and its historical trajectory by not simply interrogating it, but also reshaping and further pluralizing future memory culture(s).

[42] See Bashir Bashir and Amos Goldberg (eds.), *The Holocaust and the Nakba: A New Grammar of Trauma and History* (New York, 2019); Sa'ed Atshan and Katharina Galor, *The Moral Triangle: Germans, Israelis, Palestinians* (Durham, NC, 2020); and Charlotte Wiedemann, *Den Schmerz der Anderen begreifen: Über Erinnerung und Solidarität* (Berlin, 2022).

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'VICTIMHOOD IS A TRICKY TERRAIN TO NEGOTIATE'

MICHAEL ROTHBERG IN CONVERSATION WITH
MIRJAM SARAH BRUSIUS

Michael Rothberg has challenged the underlying logic of competitive victimhood (Opferkonkurrenz)*, the theme of this special issue, in conflicts of memory. His book* Multidirectional Memory *shows that memory conflict can be productive, generating more memory through various forms of dialogism.*[1] *In this model, different memory traditions draw on each other and emerge together in 'non-zero-sum' ways.*[2] *The multidirectional dynamic he proposes also has implications for thinking about victimhood. Moving beyond the victim–perpetrator binary, he argues that we need a new category for people who enable and benefit from violence without being perpetrators themselves. Instead, such people can understand themselves as 'implicated subjects' who occupy 'positions of power and privilege without being themselves direct agents of harm'.*[3] *In this interview, we will discuss how a more complex map of memory and historical responsibility can also produce new alliances and solidarities, a topic he will explore in his forthcoming book* Memory Citizenship *(co-authored with Yasemin Yildiz).*

MIRJAM SARAH BRUSIUS (MSB): In 2020 we published a round table that drew on your book *Multidirectional Memory* and looked at the Holocaust's entanglement with global history, empire, and colonialism. Much has happened since (see my introduction to this special issue). To what extent do you think recent debates in Germany around its memory culture have moved the discussion about multidirectional memory forward, or in fact hindered it?

MICHAEL ROTHBERG (MR): I go back and forth between bouts of optimism and pessimism. There are moments when I see German memory culture opening up in positive ways and moments when I

[1] Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford, Calif., 2009). [2] Ibid. 243.
[3] Michael Rothberg, *The Implicated Subject: Beyond Victims and Perpetrators* (Stanford, Calif., 2019), 1.

think people are so dug into their positions that positive change will be very difficult to accomplish.

To understand what is going on, I think it's worth stepping back for a moment. The translation of *Multidirectional Memory* appeared because there were scholars in Germany who felt that the perspective the book offers could help in the effort of democratizing German memory culture and making it possible to articulate memories of migration and colonialism, among other histories, alongside memory of the Shoah.[4] I was excited to have the translation because I also thought—after several years of working on migration and memory in the German context—that a multidirectional perspective could be illuminating. Translation takes time, though, and I think neither the editors nor I could have imagined the context in which the book would eventually appear in 2021. There are many ways to tell the story, but 2019 was certainly a turning point because of the Bundestag's resolution against the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement, which further politicized accusations of antisemitism and set the stage for the resignation of Peter Schäfer from the Jewish Museum Berlin, the controversy around the work of Achille Mbembe, and the whole *Historikerstreit 2.0* that followed from the Mbembe dispute. In other words, *Multidirectional Memory* appeared in Germany in the midst of an already acrimonious context that was primed for further controversy.

My impression is that that controversy derives from an entrenched divide between a powerful contingent of establishment journalists and politicians as well as activists from the *antideutsch* (anti-German) camp on one side, and a group of scholars, progressive journalists, museum and cultural institution workers, and decolonial/migrant/Black activists on the other. The former group strongly defends a vision of the Holocaust as singular and incomparable, rejects the possibility of thinking about antisemitism alongside other forms of racism, and describes any but the mildest forms of criticism of Israel as antisemitic. The latter group is seeking to understand and situate the Holocaust in relation to other histories of violence, to open space for memories of colonialism, to conceptualize reparations in the wake of colonial genocide and looting, to think in intersectional ways about forms of oppression and

[4] Michael Rothberg, *Multidirektionale Erinnerung: Holocaustgedenken im Zeitalter der Dekolonisierung*, trans. Max Henninger (Berlin, 2021).

prejudice, and to defend space for rational, critical discussion of Israeli policy and Palestinian rights. The former group strongly rejected the arguments of *Multidirectional Memory*—usually without bothering to read or understand the book—while some members of the latter group see the multidirectional framework as a way of grounding an alternative to the dominant paradigm of singularity. My sense is that right now there is something like a deadlock. There has been some progress in recent years in integrating memories of colonialism into the German public sphere, but the discourse on antisemitism and Israel remains difficult to bring onto a rational terrain.

MSB: You are now working with Yasemin Yildiz on a book called *Memory Citizenship*. This book talks about migrant encounters with Holocaust memory in Germany. You have argued that a 'double bind' dominates German memory culture. On the one hand, minorities are required to commemorate the Holocaust in order to be or become 'real Germans', but on the other, they are denied that commemoration as it is not their own history. How do you think this affects not just people's identities and discourses on exclusion and inclusion, but also hierarchical thinking in German society at large?

MR: I think what we call the 'migrant double bind' is precisely the result of hierarchical thinking in mainstream Germany. First of all, this double bind is built on a pre-existing 'German paradox', as we termed it. Like Hanno Loewy and others writing in the first fifteen or so years of the twenty-first century, we noticed that German Holocaust memory had effectively become racialized. Taking responsibility for the Nazi genocide was conceived as a quasi-ethnic inheritance. For instance, the Social Democratic politician Klaus von Dohnanyi wrote in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in 1998 that 'German identity cannot be defined today any more precisely than through our common descent from those who did it, who welcomed it or at least permitted it.'[5] As Dan Diner put it at the same moment, and in the midst of debates about the citizenship law, '*ius sanguinis* is

[5] Klaus von Dohnanyi, 'Eine Friedensrede: Martin Walsers notwendige Klage', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 Nov. 1998. Cited in Hanno Loewy, 'A History of Ambivalence: Post-Reunification German Identity and the Holocaust', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 36/2 (2002), 3–13, at 11.

being prolonged by the rituals of memory and remembrance.'[6] In such a situation, we see the coming together of the German model of taking responsibility for the Holocaust and the reproduction of a racialized, 'blood'-based notion of German identity (based on common descent and *ius sanguinis*). This is a paradox since, within such a conceptual framework, the act of taking responsibility for the Shoah actually strengthens the hold of the very exclusive, racially based notion of German identity that accompanied the Holocaust in the first place.

Until the change of citizenship law in 2000, which made it somewhat easier for immigrants and post-migrants to be naturalized as German citizens, migrants were usually considered to be outside memory culture. But at this point the double bind came into play: formal equality of citizenship for some migrants was countered with a notion of belonging that remained ethnic and that was premised on remembrance of the Holocaust. I think a lot of what is happening today in the so-called *Historikerstreit 2.0* emerges from this context of paradox and double bind. Another way to say this is that the discourse on the Holocaust has become hierarchical: there are certain authorized standpoints and there are other standpoints that are given less credence. This isn't only a matter of race—ideological protocols of remembrance also come into the picture—but it certainly is partly a matter of racialized conceptions of citizenship and memory.

MSB: A recent conference, 'Hijacking Memory', looked at the appropriation of Holocaust remembrance by the far right.[7] To what extent could this appropriation spur *Opferkonkurrenz*?

MR: I don't know if I would say that the far right is involved in *Opferkonkurrenz* necessarily, but I would certainly agree that they tend to mobilize a discourse of victimization. I think this is true far beyond Germany and far beyond questions related to Holocaust memory. One of the key elements of contemporary far-right ideology—but which was also present at earlier moments, including in the Nazi movement—is

[6] Dan Diner, 'Nation, Migration, and Memory: On Historical Concepts of Citizenship', *Constellations*, 4/3 (1998), 303.

[7] 'Hijacking Memory: The Holocaust and the New Right', conference held at the Haus der Kulturen der Welt, Berlin, 9–12 June 2022, at [https://www.hkw.de/en/programm/projekte/2022/hijacking_memory/start.php], accessed 30 June 2022.

the presentation of the dominant White society as victimized by racial minorities and immigrants. It's essentially a victim–perpetrator inversion in which racists depict themselves as victims of those they victimize. The most prominent example of this currently—and something that has apparently motivated numerous mass killings in the US and elsewhere—is the so-called Great Replacement Theory, which asserts that a conspiracy exists to replace the White population with People of Colour. This racist 'theory' also beautifully illustrates some of the connections between antisemitism and anti-Black, anti-Muslim, and anti-immigrant racisms, since Jews are considered the enablers of this 'replacement'. I don't see this as *Opferkonkurrenz*, though—I see it as the exploitation of the discourse of victimization and the violent appropriation of the experiences of actually victimized groups.

MSB: In this special issue, we are trying to historicize, analyse, and above all problematize the discourse of victimhood in post-war Germany. What lessons could be drawn from such an approach, looking in particular at the historical trajectories of *Opferkonkurrenz*? What alternatives are there to what you have described as 'the possessive investment' in the concept of victimhood?[8]

MR: I think discourses of victimhood are a tricky terrain to negotiate because one has to hold in mind a few quite different attitudes simultaneously, as I've suggested elsewhere. First, we have to recognize that experiences of victimization are real: some people and some groups really are victims of violence. I don't see how we can talk about, say, the Holocaust or police violence against People of Colour without understanding that victims are real. Next, however, I think we have to be careful about reducing individuals or groups to an essentialized notion of victimhood. People—whether they are in a Nazi-constructed ghetto or an impoverished urban centre—are not only victims; they are also agents, even when they are confronting difficult, even impossible, circumstances. We have to avoid ontologizing or essentializing victim status because doing so takes the experience out of history—being a victim is a historical experience, not a pregiven

[8] Michael Rothberg and Ankur Datta, 'Exploring Victimhood', *Seminar*, 727 (2020), at [https://www.india-seminar.com/2020/727/727_michael_rothberg.htm], accessed 6 July 2020.

identity. Grasping the historicity of victimhood helps us understand a final point: the need for caution about how victimhood can come to be a desirable status that can be appropriated as a kind of cultural capital or even as a means of reproducing violence, which the case of the far right illustrates. Embracing the identity of victim is something different, I would argue, from speaking from an experience of victimization and claiming redress or reparation. Such claims seek to transform the world, not to reify the identity of victimhood.

To my mind, the discourse of *Opferkonkurrenz* does not do much to help us confront these various aspects of victimhood. As an ideological term, *Opferkonkurrenz* short-circuits reflection on victimization by only considering the third point I've mentioned—the fact that victimhood can become a form of cultural capital. This does happen, as I've just said, but we need to be careful about reproducing that logic in our own thinking and analysis. We need instead to go behind the concept and understand the circumstances of its emergence and mobilization as an ideological weapon serving *somebody's* interests. This analysis is what I take it you are offering in this special issue.

MSB: In your and Yasemin Yildiz's research on the 'migrant archives of Holocaust remembrance' in contemporary Germany, you detected the possibility of alternative ways of conceptualizing the relations between different histories and memories of violence.[9] Can you give an example?

MR: There is no single way that migrants to Germany remember the Holocaust or that migration inflects Holocaust memory. Experiences of migration, like migrant and host communities themselves, are irreducibly plural. That said, I think the experience that the Turkish–German writer Zafer Şenocak famously described as 'immigrating to . . . Germany's recent past' has, in fact, created all kinds of fascinating constellations of memory.[10] One very moving example

[9] Michael Rothberg and Yasemin Yildiz, 'Memory Citizenship: Migrant Archives of Holocaust Remembrance in Contemporary Germany', *Parallax*, 17/4 (2011), 32–48.

[10] Zafer Şenocak, *Atlas of a Tropical Germany*, trans. and ed. Leslie A. Adelson (Lincoln, NE, 2000), 6; originally published in 1993 as *Atlas des tropischen Deutschland*. The essay from which this well-known quotation is taken was written together with Bülent Tulay.

that has deservedly received some attention is that of the late writer Doğan Akhanlı. Akhanlı was a left-wing activist who fled to Germany from his native Turkey, and was later imprisoned there again in what became an international scandal. Although he had been active in the Kurdish cause in Turkey, for example, he did not become interested in the Armenian Genocide (and its denial) until he got to Germany. He was inspired by the German model of confronting the past to take up the challenge of confronting Turkey's genocidal past, but he also developed a model that is at least somewhat at odds with the German disinclination to 'compare' the Holocaust. Akhanlı gave street tours revealing what he called 'relational histories' (*Beziehungsgeschichten*) that brought together German, Jewish, Turkish, Armenian, and Greek histories, for instance. His work was very much about recovering multidirectional layers of history and memory in urban space, without reducing one story to another.

There are other instances of such multidirectional memory work that I think are important and that we discuss in our book—for instance, the music and activism of the late Esther Bejarano and her collaboration with the migrant hip-hop group Microphone Mafia. Under the banner of anti-fascism, they brought together Yiddish songs from the Nazi ghettos with a strong anti-racist vision focused on the contemporary persistence of neo-Nazi violence against migrants and People of Colour. Not all of our examples are explicitly political in that way, but in the context of the heated debates about Holocaust memory, antisemitism, and Israel/Palestine, almost all acts of migrant memory have some implicit political dimension.

MSB: The new book you're currently writing includes examples of experiences that concern Palestine and its connection with Holocaust commemoration. Yet this connection does not happen as a direct comparison or a competition between victims. Germany is currently a long way from what scholars have been looking at for a while now: the entangled and intertwined histories of the Nakba and the Holocaust. Why would more engagement with the Palestinian experience also be important for Holocaust remembrance in Germany?

MR: I certainly know examples that bring together Holocaust memory and Palestine in ways that I would consider non-reductive

and non-competitive. I also recommend Sa'ed Atshan and Katharina Galor's *The Moral Triangle*, a highly differentiated ethnographic study of Germans, Jews, and Palestinians in Berlin, for its humanistic and reconciliatory approach.[11] But there's no doubt that the conjunction of Palestine and the Holocaust is often conflictual—especially in Germany—precisely because the two stories are simultaneously distinct and entangled. I think I might frame your question differently, though. It's not so much that more engagement with Palestinian experience is important for Holocaust remembrance in Germany. Rather, engagement with Palestinian experience on its own terms is important in itself. My worry is that a certain conception of the Holocaust and of antisemitism—a conception based on the incomparability of each—is making it nearly impossible to recognize the legitimacy of Palestinian claims and the Palestinian narrative and yet, at the same time, requiring the question of Palestine to orbit around Holocaust memory. This is a dynamic I've recently been thinking of as 'warped multidirectionality': the dominant paradigm of Holocaust memory in Germany paradoxically forces the Holocaust into relation with other histories, but in such a way that it distorts them. It's impossible to extricate Palestine from the Holocaust, but also impossible to articulate an autonomous Palestinian position that doesn't pay homage to it. Loosening the hold of the dominant paradigm of uniqueness will decrease the level of competition and conflict because it will allow other memories a greater degree of autonomy.

MSB: The German–Iranian writer Asal Dardan once mentioned that incorporating experiences of complicity and privilege from abroad into German memory culture could also be a useful exercise.[12] After all, not all minorities arriving in Germany were minorities in their countries of origin. Some held positions of power and operated in hierarchical systems of oppression. Do you see opportunities for Germany's multicultural society and its memory culture in a more intersectional approach, relating as much to class (and gender) as to race?

[11] Sa'ed Atshan and Katharina Galor, *The Moral Triangle: Germans, Israelis, Palestinians* (Durham, NC, 2020).

[12] Sasha Marianna Salzmann and Asal Dardan, 'Heimat, Umbruch, Nähe: Zeit für neue deutsche Literatur', panel discussion at Fünf: Internationales Literaturfest lit.Ruhr, 6 Oct. 2021.

MR: That's a fascinating and important insight. As I said already, I think it's essential to consider migration in all its multi-dimensionality. I'm most familiar with migration from Turkey, but already there you have various kinds of distinctions that are salient between, for example, people of Turkish, Kurdish, and Armenian descent, or class differences between those who came as labour migrants and those who came as refugees or students. Here I would refer to my work on 'implication' and the 'implicated subject', which explores the way people contribute to and benefit from histories of violence and structures of inequality without being direct perpetrators themselves.[13] Again, the example of Doğan Akhanlı is relevant—someone who recognized his implication in the Armenian Genocide and developed forms of memory activism to address it and create new forms of solidarity. Immigrants—at least those who will be read as 'People of Colour'—who come to Germany with class privilege will probably occupy positions of what I call 'complex implication'.[14] That is, they will have lines of connection to histories of privilege and even perpetration while occupying relatively subordinate positions in Germany's racialized hierarchy. Complex implication is widespread, but no less important to account for, I believe, especially if our interest is in intersectional political, cultural, or intellectual projects.

MSB: You also detect a new type of *Opferkonkurrenz* in which minority groups get trapped: empathetic responses are considered 'inappropriate', and identifying with Jewish victims, according to some, risks displacing Jewish victimhood, undermining Germany's normative Holocaust memory. As a result, Muslim minorities in particular are meant to respond in a certain way that internalizes, but does not appropriate knowledge about the Holocaust—the implicit assumption being that many are intrinsically antisemitic. I'd like to join this argument with the one you're making on an urgent need for alliances—the second key topic raised in the round table later in this special issue and one that has a long history in Germany, though it is unfortunately not well known. What would have to happen, what is needed, for these new 'forms of solidarity' to become more visible?

[13] Rothberg, *The Implicated Subject*.
[14] Ibid. 8.

MR: I think this is a good example for seeing how pernicious the discourse of *Opferkonkurrenz* can be. As Esra Özyürek and other anthropologists like Sultan Doughan and Damani Partridge have shown, there's an elaborate disciplinary discourse that attempts to constrain how immigrants and racialized minorities respond to the Holocaust.[15] As Özyürek in particular demonstrates, agents of the dominant memory regime in Germany regularly reject and stigmatize minorities' empathetic responses to the Holocaust, which might include identifying with the victims or feeling fear about becoming a victim of racial violence.[16] Instead of acting like 'repentant perpetrators,' as good Germans are supposed to, many minorities bring their own experiences of violence and exclusion to their confrontation with the Nazi past, and that manifests in complicated affective responses to the commemoration of the Holocaust.

The dominant discourse often tries to classify those responses as *Opferkonkurrenz* because they are not otherwise legible within existing frames of reference. And, of course, sometimes minorities (like majority citizens) do articulate what I've called competitive memory or relativize the extremity of the Holocaust. But I also see something else in the kinds of examples Özyürek discusses: grounds for a possible solidarity among differently victimized or marginalized groups. I don't think such feelings of solidarity are particularly rare in contemporary Germany; on the contrary, they are often actualized in various kinds of collective action—perhaps especially in the cultural realm. For the past fifteen years I've been observing—and writing about—all kinds of cultural work that brings together differently situated minorities and migrants, sometimes also in collaboration with 'majority' Germans, in places like the Ballhaus Naunynstrasse and the Maxim Gorki Theater in Berlin, and in various initiatives involving people

[15] See e.g. Esra Özyürek, 'Rethinking Empathy: Emotions Triggered by the Holocaust among the Muslim-Minority in Germany', *Anthropological Theory*, 18/4 (2018), 456–77; Damani Partridge, 'Holocaust *Mahnmal* (Memorial): Monumental Memory amidst Contemporary Race', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 52/4 (2010), 820–50; Sultan Doughan, 'Desiring Memorials: Jews, Muslims, and the Human of Citizenship', in Samuel Sami Everett and Ben Gidley (eds.), *Jews and Muslims in Europe: Between Discourse and Experience* (Leiden, 2022), 46–70.

[16] Özyürek, 'Rethinking Empathy'.

with Jewish and Muslim family backgrounds. The examples of Doğan Akhanlı and Bejarano and Microphone Mafia, which I mentioned earlier, are also part of this picture.

The major problem, it seems to me, is not on the side of 'victim' or minority groups, but in the difficulty that mainstream German society has in recognizing and valuing these forms of solidarity. I guess I would say, then, that the issue is less about carrying out these visions of solidarity on the practical level than about breaking through the hegemonic frames that either ignore this kind of work, fetishize it under the rubric of a consumable form of diversity, or—especially when Holocaust memory is at stake—seek to discipline and constrain it. The latter point about the Holocaust brings us back to the opening of our conversation and illustrates to me the importance of memory culture in the various debates unfolding in Germany today: memory culture is a site of struggle between clashing understandings of collective belonging and collective responsibility. Against the orthodoxy that seeks to maintain homogeneity and banish relationality, we need to strengthen the intersectional and radically democratic currents in memory culture and across civil society.

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FROM OPFERKONKURRENZ *TO SOLIDARITY: A ROUND TABLE*

Desiring Victimhood: German Self-Formation and the Moralization of Political Conflict

HANNAH TZUBERI AND PATRICIA PIBERGER

The closed-off storerooms of collective European historical and political consciousness are haunted by the histories and ongoing effects of colonialism and racism that have wreaked havoc on their victims. Premised on the conviction that histories of violence require recognition and representation, liberal democracies are increasingly asked to recognize these historical crimes and injustices and make them publicly visible. In Germany especially, these demands are tied to a desired ideal: colonial pasts can and must be recognized *without* competing with, or relativizing, the memory of the Holocaust and its pivotal importance for German political culture and collective self-understanding.[1] While intuitively appealing, we suggest that such a desired pluralization of the 'liberal' or 'cosmopolitan' memory paradigm may indeed lead to the recognition of *more* victims. Yet in this ideal, the political and epistemological plausibility structures of the 'politics of victimhood' are left intact. Despite an explicit commitment to solidarity in the public discourse of liberal democracies, competition for recognition (*Opferkonkurrenz*) is both an inherent, structural ingredient and a ripple effect of the politics of victimhood.[2]

[1] This desire is expressed e.g. by Jürgen Habermas, 'Der neue Historikerstreit', *philomag*, 60 (2021), at [https://www.philomag.de/artikel/der-neue-historikerstreit], accessed 21 June 2022; Susan Neiman, *Learning from the Germans: Confronting Race and the Memory of Evil* (New York, 2019); Saul Friedländer, Norbert Frei, Dan Diner, and Sybille Steinbacher, *Ein Verbrechen ohne Namen: Anmerkungen zum Streit über den Holocaust* (Munich, 2022). See also the speech by President Frank-Walter Steinmeier on the occasion of the inauguration of the Humboldt Forum, 22 Sept. 2021, at [https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/bulletin/rede-von-bundespraesident-dr-frank-walter-steinmeier-1962758], accessed 29 Jan. 2022.

[2] For a conceptualization and critique of the 'politics of victimhood', see Robert Meister, *After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights* (New York, 2011); Vincent

In the following, we will address the politics of victimhood in terms of the history of ideas and focus on the genealogy of the concept of passive victimhood in the West. We will not discuss historical experiences of victimization—namely, victimhood as a historical fact. Rather, we approach victimhood as an analytical category and argue that the work done by the figure of the victim occludes an understanding of political conflicts *as political conflicts.* Instead, it delegates the political primarily to the sphere of morality. Regardless of the transtemporal, transnational, and categorical entanglements of genocides, experiences of victimization, and their memorialization, we will thus first briefly describe the genealogy of the figure of the victim. We will then carve out the centrality specifically of the figure of the Jewish victim to the making of the German post-war order.[3] Finally, we will close with three brief examples that demonstrate how the politics of victimhood in this German context enables the recognition of more victims, yet simultaneously reproduces a hierarchization of vulnerability and informs the political subjectivation of different collectives.

The German term *Opfer* has two different meanings that are related to the semantic fields of the Latin *sacrificium/victima*. *Sacrificium* designates an active sacrifice—for example, the offering of an animal to a deity or the voluntary renunciation of certain acts—while *victima*

Druliolle and Roddy Brett (eds.), *The Politics of Victimhood in Post-Conflict Societies: Comparative and Analytical Perspectives* (Cham, 2018). Specifically on *Opferkonkurrenz*, see Jean-Michel Chaumont, *Die Konkurrenz der Opfer: Genozid, Identität und Anerkennung*, trans. Thomas Laugstien (Lüneburg, 2001), originally published in 1997 as *La concurrence des victimes: Génocide, identité, reconnaissance*. Through an analysis primarily of 'internal' Jewish debates about the Holocaust and its meaning in the present, Chaumont delineates how Jews' understanding and interpretation of victimhood evolved. One of the consequences of the rising importance of these debates generally and for Jewish self-understanding in particular is the emergence of competition not only between Jews and other victims of the National Socialist regime, but also between different Jewish actors themselves.

[3] The centrality of Jewish victimhood is, of course, not a phenomenon specific to Germany, but underpins the emergence and consolidation of the normative post-war human rights culture. On the 'globalization of the Holocaust', see e.g. Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age*, trans. Assenka Oksiloff (Philadelphia, 2006); for a critique, see Sharon Macdonald, *Memorylands: Heritage and Identity in Europe Today* (London, 2013).

designates the passive endurance of suffering caused by natural catastrophe or violence.[4] Whereas the German *Opfer* carries both of these meanings, the English sacrifice/victim and the French *sacrifice/victime* differentiate between them. Only in the eighteenth century did *Opfer* become detached from its theological context and enter the sphere of ethics, as well as historical and political philosophy. With the emergence of the modern nation-state at this time, the term's semantic range and currency increased, culminating in its association with heroic self-sacrifice for the homeland.[5]

Between the early nineteenth century and the mid twentieth century, essential social transformations occurred in European societies which have had lasting effects on the notion of passive victimhood. In particular, perceptions of violence and war have changed fundamentally. This is a result of the identification and documentation of soldiers who fell in the First World War and the compensation claims raised by bereaved families and wounded and disabled survivors. In addition, first attempts at the legal regulation of military enterprises were made as early as the mid nineteenth century.[6] However, it was only with the end of the Second World War and the gradual emergence of the processes of 'coming to terms' with Nazi crimes that the figure of the victim turned into one of the most potent figures of political culture and memory politics.[7] It is now implicated in a

[4] Martin Schulze Wessel, 'Einleitung', in id. and K. Erik Franzen (eds.), *Opfernarrative: Konkurrenzen und Deutungskämpfe in Deutschland und im östlichen Europa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Munich, 2012), 1–8, at 1. On the formation of the passive victim, see Svenja Goltermann, *Opfer: Die Wahrnehmung von Krieg und Gewalt in der Moderne* (Frankfurt am Main, 2017). On the religious origins of the active sacrifice, see also Kirstin Breitenfellner, *Wie können wir über Opfer reden?* (Vienna, 2018), 27–45; Thomas Vollmer, *Das Heilige und das Opfer: Zur Soziologie religiöser Heilslehre, Gewalt(losigkeit) und Gemeinschaftsbildung* (Wiesbaden, 2009); Robert A. Yelle, *Sovereignty and the Sacred: Secularism and the Political Economy of Religion* (Chicago, 2019); and Bernd Janowski and Michael Welker (eds.), *Opfer: Theologische und kulturelle Kontexte* (Frankfurt am Main, 2000).

[5] Adam Seigfried, 'Opfer. I. Von der Antike bis zum Reformationszeitalter', in Joachim Ritter, Karlfried Gründer, and Gottfried Gabriel (eds.), *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie online* (Basel, 2017).

[6] Goltermann, *Opfer*, 27–169.

[7] It is noteworthy that when the standard lexicon of German political–historical language, the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, was finished in the late

shift from the 'future-oriented model of progress' to the 'past-oriented model of memory' in Western societies.[8] Historian Martin Schulze Wessel speaks of a '"victimization" of historical science and political discourse.'[9] Peter Hallama attests to Western Europe's passive turn from national heroic narratives to an age of victimhood filled with guilt and shame: 'Yesterday's victimization is becoming the legitimacy of today's claims.'[10] Since the 1990s in particular, the notion that victim experiences constitute identities has gained increasing popularity, and (self-)identification as a victim has accordingly morphed into a common mode of self-description in confrontation with individual or group violence.[11]

Beyond the specific context of the Second World War, medical discourses and media presentations and representations since the 1980s have contributed to the growing popularization of victim narratives in the West. Psychotherapeutically oriented researchers emphasize how identities are formed through experiences of suffering. The medical '"discovery" of trauma as post-traumatic stress disorder',[12] its legal codification, and its pop-cultural restaging further propel the dissemination and expansion of the rhetoric of victimhood.[13] At the same time, the newly created criminological subdiscipline of victimology describes, in addition to 'primary' and 'secondary', also 'tertiary

1990s, there was no entry for *Opfer*. See Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck (eds.), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschlan*d, 8 vols. (Stuttgart, 1972–97), vol. iv: *Mi-Pre* (1978).

[8] Martin Sabrow, 'Erinnerung als Pathosformel der Gegenwart', *Vorgänge: Zeitschrift für Bürgerrechte und Gesellschaftspolitik*, 51/2 (2012), 4–15, at 14.

[9] Schulze Wessel, 'Einleitung', 1.

[10] Peter Hallama, 'Geschichtswissenschaften, Memory Studies und der Passive Turn: Zur Frage der Opferperspektive in der erinnerungskulturellen Forschung', in Schulze Wessel and Franzen (eds.), *Opfernarrative*, 9–27, at 9.

[11] Randall Hansen, Achim Saupe, Andreas Wirsching, and Daqing Yang (eds.), *Authenticity and Victimhood after the Second World War: Narratives from Europe and East Asia* (Toronto, 2021).

[12] Franziska Lamott, 'Zur Instrumentalisierung des Opferstatus', *Psychotherapeut*, 54 (2009), 257–61, at 257.

[13] Goltermann, *Opfer*, 171–233. See also Nick Haslam, 'Concept Creep: Psychology's Expanding Concepts of Harm and Pathology', *Psychological Inquiry*, 27/1 (2016), 1–17.

victimization', and thus integrates and fixes victimhood as a central component of a personality, a subject position, or an identity.[14] Far beyond the experience of violence in the context of war and persecution, victimhood is now inscribed primarily onto the physical body and codified, as well as eternalized, as a painful experience that is biologically and culturally inheritable.[15]

Towards the end of the twentieth century, the practice of empathic identification as or with victims became firmly anchored in Western and Central European societies. Relatedly, (state) recognition of (collective) victimhood has turned into a cornerstone of struggles over political representation. States now establish frameworks within which minoritized groups are placed (and place themselves) in relations of competition *and* solidarity alongside their respective victim identities. State recognition of victimhood can in this sense also be understood as an 'instrumentum regni' (a tool of government)[16] that constitutes and organizes groups around victimhood.[17] However, now that a moralized rhetoric of victimhood has become politically

[14] See Goltermann, *Opfer*, 178–96; Angelika Treibel, 'Opferforschung', in Dieter Hermann and Andreas Pöge (eds.), *Kriminalsoziologie: Handbuch für Wissenschaft und Praxis* (Baden-Baden, 2018), 441–57, at 448.

[15] On the emergence of the notion of the biological transmission of victimhood through the impact of violence and trauma on a person's genetic make-up, see Anna Danilina, 'Somatische Erinnerung und historische Gewalt: Die transgenerationale Traumaforschung der Epigenetik' (postdoctoral project, Technical University Berlin, work in progress). For the cultural idea of 'hereditary victimhood' in particular, see Jie-Hyun Lim, 'Victimhood Nationalism in Contested Memories: National Mourning and Global Accountability', in Aleida Assmann and Sebastian Conrad (eds.), *Memory in a Global Age: Discourses, Practices and Trajectories* (Basingstoke, 2010), 138–62.

[16] Daniele Giglioli, *Die Opferfalle: Wie die Vergangenheit die Zukunft fesselt*, trans. Max Henninger (Berlin, 2016), 12, originally published in 2014 as *Critica della vittima: Un esperimento con l'etica*.

[17] On the elementary importance of recognition for positive self-perception, collective identity, and participation in society, see Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition*: *An Essay* (Princeton, 1992). Others, such as Asad Haider, Wendy Brown, and Patchen Markell, critically focus on the relationship between the state and its practice of minority recognition, and read identity-based recognition processes as modern forms of governance that constitute relations of hierarchized difference. See Asad Haider, *Mistaken Identity: Race and Class in the Age of Trump* (London, 2018); Wendy Brown,

effective, global state powers also describe themselves as (potential) victims. The post-1989 order conceptualizes its military interventions as a defence of the Western moral regime and a means of preventing its own potential victimization. Whereas political struggles previously played out on the basis of different visions of the political order, such as communism versus market capitalism, they are now discussed and framed as struggles between parties with *moral* and *immoral* dispositions (the first prominent example of this being the 'axis of evil', as used by George W. Bush in 2002). Deviance is no longer described as political antagonism, but as a reluctance to identify emphatically with the suffering of others.[18]

During the first decades after 1945, the (West) German state ignored, marginalized, and blamed Jews (including all those murdered after being categorized as Jews under the Nazi regime) in its practices of restitution and its political discourses.[19] Social scientist Jean-Michel

States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton, 1995); Patchen Markell, *Bound by Recognition* (Princeton, 2003).

[18] Political theorist Robert Meister therefore argues that the post-war emergence of a normative global 'human rights discourse' and ultimately the 'War on Terror' is a revision of the justice-based 'revolution model' of 1789 to 1989 (Meister, *After Evil*, 1–49). Historian A. Dirk Moses argues that the concept of genocide as it emerged in the wake of the Holocaust is flawed in that it understands genocide to be motivated by 'irrational hatred'. Civilian deaths, however, are also caused by states striving for permanent security that is 'concerned not only with eliminating immediate threats but also with future threats' and is governed by 'a logic of prevention (future threats) as well as preemption (imminent threats)'. See A. Dirk Moses, *The Problems of Genocide: Permanent Security and the Language of Transgression* (Cambridge, 2021), 34–5. We are aware that state powers used representations of victimhood and self-victimization to legitimize their warfare as early as in the First World War. See e.g. anti-British visual stereotypes in German postcards from the early twentieth century: Maren Jung-Diestelmeier, *'Das verkehrte England': Visuelle Stereotype auf Postkarten und deutsche Selbstbilder 1899–1918* (Göttingen, 2017), 378–86.

[19] See e.g. the implementation of the *Bundesentschädigungsgesetz* (Federal Restitution Act) of 1953, as described in Norbert Frei, José Brunner, and Constantin Goschler (eds.), *Die Praxis der Wiedergutmachung: Geschichte, Erfahrung und Wirkung in Deutschland und Israel* (Göttingen, 2009). On the relation of the West German state to Jews, see Frank Stern, *Im Anfang war Auschwitz: Antisemitismus und Philosemitismus im deutschen Nachkrieg* (Gerlingen, 1991), 324–39; Peter Reichel, Harald Schmid, and Peter Steinbach, 'Die "zweite Geschichte"

Chaumont meticulously traces how these renewed experiences of humiliation, shame, and frustrated demands for recognition have been integrated into Jews' collective consciousness.[20] Only gradually, and especially in the wake of the broadcast of the Eichmann trial (1961) and the popularization of the term 'Holocaust' through the TV series of the same name (1978; first aired in Germany in 1979), did the systematic mass-murder of Jews come to be recognized as a catastrophe in and of itself, rather than as collateral damage of intensified warfare. In (West) Germany, the emergence of civil memory activism (*Geschichts- und Gedenkstättenbewegung*) and a growing interest in the historiography of the Holocaust from the 1970s onwards constituted the first public attempts to 'come to terms' with the Nazi past and, in particular, its policy of extermination.[21] Individual and collective self-formation became increasingly entangled with gazing at the past. Turning away from the self-victimization of their parents, the 'second generation' started to identify with their parents' victims and to desire the figure of the 'felt victim [*gefühltes Opfer*]'.[22] This identification with Jewish victims had both an identity-establishing and an exonerating function. Media enactments of powerless victims further promoted idealized substitute identities that enabled the German audience to distance itself from perpetrators. Identification with the Holocaust's Jewish victims and

der Hitler-Diktatur: Zur Einführung', in eid. (eds.), *Der Nationalsozialismus – die zweite Geschichte: Überwindung, Deutung, Erinnerung* (Munich, 2009), 7–21, at 18–19.

[20] Chaumont, *Die Konkurrenz der Opfer*, 21–86.

[21] Jenny Wüstenberg, *Civil Society and Memory in Postwar Germany* (Cambridge, 2017); Volker Böge (ed.), *Geschichtswerkstätten gestern – heute – morgen: Bewegung! Stillstand. Aufbruch?* (Munich, 2004); Etta Grotrian, 'Geschichtswerkstätten und alternative Geschichtspraxis in den achtziger Jahren', in Wolfgang Hardtwig and Alexander Schug (eds.), *History Sells! Angewandte Geschichte als Wissenschaft und Markt* (Stuttgart, 2009), 243–53.

[22] On the relationship between memory and identification with *and as* Jewish victims, see e.g. Ulrike Jureit and Christian Schneider, *Gefühlte Opfer: Illusionen der Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (Stuttgart, 2010); Christoph Schmidt, *Israel und die Geister von '68: Eine Phänomenologie* (Göttingen, 2018); A. Dirk Moses, 'The Non-German German and the German German: Dilemmas of Identity after the Holocaust', *New German Critique*, 101 (2007), 45–94. For examples of German self-victimization, see Aleida Assmann, *Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit: Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik* (Munich, 2006; 3rd edn 2018), 183–204.

'mourning' morphed into basic elements of remembrance and began to determine political and aesthetic commemorative practices and discourses.[23] Victimhood became a *desired* resource and an asset.

In the context of the memory politics and activism of the 1980s,[24] initial tensions arose between groups that defined themselves in relation to their victimization by the National Socialist regime. Chaumont describes how, during the first years after the war, politically persecuted victims were addressed as heroic resistance fighters who were honoured for their actions. Gradually, however, when innocence and passivity became central characteristics of victimhood, the racially persecuted began to 'outcompete' the politically persecuted. In a newly emergent 'ranking of suffering', Jews, as non-partisan and apolitical victims who were killed for no other reason than 'who they were', figured as paradigmatic victims—an inversion that must also be understood in the context of the Cold War.[25] Under the premises of the formation,

[23] Wulf Kansteiner, 'Losing the War, Winning the Memory Battle: The Legacy of Nazism, World War II, and the Holocaust in the Federal Republic of Germany', in id., Richard Ned Lebow, and Claudio Fogu (eds.), *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe* (Durham, NC, 2006), 102–46; see also Insa Eschebach, *Öffentliches Gedenken: Deutsche Erinnerungskultur seit der Weimarer Republik* (Frankfurt am Main, 2005); Aleida Assmann, *Das neue Unbehagen an der Erinnerungskultur: Eine Intervention* (Munich, 2013), 59–106. For the emerging field of memory studies in particular, see Jay Winter, 'The Generation of Memory: Reflections on the "Memory Boom" in Contemporary Historical Studies', *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute Washington DC*, 27 (2000), 69–92.

[24] We use the terms 'activism' and 'politics' to indicate that 'memory work' became a practice of both political elites (see e.g. Richard von Weizsäcker, speech during the ceremony commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the end of war in Europe and of National Socialist tyranny, Bundestag, Bonn, 8 May 1985, at [https://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Richard-von-Weizsaecker/Reden/1985/05/19850508_Rede.html], accessed 22 June 2022) and civil society (see e.g. the emergence of the 'Geschichtsbewegung' (history movement) described in Wüstenberg, *Civil Society and Memory*).

[25] Chaumont, *Die Konkurrenz der Opfer*, 162. On the 'disappearance' of communists and worker activists from German memorial contexts, see Y. Michal Bodemann, 'Reconstructions of History: From Jewish Memory to Nationalized Commemoration of Kristallnacht in Germany', in id. (ed.), *Jews, Germans, Memory: Reconstructions of Jewish Life in Germany* (Ann Arbor, 1996), 179–223. A. Dirk Moses traces the emergence of the notion of a 'victim of victims' in his *Problems of Genocide*, 481–8.

from the 1970s onwards, of what is today subsumed under the rubric of 'identity politics', the notion of innocent, passive victimhood was thus increasingly inscribed onto the figure of the Jew.[26]

After 1989, seeking to demonstrate its full and lasting belonging to the realm of 'civilized nations', the 'new' German state institutionalized the memory of the Holocaust as its 'post-national' foundation.[27] In this context, the figure of the Jew has become *the* key figure of German democratic self-assertion (*Vergemeinschaftung*) and a medium through which the very identity of the 'Berlin Republic' is articulated and demonstrated. Standing in for everything the Nazi state was not, the figure of the Jew has become a desired figure onto which hopes for a post-national, post-racial future are projected: Jewish museums, memorial sites, Jewish culture days, various Israel-related initiatives, and events, movies, and books are all sites upon which a democratic disposition is made public and experienced. 'Things Jewish' now inform the subjectivities and political emotions of those who conceive of themselves as participants, founders, and builders of a new, democratic German political consciousness and collectivity. The democratic citizen and the figure of the Jew are imagined as sharing *one and the same* moral–political space, and this is what makes the 'new Germany' an identifiable nation as well as a nation with which one can identify.[28]

[26] This move simultaneously enabled and triggered the constitution of other 'forgotten victims' of the Nazi regime in public discourse during the 1980s—primarily gay victims and the victims of Nazi euthanasia and enforced sterilization. See Katharina Stengel and Werner Konitzer (eds.), *Opfer als Akteure: Interventionen ehemaliger NS-Verfolgter in der Nachkriegszeit* (Frankfurt am Main, 2008); Harald Schmid, 'Zwischen Achtung und Ächtung: Opfer nationalsozialistischer Herrschaft im Bild der deutschen Öffentlichkeit', in id., Henning Borggräfe, and Hanne Leßau (eds.), *Fundstücke: Die Wahrnehmung der NS-Verbrechen und ihrer Opfer im Wandel* (Göttingen, 2015), 10–22.

[27] The term 'post-national' was coined by Jürgen Habermas in *Die Postnationale Konstellation: Politische Essays* (Frankfurt am Main, 1998), trans. into English by Max Pensky as *The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001). For a critique, see Albena Azmanova and Azar Dakwar, 'The Inverted Postnational Constellation: Identitarian Populism in Context', *European Law Journal*, 25/5 (2019), 494–501.

[28] On the embrace of the figure of the Jew in the context of post-Cold War nation-building, see Geneviève Zubrzycki, 'Nationalism, "Philosemitism" and Symbolic Boundary-Making in Contemporary Poland', *Comparative Studies in*

In particular, the performance of Holocaust memory and the corresponding institutionalization and expansion of Holocaust education have become prerequisites of *moral* belonging.[29] The dividing line between the genocidal past and the purified present is drawn and made visible on the level of both political discourse and individual citizens' practices, through the performance of a shift from a world in which the German state remembered its murdered Jews to a world in which it actively protects its living Jews. For the Federal Republic of Germany and its civil society, the maintenance of a special relationship with the state of Israel, the establishment of a representative, victim-identified culture of remembrance, the normative commitment to support Jewish life, and the combatting of antisemitism are thus fundamental.[30]

The paradigmatic, iconic status of the figure of the Jewish victim has implications for the desired project of pluralization in memorial contexts and ultimately impacts on the way in which present-day political struggles are read and acted out. The centrality of Jewish victimhood implies that vulnerability can be recognized in principle only if it does *not* compete with the figure of the Jew or relativize its victim status in the present. Political violence against minoritized subjects and collectives for whom (West) German rehabilitation is not central to their self-constitution remains illegible. Regardless of whether or not the Holocaust was 'historically unique', the embrace of this 'lesson of the past' is an essential condition of *moral* belonging. The

Society and History, 58/1 (2016), 66–98. For the German context, see also Jane Kramer, *The Politics of Memory: Looking for Germany in the New Germany* (New York, 1996); Ruth Ellen Gruber, *Virtually Jewish: Reinventing Jewish Culture in Europe* (Berkeley, 2002); Bodemann (ed.), *Jews, Germans, Memory*.

[29] See Sultan Doughan, 'Teaching Tolerance: Citizenship, Religious Difference, and Race in Germany' (Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 2018), at [https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Doughan_berkeley_0028E_18515.pdf], accessed 4 Sept. 2021. On the efficacy of Holocaust memory in contemporary struggles over the legitimacy of Jewish and Muslim religious practices, see Sultan Doughan and Hannah Tzuberi, 'Säkularismus als Praxis und Herrschaft: Zur Kategorisierung von Juden und Muslimen im Kontext säkularer Wissensproduktion', in Schirin Amir-Moazami (ed.), *Der inspizierte Muslim: Zur Politisierung der Islamforschung in Europa* (Bielefeld, 2018), 269–308.

[30] See Hannah Tzuberi, '"Reforesting" Jews: The German State and the Construction of "New German Judaism"', *Jewish Studies Quarterly*, 27/3 (2020), 199–224.

figure of the Jewish victim can thus raise awareness and prevent *some* forms of violence, but is simultaneously implicated in the production of *moral* others.[31]

In this sense, the moralization of political discourse constitutes the breeding ground of political subjectivation. For example, since reforms to German citizenship law in 1999–2000, the '*Ausländer*' (a legal term for a non-citizen with racial connotations, used in public colloquial language in a derogatory way) or '*Türke*' (a racialized term used for labour migrants and their families) has been replaced by a Muslim (collective) subject. Since 9/11 in particular, this new collective body has been monitored as a potential threat to liberal–democratic culture in general, and to Jewish existence in particular. Concepts such as political Islam, Muslim antisemitism, '*Gefährder*' (a legal term targeting mainly racialized subjects as possible threats to public safety), and '*Hassprediger*' (a populist term singling out racialized religious leaders and marking them as instigators of hate and violence) have found their way into media, political, and academic discourse, as well as the law.[32] The vulnerability of this collective subject is contested, as the

[31] Valentina Pisanty, *The Guardians of Memory and the Return of the Xenophobic Right*, trans. Alastair McEwen (New York, 2021), originally published in 2020 as *I guardiani della memoria e il ritorno delle destre xenofobe*. For the concept of implication, see Michael Rothberg, *The Implicated Subject: Beyond Victims and Perpetrators* (Stanford, Calif., 2019). For the figure of the 'moral other', see Uffa Jensen, *Zornpolitik* (Berlin, 2017), 40. Social scientist Willem Schinkel uses the term 'moral citizenship' to describe the increasing detachment of citizenship from its formal aspects: 'a distinction can be made between *formal citizenship*—denoting juridically codified rights and duties of citizens—members of states—and *moral citizenship*—referring to a counter-factual ideal of citizen participation. Formal citizenship has reference to both juridical status as membership of a juridico-political order and to social rights . . . Moral citizenship is something quite different and entails an *extra-legal normative concept* of the good citizen. It is not merely a factual and descriptive but also a counterfactual and prescriptive notion.' Willem Schinkel, *Imagined Societies: A Critique of Immigrant Integration in Western Europe* (Cambridge, 2017), 189–99, quotation at 198.

[32] On the securitization of Muslims, see Nahed Samour, 'Politisches Freund-Feind-Denken im Zeitalter des Terrorismus', in Andreas Kulick and Michael Goldhammer (eds.), *Der Terrorist als Feind? Personalisierung im Polizei- und Völkerrecht* (Tübingen, 2020), 49–66; Werner Schiffauer, 'Suspect Subjects: Muslim Migrants and the Security Agencies in Germany', in Julia M. Eckert (ed.),

'new Germany' associates it with a kind of pastness that manifests itself in both a premodern, non-enlightened, illiberal religiosity *and* an antagonistic relation to Jews. Forever suspicious, this collective body is hence perpetually required to demonstrate its liberal–democratic and anti-antisemitic disposition.[33]

As another example, after 1989 and the unification of the two German states, a (collective) East German subject was marked as deficient both democratically and in coming to terms with the Nazi past: it still had to 'catch up', its democracy was 'in diapers', its democratic revolution '*nachgeholt* [delayed]', and its conception of history in dire need of improvement through education.[34] As a result, right-wing violence and attitudes are understood as symptoms of inadequate *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, rather than as phenomena that need to be analysed as part of a much broader spectrum of disidentification with the Berlin Republic and its governance.[35] By relegating racism, antisemitism, and right-wing violence to a past which the East German collective has not yet purged, the 'new Germany' thus constitutes

The Social Life of Anti-Terrorism Laws: The War on Terror and the Classifications of the 'Dangerous Other' (Bielefeld, 2008), 55–78. On the monitoring and management of the Muslim collective, see Schirin Amir-Moazami, 'Zur Produktion loyaler Staatsbürger: Einbürgerungstests als Instrument der Regulierung von religiös-kultureller Pluralität in Deutschland', *Forschungsjournal Soziale Bewegungen*, 29/2 (2016), 21–34; ead. (ed.), *Der inspizierte Muslim*; Luis Manuel Hernández Aguilar, *Governing Muslims and Islam in Contemporary Germany: Race, Time, and the German Islam Conference* (Leiden, 2018). On the production of German Muslim subjectivity in particular, see Riem Spielhaus, *Wer ist hier Muslim? Die Entwicklung eines islamischen Bewusstseins in Deutschland zwischen Selbstidentifikation und Fremdzuschreibung* (Würzburg, 2011).

[33] Hannah Tzuberi and Nahed Samour, 'The German State and the Creation of Un/Desired Communities', *Contending Modernities Blog*, 22 Feb. 2022, at [https://contendingmodernities.nd.edu/theorizing-modernities/the-german-state-and-the-creation-of-un-desired-communities/], accessed 22 June 2022; Victoria Bishop Kendzia, *Visitors to the House of Memory: Identity and Political Education at the Jewish Museum Berlin* (New York, 2017), 103–32.

[34] Boris Buden, *Zone des Übergangs: Vom Ende des Postkommunismus* (Frankfurt am Main, 2009), 17–67; Wüstenberg, *Civil Society and Memory*, 206–61; Neiman, *Learning from the Germans*, 81–132.

[35] Naika Foroutan, Frank Kalter, Coşkun Canan, and Mara Simon, *Ost-Migrantische Analogien I: Konkurrenz um Anerkennung* (Berlin, 2019); Kramer, *Politics of Memory,* 51–100.

itself as a purified, now tolerant, and liberal democracy. The ubiquity of right-wing and racist structures in federal (East *and* West) German state institutions, from the police, the military, and political parties to *Verfassungsschutz* (the domestic intelligence agency), is thereby obfuscated.

A final example: over the last decade in particular, German political, media, educational, and academic discourse has been directed at Palestinians as a collective that requires special monitoring. Fostered by the emergence of the concept of Israel-related antisemitism and its implementation in political practice, the Palestinian collective body is deemed ontologically antisemitic 'until proven otherwise'.[36] Palestinians, in this sense, are collateral damage of the intensifying German wish for purification from antisemitism. So much so that in recent times, the very signifier 'Palestine' has increasingly become an accessible, internalized, and viral trope denoting antisemitism.[37] The birth

[36] See Sami R. Khatib, 'Germany and its Palestinian Discontents', *Journal of Visual Culture*, 20/2 (2022), 238–41, at 239. The concept of Israel-related antisemitism emerged from academic debates starting in the 1980s that outline an idea of '*Umwegkommunikation*' as a form of antisemitic speech in which the state of Israel is used as a stand-in for Jews; see Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, 'Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und öffentliche Meinung: Theoretische Überlegungen zum Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 38 (1986), 223–46. On the role of Israel in different conceptions of antisemitism, see Klaus Holz and Thomas Haury, *Antisemitismus gegen Israel* (Hamburg, 2021); Peter Ullrich, 'With and Without Jews: Two Families of Concepts of Antisemitism', *Conflict & Communication Online*, 21/1 (2022), at [https://regener-online.de/journalcco/2022_1/pdf/ullrich2022_engl.pdf], accessed 22 June 2022.

[37] See Anon., 'Palestine Between German Memory Politics and (De-)Colonial Thought', *Journal of Genocide Research*, 23/3 (2021), 374–82. This trope has recently triggered symbolic political interventions like the BDS resolution passed by the German Parliament in 2019. For this resolution's impact on political discourse, see Peter Ullrich, 'Über Antisemitismus sprechen: BDS, die IHRA und die Deutungskämpfe um Antisemitismus im Kontext des Nahostkonflikts', in André Ritter (ed.), *Antisemitismus in Europa: Eine Problemanzeige im Kontext des interreligiösen Dialogs* (Münster, 2022), 197–212. See also 'The GG 5.3 Weltoffenheit Initiative', at [https://www.gg53weltoffenheit.org/en/about-us/], accessed 22 June 2022. This is a coalition of German public cultural and research institutions that draws attention to the resolution's far-ranging effects on the German academic and cultural sphere. For the origins of the

of a morally 'improved' German polity, made up of citizens who have 'learned their lesson' and now wish to protect what their ancestors failed to protect, thus necessitates an inscription of Palestinians as perpetrators and of Jews as their victims. For it is Jewish vulnerability *now*—as a concrete reality and a discursive trope—that enables the makers of the 'new Germany' to experience the present as a new era in which *someone else* poses a threat to Jews.[38]

Following up on these brief examples, we close by questioning the politics of victimhood. We observe that the struggles of the present and political subjectivation are tightly bound to the constitution and recognition of past victimhood. Memorialization promises to prevent catastrophes from ever happening again. Yet our impression is that this merging of the past and the present does not necessarily *prevent* unequal relations, but rather impacts and reinforces them. Solidarity *and* competition are shaped by these unequal relations. They operate as monozygotic twins in a field structured by Germany's collective moral conversion from genocidal nationalism to liberal and allegedly difference-embracing democracy. It is precisely our clinging to the promises of the figure of the victim that urges us to analyse this figure and our attachment to it.

On Overlaps, Solidarities, and Competition

Manuela Bauche

Experiences of racism, persecution, exclusion, and genocide at times run counter to historiographic periodization. Those experiences linked to the history of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology, Human Heredity, and Eugenics (KWI-A) provide a good case study for this. The KWI-A opened its doors in September

BDS movement, see Philip Marfleet, 'Palestine: Boycott, Localism, and Global Activism', in David Feldman (ed.), *Boycotts Past and Present: From the American Revolution to the Campaign to Boycott Israel* (Cham, 2019), 261–86.

[38] See Sultan Doughan, 'Desiring Memorials: Jews, Muslims, and the Human of Citizenship', in Ben Gidley and Samuel Sami Everett (eds.), *Jews and Muslims in Europe: Between Discourse and Experience* (Leiden, 2022), 46–70.

1927 in Dahlem in the south-west of Berlin and remained in operation until 1945.[39] Scientists employed there worked on topics that we today understand as belonging to the field of human genetics. KWI-A staff were also involved in policy advice. Scientists provided counsel, first to the Weimar state and then to the National Socialist state, on the introduction of eugenicist policies, such as forced sterilizations. They directly supported the implementation of these sterilizations, for example by contributing to and writing medical reports on those to be sterilized and by training staff for the necessary administration. Additionally, research conducted at the KWI-A helped legitimize racist and ableist National Socialist policies of persecution and extermination.[40]

While reviewing the history of the KWI-A, one encounters numerous phenomena that suggest overlaps between experiences and structures that are often separated by historiography. One example is the practice of collecting human body parts. The KWI-A housed a collection of remains of more than 5,000 individuals from all over the world, assembled mainly during the German colonial era. It had been put together by the anthropologist Felix von Luschan, who died in 1924. When Eugen Fischer founded the KWI-A three years later, he also took over Luschan's chair of anthropology at Berlin University and moved his predecessor's collection to the institute in Dahlem.[41]

[39] For a comprehensive account of the history of the KWI-A, see Hans-Walter Schmuhl, *Grenzüberschreitungen: Das Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Anthropologie, menschliche Erblehre und Eugenik 1927–1945* (Göttingen, 2005).

[40] Sheila Faith Weiss, *Humangenetik und Politik als wechselseitige Ressourcen: Das Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Anthropologie, menschliche Erblehre und Eugenik im 'Dritten Reich'* (Berlin, 2004).

[41] Beate Kunst and Ulrich Creutz, 'Geschichte der Berliner anthropologischen Sammlungen von Rudolf Virchow und Felix von Luschan', in Holger Stoecker, Thomas Schnalke, and Andreas Winkelmann (eds.), *Sammeln, Erforschen, Zurückgeben? Menschliche Gebeine aus der Kolonialzeit in akademischen und musealen Sammlungen* (Berlin, 2013), 84–105. For an attempt to trace the individual life stories behind some of the human remains assembled in the collection, see Holger Stoecker, 'Human Remains als historische Quellen zur namibisch-deutschen Geschichte: Ergebnisse und Erfahrungen aus einem interdisziplinären Forschungsprojekt', in Geert Castryck, Silke Strickrodt, and Katja Werthmann (eds.), *Sources and Methods for African History and Culture: Essays in Honour of Adam Jones* (Leipzig, 2016), 469–91.

This collection has been referred to as proof of the impact of colonial science and racism on research at the KWI-A. For instance, the project 'Manufacturing Race: Contemporary Memories of a Building's Colonial Past', which in 2013 hosted a temporary exhibition at the former main building of the KWI-A in Berlin-Dahlem and later turned their results into a website, addresses 'The Skull Collection' prominently (though not exclusively).[42]

It is right and historically accurate to point to the anthropological collection as an important legacy of colonial knowledge production at the KWI-A. While Germany's colonial past has been ignored for decades in public debates on memory, more public attention has recently been paid to the presence of human remains in German museum and university collections, as well as to anthropological and anthropometric practices associated with the colonial era.[43] Physical anthropology, however, is equally linked to the Nazi era.[44] What is missing is the link between these two historical contexts. At the KWI-A, the practice of collecting human body parts continued well into the Nazi period. In 1940, its director Eugen Fischer worked to establish what he called an *Erbbiologische Centralsammlung* (collection for hereditary biology), which he wanted to include human fetuses and organs from every part of the world, as well as specimens from animals. Fischer asked colleagues all over Germany to contribute to the collection.[45] A few years later, his colleague Wolfgang Abel announced that he planned to put together a *Lehrsammlung*

[42] See e.g. *Manufacturing Race: Contemporary Memories of a Building's Colonial Past*, at [www.manufacturingrace.org], accessed 8 May 2022.

[43] For scholarly work on the history of collecting human remains in the German colonial context, see e.g. Stoecker, Schnalke, and Winkelmann (eds.), *Sammeln, Erforschen, Zurückgeben?*; Margit Berner, Anette Hoffmann, and Britta Lange (eds.), *Sensible Sammlungen: Aus dem anthropologischen Depot* (Hamburg, 2011).

[44] For accounts of collecting and experimenting with human body parts during National Socialism, see e.g. Sabine Hildebrandt, *The Anatomy of Murder: Ethical Transgressions and Anatomical Science during the Third Reich* (New York, 2016); Julien Reitzenstein, *Das SS-Ahnenerbe und die 'Straßburger Schädelsammlung': Fritz Bauers letzter Fall* (Berlin, 2018).

[45] Niels C. Lösch, *Rasse als Konstrukt: Leben und Werk Eugen Fischers* (Frankfurt am Main, 1997), 372–3.

für Rassengeschichte (teaching collection on the history of races). It remains unclear whether this collection ever materialized. If it did, some of the assembled body parts may have come from internees murdered at the Nazi concentration camp of Sachsenhausen, located north of Berlin.[46] The practice of collecting human remains while benefiting from systems of violence thus persisted throughout the entire existence of the institute. The history of the KWI-A is just one of many examples that suggest that it would be worthwhile to rethink and expand historiographical traditions.

Another example of the overlaps between historical periods is the research conducted at KWI-A under the (racist) label of *Bastardstudien*, or 'bastard studies'. It involved research on individuals whom scientists understood to be the result of 'miscegenation'. Director Fischer had built his reputation on a study conducted in 1908 in German South West Africa (today's Namibia) that entailed measuring, questioning, and observing individuals identifying as Rehoboth Basters.[47] Basters saw themselves as descendants of both European settlers and the Khoikhoi population. For Fischer, the Basters were the perfect subject for studying how physical traits are passed on in what he understood as a process of racial mixing. Fischer's research interest must also be understood against the backdrop of colonial policy debates on what (legal) status should be assigned to descendants of colonizers and the colonized.[48]

After founding the KWI-A in Berlin, Fischer encouraged younger scientists to conduct research with a similar approach. Among others, in the 1930s Tao Yun-Kuei, Johannes Schäuble, and Rita Hauschild researched individuals of European and Chinese, European and indigenous American, and Asian and African parentage. KWI-A staff were also commissioned by the Reich's Ministry of the Interior to conduct preparatory investigations for the sterilization of an estimated 400 to 800 children born to German women and soldiers of African and Asian descent serving in the French and US armies, which had

[46] Schmuhl, *Grenzüberschreitungen*, 463–4.

[47] Eugen Fischer, *Die Rehobother Bastards und das Bastardisierungsproblem beim Menschen: Anthropologische und ethnographische Studien am Rehobother Bastardvolk in Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika* (Jena, 1913).

[48] Lösch, *Rasse als Konstrukt*, 60–75.

been stationed in the Rhine regions from the end of the First World War to the mid 1920s.[49]

Research on what was understood as racial mixing provided an important pillar of the KWI-A's research profile until the end of the 1930s. When the Nazis passed the Nuremberg Laws in 1935, scientists' interest in the figuration of racial mixing expanded and evolved to include relationships between those identified as Jewish and as *deutschstämmig* (of German descent). It is well known that Fischer's 1913 book on the Rehoboth Basters was referred to by Nazi lawmakers pondering what degrees of 'mixing' to permit or ban.[50] Interestingly, at the end of the 1930s, Fischer served as an examiner for a dissertation on 'jüdisch-deutsche Blutsmischung' ('Jewish and German blood-mixing'), which advocated extending the regulations adopted in 1935.[51] It is also noteworthy that, with few exceptions,[52] historical research on the idea of 'racial mixing' is strongly divided between work on miscegenation in the colonial context[53] and research on so-called *Mischehen* (mixed marriages) during National Socialism.[54]

[49] Tina Campt, *Other Germans: Black Germans and the Politics of Race, Gender, and Memory in the Third Reich* (Ann Arbor, 2004); Reiner Pommerin, '*Sterilisierung der Rheinlandbastarde': Das Schicksal einer farbigen deutschen Minderheit 1918–1937* (Düsseldorf, 1979).

[50] Cornelia Essner, *Die 'Nürnberger Gesetze' oder die Verwaltung des Rassenwahns 1933–1945* (Paderborn, 2002), 102, 419–52.

[51] Alexander Paul, *Jüdisch-deutsche Blutsmischung: Eine sozial-biologische Untersuchung* (Berlin, 1940).

[52] Annegret Ehmann, 'From Colonial Racism to Nazi Population Policy: The Role of the So-Called *Mischlinge*', in Michael Berenbaum and Abraham J. Peck (eds.), *The Holocaust and History: The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed, and the Reexamined* (Bloomington, Ind., 1998), 115–33; Doris Liebscher, *Rasse im Recht – Recht gegen Rassismus: Genealogie einer ambivalenten rechtlichen Kategorie* (Berlin, 2021), 150–205; Birthe Kundrus, 'Von Windhoek nach Nürnberg? Koloniale "Mischehenverbote" und die nationalsozialistische Rassengesetzgebung', in ead. (ed.), *Phantasiereiche: Zur Kulturgeschichte des deutschen Kolonialismus* (Frankfurt am Main, 2003), 110–31.

[53] See e.g. Fatima El-Tayeb, *Schwarze Deutsche: Der Diskurs um 'Rasse' und nationale Identität 1890–1933* (Frankfurt am Main, 2001), 92–130; Birthe Kundrus, *Moderne Imperialisten: Das Kaiserreich im Spiegel seiner Kolonien* (Cologne, 2003), 234–79.

[54] See e.g. Beate Meyer, *'Jüdische Mischlinge': Rassenpolitik und Verfolgungserfahrung, 1933–1945* (Hamburg, 1999); Maximilian Strnad, *Privileg Mischehe?*

Yet the example of the KWI-A shows that this idea was constantly reworked and deployed throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

There is certainly no easy answer to the question of why research on such closely related topics has been divided into different academic fields. While the study of colonial history—at least in West Germany—was to a considerable degree born out of area studies and strongly influenced by thinkers in postcolonial studies, and thus only gained importance from the late 1990s, historians began working as early as the 1950s on explanations for the murderous regime whose dismantling they had just witnessed.[55] We must assume that the German state's memory politics, which after 1989–90 elevated remembrance of the Shoah to *Staatsraison* (national interest) and integrated the hitherto fragile network of memorial sites run by various actors into a state-sponsored structure,[56] did not encourage the two fields to move closer together.

Memory, Michael Rothberg argues in his book *Multidirectional Memory*, is fundamentally built on borrowing and comparing. He makes the point that memory of one specific history of suffering does not necessarily conceal other such histories. Reflecting on the Freudian concept of *Deckerinnerung* (screen memory), Rothberg suggests that memories serve as 'screens' in more than one sense of the word: even as they allow us to remember a specific event while forgetting and covering up others, they are also sites of projection to which other people can refer. Instead of involving conflict between memories, screen memory, in Rothberg's words, 'more closely resembles a remapping of memory on which links between memories are formed and then redistributed'.[57] Others have argued that the term

Handlungsräume 'jüdisch versippter' Familien 1933–1949 (Göttingen, 2021).

[55] Michael Wildt, 'Die Epochenzäsur 1989/90 und die NS-Historiographie', *Zeithistorische Forschungen*, 5 (2008), 349–71.

[56] Cornelia Siebeck, '50 Jahre "arbeitende" NS-Gedenkstätten in der Bundesrepublik: Vom gegenkulturellen Projekt zur staatlichen Gedenkstättenkonzeption—und wie weiter?', in Elke Gryglewski, Verena Haug, Gottfried Köbler, et al. (eds.), *Gedenkstättenpädagogik: Kontext, Theorie und Praxis der Bildungsarbeit zu NS-Verbrechen* (Berlin, 2015), 19–43.

[57] Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford, Calif., 2009), 14.

Deckerinnerung is better applied to the German context of memory politics in its literal sense of 'covering memory'. While Iman Attia acknowledges that memories of different events are interwoven in the German context too, she uses the notion of *Deckerinnerung* primarily to describe the ways in which this produces hierarchies.[58] According to her understanding of *Deckerinnerung*, memories can also generate blind spots.

In the following, I would like to share my reading of how the former site of the KWI-A in Berlin-Dahlem has been perceived in the media, and how this perception contrasts with the complexity of the institute's history. In my view, the media response seems to imply blind spots and to be structured along the lines of what Attia understands by *Deckerinnerung*.

In January 2015, when it was revealed that fragmented bones of animal and human origin had been found during construction work at the former KWI-A premises on the campus of the Free University of Berlin (FU), the city's press reacted with outrage. Journalists were appalled that the remains were cremated before their historical context could be investigated, so that the opportunity had been missed to identify the people whose remains had been unearthed. Press reports unanimously agreed that the find was highly sensitive, explaining: 'This was where Josef Mengele had sent skeletal parts in 1943 and 1944 that came from people whom he had had deliberately murdered in Auschwitz for hereditary biological research purposes.'[59] As a result, 'from the beginning there was suspicion that these could be bone fragments of Nazi victims'[60] and 'it [was]

[58] Iman Attia, 'Geteilte Erinnerungen: Global- und beziehungsgeschichtliche Perspektiven auf Erinnerungspolitik', in ead., Swantje Köbsell, and Nivedita Prasad (eds.), *Dominanzkultur reloaded: Neue Texte zu gesellschaftlichen Machtverhältnissen und ihren Wechselwirkungen* (Bielefeld, 2015), 75–88, at 81–2.

[59] Götz Aly, 'Bitte keine Ausflüchte!', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 19 Feb. 2015 at [https://www.tagesspiegel.de/wissen/umgang-mit-ueberresten-von-moeglichen-ns-opfern-bitte-keine-ausfluechte/11396552.html], accessed 20 May 2022. All translations my own, unless stated otherwise.

[60] Anja Kühne, 'Neue Widersprüche bei Skelettresten auf dem FU-Campus', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 6 Feb. 2015, at [https://www.tagesspiegel.de/wissen/heikler-fund-neue-widersprueche-bei-skelettresten-auf-dem-fu-campus/11333914.html], accessed 22 May 2022.

quite possible that the skeletons belong[ed] to victims of euthanasia crimes under National Socialism.'[61]

The outrage was justified. At the same time, it is noteworthy that it was based on a selective perception of the KWI-A's history. While the 'Connection to Auschwitz'[62] was cited repeatedly, KWI-A research practices that suggested links to the colonized world (for example) went largely unmentioned—even though both Nazi and colonial practices of examining human body parts provide potential explanations for the find.

Indeed, more than one historical context imposes itself when it comes to explaining the presence of human remains on the KWI-A site. One is the perfidious working relationship that existed between the institute and the concentration and extermination camp in Auschwitz-Birkenau. At Auschwitz, Josef Mengele became camp doctor (*Lagerarzt*) in May 1943 and ran his own research laboratory. A medical doctor with two doctorates, he may have asked to be transferred to the camp, anticipating that this would offer him the opportunity to conduct unrestricted research and experiments on inmates. Mengele maintained connections with numerous research institutes, and it is likely that many of the experiments he carried out on internees in the camp were commissioned by them. One was the KWI-A, which was headed at the time by Mengele's scientific mentor Otmar von Verschuer.[63]

There is evidence that Mengele had medical data on interned twins and blood samples from camp inmates sent to the institute in Dahlem.

[61] Ead., 'Einfach eingeäschert', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 26 Jan. 2015, at [https://www.tagesspiegel.de/wissen/umgang-mit-den-skelettfunden-in-dahlem-einfach-eingeaeschert/11278454.html], accessed 20 May 2022; see also Reinhard Bernbeck, 'Die Opfer nicht erneut zu Objekten machen', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 18 Feb. 2015, at [https://www.tagesspiegel.de/wissen/position-die-opfer-nicht-erneut-zu-objekten-machen/11385976.html], accessed 20 May 2022; 'Erneut menschliche Knochen entdeckt', *taz*, 1 Sept. 2016, at [https://taz.de/Auf-Gelaende-der-Freien-Universitaet-Berlin/!5336790/], accessed 20 May 2022.

[62] This is the (translated) title of Carola Sachse (ed.), *Die Verbindung nach Auschwitz: Biowissenschaften und Menschenversuche an Kaiser-Wilhelm-Instituten. Dokumentation eines Symposiums* (Göttingen, 2003).

[63] Benoit Massin, 'Mengele, die Zwillingsforschung und die "Auschwitz-Dahlem Connection"', in Sachse (ed.), *Die Verbindung nach Auschwitz*, 201–54.

Most disturbingly, he did not hesitate to order that the eyes of at least eight people who died in the camp should be removed and sent to the KWI-A in 1943 and 1944. The victims of this research were members of the German Sinti Mechau family. They had been examined before their deportation and photographed by the biologist Karin Magnussen, to whom their body parts were delivered. In Auschwitz, the Mechaus were specially selected by Mengele for Magnussen's research and probably also murdered for this purpose.[64]

The fate of the Mechau family is the consequence of a system of radical and systematic dehumanization and violence that allowed people to be racialized, deported, selected, abused, and murdered for research. Journalists in 2015 therefore very rightly referred to this context. There is no doubt that the FU should have investigated whether the human remains found on the former KWI-A site were evidence of crimes committed in the context of Nazi persecution and extermination policies.

A second context that must be considered when trying to account for these remains is the history of the anthropological and anatomical collections that were stored at the KWI-A, which I mentioned earlier. The appropriation of human remains for the anthropological collection also relied to a large extent on violence—in some cases, deadly violence.[65] The results of subsequent archaeological investigations conducted on the site suggest that the finds are linked to the anthropological collections of the KWI-A, but that an additional connection to National Socialist camps cannot be ruled out.[66]

Can the fact that public criticism of the FU's actions focused solely on practices connected to the National Socialist state be read as a

[64] Hans Hesse, *Augen aus Auschwitz: Ein Lehrstück über nationalsozialistischen Rassenwahn und medizinische Forschung. Der Fall Dr. Karin Magnussen* (Essen, 2001); Günter Heuzeroth and Karl-Heinz Martinß, 'Vom Ziegelhof nach Auschwitz: Verfolgung und Vernichtung der Sinti und Roma', in Günter Heuzeroth (ed.), *Unter der Gewaltherrschaft des Nationalsozialismus 1933–1945: Dargestellt an den Ereignissen im Oldenburger Land*, vol. ii: *Verfolgung aus rassischen Gründen* (Osnabrück, 1985), 227–352.

[65] Stoecker, 'Human Remains als historische Quellen'.

[66] Christina Boldt, 'Kein Schlussstrich', *campus.leben*, 26 Feb. 2021, at [https://www.fu-berlin.de/campusleben/campus/2021/210226-abschluss-knochenfunde/index.html], accessed 20 May 2022.

dynamic of *Deckerinnerung* in the negative sense of the word? If so, who produces *Deckerinnerung*, and why? While the state is often highlighted as playing a central role in the recognition of past injustice and in allocating resources for acts of remembrance,[67] the press coverage suggests a more complicated landscape in which the idea of *Staatsraison* extends beyond state actors.

There were a few noteworthy exceptions from the selective focus in the press reports. The Jewish weekly *Jüdische Allgemeine*, for instance, stressed the sensitivity of the finds by explaining that this was where 'Josef Mengele [delivered] specimens from Auschwitz' and where 'medical collections from all over the world, from colonial times and from times of the Nazi dictatorship, were stored'.[68] Is it a coincidence that a newspaper connected to one of the histories of persecution relevant to the KWI-A was one of the few to take a broader view of the topic? Possibly. But we can also read this exception as suggesting that—contrary to what the terms imply—*Deckerinnerung* and *Opferkonkurrenz* are not primarily produced by those fighting for recognition of their histories of exclusion and dehumanization.

Those engaged in that fight have a long history of collaboration. When the Nazi concentration camps were shut down and their inmates freed in the spring of 1945, former internees set up committees which worked to ensure that the experience of the camps and of Nazi terror would not be forgotten. Many of these committees built on the structures of clandestine inmate organizations and brought together people from a variety of countries who had been persecuted for their opposition to the Nazi regime and/or as Jews.[69] In the 1970s, Jewish organizations and individuals openly and explicitly supported German Sinti claims for recognition as victims of the Nazi policy of extermination, as well as the founding of the Central

[67] See e.g. Y. Michal Bodemann, *Gedächtnistheater: Die jüdische Gemeinschaft und ihre deutsche Erfindung* (Hamburg, 1996), 80–128.

[68] Eberhard Spohd, 'Das Rätsel von Dahlem', *Juedische Allgemeine*, 2 Mar. 2015, at [https://www.juedische-allgemeine.de/kultur/das-raetsel-von-dahlem/], accessed 20 May 2022.

[69] Katharina Stengel, 'Hermann Langbein und die politischen Häftlinge im Kampf um die Erinnerung an Auschwitz', in Barbara Distel, Wolfgang Benz, and Uwe Bader (eds.), *Die Zukunft der Erinnerung* (Dachau, 2009), 96–118.

Council of German Sinti and Roma.[70] In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Women of Colour, migrant women, and White Jewish women organized themselves separately from the predominantly White German women's movement as they felt the need to create a space in which they would not be reduced to their position as racialized individuals.[71] And today, those pushing for German colonialism to be remembered more widely engage in open exchange with prominent figures from Jewish and Sinti communities in order to learn from their struggles for remembrance.[72]

These histories are not well known. In view of a powerful discourse suggesting that plurality in the realm of memory culture can only lead to conflicting claims over memory and to *Opferkonkurrenz*, it is important to remember that there is a different story—though not a straightforward one. Some of these moments of collaboration reveal the enduring effects of the structures of persecution themselves. The camp committees, for instance, were dominated by those who had been persecuted on the grounds of their political opposition to the Nazi regime; yet these *politische Häftlinge* (political prisoners) had been granted certain privileges in the camp system compared to those persecuted and detained as Jews, Sinti, and Black people, or on the basis of other racialized categories. When the International Auschwitz Committee published an edited volume of testimonies by former camp inmates in 1962, it featured contributions by Jewish authors and former political prisoners, two contributions from former prisoners of war, and only one by a Sintezza.[73] Other experiences of persecution, including by those who had been persecuted as alleged 'criminals'

[70] Jasmin Dean, 'Zwischen Konkurrenz und Kooperation: Allianzen zwischen Jüdinnen*Juden sowie Rom*nja und Sint*ezze', *Jalta: Positionen zur jüdischen Gegenwart*, 3 (2018), 95–103.

[71] Jihan Jasmin Dean, 'Verzwickte Verbindungen: Eine postkoloniale Perspektive auf Bündnispolitik nach 1989 und heute', in Meron Mendel and Astrid Messerschmidt (eds.), *Fragiler Konsens: Antisemitismuskritische Bildung in der Migrationsgesellschaft* (Frankfurt am Main, 2017), 101–29.

[72] 'Dekoloniale [Re]visions 1/21', workshop organized by Dekoloniale: Memory Culture in the City, Berlin, 25 Feb. 2021, at [https://www.dekoloniale.de/en/program/events/revisionen-1#], accessed 8 May 2022.

[73] H. G. Adler, Ella Lingens-Reiner, and Hermann Langbein (eds.), *Auschwitz: Zeugnisse und Berichte* (Frankfurt am Main, 1962).

or 'asocials', queers, clerics, Black people, or Asians, were completely absent.[74] Furthermore, the collaboration between Jewish and Sinti organizations after 1945 mainly entailed Jews supporting Sinti—not the other way round.[75] The varying degrees of (non-)recognition of different histories of persecution and genocide determined who was able to raise their voice in support of whose struggle. Finally, when the feminist alliances of the 1980s and 1990s eventually disintegrated, some of those involved later argued that one of the movement's weak points had been its failure to create space for discussion of how privileges based on race, language, and citizenship had affected the alliance, or how antisemitic and anti-Muslim discourses around the war in Iraq had impacted on Jewish, Muslim, Black, and migrant feminists in different ways and driven them apart.[76]

The history of collaborations between 'communities' can be read as supporting a sceptical perspective on multidirectionality—one that looks anxiously at the divisive effects of state policies of (non-) recognition. The dynamics of the 2015 press coverage of the human remains found at the FU also stand for the power of the discourse of *Staatsraison* to conceal alternate histories, and to offer a straightforward path through the jumble of multiple memories. Finally, the division of historical research on histories of exclusion and violence in the first half of the twentieth century is a testament to the stabilizing effects of memory politics.

Behind all this, however, there is Michael Rothberg's optimistic view of the multidirectionality of memory and the potential for

[74] Katharina Stengel, 'Auschwitz zwischen Ost und West: Das Internationale Auschwitz-Komitee und die Entstehungsgeschichte des Sammelbandes *Auschwitz: Zeugnisse und Berichte*', in ead. and Konitzer (eds.), *Opfer als Akteure*, 174–96.

[75] This is well expressed in the speeches by prominent Jewish supporters of Sinti claims in Gesellschaft für Bedrohte Völker and Verband Deutscher Sinti (eds.), *Sinti und Roma im ehemaligen KZ Bergen-Belsen am 27. Oktober 1979: Erste deutsche und europäische Gedenkkundgebung 'In Auschwitz vergast, bis heute verfolgt'* (Göttingen, 1980).

[76] Maria Baader, 'Zum Abschied: Über den Versuch, als jüdische Feministin in der Berliner Frauenszene einen Platz zu finden', in Ika Hügel, Chris Lange, May Ayim, et al. (eds.), *Entfernte Verbindungen: Rassismus, Antisemitismus, Klassenunterdrückung* (Berlin, 1993), 82–94.

solidarities. The example of the history of the KWI-A and the handling of its legacy illustrates that historical evidence urges us to connect histories that have previously been thought of as separate and to broaden our perspective on the diversity of the victim groups affected. And the long history of collaborations reminds us that a way out of the competition might be to question the referee.

Solidarity Means Shifting Categories: Queer Victimhood and the National Socialist Past

Sébastien Tremblay

Wednesday 14 July 2021 was an emotional moment for many. Like other colleagues and activists, I had followed the discussions surrounding the commemoration of lesbian victims in the former concentration camp of Ravensbrück. Waking up on that day in mid July to the news that this would become reality filled me with joy. Indeed, after years of back-and-forth and questionable objections, a so-called commemorative sphere (*Gedenkkugel*) was finally unveiled on the seventy-seventh anniversary of the camp's liberation.[77] This success is not only due to a sudden public interest in structures of suffering and the queer history of National Socialism, but also a direct result of the indefatigable labour of historians and memory activists.[78]

[77] 'Gedenkzeichen für die lesbischen Häftlinge im Frauen-Konzentrationslager Ravensbrück', *Stiftung Brandenburgische Gedenkstätten: Mahn- und Gedenkstätte Ravensbrück. Meldungen*, 14 July 2021, at [https://www.ravensbrueck-sbg.de/meldungen/gedenkzeichen-fuer-die-lesbischen-haeftlinge-im-frauen-konzentrationslager-ravensbrueck/], accessed 20 Jan. 2022. See also Anna Hájková, 'Langer Kampf um Anerkennung: Das verspätete Gedenken an lesbische NS-Opfer', *Der Tagesspiegel*, 30 April 2022, at [https://www.tagesspiegel.de/gesellschaft/queerspiegel/langer-kampf-um-anerkennung-das-verspaetete-gedenken-an-lesbische-ns-opfer/28291076.html], accessed 22 June 2022. As of May 2022, the monument is still a temporary one. The original sphere was accidentally damaged, and the real monument will be unveiled later this year. A provisional plaque has been placed next to it.

[78] 'Aktivistinnen des lesbischen Gedenkens Anna Hájková und Birgit Bosold im Gespräch mit Ulrike Janz, Irmes Schwager und Lisa Steiniger', *Invertito:*

This episode further highlights various aspects of post-war history still lingering in Germany post-unification. As I will make clear in this contribution, the story of the *Gedenkkugel* is a metonymy for the entanglements of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* and historical scholarship in Germany. It is also a great starting point for a critique of historiographical frameworks that have gone largely unchallenged by a majority of colleagues. My argument in this piece is twofold. First, I situate *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in recent German memory culture and use queer history as a prism to underline moments of solidarity and the potential for reframing categories of victimhood—a historiographical necessity. Second, I disentangle queer history from various key turning points of German contemporary history, highlighting the importance of analysing the German *Staatsraison* intersectionally.

Memory studies in Germany, I argue, need to be recalibrated. The importance of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* has often been constitutive for social affinities, as cultural trauma and suffering during the National Socialist regime were frequently at the core of social movements, collective memories, and political identities in the post-war era. Structural debates over victimhood have thus clashed with narratives classifying victims according to perpetrator categories. In the case of queer history, gay activists in and outside academia who fought for years for the German state to recognize the atrocities committed towards non-heteronormative men during the National Socialist dictatorship were ironically reluctant to open up categories of victimhood. Faced with a reconceptualization of National Socialist queerphobia—that is, the inclusion of other queer experiences of the regime and a structural understanding of oppression—some gay historians have rejected outright the idea that women were persecuted for being lesbians.[79] Their opposition can be understood as an emotional reaction: the fear of losing a coveted status for their social group, and of possibly voiding their own political legitimacy by broadening the idea of victimhood. My quarrel here is not per se with the historiographical debates about structures during the dictatorship, but with the lack of self-reflection regarding the

[79] E.g. Alexander Zinn, *'Aus dem Volkskörper entfernt'? Homosexuelle Männer im Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt am Main, 2018).

constitutive aspect of victimhood. Beyond legal and perpetrator categories, scholars have pointed out patriarchal and racial aspects of the regime that were not always anchored in previously investigated frameworks.[80] This enlargement and democratization of victimhood would not only offer a possible way out of the competition between victim groups (*Opferkonkurrenz*), but also enrich our discussion in the present. I will now map the constitution of the German queer subject in the second part of the twentieth century and the role memory played in this endeavour.

Following the sharpening of Paragraph 175—the part of the German penal code criminalizing relationships, sex, and desire between men regardless of whether these aspects of their lives were consensual—by the National Socialist regime in 1935, legal persecution became even more central to the suffering of gay men, as thousands were murdered in concentration camps. The statute was only fully repealed in 1994 following multiple reforms.[81] The first of these—the repeal of aspects of the law tainted by the Nazis—was only ratified in 1969. In the 1970s, in the early years of gay and lesbian liberation, queer activists emphasized these legal continuities. They even reclaimed the pink triangle—the symbol that non-heteronormative men deported to the camps were forced to wear by the regime—as a badge for their movement. Beyond legal continuities, many activists of the 1970s felt a direct connection with these victims and the line was blurred between a fight for recognition and post-memory—a sort of second-generation trauma transmitted in this case outside family structures.[82]

[80] Laurie Marhoefer, 'Lesbianism, Transvestitism, and the Nazi State: A Microhistory of a Gestapo Investigation, 1939–1943', *American Historical Review*, 121/4 (2016), 1167–95.

[81] For an example of the criminalization narrative, see Robert Beachy, *Gay Berlin: Birthplace of a Modern Identity* (New York, 2014). On Paragraph 175, see Stefan Micheler, Jürgen K. Müller, and Andreas Pretzel, 'Die Verfolgung Homosexueller Männer in der NS-Zeit und ihre Kontinuität: Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede in den Großstädten Berlin, Hamburg und Köln', *Invertito: Jahrbuch für die Geschichte der Homosexualitäten*, 4 (2002), 8–51.

[82] Sébastien Tremblay, '"Ich konnte ihren Schmerz körperlich spüren": Die Historisierung der NS-Verfolgung und die Wiederaneignung des Rosa Winkels in der westdeutschen Schwulenbewegung der 1970er Jahre', *Invertito: Jahrbuch für die Geschichte der Homosexualitäten*, 21 (2019), 179–202.

This discovery of Nazi-era persecution in the 1970s is peculiar. It allowed gay activists to find historical legitimacy, fighting alongside and for victims of persecution while also identifying with the survivors. An appeal to the cultural trauma of the so-called 'Third Reich' allowed them to blur the line between the fight for the victims disregarded during the post-war era—that is, in the past—and the consolidation of a collective in the present. This was not done without overcoming hurdles.[83] Despite being debunked by the tireless efforts of early gay scholarship in the mid 1970s, a certain myth prevailed among non-academics that more queer men had been killed in concentration camps than non-queer Jewish men.[84] The stories of Jewish queer victims were rarely in the foreground of such narratives.[85] The idea of a hidden queer genocide, eventually described as a 'Homocaust' in the 1980s, was paired with a certain antisemitic resentment.[86] Ironically, because of the central role played by memory in shaping the intellectual and political life of the Federal Republic, this genuine longing for the recognition of queer suffering eventually evolved into *Opferkonkurrenz*—the idea that some persecuted groups, here non-queer Jews, had their victimhood recognized and commemorated more rapidly than others. This is far from the truth. Historians have proven numerous times that the antisemitic aspects of the National Socialist atrocities and the Shoah were not at the centre of early West German memory culture. Independently of this misconception and relativization of post-war antisemitism, the recognition of gay men as

[83] Sébastien Tremblay, 'Apocryphal Queers and Gay Orthodoxy', *New Fascism Syllabus: Blog*, 11 June 2021, at [http://newfascismsyllabus.com/opinions/apocryphal-queers-and-gay-orthodoxy/], accessed 9 May 2022.

[84] James D. Steakley, 'Selbstkritische Bemerkungen zur Mythologisierung der Homosexuellenverfolgung im Dritten Reich', in Burkhard Jellonek and Rüdiger Lautmann (eds.), *Nationalsozialistischer Terror gegen Homosexuelle: Verdrängt und ungesühnt* (Padeborn, 2002), 55–68. For early efforts to set the record straight, see Rüdiger Lautmann, Winfried Grikschat, and Egbert Schmidt, 'Der rosa Winkel in den nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslagern', in Rüdiger Lautmann (ed.), *Seminar: Gesellschaft und Homosexualität* (Frankfurt am Main, 1978), 325–65.

[85] Anna Hájková, *Menschen ohne Geschichte sind Staub: Homophobie und Holocaust* (Göttingen, 2021).

[86] Tremblay, 'Apocryphal Queers'.

victims of fascism was a long time coming. Queerness, in the form of male homosexuality, was only linked to *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in 1985 when President Richard von Weizsäcker mentioned 'homosexual men' in his speech commemorating 8 May 1945.[87] It took until 2002 to redeem the victims by amending the *Gesetz zur Aufhebung nationalsozialistischer Unrechtsurteile in der Strafrechtspflege*, an act repealing unlawful National Socialist criminal convictions.

Gay men did not walk this long path to recognition alone. Other so-called forgotten victims of National Socialism fought for recognition during these years, and moments of solidarity between interest groups created a movement to expand the categories of victimhood in the second part of the twentieth century. We can consider these struggles as a second wave of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* that paralleled the establishment of federal memorials in Berlin, the newly chosen German capital, at the start of the 2000s, when the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe near the Tiergarten propelled the construction of other monuments. At the time, gay organizations petitioning for a monument to murdered homosexual men allied themselves along the way with Roma activists demanding an official commemorative space for the 500,000 victims of the Porajmos. The Roma monument was inaugurated years after the one for homosexual men. The Memorial to the Persecuted Homosexuals under National Socialism became the centre of a long quarrel between gay and lesbian associations.[88]

Some historians have also meticulously documented lesbian lives in the camps. However, because they were not deported simply for being lesbians, some colleagues, such as Alexander Zinn, still dismiss their claim to victimhood. These historians do not deny that lesbians were present in the camps, but they argue that they were not persecuted because of their sexuality and desires.[89] Debates surrounding

[87] Von Weizsäcker, Bundestag speech, 8 May 1985.

[88] Jennifer Evans, 'Harmless Kisses and Infinite Loops: Making Space for Queer Place in Twenty-First Century Berlin', in ead. and Matt Cook (eds.), *Queer Cities, Queer Cultures: Europe since 1945* (London, 2014), 75–94.

[89] Alexander Zinn, 'Abschied von der Opferperspektive: Plädoyer für einen Paradigmenwechsel in der schwulen und lesbischen Geschichtsschreibung', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 67/11 (2019), 934–55. For a counter-argument, see Samuel Clowes Huneke, 'Heterogeneous Persecution: Lesbianism and the Nazi State', *Central European History*, 54/2 (2021), 297–32.

the *Gedenkkugel* mentioned above have crystallized these tensions. According to Insa Eschebach, these clashes are representative of the remodelling and democratization of historical analysis during the last decades.[90] Previously, historical research had focused on categories of victimhood that echoed perpetrator classifications which were anchored in unjust National Socialist laws (*NS-Unrecht*). Lesbian memory activists (and their supporters) have also emphasized that they never intended to create new categories of victimhood, but sought to underscore structures of suffering beyond legal persecution.[91] This structural analysis of suffering beyond the categories created by the perpetrators is part of a new historical framework in which coming to terms with the National Socialist past includes understanding the patriarchal and racial aspects of the regime, which were not always directly anchored in the law. In the end, gay and lesbian associations both supported the *Gedenkkugel* project and 14 July 2021 was a turning point for this new wave and for queer solidarity. The culmination of a conversation spanning more than a decade, this new solidarity between queer victims of National Socialism represents a third wave of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, offering new perspectives beyond fixed categories and *Opferkonkurrenz*.

Historiographically speaking, debates between pioneers of gay and lesbian history and a younger generation of queer historians illustrate the tensions at the core of this third wave of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*. Scholars working on non-heteronormative German history have slowly transitioned from writing a typical gay and lesbian history to a queerer approach.[92] Following this turn, identities have been opened up and discussed, allowing new investigations of queerness in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, especially from trans* perspectives.[93] Queer historians investigate sexualities beyond

[90] Insa Eschebach, 'Queere Gedächtnisräume: Zivilgesellschaftliches Engagement und Erinnerungskonkurrenzen im Kontext der Gedenkstätte Ravensbrück', *Invertito: Jahrbuch für die Geschichte der Homosexualitäten*, 21 (2019), 49–73.

[91] 'Aktivistinnen des lesbischen Gedenkens', 94.

[92] See Jennifer Evans, 'Introduction: Why Queer German History?', *German History*, 34/3 (2016), 371–84.

[93] E.g. Katie Sutton, 'Sexology's Photographic Turn: Visualizing Trans Identity in Interwar Germany', *Journal of the History of Sexuality*, 27/3 (2018), 442–79.

historical actors' categories (homosexual, urning, gay, lesbian, and so on) and try to chart queerness conceptually—that is, they use queerness as a fluid category of analysis and not as a term to be found in historical sources.[94] This broadening and deconstruction of categories has clashed with a particular narrative centred on the criminalization of gay men. Proponents of this way of interpreting the past argue that men engaging in same-sex relationships banded together over the last two centuries, and that a non-heteronormative male social group emerged from the various struggles to fight criminalization. As the penal code did not criminalize women having sex with women, gays and lesbians were often kept separate when discussing repression, pushing non-legal persecution into the background.

As I have argued, a brief look at memorial debates and queer German history enables us to trace the genealogy of a second and third wave of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*. These two waves were marked by debates among historians and social groups, were discussed in the press, and shaped political and memorial categories in the past and in the present. Since then, debates about the Holocaust and other atrocities of the 'Third Reich' have infused most of the public, political, and cultural discussions in post-unification Germany. At first glance, historians and anti-fascists like me can rejoice at the prospect of remaining relevant and at the apparent seriousness with which the German state recognizes the crimes of the past, as well as the structural remnants of the antisemitic, racist, and hetero-patriarchal ideology of the National Socialist regime.

However, this *Staatsraison* has unfortunately also opened the door to the instrumentalization of these important fragments of memory. Looking at the last few decades of queer politics, we can see how the need to flee state persecution has evolved into a search for new forms of legal protection from the state. This paradigm shift is also entangled with the horrors of National Socialism. The official plaque next to the Memorial to the Persecuted Homosexuals under National Socialism reminds visitors that the German state has a 'responsibility to actively oppose the violation of gay men's and lesbians' human rights. In many parts of the world, people continue to be persecuted for their sexuality,

[94] Evans, 'Introduction'.

homosexual love remains illegal and a kiss can be dangerous.' Presented as something connected to the German past but now mainly existing outside Germany's borders, this call-to-arms against queerphobia publicly links *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* with homonationalist assemblages. As a result, racialized male migrants, especially Muslims, are now portrayed as the homophobic 'other' and perceived as enacting a violent form of masculinity, having not experienced the supposedly enlightening effects of the traumatizing German past. In other words, moments of solidarity, fragments of memory, and the inclusion of queer suffering in *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* have had indirect consequences for racialized people in the present and led to contemporary exclusions.

What is more, the crimes committed by the National Socialist regime have significance beyond the borders of the Federal Republic. As the ultimate evil, the genocide of European Jewry and other Nazi atrocities have been universalized and sometimes conflated.[95] This has obviously led to competing debates regarding genocides and memory, but it has also given the German state a particular position, having led German politicians to see these memorial imperatives as their responsibility to history: a mandate to learn from the past and to fight ethnic nationalism and antisemitism across the world. *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* therefore became more than a *Staatsraison*; it became constitutive for citizenship, for a sense of belonging. In a way, Germany is presented as both the singular perpetrator of the twentieth century and as the herald of particular aspects of liberalism: diversity and tolerance. Leaving aside the concrete political failures of the sixteen years of the Merkel era regarding anti-discrimination policies and the rise of the far right, this narrative understands the German state as the guarantor that something like this will never happen again.

Vergangenheitsbewältigung needs to be reconceptualized beyond these patriotic notions of responsibility. First, many people living in Germany nowadays are not connected to German fascism. Second, such a perspective already renders invisible and erases millions of people who are themselves descendants of victims, particularly Jews. In other words, anti-fascist political memory needs to avoid the creation of memorial 'guest statuses' for millions of people who are

[95] See Levy and Sznaider, *The Holocaust and Memory*.

descendants not of the perpetrators, but of survivors. Memory politics needs to go beyond the feelings of the *Dominanzgesellschaft*.[96]

In the queer community, this reshaping of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* would entail two things. The first of these, following the example set by the *Gedenkkugel*, is the deconstruction of fixed categories of analysis in order to understand all the structural aspects of the National Socialist terror. This would also lead to solidarity beyond competing memories and *Opferkonkurrenz*, where crimes would be analysed in their differences—the Holocaust being different from the Nazi persecution of homosexualities, for example. Second, coming to terms with the past should not be a unidirectional endeavour to learn from it, but also an examination of how all facets of the present, including all members of society, can offer ways to break fixed narratives about the past, linking racism, antisemitism, and the present zeitgeist in a *longue durée* instead of ritually chanting 'never again'.

Responses

Manuela Bauche

The issue of victimhood—of its construction and of claims for recognition of victimhood—figure prominently in all our contributions. I would like to follow up especially on two themes.

I am particularly intrigued by Hannah Tzuberi and Patricia Piberger's retracing of how innocent and passive victimhood was inscribed onto the figure of the Jew in Germany. Hannah and Patricia argue that 'when innocence and passivity became central characteristics attached to victimhood, the racially persecuted began to "outcompete" the politically persecuted'. And that '[i]n a newly emergent "ranking of suffering", Jews, as non-partisan and apolitical

[96] The psychologist and educator Birgit Rommelspacher uses the term 'dominance society' to describe a hierarchizing social order running along many different lines of difference (class, gender, race, etc.), in which the dominant part of society remains unaware of its own hierarchies and convinced of its own equality. See Birgit Rommelspacher, *Dominanzkultur: Texte zu Fremdheit und Macht* (Berlin, 1995).

victims who were killed for no other reason than "who they were", figured as paradigmatic victims'. On reading this, I asked myself what histories of Jewish agency and resistance might have been hidden by this idea of the innocent and passive Jew. Had stories and memories of Jewish victimhood been more diverse and complicated before this figure was born in the 1970s? I also wondered to what extent this figure has informed claims for recognition by other 'victim groups', such as those affected by the history of colonialism. Have they felt the need to build their claims on the idea of passivity, or do they allow for a more differentiated picture? Is it possible to paint a complicated picture of victimhood and still be recognized as a victim? Or does one exclude the other? My impression is that there is indeed a difficult tension between the commitment to tell the history of colonization in a detailed and differentiated way, and the risk that too strong a differentiation would dissuade people from the idea that colonial rule was a violent regime built on inequality, exploitation, and violence.[97]

[97] By way of example, Rudolf Duala Manga Bell is remembered as a major figure in Cameroonian anti-colonial protests against German colonizers in the 1910s who was murdered by the Germans for his actions. While Manga Bell indeed assumed a significant role in mobilizing protest against the German colonial administration in Cameroon, he was anything but fundamentally anti-German. One could read his protest as having been primarily motivated by the fear of losing special privileges that the Duala people had been granted within the colonial system by the German authorities. Though this reading does not diminish Manga Bell's impact on the formation of anti-colonial sentiment in Cameroon, it might be too complicated a base for a story of colonial suffering and violence to support claims for the recognition of colonialism as injustice. On Manga Bell and the role of the Duala in the history of Cameroon, see Ralph A. Austen, 'Bell, Rudolf Duala Manga', in Henry Louis Gates, Emmanuel Akyeampong, and Steven J. Niven (eds.), *Dictionary of African Biography* (Oxford, 2012); Matthew P. Fitzpatrick, *The Kaiser and the Colonies: Monarchy in the Age of Empire* (Oxford, 2022), 347–72; Ralph A. Austen and Jonathan Derrick, *Middlemen of the Cameroons Rivers: The Duala and their Hinterland,* c.*1600*–c.*1960* (Cambridge, 1999). For examples of the commemoration of Manga Bell, see 'Hey Hamburg, kennst Du Duala Manga Bell?', exhibition at the MARKK Museum am Rothenbaum, 14 Apr. 2021–31 Dec. 2022, at [https://markk-hamburg.de/en/ausstellungen/hey-hamburg-3/], accessed 31 May 2022; the graphic novel Initiative Perspektivwechsel, *Widerstand: Drei Generationen antikolonialer Protest in Kamerun* (Bonn, 2021); and Christian Bommarius, *Der gute Deutsche: Die Ermordung Manga Bells in Kamerun 1914* (Berlin, 2015).

The main thought I would like to share concerns the figure of the passive victim in research on colonial and National Socialist violence. In a recent commentary on the 2020 debate over the relationship between memory of the Holocaust and of German colonialism, Frank Bajohr and Rachel O'Sullivan among others evaluate arguments for and against the claim that there was continuity between colonial and National Socialist violence.[98] One of their critiques differentiates between colonial and National Socialist violence: 'While colonial massacres and mass violence usually emerged from a guerrilla war fought by the indigenous population against the colonial masters, the Holocaust was not based on a real conflict, but rather on ideological projections.'[99] Here, Bajohr and O'Sullivan build on similar arguments that were put forward in the years between 2003 and 2007, when the 'continuity thesis', of which Hamburg-based historian Jürgen Zimmerer was perceived as the main representative, was the subject of a lively academic debate.[100] Scholars such as Birthe Kundrus made the point that the German war against the Herero and Nama in the colony of German South West Africa (today's Namibia), which left between 60,000 and 80,000 dead, was a military campaign aimed at the 'destruction of the enemy [*Vernichtung des Gegners*]'. She stressed that the genocidal effects of this war were the result not so much of a racist ideology as of the specific military context. In this argument, genocide in National Socialist Germany was implicitly presented as the contrasting image.[101]

I will not discuss the relative merits of these arguments here. What I wonder is whether the idea of the passive and innocent victim that Hannah and Patricia highlight in their contribution also informs the

[98] Frank Bajohr and Rachel O'Sullivan, 'Holocaust, Kolonialismus und NS-Imperialismus: Forschung im Schatten einer polemischen Debatte', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 70/1 (2022), 191–202. [99] Ibid. 195.

[100] Jürgen Zimmerer, 'Holocaust und Kolonialismus: Beitrag zu einer Archäologie des genozidalen Gedankens', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 51/12 (2003), 1098–119; see also id., *Von Windhuk nach Ausschwitz? Beiträge zum Verhältnis von Kolonialismus und Holocaust* (Münster, 2011).

[101] Birthe Kundrus, 'Kontinuitäten, Parallelen, Rezeptionen: Überlegungen zur "Kolonialisierung" des Nationalsozialismus', *WerkstattGeschichte*, 43 (2006), 45–62, at 48. See also Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski, 'Der Holocaust als "kolonialer Genozid"? Europäische Kolonialgewalt und nationalsozialistischer Vernichtungskrieg', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 33/3 (2007), 439–66.

differentiation between colonial and National Socialist violence. While I acknowledge that it can be useful to look closely at the similarities and differences between forms of violence, I believe that this comparison is only relevant insofar as it is possible to derive statements on memory from it.

Memory politics and the prospect of memories of colonialism being allowed to enter the realm previously reserved for the Holocaust are also what made German scholars deem Jürgen Zimmerer's claims regarding continuities between colonialism and National Socialism worth debating in the first place. Even if one agrees with the above-mentioned distinction between colonial and National Socialist violence, the question arises as to what statements about memory are to be derived from this distinction, or to what extent assumptions about memory informed the distinction. It would therefore be interesting to investigate the extent to which historiographical analyses such as those mentioned above are informed by the idea of the innocent and legitimate victim.

Finally, I would like to take up one of Sébastien Tremblay's closing thoughts. In light of conflicting claims between gay and lesbian activists around the *Gedenkkugel* in Ravensbrück, Sébastien argues that what is needed is a reconception of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, which would entail 'the deconstruction of fixed categories of analysis in order to understand all the structural aspects of the National Socialist terror.' Sébastien argues that this would allow for 'solidarity beyond competing memories and *Opferkonkurrenz*, where crimes would be analysed in their differences—the Holocaust being different from the Nazi persecution of homosexualities'.

This claim resonates strongly with my own desire to bring together experiences of historical injustice that are usually discussed and remembered separately. If I may again draw on the history of the KWI-A: among those who suffered as a direct result of the institute's research or the policies it contributed to were people with a variety of backgrounds and (ascribed) identities. Sinti and Roma, Jews, and Eastern Europeans were the subjects of research in concentration camps and ghettos by KWI-A scientists or camp staff associated with them during the Second World War. People with disabilities and other individuals in whom researchers took an interest were subjected

to examinations at the institute, as were non-Europeans during field trips within Europe and beyond. Anyone identified as carrying a hereditary disease, as well as African–German and Asian–German people, were sterilized on the recommendation of eugenic reports produced by KWI-A staff. Although these experiences are linked to distinct histories and discourses of othering—some of which also involved the idea of degeneration—they were all the result of radical dehumanization. I agree with Sébastien that a perspective that acknowledges suffering on the part of those who are not commonly or easily recognized as victims of historical injustice allows for both broad and detailed analyses of where structures of exclusion overlap and where they differ.

Those affected by this dehumanization have themselves invoked what we might call structural similarities of suffering in their acts of mutual support and solidarity. On the occasion of the first European rally commemorating the persecution and murder of Sinti and Roma by National Socialists at the former concentration camp of Bergen-Belsen in October 1979, Simone Veil, at the time president of the European Parliament, spoke. Veil had herself been persecuted as a Jew and interned at Bergen-Belsen, and her mother had been murdered there. In her speech, Veil invoked the 'dying' and the 'shadows' who had fought for survival in the camp and who 'no longer had any age, gender, or voice, whose faces were expressionless',[102] before revealing that she was speaking of Jews, Sinti, and Roma and gradually rehumanizing them. Having pointed out that Jews deported to Bergen-Belsen were often killed shortly after arrival, and that she initially thought Roma and Sinti were spared this fate, Veil concluded: 'We were too separated in the camps, we were sacrificed one after another, but still with the same hatred and efficiency.'[103] Similarly, when Petra Rosenberg, chair of both the Berlin-Brandenburg Association of German Sinti and Roma (Landesverband Deutscher Sinti und Roma Berlin-Brandenburg) and the Berlin-Marzahn Forced Camp Memorial (Gedenkstätte Zwangslager Berlin-Marzahn e.V.) was invited to comment on the commemoration

[102] Simone Veil, 'Meine Anwesenheit bezeugt meine Solidarität gegenüber den Zigeunern', in Gesellschaft für Bedrohte Völker and Verband Deutscher Sinti (eds.), *Sinti und Roma im ehemaligen KZ Bergen-Belsen*, 49.
[103] Ibid. 52.

of German colonialism, she and others pointed to Sinti, Roma, and Black people's shared experiences of everyday racism.[104]

These glimpses of solidarity raise the question of who exactly imposes 'fixed categories' of victimhood. How are categories of persecution and historical analysis and narratives of lived experience used to differentiate victimhood? How do these many layers build on each other? Where do they allow for shifts in categorization, or even for the deconstruction of categories? What is the potential of narratives of lived experience in particular, such as Simone Veil's invocation of 'shadows', for a deconstruction of fixed categories of victimhood? Might that potential lie in such narratives, rather than in historical analysis?

Sébastien Tremblay

First, I want to thank the other authors for such important insights. Both contributions demonstrate clearly how victimhood has enough cohesive potential to benefit social movements, bestowing new meanings on existing categories of identity. Yet they also highlight how studying victimhood helps us identify power structures beyond an oversimplified polarization between victims and perpetrators. Victimhood as a discourse and a memory praxis prepares the ground for a broader conversation on power asymmetries between archival, canonical, and official memories in the *Dominanzgesellschaft*,[105] the transfer of knowledge, and the foundations of *Opferkonkurrenz*.

I first want to address Manuela Bauche's focus on solidarities and reflect on moments of unity and disunity regarding the White, non-Jewish queer community in Germany. I want to underline the transcendent power of Whiteness and reflect on this lack of solidarity. I assert that the understanding of the queer community in Germany

[104] Interview with Petra Rosenberg, 'Dekoloniale [Re]visions 1/21', workshop organized by Dekoloniale: Memory Culture in the City, 25 Feb. 2021, at [https://www.dekoloniale.de/en/program/events/revisionen-1-21-interview-mit-petra-rosenberg#], accessed 30 May 2022.

[105] Aleida Assmann, 'Canon and Archive', in Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (eds.), *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdiscipinary Handbook* (Berlin, 2008), 97–108.

as White is connected to *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, and that a reconsideration of National Socialist atrocities focusing on racialization, coloniality, and antisemitism together would allow us to concentrate on historic victimhood beyond White-centred narratives, taking into consideration QBIPOC perspectives and experiences.[106]

As media debates about coloniality and the Holocaust have shown, political rhetoric based on the voices of *Menschen mit Nazihintergrund* (people with a Nazi background)[107] seems to play a much more important role than some of the scholarship coming from communities targeted by the National Socialists.[108] I do not mean to say that descendants of victims have a homogeneous and inherent understanding of, or an authentic way of reflecting on, the atrocities and genocide suffered by earlier generations. Nor is it about identity politics or other tired and tarnished political concepts.[109] In particular, these debates should not be about pitting different communities against each other.[110] My wish is to enlarge our understanding of the dictatorship and its memory by provincializing the voices of non-Jewish White Germans who, as Hannah

[106] On the framing of the queer German community as White, see Jin Haritaworn, *Queer Lovers and Hateful Others: Regenerating Violent Times and Places* (London, 2015) and Christopher Ewing, '"Color Him Black": Erotic Representations and the Politics of Race in West German Homosexual Magazines, 1949–1974', *Sexuality & Culture*, 21/2 (2017), 382–403. Others have historicized these matters further, e.g. Laurie Marhoefer, 'Was the Homosexual Made White? Race, Empire, and Analogy in Gay and Trans Thought in Twentieth-Century Germany', *Gender & History*, 31/1 (2019), 91–114.

[107] Saskia Trebing, 'Künstlerin Moshtari Hilal: "Kritik ist das Gegenteil von Gleichgültigkeit"', *Monopol: Magazin für Kunst und Leben*, 7 May 2021, at [https://www.monopol-magazin.de/moshtari-hilal-menschen-mit-nazi-hintergrund-kritik-ist-das-gegenteil-von-gleichgueltigkeit], accessed 9 May 2022.

[108] Meron Mendel, 'Wie Identitätspolitik schadet: Wer sind die "Menschen mit Nazihintergrund"?', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 March 2021, at [https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/identitaetspolitik-versus-erinnerung-an-den-holocaust-17256208.html], accessed 9 May 2022.

[109] Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò, *Elite Capture: How the Powerful Took Over Identity Politics (And Everything Else)* (London, 2022); Karsten Schubert and Helge Schwiertz, 'Konstruktivistische Identitätspolitik: Warum Demokratie partikulare Positionierung erfordert', *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*, 31 (2021), 565–93.

[110] Sabine Hark and Paula-Irene Villa, *Unterscheiden und herrschen: Ein Essay zu den ambivalenten Verflechtungen von Rassismus, Sexismus und Feminismus in der Gegenwart* (Bielefeld, 2017).

Tzuberi and Patricia Piberger show, have decided that being descended from perpetrators gives them an enlightened view of antisemitism and racism.[111] The opposite—deprovincializing voices at the margins—would not only enrich memory culture and our understanding of the National Socialist era, but would also allow mainstream debates to connect with other aspects of Germany's long history of antisemitism and racism, such as the institutional and scientific ones highlighted by Manuela. As Hannah and Patricia remind us in their contribution, it is not innocuous that dominant voices in Germany have disciplined and punished racialized voices, and that they continue to do so after dismissing for years the legacies of German colonialism. The shifts that are now on the table would not only go against a particular understanding of White mainstream liberal German memory culture, but would also force introspection regarding neocolonial projects such as the Humboldt Forum,[112] connecting centuries of German racial and colonial violence with the racialized antisemitism at the core of the murder of European Jewry.[113]

Through her example of solidarities and discussions in Berlin-Dahlem, Manuela convincingly shows us how historical framing is primordial. As Judith Butler reminds us, historical subjects evolve within constitutive frameworks and norms of recognizability.[114] On the margin, these norms, discourses, and practices are often

[111] Margrit Pernau, 'Provincializing Concepts: The Language of Transnational History', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 36/3 (2016), 483–99; Emmanuel David, 'Fantasies of Elsewhere: Notes on Provincializing Transgender', *TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly*, 7/1 (2020), 132–39; Jonah I. Garde, 'Provincializing Trans* Modernity: Asterisked Histories and Multiple Horizons in *Der Steinachfilm*', *TSQ: Transgender Studies Quarterly*, 8/2, 207–22.

[112] Mirjam Brusius, 'Stones Can Talk Back: Vergangenheitsbewältigung Revisited', *New Fascism Syllabus: Blog*, 9 June 2022, at [http://newfascismsyllabus.com/opinions/stones-can-talk-back-vergangenheitsbewaltigung-revisited/], accessed 11 June 2022.

[113] These controversies are peculiar. Not only are they often, as Manuela reminds us, absent from the margins, but scholars have focused on the racial aspects of both the regime and the Holocaust for decades without relativizing antisemitism or the singularity of the genocide. See Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, *The Racial State: Germany 1933–1945* (Cambridge, 1991).

[114] Judith Butler, 'Bodies and Power, Revisited', *Radical Philosophy*, 114 (2002), 13–19.

defined by, against, or at least in relation to structures created by the *Dominanzgesellschaft*. As I mentioned in my contribution, for the queer community in Germany, these relational structures and normative spaces have meant that a group of recognized victims—in my case queer men—obtained political acknowledgement through acts of memory defined and welcomed by the *Dominanzgesellschaft*.[115] This victory may have created a marginal subgroup of gay men who are both recognized victims of German fascism and the new gatekeepers of who is considered worthy of the same status.[116] The example of the *Gedenkkugel* in Ravensbrück readily comes to mind. In the case of the long-standing fight between scholars of gay history, such as Alexander Zinn, and those researching queer–feminist history, such as Anna Hájková, these structures do not excuse the dismissal, by opponents of lesbian recognition, of decades of scholarship; however, they do explain some of the tensions at the core of *Opferkonkurrenz*.

In one of their footnotes, Patricia and Hannah mention Reinhart Koselleck while discussing the establishment of the *Opfer* in German contemporary history. Here I would also like to point to Koselleck's view of memorialization and especially the visual culture of remembrance, reminding us that his way of understanding history, though admittedly a conservative one, still stressed the potential for co-existing historical narratives.[117] Koselleck was against an official memory carved into stone, as it would erase the plurality of experiences of historical events.[118] Together with misogyny, which certainly exists in the gay community, I think the fear of erasure explains the position adopted by some gay historians. In contrast, deprovincializing voices on the margins of pre-existing framings emanating from the *Dominanzgesellschaft* illustrates the potential of a history written using differences and

[115] Sébastien Tremblay, '"The proudest symbol we could put forward"? The Pink Triangle as Transatlantic Symbol of Gay and Lesbian Identities from the 1970s to the 1990s' (Ph.D. thesis, Free University of Berlin, 2020).

[116] Hájková, 'Langer Kampf'.

[117] Reinhart Koselleck, 'Denkmäler sind Stolpersteine: Der Historiker Reinhart Koselleck zur neu entbrannten Debatte um das geplante Berliner Holocaust-Mahnmal', *Der Spiegel*, 2 Feb. 1997, 190–2.

[118] Margrit Pernau and Sébastien Tremblay, 'Dealing with an Ocean of Meaninglessness: Reinhart Koselleck's Lava Memories and Conceptual History', *Contributions to the History of Concepts*, 15/2 (2020), 7–28.

in the plural.[119] As the history of the KWI-A exemplifies, this plurality does not exclude coherent historical narratives. On the contrary, it enables the better problematization of historical events, taking into consideration bigger structures, interpretation patterns, and interconnected experiences.

Second, I want to look at one of the aspects tackled by Hannah and Patricia—namely, the enlightening and performative effects of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* and victimhood in post-unification Germany, as well as the ways in which conceptions of temporalities and especially racialized modernities have created a different context for contemporary political struggles. I am especially interested in how White non-Jewish queers living in Germany have benefited from a focus on victimhood, even though the Holocaust, the Porajmos, and other atrocities committed by the National Socialist regime were fundamentally racialized endeavours. In a world where non-European spaces have been portrayed at least since Hegel as premodern, backward, and trying to catch up with European time,[120] I argue that the exclusion of racialized individuals from the enlightening effects of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*—whether or not they have a concrete experience of migration in their biography—is connected to how migration is understood as temporal mobility and not only per se as geographical mobility.[121] Because racialized bodies in Europe are framed not as modern, but as perpetual foreign agents from a premodern past, they are relegated to a space that has yet to be blessed by the lessons learned from the horrors of the two world wars on European soil or by the importance of the Holocaust for the European community.[122]

[119] Sabine Hark, *Gemeinschaft der Ungewählten: Umrisse eines politischen Ethos der Kohabitation* (Berlin, 2021).

[120] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (Leipzig, 1924), 55.

[121] Fatima El-Tayeb, '"Blood Is a Very Special Juice": Racialized Bodies and Citizenship in Twentieth-Century Germany', *International Review of Social History*, 44/7 (1999), 149–69; ead., *European Others: Queering Ethnicity in Postnational Europe* (Minneapolis, 2011).

[122] For examples of the demonization of the non-enlightened 'other' and potential 'imported illiberalism', see Mariam Lau, 'Queer oder Schwul?', *Die Zeit*, 1 July 2021, 48; Christopher Sweetapple, 'Von Abu Ghraib nach Nordneukölln', *Der Freitag*, 7 Dec. 2018; Anna Schneider and Lucien Scherrer, 'Schwulenhass,

What is more, because gay men and lesbians in Germany understand themselves as the heirs of the victims of the National Socialists, the boundaries of the contemporary 'community' are defined by European time and by Whiteness. Scholars have also demonstrated how such White-centred genealogies linger through historiography and racially exclude other queer men through general conflations of 'Islam' with the 'homophobic other'.[123] Because the perpetrators and victims of the initial injury were framed as White and the injury itself as foundational, Whiteness permeates the construction of the German historical queer subject.

The contributions to this round table have highlighted how defining victimhood by original perpetrator categories results in debates such as those surrounding the *Gedenkkugel* or the memorial in the Tiergarten to the homosexuals murdered under National Socialism. Reshaping our frameworks of National Socialist persecution means democratizing memory culture.[124] As the other contributors have shown, this is only possible if we stop using the *Dominanzgesellschaft* as the point of departure for our endeavour. Scholarship from outside Germany and German scholarship written at the margins are already doing so uncontroversially, as Manuela mentions. It is therefore time to move beyond sensationalist media quarrels that pit victim groups against each other. Germany is still mired in antisemitic and racist structures, and the task of reshaping these debates productively beyond the offence-taking and the clickbait has unfortunately fallen on the shoulders of the worst affected.

Islamismus und linke Realitätsverweigerung in Berlin-Neukölln', *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 19 Nov. 2020.

[123] Jin Haritaworn and Jen Petzen, 'Invented Traditions, New Intimate Publics: Tracing the German "Muslim Homophobia" Discourse', in Stephen Hutchings, Chris Flood, Galina Miazhevich, et al. (eds.), *Islam in its International Context: Comparative Perspectives* (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2011), 48–64; Zülfukar Çetin, *Homophobie und Islamophobie: Intersektionale Diskriminierungen am Beispiel binationaler schwuler Paare in Berlin* (Bielefeld, 2014).

[124] Insa Eschebach uses the example of the *Gedenkkugel* as democratization in 'Queere Gedächtnisräume'.

Our initial contribution focuses on the figure of the victim and contemporary society's attachment to it. In Sébastien Tremblay's text, this attachment takes shape in a desire for queer solidarity and the overcoming of competitive victimhood through mutual recognition. Recounting the struggle that preceded the installation of a *Gedenkkugel* for lesbian women in the former concentration camp Ravensbrück, he argues for an 'enlargement and democratization' and ultimately a 'reframing' of victimhood and its categories. In Manuela Bauche's contribution too, recognition of historical victimhood is fundamental to present-day solidarity. Her case study—the KWI-A—recontextualizes Nazi history by zooming in on its material and ideological interconnectedness with Germany's colonial past. Based on observations of the memorialization of the institute, she uncovers a 'long history of collaboration' between those affected by racism and persecution and highlights the overlap of 'experiences and structures that are often separated by historiography'.

In our response, we complicate the notion of victim-based recognition as a basis for solidarity. By focusing on the *Gedenkkugel*, we show that the analytical category of 'victimhood' opens up an alternative reading of the struggle—one that places it within a normative memory paradigm and thus reveals that competition is the monozygotic twin of solidarity. When examined through the analytical category of 'memory', the lesbian memory activists featured in Sébastien's contribution engage in *counter-memory* activism. They contest conventional historical narratives that manifest themselves in state-sponsored memorial spaces and public monuments that do not allocate any specific visibility to lesbian victims. Within a memory paradigm, the *Gedenkkugel* is a self-evident and desired material telos of historiographical research into histories of persecution. It renders lesbians visible as *particular* victims.[125] Yet when 'victimhood' is taken up as an analytical

[125] Lesbian memory activists at first attempted to install the *Gedenkkugel* against the wishes of both the Ravensbrück memorial site (*Gedenkstätte*) and the Lesbian and Gay Federation in Germany (Lesben- und Schwulenverband in Deutschland, LSVD). Sébastien associates the LSVD with an older stream of scholarship that he juxtaposes with approaches developed in the

category rather than as a historical fact to be recognized in solidarity, counter-memory seems to be a less conclusive framing of the struggle for the *Gedenkkugel*. In our analytical framework, this struggle appears to be absolutely 'in sync' with the normative, victim-centred memory culture of post-1989 Germany.

Within a memory paradigm, a memorial is a natural end product of memory work. Taking up victimhood as an analytical category, however, obliges us to ask why contemporary actors embrace historical victimhood, and to consider their timing in doing so. Why did it become important in the mid 2010s for lesbians to launch their struggle for a permanent *Gedenkkugel*, and thus to establish lesbian victimhood of National Socialist persecution as a distinct category? A brief look back: an initiative called Autonome feministische Frauen und Lesben aus Deutschland und Österreich (Autonomous Feminist Women and Lesbians from Germany and Austria, hereafter 'Initiative') installed a first temporary *Gedenkkugel* in Ravensbrück in 2015 and submitted a first petition for it to be made permanent in 2016.[126] This demand did

context of new queer historiographies. Whereas the former disables queer solidarities, the latter enable a 'broadening [of] the idea of victimhood' and thus the recognition of (historical) suffering that goes beyond perpetrator categories. For example, the Nazis did not categorize persecuted persons as 'lesbians', but in their attempt to purify and remake the body of the nation, 'lesbian behaviour' was explicitly mentioned alongside a wide range of further categories such as mixed-race or Jewish parentage, prostitution, or promiscuity. The women whose files mention 'lesbian behaviour' did not necessarily self-define as lesbians, but saw themselves as communists or members of other persecuted groups. The categories underlying contemporary memorial regimes are thus sometimes distinct from those of both perpetrators and victims alike.

[126] For an outline of the conflict over the *Gedenkkugel*, see Ina Glaremin, '"Mindere Vergangenheit"? Die Debatte um die Gedenkkugel für lesbische Frauen* in der Gedenkstätte Ravensbrück' (MA dissertation, Technical University Berlin, 2021), at [https://sexualityandholocaust.files.wordpress.com/2021/06/ina_glaremin_gedenkkugel-2.pdf], accessed 11 June 2022. Eventually, a historical assessment commissioned by Ravensbrück and the Bundesstiftung Magnus Hirschfeld enabled the decision for a permanent memorial; see Martin Lücke, 'Die Verfolgung lesbischer Frauen im Nationalsozialismus: Forschungsdebatten zu Gedenkinitiativen am Beispiel des Frauen-Konzentrationslagers Ravensbrück', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 70/5 (2022), 422–40. Even before the campaign for the *Gedenkkugel*,

not develop in the context of the debates about the Memorial to the Persecuted Homosexuals under National Socialism, which opened in 2008, or the early lesbian history movement of the 1980s, which investigated lesbian life and victimization during the Nazi era, among other things.[127] These earlier historiographical efforts and the establishment of a lesbian 'prehistory' were not linked to specific memorial demands. We argue that there are two reasons why lesbian memory activists only recently began to organize for a memorial. First, within an institutionalized National Socialist memorial landscape, and in a move of *women's* solidarity rather than queer solidarity, lesbian memory activists aim to historicize their civil rights movement by achieving permanent visibility and recognition of specific victimhood under National Socialism. Second, fuelled by generational change and the contestations of anti-racist and queer critiques, the recognition of particular National Socialist victimhood functions as a 'stand-in' for the legacy of the increasingly contested lesbian struggles of the 1970s to 1990s. Let us now present our reasoning.

Although a few men were also incarcerated in Ravensbrück, the camp's post-war history has clearly been shaped by women—especially

Ravensbrück was important to lesbians. From 1984 onwards, the only lesbian group in the GDR, the Arbeitskreis Homosexuelle Selbsthilfe—Lesben in der Kirche, used Ravensbrück in its struggle for political recognition. See Samirah Kenawi, 'Konfrontation mit dem DDR-Staat: Politische Eingaben und Aktionen von Lesben am Beispiel Ravensbrück', in Gabriele Dennert, Christiane Leidinger, and Franziska Rauchut, *In Bewegung bleiben: 100 Jahre Politik, Kultur und Geschichte von Lesben* (Berlin, 2007), 118–21. After 1989, West German lesbians such as Alice Schwarzer also joined the official ceremony commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the liberation of Ravensbrück in 1995. See Alice Schwarzer, 'Leben nach Auschwitz', *EMMA*, 6 (1995), 51–9.

[127] Early lesbian historical narratives and oral histories cover life in the Weimar Republic, under National Socialism, and in post-war Germany; see Ilse Kokula, *Jahre des Glücks, Jahre des Leids: Gespräche mit älteren lesbischen Frauen. Dokumente* (Kiel, 1986). Only in the late 1980s did lesbian experiences during the years of Nazi rule come to be presented as a distinct topic of interest; see e.g. ead., 'Zur Situation lesbischer Frauen während der NS-Zeit', *Beiträge zur Feministischen Theorie und Praxis*, 25/26 (1989), 29–36; Claudia Schoppmann, *Nationalsozialistische Sexualpolitik und weibliche Homosexualität* (Pfaffenweiler, 1991).

by politically persecuted women and their histories of resistance. Accordingly, one of the Initiative's first steps was to contact the International Ravensbrück Committee (IRK), an organization for former prisoners which co-ordinates international efforts to historicize the camp.[128] Reacting to the memorial site's approval of the *Gedenkkugel* in 2021, the Initiative publicly documented its gratitude to the IRK: 'We . . . would like to thank the International Ravensbrück Committee as well as the Austrian and German Camp Community Ravensbrück, who supported the Initiative from the beginning.'[129] Undoubtedly, the IRK's support was of pivotal importance for the Initiative, and possibly outweighed the initial tensions (and subsequent rapprochement) between lesbians and gays.

One could thus frame the struggle for the *Gedenkkugel* as a moment of *women's* solidarity rather than queer solidarity, and of *fragmentation* rather than unification. Lesbians, descendants of inmates, and other representatives of the IRK collaborated to *disembed* lesbian girls and women from a collective of undifferentiated female victims. As a specific lesbian victimhood is made visible, lesbians are marked as particular and levered out of the shared memorial space, no longer forming a fragment of general, unspecified female victimhood.[130] The

[128] See 'Unterstützung für Denkmal für die verfolgten und ermordeten lesbischen Frauen und Mädchen im ehemaligen KZ Ravensbrück', *Rut-Online*, at [https://rut-online.de/gedenkkugel-ravensbrueck/], accessed 24 June 2022. Only after receiving the IRK's support in May 2016 did the initiators of the *Gedenkkugel* submit an official petition to the *Gedenkstätte*; see Initiative, 'Dankschreiben 2018', at [https://feminismus-widerstand.de/?q=danke_2017], accessed 24 June 2022. On the post-war history of Ravensbrück and the role of the IRK and its historical commission, see Susan Hogervorst, 'Erinnerungskulturen und Geschichtsschreibung: Das Beispiel Ravensbrück', in Stengel and Konitzer (eds.), *Opfer als Akteure*, 197–215.

[129] Initiative, 'Wege zum Gedenken und Erinnern an lesbische Frauen im Frauen-KZ Ravensbrück', press release, 16 Apr. 2022, at [https://feminismus-widerstand.de/?q=gedenkkugel], accessed 24 June 2022.

[130] Women's solidarity was an important frame for lesbian memory activists fighting for the recognition of lesbian persecution, and they therefore called their opponents a 'patriarchal headwind' and accused them of misogyny and lesbophobia; Lisa Steininger, 'Eine Gedenkkugel als sichtbares Zeichen des Erinnerns an die Verfolgung und Ermordung lesbischer Frauen', *Mitteilungsblatt der Österreichischen Lagergemeinschaft Ravensbrück & FreundInnen* (Dec.

Gedenkkugel in this sense is the materialization not only of an opening up of categories, but also of a *particularization* and *fragmentation* of memory.

The desire for recognition of specific lesbian victimhood, we suggest, can be contextualized in a (generational) conflict over the legacy and historicization of the new lesbian movement. In contemporary queer/trans and anti-racist feminist discourse, earlier feminists and lesbians (the German *Frauen/Lesbenbewegung*) are frequently marked as 'White feminists and lesbians' and criticized for their alleged privilege and for having been particularly invested in the interests of White, bourgeois women.[131] In light of significant gains in civil rights and political equality, lesbians can no longer define themselves as victimized subjects without contestation. In this context, lesbians' memories of their personal, biographical experiences of post-war victimization and their fight for political equality as citizens are expressed and legitimized through being interlocked with victimhood under National Socialism.[132] Consider the inscription on the *Gedenkkugel*: 'In memory

2017), 18–20, at 18–19. Eva Bäckerová, president of the IRK, also cited patriarchal power structures as a reason for the invisibility of lesbian victimhood and memory in her letter of support addressed to the *Gedenkstätte*; see Eva Bäckerová, 'An die Stiftung Brandenburgische Gedenkstätten', *Mitteilungsblatt der Österreichischen Lagergemeinschaft Ravensbrück & FreundInnen* (Dec. 2016), 5–6.

[131] Such criticism clashes with the lived experiences of (White) lesbians who grew up under conditions of legal discrimination and without full civil rights. It also ignores those lesbians and feminists who questioned female (National Socialist) victimhood in the 1980s and 1990s and were invested in debates about female perpetratorship, racism, antisemitism, and other forms of violence within the German women's and lesbian movements. See e.g. Studienschwerpunkt 'Frauenforschung' TU Berlin (ed.), *Mittäterschaft und Entdeckungslust* (Berlin, 1989); and *Geteilter Feminismus: Rassismus, Antisemitismus, Fremdenhaß*, special issue of *Beiträge zur feministischen Theorie und Praxis*, 27 (1990). On debates about the role of women in Nazi Germany, see Atina Grossmann, 'Feminist Debates about Women and National Socialism', *Gender & History*, 3/3 (1991), 350–8.

[132] In this move, queer nostalgia (Haritaworn, *Queer Lovers and Hateful Others*, 142–53) and victimhood nostalgia converge: the history of one's own post-war victimization is made legitimate and commemorable through victimhood under National Socialism. In addition, (self-)figuration as a Nazi victim impacts a subject's interpellation in the present. On a discursive level, historical National Socialist victimhood situates a subject outside perpetratorship and closer to justice and morality.

of all lesbian women and girls in the Ravensbrück and Uckermark women's concentration camp. *They* were persecuted, incarcerated and murdered. *You* are not forgotten'.[133] 'They' were murdered in the impersonal, detached third person plural, but are remembered in the direct second person plural. 'We' have a direct, personal connection to the persecuted 'foremothers', with whom 'we' form a transtemporal community of passive suffering. By disembedding lesbian victims from the undifferentiated collective of female victims, lesbians become visible within the established National Socialist memorial landscape—and thereby also enable the memorialization of their own post-war struggle in anticipation of an upcoming generational change. By remembering them ('you'), we also remember *ourselves*. The *Gedenkkugel* is thus also an act of self-memorialization—a permanent, material, and public witness of 'our' role as foremothers to future lesbians.[134]

The struggle for the *Gedenkkugel* thus appears less 'against or counter to' and more 'in sync' with the normative, victim-centred memory culture of post-1989 Germany. Real-life experiences of discrimination are channelled through a disembodied reference to victimhood under National Socialism. No biological family relations are necessary to claim a link between the memorializing community and the persecuted women. Rather, victimhood is 'transmitted . . . outside family structures' (Sébastien Tremblay) and can also be claimed by descendants of bystanders and perpetrators through empathic identification *with* and

[133] Initiative, 'Wege zum Gedenken' (emphasis our own).

[134] The demand for memorialization is entwined here with the formation of lesbian political subjectivity. This operation is underpinned not only by a desire for memory, but by a striving for visibility. Consider in this regard the pre-1989 history of Ravensbrück: through a particular practice—the demand for memorialization—a group (Lesben in der Kirche) was formed as a political actor. 'These eleven women posed an enormous danger to the power of the state'; Kenawi, 'Konfrontation mit dem DDR-Staat', 120. Another example is the struggle over lesbian representation in the film shown at the Memorial to the Persecuted Homosexuals under National Socialism. The main focus of these debates was also the history of Nazi persecution and lesbian visibility; see 'NS-Verfolgung von Lesben wird weiter geleugnet', *Emma*, 1 July 2010, at [https://www.emma.de/artikel/neuer-streit-ums-homo-mahnmal-ns-verfolgung-von-lesben-wird-weiter-geleugnet-265069], accessed 31 Aug. 2022. In a move we describe as queer solidarity, lesbian victimhood was added to gay victimhood by the addition of a lesbian couple to the film in 2012.

as victims—in this case, lesbian victims. Full inclusion in the historical narrative of post-war Germany, and specifically its public sphere, is mediated through efforts to achieve the recognition and institutional remembrance of victimhood under the Nazis. As exemplified by historian Anna Hájková: 'Lesbian women are from now on no longer stepdaughters of history, but full members of it.'[135] Concrete struggles against discrimination become expressible, commemorable, and politically effective through (collective) self-constitution as victims of National Socialist persecution.[136]

If this is the case, however, how can minoritized collectives assert their political rights if they cannot claim National Socialist victimhood, or if their claims to victimhood are in opposition to those of the figure of the Jew? Unsurprisingly, the *Gedenkkugel* memory project seems to be one that QPOC organizations such as LesMigraS or GLADT are not specifically invested in. We agree with Manuela and Sébastien that the memorial 'afterlife' of genocide(s) needs to reflect

[135] Anna Hájková, 'Langer Kampf'. In our reading, the lesbian struggle for a *Gedenkkugel* is not substantially different from the memory politics of the gay movement in the 1970s and 1980s. As Sébastien Tremblay indicates, the latter blurred the lines between a fight for recognition of 'victims disregarded during the post-war era' and the creation of a 'collective in the present' or post-memory; see Columbia University Press, 'An Interview with Marianne Hirsch', at [https://cup.columbia.edu/author-interviews/hirsch-generation-postmemory], accessed 24 June 2022. This example makes it clear that the 'consolidation of a collective in the present' can involve confrontational memory work (e.g. the idea of a 'Homocaust') and can at times also be weaponized in the context of contemporary political struggles (as in the struggle to abolish Paragraph 175). As Koray Yılmaz-Günay and Salih Alexander Wolter highlight, analogy and competition played a central role in gays becoming recognized as victim subjects. Presenting itself as the 'only forgotten victims', who were at a disadvantage to Jews as the 'privileged victims', the gay community demanded entry into the nation and its culture of commemoration. See Koray Yılmaz-Günay and Salih Alexander Wolter, 'Pink Washing Germany? Der deutsche Homonationalismus und die "jüdische Karte"', in Duygu Gürsel, Zülfukar Çetin, and Allmende e.V. (eds.), *Wer macht Demo_kratie? Kritische Beiträge zu Migration und Machtverhältnissen* (Münster, 2013), 60–75.

[136] Alternative places of memorialization, such as lesbian and feminist archives in Germany, cannot keep up with the National Socialist memorial landscape. They have a precarious status, and do not ensure lasting, sustainable transmission in the mainstream.

the complex entanglements running through histories of violence. Yet when recognition in the present is channelled exclusively through National Socialist victimhood, unequal relations lie dormant. Manuela thus marks the genealogy of solidarity as 'not a straightforward one.' For example, when the representative bodies of Jews and of Sinti and Roma—the Central Council of Jews in Germany and the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma—worked together to campaign for the Memorial to the Sinti and Roma of Europe Murdered under National Socialism, only the former were in a position to support the latter. While Manuela suggests that 'moments of collaboration reveal the enduring effects of the structures of persecution themselves', we propose that it is precisely instances where solidarity collapses that require close scrutiny.

Returning to our reading of lesbian memory work, it would be of the utmost importance to ask, for example, how the 1990s alliances between Women of Colour mentioned by Manuela disintegrated, and what role victimhood under National Socialism played in these processes. Paying attention to moments of collapse reveals the narrative of solidarity to be suffused with competitive relations.

The last few years in particular have shown that memory debates serve as arenas in which present-day political conflicts are acted out. This makes it almost impossible to detach the writing of genocidal histories from their political valence. In the current memory paradigm, therefore, the visibility of contemporary injustice remains bound to the recognition of past victimhood—as if the best way to address injustice *now* would be to build a memorial to those still precariously *alive*.

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BEYOND VICTIMHOOD: GERMAN MUSLIMS AND THE MINORITY QUESTION AFTER THE HOLOCAUST

SULTAN DOUGHAN IN CONVERSATION WITH
MIRJAM SARAH BRUSIUS

In her research, Sultan Doughan shows how the memory of the Holocaust is mobilized in tolerance education and extremism prevention as a means of integrating Muslims into German society. Yet while the German government invests in memorials and museums that commemorate the Holocaust, Doughan argues, it also extricates itself from current forms of violence. Holocaust commemoration as a European project is part of a triumphalist narrative that presents Vergangenheitsbewältigung *as a successful transition to liberal democracy – a reality that minoritizes and racializes Middle Easterners as Muslims. In this interview with historian Mirjam Sarah Brusius, anthropologist Sultan Doughan examines how Middle Easterners in Germany relate to the figure of the Jew. Muslims and Jews operate in this governed structure as opposing figures who must be religious and historical enemies. While both have clearly assigned roles in German public discourse, Doughan approaches their historical and contemporary positionalities beyond clear-cut concepts of* Opferkonkurrenz*, and thus rethinks this discourse and points to past and future alliances.*

MIRJAM SARAH BRUSIUS (MSB): In your research, you 'address the minority question as one that cannot be asked in Germany'.[1] What do you mean by that?

SULTAN DOUGHAN (SD): This is the concluding statement of an interview about how Holocaust memory centres a particular notion of humanity as universal. What I mean by this is that Muslims, like Jews, are not governed as a religious minority in Germany, but are directed towards assimilation and the shedding of traditional differences that do not easily align with Protestant notions of modernity. Historians

[1] Jonathon Catlin, 'A New German Historians' Debate? A Conversation with Sultan Doughan, A. Dirk Moses, and Michael Rothberg', *Journal of the History of Ideas: Blog*, 2–4 Feb. 2022, at [https://jhiblog.org/2022/02/02/a-new-german-historians-debate-a-conversation-with-sultan-doughan-a-dirk-moses-and-michael-rothberg-part-i/], accessed 20 July 2022. Quotation in part II.

and scholars of the Holocaust have pointed out that Holocaust memory has been 'de-Judaized' and assimilated into secularized Christian notions of human suffering.[2] Holocaust memory, when displayed for national purposes, has the power to gloss over and elide traditional Jewish difference. In the context of Germany, Holocaust memory has also become central in managing Muslims and inculcating in them the liberal values that prioritize state-sanctioned narratives over communal narratives, national memory over social memory, and the ideal of the citizen over the reality of social personhood embedded in a community. On the face of it, these are national achievements and serve the purpose of safeguarding liberal democracy.

MSB: What is problematic about this approach for those who are not fully part of majority society in Germany and who are the target audience for the forms of national commemoration that you describe?

SD: This picture is too idealistic to account for the complex realities that many Germans with migrant backgrounds live with, especially if a catastrophe as big as the genocide of European Jewry is the paradigmatic example of racism, racialization, and political inequalities. How do you make a case for your lived and experienced forms of inequality, discrimination, racism, and even racist murders? How do you account for being minoritized and treated as different, while at the same time being asked to act more in accordance with majoritarian norms and values? Holocaust education often claims that it has progressively overcome all the evils of the past. Can you use the German term *Rasse* (race) if you want to name the governing effects on certain groups, or is that term exclusive to a genocidal past? This is the social side of my statement; it also has a historical side.

MSB: Current discussions in the history of race in Germany touch on how 'race' and *Rasse* might be used as historical and analytical terms in future. This is complicated, especially for German-speaking academic circles inside Germany. *Rasse* is a historically troubled term. 'Race' as an analytical term that marks race as a social construct, on

[2] Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Boston, 1999); Paula Cowan and Henry Maitles, *Understanding and Teaching Holocaust Education* (London, 2017); Reinhart Koselleck, 'Wer darf vergessen werden? Das Holocaust-Mahnmal hierarchisiert die Opfer. Die falsche Ungeduld', *Die Zeit*, 19 Mar. 1998.

the other hand, is often considered to be imported from a US context and not always applicable to German matters, past and present.[3] Your answer, in other words, is timely, pointing to the temporal and cultural divisions that are in play when we write post-war histories of race. Your work looks at the centring of the figure of the Jew as the historical and categorical victim of racism. Yet we know that anti-semitism and racism are both grounded in a complex entanglement between race science, social projection, and prejudice. Do you also see failures in terms of how the pre-war history of race in Germany was written? Does a historical view which takes into account the *longue durée* of the history of race help you to engage with the 'minority question' in your work?

SD: Absolutely, I am invested in understanding the genealogy of the minority question in the modern nation state. The emergence of religious minorities has been historically circumvented in Germany. German Jews, by virtue of collective emancipation, were expected to assimilate into German liberalism. Judaism did not disappear during the nineteenth century, but was reorganized in ways that became acceptable within the various national contexts.[4] Yet Jews could never be German, French, or Italian enough. They remained ambiguous, even if they only claimed a Jewish identity. Racial ideology as expressed in eugenics and later in Nazi laws clearly demarcated European Jews as essentially foreign, essentially Semitic, and territorially from outside Continental Europe. This is the starting point for my thoughts about the predicament of Muslims 'after the Holocaust'. Muslims are not disappearing, but they are being reclassified so that certain historical, ethnic, and class differences are associated with being Muslim, and these are ossified as a 'Muslim problem'. In a way, the promise of

[3] Workshop: Race, Rassismus und Geschichtswissenschaft, held online, 21 Feb. 2022; see the conference report by Pia Marzell, 'Race, Rassismus und Geschichtswissenschaft', *H-Soz-Kult*, 1 Apr. 2022, at [https://www.hsozkult.de/conferencereport/id/fdkn-127929], accessed 20 July 2022.

[4] Lisa Silverman, *Becoming Austrian: Jews and Culture between the World Wars* (New York, 2012); Shira Klein, 'Challenging the Myth of Italian Jewish Assimilation', *Modern Judaism: A Journal of Jewish Ideas and Experience,* 37/1 (2017), 76–107; Ethan B. Katz, 'An Imperial Entanglement: Anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and Colonialism', *American Historical Review,* 123/4 (2018), 1190–209.

integration has made it possible to further mark out former migrants as Muslims. I am therefore interested in pointing out contradictions and making invisible frames visible.

By addressing the minority question, I am dealing on the one hand with practices that appear as religious differences, including ethnic, class, and linguistic differences. On the other, the situation in Germany is one in which certain differences are discursively anchored in traditional Islam to demarcate danger, threat, and incompatibility with the liberal order and secular modernity. Muslims are not a legally recognized ethnic or religious minority. Unlike legally defined ethnic minorities in Germany, Muslims do not have a historical claim to national territory. In this sense, the minority question cannot be directly asked when it comes to Muslims. Yet I address the issue of how Muslims are legally and politically minoritized even in the context of the memory of the Holocaust. Why have descendants of former Middle Eastern migrants not been accepted as Germans, despite having German citizenship? Instead, they are seen as Muslims.[5] Further, given all the state-funded integration and extremism prevention programmes, how are they addressed and educated to be German? What role does Holocaust memory play in all of this?

MSB: Racism (and in fact antisemitism) against multireligious Middle Eastern communities did not start with the generation of *Gastarbeiter* (foreign workers invited to West Germany after the Second World War). It, too, has a longer history. Ulrich Herbert reminded us recently that *Gastarbeiter* were perceived as a continuation of *Zwangsarbeiter* (forced labourers during the Second World War).[6] Recent

[5] Sultan Doughan, 'Desiring Memorials: Jews, Muslims, and the Human of Citizenship', in Ben Gidley and Samuel Sami Everett (eds.), *Jews and Muslims in Europe*: *Between Discourse and Experience* (Leiden, 2022), 46–70, at [https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004514331_004]; Sultan Doughan, 'Minor Citizens? Holocaust Memory and the Un/Making of Citizenship in Germany', *RePLITO*, 4 Feb. 2022, at [https://doi.org/10.21428/f4c6e600.d6dbedf3].

[6] 'Bielefelder Debatten zur Zeitgeschichte II: Antisemitismus und Rassismus. Konjunkturen und Kontroversen seit 1945', discussion convened by the Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung (ZiF), Bielefeld University, 11 Feb. 2022. Details at [https://aktuell.uni-bielefeld.de/event/bielefelder-debatten-zur-zeitgeschichte-ii-antisemitismus-und-rassismus-konjunkturen-und-kontroversen-seit-1945/], accessed 20 July 2022.

research by Marc David Baer discusses citizens of the Turkish Republic living in Germany during the Third Reich, who feared being mistaken for Jews during the November pogrom of *Kristallnacht*.[7] While some could have been Jewish, others might have identified with different or mixed ethnicities. A recent thesis by Anita Klingler that won the GHIL Ph.D. prize in 2021 mentions a 1931 incident on Kurfürstendamm in Berlin when the Sturmabteilung engaged in violent antisemitic rioting on the evening of Rosh Hashanah. As Klingler notes, the victims included 'many non-Jews, who are German citizens, but also foreigners, such as Romanians, Armenians, etc.' An Egyptian student was also reported as having been punched in the face while leaving a vegetarian restaurant.[8] This reminds us that it was the Nazis who determined who was perceived as Jewish, Sinti, or Roma. The recent history of racism and antisemitism is also entangled: the perpetrator of the antisemitic attack in Halle in 2019 went to a kebab restaurant after his attempt to kill Jews failed. He was searching for alternative victims and targeted Middle Eastern and Muslim immigrants or their descendants. To what extent do you think that highlighting the entangled histories of racism and antisemitism would help recognition of their entanglement today?

SD: Entanglement is an interesting concept. If I understand it correctly, it weaves together separate strands of history into a reality where various political and social issues intersect. This is one way to overcome nationally divided histories like the ones you have described in which members of particular groups, such as the Egyptian student in Nazi Germany or the mistaken Middle Easterner in the kebab restaurant in Halle, become victims of collateral damage.

Entanglement seems to be premised upon separate histories. If you focus on migration and ethnicity, you can make the case that

[7] Marc David Baer, 'Mistaken for Jews: Turkish Ph.D. Students in Nazi Germany', *German Studies Review*, 41/1 (2018), 19–39, at [https://doi.org/10.1353/gsr.2018.0001].

[8] 'Though I am not a Jew, I may be taken for one from my appearance', one witness reported. Both quotations are taken from 'Die Opfer der Meute', *Vorwärts*, 19 Sept. 1931. Cited in Anita Klingler, 'Negotiating Violence: Public Discourses about Political Violence in Interwar Britain and Germany' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2020), 200.

the Egyptian man is an upper-class student in Nazi Germany and completely unrelated to the internal politics of the German racial state. Similarly, the perceived Middle Easterner targeted in the kebab restaurant seems to belong to an altogether different labour migration history, separate from the historical trajectory of Jewish life and the Holocaust, yet becoming 'entangled' in its lethal reality. Again, this is an interesting approach which can show how much broader the problem of antisemitism is. Even though it is centred on the figure of the Jew, it creates these larger effects. But I wonder if entanglement as an analytical lens does not, in the end, reify the logic of nationally separated histories.

My own starting point is a different one. I do not focus on antisemitism and racism as separate objects, although they direct specific work onto different target groups. I am concerned with the framework that makes these differing forms of discrimination and racialization possible in the first place. As you said, racism did not start with the *Gastarbeiter* generation, and antisemitism did not start with the Holocaust, as we know. Where we start the analysis, therefore, is determined by what exactly we want to demonstrate.

MSB: Your research on citizenship shows that Middle Eastern immigrants and their descendants were moved from the category of *Ausländer*[9] to that of Muslim, and suggests that at this time, Holocaust memory took the role of a moral compass. How would you explain your analytical approach to account for this template?

SD: My analytical starting point is 'the secular', through which the purpose of knowledge production emerged as the governance of those lives that seemed valuable within the logic of a modern nation state. Racist and humanist notions of the willed individual man are the outcome of secularism. It could certainly be said that Jewish, Muslim, and Black lives are entangled in Europe today, and one could go on to show how these groups are similarly discriminated against, and how they and their suffering are hierarchized in public discourse. These are all important steps towards acknowledging and showing that racism has

[9] Sultan Doughan, 'Memory Meetings: Semra Ertan's *Ausländer* and the Practice of the Migrant Archive', *Transit: A Journal of Travel, Migration and Multiculturalism in the German-Speaking World* (forthcoming, 2022).

real effects. But in the end, antisemitism, racism, and Islamophobia are all shorthand terminologies connected to more fundamental and structural issues of political equality. And this political equality can currently only be granted from within the framework of the secular state and its institutions. As an anthropologist of secularism, I want to understand why these differentiations emerge, and how they are related to governing institutions.

MSB: What do these terminological problems tell us about current hierarchies—*Opferkonkurrenz*—when it comes to victimhood and discrimination?

SD: Political equality is often only granted to minorities and minoritized subjects when they can make a case for injury, for disadvantage, for discrimination. We can think of the women's rights movement or the US civil rights movement here. As you hint in your question, recognition is key. This is another tricky term. I have been thinking about this when it comes to Muslim communities and the way they have mobilized notions of anti-Muslim racism in certain instances while remaining rather cautious in others. It seems to me that there are at least two problems here. One is that anti-Muslim racism is brought into play when we talk about individual prejudice and physical violence. The language of racism often lends itself to these instances.

If we take other cases in recent history, such as the headscarf debates that had major legal, social, and personal consequences, especially for women who could not take up jobs, we do not talk about racism or even gender discrimination. My point is not to claim that this is real racism, but rather how recognition itself can stand in the way of making a case for equality. The recognizing institution is often a state institution. What do you do when your form of lived religiosity is perceived as detrimentally opposed to secular principles? And these principles are embedded in a range of rights and a particular notion of freedom. What if your way of life is considered not only to be violating the secular principles of the state, but also as causing unfreedom and spreading the wrong ideology? This kind of discourse has been circulating in the last two decades, ever since Muslim communities tried to have Islam officially acknowledged as a religion with a public

status in Germany. This discourse might not physically kill a person, but it is socially and politically deeply disabling and stigmatizing. In addition, it has contributed to a social atmosphere of suspicion of real or perceived Muslims. In other words, a victim narrative grounded in the language of racism is difficult to mobilize here.

MSB: You highlight the differences in governance which the state and legislation directly or indirectly impose on specific minoritized groups, enhanced by public perception through the media, for example. Do you see the potential for alliances in these forms of governance? Could you give us an example of how victim groups have refused to subscribe to these hierarchies?

SD: An example is the circumcision debate in the summer of 2012 that again targeted Muslim communities with the same full legal thrust of liberal discourse.[10] Ultimately, circumcision was not banned because Jewish communities perceived this as an attack on the promise of Jewish life after the Holocaust and appealed against the decision. But the language of antisemitism was not used here either. Jewish and Muslim bodies intersected and constituted a joint target, but the main one was the 'Islamic practice' of circumcision. To speak to your question about entanglement, in the end this entanglement shamed the German government into backtracking, and even acknowledging that there were contradictory rights in play (children's rights versus religious freedom). But ultimately it was historical responsibility for Jewish life that undid the circumcision ban.

There was no concern for what this ban would have done to Muslims. It could be asked whether this decision was not in principle about the minorities, but about the kind of nation state Germany wanted to be, and banning Jewish circumcision forged a bad link with an image of the past. This decision laid bare the fact that the secular liberal framework is not simply neutral and universal, but is also historically shaped. The secular as a framework through which we know, govern, are governed by, and are oriented towards the nation

[10] Sultan Doughan and Hannah Tzuberi, 'Still Questioned: Reconfiguring the Jew out of the "Muslim Problem" in Europe', in 'A Forum on Elad Lapidot's *Jews Out of the Question: A Critique of Anti-Anti-Semitism*', *Marginalia*, 1 July 2022, at [https://themarginaliareview.com/still-questioned/], accessed 19 July 2022.

state as citizens is predicated upon norms and moral values that are based on the experience of the Holocaust in Germany. In a way, this is a German story and relationship with the secular, but Europe as a political project is built upon this.

MSB: The figure of the Muslim thus complicates both the overall picture and the figure of the Jew itself. It has what you have described as 'a double effect on the figure of the Jew', that is, 'the potential to . . . reconfigure Jewish traditions as concrete forms of life'.[11] Were there cases in the past when the kinds of incidents that you describe also led to alliances between Jewish and Muslim interest groups, and what can we learn from such examples?

SD: What the circumcision ban controversy demonstrates is that there are clear victim hierarchies in Germany, and they were reinforced by the debate. This certainly shows us that despite the Holocaust, secularized Western Christianity is still the norm for how an institutionalized religion is organized. The figure of the Muslim makes the figure of the Jew tangible as a member of a living community embedded in a tradition with certain practices. But again, this is rather incidental and triggered by the framework of the secular, in which the Muslim body is constantly reproduced as a problem. From my encounters and conversations with Muslim representatives of Turkish mosques in Berlin, I know that they had given up on the circumcision case and were taken by surprise when Jewish communities forged ahead. There was a sense of relief and gratitude, from what I could tell, but I do not recall that anyone told me about existing Jewish–Muslim alliances or solidarity.

In the past certainly, before Muslims were singled out as antisemites, the Central Council of Jews in Germany had been vocal against right-wing racism and arson attacks against refugee and Turkish homes in Germany. The Muslim and Jewish organizations I collaborated with during my fieldwork were often run and organized by pious and practising Muslims and Jews, but the organizations were not necessarily religious, such as the Salaam–Shalom Initiative in Berlin, spearheaded by the then rabbinical student Armin Langer.

[11] Ibid. See also Gil Anidjar, *The Jew, the Arab: A History of the Enemy* (Stanford, Calif., 2003).

Langer attracted a great deal of public attention, partly because he sometimes attacked the Central Council of Jews for fuelling anti-Muslim and specifically anti-Arab sentiment, especially during the refugee crisis of 2015. But I think he also attracted attention because he evinced that there was not one single Jewish voice, but a dissenting plurality and much discussion, often not audible to those outside the Jewish communities. The 'Jewish voice' in the German public seems rather monolithically circumscribed, so this young organization that attracted mostly Muslim university students of Turkish background and many Jewish Israelis, who were keen to meet Muslims and Arabs, managed to build some alliances. For Turkish Muslims in Germany, Jews are desirable allies in the project of political equality. But I wonder if the struggle against anti-Muslim racism has focused on finding supporters and has not extended solidarity to other forms of racism, especially anti-Black or anti-Roma.

MSB: Anthropologists working on this issue, including yourself, Esra Özyürek, and Irit Dekel, have shown how aspects of German Holocaust memory culture, such as discourse and memorials centred on a special German–Jewish or Judeo-Christian bond, often exclude and marginalize People of Colour.[12] While some from migrant backgrounds have been charged with 'inherent antisemitism' and accused of lacking empathy with Holocaust victims, your fieldwork suggests that many can strongly relate to the history of the Holocaust as victims of contemporary racism. That said, they relate to the Holocaust in ways that are markedly different from the normative framework.[13] How does this play out in your own fieldwork?

[12] Irit Dekel, 'Jews and Other Others at the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin', *Anthropological Journal of European Cultures,* 23/2 (2014), 71–84, at [http://www.jstor.org/stable/43234610], accessed 20 July 2022; Esra Özyürek, 'Muslim Minorities as Germany's Past Future: Islam Critics, Holocaust Memory, and Immigrant Integration', *Memory Studies*, 15/1 (2022), 139–54, at [https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698019856057]; ead., 'Rethinking Empathy: Emotions Triggered by the Holocaust among the Muslim-Minority in Germany', *Anthropological Theory*, 18/4 (2018), 456–77, at [https://doi.org/10.1177/1463499618782369].

[13] Sultan Doughan, 'Deviation: The Present Orders', Member Voices, *Fieldsights*, 18 Sept. 2013, at [https://culanth.org/fieldsights/deviation-the-present-orders], accessed 20 July 2022.

SD: I should be clear about several things implicit in your question. The figure of the Jew as a former victim of genocide weighs differently in Germany. But this raises the question of whether genocidal pasts are ultimate qualifiers for redress. I am also not suggesting that all forms of antisemitism are equal or that there is necessarily a progression from racism to racially motivated genocide. When it comes to exclusion and marginalization, I would like to further differentiate between what happens in pedagogical practice and the experience of death and survival that goes beyond the usual victim/perpetrator binaries.

Certainly, some views are excluded, but they are never banned from pedagogy. As I showed in my work on German civic education, opposing views can provide welcome opportunities to build a different narrative. In the tolerance projects sponsored by the German state, civic educators did not simply exclude the Palestinian perspective on 1948, but they usually 'corrected' this narrative by explaining that it was the Arab armies who had ordered them to leave, or that wealthy landowners had sold their land legally. The aim of these corrections was to stabilize German victim categories and to defuse antisemitic sentiment.

These examples show that there is an invitation, a bringing in, an address, but this involves a clear structure of how to come in, how to see, and how to relate. There is obviously a range in all of this, and it is not a single story. In principle, however, the perspective on the Holocaust adopted in Germany is that of the historical perpetrator and the current guardian of liberal democracy. It could be said that the perspective of the victim is excluded, unless you are Jewish, belong to another injured party, or are descended from survivors. The normative position, therefore, is that of past superiority founded on racism and present-day superiority built on perpetrator consciousness. I am calling the latter a position of superiority because it is intertwined with a triumphalist narrative of having overcome perpetratorship in ways that many other nation states have not. In other words, what are playing out here are nationalist sentiments in moralizing terms.

A sense of survival and death are crucial for engagement with catastrophes, and these go beyond the clear-cut binaries of victim and perpetrator. In a recent article, I discuss how one student was shocked

to see young children in striped pyjamas with tears in their eyes; another girl discovered her own name in the records at Auschwitz. But there are other unpublished instances in my fieldwork. One student could not believe that there was an agency for labour (*Arbeitsamt*) specifically for Jews in Berlin—it seemed so trivial and strange to him. He also thought that all Jews had been immediately deported; it seemed cruel to him that they were managed in an institution such as the *Arbeitsamt*. These were all intimate engagements with the workings of this genocide that could shift the big categories of victim and perpetrator and create an understanding of genocidal mechanisms as things that are not outside of history, but present and familiar in their own everyday lives. But they were also anchored in something the students brought to these educational sites: a sense of violation and humiliation.

According to a civic educator at one memorial site, practising Muslim students were curious about images in which Jewish religiosity was mocked. Certainly, they could anchor these images of mockery in something they were aware of, if not from the position of the perpetrator or the historical victim of genocide, then perhaps from a sense of shame for their visible religious difference. For Palestinian participants in these tolerance projects, the word 'Jew' had a very different meaning. It was at times hard to dissociate the term 'Jew' from 'Israeli', but when they focused on what had happened and how, the events of the Holocaust were eye-opening for most participants.

MSB: Where do you see an opportunity for solidarity, in light of Germany's changing demographics? Germany now has a large Muslim population, many Palestinians (who are automatically marked as Muslim), and an influx of more recent immigration by liberal Jews.

SD: In Berlin I have seen Palestinian refugee women and female Holocaust survivors forging friendships and sharing forms of care. Palestine activists know that religious commonalities will not suffice as terms to talk about a range of political issues. Instead, groups like Jewish Voice for Peace and Palestine Speaks have mobilized for a cause beyond religious identities and notions of victimhood. What we can learn from all this is that solidarity alliances organized around

common struggles can take victimhood only as a starting point, a trigger. But they will need to forge a more rooted cause based on the experience of injustice to shift the terms of injury and perhaps the frame of recognition altogether.

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MEMORY CULTURES 2.0 AND MUSEUMS

JAŚ ELSNER IN CONVERSATION WITH MIRJAM SARAH BRUSIUS

Museums are central to memory culture. Material culture can function as a surrogate for written history. Germany offers an intriguing example with a recent addition to its national museums: the Humboldt Forum. Housed in the reconstructed imperial palace, it has attracted much criticism, but has also sparked debates about Germany's long-neglected colonial past. Current discussions have revealed the colonial worldviews behind ethnology collections now housed in the Humboldt Forum and the Museum for Asian Art, for instance. The custodians of the collections of antiquities on Museum Island across the road, however, have so far largely remained silent and aloof, as though they are uninvolved in this narrative. The conversation, it seems, has only just started, and the deeper one digs, the more issues emerge. What is also striking is the lack of engagement with something otherwise central to German memory culture: the question of Holocaust remembrance and how the Nazi era relates to these sites and museum collections. In this conversation, the classicist Jaś Elsner and Mirjam Sarah Brusius discuss memory culture in the Humboldt Forum and its surroundings. They explore it as a multilayered site where colonial collecting and scholarship, antiquity and its reception, (the lack of) Holocaust remembrance, and contemporary politics tacitly converge in complex and largely unresolved ways.

MIRJAM SARAH BRUSIUS (MSB): Let us begin by outlining the status quo at the Humboldt Forum. Where do you see the major pitfalls and blind spots in what has been made of this urban space in the context of German memory culture?

JAŚ ELSNER (JE): First, we must ask to what extent the addition of the Humboldt Forum to the Berlin Museum Island nexus is a decentring exercise in any sense. Does it grant a real voice to different non-Western cultures, rather than expressing models of thought sanctioned and spoken through colonialism or Eurocentrism? How do the materials that will be conserved, curated, stored, and displayed in the Humboldt Forum stand in relation to that extraordinary parade from classical antiquity at the Altes Museum, via the cradle of civilizations in

the Pergamon Museum and Neues Museum, Christianity at the Bode Museum, and the culmination of all these things in Germany and Italy in the Bode's sculpture collection, and in Germany in the paintings of the Alte Nationalgalerie? That is an extraordinary imperial narrative of the late nineteenth century rising to German nationalism, which has remained largely unchanged despite all that happened in the twentieth century. It is, apparently, undergoing significant—but not yet wholly clear—ideological and structural reconfiguration at this very moment. The centre of the old story is a direct line from antiquity to Germany. The addition of an ethnographic/Asian supplement in the old Schloss does not necessarily look like much of a challenge to that story and could easily be turned into a confirmation of it. This is a deep problem. The very reconfiguration of the current museums is itself potentially a problem. Their present form is well exemplified by the architectural structure and orchestration of the Pergamon Museum, which descends from the post-classical Hellenistic era via the colourful arabesques of the Ishtar Gate and ancient Babylon to end in Islam. One might have preserved this configuration and critiqued its form and ideology explicitly—this would at least have been an option. But instead, there will be a reshaping of the building that will have the great advantage of allowing much more into the display, but will effectively and inevitably adapt the old narrative rather than start again. There are real questions which need some airing—choices made (consciously or unconsciously) to preserve the ideological models of the past, even if one tinkers with them.

MSB: You are alluding to Johann Joachim Winckelmann and the *Geschichtsbild* (view of history) that derives from him. In a recent radio programme about Museum Island, which I made with Lorenz Rollhäuser and which also involves you as an interviewee, we discuss Winckelmann's work as an 'ideological template' that degrades other cultures, while the White Greeks are seen as the pinnacle of civilization and White Germans their heirs.[1] In other words, it was only through this elevated view of White antiquity that negative views of so-called

[1] Mirjam Brusius and Lorenz Rollhäuser, 'Imperiale Träume auf der Berliner Museumsinsel: Auf Sumpf gebaut', Deutschlandfunk Kultur, 28 June 2022, at [https://www.hoerspielundfeature.de/auf-sumpf-gebaut-100.html], accessed 1 July 2022.

'uncivilized cultures', now housed in the Humboldt Forum across the road, were validated. The monumentalism of Museum Island was perverted by the Nazis, who believed that superior German civilization was the rightful heir of classical antiquity, reduced to ideal 'Aryan' racial types. The Whiteness of these sculptures prevails, although we now know that neither the sculptures, nor the people of antiquity, were in fact White. You are a classicist who has recently been pushing forward debates about globalized classics, which are central to this problem. What are globalized classics and why does moving away from a concept of White antiquity matter for the future of museums as sites of national memory—and also for a more inclusive, multicultural approach to German memory culture in general, as some contributors to this special issue suggest?

JE: The challenge of bringing Berlin's great collections of ethnographic materials and also Asian art into the arena of Museum Island and its unique displays of antiquities is vast. The bottom line is that in conceptual terms, Winckelmann's template—brilliant solution though it was to a series of questions about European cultural ancestralism—is entirely useless as an empathetic interpretative model for understanding non-European cultures. It is entirely grounded in the conceptual and philosophical terminology of Greco-Roman and European Christian thought, inflected through the Enlightenment. How can that cope with equally or more ancient models of thinking grounded in concepts about materials, objects, images, art-making (let alone ontologies of being) that are entirely different? Take Buddhism. How can a European intellectual foundation based on the certainty that we have a single life (itself in fact a polemically constructed ideological fix in the twenty-second book of Augustine of Hippo's *City of God*, even though it is secularists as much as Christians who hold such views today) make serious sense of a religious and cultural system in which reincarnation over endless lifetimes is simply a truth? How can an art history and a museology founded on presence (whether the ontological speculations of antiquity or Judeo-Christian–Islamic models of a monotheistic God) cope with the arts of a religion grounded in a very powerfully and philosophically argued theory of emptiness, as is certainly the case with Mahayana Buddhism? These

issues are even more fraught in the case of ethnographic collections of cultures whose oral histories and philosophies have only been written down in modernity. Yet to create dialogues with such different and differentiated worlds is the key to the problems of the globalized humanities—including classics, art history, and museum practice. It is both a cultural phenomenon and a scholarly agenda in the current world, and crucial also to new *Altertumswissenschaften* (the study of ancient cultures and societies) for a new era.

MSB: Berlin's latest neo-classical addition is the James Simon Gallery, which functions as the new entrance to Museum Island, and whose Jewish namesake is honoured by an inscription. Yet what is missing is a plaque explaining that the Bode Museum next door, which reopened in 2006, was in 1956 knowingly named after a former director and committed antisemite, Wilhelm von Bode, who dismissed Simon's Jewish colleagues. Curiously, the infamous *Zivilisationsbruch* (civilizational rupture) is materially almost absent from this site, although it was precisely here that it was prepared by disciplines such as archaeology and anthropology, which undergirded these museums with their scholarship and contributed significantly to race science around 1900. A sign at the entrance of the Humboldt Forum reminds visitors that 'much happened' at this site, yet it remains silent about the years 1933 to 1945. This is noteworthy given that the German state's memory politics, especially after 1989–90, elevated remembrance of the Shoah to *Staatsraison* while, until recently, it did not necessarily encourage colonial remembrance. At the Humboldt Forum we see an odd inversion of that, or at least no linkage between colonial atrocities and Nazism. What do you make of the fact that events that are so central to German memory culture feel strangely disconnected from this site as one walks through it?

JE: In the case of the Humboldt Forum and its packaging of the non-European and ethnographic, we may ask if this will stand magnificently and silently for itself, or whether it will need to carry a long post-colonial disclaimer in the form of an information-packed placard, full of apologies for the past and old photographs, of the kind that defines the memory landscape of so many monuments and sites in the city of Berlin?

This last is not a joke. Take, for example, the Kindertransport monument, which in 2015, during my three-month stint as a Fellow at the Humboldt University of Berlin, I passed daily on my way to work, alongside its explanatory plaque (Figs. 1 and 2). The monument is pretty awful (I admit that this is a subjective aesthetic observation out of keeping with academic objectivity!) and the claims it makes are tendentious. There really is no link at all between the Kindertransport and the trains to the camps, which were not only for children, except for the happenstance that this group statue stands next to a railway station and is concerned with trains. The thing really does need explaining in the panels. But those panels are worrying: not only on this statue, but in the whole monumental landscape of Berlin.

Fig. 1: Frank Meisler, *Trains to Life – Trains to Death*. Kindertransport memorial monument, Friedrichstrasse Railway Station, Berlin. Bronze; erected 2008. Photo credit: Jaś Elsner, 2015.

Fig. 2: Signage around the Kindertransport memorial monument, Berlin. Photo credit: Jaś Elsner, 2015.

They attempt, inevitably, to control the space of interpretation—and one can see *why* in the context of the return of neo-Nazism all over Europe, but also when monuments are as mediocre as this one, as ill-thought-out as this one—both aesthetically and topographically—in its attempt to make a claim through pure visual and spatial rhetoric, and as illogical in connecting different kinds of stories. But the strategy of interpretative control is inevitably—and in this capital city of Germany problematically—authoritarian, and I would suggest that this makes it potentially counterproductive. It has, however, become normative in Berlin, and a really striking, mega-informative feature of the museological and memorial landscape in a city which of course bears unique scars and caesuras scratched across its material cultural and visual environment. Yet when the authoritarian strategy of information control is not applied—in a city where such controls are ubiquitous and especially when insufficient consideration has gone into thinking through the monumental context—other problems arise.

MSB: Could you give an example?

JE: What comes to mind is a problematic instance of the selection of visual culture in relation to a lack of explanatory material, found

very close to the Humboldt Forum and Museum Island's antiquity collections. Mount the steps of the Winckelmann Institute of the Humboldt University of Berlin, just next to Humboldt Forum and Museum Island, and you will be confronted by the magnificent casts shown in Figs. 3–5. First, on the mezzanine as the stairway turns back on itself, we have (unlabelled) a magisterial Roman historical relief: the great triumphal scene from the inner passageway of the Arch of Titus in the Roman Forum, from roughly the 80s or early 90s CE (Fig. 3). This cast is grey. Then, further up, we have a fine relief from the Meroitic site of Musawwarat es Sufra in Sudan, dating to the third century BCE—this time with a label, since I suppose Musawwarat is a bit obscure to classicists (Fig. 4). This cast is brown. Finally, as we reach the top and the small figure from Olympia who nestles by the staircase, we turn into a great open space at the zenith to find a substantial section of the west pediment of the great temple of Zeus at Olympia from the 460s BCE, with Apollo at its centre, and the spectacular Victory (Fig. 5). These casts are pure white.

Fig. 3: The lower turn of the staircase at the Winckelmann Institute, Humboldt University of Berlin: plaster cast of the Jewish spoils from the Arch of Titus. Photo credit: Jaś Elsner, 2015.



Fig. 4: The upper turn of the staircase at the Winckelmann Institute, Humboldt University of Berlin: plaster cast of a relief from Musawwarat es Sufra in Sudan. The caption reads: 'King Arnekhamani and Prince Arka. Plaster cast from the south external wall of the Lion Temple of Musawwarat es Sufra, Sudan. Late Meroitic period, Kingdom of Kush.' Photo credit: Jaś Elsner, 2015.

Fig. 5: The light-filled room at the top of the stairs, Winckelmann Institute, Humboldt University of Berlin: casts of the Nike of Paionios and the west pediment of Olympia. Photo credit: Jaś Elsner, 2015.

Now what does this story mean? There are no explanatory panels; there is no strategy of interpretative control. At the top is the glory that was Greece, presented in its most Panhellenic and celebratory form and in some of its finest masterpieces, all from the classical zenith most supremely appreciated in later periods. This is simultaneously a story of German intervention, since these masterpieces are the product of German archaeology in the most significant dig conducted in mainland Greece by the German archaeological institute. Both the temple and the Nike statue were excavated by a German team in 1875. As we climb to this pinnacle, the simultaneous centre of Greece and Germany, of Greek culture and German scholarship, we ascend through a kind of antique ethnography. Can you see the relevance of this story to the problem of the Humboldt Forum? Immediately before Greece is Africa—not prior in time but primitive (. . . you fill in the interpretative dots . . .) and, interestingly, the results of a Humboldt University dig in GDR times. And what should we make of the reliefs from the Arch of Titus? These reliefs have no archaeological connection with Berlin. What can whoever chose to put this material here possibly have been thinking when they put the panel of the Jewish spoils, the Roman state's public celebration of imperial triumph over a recalcitrant ethnos, the image of the captured Menorah in this place, in this building, in this city of all cities—without any attempt to explain themselves? Did you know, by the way, that the archaeological institute got its name in 1941 (of all the possible dates since its founding in the early nineteenth century) during the tenure as director of Gerhart Rodenwaldt, the greatest German archaeologist of his era, who shot himself as the Russian tanks rolled into Berlin in April 1945, a few days before his Führer? And what do we do with the colour coding that mounts the steps towards white?

MSB: These casts illustrate how Nazism and antiquity are deeply intertwined, both in the museum and in the academy—although it must be said that universities as institutions appear to be reluctant to join these debates. The examples also demonstrate the impossibility of detaching the scholarly study of antiquity from the troubled colonial history of the Humboldt Forum's collections across the road.

Like anthropology, archaeology also underpinned race science, and also scientifically informed antisemitism. All these disciplines have colonial roots. I can further see the difficulty with respect to the control exerted by information panels, or the lack of them that you are pointing out here. What does this example tell us about the unchallenged universalism of the memory narrative presented to us on these sites?

JE: I am not making accusations about the Winckelmann Institute: it is easy to explain away its amazingly egregious madness as simply unthinking. But the questions it raises are very real—the questions of unconscious repetition of (in this case) tropes of antisemitism and racist primitivism rising to the triumphant white of Greece, especially in a liberal context where you cannot control the responses of viewers, and a global context where non-Germans have little or no sense of the ideological and cultural baggage weighing down this whole display. I cannot fully control my own responses to the extraordinary display of casts. My reactions may not be the normative or appropriate ones in the context of modern Berlin, but what I see is the city's history—its open scars, its relentless commemorative culture, almost always commemorating horror—and the fact that my presence here is a happenstance of history, since my parents should both have died in Poland, as so many of the family did in the very year after Rodenwaldt renamed his institute and at the behest of the last great globalizing impulse of this nation. The very existence and presence of an ethnographic and Asian appendage to the incredible museological story of European supremacy that leads from Greece to Germany in Museum Island, and has done so since before the First World War, is a huge problem of interpretative credibility. Its very globalism, with universalist claims and collections, dwarfs the parochialism of my own concerns with the Jewish spoils and African reliefs on the staircase of the archaeological institute.

MSB: Meticulous care was invested in preserving bullet holes, scars of the Second World War, when the facade of the Neues Museum on Museum Island was renovated—scars of a war that Germany itself started. This uncomfortably recalls the fact that the German perpetrators of the Holocaust first saw themselves as victims of the war—a

view which held sway for decades. Yet, as we discussed earlier, other traces of Nazism are not fully explained around Museum Island, the Humboldt Forum, and their surroundings. This special issue is concerned with the topic of *Opferkonkurrenz*. Do you see any potential for colonial histories and their connections with the Holocaust to intertwine and—in theory—be made visible on this multilayered site? Can the reception of antiquity play a role here?

JE: What is the centre presupposed in the Humboldt Forum story? How does it construct the centre of its colonial, or post-colonial, or anti-colonial, or post-post-colonial narratives? How does it define its narratives? Ought it also to perform a huge screen of post-imperialist self-flagellation in the style of all the Holocaust monuments? And is such a performance any real kind of expiation or just the apologetic excuse after which we can get on with business as usual? These are questions with ramifications way beyond our specific focus on the Humboldt Forum—questions about the immigrant crisis in Europe today; questions about the refugee crisis and whether we privilege White refugees from Ukraine over non-White people from Syria or Afghanistan; questions about the failure of leadership in the West today. But they are hugely relevant to the immense, generous, and in so many ways laudable cultural enterprise that is seeing the Berlin museums reconfigured for the new millennium.

MSB: The master narrative of these sites, so it seems, invites visitors to see material evidence for the success of the Humboldtian promise of *Bildung*, of cultural education and humanistic improvement, of which these museums and academic sites formed a part. But we know that this 'civilizing mission' did not exactly work in Germany.

JE: So here is where I see the problem. The wilfully Eurocentric and Germanocentric cultural model of Museum Island is the instantiation of a philosophy of *Bildung* created in the nineteenth century here in Prussia and planned under the empire. It continued, despite the First World War and the great difficulties thereafter, until the completion of the Pergamon Museum (the last to be constructed on the site) in the late Weimar Republic. That philosophy of *Bildung*, grounded in *Altertumswissenschaften*, underwritten by the German university system, and cast in stone by the Berlin museums, proved itself not fit for

purpose in the years between 1933 and 1945. Put simply, if *Bildung*—cultural formation—makes you a better person, then how could the land where it was perfected have planned and conducted the Holocaust? In the post-war years, instead of rethinking the basis of what we want education, culture, and the museum to be, we—and by this I mean all the Western countries, including Europe and America—have been engaged in what is largely a redemptive process of putting back together the pieces shattered in the Second World War and its aftermath, the Cold War. Nowhere is this more obvious than in Berlin. What we have not done is to start again. Yet the premise that education and culture make you a better person is not true and has been disproved. In this city and this country.

MSB: The round table in this special issue focuses as much on *Opferkonkurrenz* as on alliances—that is, the historically informed and future potential networks of solidarity between victimized groups. What kind of epistemic tone would museums and the academy have to strike in order to foster such conversations?

JE: The challenge of globalization is a wonderful one because it does, in principle, allow the possibility of decentring, of finally giving up the central place of the European tradition (which is not the same as devaluing its qualities), and of a dialogue that could ultimately be on equal terms with other traditions whose modernity is rooted in great and venerable antiquity as well as deep philosophical thought. But that is a vast project and will take generations to achieve—it requires talking on equal terms, not European ones or Eurocentric ones, nor on post-colonialist and 'decolonizing' ones (which merely invert the tropes of colonialism), in discourses that empower non-European models of thinking and argument alongside European ones. We are not there yet. We are at best at the inception of such an enterprise, in which the globalized humanities (including classics and art history) have a key place. At the moment, frankly, we have no idea where we are, and are trying (at best) to find bases from which a new way of working might begin. If you set in stone, for the next hundred years, a formal instantiation of the current global vision, as is planned, indeed, arguably has already taken place for the Humboldt Forum, then you establish a Eurocentric confusion,

unconfident of its Eurocentrism but unable to escape it, long before we have the conceptual means to think outside the box. This is a disaster.

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CLASSICS REREAD

ON THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF AN EXTRAORDINARY BOOK

HELMUT ZEDELMAIER

ANTHONY GRAFTON, *The Footnote: A Curious History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), 256 pp. ISBN 978 0 674 30760 5 (paperback), £20.95

Footnotes are peculiar things. All scholars use them to demonstrate that the statements they make in their work are not arbitrary, but based on a careful consideration of data, sources, and research findings. Inserted in greater or smaller numbers at the bottom of the page or sometimes at the end of the piece, or in sociological and scientific work as 'parenthetical references' in the text, they are not particularly well-liked, however. Generally set in a smaller font size than the main text, footnotes are for many people a chore that they like to 'crack lazy jokes' about, but which they need to attend to nevertheless.[1] Stringent argument, explanations based on evidence, and good writing in the main text constitute the tour de force that allows authors to demonstrate their skills (at least in the humanities). This is where they can put on display their specific knowledge, capacity for innovation, and ability to express themselves—where they can prove their expertise. Footnotes, by contrast, are something owed to 'the discipline'. In other words, while the main text demonstrates individuality, footnotes document a team effort. They call up data, sources consulted, and what has already been discovered about the

Trans. by Angela Davies (GHIL)

[1] See Georg Stanitzek, 'Zur Lage der Fußnote', *Merkur: Deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken*, 68/776 (Jan. 2014), 1–14, at 4.

subject. To put it differently once again, footnotes point to what is possible, what makes the text dance. This is what the modern epistemic regime expects. Its professional adepts are 'tuned in to an automatic questioning of the footnote apparatus . . . What does this person know? Have I been mentioned? Have I missed anything? Is there any evidence of theoretical imagination at work? What does this person permit themselves? What *can* they permit themselves? In short, how do they work?' And the passage continues: 'one can see almost at first glance whether it is fear and obedience, or freedom and generosity that are expressed in the use of footnotes.'[2]

This lovely quotation is from an essay by Georg Stanitzek, a German literary scholar who, without using any footnotes at all,[3] precisely analyses the present state of the footnote. Stanitzek complains about the lack of academic reflection on the footnote, about which, he claims, 'there is little empirical research worth mentioning'.[4] But, he says, there is one exception to this: Anthony Grafton, 'a giant of research on footnotes . . . from whose shoulders one can take a look around'.[5] In 2014, when Stanitzek's musings on the state of the footnote were published, Grafton's book *The Footnote: A Curious History* was already almost twenty years old, as the first German edition had been published in 1995.[6] The revised English edition of 1997 (slightly expanded by comparison with the German version), translated into French (1998), Portuguese (1998), Spanish (1998), Italian (2000), and Turkish (2012), is among the Princeton professor's most successful

[2] Ibid. 3–4.

[3] But another essay by Georg Stanitzek which looks at the footnote in light of relations between the essay and academia around 1900, published two years later, is richly equipped with interesting footnotes about the footnote and its history: 'Geist und Essay um 1900: Typografische Beobachtungen', in Michael Ansel, Jürgen Egyptien, and Hans-Edwin Friedrich (eds.), *Der Essay als Universalgattung des Zeitalters: Diskurse, Themen und Positionen zwischen Jahrhundertwende und Nachkriegszeit* (Leiden, 2016), 319–37.

[4] Stanitzek, 'Zur Lage der Fußnote', 2.

[5] Ibid. 11.

[6] Anthony Grafton, *Die tragischen Ursprünge der deutschen Fußnote*, trans. H. Jochen Bußmann (Berlin, 1995). One year earlier, the basics of the book had been published as an essay: Anthony Grafton, 'The Footnote from de Thou to Ranke', in id. and Suzanne Marchand (eds.), *Proof and Persuasion in History*, special issue of *History and Theory*, 33/4 (1994), 53–76.

books.[7] At a little over 200 pages long, the slim volume was praised internationally in numerous reviews, and reached a wider readership than a specialist academic one alone.[8] Among other things, the strong response it evoked is demonstrated by its own lasting career as a footnote. Why has it been so successful? What sort of story is told by *The Footnote: A Curious History*?

In his quest for the origins of the footnote, Grafton consulted many printed and unprinted historical sources. But it is only the combination of a solid basis in the sources with a sparkling narrative that makes the book into a *Curious History*. Grafton's writing is vivid, rich in metaphors, and sometimes also ironic. And by not allowing his story to progress in a straight line towards a goal, he undermines the usual path of historical reconstruction, preferring to tell his story in reverse, before ultimately going 'back to the future'.[9] The book begins with a sort of epistemological phenomenology of historical footnotes. Starting with Leopold von Ranke, Grafton traces a path back to Edward Gibbon and Jacques-Auguste de Thou, and thence to collections of early modern antiquarian and ecclesiastical sources and their prototypes from antiquity. Arriving at Pierre Bayle, a surprising end point, the narrative goes forwards again in the direction of modernity ('The Cartesian Origins of the Modern Footnote'). The arc of the story is often broken by digressions—typical of essays— relating insightful anecdotes drawn from different cultures and periods of historiographical documentation. Grafton casts light on the historical role of annotations and evidence by discussing examples in illuminating detail, thus bringing the working methods and techniques of his protagonists to life, but also their passions, politics, strategies, and carelessness.

[7] See the precise bibliographical data in C. Philipp E. Nothaft, 'Anthony Grafton: A Bibliography to 2015', in Ann Blair and Anja-Silvia Goeing (eds.), *For the Sake of Learning: Essays in Honor of Anthony Grafton*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 2016), i. pp. li–lxxvii, at li–lii.

[8] Despite the general admiration, the longest review (as far as I know) was critical of Grafton's historical reconstruction of the footnote (in the German version): Martin Gierl, 'Gesicherte Polemik: Zur polemischen Natur geschichtswissenschaftlicher Wahrheit und zu Anthony Graftons *Die tragischen Ursprünge der deutschen Fußnote*', *Historische Anthropologie*, 4/2 (1996), 267–79.

[9] Chapters 5 and 6 are headed: 'Back to the Future 1' and 'Back to the Future 2'. See Grafton, *The Footnote*, 122 and 148.

But in this work Grafton is interested less in the origins of footnotes or endnotes in the narrow formal (typographical) sense, than in how the bottom part of the page came to be primarily the visible expression—the footprint, so to speak—of what is known as critical historiography. Taking the footnote as a small but revealing object of observation, Grafton wants to understand how modern historical criticism came about and to identify how it was different from traditional historiography: 'The appearance of footnotes—and such related devices as documentary and critical appendices—separates historical modernity from tradition.'[10] On his way 'back to the future', Grafton demonstrates that the principle governing the modern historical footnote—that is, to make historiography transparent in terms of the sources and research on which it is based—had a protracted development in the early modern period. Critical history did not start with Ranke, who successfully dramatized himself as the founder of critical historiography without any existing model.[11] Grafton shows that modern historiography was composed of many layers of tradition, with the footnote serving as a sort of palimpsest for this. His exposure of earlier layers of historical criticism undermines the superiority with which modern historians from the nineteenth century onwards have programmatically set themselves apart from their premodern colleagues. As a student of the great Arnaldo Momigliano and a profound philologist himself, Grafton, author of the seminal *Study in the History of Classical Scholarship*,[12] widened a narrow, disciplinary perspective out into the history of historiography. In his search for the origins of historical criticism, he was able to include the whole spectrum of early modern European scholarship, not least in its interaction with the new (natural) sciences. What came out of this is a reconstruction of the 'origins of modern history',[13] which is still one of the best studies that the history of historiography has produced.

Footnotes did not always convey a serious impression of academic criticism, and this is still true today. Numerous revealing anecdotes recounted by Grafton make this clear. And there has long been some

[10] Ibid. 23–4.

[11] Ibid. 37, 56–7.

[12] Anthony Grafton, *Joseph Scaliger: A Study in the History of Classical Scholarship*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1983–93).

[13] Grafton, *The Footnote*, 149.

resistance to using critical notes, as Ranke confirms, calling footnotes 'distasteful things'.[14] With the establishment of the footnote, whose 'high social, if not typographical, position' was legitimated by the marriage between 'history and philology, its parents',[15] narrative in the main text could no longer unfold as freely and independently as it had in the traditional history-writing of antiquity, but had to be restrained. While the text on the top part of the page presents the past as a complete, finished image, the lower part indicates that it is, strictly speaking, accessible only in a fragmentary form. Its investigation is incomplete and it is soon likely to become outdated, when historical criticism discovers new sources or new research suggests that the narrative requires revision. In this way footnotes always document the incompleteness of narrated history, and constantly issue a certain democratic appeal for scholars to undertake more careful research themselves in order to confirm the impression given by the top of the page, or to revise it where necessary. Grafton approves of this, finding it enlightened, democratic, and social, and thus ends his book with praise of the footnote: 'Only the use of footnotes enables historians to make their texts not monologues but conversations, in which modern scholars, their predecessors, and their subjects all take part.'[16]

Michael Bernays, a German literary scholar and author of 'Zur Lehre von den Citaten und Noten',[17] had a similar view at the end of the nineteenth century. Grafton, who owes much to this work by Bernays, praises it as a 'pioneering essay on the history of the footnote'.[18] Georg Stanitzek, too, mentioned above as an admirer of Grafton's book, is not only a precise analyst but a great friend of the footnote, and complains in his essay about the lack of interest in, and indeed, disdain for it. Footnotes tend to be replaced by pictograms and information boxes in introductions to academic courses for German students today.[19]

[14] Ibid. 64. [15] Ibid. 24. [16] Ibid. 234.

[17] Michael Bernays, 'Zur Lehre von den Citaten und Noten' [1892] in id., *Schriften zur Kritik und Litteraturgeschichte*, 4 vols. (Berlin, 1895–9), vol. iv: *Zur Neueren und neuesten Litteraturgeschichte; Zum deutschen Drama und Theater; Zur neuesten Litteratur; Zur Lehre von den Citaten und Noten*, ed. Georg Witkowski (1899), 253–347.

[18] Grafton, *The Footnote*, 4. On Bernays' footnote analysis, see Stanitzek, 'Geist und Essay um 1900'.

[19] Stanitzek, 'Zur Lage der Fußnote', 2–3.

Despite the great response it evoked in its time, Grafton's book has hardly inspired any follow-up studies on the history of the footnote, apart from a few, mainly short exceptions.[20] Nor has similar work been done in other disciplines as far as I know. After all, annotations, whether as footnotes or in other formats, are not limited to history, the subject Grafton largely concentrates on. On the contrary, in all modern academic disciplines they are the essential instrument of a critical dialogue between those who write academic texts and those who read and critically evaluate them in light of the evidence they cite. But its historical method, which relies on 'technical practices' rather than on 'explicit professions',[21] has made Grafton's book a model of its kind, and one which has further sharpened our view of the history of the footnote. Many historical studies undertaken since the publication of *The Footnote* confirm this. Like Grafton, instead of placing their trust in 'explicit professions', they analyse what is actually said in historical texts, and what they provide as evidence. But the practices of generating and securing knowledge are now attracting interest in wider fields. They have become the subject of investigation internationally in the history of knowledge and science, disciplines in which Grafton himself continues to work intensively.[22] In a footnote in *The Footnote*, Grafton points to the lack of a 'history of note-taking',[23] a topic that has been increasingly researched in recent years,[24] along with practices such as reading, collecting, information-gathering, compiling, and

[20] Robert J. Connors, 'The Rhetoric of Citation Systems, Part I: The Development of Annotation Structures from the Renaissance to 1900', *Rhetoric Review*, 17/1 (1998), 6–48; and id., 'The Rhetoric of Citation Systems, Part II: Competing Epistemic Values in Citation', *Rhetoric Review*, 17/2 (1999), 219–45 deserve special mention.

[21] Grafton, *The Footnote*, 26.

[22] Most recently, Anthony Grafton, *Inky Fingers: The Making of Books in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., 2020).

[23] Grafton, *The Footnote*, 46, n. 19.

[24] I shall mention only a few publications here: Élisabeth Décultot (ed.), *Lire, copier, écrire: Les bibliothèques manuscrites et leurs usages au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 2003); Ann Blair and Richard Yeo (eds.), *Note-Taking in Early Modern Europe*, special issue of *Intellectual History Review*, 20/3 (2010); Richard Yeo, *Notebooks, English Virtuosi, and Early Modern Science* (Chicago, 2014); Alberto Cevolini (ed.), *Forgetting Machines: Knowledge Management Evolution in Early Modern Europe* (Leiden, 2016); Elisabeth Décultot, Fabian Krämer, and Helmut Zedelmaier

the instruments, media, and institutions of processing and storing information. A small selection of recent work in relation to the early modern period testifies to the growing historical interest in the 'technical practices' with which Grafton contrasts the 'explicit professions' of Leopold von Ranke and his successors in *The Footnote*. It can be found—how could it be otherwise—in the final footnote of this small birthday tribute to a great book which was published twenty-five years ago.[25]

(eds.), *Towards a History of Excerpting in Modernity*, special issue of *Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte / History of Science and Humanities*, 43/2 (2020).

[25] Arndt Brendecke, Susanne Friedrich, and Markus Friedrich (eds.), *Information in der Frühen Neuzeit: Status, Bestände, Strategien* (Berlin, 2008); Ann M. Blair, *Too Much to Know: Managing Scholarly Information before the Modern Age* (New Haven, 2010); Martin Mulsow, *Prekäres Wissen: Eine andere Ideengeschichte der Frühen Neuzeit* (Berlin, 2012); Fabian Krämer, *Ein Zentaur in London: Lektüre und Beobachtung in der frühneuzeitlichen Naturforschung* (Affalterbach, 2014); Françoise Waquet, *L'ordre matériel du savoir: Comment les savants travaillent, XVIe–XXIe siècles* (Paris, 2015); Anthony Grafton and Glenn W. Most (eds.), *Canonical Texts and Scholarly Practices: A Global Comparative Approach* (Cambridge, 2016); Annette Caroline Cremer and Martin Mulsow (eds.), *Objekte als Quellen der historischen Kulturwissenschaften: Stand und Perspektiven der Forschung* (Cologne, 2017); Markus Friedrich, *The Birth of the Archive: A History of Knowledge*, trans. John Noël Dillon (Ann Arbor, 2018); Randolph C. Head, *Making Archives in Early Modern Europe: Proof, Information, and Political Record-Keeping, 1400–1700* (Cambridge, 2019); Markus Friedrich and Jacob Schilling (eds.), *Praktiken frühneuzeitlicher Historiographie* (Berlin, 2019); Friedrich Beiderbeck and Claire Gantet (eds.), *Wissenskulturen in der Leibniz-Zeit: Konzepte – Praktiken – Vermittlung* (Berlin, 2021); Ann Blair, Paul Duguid, Anja-Silvia Goeing, and Anthony Grafton (eds.), *Information: A Historical Companion* (Princeton, 2021).

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BOOK REVIEWS

STUART AIRLIE, *Making and Unmaking the Carolingians, 751–888* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021), xix + 435 pp. ISBN 978 1 788 31744 3 (hardback), £76.50. ISBN 978 1 350 18900 3 (paperback), £26.09

How did the Franks know that they were living in the Carolingian realm? By analogy with Hopkins's work on the Roman Empire,[1] Airlie sums up the main concerns of his recent study as follows (p. 15): how did the family rhythm of the royal household shape the political culture of the Frankish realm? How was the idea of the specialness of the Carolingians created, communicated, and maintained? What ranks and expectations developed within the royal family over the course of about 150 years when Francia was ruled only by Carolingian kings? These basic questions guide Airlie's analysis of the 'many-headed monster' (p. ix), as the Carolingian family appears to modern researchers, over 318 pages of text. The presentation throughout is both accessible and sophisticated. The book comprises nine chapters, each with three to seven sections, whose detailed contents can only be broadly outlined here.

After 'Weighing the legacy of the Carolingians' (pp. 1–4), the author introduces the methodological background he draws on when researching 'The illusion of natural authority' (pp. 4–9). Adapting Antonio Gramsci, Airlie considers Carolingian royalty as orthodoxy—a system of practices and norms which fed the idea of specialness over space and time. Pierre Bourdieu's concept of habitus takes this exclusive and innate Carolingian royal distinctiveness further. Finally, based on the work of Michel Foucault, 'power' is understood as a fluid social attribute of subjects, groups, or societies—something that is not only repressive, but also discursive, evolving, and productive. The contents of the methodological toolbox

[1] Keith Hopkins, *Conquerors and Slaves* (Cambridge, 1978), 197.

are demonstrated when discussing 'Frankish royalty as inheritance' (pp. 9–13), 'Carolingian specialness' (pp. 13–18), how it is portrayed in the sources (pp. 18–23), and a case study of the reception of the death of 2-year-old Louis, grandson of Louis the German, in 879 (pp. 23–5).

The following chapters present the history of the Carolingian family chronologically and in terms of the different generations of kings—that is, Pippin III (ch. 2), Charlemagne (ch. 3), Louis the Pious (ch. 5), the various royal lines after the 843 Treaty of Verdun (ch. 6), and the loss of uniqueness after 888, with a few glances forward into the post-Carolingian world (ch. 9). However, chapters on the sons (ch. 4), the women and daughters of the royal family (ch. 8), and the imaginary of Carolingian power (ch. 7) open this structure out by surveying the whole Carolingian era.

Yet the chapters on the reigns of specific kings are not regicentric. When Airlie describes the 'Building [of] Carolingian royalty 751–68' under Pippin (pp. 27–52), the sources are already centre stage, as Airlie observes how Pippin's family—his wife, sons, and daughters—were involved in representing the recently gained kingship. The benefits of taking a broader, family-inclusive perspective on events are also evident when it comes to Airlie's reflections on why Pippin sought the throne. Airlie explains that he embarked on the venture in a sticky situation between the claims of his nephews and his half-brother Grifo. Pippin eventually established a new balance of power with the lay and clerical aristocracy. Former Merovingian centres such as Saint-Denis were integrated into his system of kingship, giving Pippinid/Carolingian foundations such as Prüm a new royal quality. Airlie further interprets the rituals involved in these efforts, their transmission, and monastic remembrance (*memoria)* as links between the past, present, and future of Carolingian rulership.

The account of Charlemagne (pp. 53–92) likewise focuses on how Carolingian royalty was shaped not only through the exercise of its power, but also by the limits to its authority. On the one hand, the co-operation between the aristocracy and the king (as senior partner) is highlighted, while on the other, the competition and conflicts within the family are emphasized. Many examples show how these two major dynamics were intertwined, and in addition to well-known events, special attention is paid to lesser-known individuals. To list

but a few, Airlie considers the role of Pippin's widow Bertrada in the carefully orchestrated succession of 767; the Hardrad conspiracy of 785–6; the Carolingian legitimacy paradox of Pippin the Hunchback, who was born royal but who was later stripped of his royalty; Pippin of Italy (died 810); and the status of Charlemagne's daughters on the eve of his reign. Airlie thus integrates the research of recent decades to produce a broad picture when explaining situational reactions, instabilities, and special occasions as well as mid-term trends and long-term developments, always taking into account the views of the elite, the royal family, and the ruler. He concludes that the figure of Charlemagne was enlarged by a projection of his aura throughout the realm, and that he 'cast a much longer shadow than any of his predecessors and most of his successors' (p. 56).

While medieval research in general focuses mainly on relations between the king and his heir(s), the chapter on 'Child labour 751–88' (pp. 93–120) deals with the biological life cycle and the socio-cultural role of 'Born rulers' (pp. 93–102). (The princesses are discussed in chapter eight.) Airlie highlights the early participation of the heirs presumptive in representing the power and distinctiveness of the royal family—for example, by their given names, including in the case of the remembrance of children who had died young (pp. 102–9). The childhood of the princes is further illuminated as a period of networking with current political actors, who were their godfathers or mentors, and with future ones, by learning and playing with the offspring of the Frankish elite.

It is noteworthy that the fifth chapter, entitled 'Louis the Pious and the paranoid style in politics' is the longest in the book (pp. 121–72). I will just make two further points here. First, Airlie's discussion of Bernard of Italy's political vulnerability as the orphaned son of a king who was close to his grandfather Charlemagne, and later as king in distant Italy, is outlined in chapters three to five. For the reader it is an added pleasure that the main questions reappear as leitmotivs throughout the argument, and that Airlie also develops and interlinks the examples in a way that makes them easy to understand and encourages the reader to compare them. Second, he continues to carefully present the results of recent research in reassessing the historical image of Louis the Pious based on events up to the Treaty

of Verdun of 843. Apart from processes of differentiation within the royal family, the chapter also evaluates the evolution of family norms and their political functionalization.

Chapter six casts a dynastic glance at the post-843 kingdoms as 'Lines of succession and lines of failure 843–79' (pp. 173–216). At this point, the 'Carolingian political–familial geography' was 'broader and deeper than rule by brothers' (p. 182). 'Carolingian royalty was socially constructed in that the political elite had to recognize a king, but only Carolingians could be so recognized and their status was inborn, in social terms, and thus an integral and necessary part of their royalty along with the religious aura' (p. 183). This dominant position is illustrated by a horizontal view of 'Rule by brothers' (pp. 179–84) and a vertical view of the kingdoms under 'Rule by fathers' (pp. 184–7). In addition to the lesser-known Pippin II of Aquitaine, the case of Charles the Bald and his 'Radical options' in family politics are put under the spotlight: 'sending some of his legitimate sons . . . into monasteries, deploying fertility magic to re-activate his wife's exhausted body, building an artificial Carolingian (Boso), commissioning counsellors to advise him on disinheriting a son, Charles was the Dr Frankenstein of ninth-century politics' (p. 205).

In my opinion, chapters three, seven, and eight form the heart of the study, while the others provide a deeper and more detailed evaluation of the events and sources. However, the analyses of case studies and long-term developments are well balanced in the argument. For example, the whole book examines how the idea of exclusive Carolingian royalty was disseminated by different carriers of memory. In chapter seven these observations are brought together (pp. 217–42): the comparison of sources from the time of Charlemagne to the tenth century makes genealogies appear dynamic, customized, and goal-oriented (pp. 217–23). Nor were the notions of kinship and the legitimacy of offspring predefined (pp. 224–33), so that succession and pecking orders remained fluid. Even without a claim to the throne, closer or more distant members of the Carolingian family could radiate a special identity or political potential. Eventually, the realm was covered by a royal presence in the form of places of memory and power, or constant prayers for the king, his heirs, and predecessors (pp. 233–42).

The importance of the Carolingian women in this dynastic framework is the focus of the eighth chapter (pp. 243–72). Since it is both impossible and undesirable to summarize all of Airlie's observations here, suffice it to say that he questions the existence of marriage patterns or strategies, but notes some general developments without omitting the remarkable exceptions to these trends. Princes' marriages were predominantly arranged and dictated as political decisions by their fathers, who usually took the state of the succession into consideration. By contrast, the mainly aristocratic women who became queens were irreversibly absorbed into the Carolingian familial and royal identity. Royal daughters had political value, too, and therefore tended to be controlled strictly. Their key role in maintaining Carolingian authority by networking and memory is especially visible in monasteries (pp. 255–72).

The eighth chapter thus generates the background for the ninth and final one: 'The loss of uniqueness: 888 and all that' (pp. 273–318). The crisis is analysed chronologically from 'The incredible shrinking dynasty?' in the 870s (pp. 273–8) to the reign of Charles the Fat and his deposition and death (887–8, pp. 279–91), which finally leads to '888 and the breaking of the dynastic spell' (pp. 292–310). It is tempting to see the short 'Ending' (pp. 310–18) as an account of the slow fading of the Carolingian legacy. Increased dynastic mortality put stress on the established power mechanisms, a development interestingly discussed by historiographers at the time. It was noticed by aristocrats as well, who took their chances, but were forced to act by the rapidly shifting but nonetheless Carolingian-framed political landscape.

This review has attempted to indicate the huge effort which has gone into this monograph. Airlie's key achievement is to structure the presentation comprehensibly while also providing a coherent and well-grounded perspective. He shows how the Carolingians became special as the royal family through processes of familial and political differentiation. Political culture constantly developed between rulers and aristocrats, kings, wives/queens, heirs, and their siblings, while Carolingian dominance was established as a fixed yet dynamic framework. People and phenomena (and chapters) are always linked by spatial and temporal dimensions, for example, when the memory of Carolingians as former kings, donors, abbots/abbesses, or pupils

lived on and was concentrated in different places. Taking this holistic view, *Making and Unmaking the Carolingians* is a new standard work which assembles the international research into a full panoply. It thus demonstrates how the history of dynasties or rulers can be captured with a modern cultural–historical approach. Like Theodor Adorno, who quipped that it is 'the task of art . . . to bring chaos into order',[2] Airlie reveals existing questions, adds new ones, and unpicks some oversimplifications—in discussing appropriate meanings for the terms 'dynasty' and 'family' in the early Middle Ages, for example—without losing the illustrative and entertaining qualities of his accessible language. The book ends by presenting 'the silence around Charles's tomb in Maastricht'—Duke Charles of Lower Lorraine, the last agnatic Carolingian (died 991)—as 'the end of an old song' (p. 318). But as long as studies like Airlie's are written, the echo of this song will continue to enchant modern readers.

[2] See Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life*, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London, 2005; 1st pub. in German, 1951), 222.

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SIMON KARSTENS, *Gescheiterte Kolonien – Erträumte Imperien: Eine andere Geschichte der europäischen Expansion 1492–1615* (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2021), 619 pp. ISBN 978 3 205 21207 2. €55.00

Simon Karstens has created an elephant. His *Gescheiterte Kolonien – Erträumte Imperien* is a large-format, 600-page long habilitation thesis and, in many respects, an unwieldy, cumbersome creation. It is even bound in a sturdy grey cover. Yet it is also enormously pleasing, in the improbable manner of elephants, and worthy of consideration as an important part of the research landscape.

Karstens's book is a monumental study of European colonial projects—mostly English and French—in the Americas between 1492 and 1615, which were for various reasons considered to be failures by contemporaries. It looks at the countless ways in which the notion of 'failure' was discursively produced and utilized in the creation of European colonial knowledge, as well as in the establishment of European polities as potential or putative colonial powers. The existing historiography here is often contradictory: whether a project is seen as a success or a failure depends largely on the historian's point of view and choice of material. Karstens chooses to tackle the subject and its many conflicting analyses comprehensively, taking a fresh perspective by going back to the historical sources—that is, the varied and divergent reports, analyses, justifications, and narratives written by European contemporaries, sometimes to educate or entertain a broader public or to please a monarch, sometimes to convince potential investors to pour money into new colonial ventures. The aim of this re-examination, as he puts it, is 'to analyse the source basis of these contradictory conclusions' (p. 15) in order to trace how and why colonial projects came to be seen as failures both by early modern writers and the historians who studied their texts.

The book's structure is pleasingly simple. The introduction (part one) is followed by three large parts each divided into a small number of subsections. Part two starts with a detailed overview of colonial projects during the early period of transatlantic expansion. Karstens places the well-known narratives of Spanish and Portuguese colonial successes in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries into perspective, providing a more tempered and mixed picture of success and failure in

various Atlantic spaces and social contexts. He then introduces French and English efforts in the same spaces at the same time, showing the invariable entanglements and explaining the historical actors' varied knowledge of the Americas and their peoples, and how this knowledge was intertwined with accounts of failure and the preparation of new projects.

The core of the book consists of two large analytical sections. The first (part three) deals with failed projects and how they were portrayed between 1530 and 1615. This part is an extremely thorough history of early French and English attempts at colonization, thoughtfully set against indigenous perspectives to the extent that these were available to the author, and against existing historiographical interpretations of the events. The second analytical section (part four) addresses the issue of how failure was talked about (or not, as the case may be) in contemporary texts. It critically examines spaces of failure—such as the 'Atlantic', the 'New World', or the 'colony'—and interpretations and arguments addressing failure, finally tying the two together. Here, Karstens's text is highly analytical and the book is at its most interesting in terms of its own aims—namely, to investigate narratives of failure and the ways in which they became meaningful and powerful.

The metaphor of 'weaving' may be sadly overused in many texts, but in the case of this book, it is an adequate description of its method and narrative style. Going back and forth between Europe and the Americas, Karstens is constantly pulling in and interlinking threads relating to different peoples and their various interests and knowledge, as well as a multitude of places and spaces, processes, actions, and reactions. Through the lens of failure and its discursive production, Karstens unfolds an exhaustive, multifaceted history of French and English attempts to colonize and exploit, or at least to profitably trade with, various regions and indigenous peoples in the Americas. It is interwoven not only with the multitude of European contexts which these projects sprang from or referred to, such as political developments, cultural movements, lines of religious conflict, and so on, but also (as far as possible, given the source base and perspective of the study) with various indigenous interests and strategies not just to deter and deflect European intrusion, but also

to exploit it—for example, in a variety of internal conflicts. Karstens constantly attempts to highlight the absence of such voices from European narratives, and to reconstruct the indigenous perspectives left out or distorted by European writers who, in some cases, had themselves been colonizers.

This constant weaving together of so many strands, aspects, elements, and facets creates a narrative which is, at times, slightly overpowering, but also remarkably vivid. It is a huge, vibrant structure constantly in motion, composed of countless activities, people, and spaces; of power and manipulation and interests and money; of sea and ships and land and fur; of war and peace; of journeys made and stories told. It is knowledgeable, instructive, highly useful, and often simply fascinating. It is also a good read—Karstens has a talent for selecting anecdotes, including, for example, James I's intense desire to have a 'flying squirrel' from the Americas (p. 362). Parts of the introduction cannot conceal that the book is, indeed, a habilitation thesis as they are weighed down by methodological and theoretical considerations which, while necessary, make the text rather ponderous and cumbersome. However, a habilitation thesis has to satisfy the demands and standards of the academic field as well as the author's own, and all in all, Karstens has written a highly engaging book that is easy to like. Some parts of it, especially the huge, detailed part three, seem like the kind of grand narrative which one might expect to find in the work of a much older historian. *Gescheiterte Kolonien – Erträumte Imperien* is an excellent addition to the canon of European colonial historiography, and I hope it will be accepted into the fold.

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CAROLIN SCHÄFER, *'Authority' in Ordnung und Aufruhr: Der Autoritätsdiskurs während der Englischen Revolution und des Interregnums*, Ancien Régime, Aufklärung und Revolution, 47 (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2021), ix + 398 pp. ISBN 978 3 110 65900 9. £72.50

The basic premise of Carolin Schäfer's Ph.D. thesis, completed at the Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, is that 'authority' was a core concept in the English conflict of the 1640s and 1650s, and one that researchers have hitherto neglected. Connecting and building upon the methodological approaches of the Cambridge School and of German conceptual history (*Begriffsgeschichte*), she seeks to understand the contemporary discourse of authority by examining not just the meanings attached to the concept, but also its strategic use in specific discursive situations. The focus of her study is Thomas Hobbes, who is often categorized as a theorist of power. Schäfer, however, aims to show that in Hobbes's theory of the state, it is authority, not power, that provides 'the basic template' on which the 'entire political and religious order' is built (p. 9). In line with the approach of the Cambridge School, Hobbes is thus situated in his contemporary discursive context. From this perspective, Schäfer suggests, investigating authority promises to contribute not only to a more accurate political categorization of Hobbes, but also to the study of English republicanism—a hotly debated topic among researchers.

Hobbes's role as the focal point of the book is reflected in its structure. Instead of arranging her material chronologically, Schäfer begins the analytical part of her study in chapter three with a discussion of Hobbes's main work: *Leviathan*, published in 1651. She analyses the book for its use of the concept of 'authority' and separates it from classical tradition, arguing first that Hobbes understands authority as something that emanates from an office and therefore as a legal construct—one that comes closer to the Latin *potestas* than to *auctoritas*. In this form, it applies to the sovereign, as well as to lower secular and clerical officials. This makes it a delegated competence whose source lies outside the individual on whom it is bestowed. In the case of the sovereign, secular authority comes from the individuals who

Trans. by Jozef van der Voort (GHIL)

collectively comprise the state, and spiritual authority comes from God; with lower officials, authority is derived from the sovereign. However, Schäfer argues, there is a difference between the two forms: the sovereign's authority is limitless and irrevocable, while that of lower officials is conditional and can be withdrawn at any time.

Second, Schäfer suggests that Hobbes uses authority in the sense of reputation, in line with the classical notion of *auctoritas*. This meaning applies to scholars and especially to advisors, and in this context it refers to the recognition of personal qualities rather than to delegated competences. These qualities give rise not to formal rights, but merely to greater chances of exerting influence. Third, she argues, Hobbes writes of patriarchal authority—another kind of formal, legal authority derived from status, not personality. This authority is not delegated by the sovereign, but exists by virtue of nature and customary law. Yet even though the sovereign is not its source, he or she can still restrict or remove it at any time. In any case, Schäfer stresses, Hobbes makes a distinction between authority and power, with the former denoting the legitimacy of the hierarchical order, while the latter simply refers to de facto dominance.

Chapter four then supplies the prehistory to Hobbes's chief work. After reconstructing a kind of status quo ante with the help of Tudor and early Stuart royal proclamations, Schäfer traces the dispute over authority into the reign of Charles I and up to the year in which *Leviathan* was first published. The initial understanding of authority in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries matches Hobbes's concept of it as derived from a particular office, which he applied primarily to the person of the monarch. Under Charles I, however, this understanding grew unstable—though it was not until 1642 that the confrontation between king and Parliament became a dispute over authority. Even after the war, Schäfer tells us, MPs found it difficult to detach the concept from its association with the monarch and apply it to Parliament instead. In the early days of the Commonwealth, she argues, its defenders were unable to appeal to authority and therefore increasingly took refuge in their de facto power instead. During the engagement controversy in particular, the republicans revealed themselves to be apologists for the sheer necessity of having rulers and subjects.

On this basis, chapter five turns to the political categorization of Thomas Hobbes. Schäfer notes that he was in principle a supporter of monocracy and sympathetic towards traditional monarchy. The fact that *Leviathan* could also be used to justify the republic did nothing to change this position, since in Hobbes's view, securing peace and order took precedence over the form of government. And in 1651, the best way to secure peace was to recognize the new rulers in power. Instead of marking a change in its author's political allegiance, therefore, Schäfer argues that *Leviathan* is a concession to reality. She takes a similar view of Hobbes's exposition of the right of conquest, asserting that it represents a one-off argument produced in response to the historical context, but that the establishment of authority by consensus remains the general rule for Hobbes. Furthermore, even in cases of conquest, it is necessary for the ruler's authority to be recognized by his or her subjects. In this way, Schäfer argues, Hobbes incorporates the people as the foundation of his political model while still legitimizing absolute sovereignty.

In an attempt to gauge the impact of Hobbes's ideas, the sixth and final chapter looks at how the concept of authority was used until the end of the Interregnum. In particular, Schäfer detects a clear influence on the republican Marchamont Nedham, who in 1650 had justified the new regime simply by pointing to its superiority in terms of power, but by 1656 showed a new awareness of the need to legitimize its supremacy. She argues that this shift is reflected in Nedham's use of the concept of 'authority', which he defines similarly to Hobbes even while making antithetical arguments to those set out in *Leviathan*. On the whole, however, Schäfer suggests that Hobbes's understanding of authority did not set a new standard. His contribution was not so much to redefine the concept as to refine it, drawing on the traditional, Royalist interpretation of the word. The republican James Harrington, by contrast, took an innovative approach by developing a new understanding of authority based on classical *auctoritas* that stood in clear opposition to Hobbes's definition.

Schäfer's conclusion summarizes what she sees as the key points of her complex study. This provides a general overview of her argument—something that the reader occasionally risks losing sight of due to the non-chronological structure of the book—and is also forcefully

argued. However, despite this clarity, not all of her conclusions are convincing, and in certain places the methodology behind them seems questionable. Three examples will allow me to illustrate this.

First, Schäfer assumes that the meaning of authority was fairly clear in the early seventeenth century (see p. 21). Every study needs a starting point, which must perforce be a constructed one. Yet the decision to limit the scope here to royal proclamations seems questionable to me, or at least in need of explanation, as it means that the conceptual foundation of Schäfer's study reflects the position of only one of the parties to the conflict. The book thus lacks a complementary examination of the Parliamentarian side and its own definition of authority; nor is there any analysis of law and custom as normative reference points to which both sides were bound. As a result, Schäfer's account only leaves room for a single version of royal authority that seems quietly analogous to the Bodinian definition of sovereignty as a binary quality that is either entirely present or entirely absent. In my view, however, the early Stuart conflicts between king and Parliament were not as clearly organized as Schäfer suggests. They involved concepts of different authorities as well as of shared or graduated authority, and if the term cannot adequately capture this complexity, it might not be a useful analytical tool. But in fact the phrase 'by authority of Parliament' was used even before 1642, the year Schäfer stresses as a turning point. The notion that this authority was always derived from the king, as Schäfer argues with reference to the Petition of Right (p. 207), is not borne out by the text of the Petition; nor does it seem likely in view of the contemporary debate over the ancient constitution and the origins of Parliament in an oft-conjured 'time out of memory'.

Second, when setting out the aims of her study, Schäfer suggests that her examination of authority will also help to more accurately define English republicanism. Her most incisive contribution on this front is the argument that in the early days of the Commonwealth, popular consent was a much stronger presence in Royalist and absolutist texts than in those authored by republicans—namely, Nedham and Anthony Ascham. She therefore concludes that the 'link between a monarchy and the oppression of the people, and that between a republic and the freedom or participation of the people . . . [must] be reconsidered in light of these examples' (p. 326). This extrapolation

from the specific to the general requires further evidence to support it, in my view. To start with, a definition of republicanism—a term that is highly contested by scholars, as Schäfer herself points out—is needed, which could then be used to categorize the different authors. It is not obvious that Ascham lends himself here as an example.

An explanation of Schäfer's choice of sources is also needed. Are they relevant to English republicanism, the use of authority, or the contemporary political debate? This in turn leads to a need for closer consideration of the intention behind given statements within their specific discursive context. It is true that during the engagement controversy some (though by no means all) authors argued that the existing government—which happened to be a republican one—should be accepted out of sheer necessity, rather than for the sake of republican values. However, this can also be read as a concession to readers in a specific context in which the primary aim was not to win over opponents of republicanism, but to achieve the pragmatic goal of restoring stability to the Commonwealth. It is striking that Schäfer does not consider this possibility, given that in her reading of Hobbes she frequently describes *Leviathan* as a concession to reality. At times, therefore, one has the impression that double standards are being applied. On the one hand, she considers Hobbes's idea of the right of conquest to be an exceptional product of the historical situation (though in my opinion he places authority by conquest on an equal footing with the notion of authority through consensus). On the other, although Schäfer mentions Nedham's assertion that the establishment of a government with the consent of the people or its representatives is a dictate of reason, but not one that applies in times of war, she does not consider it in detail. In fact, she overlooks it altogether when she claims that Nedham rejects the idea of a social contract in principle and instead advocates 'sovereign authority in the form of military supremacy' (p. 324). Hobbes, by contrast, is repeatedly depicted as arguing for a form of popular sovereignty (see in particular p. 372)—but elsewhere in the text this claim is explicitly rejected (p. 330). In short, Schäfer's assertion that Hobbes ascribed 'a significantly higher political value' to the people than Nedham (p. 326), even though in Hobbes's system the people are subordinate to an all-powerful sovereign, is based on a series of doubtful interpretations.

Third and finally, my criticisms of Schäfer's comparative categorization of Hobbes and Nedham are ultimately bound up with my doubts regarding her core argument that authority is central to Hobbes's theory of the state and clearly distinguished from power. In Schäfer's account, although power carried greater weight in the legal vacuum that was the state of nature, it was supplanted by the legitimate form of authority once the state had been founded (p. 45). The design of Schäfer's study forces us to assume that power and authority are terms used by contemporary authors, and not analytical categories that she applies to her sources. If we take this as a given, however, there are two very simple points that speak against the subordination of power to authority. The first of these is simply the frequency with which the two words are used. It is not the case that 'power' appears less frequently in *Leviathan* after chapter fourteen, which describes the sealing of the social contract and thus the end of the state of nature, and that 'authority' appears more often in its stead thereafter. Rather, 'power' remains a key term throughout the entire treatise, and appears substantially more often than 'authority'. Second, the very title of the book suggests that power plays a central role: *Leviathan: Or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil*.

These observations, based on the surface of the text, are also borne out by its content: in chapter thirteen, Hobbes asserts the necessity of establishing a 'common Power'—not authority—in order to overcome the state of nature.[1] In the key fourteenth chapter—in which the word 'authority' does not appear once—he emphasizes that the social contract can only be effective when guaranteed by power. For as chapter seventeen makes clear: 'Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.'[2] Similarly, in chapter twenty-nine, we learn that the duty of obedience comes to an end when sovereigns no longer have the power to protect their subjects. This is by no means to deny that authority takes centre stage in other chapters; however, I do not see any pattern across the book as a whole that supports the argument of a clear distinction between power and authority. In fact, the two terms are often used interchangeably as synonyms, with the adjectives 'soveraign', 'legislative', and 'supreme' applied by turns to

[1] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil* (London, 1965), 98. [2] Ibid. 128.

both words. There may nonetheless be complex and subtle differences between the two concepts, but Schäfer would have needed to demonstrate this in order for her readings to be plausible. Yet even if it were the case that 'legislative power' always referred to the force of the law, while 'legislative authority' denoted the legitimacy of the law-giver, the overall argument that power clearly plays a less important role than authority in the functioning of the state would remain unconvincing.

Leaving aside these criticisms, however, Schäfer's Ph.D. thesis has resulted in a book that tackles an important topic and draws on an impressive breadth of source material. She is also unafraid to expand her findings into incisive arguments that encourage readers to go back to the original text of *Leviathan* in order to re-examine their habitual interpretations. Although not every reader will be willing to buy into all of Schäfer's interpretations, her study therefore promises to inspire lively debate.

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DANIEL MENNING, *Politik, Ökonomie und Aktienspekulation: 'South Sea Bubble und Co.' 1720* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2020), x + 458 pp. ISBN 978 3 110 42614 4 (hardback), £86.50; ISBN 978 3 110 77672 0 (paperback), £24.00

Daniel Menning's book was published, appropriately enough, in 2020, on the 300th anniversary of the South Sea Bubble, a crucial phenomenon in early modern European economic and cultural history. In 1720 the British South Sea Company, and the similarly constituted French Mississippi Company set up by John Law, monopolized the capitalization of state debt by certain chartered trade companies and introduced investing in stocks to a broader public in France and Britain. After a brief stock trade mania, the share prices of both companies plummeted later that year, subjecting Britain and France to the gruelling experience of a large-scale crash in domestic financial markets. This disaster, along with the widespread metaphor of the bubble, has become part and parcel of collective European memory and is almost invariably cited as a historical point of reference for stock market crashes up to the most recent financial crises of the early twenty-first century.

The author's aim is to write a new economic, cultural, and institutional history of the 1720 stock euphoria that goes beyond the more conventional and often narrower approaches to the subject in two respects. First, he expands the dominant Anglo-French perspective centred on the South Sea and Mississippi companies to include a multitude of lesser-known joint-stock companies in Western and Central Europe, and to a lesser extent in the Atlantic world, that were modelled on the well-known 'big players' in Britain and France. Menning analyses the 1720 joint-stock company boom as a pan-European, partially even global phenomenon and looks at the financial and economic interdependencies that accompanied a veritable wave of newly founded or planned companies. Second, the general approach differs from many previous accounts of the 1720 stock market boom which focus on economic history or the history of finance and stock-trading in a narrow sense, the cultural history of the bubble and learned or popular perceptions of it, or on case studies of European offshoot companies, taking a rather limited local or regional history

perspective. Menning, by contrast, outlines an interconnected history centred around one of the key features of what has been called (shunning more restrictive or slightly outdated terminology such as 'mercantilism') an early modern 'economic reason of state'[1]—that is, the commercial rivalry between states, the so-called 'jealousy of trade' which, as John Shovlin has pointed out, had grown into a veritable 'jealousy of credit' by 1720.[2] This saw commercial rivals constantly observing, imitating, and improving on economic ideas, institutions, and achievements in the hope of eventually surpassing them. Menning identifies this dynamic of mutual emulation as the key practical driving force behind the rapid emergence of joint-stock companies in various places in Western and Central Europe. Yet the scope of the study is not limited to mere mutual perceptions. Menning presents a *histoire croisée* of the 1720 bubble which considers transfers of knowledge and the individuals promoting company projects in particular to be factors that enabled the transnational spread of joint-stock companies.

In order to underline the interconnectedness and the dynamism of this very dense and rapid, almost revolutionary transformation of trade and finance in 1720–1, Menning arranges the chapters of his study in a chronological narrative that focuses on the eighteen months or so that the stock mania and its immediate economic and political aftermath lasted. The author is therefore only briefly concerned with what are traditionally seen as the more immediate origins of the events of 1720—that is, the establishment of the first joint-stock insurance company in London, and the more general interest in new trade companies in various parts of Europe. These initially remained mere plans, and earlier proposals for a monopoly on converting state debt into South Sea Company stocks were rejected. But in France, John Law was charged with restructuring and eliminating much of the royal debt by means of a super joint-stock company to exploit new colonial riches in Louisiana. The initial success of his Mississippi company and the ensuing British fear of being overtaken by an arch-rival, as well

[1] See e.g. Philipp R. Rössner (ed.), *Economic Growth and the Origins of Modern Political Economy: Economic Reasons of State, 1500–2000* (Abingdon, 2016).
[2] John Shovlin, 'Jealousy of Credit: John Law's "System" and the Geopolitics of Financial Revolution', *Journal of Modern History*, 88/2 (2016), 275–305.

as noticeable capital flight to the Continent, eventually enabled the similarly functioning South Sea Company to be set up. Its meteoric rise stimulated a multitude of projects within the British world, adapting the South Sea Company's business model to other long-distance trading companies and to different economic sectors such as construction or even fishing, and eventually triggering limitations on this model through a legal framework: the Bubble Act (1720). As Menning points out, this legislation was less an attempt to effectively limit or suppress the spread of the joint-stock company model and its potential risks than to rein in the speculation of stock-jobbers and restore parliamentary control over public credit.

In the meantime, the temporary success of the two major joint-stock companies in Western Europe inspired many attempts at emulation all over Western and Central Europe. In the Habsburg monarchy, for example, a rival West Indies company operating from the Austrian Netherlands attracted intense scrutiny from the worried British. These plans and projects can be placed in the context of transfers of economic knowledge promoted by highly active projectors who were (often self-appointed) experts in this type of business model. They were combined with ambitious schemes in other economic sectors, such as banking or textile manufacturing. This was the case, for example, with the banking project presented by the English promoter Ebenezer Corr in the Duchy of Brunswick, and the Harburg Company in the neighbouring Electorate of Hanover. Nevertheless, these companies and their business models, along with the very concept of stocks as an economic instrument, had to be shaped to specific local institutional environments and expectations. This was the case in the German states, where they were adapted to the interests and priorities formulated by contemporary cameralist discourse. The establishment of such companies was also often accompanied by judicial and institutional conflict between various actors, especially in polities where authority was divided between a plurality of political players, as in many territories of the Holy Roman Empire and the Dutch Republic.

The eventual downfall of both the Mississippi Company and the South Sea Company and the ensuing domestic financial and political fallout, however, did not discourage emulation in other parts of Europe.

Menning argues that this cannot be easily attributed to informational asymmetries between the centres and peripheries of early modern finance economies. After the disastrous failures in Britain and France, some projectors, would-be entrepreneurs, and their sponsors attempted to redirect the flow of investment capital in Europe in their favour. They also nimbly modified their plans to account for the consequences of recent financial disasters—for example, by attempting to restrict trade in their companies' stocks to foreign markets to prevent domestic hyperspeculation, or by incorporating lotteries into their business model in order to attract wider circles of investors. After a sometimes breathless account of this entangled history of an extraordinarily eventful and dynamic eighteen months, a synopsis concisely summarizes the role of key economic concepts, transfers of entrepreneurial knowledge in Europe, and the adaptability of the notion of stocks to various institutional contexts.

Menning offers an engaging and insightful account of the 1720 stock market boom as a shared and intertwined experience of European societies and economies (including various overseas entanglements) and presents a fascinating case study of the stunning acceleration in economic development produced by early modern capitalism. Introducing broader European and global perspectives, tracing the circulation of economic knowledge, and locating the phenomenon in a transnational space of mutual perceptions by various actors and institutions, the author not only focuses attention on the histories of lesser-known companies and projects that have until recently been largely neglected. He also convincingly demonstrates that joint-stock companies which entered the game very late, after the crashes in Britain and France, did so not despite operating in an intertwined space of communication, but because of this. Menning also addresses the importance of early modern projects and projecting. By contextualizing this phenomenon with reference to contemporary cultures of economic expertise and entrepreneurship, he goes beyond historiographical clichés of abject failure and fraud perpetrated by disreputable 'adventurers'; yet he does not fully explore this aspect. From a larger cultural point of view, the events of 1720–1 also shaped very different visions for the future of society and the economy. Novel company projects and the initial experience of accelerated financial

and economic development surrounding the stock market euphoria encouraged contemporary ideas and visions of open socio-economic futures shared by projectors, entrepreneurs, government officials, and other observers, well before the fundamental transformation of socio-political mindsets during the last third of the century. By contrast, the disappointments and negative consequences of the English experience inspired more 'regressive' concepts of economic order and traditionalist notions of trade, production, and craftsmanship.

Menning's adherence to the timeline of simultaneous and interrelated events in many respects highlights the underlying dynamic of 'jealousy' and 'emulation' in 1720–1, a time bristling with new, quickly evolving business models and economic ideas, along with new ways of raising capital. Nevertheless, presenting so many chronological case studies on the heels of intertwined developments also disperses the threads of these stories throughout the book. The chapters often require the hasty introduction of many institutional, political, judicial, and economic contexts, particularly as the book's opening 'Overture' (pp. 19–50) is somewhat sketchy and does not completely introduce the relevant contexts, actors, institutions, and economic discourses. The relatively short synopsis at the end is also burdened by having to redraw connections and point out most of the typological and comparative aspects of the themes presented. The author admits that this approach, with its shifting contexts, is 'highly demanding to the reader' (p. 17), and indeed, difficulties in following this vast, rhizomatic structure should not be exclusively blamed on the reader's attention span or lack of persistence. Perhaps an outline less strictly wedded to the chronology of events, along with a more stringent exploration of fewer carefully selected case studies and their wider ramifications and relations of 'emulation', would have helped reader and author alike to navigate the narrative. The book's important insights might have benefited from this without its entangled history approach being affected. It could also have highlighted the methodological advantages of examining an economic and social phenomenon through case studies—namely, the close analysis of how certain entrepreneurial concepts and contemporary economic discourses and practices were enacted in precise social and institutional contexts, as Menning himself points out in the introduction (p. 16).

The focus on 1720–1 also seems to cut short any analysis of the aftermath of the events and their long-term significance for British economic history in the eighteenth century. The impact of the Bubble Act on investment in early industrial manufacturing deserves more elaboration, as does Menning's own engaging assumption that despite the immediate backlash, the South Sea Bubble helped to prepare for the Industrial Revolution by enabling new horizons of expectation for future economic progress and development. Moreover, a more thorough treatment of the contemporary media, the communication infrastructure, or the conditions under which news and economic information travelled might have further shown how '1720', as a synchronized event in an interconnected European (and global) space of communication, was at all possible in practical terms. Such critiques, however, do not diminish the indisputably great merits and the enormous scope of this impressive synoptic and entangled history of a key event in early modern economic and cultural history. It would be truly beneficial if the book were soon to be made accessible to an English-speaking readership.[3]

[3] For related English-language publications by the same author, see e.g. Daniel Menning, 'The Economic Effect of the South Sea Bubble on the Baltic Sea Trade', in id. and Stefano Condorelli (eds.), *Boom, Bust, and Beyond: New Perspectives on the 1720 Stock Market Bubble* (Berlin, 2019), 161–78.

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MICHAEL GNEHM and SONJA HILDEBRAND (eds.), *Architectural History and Globalized Knowledge: Gottfried Semper in London* (Mendrisio: Mendrisio Academy Press / gta Verlag, 2021), 215 pp. ISBN 978 3 856 76409 8. €35.00
MICHAEL GNEHM, SONJA HILDEBRAND, and DIETER WEIDMANN (eds.), *Gottfried Semper: London Writings 1850–1855* (Zurich: gta Verlag, 2021), xliii + 591 pp. ISBN 978 3 85676 403 6. €79.00

Born on 29 November 1803 in Altona, Gottfried Semper was one of the most important architects and theorists of art and architecture of nineteenth-century Europe. His professional activity might be divided into four periods: Dresden between 1834 and 1849, where he was professor of architecture at the Academy of Fine Arts; London between 1850 and 1855, where he worked on the Great Exhibition of 1851 and its successor, the Crystal Palace at Sydenham, and was appointed in 1852 as professor of ornamental art at the newly founded Department of Practical Art under the direction of Henry Cole; Zurich between 1855 and 1871, where he took the chair of architecture at the Federal Polytechnic School (*Polytechnikum*); and a later period working on projects in Vienna lasting until his death in 1879 in Rome.

Semper's architectural output in the German-speaking world was impressive. In Dresden it included the art gallery completing the Zwinger complex, the Hoftheater (later replaced after fire by today's Semperoper), a synagogue, and numerous other prominent buildings. In Zurich, Semper designed the *Polytechnikum* building that still houses the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule (ETH). In Vienna, he played a leading part in the transformation of the city and the creation of the new Ringstraße, with plans for a museum and cultural quarter including the Kunsthistorisches and the Naturhistorisches Museum and the Burgtheater. As Sonja Hildebrand and Michael Gnehm bravely claim in their introduction to *Architectural History and Globalized Knowledge*, 'No other architect in the nineteenth century created buildings that continue to shape the cityscape today in so many different places which at the same time represented stages in his life' (p. 8).

The two volumes reviewed here deal with Semper's London period. In Britain, his architectural building work was much more limited.

A great deal of insight is provided into the reasons for this. Yet as the authors argue, the London period was a particularly significant one. Both works testify to the importance of Semper's time there in terms of his theoretical development and publications. For alongside his architectural output Semper was a leading participant in contemporary discussions about art and design history and aesthetics. The authors reveal Semper's encounter with modern, industrializing Britain as crucial to the evolution of his thinking and subsequent architectural and written output. And even without major architectural commissions, Semper left his mark in the United Kingdom.

Both volumes arise out of the project 'Architecture and the Globalization of Knowledge in the 19th Century: Gottfried Semper and the Discipline of Architectural History'. Funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation, the research involved collaboration between the Institute for the History and Theory of Art and Architecture at the Università della Svizzera italiana and the Institute for the History and Theory of Architecture at ETH Zurich. Symptomatic of well-funded and well-organized research, both volumes are notable for their high-quality presentation. Despite the challenges of language (Semper worked in German, English, and French) and orthography, the editors and authors have achieved a high degree of precision.

As Sonja Hildebrand and Michael Gnehm state in *Architectural History and Globalized Knowledge*, 'With the exception of Paris, none of the many places where Semper lived—neither Hamburg nor Dresden, Zurich nor Vienna—had as great an influence on his thought as London' (p. 9). Like countless other Germanic and European visitors to mid-Victorian Britain, Semper was fascinated both by the process of modernization and the international and imperial culture he encountered. Exiled from reactionary Saxony in 1849, he was forced to engage with this new environment not just intellectually, but also professionally. The success or failure of his engagement outlined here reveals much about Semper himself, as well as the wider context of British–German and European cultural developments.

The first volume under review is an edited collection of essays exploring Semper's experiences and work in London. Murray Fraser usefully provides an opening frame of reference for understanding the course of Semper's career while in London. He points to the high

standing of German art and architecture in Britain from at least the 1830s, particularly among art reformers. Semper's early work on classical architecture and polychromy—the use of colour on Greek and Roman sculpture—was already known. Semper also visited Britain in 1838 as part of his preparatory research for the Hoftheater in Dresden and met Thomas Leverton Donaldson, a founder member of the Royal Institute of British Architects, proponent of classicism, and member of the committee to explore polychromy in connection with the Elgin Marbles. Donaldson would become a lifelong friend. The rising number of British visitors to German capitals to admire new museums and buildings, meanwhile, meant Semper's Hoftheater and other Dresden projects attracted attention.

Fraser also sets the thematic tone by pointing to the significance to Semper's work of London's global character and, in particular, his interaction with the Great Exhibition of 1851. Commissioned by Henry Cole to arrange colonial displays there, Fraser shows how Semper consequently reflected in his writings on the evolution of architecture, the relevance of historical styles—including polychromy—in modern architectural settings, and universal principles of design and decorative art. Such reflection facilitated Semper's appointment under Cole at the Department of Practical Art, where he taught and researched for almost two years and enjoyed a professional basis for numerous further projects. Also highlighted by Fraser, not re-examined in this volume, and certainly noteworthy here are Semper's design work for the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich and the astounding commission by Prince Albert in 1855 of a design for the layout of the new South Kensington estate.

Claudio Leoni provides an in-depth explanation of Semper's work on the Canadian court at the Great Exhibition, the image of which, he judges, 'has had an almost iconic status in architectural discourse, illustrating the beginning of material culture in mid-nineteenth-century architectural theory' (p. 39). Following what seems a pattern of Semper's life, the mission soon crept, as it were, to include the displays of Turkey, Sweden, Denmark, and the Cape of Good Hope. Leoni notes the united Canadian display's political significance pre-confederation. He provides striking detail on the exhibits—including a Canadian fire-engine 'of unusually large proportions, and remarkably

elegant design and workmanship', trialled on the Serpentine, and 'capable of throwing two streams of water 156 feet high, or a single stream of 210 feet high' (p. 43). Leoni also explains how the Canadian court expressed Semper's evolving thought regarding the relationship of architect to decorator, the technique and meaning of display, and museology.

In an initially eyebrow-raising but ultimately rewarding chapter, Philip Ursprung imagines a round-table discussion including Semper, his contemporary and co-exile Karl Marx, Crystal Palace architect Joseph Paxton, and Herman Melville. Ursprung is perhaps overcandid in admitting to being no expert on Semper and having done no archival research for the chapter. Involvement with the project and access to its findings proves enough to enable valuable insights regarding the Crystal Palace and the participants' engagement with themes of the industrialization and commercialization of architecture, the decoration of modern buildings, and gigantism. Semper's qualified approach to modern architecture is clarified by comparison with Paxton. The ambivalence generated in many contemporaries by such patently modernist buildings as the Crystal Palace is conveyed. Ursprung reiterates the unique opportunity the exhibition provided for Semper:

> with this event and its enormous impact on visual culture, the issue of representation moved to the centre stage in architecture, economy, science, and culture in general. For a brief moment, the whole scale of society, economy, art, and science was made visible simultaneously at a single level of representation, in one space. Such a concurrence of factors had never arisen before, and it was never again repeated (p. 61).

Mari Hvattum follows with a chapter devoted to one of Semper's most discussed commissions: the Duke of Wellington's funeral car, designed during his time at the Department of Practical Art. Hvattum notes Semper's collaboration on the car with both Cole and Richard Redgrave and consequent debates about ultimate responsibility. She emphasizes the contemporary significance of the Duke of Wellington's funeral in 1852 and, drawing on contemporary media, shows the intense public discussion of the car's meaning. Central to

the chapter—as to Semper—is the question of how far historical precedent should be applied to modern design. Among the many such precedents Semper considered, it is pleasing to this reviewer to be directed towards Andrea Mantegna's *Triumphs of Caesar*, then as today located at Hampton Court Palace. Ultimately, however, the funeral car demonstrated the dangers of weighing down modern design with history. Paxton's Crystal Palace managed to be both functional and aesthetically pleasing. Semper's funeral car was, Hvattum judges, marked by its 'ponderous monumentality' (p. 80). In the public mind it was upstaged by the simple pathos of Wellington's riderless horse, boots hanging from the saddle.

The main focus of Dieter Weidmann's chapter is Semper's use of English, an unusual subject focus but one that provides insights and entertaining detail, and also allows reflection on challenges to acclimatization faced by migrants. Weidmann describes Semper's travels before his arrival in Britain. He studied in Paris and travelled widely, including in France, Italy, Sicily, and Greece. Weidmann reminds us of the continuing French influence in Semper's life, linguistically and intellectually. Using lists of his grammar books drawn from customs records and Semper's own translation exercises, gathered as part of the research project, Weidmann traces how Semper learned English. It remained cumbersome, despite his many public duties. Semper jumbled French, German, and English to create words such as 'barches', 'fricture', 'sutt', and 'didges' (p. 96). Cole would describe Semper's draft lectures diplomatically as 'suggestive' (p. 91). The importance of Semper's difficulties with English to his removal to Zurich is left open.

In her chapter on Semper and curvilinearity, Sonja Hildebrand demonstrates how Semper, drawing on German Romantic precedents, and building on his own interest in mathematics and natural science, engaged with contemporary British discussions on the nature and laws of beauty and the problem of perception. With the help of call slips Semper used during his research at the British Museum Library, Hildebrand identifies Semper's interaction with theorists including Francis Penrose, James Fergusson, and David Ramsay Hay. She successfully demonstrates the importance of this to Semper's own work on the interrelationship of form and function, an immediate

illustration of which was his work on the shape of Greek slingshots and Prussian musket balls.

Elena Chestnova examines Semper's lectures at the Department of Practical Art to trace the development of his ideas regarding decoration and design. Responsible at the outset for metalwork design, his brief expanded quickly to decorative arts more widely and especially pottery. At Cole's suggestion, Semper visited Herbert Minton's factory at Stoke. Drawing on this and the work of writers including Karl Otfried Müller, Georges Cuvier, and the director of the Sèvres porcelain manufactory Alexandre Brongniart, Semper developed further his theories regarding national differences of ornamentation. He considered function and spirit as influences on ornamentation, producing thereby a hierarchy of material culture. Like others in the art reform movement, he identified a deterioration in decorative art connected with mechanization and shared their admiration for non-European design.

Kate Nichols looks at Semper's work for the Crystal Palace at Sydenham. Semper argued for an architectural history based on divisions of space, including through hung textiles. It was appropriate, then, that his (limited) practical contribution there was the design of the mixed textile court. Yet as Nichols shows, he had a far more important impact indirectly. Both Semper and Owen Jones had been interested in Greek sculpture and polychromy since the 1830s. Jones, influenced by Semper, displayed plaster casts of Greek art in colour. Nichols effectively and entertainingly conveys the outrage caused. She also argues that Semper's writings were 'foundational to what was to become one of the lasting, and most controversial, aspects of the Sydenham Palace: its display of brightly painted copies of the Parthenon frieze' (p. 144).

Semper's views on textiles lead into Caroline van Eck's chapter: the architect's anthropological interest in body art among indigenous peoples in such things as tattoos and masks. A central concern was its representational function. Van Eck shows how Semper's thought built on a century or more of anthropological interest, but also how, by tracing degrees of representation and symbolism, he 'unfolds a view of the nature of architecture, its origins, the laws that govern its development, and its aesthetics that is completely new' (p. 173). Beat Wyss

continues the discussion of Semper's textile paradigm and its facilitation of an evolutionary history of architecture. In this respect, Wyss shows, Semper belonged to a broad intellectual concern with evolution predating Darwin.

The concluding chapter by Alina Payne appropriately seeks to summarize Semper's significance. Central, she argues, was his ability to combine disciplines and develop global theories of art and architecture. Semper's universalism was particularly triggered by the Great Exhibition. This 'enormous *Handelsraum*', as Payne puts it, was a 'Humboldtian playground of cultural simultaneities and comparisons . . . it was a visual display of things compared to each other. And comparative aesthetics comes straight out of it' (p. 205). Semper's interdisciplinary work fed back into disciplinary discourse and, even if not always accepted, was deeply influential:

> What Semper had done was to reinterpret the Great Exhibition, as a mentality-changing event, into a methodology for analysis—of art, architecture, crafts, and the relation of man to the products of mind and hands, of labour and memory. He laid the foundations of a first global art history, as well as providing a site for the globalization of knowledge—meaning not only that he engaged with territorial geography but also with disciplinary territories, with a broad geography of disciplines (pp. 207–8).

The second volume under review, *Gottried Semper: London Writings 1850–1855*, presents an extensive collection of Semper's works written in London but hitherto unpublished. Sections include: materials Semper produced on arrival and as he attempted to set up a private school of architecture; letters, articles, and notes written in connection with the Great Exhibition; essays on polychromy; works written in connection with his duties as professor at the Department of Practical Art—including his report on the arms at Windsor Castle; his lectures during this time; and other supplementary texts, some of which are not by Semper, but relate directly to his career.

The editors provide a highly valuable general introduction offering contextual detail regarding Semper's life before Dresden, his connections and work in France, his involvement with the revolutions of 1848–9, and his aborted intention to emigrate to the USA. They point

to his time in Rome and acquaintances there, including Emil Braun, who was crucial in his decision to come to Britain. They allude to Semper's connections to other Germanic migrants in London, reveal the significance of his work on polychromy, and explain his transfer to the Department of Practical Art. His move to Switzerland is also rationalized under the heading 'The Will to Architecture' (p. xxviii) as a desire to return to architectural practice that had been stymied in Britain.

The general introduction begins a hierarchy of analysis. After the main documents comes an 'Apparatus' containing an introduction to each section, an explanatory note on separate documents, multiple variants of the documents, and then references to other versions of documents published elsewhere. This meticulous, scientific structure is complex. Yet here the excellent production work comes to our assistance: sections are colour coded. There are even useful bookmarks in corresponding tones. More importantly, the volume allows access not just to Semper's curious orthography, but also to the way his ideas gestated and evolved. In astounding detail the editors record Semper's own emendations to documents. Appendices provide extensive bibliographies of Semper's writings, works used by Semper, and secondary literature. This impressive rigour makes the volume a central and lasting reference work.

Taking the two volumes together, the research team's centre of gravity in art and architectural history means some subjects demand further consideration. Semper's politics and the significance of his participation in the revolution in Dresden remain opaque. Despite intermittent mention of his siblings, wife, and children, the roles, demands, and practicalities of his extensive family are largely unaddressed. More acknowledgement is needed of the broad Victorian interest in Germanic culture that predated and accompanied Semper. Murray Fraser makes mention of this, but the British–German cultural hinterland was far more extensive than is conveyed. The editors and authors point to Semper's often close connections to other German migrants, including Lothar Bucher, Julius Faucher, Gottfried Kinkel, and William Siemens, and provide much information useful to research in this area. The inclusion of Bucher's 'London' article is particularly insightful. Yet greater analytical focus on this area is possibly required.

The authors provide a wealth of detail regarding Semper's networks and make mention of his closeness to figures such as William Siemens and fellow Dresden revolutionary Richard Wagner. Again, one is left wanting more information. Perhaps this is to be viewed as one of the values of the project.

Across both volumes, Prince Albert, in particular, remains a vague and yet undeniable shadow, his agency at times clear, at other times implied or left to be suspected by the reader. It is almost unimaginable, even if Cole made the approach, that Albert did not know about—and give his consent to—Semper's employment at the Great Exhibition. As the *London Writings* show, Albert commissioned Semper to write for a German readership about the exhibition and to design Wellington's funeral car, and agreed to a report on the arms at Windsor. Albert's decision to ask Semper to come up with a solution for planning the South Kensington estate—and his enthusiasm for the resulting proposals—is remarkable. This is especially so considering Semper's status as a revolutionary with a death penalty for treason hanging over him in Dresden until 1863. Doubtless, ubiquitous Prussian intelligence conveyed to Berlin Semper's involvement in the exhibition. Seen in this light, Albert's sustained support for Semper was soft, yet clear and powerful liberal propaganda in the Germanic political context.

Albert, meanwhile, had also travelled to Rome and knew Emil Braun. So, too, had Ludwig Grüner, also from Dresden, a close contemporary of Semper and employed as Albert's art adviser between 1845 and 1855, though curiously not mentioned in these volumes. Semper's concern to combine historical styles with modern production chimed entirely with Albert's position and also with his moderate liberal political views. Murray Fraser notes in *Architectural History* that four years after Albert's death, 'one General Grey' (pp. 32–3) attempted to have Semper appointed as architect for the Royal Albert Hall. By this point, Grey was Victoria's private secretary. Much more may be said on all these fronts.

Together, these volumes constitute a substantial and lasting contribution to knowledge and understanding of Semper. The analysis of Semper's work during his time in London is excellent in relation to the history of art, architecture, and aesthetics. The volumes also,

however, have wider relevance for scholars of German migration, British–German cultural relations in the Victorian period, the history of exhibitions, and the art reform movement. The production of the volumes is outstanding and supports the success of the research process. Where the architectural focus means important aspects of Semper's life and significance are downplayed or absent, the volumes are important in raising questions and encouraging further research. The extensive primary materials produced by the project have undeniable intrinsic value for future research.

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STEVEN PRESS, *Blood and Diamonds: Germany's Imperial Ambitions in Africa* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2021), 352 pp. ISBN 978 0 674 91649 4 (hardback), $35.00 / £28.95 / €31.50

After years in which cultural history dominated the study of German colonial rule in Africa, interest in its economic history is back on centre stage. In the wake of the new history of capitalism and other approaches, historians are increasingly researching the economic basis of German colonial rule. Steven Press's book on the economics of diamond mining in the German colony of South West Africa is an important example of this renaissance. And Press does not limit himself to this colony. He also looks at how German diamond production was embedded in—and changed—the economic structures of global diamond trading in South Africa, Britain, Belgium, and the United States, thus breaking up the national perspective which irritatingly still prevails in German colonial history. Press asks many important questions about the economic significance of the German colonial empire. While historians have generally viewed Germany's colonies as economically insignificant, Press argues that we should rethink this. Not only was colonial business more profitable than usually acknowledged; it also played a large role in domestic politics and debates.

Press starts with a tour de force through the history of German colonial rule in South West Africa. It began with Otto von Bismarck's unfortunate approach to colonialism as company rule, when he backed Adolf Lüderitz and his successor, the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft für Südwest-Afrika (DKGSWA), in pursuing their dubious claims in South West Africa. The DKGSWA eventually became a prosperous diamond company, but at first it failed to govern the new colony, and Bismarck had to establish a conventional colonial administration to take over. However, the DKGSWA continued to claim rights over large swathes of land in which it was prospecting for mineral wealth—especially for diamonds, which had made nearby South Africa rich. Minerals, however, did not materialize. Instead, Germany promoted South West Africa as a settler colony. The arid country offered only limited possibilities for farming. The settlers therefore soon ran into violent conflicts over land and water with the African inhabitants, which escalated into a genocidal war against the Herero and Nama in

1904. South West Africa was a burden for Germany, marred by failing businesses, scarcity, and violence, until 1908, when diamonds were finally found, unleashing a mining boom.

Consumers in Europe and North America used diamonds to store value. This only worked because diamonds were regarded as scarce, and people paid huge amounts for them. Diamond finds in South Africa near Kimberley had endangered the idea of scarcity and, therefore, the high prices diamonds fetched. In the 1880s, Cecil Rhodes and the diamond company De Beers brought this threat under control by buying up almost all South African mines, thus re-establishing the scarcity of diamonds by limiting production. By 1900, Rhodes and a London-based syndicate that collaborated with him had established a quasi-monopoly over the global diamond trade, and wholesalers, cutters, importers, and retailers depended on them.

In South West Africa, diamonds turned up from time to time near Lüderitz Bay, but prospectors were unable to find large deposits. They were searching geological formations similar to those in neighbouring South Africa—and walked past diamond fields without noticing. The search was not successful until 1908. Press links the diamond strikes to the genocidal military campaigns of 1904–8. In the destruction of the Nama in particular, 'the turning of the German military eye to the stretch abutting Lüderitz Bay improved the odds of large-scale diamond discovery and created a new momentum toward it' (p. 53). Sometimes the military deliberately directed violence to areas where diamonds were expected to turn up: 'Prospective diamond riches and violence . . . reinforced one another' (p. 53).

Diamonds were discovered in the desert near Lüderitz Bay by Zacharias Lewala, a South African railway worker with mining experience, but it was the engineer August Stauch who secretly bought up land along the railway and became South West Africa's first diamond tycoon. What followed was a chaotic rush which Press colourfully describes. Within months, Lüderitz became a boom town as people flocked to the desert to make their fortunes. There was a risk that prospecting could descend into chaos. Miners made conflicting claims and sold diamonds at rock-bottom prices. Most of them did not know that diamonds were precious because they were rare. In reaction, the German colonial secretary, Bernhard Dernburg—the secret

hero of this book—recognized the claims of the moribund DKGSWA. He declared large swathes of the Namib Desert a Forbidden Zone where only the company could decide who would be allowed to mine. To control production and marketing, Dernburg established the diamond Regie—a 'state-approved, national cartel' (p. 88)—and put an end to the first chaotic months of prospecting to ensure that diamonds remained scarce. He had a larger plan: to establish a corporation to rival De Beers and its London-based syndicate. Press shows that the potential was there: stones from South West Africa were easier to mine, of superior quality, and smaller in size, corresponding to the wishes of US middle-class buyers. This was a relevant consumer group, as around 75 per cent of all diamonds mined went to the United States, where many of them graced engagement rings, which were becoming ever more popular.

Here Press for the first time abandons his narrative style and lays out the importance of his work for the history of German colonial rule in general. He argues that historians have underestimated the significance of the diamond economy. While Horst Gründer writes that German diamond exports accounted for 52 million marks between 1908 and 1913, Press points to statements by De Beers that in 1913 alone, South West Africa exported diamonds worth 59 million marks. Including smuggled stones, Press estimates that the real value of diamonds from the German colony was closer to 118 million marks in 1913. I can confirm from my own research on the rubber trade in the German colony of Kamerun that official data often did not reflect the sums actually exported.[1] Press, therefore, rightly sees a 'need to reexamine the anatomy of the German colonial economy. There was more money motivating this colonial regime, and more money generated from its exploitation of Indigenous peoples, than has been acknowledged in curt dismissals' (p. 90).

In the chapter on labour, Africans move more into the centre of the narrative. Germany's policy of extermination in 1904–8 had exacerbated the problem of labour in a colony which was only thinly populated. Labourers for the diamond industry had to come from

[1] Tristan Oestermann, 'Kautschuk und Arbeit in Kamerun: Soziale Mobilität, Zwang und Militanz unter deutscher Kolonialherrschaft' (Ph.D. thesis, Humboldt University of Berlin, 2021).

elsewhere. Some Africans went from the Cape Colony to South West Africa. Ovambo migrants from the colony's north, however, provided a lasting solution to the problem. Thousands travelled to the diamond fields, where they faced appalling working conditions—bad sanitation, housing, and violence at the workplace. Many found an early death in the desert. Press explains this as a result of the colonists' racist mindset and the fact that the state had little say in the Forbidden Zone, where the DKGSWA ruled out government standards for working conditions. However, Press's account of African labourers remains superficial. While he mentions Ovambo authorities making deals with their German counterparts to provide labour, young men wanting to earn money so that they could marry, and migrants from the Cape choosing South West Africa because of higher wages, the social conditions enabling the emergence of this system of labour migration remain hidden. Rather than stressing their agency, Press reproduces the story of Africans as helpless victims of all-powerful colonial actors.

In Germany, the diamonds led to a frenzy on the stock markets—with the DKGSWA as the rising star. Before 1908, shares in colonial companies had not been of any interest for most investors. But now, diamond companies paid unbelievable dividends of up to 3,800 per cent. According to Press, this diamond mania was a 'singular phenomenon in Imperial German financial history' (p. 136), which soon turned into a bubble. Fraudsters and bogus companies mushroomed on the colonial stock market, which lacked proper state regulation by design. Illicit activity did not stop there. The exclusive role of the Regie also created a large black market for diamonds. Smuggling was not a marginal phenomenon, according to Press. At least 50 per cent of all South West Africa's diamonds found their way on to the world market illegally. Even though the state tried to stop smuggling by employing a diamond police and secret agents and introducing measures to control the African population, it was unsuccessful. While the public connected smuggling with Jewish networks and Africans, it was, in fact, settlers, officers, soldiers, and especially women who used every loophole to take the stones out of the country.

Obviously, many people felt left out by the diamond boom. Dernburg not only excluded individual miners, but also ignored German

diamond cutters and struck a deal with Antwerp, an old but ailing centre of the diamond industry. Antwerp was well connected with the world market for diamonds, and especially with the USA, home to most of their consumers. This connectedness was important to Dernburg, even though co-operating with Antwerp meant losing a share of the business associated with the stones and facing furious reactions in German politics. Social Democrats, antisemites, and others criticized Dernburg's capitalist colonial policies. Equally, criticism came from settlers in South West Africa, who feared the rapid industrialization of the agrarian colony and wanted to have a say in how the new wealth was spent. Thus Dernburg and his policy were under pressure from the start. Political forces in Germany and South West Africa criticized the fact that diamonds only benefited wealthy capitalists.

In 1910, the diamond stock bubble burst. Dernburg lost his last backers and left office in June. A Reichstag commission now freed the way for the diamond Regie to be reformed. New people who became members of its board, such as Stauch and the journalist Paul Rohrbach, gave the Regie a more populist agenda. Dernburg's cartel, designed to steer production in order to maintain the impression that diamonds were scarce, came to an end. Production rates increased. However, Press argues, this undermined the future of the diamond industry in South West Africa. Diamond prices plunged and the Antwerp syndicate ran into financial problems. In 1914, the Germans entered into an agreement with De Beers, putting an end to the idea of a competitive German diamond industry. During the First World War, diamonds from South West Africa continued to be of global importance. Smuggled stones funded the German war effort. Diamonds also played a part in arms production and storing wealth in societies with devaluing currencies. After the war, Ernest Oppenheimer, a South African businessman, bought up Germany's mining rights and became the world's most powerful diamond tycoon.

Press provides a strong and convincing narrative which suggests that further studies in German colonial economics will be very revealing. He deserves praise for placing German South West Africa's diamond boom into a global framework. Nevertheless, he rarely presents generalizing arguments, and when he does, he is often in danger of overstretching them. Writing that 'genocidal violence and

diamonds' were 'the defining traits of Germany's short-lived overseas colonies' (p. 10) makes his topic too big. Similarly, when he writes that 'Diamond labor dynamics . . . constitute a new kind of link "from Windhoek to Auschwitz"' (p. 232), he is searching for relevance in the wrong place and ignoring the ample literature on similar colonial labour conditions elsewhere in the world, which obviously did not lead 'to Auschwitz'. Generally, Press singles out German colonial rule and presents it as especially ruthless and brutal, silently implying a German *Sonderweg* or special path in Africa. While diamond mining was hard and often deadly work, comparing it with contemporary practices in the neighbouring South African mining industry and its labour migration patterns would have put this into perspective. Finally, African agency is of only marginal importance to Press. His book is a history of colonial economics, centred on European actors, which is totally legitimate as he provides us with a strong and compelling narrative, revealing hitherto unknown connections of Germany's colonial economy. This narrative may motivate others to follow him and to pick up parts of this history lying hidden in the past, like diamonds in the desert.

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MARC DAVID BAER, *German, Jew, Muslim, Gay: The Life and Times of Hugo Marcus* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 320 pp. ISBN 978 0 231 19670 3 (hardback), $95.00/£74.00; ISBN 978 0 231 19671 0 (paperback), $30.00/£25.00

The book under review here has received attention and appreciation from scholars of religion and of Islamic, Jewish, and sexuality studies. It is an important book, and in five well-written chapters, the author narrates the life and times of Hugo Marcus (1880–1966). Marcus lived a difficult but interesting life as a Jewish gay man who converted to Islam in interwar Berlin. His intellectual biography provides a chance to explore various facets of German history in turbulent times.

Chapter one examines Marcus's involvement in the gay rights movement led by Magnus Hirschfeld and a wider scholarly and activist circle in Berlin. The second chapter documents Marcus's queer conversion to Islam at the Ahmadiyya mosque and maps out the vibrant Muslim community in interwar Berlin. The third chapter looks at Hugo Hamid Marcus's changing fortunes as he navigated his Jewish past and Muslim convert identity during the violent rise of the Nazi regime and the transformation of German society. Chapter four takes us through the difficult history of Jewish persecution and Marcus's escape from Nazi Germany to a relatively safe but discriminatory exile in Switzerland. The significant final chapter examines the literary expression of Marcus's complex life as a gay writer, his literary influences, and the friends who supported him in his lonely last years until his death in 1966. The introduction looks at the existing historiography and the resulting conceptual problems and possibilities for working on the life and writings of a queer German–Jewish convert to Islam. In Baer's analysis of Marcus's life, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe emerges as an important intellectual influence. The conclusion ends with the recent establishment of the queer-friendly Ibn Rushd-Goethe Mosque in Berlin. Through carefully interwoven chapters, we get a nuanced intellectual biography of a difficult life and challenging times with various personal contradictions and intellectual confluences. It thus provides an entry point for understanding more significant issues about Muslims, Jews, and queer life in German history.

Baer's book contributes to debates in various disciplines and fields of research, including connected German–Asian studies—mainly of the South Asian Ahmadiyya Muslim community or Ahmadis, who formed a modernist religious movement that established the first major mosque in Berlin. This review will engage with the book to explore the new direction it has opened up in the discipline of German–Asian history. How can scholars of global history maintain a comparative perspective as they negotiate the demands of transnational actors and multilingual archives? Moving beyond the polarized contemporary debate on Islam and Muslim migrants in Germany, the book offers a historical reading of Islam, conversion, and German subjectivity in the interwar years, which is valuable as the chosen case study is an interesting and complex one. Ahmadiyya Islam in Germany allows for a new reading not just of Ahmadis, but also of Islam: what one might call Weimar Islam in interwar Berlin. This expression of Islam maintained a dialogue with German debates on education, science, psychoanalysis, gender, and life reform (*Lebensreform*). This allows us to see Ahmadiyya Islam as the first significant movement within South Asian Islam to engage with Europe through a mosque and multilingual English and German publications in Britain and Germany.

While the book under review is a meticulous reading of Marcus's understanding and adaptation of Islam, the South Asian Ahmadis who were foundational to his views remain marginal. This might be because the focus remains on Hugo Marcus, even when the author documents his role in gay rights circles and the Muslim community in Berlin. This is a methodological problem that stems not so much from the question of archives as from the genres of global intellectual history and biography. The Ahmadiyya mosque in Berlin has slowly but steadily attracted academic attention, not least because it had some notable European converts, such as Marcus, Muhammad Asad (born Leopold Weiss), and Omar Rolf von Ehrenfels. However, by focusing on European converts without paying attention to the Ahmadi actors who brought the knowledge which allowed the possibility of translation and adaptation and helped build dialogue between the two cultures and languages, Baer achieves only a partial understanding.

Moreover, presenting Ahmadiyya actors solely as religious missionaries is not very productive. Indeed, the imam and regular visitors

to the mosque were also university students and scholars pursuing various fields of knowledge, particularly science, economics, and philosophy. These actors included not just the mosque leaders Sadruddin and Abdullah, but also regular participants such as Syed Abid Husain, Zakir Husain, and K. Abdul Hamied, among many others. The Ahmadiyya mosque was intellectually connected with the German secular university and emerged as an important public arena for studying secularism and Islam in Germany. It was open to a range of scholars, including those who engaged with minority status and persecution. This may explain their openness to sexual minorities. In other words, thinking in terms of minorities instead of identity markers became a more productive way to understand the presence of a variety of political, religious, and sexual minorities. The Ahmadis understood the issue of persecution of Jews and homosexuals because they had themselves been confronted with persecution in the increasingly communalized and sectarian polity of British India. Here, some attention to the comparative dimension of South Asian history would have helped to contextualize and better understand Ahmadi politics in Europe.

The author does an admirable job of mapping the world of Hugo Marcus. However, Baer does not decentre or examine the complexities of Marcus's intellectual influences, instead confining himself to German intellectuals and knowledge formation. Apart from the works of Goethe, the remarkable and prolific writings of the influential Ahmadi writer and leader Muhammed Ali on questions of modernity, religion, and subjectivity are mentioned but not explored. The author reveals that the Ahmadis continued to support Marcus personally, despite many threats, even as German society and institutions were Nazified. Not only did they help Marcus escape from Germany to Switzerland, but they also made travel arrangements for his stay in British India. Unlike Omar Rolf von Ehrenfels, who moved to British India and worked with Ahmadis, Marcus made a different choice. He returned to Switzerland, where he relied on his Jewish and homosexual connections. Ahmadi friends continued to support him financially, emotionally, and intellectually, as is clear from the letters they exchanged. They also engaged critically with his translations and helped him develop his scholarly work on Islam and modernity.

Ahmadiyya Islam sought a new form of connection and affinity over difference. This made it appealing to many Germans, particularly Jewish converts to Islam. However, this sense of identification must be critically analysed. Queer conversion is an extremely interesting phenomenon and can be understood as an act of translation. Baer is one of the finest scholars on the issue of conversion, as is evident in this book. However, it seems to me that the case study reveals conversion not just as a religious act but as an intellectual and emotional translation. Marcus negotiated the meaning of what was available and what he desired personally. This brings us to questions of subjectivity and desire, both conscious and subconscious, and to the issue of conversion. It seems that Islam appeared as a queer religion, at least in the version understood by Marcus. This is an important point in the contemporary debates about Islam and homosexuality.

The book reveals fascinating facets of Marcus's life as a Jewish, Muslim, and gay German. Yet Marcus belonged to all and none of these categories. If anything, his life and death are a testament to the failure of compartmentalizing identity and intellectual history.

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THEODOR LESSING, *Jewish Self-Hate*, trans. Peter C. Appelbaum, ed. Benton Arnovitz (New York: Berghahn Books, 2021), 186 pp. ISBN 978 1 789 20986 0 (hardback), £110.00; ISBN 978 1 789 20992 1 (paperback), £23.95

The idea of Jewish self-hatred is certainly not a new one, neither has its meaning changed much. The term originated in Germany with the dawn of Reform Judaism, which sought to bring Jewish communal practice more into line with that of its German counterparts, and which caused a split within German Jewry as a result. The split effected further communal splintering, as groups now found an urgent need to (re)define themselves against the emergent ideology. Consequently, we see 'Conservative' and 'Orthodox' Judaism emerge in Germany as a reaction to Reform Judaism (much as conservatism found its own ideological voice only after, and as a result of, the dawn of liberalism). Thus the term is used amongst Jews themselves to denote apparent internalized antisemitism.[1] Today it is most often applied to Jewish detractors of either Israeli policy or indeed the existence of the state itself. And the title of 'self-hating Jew' is often lobbed against actors such as Woody Allen and Larry David, although probably both and certainly the latter, perhaps unsurprisingly, would disagree. In a now-classic episode of *Curb Your Enthusiasm*, upon being called a 'self-loathing Jew' for whistling Wagner, David's eponymous character retorts: 'I do hate myself, but it has nothing to do with being Jewish.'[2]

However, it was only with the publication of the German–Jewish philosopher Theodor Lessing's *Der jüdische Selbsthaß* (Jewish Self-Hate) in 1930 that the term gained widespread use. Lessing used a case study of six intellectuals who, through their own Jewish self-hatred, he believed stoked the fires of German and Austrian antisemitism. The book's publication date is noteworthy; appearing only three years before Hitler became Germany's chancellor, it

[1] See, inter alia, Sander L. Gilman, *Jewish Self-Hatred: Anti-Semitism and the Hidden Language of the Jews* (Baltimore, 1986), 361; Antony Lerman, 'Jewish Self-Hatred: Myth or Reality', *Jewish Quarterly*, 55/2 (2008), 46–51.
[2] Larry David, 'Trick or Treat', *Curb Your Enthusiasm*, Season 2 Episode 3, HBO (2001).

was almost immediately included in the Nazi book-burning rituals that began the same year. Only two months after Hitler assumed his chancellorship, Lessing fled with his wife to Marienbad. It was a short-lived escape: he was shot by assassins while working on 30 August, a price having been put on his head by the Nazi regime. He died the next day, aged only 61. *Der jüdische Selbsthaß* became an underground classic, and Lessing was elevated to the status of cultural–historical philosophical clairvoyant.

It is thus perhaps surprising that this volume, translated by Peter C. Applebaum and published in 2021, is the first English translation of the work. As such, it represents a valuable contribution to the body of scholarship dealing with the phenomenon of internalized antisemitism. Applebaum's translation preserves Lessing's own angst-ridden writing style: at times clear and concise, at other times rambling and murky. Five short chapters on 'Jewish Destiny' and a 'scientific' excursus on Jewish self-hate are followed by six 'life stories' which, in Appelbaum's words, 'delve into the complex nature of German Jewish self-hate during the latter part of the nineteenth century through the Weimar Republic' (p. ix). Nonetheless, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the book betrays as much about Lessing's own psychological state at the time of writing as it does about the six figures whom he vignettes, and indeed this is the overwhelming feeling that the reader is left with upon completion of the volume. And therein perhaps lies the book's weakness: it all seems rather dated. Lessing's prose is characterized by a hypersensitivity and pathos that are at times simply too much for today's reader to bear. His theorizing rarely approaches the cool neutrality and scientific methodology that one would expect from a philosopher and mathematician today.

In the first chapters Lessing summarizes the situation of 'Eastern' and 'Western' Jews that are all too familiar to today's reader: the book was written in the wake of the 1929 Arab anti-Jewish riots in British Mandatory Palestine, which erupted over the question of access to the Western Wall and in which hundreds of Jews and Arabs were killed and many more injured. For Lessing, the riots proved nothing more than that the Jews were always damned to persecution. Even when 'tired of ever-repeating cycles of mass hysteria, which no nobility of

thought, culture, or action can ever reconcile', the 'oldest of all peoples [had] decided to take its destiny into their own hands' (p. 4) and return to their ancient homeland. His conclusion that '[w]hen we stand up for our own rights, they respond, "Have you not yet learned that dogged self-preservation of a special people is nothing more than treachery against universal human, *trans*national values?"' (p. 4) is indicative of the style of argumentation that he employs throughout the book. Although one might not argue with the truth of such conclusions, they are presented in a manner that is just too personal for what is supposed to be a study of a particular sociological phenomenon.

Figures such as Moses Mendelssohn, Moses Hess, Karl Marx, Heinrich Heine, Max Nordau, and Theodor Herzl (although the latter only in passing) are all mentioned in the opening chapters, but there is nothing new for today's reader to glean from Lessing's discussion, although it certainly would have been more *au courant* in 1930. And his chapter that promises a discussion about the psychology, pathology, logic, and morality of self-hate is philosophical at best, and only at a stretch. There is little scientific discussion, in spite of the chapter's title, and statements such as, 'Jewish spiritual development reveals a fateful exaggeration of the spiritually conscious over the aesthetic–religious' and 'Within the spiritually conscious life, ethical intension predominates over logical perception' (p. 21) are presented with no proof.

The six 'self-hating Jews' whose life stories Lessing tells—Paul Rée, Arthur Trebitsch, Max Steiner, Walter Calé, Maximilian Harden, and Otto Weininger—are, with the possible exception of Weininger, all but forgotten today, except perhaps in academic circles. The essay on Weininger—certainly a conflicted soul whose book *Geschlecht und Charakter*[3] is still presented today in any robust discussion on racial theory—promised the most, but contributes little to any real understanding of Weininger's tragic figure. The essay on Trebitsch is the most illuminating and comprehensive. There are also glaring omissions: why, for example, Paul Rée, of whom, in Lessing's words, 'nothing . . . remains for posterity' (p. 37), and not, say, Karl Kraus,

[3] Otto Weininger, *Geschlecht und Charakter: Eine prinzipielle Untersuchung* (Vienna, 1903).

who would have provided a more interesting and multidimensional study?

All six men met early and tragic deaths, probably all by suicide (although Rée's 'shatered [*sic*] body' (p. 48) was found at the foot of a glacier, so accidental death cannot be ruled out). Lessing's implication of course is that Jewish self-hate could be internalized only so much. And such conclusions betray Lessing's main methodological weakness. In his attempt to highlight the pseudoscientific methods employed by the six 'self-hating' Jews whom he discusses, Lessing himself employs a methodology that is no less so. Perhaps all six men committed suicide as a consequence of their inability to reconcile their own Jewishness with their internalized Jewish self-hate. But Lessing's 'conclusions' can be no more than theories. Indeed, Weininger at least was likely also homosexual. Perhaps also Max Steiner, if we are to believe Lessing's cryptic claim that, as in the case of Weininger, 'newspapers indulged in vague speculations' as to the reason for his suicide, but 'only a few friends knew the truth' (p. 92). Were these men racked with Jewish or homosexual self-hate? Did one win out over the other? These are questions, one suspects, that Weininger and Steiner themselves would have been hard pressed to answer. Thus Lessing's pseudoscientific reasoning seems not only dated, but also guilty of a confirmation bias that the modern reader cannot shake off.

Rather fittingly, Sander Gilman provides an excellent introduction that contextualizes both Lessing's work and the era in which he felt compelled to write it. One wishes that Lessing himself could have read and drawn on Gilman's contribution to the volume. Paul Reitter's afterword fulfils a similar function, and is more directly critical of Lessing than either Gilman or Appelbaum. The latter's translation, it should be noted again, is first class, and his notes very helpful indeed, although they could have benefited from critical analysis of Lessing's prose in addition to providing context to his narrative.

Thus we are presented with an uneven volume. On one hand—due to the fact that it represents the first (and very good) English translation of Lessing's *Der jüdische Selbsthaß* and is well annotated with excellent contributions from Gilman and Reitter—it is a worthy

addition to the body of scholarship that deals with German–Jewish cultural history, antisemitism, and racial theory; on the other, it is a work that fails to convince due to an outdated methodology and prose style.

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CONFERENCE REPORTS

Workshop on Medieval Germany. Organized by the German Historical Institute London in co-operation with the German Historical Institute Washington DC and the German History Society, and held at the GHIL on 6 May 2022. Conveners: Len Scales (Durham University) and Marcus Meer (GHIL).

After many months of online-only conferences, one of the first in-person events to take place at the GHIL saw thirteen scholars gather at the beginning of May 2022 for a densely packed day of discussion dedicated to medieval history. What united participants at this workshop—and its previous iterations—was their special interest in the German-speaking lands of the Middle Ages. Encouragingly, the list of participants' home institutions shows that this interest is far from restricted to scholars based in Germany, but also alive and well in the United Kingdom. In addition, the workshop was fortunate to welcome scholars from North America, not least thanks to the support of a travel grant in one case awarded by the GHI Washington DC. Ph.D. students and early career researchers had the chance to present their current projects and discuss their approaches among themselves and with two distinguished scholars invited by the GHIL. In 2022 these were Eva Schlotheuber (Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf) and Wolfram Drews (University of Münster). Like their respective areas of specialization, all the speakers traversed broad chronological boundaries from the early medieval period to the later Middle Ages and reached beyond narrowly (and artificially) conceived notions of the borders of medieval 'Germany'. Yet thematic strands emerged, which illustrate the diversity of ongoing trends in medieval history.

One such strand dealt with experiences and constructions of 'otherness'. It was led by the paper presented by Wolfram Drews, who traced the changing perceptions in modern scholarship of early medieval Mozarabic Christians on the Iberian Peninsula, moving from an

emphasis on their role as martyrs to an appreciation of their achievements as cultural brokers. For the high medieval period, John Eldevik (Hamilton College) presented tentative thoughts on the possible relationship between accusations of torture suffered by Christians at the hands of Muslims in European chronicles and the emergence of the myth of ritual murder directed at Jews in the aftermath of the Second Crusade. Based on English and German sources, Eldevik's work suggested that these may have given rise to the popular image of Christendom's damaged body, threatened by internal and external forces—that is, Muslims and Jews. Lane Baker (Stanford University) found that stereotypes and prejudices developed in a comparable way during the late medieval period in his exploration of the historiographical reception of the arrival of Romani immigrants in the Holy Roman Empire. Baker's close reading of the sources and their transmission illuminated not just medieval perceptions of 'outsiders', but also showed how antiziganist sentiment was at times retrospectively introduced to earlier sources—edits which were not always critically appreciated by modern editors.

A second thematic strand addressed the social dimensions of confraternity and consorority. Eva Schlotheuber demonstrated how investigating the letter collections of nuns at the Benedictine Lüne Abbey gives a voice to the sisters who lived there. Schlotheuber stressed that new digital editions of such collections allow easier access and provide a comprehensive perspective on the social history of monasteries and nunneries, also revealing extensive intertextuality and specifically fashioned vocabularies. Miriam Peuker (University of Greifswald) turned the audience's attention from Benedictine to Dominican nuns and the lesser-explored area of Saxony. She highlighted that the founding family exerted influence on the nuns of Lahde, and that they had to draw on wide-ranging networks—secular as well as ecclesiastical—outside the convent to ensure the survival of their house. Matthias Wesseling (RWTH Aachen University) subsequently showed how marginalized social groups also flocked together to create institutions that were somewhat less easy to define. Wesseling drew attention to the fact that such associations are sometimes restrictively referred to as 'beggars' brotherhoods', although they were not necessarily restricted to beggars but also included the

working poor, thus offering a fertile field for research on premodern poverty.

The court as a space for multimedia forms of communication and as a stage for social aspiration was at the heart of two further presentations. Simon R. Bürcky (Justus Liebig University Giessen) spoke about the imperial court as lying at the far end of the spectrum of social relations carefully maintained by the rather minor noble family of the counts of Solms. Their pursuit of enhanced position and power further rested on cultivating their dynastic links and extending their lordship through territorial gains. Meike Wiedemann (LMU Munich) subsequently explored the architectural and ceremonial framing of feasts at late medieval and early modern courts as a stage for public displays of power alliances and demonstrations of bonds of trust. She argued that during the later Middle Ages, courts saw the rise of the *Tafelstube*, where the ruler and distinguished guests and courtiers could increasingly withdraw from the (more) public feast to a (more) private room.

A final strand of presentations dealt with tradition in religious contexts. Huw Jones (University of Oxford) posited that narratives of the conversion of pagans in the twelfth-century hagiography of Bishop Otto of Bamberg showed that such conversions were seen as claims to unquestionable sanctity. They also spoke to the expectations and preconceptions of their writers when it came to questions of secular and episcopal authority, as well as to conceptions of barbarians. Philipp Winterhager (Humboldt University of Berlin) continued the topic of bishops, adding charters and letters to an analysis of narrative sources, with a special focus on accounts of material exchanges as part of a discourse on episcopal authority. Curiously, such accounts often emphasized the past of the objects of material transactions. Tradition also mattered in the presentation by Vedran Sulovsky (University of Cambridge). It appeared as the high medieval legacy of the Carolingian apse mosaics at Aachen cathedral, which were replaced in the fourteenth or early fifteenth century and are now lost. Sulovsky suggested that similarities in later pieces of art may allude to their original, early medieval appearance and indicate that Carolingian Aachen was much more Roman—that is, following in the tradition of Papal Rome— than is generally appreciated.

Tradition was also on the minds of the conveners Len Scales (Durham) and Marcus Meer (GHIL) as they reflected on the chronologically, thematically, and partly also geographically inclusive nature of the topics and approaches presented, and expressed their hope of continuing the workshop in two years' time.

MARCUS MEER (GHIL)

From Cambridge to Bielefeld—and Back? British and Continental Approaches to Intellectual History. Conference organized by the German Historical Institute London and the German Association for British Studies and held at the Großbritannien-Zentrum of the Humboldt University Berlin, 2–4 June 2022. Conveners: Sina Steglich and Emily Steinhauer (GHIL).

Framed by Cambridge and Bielefeld, two clusters of intellectual history in the twentieth century, this conference aimed to elucidate the state of the field of intellectual history today and the transnational landscapes in which it operates. With nineteen scholars from Continental Europe and Britain, it opened a space for an inquiry into the diverse methodological preconditions and self-understandings that underpin the writing of intellectual history and embed it in both different academic practices and wider transdisciplinary challenges. By approaching the topic through the localized lenses of the Cambridge School and the German *Begriffsgeschichte* approach (which was centred on Reinhart Koselleck's academic circle in Bielefeld), the conference programme itself subtly highlighted the intellectual historian's proximity to the discipline of political science, with which the academic circles in both Bielefeld and Cambridge were intimately connected. This opened two axes of meta-disciplinary reflection. On the one hand, it urged the participants to question the nature of intellectual history as a scholarly field—whether, for instance, the intellectual historian is simply a historiographer of political thought. On the other, it delineated the challenges for a field rooted in specific political and geographical contexts which now needs to adapt to global conditions that entail rethinking the canon, decentring the Western perspective, and focusing on specific histories, such as of marginalized groups or thoughts. Against this background, the programme inspired reflections about the purpose of intellectual history, and how the past is used in the present.

The first panel probed the genealogies and trajectories of European intellectual history. Stuart Jones (University of Manchester) examined the extent to which it was perceived as an 'English' discipline in the early twentieth century. By focusing on figures such as Mark Pattison, W. E. H. Lecky, and Leslie Stephen, Jones argued that the trend of

historicizing ideas, especially religious ones, emerged towards the end of the nineteenth century in Britain and was perceived as a distinctive 'style' by philosophers such as Henry Sidgwick and John Morley. Dina Gusejnova (London School of Economics and Political Science) pursued another line of enquiry when she interrogated the relations between British and German political thought through a history of specific sites. Using examples as diverse as an attack on C. K. Odgen's Cambridge bookshop in 1918 and John Dunn's and Norbert Elias's simultaneous stays in Ghana in the 1960s, she explored how waves of emigration, translation, and ressentiment shaped the influence (or lack thereof) of German thought in Britain. Another trajectory of the discipline was identified by Kai Gräf and Sebastian Schütte (Heidelberg University) in the field of intellectual history as it was practised in Germany from the 1930s to the 1990s. As they pointed out, the discipline found itself in an unfortunate position, due not only to the emigration of scholars in the 1930s, but also to the emergence of the rival field of social history, which attracted many more politically engaged scholars, such as Eckart Kehr and Hans-Ulrich Wehler. Picking up this theme of political involvement, Luke Ilott (University of Cambridge) engaged with Michel Foucault's historical approach, which operates as a mode of political thought in France. Based on archival material, Ilott argued that Foucault's stay in Tunis in the late 1960s allowed him to draw on a range of anglophone sources that were not discussed in French intellectual circles, such as texts by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Willard V. O. Quine, and Robert Merton. With their focus on the extra-linguistic conditions of speech, these authors helped Foucault move away from the French structuralism of the 1960s and find a materialist historical method that could address the political in a new way.

The first day ended with a keynote lecture by Richard Bourke (University of Cambridge), who explored the enduring reception of Hegel's ideas in Continental European and anglophone contexts. Tracing the intricate ways in which intellectuals on both sides of the Channel used Hegel's ideas to often conflicting ends, he concluded that we can benefit most from understanding Hegel's philosophy as a characterization of his own time. Yet this should not relieve us from the burden of making our own historical judgements. Rather, Bourke

argued, a historical reading of Hegel illustrates that each generation faces the renewed inevitability of judging its own times on the basis of criteria that have developed historically. If the Cambridge School is characterized by an insistence on the necessity to both understand history and think for ourselves, he concluded, then the Cambridge intellectual historians might have forgotten that they did not invent the contextualist methods for which they are now most famous.

The next day started with an introduction to the Fachinformationsdienst Anglo-American Culture, which provided useful information on newly available library services. The second panel then addressed the practice of British intellectual history outside Cambridge. Tim Stuart-Buttle (University of York) discussed the methodological outlook of the 'itinerant Oxonian' Hugh Trevor-Roper. Presenting Trevor-Roper as a historian who primarily assumed that the individual human mind was dynamic and resistant to static classification, Stuart-Buttle illustrated how exercising caution regarding the utility of methodological assumptions can result in an intellectual historiography that is receptive to the astonishing creativity of both historical actors and past historians. Max Skjönsberg (University of Cambridge) provided a similar portrait of the political theorist and historian Michael Oakeshott, whose attachment to the London School of Economics and Political Science likewise resulted in a distinctive style of intellectual history. In his talk, Skjönsberg introduced the audience to key concepts in Oakeshott's political and historical thinking, such as his focus on the history of ideology as opposed to the history of political thought, his distinction between the nomocratic and teleocratic styles of politics, and his different understandings of statehood, such as *societas* and *universitas*. Lastly, Cesare Cuttica (University of Paris 8) depicted the University of Sussex, home to intellectual historians such as John W. Burrow, Stefan Collini, and Donald Winch, as another significant site for the field. Shaped by a deeply transdisciplinary outlook, intellectual historians at the University of Sussex not only offered the first and, for a long time, the only undergraduate programme in intellectual history in the UK, but also managed to combine history with cultural studies, literary criticism, and philosophy, thus producing a new, special kind of essayistic writing.

The third panel emphasized the need to move beyond texts as the sole objects of study in four talks devoted to the way ideas were

embodied and put into practice in Britain from the eighteenth to the twentieth century. In her talk on ancient and modern knowledge, Heather Ellis (University of Sheffield) examined the role of classical authors in scientific discourse in Manchester from 1780 to 1840. Challenging the standard narrative of a clear break between the 'ancients' and the 'moderns', she pointed out how references to classical authors were often deployed as evidence in various modern sciences. Martha Vandrei (University of Exeter) interrogated our understanding of modern thought by illustrating the intertwined nature of philosophical reasoning and theatrical practice in the drama of the British 'syncretic' poets. Under the heading of 'practical metaphysics', she probed the impact of philosophical idealism on the genre of 'open drama' that combined tragedy and spoken word in early Victorian London. Laura Forster (Durham University) then explored the late Victorian period with a focus on the intellectual dynamics of political radicalism, and emphasized the need to consider the emotional sides of friendships, personal encounters, and communal events. She argued that the intellectual impact of performative rituals such as funerals should be taken seriously: more refined political reflections could often only occur after feelings — such as solidarity — had been aroused by the symbolic force of such events. Hélène Maloigne (University College London) completed the panel discussion by casting light on the emergence of forms of intellectual history in other fields, such as archaeology. After outlining a study of the debate about the occurrence of the flood as described in the Book of Genesis that followed the publication of the first archaeological findings from excavation sites along the Euphrates River in the 1930s, she concluded that positions within intellectual history regarding the credibility of the biblical sources (for example) influenced the public communication of the science.

The fourth panel was devoted to methods. Ian Stewart (Queen Mary University of London) presented Adam Smith's method of 'conjectural history', which was challenged by Johann Gottfried Herder and the German philosophy of language. He argued that both approaches still influence methodological presuppositions about the nature of cognitive abilities today, such as language being either innate or a (socially) constructed tool. Stanisław Knapowski (Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznán) addressed the threat that locations

can pose when their role in historical understanding is highlighted. Linking the intellectual history of early Fourierist architecture to Bruno Latour's actor–network theory, he argued that architectural objects could, under certain conditions of intellectual reception, themselves become historical agents—even if, like many early socialist architectural plans, they were never fully realized. Felix Oberholzer (University of Basel) closed the panel with an examination of the concept of 'experience' in feminist historiography and women's history. By recalling that the experience of texts has to be seen as both socially produced and socially productive, he questioned how far the appeal to a specific socially conditioned experience can be universally applicable as a source in the writing of feminist intellectual history.

The fifth and last panel, held on the morning of 4 June, returned to the theme of German conceptual history. Adriana Markantonatos (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich) argued for the importance of the history of art in the understanding of Reinhart Koselleck's conceptual history method. Emphasizing the extent to which Koselleck was driven by questions of visibility and invisibility, she pointed out which visual metaphors and pictorial analogies dominate key aspects of his work and thus need to be understood more than textually. In a similar vein, Olga Byrska (European University Institute Florence) made a case for the inherent interdisciplinarity of the field by interrogating the specificity of the task of writing intellectual history. Depending on which archives are available to intellectual historians, for what reasons, and for which specific audience they are intended, historiographies can become a form of social control. With no possibility of a subject being neutral, intellectual historians have to critically consider whom they are devoting attention to and why. Alec Walker (Free University of Berlin) rounded off the panel with a critical reflection on the narratives surrounding ordoliberalism in 1960s Germany. On the basis of a contextualist reading of the Social Democratic Bad Godesberg Programme, he challenged the idea that the German SPD intended to isolate markets from democratic pressures and 'introduce neoliberalism', and argued that the party instead had to come to terms with an existing market order and came to see its main task as alleviating its ills.

Discussion ranged around the topic of the disciplinarity of the field and revealed a number of shared concerns, such as the extent to which

intellectual historians feel the need to construct an image of their discipline in response to funding requirements, to justify themselves in light of the often imprecise impact of their studies, or to defend their attention to canonical works against the charges of 'elitism' or an alleged lack of concern for social justice. Touching upon the need for a more trans- or even post-disciplinary self-understanding, the conference provided a valuable picture of the current state of the field and its attempt to come to terms with its own political framing.

MAXIMILIAN PRIEBE (University of Cambridge)

Education and Urban Transformations: Marginalities and Intersections. Conference held at the German Historical Institute London, 9–11 June 2022. Conveners: Indra Sengupta (GHIL), Nandini Manjrekar (Tata Institute of Social Sciences, TISS), Geetha B. Nambissan (Jawaharlal Nehru University, JNU), Shivali Tukdeo (National Institute of Advanced Studies, NIAS), and Sebastian Schwecke (Max Weber Forum for South Asian Studies, MWFSAS).

This conference marked the culmination of the current research phase of the project 'Education and the Urban in India since the Nineteenth Century', co-ordinated jointly by the GHIL, MWFSAS, JNU, TISS, and NIAS. The project was an inquiry into a range of issues intersecting with education and urban studies, and several questions that had emerged from it through workshops and academic exchanges were taken forward in this conference. Participant presentations foregrounded a research agenda connecting questions in education, the historical development of urban forms, urban and social restructuring, and marginalization, among others. Participants interrogated the urban–education dynamic and identified historical, social, and political factors as essential anchors around which the changes on urban and educational terrain can be understood.

The first session, 'Nation, Citizenship, and Urban Education', began with a paper by Margrit Pernau (Max Planck Institute for Human Development) on 'Gandhians in the City: The Jamia Millia Islamia 1920–1947'. She looked at ways in which the nationalist imagination of education and learning in colonial India was deeply connected to different notions of urban and rural life. Pernau elaborated this through her historical research on the making of the Jamia Millia Islamia university. Founded in 1920, Jamia was conceptualized as a model of nationalist education, subscribing to a Gandhian philosophy rooted in an idealized vision of country life and the 'traditional' village. Using maps, Pernau illustrated how Jamia moved from Aligarh to Delhi's Karol Bagh in 1926, and from there to its present location in Okhla in 1935. She argued that while it remained within the urban environment of the new capital of India, it was deliberately located in an area close to nature. Nandini Manjrekar's paper, 'Schooling and the Industrial City: Free and Compulsory Education in Girangaon, Bombay, 1900–1940', focused on

a textile mill district in colonial Bombay. She pointed out that the period covered by her research was a time when a steep increase in the city's industrial workforce converged with a strong impetus towards public education for the working class. It is through the works of Dalit writers rather than material from the official archive, she suggested, that we learn about the role of education in the lives of mill workers in Bombay. Manjrekar observed that mapping public education in a working-class neighbourhood truly reflected Bombay's character and later growth as a migrant city.

Silvia Grinberg (Universidad Nacional de San Martín) carried forward the conversations on urban space and educational opportunities from the past to the present by shifting focus to schools in the city of Buenos Aires. Her paper, 'Urban Cartographies of Educational Inequalities: The School/Subjects/Slums Series in Buenos Aires, Argentina', reflected on the everyday production of educational inequality and school segregation. She highlighted a contradiction in urban schooling practices: school enrolments in urban Buenos Aires have increased since the early twentieth century, while at the same time education has become more exclusionary. Grinberg deployed a nuanced understanding of cartography as a theoretical tool for mapping the processes of segregation produced by schools and their neighbourhoods.

The keynote lecture held that evening was given by William T. Pink (Marquette University). Entitled 'Reimagining Education for the Common Good: Interrogating Key Intersectionalities in Pursuit of a Twenty-First Century Praxis', it presented a data-driven analysis of inequalities in education in the USA and other countries that deepened further during the Covid-19 pandemic. Pink discussed five factors—merit and the limitations of the concept of meritocracy; education and credentialism as the route to success in society; the school as an incubator for reform; rethinking the place and value of work; and out-of-school factors impacting educational reform—and drew attention to the ways in which they function and how they limit the process of education. He suggested that investigating the intersectionality of these factors can help to unravel a complex web of education and educational practice that continues to impact on students differently, depending on the intersections of other factors such as class, race, gender, and ethnicity.

The second session was headed 'Urban Restructuring and New Marginalities' and opened with a paper on 'Changing Urban Landscapes, Poverty and Education: A Perspective from the Margins of Delhi'. In it, Geetha B. Nambissan explored the implications of Delhi's changing urban landscape for the education of children from underprivileged backgrounds. She drew on urban and educational scholarship in Delhi and her fieldwork in Bawana, a resettlement colony on the city's fringes, to explore how the transformation of the city led to exclusion and educational inequalities, and impacted on the agency of the poor. She argued that education is implicated in the changing urban environment and showed that as Delhi became a megacity, children from the lower socio-economic classes faced severe spatial polarization and educational injustice as schools and colleges were segregated, leaving them with few or no educational opportunities at all. In the next presentation, 'Education Hub in Delhi-National Capital Region (NCR): Exploring the Entanglements between Higher Education and Urbanization in Early 2000s', Debarati Bagchi (MFWSAS) considered the relationship between land acquisition, higher education, and educational markets. Her paper focused on the land–university nexus on the northern, agrarian fringes of Delhi. Bagchi examined the acquisition of land on which to build an elite education hub, the Rajiv Gandhi Education City (RGEC) and explored this as a site for studying 'frontier urbanism' and the entanglements of the agrarian and the urban in South Asia. She traced the envisioning of this region as a multifunctional urban complex, and examined the government regulations and legislation that facilitated private investment in higher education and paved the way for enclosed elite private education zones such as the RGEC. Bagchi also critically analysed the role of the state in positing private education as a public good and using these educational hubs to provide urban growth. Shivali Tukdeo's presentation on 'Relentless Stretching: Urban Transformation and Educational Inequality' examined the restructuring of Bengaluru between 2010 and 2020 and looked at connections between urban megaprojects, the creation of new margins, and education. Focusing on the Metro Rail project in Bengaluru that was driven largely by capital and private agencies, she explored the process by which the project required two

neighbourhoods to be relocated to resettlement colonies far from the city centre, and the connections between economically driven re-structuring and its consequences for the working poor. Tukdeo argued that the complete absence of basic facilities in these peri-urban areas indicates that they were left for private interests to develop. While various types of educational schemes have been crucial in facilitating greater access to education and improving its quality in rural and Adivasi regions, Tukdeo said that peri-urban areas have not yet found a place in education policy.

The third session, 'Urban Transitions, Youth, and Social Aspiration', was opened by Yamini Agarwal (MFWSAS) speaking on 'Gender and Education: Impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic in a Marginalized Neighbourhood in New Delhi', which reflected on how teenage girls from low-income families were impacted by school closures and the transition to online education. Agarwal presented observations based on her field research in Sompur, an unauthorized colony in New Delhi which, despite having a population of almost a million, lacks basic urban infrastructure and has only one senior secondary government school. In such a dire situation, ed-tech companies have been trying to expand their business by exploiting the educational aspirations of poor and marginalized families. Agarwal's paper explored how the two years of the pandemic deepened the educational divide as the result of over-reliance on digital education and the shrinking role of public education in general. The paper by Meg Maguire (King's College London), 'Place Matters: Spatial Dimensions of Young People's Transitions in an Urban Setting', focused on the centrality of space, place, and geography in understanding the transition to higher education—or the lack of it—among urban youth. Referring to her ethnographic research in urban localities in the UK, she drew our attention to how structural dimensions of place shape the aspirations of young adults by determining a sense of identity and belonging, while also materially constraining or enabling people's choice-making and life chances. These structural aspects include basic access to school, housing, and healthcare, as well as factors such as transport and connectivity that play a crucial role in creating hierarchies of proximity and distance.

The round table, 'Covid-19 and Education', brought together speakers who reflected on the pandemic and its impact on education

in four different contexts. Yusuf Sayyed (University of Sussex) opened the discussion by presenting data on school closures from around the world over the last two years. He explored why greater attention was paid to policy during the pandemic than at other moments of crisis. During the ongoing transition to neoliberal education, the state acted by putting emergency regulations in place and mobilizing very large amounts of money. The push for more technology-based education came largely from the middle classes, thus alienating marginalized groups even further. Laila Kadiwal (University College London) highlighted the blatant class differentiation that was reinforced by the pandemic. While the richest could afford to isolate and be vaccinated before others, very many teachers died in Uttar Pradesh in India during the second wave. She then focused on the attitudes of the people in power in the UK and the race to buy vaccines, arguing that this was nothing but White supremacy and Western imperialism in a new garb. Silvia Grinberg presented a detailed picture of how lockdowns were implemented in Buenos Aires, pointing out that the idea of social distancing proved futile in the slums. She presented data on how public and private schools functioned and explored why the pandemic only further aggravated the existing structural inequalities in urban education. Georgie Wemyss (University of East London) depicted the experiences of minority and migrant university students in London. She shared snippets from what she herself had witnessed among students at her place of work. Those who worked to pay for their education tended to be the worst hit. Lack of access to the university space was a source of great personal loss and resulted in the social alienation of students who were already marginal in UK society. The round table was followed by a vibrant question-and-answer session. Members of the audience from different corners of the world shared their own experiences and observations of the challenges faced by various sections of society during the pandemic.

The final session, 'Urban–Education Dynamics, Knowledge, and Pedagogies', started with a presentation by Akash Bhattacharya (Azim Premji University) on 'Education and "Improvement": Joykrishna Mukherjee and Nineteenth-Century Uttarpara', which connected the histories of Indian education with the long-term history of urbanization beyond the colonial metropolis. Bhattacharya focused on the

early years of Uttarpara's transformation from a cluster of hamlets into a place shaped by steady urbanization. He showed how the aspirations for urbanization of the local landholding elite, including its chief patron Joykrishna Mukherjee, led to the physical and social transformation of Uttarpara and consolidated the demographic and social power of the Bengali urban middle class in the area. Bhattacharya argued that in the process, Uttarpara remained a 'fluid space' which maintained finely calibrated relationships with the metropolis on the one hand and the rural hinterland on the other.

In the final presentation, 'Walking the Dock: Transient Pedagogy and the Urban–Education Dynamic', Georgie Wemyss engaged with the intersections of education and urban studies by exploring practices of walking and talking in urban contexts as dialogic tools in critically researching, understanding, and contesting structural inequalities and global colonialities. Wemyss drew on several decades of walking and researching the East India Docks in London to consider the ways in which unevenly paced, embodied, and transient experiences of walking and talking across space and time can challenge structures that contribute to the marginalization and feelings of (un)belonging experienced by racialized and minoritized citizens. The conference ended with Wemyss taking the participants on a walk around the East India Docks in London.

Yamini Agarwal and Debarati Bagchi (MWFSAS)

NOTICEBOARD

Scholarships Awarded by the German Historical Institute London

Each year the GHIL awards a number of scholarships to German postgraduate and postdoctoral researchers to enable them to carry out research in Britain and Ireland. The scholarships are generally awarded for a period of up to six months depending on the requirements of the project. Scholarships are advertised on [www.hsozkult.de] and the GHIL's website [www.ghil.ac.uk]. Applications should include a CV, educational background, list of publications (where appropriate), and an outline of the project, along with a supervisor's reference confirming the relevance of the proposed archival research. Please address applications to Dr Stephan Bruhn, German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ, or send them by email to stipendium@ghil.ac.uk. **Please note that due to the United Kingdom leaving the EU, new regulations for research stays apply. Please check the scholarship guidelines for further information.** If you have any questions, please contact Dr Stephan Bruhn. Scholars present their projects and the initial results of their research at the GHIL Colloquium during their stay in Britain.

In the second round of allocations for 2022 the following scholarships were awarded:

Beatrice Blümer (University of Kassel): Der *Liber insularem Archipelagi* von Cristoforo Buondelmonti
Lea Börgerding (FU Berlin): Women's Internationalism Behind the Berlin Wall: The GDR Women's League, East–South Relations, and Socialist Solidarity during the Global Cold War, 1949–89
Franziska Davies (LMU Munich): Jenseits von 'Ost' und 'West': Eine vergleichende Verflechtungsgeschichte von Streiks und Arbeitskämpfen in Polen, Großbritannien und der Sowjetunion in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren

Thomas Dorfner (RWTH Aachen University): Mammon für die Mission: Handelstätigkeit und Spendenakquise der Moravian Church in der atlantischen Welt (1760–1815)
Martin Kristoffer Hamre (FU Berlin): Notions and Practices of Fascist Internationalism in the 1930s
Anna Hänisch (University of Cologne): 'In Palestine, as in Ireland': Das Britische Empire in Irland und Palästina zwischen Diplomatie und Gewalt (1912–47)
Manuel Kamenzin (Ruhr University Bochum): Prophetie und Politik im spätmittelalterlichen römisch-deutschen Reich
James Krull (University of Bonn): Trauer mit 'Geschichtswucht': Nationale Gedenktage in Großbritannien und Deutschland seit 1945
Ole Merkel (Ruhr University Bochum): Jenseits von Marx: Sozialismus und Sklaverei 1830–90
Jean Philipp Molderings (Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf): Die postkoloniale Nation im Museum: Wandlungen erinnerungskultureller Strategien im Humboldt Forum und British Museum 2002–22
Sarah Maria Noske (Justus Liebig University Giessen): Koloniale Mikrowelten: Orte kommerzieller Intimität im Pazifik (ca. 1860–1920)
Daniela Roberts (University of Würzburg): 'Framing Collections': Raumkonzepte und Sammlungskultur des Gothic Revival in England
Maximilian Rose (University of Hamburg): Dimensions of Failure and Missionary Work on the Gold Coast (*c.*1735–1825)

Forthcoming Events

Social Data Infrastructures for Contemporary Historians: Proposals for a Better Future. Conference to be held at the Werner-Reimers-Stiftung, Bad Homburg, 21 November 2022. Conveners: Christina von Hodenberg (German Historical Institute London) and Lutz Raphael (Trier University).

Beyond the Progressive Story: Reframing Resistance to European Integration. International conference to be held at the German Historical Institute in Rome, 27–31 March 2023, organized by participants in the research

project '(De)Constructing Europe', a co-operation between the Max Weber Foundation and the Hamburg Institute for Social Research (HIS Hamburg), funded by the German Ministry for Education and Research. Conveners: Antonio Carbone (GHI Rome), Olga Gontarska (GHI Warsaw), Alexander Hobe (HIS Hamburg), Beata Jurkowicz (GHI Warsaw), William King (GHI London), David Lawton (GHI London), Andrea Carlo Martinez (GHI Rome), Philipp Müller (HIS Hamburg), and Katharina Troll (HIS Hamburg).

In view of the recurrent crises that have hit the European Union over the last two decades, dominant assumptions about its historical development are being revised. Whereas important theories of integration have mainly explained European integration as a linear, progressive, teleological process, recent criticism casts doubt on their capacity to capture the twists and turns of both current and past developments in the European Communities and Union. In particular, the picture of the European Union as a political entity inexorably on its way to ever-deepening supranational unity has been called into question.

The conference will contribute to a reconceptualization of the history of Europeanization by starting from the observation that resistance and opposition to the EEC and the EU should not be conceived as mere obstacles that had to be overcome on the way to integration. Rather, they have often been important factors in shaping the institutions and policies of European co-operation that have emerged since the end of the Second World War. Multiple conceptions of Europe have intertwined and clashed, constantly redefining the scope and character of European integration. As a result, this has not proceeded in a linear fashion and has not been consistently underpinned by a single vision. By focusing on concrete historical trajectories and changes of direction, the conference aims to develop perspectives other than that of the conventional 'teleological view' of European integration.

Colonial Times, Global Times: History and Imperial World-Making. The second Thyssen Lecture, to be given by Sebastian Conrad (Free

University of Berlin) on 15 May 2023 at the GHIL and on 16 May 2023 at the University of Manchester. Organized by the GHIL in co-operation with the Fritz Thyssen Foundation.

Colonial hierarchies were constituted not by military and economic power alone, but also by imperial world-views. Chief among their ingredients was a particular temporality. The expansion of the European (and, soon, American and Japanese) empires, and the grafting of imperial structures onto colonized communities, confronted large groups of people with new temporal norms. This 'temporal invasion' found expression in the proliferation of clocks as levers of punctuality and temporal discipline; the alignment of calendars and the concomitant synchronization of the globe; and the dissemination of history as the privileged way of linking past, present, and future. Consequently, as will be argued, historians emerged as imperial agents in their own right. They helped introduce 'historical time' and a cosmology that redefined narratives about the past and trajectories into the future in the colonizing/colonial world. How did historians achieve this revolutionary form of world-making? Was this only a colonial imposition, or must it be seen as a response to global conjunctures? What are the legacies of this refashioning of temporality in an age of imperial globality, and how does it resonate today?

Sebastian Conrad is Professor of Modern History at the Free University of Berlin. His work has focused on issues of coloniality/postcoloniality, global history, intellectual history, the history of nationalism, and the theory of history. At the Free University he directs the Global History MA programme and the Global Intellectual History graduate school. Among his publications are 'Enlightenment in Global History', *American Historical Review*, 117/4 (2012), 999–1027; *German Colonialism: A Short History* (2012); *What is Global History?* (2016); and, edited with Jürgen Osterhammel, *An Emerging Modern World, 1750–1870* (2018).

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