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FASCISM AND FINANCE: ECONOMIC POPULISM IN INTER-WAR EUROPE

ALEXANDER NÜTZENADEL

In 1931 Germany experienced the worst banking crisis in its history. One of the largest German banks, the Darmstädter und Nationalbank (Danat), filed for insolvency and the entire financial system collapsed within a few weeks. A banking panic broke out on 13 July and banks closed for three weeks. International investors withdrew their loans, the German government had to suspend international payments, and the major banks were temporarily nationalized.[1]

On 7 August—only a few days after the bank panic—the German chancellor Heinrich Brüning travelled to Rome, where he met with Benito Mussolini and other fascist leaders. Symbolically, this was a highly significant event, as it was the first state visit of a German chancellor to the Duce. The meeting generated huge—and mostly positive—publicity in Germany and Italy, as well as in the international press. The *New York Times* associated Brüning's visit to Rome with a 'feeling of optimism', and Mussolini was expected to use the meeting 'to bring up his aspiration to take a leading role in recovery from depression'.[2]

Brüning was deeply impressed by the Italian dictator, especially by his economic expertise. He noted in his diary that the Duce was

This is the lightly revised text of my Gerda Henkel Lecture, held at the GHIL on 24 November 2021. Johanna Biedermann, Eva-Maria Kaiser, Hanna-Sophie Klasing, and Tobias Scheib provided valuable research assistance. I am greatly indebted to Felix Römer for his critical comments

[1] For a detailed account of the German banking crisis, see Karl E. Born, *Die Deutsche Bankenkrise 1931: Finanzen und Politik* (Munich, 1967).
[2] *New York Times*, 7 Aug. 1931, 10.

particularly well informed about all economic matters and could readily cite statistics on trade, unemployment, and finance.[3] Discussions revolved around bilateral preference treaties and other measures against the depression. Mussolini promised Brüning that he would support Germany's aspirations to establish a customs union with Austria in the face of resistance from the French government. It was also agreed that Italy, which was itself in the process of nationalizing its banking system, would send economic advisers to Germany.[4] Highly satisfied, Brüning returned to Berlin. Five years before the Axis between Germany and Italy was sealed, an informal rapprochement had begun to take shape in the field of economic policy.[5]

The question of whether and how economic factors contributed to the rise of fascism is as old as fascism itself. In the view of contemporary Marxists, fascism was nothing more than the product of the crises of financial capitalism. While this linear causality has been rejected by most historians, cultural and social history has dominated research for many decades.[6] Only recently have economic historians redirected their attention to the Great Depression and its political effects, often inspired by the financial crisis of 2008 and the search for

[3] Heinrich Brüning, *Memoiren 1918–1934* (Stuttgart, 1970), 355–7; see also Wolfgang Schieder, *Mythos Mussolini: Deutsche in Audienz beim Duce* (Munich, 2013), 161–2 and 247–8.

[4] See report by Foreign Minister Julius Curtius, Nr. 440: 'Ministerbesprechung vom 10. August 1931, 11 Uhr', in Tilman Koops (ed.), *Akten der Reichskanzlei: Weimarer Republik. Die Kabinette Brüning I und II (1930–1932)*, 3 vols. (Boppard am Rhein, 1982–90), vol. ii: *1. März 1931 bis 10. Oktober 1931* (1982), 1546–52; see also Julius Curtius, *Sechs Jahre Minister der deutschen Republik* (Heidelberg, 1948), 222–5.

[5] Per Tiedtke, *Germany, Italy and the International Economy 1929–1936: Co-Operation or Rivalries at Times of Crisis?* (Marburg, 2016); on the evolution of the Axis, see Jens Petersen, *Hitler–Mussolini: Die Entstehung der Achse Berlin–Rom, 1933–1936* (Tübingen, 1973); Christian Goeschel, *Mussolini and Hitler: The Forging of the Fascist Alliance* (New Haven, 2018).

[6] See e.g. Devin O. Pendas, Mark Roseman, and Richard F. Wetzell (eds.), *Beyond the Racial State: Rethinking Nazi Germany* (Cambridge, 2017); Martina Kessel, *Gewalt und Gelächter: 'Deutschsein' 1914–1945* (Stuttgart, 2019); Michael Wildt, *Die Ambivalenz des Volkes: Der Nationalsozialismus als Gesellschaftsgeschichte* (Berlin, 2019).

historical comparisons.[7] However, most studies have been confined to individual nation states, focusing primarily on Germany.[8] Others have used very large comparative datasets on elections, strikes, or street protests to measure the effects of economic shocks on political polarization. In particular, right-wing populist movements and parties gain support after economic crises.[9] While the correlation between economic distress and political extremism is statistically significant over the course of the twentieth century, the explanatory value of these studies is often limited. What we learn from them is that economic crises do lead to political extremism, but it remains unclear why and how this happens, especially in the case of financial crises.

This article argues that European right-wing populist movements drew heavily on economic conflicts and financial shocks and successfully addressed rising distributional cleavages and creditor–debitor conflicts on both a national and international level.[10] Moreover, populist governments had a lasting effect in that they shaped the financial reforms implemented in most countries from the 1930s. This means that economic populism is not only a short-term reaction to economic and financial crisis, but often engenders a long-term transformation of political institutions.

Historians have rarely referred to the concept of populism when analysing the rise of fascism, even though Pierre Rosanvallon has characterized the twentieth century as a 'century of populism'.[11] And yet this concept provides considerable analytical value, especially for the inter-war period. While the comparative study of fascism often

[7] See e.g. Johannes Bähr and Bernd Rudolph, *Finanzkrisen: 1931 und 2008* (Munich, 2011); Barry Eichengreen, *Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, The Great Recession, and the Uses – and Misuses – of History* (New York, 2015).

[8] Tobias Straumann, *1931: Debt, Crisis, and the Rise of Hitler* (Oxford, 2019).

[9] See e.g. Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick, and Christoph Trebesch, 'Going to Extremes: Politics after Financial Crises, 1870–2014', *European Economic Review*, 88 (2016), 227–60.

[10] For a general assessment, see Jeffry Frieden, 'The Political Economy of Adjustment and Rebalancing', *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 52 (2015), 4–14.

[11] Pierre Rosanvallon, *Le siècle du populisme: Histoire, théorie, critique* (Paris, 2020); see also Barry Eichengreen, *The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era* (Oxford, 2018).

operates within a narrow framework of defining a 'fascist minimum',[12] populism is a more open concept. Rogers Brubaker has argued that the term 'populism' not only describes an empirical phenomenon, but is also a useful analytical category.[13] It provides a powerful concept with which to explore the erosion of democracy and the emergence of authoritarian—but not necessarily fascist—rule after 1918. It also helps us to better understand why some countries resisted fascist dictatorship, while others did not.

The following analysis focuses on four societies with different political trajectories: Italy, Germany, France, and Britain. The analytical framework is both comparative and transnational. Even though populism appealed to national autonomy, it had a strong cross-border dynamic. Populism was a highly contagious phenomenon.

There is no general consensus about the exact meaning of economic populism. Instead of a single definition, I shall highlight four distinctive features that characterized economic populism in inter-war Europe. The first element refers to Cas Mudde's influential theory that populists claim to speak (and act) on behalf of 'the people', who are set against mostly liberal elites and mainstream politicians.[14] According to this narrative, the 'people' are hard-working and suffer from economic distress, while the elites are self-serving and corrupt. This dichotomy between 'the people' and 'the elites' as two homogenous groups can be interpreted as a simplistic yet effective way to frame rising inequality and distributional conflicts within societies. This vertical antagonism is often accompanied by a horizontal opposition between 'the people at home' and external forces. As I will argue, economic populism takes the most radical forms when agitation combines both dimensions—the vertical and the horizontal.

The second element is protectionism. Nationalist campaigns directed against foreign trade, immigration, or capital mobility were not only frequently combined with nativist ideologies, but also extended

[12] Roger Eatwell, 'On Defining the "Fascist Minimum": The Centrality of Ideology', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 1/3 (1996), 303–19.
[13] Rogers Brubaker, 'Why Populism?', *Theory and Society*, 46/5 (2017), 357–85.
[14] Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge, 2007).

to protectionist notions of social welfare.[15] National Socialism in Germany is a case in point. As one of the most radical variants of economic populism, it blended social protection of the 'people's community' (*Volksgemeinschaft*) with visions of economic autarky.[16]

The third distinctive feature is a rhetoric of crisis and national decline. Populists dramatize existing economic problems and frame them in larger narratives of national decline and social degeneration.[17] Redemption is possible, the argument goes, but it requires revolutionary changes and extraordinary measures. Complex causalities, as in the case of financial crises, are frequently explained with reference to conspiracy theories or by blaming ethnic or religious minorities. Economic narratives are a crucial element of populist propaganda, and their success often depends on new forms of media communication.

The fourth element of economic populism is the authoritarian use of technocracy.[18] In opposition, populists typically accuse democratic institutions like parliaments and elected governments of being too weak to solve serious economic problems effectively. But once in power, they combine charismatic dictatorship with technocratic government. This includes the systematic strengthening of existing institutions, such as central banks or ministries, in combination with comprehensive economic planning and regulation.

This classification is, of course, an ideal type, and not all populist movements exhibit all four elements in the same way. However, the classification is useful to understand the common ideological patterns and economic practices of populist movements and regimes during

[15] Dani Rodrik, 'Populism and the Economics of Globalization', *Journal of International Business Policy*, 1/1–2 (2018), 12–33; Philip Manow, 'Welche Rolle spielen Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit und Globalisierung für die Ausprägungen des Populismus?', *Totalitarismus und Demokratie*, 17/1 (2020), 35–44.

[16] For the concept of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, see Frank Bajohr and Michael Wildt (eds.), *Volksgemeinschaft: Neue Forschungen zur Gesellschaft des Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt am Main, 2009); Michael Wildt, *Die Ambivalenz des Volkes: Der Nationalsozialismus als Gesellschaftsgeschichte* (Berlin, 2019).

[17] Mark Elchardus, 'Declinism and Populism', *Clingendael Spectator*, 71/3 (2017), 1–10.

[18] Christopher Bickerton and Carlo Invernizzi Accetti, 'Populism and Technocracy: Opposites or Complements?', *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 20/2 (2017), 186–206.

the inter-war years. The following article is divided into three parts. It starts with a short analysis of the financial conflicts in Europe after the First World War and their radicalizing effects. The second part discusses the question of financial sovereignty and how the fascist economic system in Italy served as a model for populist movements across Europe. The third part explores the impact of populist regimes on financial and monetary reforms during the 1930s and 1940s.

Finance, Debt, and Distributional Conflicts after the First World War

The post-war economic crisis had not been predicted by contemporary economic experts. It came as a huge shock and increased existing social tensions and political conflicts. All four countries under discussion faced massive public debt, along with high inflation, foreign account deficits, and the constant erosion of their currencies.[19] The situation was worst in Germany, where the question of foreign debts was aggravated by the high burden of reparations. In his book *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1919), John Maynard Keynes had predicted the radicalizing effect of the Treaty of Versailles.[20] The financial burden of the reparations was aggravated by the fact that no lasting settlement was reached between Germany and the Allies.[21] For right-wing populist movements in Germany, this turned out to be a gift, as they could blame foreign powers for the harsh terms imposed on them. For German governments, the so-called 'Versailles diktat' was a frequently used tool for diverting attention from their own political failures.

Yet for the victors of the war too, the Treaty of Versailles was a political burden, as the financial compensation was considered inadequate and gave rise to internal political conflict and social unrest. Strikes and revolutionary ferment broke out almost everywhere. In a certain sense,

[19] See Charles H. Feinstein, Peter Temin, and Gianni Toniolo, *The European Economy between the Wars* (Oxford, 1997), 18–53.

[20] John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (London, 1919).

[21] Sally Marks, 'Mistakes and Myths: The Allies, Germany, and the Versailles Treaty, 1918–1921', *Journal of Modern History*, 85/3 (2013), 632–59.

the post-war European crisis can be interpreted as a distributional conflict that assumed both national and international dimensions.[22] At its heart, this was a struggle over the question of who should pay for the war, and any solution would inevitably have consequences for how the costs were shared among the population. For governments, inflation was a popular instrument for reducing debt, but it had significant redistributional effects. At the national level, the fierce international conflicts over reparations were bound up with accusations that certain social groups had profited from the war while ordinary people had been fighting in the trenches. Condemnation of wartime profiteers affected all countries, though it was particularly severe in Germany and led to a new wave of antisemitic campaigns.[23]

In all four countries, the post-war economic and social crisis led to a perception of decline, while exposure to external forces seemed to reduce the political autonomy of national governments. Shrinking competitiveness, declining exports, and negative balances of payments created a sense of crisis and external dependency. This was a particularly bitter experience for Britain and France, where falling exports were accompanied by a relative decline of their financial centres.[24] The French banking sector had already been fading in importance for some time, but this trend was now becoming more apparent. In Britain, the decline was critical as London's position as a global financial hub had largely depended on trade finance, which collapsed with the outbreak of the war. Anti-colonial movements were also challenging Britain's position in the international system. Although financial activities in the City of London gradually recovered during the 1920s, they never returned to previous levels. Many international banks closed their London branches during the war and did not return afterwards.

[22] Charles S. Maier, 'Die deutsche Inflation als Verteilungskonflikt: Soziale Ursachen und Auswirkungen im internationalen Vergleich', in Otto Busch and Gerald Feldman (eds.), *Historische Prozesse der deutschen Inflation 1914 bis 1924* (Berlin, 1978), 329–42.

[23] Martin H. Geyer, 'Contested Narratives of the Weimar Republic: The Case of the "Kutisker–Barmat Scandal"', in Kathleen Canning, Kerstin Barndt, and Kristin McGuire (eds.), *Weimar Publics – Weimar Subjects: Rethinking the Weimar Republic* (New York, 2010), 211–35.

[24] See Youssef Cassis and Eric Bussière (eds.), *London and Paris as International Financial Centres in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford, 2005).

In Italy, the post-war crisis was even worse. In 1918 Italy had one of the highest inflation rates in Europe, a soaring public debt, and stagnating wages, which led to major social unrest.[25] In 1921 a severe crisis unfolded in the Italian banking sector when the Banca Italiana di Sconto—one of the country's most important industrial banks—became insolvent, triggering a major default of the Italian financial system. The bankruptcy had huge political effects as the Banca Italiana di Sconto had been heavily involved in war finance and had close ties to high political circles, as well as to the armaments company Ansaldo.[26] The bank was accused of lining its pockets during the war while hundreds of thousands of Italians starved to death or were hunkered down in trenches for the fatherland. Moreover, the bank's insolvency now threatened to wipe out the savings of millions of Italians. Managers and political leaders were accused of share price manipulation and delayed filing of bankruptcy. The episode played into the hands of Mussolini, as the Italian public grew convinced that the old liberal elite surrounding Prime Minister Francesco Nitti had failed politically and was mired in corruption.

Financial conflicts also shaped international diplomacy after the First World War. Here once again, the question of how to re-establish the international order was highly controversial. On the one hand, it was apparent that the informal system of co-operation that had dominated international finance before 1914 could not be restored. On the other, the new institutions around the League of Nations were too weak to create a new and powerful system of global financial governance. While scholars such as Patricia Clavin have revisited the role of the League of Nations, from the contemporary perspective at least the League's limitations cannot be ignored.[27] Hardly any of the recommendations made by the League's Economic and Financial Organization (founded in 1920) had the desired effects. One example

[25] Sabrina Leo, 'Il sistema finanziario della prima guerra mondiale tra debiti di guerra e riparazioni', *Eunomia: Rivista semestrale di Storia e Politica Internazionali*, 4/2 (2015), 77–100.

[26] Anna Maria Falchero, *La Banca italiana di sconto, 1914–1921: Sette anni di guerra* (Milan, 1990).

[27] Patricia Clavin, *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920–1946* (Oxford, 2013).

was a commission established in 1920 under the leadership of the Dutch banker ter Meulen, which sought to introduce an international credit scheme as a new basis for trade finance. In the UK in particular there were high expectations for the scheme, which led to all the more disappointment when it failed.[28]

One of the paradoxical effects of this initiative was that international collaboration increased on the level of informal networks. Private actors, and especially bankers, played a key part in this. Bank directors had already expanded the scope of their public engagement during the war, when they acted as financial experts and managers of the wartime economy in many countries. A few, such as Karl Helfferich, a director of Deutsche Bank, were even appointed to political office. After 1918, bankers represented their governments in the important Financial Commission of the Versailles Treaty negotiations, such as Carl Melchior on the German side; Melchior also became the German government's key adviser in subsequent reparation negotiations.[29] In 1926 he was appointed as the German representative to the League of Nations Financial Committee, and from 1931 he served as a board member of the Bank for International Settlements in Basel. Another example was Carl Bergmann, a former director of Deutsche Bank, who became the German representative to the Versailles Reparations Commission and head of the War Burdens Commission.[30] International financial experts gained considerable importance in the reparation settlements. For instance, the Dawes Committee included many high-profile figures of finance, such as Émile Francqui, a prominent Belgian banker; Josiah Stamp, a director at the Bank of England; and Jean Parmentier, the French inspector general of finance.[31] Their expertise allowed them to become important

[28] Jamieson G. Myles, 'Steering the Wheels of Commerce: State and Enterprise in International Trade Finance, 1914–1929' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Geneva, 2021), 101–41.

[29] Melchior continued to have close relations with Keynes. See John Maynard Keynes, *Two Memoirs: Dr. Melchior, A Defeated Enemy, and My Early Beliefs* (London, 1949).

[30] Werner Plumpe, Alexander Nützenadel, and Catherine Schenk, *Deutsche Bank: The Global Hausbank 1870–2020* (London, 2020), 262–3.

[31] Robert Yee, 'Reparations Revisited: The Role of Economic Advisers in Reforming German Central Banking and Public Finance', *Financial History Review*, 27/1 (2020), 45–72.

advisers of national governments, but even more important were their international networks, which allowed communication when official diplomatic channels were blocked. For a politically isolated country like Germany, these international contacts were an indispensable asset. Yet these activities also fuelled popular distrust of the international financial establishment, which was portrayed as a small wealthy elite pursuing its own agenda instead of common national interests.

To many observers, it seemed as if financial actors were growing more and more powerful. Not only did bankers play an important public role, but banks too seemed to gain more market power as a consequence of concentration through various mergers and acquisitions during and after the war.[32] Many commercial banks were transformed into vast financial conglomerates. Concentration was a response to shrinking profitability, a problem that had become particularly acute during the era of inflation. Nevertheless, the overall impression was that banks were gaining increasing influence in all spheres of the economy. This was exacerbated by the fact that large commercial banks, especially in Germany and Italy, but also in France, were acquiring substantial industrial holdings.

At the same time, the international exposure of banks increased due to high balance of payment deficits and a rise in international lending in the private sector. The bulk of international credit was short-term, which made financial markets more volatile.[33] While this stimulated the economic recovery of the Golden Twenties, it also increased exposure to international financial investors. On the eve of the Great Depression, 40 per cent of the funds held by German banks were foreign, most of them short-term loans. Moreover, before the re-establishment of the gold standard in the mid 1920s, arbitrage and speculation on currency markets were highly attractive.[34]

[32] Manfred Pohl, *Konzentration im deutschen Bankwesen (1948–1980*) (Frankfurt am Main, 1982), 285–357; Eugene Nelson White, 'The Merger Movement in Banking, 1919–1933', *Journal of Economic History*, 45/2 (1985), 285–91.

[33] Olivier Accominotti and Barry Eichengreen, 'The Mother of All Sudden Stops: Capital Flows and Reversals in Europe, 1919–1932', *Economic History Review*, 69/2 (2016), 469–92.

[34] Charles H. Feinstein and Katherine Watson, 'Private International Capital Flows in Europe in the Inter-War Period', in Charles H. Feinstein (ed.), *Banking, Currency, and Finance in Europe between the Wars* (Oxford, 1995), 94–130.

To conclude, the inter-war period did not mark the end of financial globalization. On the contrary, it saw an increase in global capital mobility and financial intermediation through banks and other financial actors.

In Quest of Financial Sovereignty: The Fascist Model

As global finance soared, demands for monetary and financial sovereignty gained in importance. In all European countries, the return to gold currency was seen as an essential step in this direction. Before 1914, the gold standard had been an instrument to facilitate international trade and finance, but now it became a project of national autonomy and financial independence.[35]

These populist demands were loudest in fascist Italy. In the summer of 1925 Mussolini launched the 'Battle for Grain' as a large populist campaign to make Italy independent of foreign imports.[36] The goal was to stimulate domestic wheat production by introducing high tariff walls, thus removing the country's dependency on imports. The autarky campaign was not designed solely to prepare for a possible future war, but also to reduce Italy's negative balance of payments. Ironically, the return to the gold standard required huge injections of external capital primarily from loans provided by US banks, combined with a programme of deflation through wage cuts and price controls.[37] Mussolini announced his new programme in a belligerent speech on 18 August 1926:

[35] Barry Eichengreen, *Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919–1939* (Oxford, 1992).

[36] Alexander Nützenadel, 'Dictating Food: Autarchy, Food Provision, and Consumer Politics in Fascist Italy, 1922–1943', in Flemming Just and Frank Trentmann (eds.), *Food and Conflict in Europe in the Age of the Two World Wars* (Basingstoke, 2006), 88–108.

[37] Roland Sarti, 'Mussolini and the Italian Industrial Leadership in the Battle of the Lira 1925–1927', *Past & Present*, 47 (1970), 97–112; Michael Behnen, 'Dollars für Mussolini: Amerikanischer Corporate Liberalism und Faschismus 1922–1933', in Jörg Nagler (ed.), *Nationale und internationale Perspektiven amerikanischer Geschichte: Festschrift für Peter Schäfer zum 70. Geburtstag* (Frankfurt am Main, 2002), 135–55.

> I will never inflict on this wonderful people of Italy, who have worked like heroes and suffered like saints for four years, the moral shame and economic catastrophe of the failure of the lira. The fascist regime will resist with all its power the attempts by hostile financial powers to bleed it dry, and is determined to crush them when they are detected within. The fascist regime is prepared . . . to make all the necessary sacrifices. But our lira, which represents the symbol of the nation, the sign of our wealth, the fruit of our work, our efforts, our sacrifices, our tears, our blood, must be defended and will be defended. When I go out among the people, the people who really work, I feel that by speaking like this I perfectly interpret their feelings, their aspirations, and their will.[38]

The return to the gold standard was coupled with extensive regulation of the private banking sector. As early as 1925, the fascist government passed a law placing the stock market under its control. The Banca d'Italia was nationalized in 1926 and granted a monopoly on issuing banknotes. In the same year, the private commercial banks were placed under the supervision of the Banca d'Italia and a minimum reserve requirement was imposed. The regime also introduced insurance to protect bank deposits. The following years saw further regulations. In 1931 the industrial holdings of the major commercial banks were split off into a state-run holding company. The large commercial banks were nationalized, and a further strengthening of the Banca d'Italia as a note-issuing and supervisory institution followed in 1936.[39]

Italy's return to the gold standard and the financial reforms that its government embarked upon in 1926 met with widespread approval abroad. Mussolini was praised for his vigorous approach not only in right-wing, nationalist circles, but also by many liberals and conservatives. In France, Italy's programme of currency nationalism seemed

[38] Benito Mussolini, *Opera omnia di Benito Mussolini*, ed. Edoardo Susmel and Duilio Susmel, 44 vols. (Florence and Rome, 1951–80), xxii. 197 (translation my own).

[39] Alfredo Gigliobianco, Claire Giordano, and Gianni Toniolo, 'Innovation and Regulation in the Wake of Financial Crises in Italy (1880s–1930s)', in Alfredo Gigliobianco and Gianni Toniolo (eds.), *Financial Market Regulation in the Wake of Financial Crises: The Historical Experience* (Rome, 2009), 45–74.

to strengthen the conservative government under Raymond Poincaré in its own attempts to return to the gold standard. For Poincaré, invoking the threat of currency depreciation and capital flight was a strategy to curb the radical forces in his *union nationale* coalition.[40]

Political conflicts about the return to pre-war gold parity also arose in Britain, which experienced a wave of strikes and street protests after 1925. Conservatives such as Winston Churchill praised Mussolini's authoritarian programme of financial and monetary stabilization. Churchill, who had overseen the return to the gold standard as chancellor of the Exchequer, visited Mussolini in early 1927. On this occasion, he celebrated the Duce for his 'struggle against the bestial appetites and passions of Leninism' and applauded his efforts 'to maintain a strict and safer standard of Italian finance'.[41]

Churchill's admiration for Mussolini is well known.[42] But Churchill was not alone; in fact, he represented a growing group of admirers of Mussolini among conservative and right-wing politicians in Britain.[43] One example was Lord Rothermere, the founder of the *Daily Mail* and owner of a huge newspaper empire with millions of readers. Rothermere was a pioneer of the popular press in Britain, and he used his media outlets for crude populist campaigns which centred on economic conflicts and national rivalries. Rothermere blamed British politicians for ignoring the deep economic crisis and the relative decline of British industries compared to the rest of the world. 'How are we faring in the Economic War which is now upon us?' he asked in an article published in February 1928.[44] The answer seemed to be simple: 'Inevitably one turns towards the example of Italy, which has emerged

[40] Kenneth Mouré, *The Gold Standard Illusion: France, the Bank of France, and the International Gold Standard, 1914–1939* (Oxford, 2002), 114.

[41] 'Mr. Churchill on Fascism', *The Times*, 21 Jan. 1927.

[42] See Geoffrey Wheatcroft, *Churchill's Shadow: The Life and Afterlife of Winston Churchill* (New York, 2021).

[43] See Martin Pugh, *'Hurrah for the Blackshirts!' Fascists and Fascism in Britain between the Wars* (London, 2006), 5; Bernhard Dietz, *Neo-Tories: The Revolt of British Conservatives against Democracy and Political Modernity (1929–1939)*, trans. Ian Copestake (London, 2018); Anna Lena Kocks, *Geselligkeit vereinnahmen: Jugend und Freizeit als Agitationsfelder des italienischen und britischen Faschismus* (Darmstadt, 2021), 127–30.

[44] Lord Rothermere, 'Do We Need a Mussolini?', *Sunday Pictorial*, 28 Feb. 1926, 8.

from a position of impending ruin and is to-day economically the most progressive nation in Europe—thanks to the genius of one man.' However, Rothermere was sceptical about importing fascism to Britain. Besides the fact that 'no man with the necessary qualities has yet appeared on the political horizon . . . autocratic control vested in one person has always been repugnant to the British people'. As an alternative, Rothermere proposed the institution of a 'Committee of Three' invested with 'plenary powers'. The remit of this triumvirate was to be restricted to economic policy, and their members should have no 'political entanglements'.[45] For this office, Rothermere recommended established figures from the corporate world, such as the chairman of Imperial Airways Eric Geddes, or Reginald McKenna from Midland Bank.

Rothermere's proposal was unsuccessful, but it is evidence of a new populist tone that entered the British debate on economic policy. In 1929 Rothermere once again used his media empire to support the Empire Free Trade Crusade founded by Lord Beaverbrook, another newspaper magnate. The initiative aimed to create a trade zone for the British Empire that was to be protected from the rest of the world by a high tariff wall—an idea analogous to the preferential trade zones established by Italy and Germany after the Great Depression.[46]

Such positive responses to authoritarian models of economic organization were not limited to right-wing political figures. Corporatist ideas, for example, attracted considerable attention even in the Labour Party and the Trades Union Congress, as the British left sought inspiration for new concepts of economic planning and industrial modernization.[47] Flirting with Italian fascism did not necessarily mean a wholesale import of the system to Britain. Many moderate Tories, such as the young Harold Macmillan, rejected Mussolini and

[45] Ibid. [46] Jerry M. Calton, 'Beaverbrook's Split Imperial Personality: Canada, Britain, and the Empire Free Trade Movement of 1929–1931', *The Historian*, 37/1 (1974), 26–45, at 37; on Lord Rothermere's support for the British Union of Fascists, see Pugh, '*Hurrah for the Blackshirts!*', 140, 149–50.

[47] L. P. Carpenter, 'Corporatism in Britain 1930–45', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 11/1 (1976), 3–25; Valerio Torreggiani, 'Towards an Orderly Society: Capitalist Planning and Corporatist Ideology in Britain in the Great Slump (1931–1934)', *Journal of European Economic History*, 1 (2016), 67–97.

his brutal regime while being intrigued by fascist corporatism and economic planning. Macmillan worked and published constantly on corporatist themes, starting with his book on *Industry and the State* (1927).[48] Other prominent admirers included Basil Blackett, a director of the Bank of England; Arthur Salter, the former head of the Economic and Financial Organization of the League of Nations; and Lord Melchett, the chairman of Imperial Chemical Industries, who proposed a National Industrial Council inspired by fascist economic organizations. All these figures were sceptical that traditional institutions would be able to solve the mounting economic problems and social conflicts. Parliaments were seen as lacking the necessary economic expertise and the will to take decisive action.

A similar interest in fascist Italy existed in almost every European country after the onset of the Great Depression.[49] As in the UK, these discussions were not limited to the various fascist or radical right-wing movements. Moreover, fascists outside Italy often sought to set themselves apart and emphasized their ideological originality and political independence. Oswald Mosley, the founder of the British Union of Fascists, argued for corporatist ideas and increased state control over the economy in his 1932 manifesto *The Greater Britain*. But instead of deferring to Mussolini, he claimed these economic ideas as his own: 'We seek to organise the Modern Movement in this country by British methods in a form which is suitable to and characteristic of Great Britain. We are essentially a national movement, and if our policy could be summarised in two words, they would be "Britain First"'.[50] Similarly, in inter-war Germany, the rising Nazi movement displayed an ambivalent attitude towards Italian fascism by insisting on the originality of its own economic programme. Even though

[48] Valerio Torreggiani, 'The Making of Harold Macmillan's Third Way in Interwar Britain (1924–1935)', in Alessandro Salvador and Anders Kjøstvedt (eds.), *New Political Ideas in the Aftermath of the Great War* (Cham, 2017), 67–85.

[49] António Costa Pinto, 'Fascism, Corporatism and the Crafting of Authoritarian Institutions in Inter-War European Dictatorships', in id. and Aristotle Kallis (eds.), *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe* (Basingstoke, 2014), 87–117.

[50] Oswald Mosley, *The Greater Britain* (London, 1932), 19; see also Gary Love, '"What's the Big Idea?" Oswald Mosley, the British Union of Fascists and Generic Fascism', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 42/3 (2007), 447–68.

many Nazis considered the Duce to be a natural ally, ideological and political rivalries remained considerable even after 1933.[51]

However, in Germany too, interest in Italian fascism increased noticeably during the Great Depression. One of the most active advocates of the Italian dictatorship was Erwin von Beckerath, an eminent professor of economics at the University of Cologne. Beckerath wrote several books on Italian fascism, organized lectures and conferences with German and Italian scholars, and finally founded a department of corporatist studies at the Petrarca Institute in Cologne in November 1933. Beckerath's sympathy for Mussolini was driven by the expectation that National Socialism would eventually drop its revolutionary economic programme and follow the more moderate path of Italian fascism.[52]

In German banking, interest in Italy was strongly motivated by concerns about the consequences for private ownership of a possible Hitler government. A cause for concern were radical Nazi party representatives such as Gottfried Feder, who demanded the end of 'interest slavery' to the large commercial banks. Feder claimed that the nationalization of the banks in the summer of 1931 should not be limited to a period of crisis, but made permanent.[53] For Feder and other Nazi ideologists, the savings and co-operative banks represented the genuine and healthy German tradition of banking, while the large commercial banks stood for 'internationalist' and Jewish influences on finance. In the wake of the banking crisis, antisemitic campaigns targeted large commercial banks, blaming the crash on the over-representation of Jewish managers and their allegedly

[51] See Goeschel, *Mussolini and Hitler*.

[52] Wolfgang Schieder, 'Das italienische Experiment: Der Faschismus als Vorbild in der Krise der Weimarer Republik', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 262/1 (1996), 73–125; id., 'Faschismus für Deutschland: Erwin von Beckerath und das Italien Mussolinis', in Christian Jansen, Lutz Niethammer, and Bernd Weisbrod (eds.), *Von der Aufgabe der Freiheit: Politische Verantwortung und bürgerliche Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Festschrift für Hans Mommsen zum 5. November 1995* (Berlin, 1995), 267–83.

[53] Addresses by Wilhelm Keppler and Gottfried Feder at the meeting of the Investigation Committee on 6 September 1933 in Deutsches Reich: Untersuchungsauschuss für das Bankwesen 1933, *Untersuchung des Bankwesens 1933*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1933–4), vol. i. pt. i. 12–19.

cosmopolitan ideas. Economic antisemitism had a long tradition in Germany, but after the failure of the Danat under the leadership of Jakob Goldschmidt in 1931, Nazi propaganda was successful in linking antisemitism to financial speculation and mismanagement.[54] This propaganda seemed all the more plausible as Goldschmidt stood accused not only of risky investments and lax credit practices, but also of accounting fraud. Similarly, the largest German bank, the Deutsche Bank und Disconto-Gesellschaft, came under public attack after a series of financial scandals and misinvestments. Further outrage was caused by Deutsche Bank's refusal to participate in a banking consortium to rescue the Danat.[55] The fact that the German taxpayer had to foot an enormous bill for bank bailouts while the government cut the wages of civil servants and benefits for jobless workers increased the general feeling that the burden of the crisis was being distributed unequally. This sentiment was fuelled by the Nazi propaganda machine. The huge electoral success of the NSDAP in July 1932 was, as we know from various analyses of national and regional elections, strongly influenced by the banking crisis and its polarizing political and socio-economic effects.[56]

Financial Regulation in Times of Populism

What impact did populism have on monetary and banking reforms during the 1930s and 1940s? In Germany, although most members of the economic elite underestimated Hitler's radicalism and violence, their prediction that the new regime would sooner or later adopt a more moderate stance in economic policy proved to be right. Hitler called the former president of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht, back into office. Schacht—who in 1934 also became Reich minister

[54] See Martin H. Geyer, 'What Crisis? Speculation, Corruption, and the State of Emergency during the Great Depression', *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute Washington DC*, 55 (2014), 9–35.

[55] Plumpe, Nützenadel, and Schenk, *Deutsche Bank*, 293–5.

[56] Sebastian Doerr, Stefan Gissler, José-Luis Peydró, et al., 'Financial Crises and Political Radicalization: How Failing Banks Paved Hitler's Path to Power', *BIS Working Papers*, 978 (2021).

of economics—was well-known for opposing the nationalization of commercial banks. Schacht set the tone for the inquiry commission established in summer 1933 to discuss the causes of the banking crisis and the reorganization of the German financial system.[57]

In its final report, the commission partly echoed the nationalist and racist perspectives of the Nazi programme in arguing that German banks were sound, and that their main problems were caused by external forces, including the high reparation costs and the withdrawal of foreign credits. Furthermore, the report endorsed the existing banking system, with its mixture of private commercial houses and public and savings banks. While Jewish bank directors were dismissed and Jewish owners expropriated under Aryanization laws, all banks that had been placed under state ownership after 1931 were reprivatized by 1936.[58] Clearly, Schacht and other Nazi leaders shared a belief in the continued existence of a private banking system as an important tool for financing rearmament and organizing the monetary side of warfare.[59] At the same time, the Bank Act of 1934 and the Stock Corporation Act of 1937 created a comprehensive legal framework with which to control the entire financial and corporate sector.[60]

Remarkably, there were substantial similarities to the banking reform initiated by the fascist government in Italy in 1926. Liquidity rules and reserve requirements were introduced to enforce the stability of the financial sector. Establishing new banks or subsidiaries required government approval, and competition within the banking sector was suppressed by the introduction of fixed interest rates and provisions. State control was generally intensified, and was exercised by the Reichsbank, the banking commissioner, and a new

[57] Christopher Kopper, *Zwischen Marktwirtschaft und Dirigismus: Bankenpolitik im 'Dritten Reich' 1933–1939* (Bonn, 1995), 86–112.

[58] Dieter Ziegler, 'After the Crisis: Nationalisation and Re-Privatization of the German Great Banks 1931–1937', *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 52/2 (2011), 55–73.

[59] On Schacht, see Christopher Kopper, *Hjalmar Schacht: Aufstieg und Fall von Hitlers mächtigstem Bankier* (Munich, 2006).

[60] Johannes Bähr, 'Modernes Bankrecht und dirigistische Kapitallenkung: Zur Steuerung der Ebenen im Finanzsektor des "Dritten Reichs"', in Dieter Gosewinkel (ed.), *Wirtschaftskontrolle und Recht in der nationalsozialistischen Diktatur* (Frankfurt am Main, 2005), 199–223.

control board.[61] All in all, legal regulation of finance in Nazi Germany was based on rigorous state control, but universal banking was not touched—unlike in Italy, where a separation had been introduced between banking and industry, and between short- and long-term credit. Convergence of regulation did not necessarily mean that both countries followed exactly the same path.

Although France and Britain also faced severe economic problems after 1929, the shock waves of the Wall Street crash were less severe than in Germany and Italy. In Britain, where gold parity was abandoned in September 1931, output fell by 6 per cent between 1929 and 1932, while Germany saw a fall of more than 30 per cent during the same period. Britain also experienced almost no bank failures in the inter-war period. Liquidity-to-capital ratios remained stable, and credit banks did not engage in risky credit practices, as they did in Germany.[62] Indeed, most British politicians agreed that the country's economic problems were rooted mainly in the industrial sector and in declining exports rather than in finance. The Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry, formed in 1929 to inquire into the causes of the depression, criticized the banks not for their general business practices, but only for their lack of engagement in financing industry, while Keynes in particular questioned the Bank of England's reluctance to enforce macroeconomic stabilization. As a consequence of the Macmillan report, a special institution was created to finance medium and small businesses, but inter-war Britain remained almost entirely free of formal banking regulation. It was not until 1946 that the Bank of England was nationalized and moderate supervision of commercial banks was introduced.[63]

The French banking system, unlike Britain's, was geared towards the Italian model. Like Italy, France maintained the gold standard

[61] Theo Balderston, 'German Banking between the Wars: The Crisis of the Credit Banks', *Business History Review*, 65/3 (1991), 554–605, at 588.

[62] H. W. Richardson, 'The Economic Significance of the Depression in Britain', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 4/4 (1969), 3–19; Patrick K. O'Brien, 'Britain's Economy between the Wars: A Survey of a Counter-Revolution in Economic History', *Past & Present*, 115 (1987), 107–30; Steven N. Broadberry, *The British Economy between the Wars: A Macroeconomic Survey* (Oxford, 1986).

[63] Christos Hadjiemmanuil, 'Banking Regulation and the Bank of England: Discretion and Remedies' (Ph.D. thesis, University College London, 1996), 24–5.

until 1936, and the Banque de France pursued a strict course of monetary stability. However, the private banks were less affected by the crisis than those in Germany or Italy. Only small, regional banks went bankrupt, and there were no massive bank panics or withdrawals of foreign credit. More important was a flight to safety from commercial to domestic savings banks.[64] As the Banque de France had accumulated huge gold reserves, no foreign currency crisis occurred like that in Germany. The economic downturn was less severe, even though it lasted longer. The Banque de France and the conservative government were criticized for their monetary orthodoxy and their reluctance to fight the crisis. Populist campaigns were waged both by radical right-wing groups, such as the Croix-de-Feu, and by the radical left, leading to street protests and violent conflicts—especially in the wake of the political scandal around the Jewish financier Alexandre Stavisky, which led to rumours of a right-wing *coup d' état*.[65] Populist criticism was directed not only at Stavisky and other bankers, but also at the Banque de France, which was still under private ownership, and the ensuing campaigns popularized tropes like that of the *200 familles*—a small elite which allegedly controlled both the private economy and the monetary system, and which strictly opposed devaluation for selfish motives. Economic antisemitism had a long-standing tradition in France, but the enduring economic crisis and internal political polarization triggered a new wave of antisemitic propaganda from the right-wing press, especially after the electoral victory of the left-wing Popular Front in May 1936. In the following years, continuous antisemitic campaigns attacked the new prime minister Léon Blum, a Jewish socialist, along with other politicians and public figures from finance and banking.[66]

[64] Patrice Baubeau, Eric Monet, Angelo Riva, et al., 'Flight-to-Safety and the Credit Crunch: A New History of the Banking Crises in France during the Great Depression', *Economic History Review*, 74/1 (2021), 223–50; see also Jacques Marseille, 'Les origines "inopportunes" de la crise de 1929 en France', *Revue économique*, 31/4 (1980), 648–84; Michel Lescure, 'Banking in France in the Inter-War Period', in Feinstein (ed.), *Banking*, 315–36.

[65] See Paul Jankowski, *Stavisky: A Confidence Man in the Republic of Virtue* (Ithaca, NY, 2002).

[66] Julian Jackson, *The Politics of Depression in France 1932–1936* (Cambridge, 2002), esp. 99, 126, and 182; Jean-Marc Dreyfus, 'Banquiers et financiers juifs

The transformation of the French monetary and banking system started in 1936 under Blum's Popular Front regime. The country finally left the gold standard and devalued the franc, while an act passed on 24 July 1936 gave the government the power to intervene directly in the management of the Banque de France. Proposals for further regulation of commercial banks were controversially discussed in the new National Economic Council. While one group preferred to nationalize the banking system, others favoured a corporatist system based on a certain degree of autonomy for the banks. The Bank Act was postponed several times and finally imposed under pressure from the German occupation authorities in June 1941.[67] The German military administration appointed a commissioner to control the Banque de France and the private banks, but left the implementation of monetary and financial policy to the French institutions. The willingness of the Vichy regime to collaborate with the Nazis and to transfer enormous financial resources to the war machine of the Reich was the price for maintaining a certain level of autonomy.[68] As a result, the Germans did not change the legal and institutional framework created in France after 1936. The post-war government under Charles de Gaulle preserved most of the wartime regulations and continued the reforms by nationalizing the Banque de France together with the major commercial banks. The transformation of the French monetary and financial system between 1936 and 1945 was an important prerequisite for the *planification économique* (economic planning) established during the post-war era.[69]

de 1929 à 1962: Transitions et ruptures', *Archives Juives*, 29/2 (1996), 83–99; Ralph Schor, *L'antisémitisme en France pendant les années trente: Prélude à Vichy* (Brussels, 1992).

[67] Claire Andrieu, 'Genèse de la loi du 13 juin 1941, première loi bancaire française (septembre 1940–septembre 1941)', *Revue Historique*, 269/2 (1983), 385–97.

[68] See Filippo Occhino, Kim Oosterlinck, and Eugene N. White, 'How Occupied France Financed its own Exploitation in World War II', *American Economic Review*, 97/2, (2007), 295–9.

[69] See Eric Monnet, *Controlling Credit: Central Banking and the Planned Economy in Postwar France, 1948–1973* (Cambridge, 2018).

Conclusion

To conclude, I will highlight four major findings of this research, which will also enable comparative perspectives on the present.

First, domestic and international conflicts over financial and monetary policy increased dramatically during the inter-war era and gave birth to extreme populist movements and parties. Populists successfully addressed economic misery, social disparities, and monetary instability. They framed economic crises in overarching narratives of national decline, global dependence, and a loss of economic sovereignty. In this context, the crash of 1931 was the 'perfect storm' (to borrow a metaphor used by Rogers Brubaker with reference to the financial crisis of 2008).[70] Still, history teaches us that there is no linear causality between financial shocks and the rise of populist movements. Populism is more than just a stylistic repertoire that can be activated whenever the moment seems right. Neither can we explain populism—as proposed by some economists—using a simple model of supply and demand, in which demand is determined by exposure to foreign trade shocks or rising social insecurity, and supply depends on the existence of charismatic leaders and populist ideologies.[71] From the comparative studies of de Bromhead, Eichengreen, and O'Rourke we know that the cumulative effects of persistent or recurrent economic recessions were more significant for right-wing voting patterns than individual economic shocks.[72] This means that past experiences and long-term cultural shifts are key factors in explaining populism. While this finding should motivate more interdisciplinary research at the intersection of economic and cultural history, it has far-reaching implications for the understanding of populism in the present. The bad news may be that populism will not disappear when the economic situation improves, as it is deeply rooted in our culture.

[70] Brubaker, 'Why Populism?', 369.

[71] See e.g. Luigi Guiso, Helio Herrera, Massomo Morelli, et al., 'Demand and Supply of Populism', *EIEF Working Papers Series*, 17/03 (2017), at [http://www.eief.it/files/2017/02/wp-173.pdf], accessed 7 Feb. 2022.

[72] Alan de Bromhead, Barry Eichengreen, and Kevin H. O'Rourke, 'Political Extremism in the 1920s and 1930s: Do German Lessons Generalize?', *Journal of Economic History*, 73/2 (2013), 371–406.

Second, populism is characterized by a complex interplay between the anti-global agendas of populist movements on the one hand, and their international transmission on the other. The example of Italian fascism and its impact on populist financial and monetary agendas in other European countries is a case in point, demonstrating how populist movements are embedded in transnational processes. More important than internal exchanges between the various fascist movements and regimes is the question of how these transnational influences reached beyond extreme right-wing political groups to shape even 'mainstream' political agendas. Again, it is important to examine specific political practices rather than just looking at ideological programmes and exchanges.

Third, populist ideas spread to most European countries from the 1920s, but their political impact varied. Germany and Italy were most strongly affected, while in France, left-wing populism proved more powerful than the right-wing variants.[73] However, during the 1930s, France experienced a convergence of these populist movements and their social and economic demands. As Michel Winock has argued, a 'populist synthesis [*synthèse populiste*]' characterized the country's political evolution in the wake of the depression.[74] Britain is an interesting example of a country where economic populism hardly translated into extreme voting patterns and party structures. As vociferous as Mosley's Union of Fascists was, it remained a tiny group compared to right-wing movements in Germany, Italy, and many other European countries.[75] One standard explanation lies in the fact that Britain left the gold standard relatively early and was able to pursue more expansive fiscal and monetary policies.[76] Perhaps of equal importance was the strategy adopted by the national

[73] Marc Lazar, 'Du populisme à gauche: Les cas français et italien', *Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'histoire*, 56 (1997), 121–31.

[74] Michel Winock, 'Populismes français', *Vingtième Siècle: Revue d'histoire*, 56 (1997), 77–91, esp. 84–5.

[75] See Mike Cronin (ed.), *The Failure of British Fascism: The Far Right and the Fight for Political Recognition* (Basingstoke, 1996); John Stevenson, 'Conservatism and the Failure of Fascism in Interwar Britain', in Martin Blinkhorn (ed.), *Fascists and Conservatives: The Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe* (London, 2012), 270–88.

[76] See e.g. Eichengreen, *Populist Temptation*, 73–88.

governments after 1931 to integrate populist demands into the political mainstream.

Fourth, populism was not only a protest movement or a destructive political force, but also created new instruments of state intervention into the economy. While most political scientists agree that anti-institutionalism is a key feature of present-day populism, this assumption must be questioned from the perspective of the inter-war experience. Once in power, populist regimes pursue a technocratic agenda and create legal and bureaucratic institutions that last for a long time. These transformations are often a compromise between populist claims and more technical requirements, as the financial and monetary reforms of the 1930s and 1940s show.

All four countries provide good examples of technocratic path dependency that reached far beyond the caesura of 1945. For Germany, Albrecht Ritschl has pointed to the 'long shadow' of the Third Reich, arguing that Hjalmar Schacht was more important for the design of the social market economy than Ludwig Erhard.[77] It is certainly true that the Bank Act of 1934 was adopted by the Federal Republic with only marginal changes. In the case of Italy and France, the legacies of the 1930s and 1940s are even more significant, as banking regulations and monetary regimes created in this period remained effective until the 1980s. Even though banking regulation in Britain remained less institutionalized, tendencies towards more supervision and co-ordination through the Bank of England also existed there.

On the international level, one of the most far-reaching consequences of these institutional continuities was the fact that financial regulation generally remained the preserve of the nation state until the 1980s. From a historical perspective, the manifold implications of these continuities remain a puzzle, and this should inspire more comparative research. The historical entanglement of fascism and finance may provide a clue to better understand these long-term trajectories in twentieth-century Europe.

[77] Albrecht Ritschl, 'Der lange Schatten Hjalmar Schachts: Zu den langfristigen Wirkungen des Dritten Reichs auf die Wirtschaftsordnung Deutschlands seit dem Kriege', *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 45/2 (2004), 245–8.

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EFFICIENT AND WISE? ELDERLY ABBOTS IN ENGLISH BENEDICTINE MONASTERIES IN THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH CENTURIES: THE CASE OF ST ALBANS ABBEY

ÉLISA MANTIENNE

I. Introduction

From May 1366 onwards, Thomas de la Mare, abbot of St Albans, regularly excused himself from Parliament due to infirmity caused by illness and old age.[1] He was then in his fifties, weakened by the plague he had contracted at the beginning of the 1360s.[2] His case is exceptional because his chancery kept writing such letters for thirty years until his death at the age of 87 in 1396.[3] During all these years, St Albans Abbey, one of the biggest monasteries in England, had an abbot who felt old and ill enough to use it as an excuse not to go to Parliament. It was not always the case that old age was associated with illness and incapacity; indeed, it cannot be summarized solely as a bodily condition as it is also a 'social and behavioral syndrome', dependent not only on one's physical condition, but also on the perceptions held by the person in question and their entourage.[4]

Much has been written in historiography about the perception of old age and cycles of life in the Middle Ages, and how it varied

Many thanks to Mirjam Brusius, Stephan Bruhn, Marcus Meer, and Michael Schaich for their helpful comments, and to Jozef van der Voort and Angela Davies for their help with translations and with editing this text.

[1] The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), SC 10/29 1423, proxy letter from St Albans Abbey, 26 Apr. 1366; Phil Bradford and Alison McHardy (eds.), *Proctors for Parliament: Clergy, Community and Politics,* c.*1248–1539*, 2 vols. (Woodbridge, 2017–18).

[2] James G. Clark (ed.) and David Preest (trans.), *The Deeds of the Abbots of St Albans: Gesta abbatum monasterii Sancti Albani* (Woodbridge, 2019), 913.

[3] David M. Smith, Vera C. M. London, David Knowles, et al. (eds.), *The Heads of Religious Houses: England and Wales* (Cambridge, 2001–8), vol. iii: *1377–1540* (2008), 62–3.

[4] Joel T. Rosenthal, *Old Age in Late Medieval England* (Philadelphia, 1996), 1.

depending on social groups, the period concerned, and the context.[5] Whereas legally old age often started between 60 and 70, this general tendency must be juxtaposed with demographic studies and the specificities of some professions, or the fulfilment of duties for a community, such as in monastic or royal offices.[6] For instance, abbots were in most cases elected in their forties or fifties.[7] This could seem a rather advanced age when we consider that in premodern England, the average life expectancy of a 25-year-old was around 50 to 55.[8] Thanks to better living conditions, however, and because they often lived apart from the community, a privilege that decreased the risk of infection during epidemics, abbots had a higher life expectancy than the rest of the community. Hence, there were two kinds of 'elderly abbots': first, those who had been elected as young, mid-career monks and who outlived the rest of the community, and second, abbots elected in their old age. Compared to the general population of England, 50 was an advanced age, but among abbots—provided they were healthy—it was not considered particularly old.

The literature on the demographic and social aspects of old age is extensive, but elderly members of the church have not received as much attention as they deserve, especially members of monastic communities.[9] In Benedictine houses, arrangements for the care of ill and

[5] See e.g. Shulamith Shahar, *Growing Old in the Middle Ages*: '*Winter Clothes us in Shadow and Pain*' (London, 1997), 12–35; Isabelle Cochelin and Karen Smyth (eds.), *Medieval Life Cycles: Continuity and Change* (Turnhout, 2013).

[6] For broader reflections on this subject, see Pat Thane, *Old Age in English History: Past Experiences, Present Issues* (Oxford, 2000), 24–7.

[7] Martin Heale, *The Abbots and Priors of Late Medieval and Reformation England* (Oxford, 2016), 45–8.

[8] See Shahar, *Growing Old*, 32 (on the general population); Alan J. Piper, 'The Monks of Durham and Patterns of Activity in Old Age', in Caroline M. Barron and Jenny Stratford (eds.), *The Church and Learning in Later Medieval Society: Essays in Honour of R. B. Dobson* (Donington, 2002), 51–63; John Hatcher, Alan J. Piper, and David Stone, 'Monastic Mortality: Durham Priory, 1395–1529', *Economic History Review,* 59/4 (2006), 667–87; and Barbara Harvey, *Living and Dying in England, 1100–1540: The Monastic Experience* (Oxford, 1993), 127–9, 142–4.

[9] On priests and clerics, see Kirsi Salonen, 'What Happened to Aged Priests in the Late Middle Ages?', in Christian Krötzl and Katariina Mustakallio (eds.), *On Old Age: Approaching Death in Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (Turnhout,

elderly monks were recorded in customaries, statutes of the order, or chapter ordinances; they exempted the ill and infirm from fulfilling their duties and allocated them a special place, often in the infirmary.[10] When too old or too ill to rule, abbots and priors enjoyed similar benefits. Some of them were allowed to resign, as has been discussed in studies of Benedictine and Cistercian communities.[11] Although old age does not necessarily go hand in hand with disease, disability, and senility, the probability of such problems arising increases with age. This article is a study of old age as a time of greater risk of abbatial incapacity. It sheds light on how religious communities assessed such situations, and how they were handled when the time came.

The rich documentation available for the Benedictine community of St Albans makes it a pertinent case study for the following reasons. Part one of this article discusses the narratives and archival traces that survive from this major English house, which offer evidence of what it meant for a monastery to have an elderly abbot. This was the

2011), 183–96 and Nicholas Orme, 'Sufferings of the Clergy: Illness and Old Age in Exeter Diocese, 1300–1540', in Margaret Pelling and Richard M. Smith (eds.), *Life, Death and the Elderly: Historical Perspectives* (London, 1991), 52–61.

[10] See e.g. William Abel Pantin, *Documents Illustrating the Activities of the General and Provincial Chapters of the English Black Monks 1215–1540*, 3 vols. (London, 1931–7), vol. i. 81–2, vol. ii. 48–9, 86; Richard B. Dobson, *Durham Priory, 1400–1450* (Cambridge, 1973), 78; Harvey, *Living and Dying*, 87–88; Riccardo Cristiani, 'Integration and Marginalization: Dealing with the Sick in Eleventh-Century Cluny', in Susan Boynton and Isabelle Cochelin (eds.), *From Dead of Night to End of the Day: The Medieval Customs of Cluny* (Turnhout, 2005), 287–95, at 292–3; and Joan Greatrex, *The English Benedictine Cathedral Priories: Rule and Practice,* c.*1270–1420* (Oxford, 2011), e.g. 290–2 on episcopal visitation as an occasion to remind the priors of cathedral priories of their duties by the sick. For a summary of the issue, see Elma Brenner, 'The Medical Role of Monasteries in the Latin West, *c.*1050–1300', in Alison I. Beach and Isabelle Cochelin (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Medieval Monasticism in the Latin West* (Cambridge, 2020), 865–81.

[11] Greatrex, *The English Benedictine Cathedral Priories,* 297–8; Martin Heale, '"For the Solace of their Advanced Years": The Retirement of Monastic Superiors in Late Medieval England', *Journal of Medieval Monastic Studies*, 8 (2019), 143–67; id., *Abbots and Priors*, 98–9; Dobson, *Durham Priory*, 110–13; and Amelia Kennedy, '"Do Not Relinquish your Offspring": Changing Cistercian Attitudes Toward Older Abbots and Abbatial Retirement in High Medieval Europe', *Radical History Review,* 139 (2021), 123–44.

case at St Albans for most of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. Though not framed as a weakness in monastic discourses, old age represented a time of potential problems for the monastery. The second part addresses one such problem: old age is often accompanied by illness and senility, and both these weaknesses could be dangerous if they were incorrectly handled by the monastic superior and his entourage. The third part argues that—at least in the larger monasteries—the problem raised by an abbot's illness and old age was not so much the lack of a supervisor to ensure the smooth running of the abbey, but the lack of a representative to defend its interests.

II. Old Age among Abbots in St Albans: Discourses and Facts

St Albans Abbey had been a great centre of chronicle-writing since the time of Roger of Wendover and Matthew Paris in the thirteenth century. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, two major figures emerge: the precentor Thomas Walsingham and the abbot John Whethamstede.[12] Some testimonies of life in the community of St Albans and on the abbots survive in the historiographical works of these authors, and in those of other less well-known or anonymous monks. The scarce references to the advanced age of the abbots in these narratives show that it was not openly addressed as a problem in the domestic texts.

Thomas de La Mare, John Moot, John Whethamstede: Three elderly abbots

Thomas de la Mare was around 40 at the time of his election in 1349, but, as mentioned in the introduction, he was ill and quickly came to be presented as old in the sources.[13] One can only guess at John

[12] C. Esther Hodge, 'The Abbey of St Albans under John of Whethamstede' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester, 1933); Richard Vaughan, *Matthew Paris* (Cambridge, 1958); James G. Clark, *A Monastic Renaissance at St Albans: Thomas Walsingham and his Circle, c.1350–1440* (Oxford, 2004).

[13] James G. Clark, 'Mare, Thomas de la (*c.*1309–1396), abbot of St Albans', in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004–), online edition accessed 30 Oct. 2021 (hereafter *ODNB*).

Moot's age when he replaced de la Mare in 1396 and died of pleurisy in 1401.[14] By the time he was elected, he had occupied various offices in the monastery over the previous forty years, which means he could have been 60, if not older. He had been cellarer during the 1350s, before assuming the office of prior from the 1360s.[15] The account of his election does not mention his age, only his great experience in spiritual and temporal matters.[16] After his death, two young abbots were elected: William Heyworth, who resigned in 1420 to become bishop of Coventry and Lichfield, and his successor John Whethamstede, who was not yet 30 at the time of his election. He resigned in 1440. When his second abbacy began in 1452, he was around 60, and he ruled the monastery until his death in 1465.[17]

In each of these examples, old age was probably perceived in very different ways. The age and health of John Moot are not mentioned in the monastic sources we have except for his last and sudden illness, whereas Thomas de la Mare had been seriously ill for thirty years—his poor health is a leitmotiv in the chronicle of his abbacy—and John Whethamstede was infirm for the last decade of his second abbacy and regularly referred to his own physical condition in his register.[18] However, he does not explicitly allude to the problems his age raised for the monastery, which is only logical if we consider that he was the author of the narrative. The case of the *Deeds of*

[14] Henry T. Riley (ed.), *Gesta abbatum monasterii S. Albani*, 3 vols. (London, 1867–9), iii. 451. The translation of the *Gesta abbatum* by David Preest in *Deeds of the Abbots* does not cover John Moot's abbacy.

[15] Ada Levett, *Studies in Manorial History* (Oxford, 1938), 167–8. The proxy letters from series SC 10 in the National Archives further narrow down the dates given by Levett, as John Moot is mentioned as prior in the letter dated May 1366 (SC 10/29 1423). It is possible that his nomination as prior followed the deterioration of Thomas de la Mare's health after the Second Pestilence at the beginning of the 1360s.

[16] Riley (ed.), *Gesta abbatum*, iii. 432.

[17] James G. Clark, 'Whethamstede [Bostock], John (*c.*1392–1465), scholar and abbot of St Albans', in *ODNB*; Smith (ed.), *Heads of Religious Houses*, 63.

[18] Henry T. Riley (ed.), *Registra quorundam abbatum monasterii S. Albani, qui saeculo XVmo floruere*, 2 vols. (London, 1872–3), i. 322, 420, 473. John Whethamstede personally oversaw the writing of the various accounts of his abbacies; see David R. Howlett, 'Studies in the Works of John Whethamstede' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Oxford, 1975).

the Abbots of St Albans is more complicated. This domestic chronicle was compiled from various other chronicles by Thomas Walsingham during Thomas de la Mare's abbacy. Walsingham's text ends in 1381, but the chronicle was taken up by other monks, who compiled a continuation of de la Mare's abbacy along with narratives about his successors John Moot and William Heyworth.[19] Though the authors of the continuation are generally full of praise for Thomas de la Mare, both he and John Moot are occasionally criticized in these texts. Had their old age been a real problem for the monastery, therefore, the chroniclers would have probably discussed it more than they did.[20]

Even though elderly abbots were a reality in St Albans, few documents produced at the abbey during this time mention the subject. Neither the rule of St Benedict nor other Benedictine constitutions contain much about the question of old monks; the rule of Benedict merely states that it may be adapted to children and aged monks (chapter 37).[21] In St Albans, an ordinance was passed under Abbot Roger de Norton (in office 1263–91) so that old priors who 'could not any longer properly attend to their spiritual and temporal duties should be called back to live in their mother house, like knights who had done their service'.[22] Decades later, the constitutions of Thomas de la Mare mentioned the question of age in a very different context: he forbade elderly monks from studying philosophy in Oxford because they were less able to learn:

> Likewise, although old age flourishes in wisdom and is venerable, as [old people] are however generally more obtuse than

[19] Thomas Walsingham compiled the *Deeds* from the abbacy of Hugh de Eversden until the death of Thomas de la Mare. The attribution of the continuation of de la Mare's life is uncertain. James G. Clark, 'Thomas Walsingham Reconsidered: Books and Learning at Late-Medieval St. Albans', *Speculum*, 77/3 (2002), 832–60, at 844–6; Clark (ed.) and Preest (trans.), *Deeds of the Abbots*, 16–21, 759–931.

[20] The continuation has a more 'partisan tone' than the text by Thomas de la Mare (Clark (ed.) and Preest (trans.), *Deeds of the Abbots*, 16), but its author is prepared to 'record his failures as well' (ibid. 925). These failures are not attributed to old age; see Riley (ed.), *Gesta abbatum*, iii. 416–19.

[21] Shahar, *Growing Old*, 103–5.

[22] Clark (ed.) and Preest (trans.), *Deeds of the Abbots*, 527–8.

> the young in intellectual matters, and less able when it comes to the study of philosophy . . . we decide that in the future, men of great age will not be sent to the *Studium* to study philosophy.[23]

More important than this diminished capacity for learning, an elderly abbot brought with him the prospect of an abbatial vacancy. The problems of these periods of transition between two abbots are discussed at length in the domestic narratives, but did not prevent the monks from taking the risk of electing old men to lead the community. In 1235, for example, John de Hertford could not travel to Rome to have the pope confirm his recent election in person 'because of his old age and bodily weakness and the dangers of the journeys'.[24] In an addition to Matthew Paris's contemporary chronicle, the fourteenth-century chronicler Thomas Walsingham describes how John de Hertford was mocked in Hertford and St Albans for 'riding like an old man' on his way to the monastery: '"Look at that!" they cried. "That old man, who is already worn out, thinks he will be abbot."'[25] Did Walsingham add this part to Matthew Paris's narrative because of a particular interest in the question of the abbot's age? The answer is unclear; the story aims to underscore de Hertford's virtue, and the question of old age is ancillary to the chronicler's purpose. The abbot's age is not mentioned again in the narrative, and he is praised for his abbacy, which lasted twenty-eight years. However, such a long term of office was the exception, not the rule. Before we consider the possible difficulties that could arise under the rule of an elderly abbot, we must first examine the risk of recurring vacancies.

[23] Riley (ed.), *Gesta abbatum*, ii. 463: 'Item, cum licet se sapientia vigeat, et venerabilis sit senectus, sunt tamen communiter ingenii obtusioris quam juvenes, et at studendum in philosophicis minus apti . . . statuimus ut futuris temporibus senes in aetate provecti pro philosophia addiscenda ad Studium non mittantur.' (Translation my own; this passage is not translated in Clark (ed.) and Preest (trans.), *Deeds of the Abbots*.)

[24] Clark (ed.) and Preest (trans.), *Deeds of the Abbots,* 437. He was probably 'past middle age' at the time of his election (ibid. 437 n. 18). See also Riley (ed.), *Gesta abbatum*, i. 312.

[25] Clark (ed.) and Preest (trans.), *Deeds of the Abbots*, 446; Richard Vaughan, 'The Election of Abbots at St Albans in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries', *Proceedings of the Cambridge Antiquarian Society*, 47 (1954), 1–12, at 3.

Abbatial vacancy

Due to John Moot's advanced age at the time of his election in 1396, the abbatial seat became empty again just five years later, in 1401. This was a burden for the monastery. During the interregnum, numerous financial levies were taken from the abbey, not least because permission to hold an election (*congé d'élire*) had to be obtained from the king, just as the new abbot needed to be confirmed by the pope.[26] The journey to Rome was a source of considerable expense, and the monastery was deprived of its leader for several weeks.[27] The abbots tried to limit these burdens: Thomas de la Mare secured an important charter from the king that lessened the consequences of vacancy for the monastery by converting the large fees paid to the crown during vacancies into a regular annual sum. The charter also stated that 'the prior and the convent should have and hold the tenure of the abbey, that is, of all its temporalities', and gave the prior and the monks full powers of administration over the monastery (with some exceptions).[28] De la Mare obtained from the pope the privilege of not having to travel to Rome to confirm his election (for which the

[26] Vaughan, 'The Election of Abbots at St Albans', 5–8.

[27] John de Berkhamsted was the first newly elected abbot of St Albans to travel to Rome in 1290; the previous abbots sent proctors instead. This obligation for abbots of exempt houses to travel to Rome dated back to the Fourth Lateran Council; see ibid. 7. On the expenses incurred by Thomas de la Mare, see Clark (ed.) and Preest (trans.), *Deeds of the Abbots,* 776–7.

[28] Quoted from ibid. 887; see also *Calendar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office*, pt. v: *Richard II*, 6 vols. (London, 1895–1909), vol. vi: *1396–1399* (1909), 545. Thomas Walsingham considered the charter important enough to reproduce its whole content in the general chronicles; see Wendy Childs, John Taylor, and Leslie Watkiss (eds.), *The St Albans Chronicle: The* Chronica Maiora *of Thomas Walsingham*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 2003–11), i. 378–81. The charter is not referred to in the main version of the *Deeds of the Abbots*, and only the continuation mentions the commutation of the thousand marks payable for each vacancy to a yearly payment of fifty marks. Perhaps we can explain this lack of interest through the conditions surrounding the chronicle's compilation. The *Deeds of the Abbots* stops with the narrative of the 1381 revolt, so the compiler may have chosen to omit certain details from the year 1380 in favour of narrating at length the spectacular events that happened in the monastery and its vicinity.

monastery had to pay the pope the annual sum of twenty marks).[29] Thanks to this, the succession of vacancies in 1396–1401 may have been less expensive for the monastery.

Even with these precautions, however, the new abbot had to spend a great deal on his installation, as implied in this passage from the chronicle of William Heyworth's abbacy: 'to avoid the costs incurred by newly appointed dignitaries, he left the monastery for some time'.[30] Moreover, there was always a risk that external parties would try to take advantage of gaps in abbatial power at the expense of the abbey. During Thomas de la Mare's illness, when there was a risk that the abbatial seat would fall vacant, rumours circulated that the pope intended to appoint someone close to the Roman Curia as head of the monastery; and fifty years later, some royal servants tried to take advantage of the vacancy preceding John Whethamstede's second election.[31]

Reasons to elect an elderly abbot

Despite the burdens that the death of an abbot and the subsequent vacancy of power placed on a monastery, it is possible that the charters and privileges bought by Thomas de la Mare removed any potential prejudices against the election of John Moot, an experienced but already old man. His extensive experience is presented as an asset, and a prior was made abbot in one third of the elections held in thirteenth and fourteenth-century St Albans.[32] Forty years later, when the monks chose to elect another old man (though probably not quite

[29] Clark (ed.) and Preest (trans.), *Deeds of the Abbots,* 887; quoted in Riley (ed.), *Registra*, i. 78.

[30] Riley (ed.), *Gesta abbatum*, iii. 494: 'ad evitandum sumptus qui noviter in dignitate constitutis evenire solent, monasterium per aliquod tempus deseruit.' (Translation my own.)

[31] Clark (ed.) and Preest (trans.), *Deeds of the Abbots,* 929: 'This was done to avoid what usually happens when death is discovered to be imminent, namely even the good people making light of the matter, and the bad ones too freely making havoc of the goods and the rights of the monastery.' See also Riley (ed.), *Registra*, i. 78.

[32] Riley (ed.), *Gesta abbatum*, iii. 432; Clark (ed.) and Preest (trans.), *Deeds of the Abbots*, 928–9; Vaughan, 'Election of Abbots at St Albans', 5.

as old as John Moot), they knew that he had experience not only as obedientiary, but also as an abbot. Even so, there seem to have been discussions surrounding his election, as Whethamstede was not the only candidate.[33]

A comparison can be made with the patterns of election in another Benedictine establishment: the Cathedral Priory of Durham, whose priors were usually past 50 at the time of their election between 1351 and 1478.[34] One possible explanation is that the problems encountered during vacancies of the priory were smaller than those of an abbey. Unlike at St Albans, the election was not subject to papal or royal approval, leading to considerable savings in time and money. Moreover, the disputes between the bishop of Durham and the chapter at the beginning of the fourteenth century were laid to rest, and the powers of the custodian of the priory appointed by the bishop were limited during the fourteenth century. Even though interregna were a dangerous time for the community because of external pressure on their temporal and spiritual rights, electing a new head of the community seems to have been easier than at St Albans.[35] The prospect of regular vacancies was not such a problem, and so older, more experienced monks were chosen, whereas the monks of St Albans seem to have preferred younger abbots such as William Heyworth or John Whethamstede (during his first term) after two consecutive elderly abbots. However, the accounts of abbatial elections in St Albans give very few details concerning age as a reason for the choice of abbot. When age is mentioned, it is not generally commented upon, as we saw in the account of John de Hertford's election mentioned earlier. One exception is the description of John Whethamstede's second election, when the prior addressed the monks with these words:

> indeed, there is no equal battle, where the minority struggle against the majority . . . where the young start a fight against the old; or the ignorant against the wise. They are indeed older than you, they are wiser than you, they are three times more

[33] Riley (ed.), *Registra*, i. 5–9.

[34] Dobson, *Durham Priory*, 89 (incl. n. 2). The prior John Wessington (in office 1416–46) was 45 at the time of his election and appears to have been young compared to his predecessors and successors.

[35] Ibid. 82–4.

> than you, and therefore with all their strength, in matters concerning election, they are mightier than you.[36]

An old abbot was expected to have experience and wisdom, and this was particularly valued in 1452 after the disastrous abbacy of John Stoke.[37] Although the chroniclers of St Albans never explicitly present old age as a burden for the monastery, alternative views can be found in narratives from other Benedictine houses. Jocelin of Brakelond wrote about the discussions that took place before the election of Abbot Samson of Bury St Edmunds (1182). Every monk had a different opinion about what the profile of the next abbot should be, and age was taken into account: 'One man . . . was excluded from consideration by some of our senior monks on the grounds that he was a junior. The young monks said that the senior monks were elderly and infirm, and incapable of governing the abbey.'[38] In the end, however, an elderly monk was elected, and the chronicler stressed the experience and wisdom that come with old age.

III. Ill and Senile Abbots

Though not always well documented, disability and senility were probably common among abbots and priors. When they list the situations in which abbots were exempted from some of their duties, the thirteenth-century statutes of the Black Monks mention first physical infirmity and weakness, and then the needs of the monastery's administration.[39] Indeed, only a minority of monastic superiors

[36] Riley (ed.), *Registra*, i. 9: 'non enim est pugna aequalis, ubi pauci dimicant contra plures; satisque de raro subsequitur victoria, ubi juvenes certamen ineunt contra senes, aut inscii adversus sapientes. Sunt enim seniores vobis, sunt sapientiores vobis, sunt in triplo plures vobis, et propterea ex omnibus viribus, quod actum electionis, vobis potiores.' (Translation my own.)

[37] Clark, 'Whethamstede [Bostock], John'.

[38] Jocelin of Brakelond, *Chronicle of the Abbey of Bury St Edmunds*, trans. Diana Greenway and Jane Sayers (Oxford, 1989), 11–14 (quotation at 14). Samson was 47 at the time of his election (ibid. 36). See also Antonia Gransden, 'Samson (1135–1211), abbot of Bury St Edmunds', in *ODNB*.

[39] Pantin, *Chapters of the English Black Monks,* i. 9, 35, 65, 232.

resigned in late medieval England, and this decision was not an easy one. Attitudes to resignation could vary: there were no provisions for this in the Benedictine rule, and some monks considered it a neglect of duty. This point of view was shared by the chronicler Thomas Walsingham in St Albans, who disapproved of Abbot Thomas de la Mare's attempt to resign.[40] Hence, even a very weak abbot could stay in office for months or years, waiting for his death or a resignation. In the case of Prior John Wessington of Durham, for example, it took six years before he decided to resign. Wessington even discussed his health in his own letters; however, it was not presented as the immediate reason for the change in leadership of the priory, as suggested by Richard Dobson.[41] In St Albans, too, mentions of physical disability and senility are frequent, but rarely explicitly referred to as a problem by the chroniclers. Rather, they concur with the model of 'virtuous aging' that Amelia Kennedy describes in the case of Cistercian abbots, with the abbot providing both 'spiritual guidance' for the community and a model of virtuous suffering and death.[42]

Attitudes to illness

Old age proved to be more problematic when abbots were ill. Because of his health problems, Thomas de la Mare considered himself old from the beginning of his time as abbot. At the end of the 1350s he wanted to resign and serve God as a mere monk, 'asking for no more than any ordinary brother, despite his lengthy labours, his old age and his former high position'.[43] A few years later, during the Second Pestilence, he was prostrated by plague and suffered painful ulcers,

[40] Heale, '"For the Solace of their Advanced Years"', 144–5 n. 11 and 150. See also Kennedy, '"Do Not Relinquish your Offspring"', 128–33 on the situation in the twelfth-century Cistercian order. She argues here that the order's view on resignation evolved in the thirteenth century because of the 'growth and bureaucratization' of the order: incapable abbots were more frequently asked to step down (ibid. 126).

[41] Dobson, *Durham Priory*, 111.

[42] Kennedy, '"Do Not Relinquish your Offspring"', 126.

[43] Clark (ed.) and Preest (trans.), *Deeds of the Abbots*, 796; he was then around 50. He had already fallen ill during his journey to Rome at the time of his election; this may be a sequel to that episode.

fevers, and other symptoms.[44] His weakness increased considerably during the last seven years of his life: he was virtually paralysed, and his illness and infirmity are described at length and in detail using phrases borrowed from martyrdom narratives.[45] A similar level of detail is given by John Whethamstede when he describes his own bodily condition at the time of his second election: 'colic and stones, incontinence and kidney disease, old age and senility'.[46]

Both narratives convey the idea of strength, as the abbots' sufferings did not prevent them from carrying out their duties at least until the last few months of their lives, as in the case of de la Mare.[47] On the contrary, the author of the continuation of the *Deeds of the Abbots* even managed to find some advantages for the abbey: 'Even in his great weakness he [Thomas de la Mare] made his monks . . . still more loyal and hard-working . . . and all the nobles showed him greater goodwill than when he was in his usual vigorous health.'[48] It is difficult to know whether or how the abbot's state of health contributed to a change in the nobility's attitude towards him. Various noblemen visited the abbot on his deathbed, and numerous entries are recorded in the abbey's *Book of Benefactors* from the 1370s onwards.[49] As James Clark has shown, the abbacy of Thomas de la Mare coincided with an effort to attract lay people to join the abbey, especially noblemen, and the revival of the fraternity of St Albans was one way to achieve this.[50]

[44] Ibid. 913, 929.

[45] Ibid. 913, 928–31.

[46] Riley (ed.), *Registra*, i. 9: 'dictumque patrem, quamvis multum renitentem, multaque etiam, ac multifaria, videlicet *colicam et calculum, diampnem et nephresium, senectam et senium*, diemque dierum instantem novissimum, pro se in suam excusationem opponentem, nihilominus rursus eligerent' (I have translated the emphasized text above). On the uses of the word *senium* and the connection between age and mental decline, see Shahar, *Growing Old*, 16–18, 39.

[47] Clark (ed.) and Preest (trans.), *Deeds of the Abbots*, 913–15.

[48] Ibid. 922.

[49] Ibid.; British Library, Cotton MS Nero D VII, Benefactors' Book of St Albans Abbey; James. G. Clark, 'Monastic Confraternity in Medieval England: The Evidence from the St Albans Abbey *Liber Benefactorum*', in Emilia Jamroziak and Janet E. Burton (eds.), *Religious and Laity in Western Europe, 1000–1400: Interaction, Negotiation, and Power* (Turnhout, 2007), 315–31.

[50] James G. Clark, 'Selling the Holy Places: Monastic Efforts to Win Back the People in Fifteenth-Century England', in Tim J. Thornton (ed.), *Social Attitudes and Political Structures in the Fifteenth Century* (Stroud, 2001), 13–32.

However, this phenomenon cannot be directly attributed to Thomas de la Mare's old age as a number of motives led nobles to apply for the privilege of fraternity, such as the prestige of the monastery or their devotion to the abbey's patron saint.

Whereas direct proof of people's goodwill towards Thomas de la Mare is difficult to find, some individuals tried to take advantage of the abbot's illness to the detriment of the monastery. In the late 1370s a suit was brought by the monastery against John Chiltern, a neighbour and relative of Thomas de la Mare who had occupied a manor and some tenements that belonged to the monastery, but refused to pay the annual sum he owed.[51] In the narrative of this protracted conflict, which started in the 1360s, the outlawed Chiltern is said to have returned to England from exile in order to stage a counter-attack, taking advantage of the passage of time and the deaths of some important allies of the abbot.[52] De la Mare fought back, taking Chiltern to court over unpaid debt. To avoid having to pay, Chiltern lied and pretended that the abbot was dead. 'Although then greatly debilitated by sickness', Thomas de la Mare had to be carried on a litter to London to defend his case before the Common Bench and to prove that he was still alive.[53] This example stresses the strength and courage of an abbot who defended the rights of his community for as long as he physically could, and who carried out his duties despite his sufferings.[54] Similar remarks are to be found in John Whethamstede's register in 1456: the abbot was unwell, and his state of health seems to have worsened the following year. Nonetheless, he petitioned Henry VI to secure the donations the abbey received from the king. Unlike Thomas de la Mare, he did not travel to London in person, delegating the case first to the prior and then to another representative in the capital. However, he prosecuted the long and arduous matter until its end, just as de la Mare had done.[55]

[51] Clark (ed.) and Preest (trans.), *Deeds of the Abbots,* 808–12.

[52] Ibid. 811: 'So seeing that the abbot was now destitute of friends or overcome by old age, he determined to return.'

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid. 913.

[55] Riley (ed.), *Registra*, 256, 264–5. In this narrative, Whethamstede is determined to resolve the matter despite his old age and illness. In 1460, he was still active in defending the interests of the monastery; when letters were no longer sufficient, he sent representatives (ibid. 357–9).

The importance of virtue and good counsel

The chronicles of the abbacies of de la Mare and Whethamstede stress the strength and courage of the abbots, who are held up as examples for others.[56] Their virtue not only helped them to endure unbearable illness, but also prevented them from becoming a burden to the other monks even when they were ill or senile, like de la Mare. In his case, old age was indeed associated with the loss of intellectual capacities and a return to the 'state of innocence', to quote the author of the continuation of the *Deeds of the Abbots*:

> By now God's soldier had served his time. He was worn out, even senile, emptied of strength and feeling by his crippling illnesses, and indeed reduced to the state of innocence and therefore dependent on the care and advice of others.[57]

The second defence against illness and senility was good counsel, as the example of Thomas de la Mare underlines. The abbot was well cared for—in the first instance by God, but also by the monks and especially the prior, to whom he transferred the administration of the monastery when he became too old and too ill.[58] This is a crucial point: an old leader was not a problem as long as he was not senile (which does not seem to have been the case for de la Mare until 1394), and when senility came, he needed good counsel. However, the chronicler of John Moot's abbacy presents a less idyllic image of the transfer of power between de la Mare and Moot: Moot 'deceitfully stole the government and the tutelage from him [de la Mare] and from the whole monastery, and for two years, while he [de la Mare] was still alive, he [Moot] administrated in accordance with his own will.'[59] De la Mare's main counsellor therefore did not seem so selfless to some of the monks.

[56] Clark (ed.) and Preest (trans.), *Deeds of the Abbots,* 913*:* 'he continued tirelessly to care for the monastery which was his task and repeatedly by his example to stir up others, even the indolent, to do the same.'

[57] Ibid. 908.

[58] Ibid. 909.

[59] Riley (ed.), *Gesta abbatum,* iii. 463: 'regimen seu tutelam ipsius et totius monasterii cautelose surripuit, et pro libito suae voluntatis, ipso vivente, per biennium ministravit.' (Translation my own.)

The importance of virtue and good counsel in government more generally, and not only in case of monastic administration, is revealed in Thomas Walsingham's depiction of the last years of King Edward III (*r.* 1327–77). In the narrative for 1376–7, the old king is represented as weakened, senile, poorly advised by sycophants, and blinded by his love for his mistress Alice Perrers. The general impression is one of a glorious king who had been able to exercise self-control throughout most of his life, but who submitted to excess—notably carnal excess—in his final years.[60] The result for the chronicler is that 'as he moved towards old age and went down the sky to his sunset, the happy events were gradually driven out by his sins and grew fewer, while many unfortunate and unlucky disasters mushroomed in their place.'[61] There is a resemblance between monastic and royal power: in the hands of a senile man, power could result in catastrophe when the ruler and his entourage lacked virtue and were no longer able to restrain their passions. Next, we must go beyond the chronicles and examine the archives in order to see the reality of life at a monastery under the control of an old and possibly senile abbot.

IV. Administering the Monastery under an Incapable Abbot

When the head of a religious house was no longer able to carry out his duties, the situation could be handled in various ways, and the abbot or prior in question could be allowed (or asked) to resign. Episcopal visitations were occasions when problems in the administration of a community could be pointed out; when these problems were attributed to the inability of the abbot, bishops could act as decision-makers.[62] In some other cases, coadjutors could be appointed. St Albans is a case apart: it belonged to the category of monasteries exempted from the bishop's jurisdiction. No episcopal visitation could remark on the

[60] James G. Clark (ed.) and David Preest (trans.), *The* Chronica Maiora *of Thomas Walsingham, 1376–1422* (Woodbridge, 2005), 32–3. Ibid. 33.

[62] See e.g. Greatrex, *The English Benedictine Cathedral Priories*, 298 on the resignation of the archbishop of Ely during a visitation by Archbishop Arundel in 1401. In the Benedictine order, the visitations made by other abbots of the order were also an occasion to point out failings.

problems raised by the administration of an incapable abbot.[63] In this case, a progressive internal delegation of power took place informally at first, before being made official by privileges acquired directly from the pope and the king. These internal arrangements were not enough to prevent the consequences that the long-term absence of the abbot could have for the community and for the monastery's place in the realm.

The delegation of power

In the largest houses, the abbot was the master of a community whose daily administration was handled by numerous lay and monastic officers. Some of these were obedientiaries, who were granted manors to cover the costs of their office.[64] They were chosen by the abbot, who symbolically gave them the keys of their office. So much for the theory; in practice, officers operated largely independently, had their own staff, and were accountable to the whole chapter. The illness or senility of the abbot does not therefore seem to have been a major problem for the running of the community. Moreover, even when they were healthy, abbots were often away, whether taking care of the business of the monastery, attending royal or ecclesiastical convocations, or visiting one of their manors.[65]

In case of the death, illness, or absence of the abbot, the prior of the monastery (or the subprior in case of a priory) generally took the lead and administered the community.[66] What might have started out as a temporary solution turned into a long-term situation during Thomas de la Mare's abbacy. His infirmity lasted for decades, meaning that

[63] On external control of a religious house, see e.g. Alastair Dobie, *Accounting at Durham Cathedral Priory*: *Management and Control of a Major Ecclesiastical Corporation, 1083–1539* (Basingstoke, 2015).

[64] Riley (ed.), *Gesta abbatum,* iii. 425, 480. On Benedictine officers and obedientiaries, see Greatrex, *The English Benedictine Cathedral Priories*, 160–236; Barbara Harvey, *The Obedientiaries of Westminster Abbey and their Financial Records,* c.*1275–1540* (Woodbridge, 2002); and Dobie, *Accounting at Durham Cathedral Priory*, 28.

[65] David Knowles, *The Religious Orders in England*, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1948–59), vol. ii: *The End of the Middle Ages* (1955), 252–3; Heale, *Abbots and Priors*, 59–61, 155 ff.

[66] Dobson, *Durham Priory*, 83.

the power and influence of Prior John Moot grew considerably, and the continuation of the *Deeds of the Abbots* explicitly describes some of the privileges and possessions restored under de la Mare's abbacy through the prior's actions.[67] The same chronicler explains that when de la Mare became too ill,

> he handed over, according to his wishes formed long ago in the days of his health, the temporal and the spiritual care of the monastery, with the approval and at the urging of the monks, to his pupil, the prior John Moot, who was the leading candidate because of his experience and hard work in most of the internal and external major offices.[68]

This transition was probably made easier by an important privilege obtained from Pope Boniface IX in 1394, during de la Mare's infirmity.[69] It stated that when abbots of St Albans were ill or absent, priors could absolve the monks, admit novices, and exercise the abbot's full jurisdiction over spiritual and temporal matters, among other things. This privilege, obtained two years before de la Mare's death, cost more than a thousand marks. The trouble and expense gone to in order to obtain such a right implies that abbatial illness and senility had been a problem at times in the past. Indeed, some of the abbot's powers could not easily be transferred to others; there were both legal and tacit limits to the delegation of his authority. De la Mare was not expected to resign, so other expedients had to be found. This expansion of the prior's role in cases of abbatial incapacity was at first a temporary answer to the particular situation of Abbot de la Mare, but it became permanent with this papal document.

However, the office of prior was not the only one to be affected by the abbot's situation. The register of Thomas de la Mare, compiled by

[67] Clark (ed.) and Preest (trans.), *Deeds of the Abbots*, 909 (manor of Westwick–Gorham).

[68] Ibid. 928–9. The date of this delegation of power is not precisely known. It might have been after 1394, or perhaps in the very last weeks of de la Mare's life. See also Riley (ed.), *Gesta abbatum,* iii. 463.

[69] William Henry Bliss, J. A. Twemlow, Michael J. Haren, et al. (eds.), *Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland: Papal Letters*, 20 vols. (London and Dublin, 1893–), vol. iv: *1362–1404* (1902), 500 (2 Oct. 1394).

his chaplain William Wintershill, bears witness to the many occasions on which abbots could designate proxies, name attorneys, and appoint procurators.[70] Templates of proctors' letters were copied into the register for specific situations in which the abbot could not complete his duties: collecting taxes, attending assemblies, and so on. Among all these many formularies, the 'parliamentary proxy' can be singled out.[71] This excuses the abbot from attending Parliament and gives the names of three people (in this case a monk, a clerk, and a layman) designated to attend in place of the abbot, who was summoned by the king to sit in this assembly as a Lord Spiritual.[72] The documents concerning St Albans in the National Archives series SC 10 indicate that Thomas de la Mare used these letters on a regular basis. As mentioned in the introduction, from May 1366 he sent letters excusing his absence due to illness and infirmity: 'restrained because of numerous weaknesses in my body and inconveniences that come with old age and that are growing daily, I am unable to attend in person.'[73] This became a standard formulation and was copied in most of the letters sent after 1366.[74]

[70] Cambridge University Library, Ms. Ee 4 20. Other letters of proxy can be found in British Library, Harley MS 602 (known as the register of John Moot). On the question of representation, see Anton-Hermann Chroust, 'Legal Profession during the Middle Ages: The Emergence of the English Lawyer Prior to 1400', *Notre Dame Law Review,* 32/1 (1956), 85–140; Laurent Mayali, 'Procureurs et représentation en droit canonique médiéval', *Mélanges de l'école française de Rome: Moyen Âge*, 114/1 (2002), 41–57.

[71] Cambridge University Library, Ms. Ee 4 20, fo. 93r.

[72] On these letters and how they were used, see Bradford and McHardy (eds.), *Proctors for Parliament*.

[73] TNA, SC 10/29 1423: 'multiplicibus corporis mei debilitatibus et incomodis michi ex senio contingentibus et in dies excrescentibus detentus personaliter interesse nequeo.' (Translation my own.) Proxy letters from Abbot de la Mare survive for the parliaments of 1352, 1353, 1354, 1355, 1362, 1366, 1371, 1372 (Feb.), 1373, 1377 (Jan. and Oct.), 1378, 1379, 1380 (Jan.), 1382, 1383 (Oct.), 1384 (Nov.), 1385, 1386, 1388 (Feb.), 1391, 1393, 1394, and 1395 (TNA, SC 10/25 1246; 10/26 1266, 1281; 10/27 1310; 10/28 1376; 10/29 1423, 1436; 10/30 1471; 10/31 1506, 1536; 10/32 1571B, 1589, 1595; 10/33 1632; 10/34 1697; 10/35 1712, 1732; 10/36 1761, 1780, 1799; 10/37 1849; 10/38 1889; and 10/39 1903, 1938).

[74] The register of Abbot de la Mare was compiled at the end of the 1380s, and the letter copied in it as a template is held in the National Archives, SC 10/36 1761 (parliament of 1385), with an explanation that the same phrasing would be used in subsequent letters.

The consequences of these absences are difficult to prove. As was the case for many religious houses whose superiors could not or did not want to attend Parliament, the monastery was still represented by many reliable proctors.[75] Most of them were chosen from the abbey's cellarers, priors, and lay officers.[76] However, it is possible that de la Mare's long illness resulted in a loss of prestige for the monastery, or at least a reduction in importance compared to other English houses. When de la Mare's successor attended Parliament for the first time in 1397, his precedence over the other abbots had been 'usurped' by the abbot of Westminster 'because of the absence for more than a decade of Lord Thomas, the last abbot, owing to bad health, infirmity, and old age.'[77] John Moot had to fight to recover this lost status, and it seems that he attended every parliamentary session until the end of his own abbacy. Despite his efforts, this privilege had been eroded under his predecessor and was lost by his successor William Heyworth.[78] This was not a problem faced by all monasteries, however; it was specific to St Albans because of its coveted place in the institution of Parliament and the authority claimed by its abbots.

A fragile authority outside the monastery?

Although the internal administration of the monastery could be managed despite the physical or intellectual incapacity of the abbot, there

[75] Bradford and McHardy (eds.), *Proctors for Parliament*.

[76] Élisa Mantienne, 'Auteurs, compilateurs, administrateurs: Les moines de Saint-Albans et le pouvoir, années 1350–années 1440' (Ph.D. thesis, Université de Lorraine, 2019), 52–4, 70–8, 503–18.

[77] Henry T. Riley (ed.), *Annales monasterii S. Albani, a Johanne Amundesham, monacho, ut videtur, conscripti, A.D. 1421–1440*, 2 vols. (London, 1870–1), i. 415: 'per absentiam decennalem amplius Domini Thomae Abbatis ultimi, propter corporis invalitudinem, impotentiam, et senium.' (Translation my own.)

[78] Parliaments of Jan. and Sept. 1397, 1399, and 1401; on the last three of these occasions, his presence is attested by his nomination as trier of petitions in the rolls of Parliament. See the relevant records on the website *The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England* (*PROME*), at [http://www.sd-editions.com/PROME/home.html], accessed 14 Jan. 2022. Moot and Heyworth lost their place in Parliament; see Riley (ed.), *Annales monasterii*, i. 414–7 and id. (ed.), *Gesta abbatum*, iii. 435.

were real problems when it came to matters of authority and representation, at least for the greater houses. Heads of communities like St Albans were important figures in England, and their presence in Parliament was one aspect of this. Thomas de la Mare was summoned to royal councils during the 1350s and 1360s, and he presided (with other abbots) over the chapters of the Benedictine monks throughout the 1360s. We have to wait until 1429 before we see another abbot of St Albans in this office.[79] Although he had been entrusted with certain missions by the king and the Benedictine order, after the 1370s his growing inability to travel probably reduced the number of responsibilities he was given. During de la Mare's abbacy, St Albans Abbey may have lost some influence because he could not maintain his position in major institutions or be present in person at royal and ecclesiastical assemblies or at court.[80] The monastery remained important from an intellectual point of view thanks to the other monks, especially university monks.[81] Hence, the problems raised by de la Mare's old age were not insurmountable, but they slowly reduced the position of the monastery in public life in the context of both the competition between the great Benedictine houses of England and the declining role of abbots in the central government of the realm as they were replaced by skilled clerks.[82]

[79] William A. Pantin, 'The General and Provincial Chapters of the English Black Monks, 1215–1540', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society,* 10 (1927), 195–263, at 252–4.

[80] The late medieval period in England coincided with renewed attention to the self-representation of abbots. In order to display his full authority, an abbot had to attend in person the various assemblies he was summoned to. His status was thus diminished when represented by proxies, even when he delegated his full power to them. On the question of the self-representation of abbots, see Martin Heale, 'Mitres and Arms: Aspects of the Self-Representation of the Monastic Superior in Late Medieval England', in Anne Müller and Karen Stöber (eds.), *Self-Representation of Medieval Religious Communities: The British Isles in Context* (Berlin, 2009), 99–124.

[81] Clark, *Monastic Renaissance*.

[82] Benjamin Thompson and Jacques Verger, 'Church and State, Clerks and Graduates', in Christopher Fletcher, Jean-Philippe Genet, and John Watts (eds.), *Government and Political Life in England and France,* c.*1300*–c.*1500* (Cambridge, 2015), 183–216; Heale, *Abbots and Priors*, 204–5, 212–26.

Fifty years after the death of Abbot de la Mare, his case can be compared to John Whethamstede's second term. From the late 1450s Whethamstede was seriously ill, but he continued to defend the interests of the abbey, supervising matters from the monastery and sending representatives to London because of his old age.[83] This sometimes led to complications. In 1461, when he sought to defend the abbey's rights to the priory of St Andrew's in Pembroke, his archdeacon represented him in Parliament. As the abbot was 'old, and because of old age and illness, was not in physical condition to be present in Parliament', the archdeacon had to address the chancellor for permission to intercede with the king on the abbot's behalf.[84] Eventually, Whethamstede became so ill that he could no longer receive visitors to the monastery (apparently unlike Thomas de la Mare)—even royal visitors in some cases. In 1459, when Henry VI visited the abbey, Whethamstede was absent 'because of languor and old age' and his prior had to take his place.[85]

When we turn to ecclesiastical relations, we see a contrast with the numerous legacies of Whethamstede's first abbacy. The abbot who had helped Henry V reform the Benedictine orders in the 1420s and who was a member of the delegation to the Council of Pavia–Siena (1423–4) does not appear in the list of prelates and nobles accompanying the embassy sent by the king to the Council of Mantua.[86] Many other factors might explain this, but the narratives from the register suggest that personal meetings with members of the royal government or other ecclesiastics became rarer and rarer as the abbot grew older. It is difficult to precisely assess an abbot's loss of influence. Fewer visits are recorded to the abbot and to his monastery and fewer people entered the fraternity, yet these may also be false impressions arising from a lack of sources. Moreover, not every change that affected the

[83] Clark, 'Whethamstede [Bostock], John'; Riley (ed.), *Registra*, 416.

[84] Riley (ed.), *Registra*, 417: 'senis, et prae senior, ac etiam morbo, in Parliamento adesse non valentis'. (Translation my own.)

[85] Ibid. 324: 'propter languorem and senium'. In 1461 the abbot met the king in a very different context: Whethamstede appeared in person to beg for protection against plunderers during the Wars of the Roses (ibid. 394).

[86] Ibid. 332. The council was summoned in response to the capture of Constantinople by the Ottomans in 1453.

monastery can be attributed to the physical condition of the abbot: Whethamstede's second abbacy took place in a very different political and ecclesiastical context from his first. Hence, one cannot conclude that St Albans was affected by a structural problem created by the incapacity of some of its abbots. Unique to St Albans was the duration of Abbot de la Mare's poor health over several decades. The community continued to be represented externally during this long period, but only by people of inferior rank, such as clerks or monks.

V. Conclusion

This article has presented a case study of a great monastery which could afford to elect elderly abbots in order to benefit from their experience and maturity, despite the associated risks of illness, senility, and imminent death, along with the resultant problems created by an abbatial vacancy. Measures had to be taken in the event that the abbot was unable to rule, and also after his death, in order to ensure a smooth transition of power. The administration of the community could continue under an incapable abbot, but the monastery's external relations might be affected. This was especially the case when a monastery claimed a special place in the ranks of English religious houses. However, it is difficult to determine the impact of this on the rank and prestige of the house compared to other external factors.

Whereas discourses about old age and archival evidence are often studied separately in historiography, the rich documentation that survives for St Albans allows these two aspects to be brought together. Both in theory and in practice at St Albans Abbey, the old age of the monastic superior and the disabilities and diseases that often ensued were not a major problem for the monastery. Each religious community had its own way of dealing with these situations, and what made St Albans unique was its status as an exempt monastery, which prevented bishops from intervening and enabled the community to adapt to the new situation without much external input.

However, further cases need to be examined in order to understand if there were common trends in the way elderly superiors were handled in the Benedictine order, as has been done by Amelia

Kennedy in her work on Cistercians.[87] The rule of St Benedict does not address the question of ageing abbots, but the close connections between Benedictine monasteries, the visitations, and the frequent convening of chapters of the order could lead us to think that there were common patterns in dealing with incapacity among heads of religious houses. As we have seen here, there were many ways to tackle the problem, and although examples of resignation tend to be better researched, the case of St Albans provides an example of an alternative, less spectacular way of adapting to the illness and senility of abbots.

Providing a new angle from which to examine the differences between the houses in a religious order, the study of old age also helps us explore the structures of monastic communities in greater depth. Abbots (and priors) are well-known figures in historiography, and some have been studied in detail, but the connections between them and the rest of the community are sometimes hard to capture.[88] The abbot held a special place within the monastery: he was the wellspring of authority and the external representative of the house. These special roles made him both a key member of the community and at the same time separate from it, often with his own servants and his own lodgings. To study what happened when he was no longer able to govern, along with the consequences of this for the religious house in question, is to throw new light on what the abbot really represented for the community.

[87] Amelia Kennedy, 'Growing Old in a Cistercian Monastery, *c.*1100–1300' (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 2000); ead., '"Do Not Relinquish your Offspring"'.

[88] On the separation between abbot and monastery, see the summary in Heale, *Abbots and Priors*, 98.

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REVIEW ARTICLES

BETWEEN CHICHÉN ITZÁ, BAGHDAD, AND GUANGZHOU: NEW APPROACHES TO THE GLOBAL MIDDLE AGES

ERIC BÖHME

JOHANNES PREISER-KAPELLER, *Jenseits von Rom und Karl dem Großen: Aspekte der globalen Verflechtung in der langen Spätantike, 300–800 n. Chr.*, Expansion, Interaktion, Akkulturation: Globalhistorische Skizzen, 32 (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2018), 292 pp. ISBN 978 3 854 76554 7. €19.90

VALERIE HANSEN, *Das Jahr 1000: Als die Globalisierung begann*, trans. Anna Leube and Wolf Heinrich Leube (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2020), 393 pp. ISBN 978 3 406 75530 9. €28.00; first published as *The Year 1000: When Explorers Connected the World—and Globalization Began* (London: Penguin, 2020)

CATHERINE HOLMES and NAOMI STANDEN (eds.), *The Global Middle Ages*, Past & Present Supplements, 13 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), xxii + 441 pp. ISBN 978 0 198 83750 3. Open access at [https://academic.oup.com/past/issue/238/suppl_13]

JÖRG OBERSTE and SUSANNE EHRICH (eds.), *Italien als Vorbild? Ökonomische und kulturelle Verflechtungen europäischer Metropolen am Vorabend der 'ersten Globalisierung' (1300–1600)*, Forum Mittelalter: Studien, 16 (Regensburg: Schnell & Steiner, 2019), 208 pp. ISBN 978 3 795 43449 6. €34.95

Globality is in vogue. The fact that this impression holds true not only for our modern world, but also for discourses in historiography, is attested by the multitude of publications relating in one way or another to the field of world history. While earlier discourse was pre-occupied with the question of whether such a global perspective was a

'Chimera or Necessity',[1] the debate has since turned in numerous other directions, taking in terminological aspects as well as the question of whether supposedly well-established periodizations distinguishing, from a mainly Eurocentric perspective, between 'antiquity', the 'Middle Ages', and an 'early modern age' should be reassessed.[2] Even though scholarly debates on such questions are still in full swing, there is an academic consensus that human interactions in the so-called 'Middle Ages' were in no way confined to local relations between kings, nobles, clerics, and other parts of primarily European societies. Rather, these groups often engaged in far-reaching and complex networks connecting not only Europe and the medieval Mediterranean, but large parts of Africa, Eurasia, and East Asia as well. These networks can only be understood properly if they are studied from a more flexible, balanced, and non-Eurocentric perspective, taking into account that the partners interacting with European protagonists themselves took part in complex systems of communication and exchange with other parts of the world, in which Europe was merely on the periphery. But what exactly can be considered 'global' in the medieval millennium, and when can it be attested at the earliest? Scholars tend to answer such questions, if at all, rather diversely. While the overall development of this field of research is far too complex to be treated in brief, this review article seeks to present and compare four recent publications that are equally ambitious in their approaches and that received considerable publicity. How do their findings contribute to our perception of the concept of the global Middle Ages?

Johannes Preiser-Kapeller's monograph *Jenseits von Rom und Karl dem Großen* was published in 2018 and has received quite a number of reviews—mostly in German, but also in Italian, English, and other languages.[3] During his early career, Preiser-Kapeller focused mainly on

[1] See the call for papers for a workshop headlined 'World History Today—Chimera or Necessity', held in Leipzig on 12–14. Feb. 1998, *H-Soz-Kult*, 7 Jan. 1998, at [http://www.hsozkult.de/event/id/event-51100], accessed 13 Nov. 2021.

[2] Cf. Tillmann Lohse, 'Review Symposium zu J. Preiser-Kapeller, *Jenseits von Rom und Karl dem Großen*', *H-Soz-Kult*, 25 Mar. 2019, at [http://www.hsozkult.de/text/id/texte-4703], accessed 13 Nov. 2021.

[3] An overview can be found at [http://www.univie.ac.at/VSIG/site/2018/02/jenseits-von-rom-und-karl-dem-grosen], accessed 13 Nov. 2021.

Byzantine history, but he has subsequently engaged with wider topics such as environmental and climate history, as well as global history. Pertaining mainly to the latter field, *Jenseits von Rom* concentrates on the so-called 'long late antiquity', a relatively new research concept comprising the period between around 200 and 900 CE. According to the author, these centuries have for a long time been perceived, at least from a Western European or Mediterranean perspective, mainly as a period in which the political and economic networks maintained under Roman rule fell apart almost entirely. In contrast to this view, Preiser-Kapeller aims to switch the centre of attention from Europe to the eastern Mediterranean, East Africa, the Near East, the Indian subcontinent, and Central and East Asia. In these parts of the world, the third to seventh centuries CE also witnessed the collapse of several major empires, but these were replaced by new and sometimes even larger 'imperial formations' (p. 13). In this 'Afro-Eurasian late antiquity' (p. 14), the author discerns global entanglements between political and economic centres and aims to contrast their dynamics with the so-called 'Dark Ages' in Western Europe before the European expansion.

In his short and rather anecdotal introduction, Preiser-Kapeller describes his book as a series of six 'global historical sketches' (p. 10) rather than a study as comprehensive as Michael McCormick's *Origins of the European Economy*, for example.[4] In contrast to this understatement, these 'sketches' or chapters, roughly equal in length and based on both primary sources and research literature, open up a truly extensive panorama of countless events and developments centred on several core topics. In this context, a detailed index of names and places would have been very helpful, although ten rather plain maps provide some (at least elementary) orientation.[5]

The first chapter focuses on political developments on the macro level, which the author presents as 'rhythms of imperial formations' (p. 13). These rhythms, marked by the formation and decline of larger

[4] Michael McCormick, *Origins of the European Economy: Communications and Commerce, AD 300–900* (Cambridge, 2001).

[5] This has also been criticized by Arnaldo Marcone, 'Review of: Johannes Preiser-Kapeller, *Jenseits von Rom und Karl dem Großen*', *Sehepunkte*, 19/2 (2019), 15 Feb. 2019, at [http://www.sehepunkte.de/2019/02/32061.html], accessed 13 Nov. 2021.

political entities, are traced in more or less chronological order from around 500 BCE to 900 CE. Although the sheer quantity of developments is necessarily reduced to major outlines, a number of subheadings serve as a guide through the wider trends discerned by the author, such as 'the crisis of the "old" empires' (p. 18), the rise of 'new superpowers' (p. 38), and the 'decay' of empires in the ninth century (p. 57). The second chapter delves into the complex relations between the different political entities, tracing diplomatic interactions and rivalries. Another important topic is the question of mobility and competition between elites within a single political entity, which the author presents via the examples of China, the early Islamic Caliphate, and the South Caucasus. In the third chapter, Preiser-Kapeller studies processes of exchange within the religious sphere, focusing on the spread of Buddhism, the persistence and expansion of Christianity, and their respective repercussions on political developments.

The fourth chapter then leaves the political-religious elites to examine social groups on lower levels, tracing mobility and exchange among merchants, artists, artisans, enslaved people, and others. Chapter five goes even further by focusing on the 'mobility' of animals and plants, who were involuntary participants in commercial and diplomatic exchange between different world regions and cultures. The ecological consequences of these man-made changes connect this chapter to the last thematic section, which deals with the impact of climatic conditions on political and socio-economic developments.

In a short conclusion, Preiser-Kapeller summarizes the main points of his study: the phenomenon of global entanglement in the 'long late antiquity' can be perceived as overlapping and interdependent networks 'between places, persons, and objects' (p. 251). These networks survived the disintegration of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century and became more complex over time. In other world regions too, empires collapsed. However, these were replaced by even bigger formations such as the Islamic Caliphate in the west and the Tang Empire in the east, to name but two. Although these new powers were by no means as interdependent as the parts of the former Roman Empire, they were connected through overlapping and complex networks of which the post-Roman west was a part as well. Yet rulers like Charlemagne or the popes in Rome who claimed control

over this post-Roman west stood not at the centre of a much larger Afro-Eurasian system, but merely at its periphery—a situation which persisted until the Industrial Revolution around 1800.[6]

Although some of the countless processes and events touched upon may have deserved a more detailed and critical analysis based on the primary sources available, *Jenseits von Rom* is a remarkable synthesis which contributes to several historiographical trends because it picks up the concept of the 'long late antiquity' and extends it impressively to an Afro-Eurasian context, including findings from the natural sciences as well.[7] This broad scope almost necessarily entails complex problems, like the question of the extent to which we can really apply a period like the 'long late antiquity' to East and South-East Asia,[8] or whether imperial power was as crucial to the processes of entanglement as suggested.[9] In other responses to Preiser-Kapeller's conclusions, it has furthermore been argued that the post-Roman west might not have been as peripheral as the author suggests to his Afro-Eurasian system, which he studies from a rather eastern-oriented perspective.[10] Nevertheless, Preiser-Kapeller's study is worth reading, not only because of its impressive scope and approach, but also due to its style, through which the author makes his findings accessible to academics, students, and enthusiasts alike.

Another book not unlike Preiser-Kapeller's has recently been published by the American scholar Valerie Hansen. Originally a sinologist, Hansen has also worked on the history of the Silk Road and

[6] On the concept of the so-called 'Great Divergence', cf. e.g. Leonid Grinin and Andrey Korotayev, *Great Divergence and Great Convergence: A Global Perspective* (Cham, 2015).

[7] Cf. the reviews by Mischa Meier, *Historische Zeitschrift*, 309/2 (2019), 470–2; by Wolfram Drews, *Das Mittelalter*, 25/2 (2020), 450–2; and by Lutz Berger in the aforementioned Review Symposium on *H-Soz-Kult*, 3 Apr. 2019, at [http://www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/reb-27510], accessed 13 Nov. 2021.

[8] This question has already been addressed in the negative critique by Marcus Bingenheimer in the Review Symposium on *H-Soz-Kult*, 4 Apr. 2019, at [http://www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/reb-27512], accessed 13 Nov. 2021.

[9] This has been pointed out in the review by Philipp Winterhager, *English Historical Review*, 134 (2019), 943–5.

[10] Stefan Esders in the Review Symposium on *H-Soz-Kult*, 5 Apr. 2019, at [http://www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/reb-27511], accessed 13 Nov. 2021.

of globalization. Her study *The Year 1000: When Explorers Connected the World—and Globalization Began* (translated into German as *Das Jahr 1000: Als die Globalisierung begann*) has likewise received mixed reviews. She takes a different approach to Preiser-Kapeller, one that is narrower in time but wider in space. Her study aims to demonstrate that the year 1000 (or rather the centuries around it) marked the beginning of globalization, originating not in Europe, but in the Americas, Africa, and Asia, which in that period began to be connected by a global system of 'pathways'.

After a prologue containing several short anecdotes that illustrate the main concerns of the book, the reader is presented with eight chapters of more or less equal length. The first of these serves as a more comprehensive introduction, providing an overview of the world in (or rather, around) the year 1000 and touching on many of the topics addressed in more detail later on. After that, Hansen delves into specific themes. In chapter two, she traces the Viking expeditions into the North Atlantic as well as their settlements in Newfoundland and possibly New England, both of which are generally dated to the eleventh century. The third chapter follows up by discussing the possibility of further Viking voyages as far south as Chichén Itzá in modern-day Mexico, essentially relying on Mayan wall paintings depicting fair-haired captives and ships resembling Viking traditions.

In the fourth chapter, Hansen leaves the Americas for North-Eastern Europe, where the empire of the Kievan Rus reached its greatest extent in the mid eleventh century and served as an intermediary between Byzantium, Central Asia, and Northern Europe. Hansen focuses mainly on religion and the economy, citing the introduction of Orthodox Christianity and of silver coinage as her main examples. Chapter five takes the reader south to the Near East and North Africa. Here too, Hansen focuses mainly on economic aspects, highlighting the significance of these regions in supplying large parts of the 'Old World' with enslaved people and gold.

In the next section, Hansen gradually moves her perspective towards the east. Chapter six deals with North and Central Asia, which are treated from different angles. Besides the importance of trade networks and their dependence on political conditions, the author stresses the significance of the religious sphere, with Buddhism and Islam

eventually dividing Central Asia into two parts. Chapter seven takes a two-pronged approach by concentrating first on the human settlement of Oceania and then on South Asia, where the main developments are once again examined from economic, religious, and political perspectives. The last chapter takes Hansen to her main field of research: thanks to her expertise in Chinese history, she is able to present this 'most globalized place in the world' (p. 261) in much more detail, drawing on a wide range of sources and broadening the chronological and thematic scope considerably. In place of a summary, Hansen concludes her book with an epilogue consisting mainly of further loosely connected anecdotes, from which she draws rather vague generalizations on alleged parallels between the processes of globalization observed in her book and the challenges of the modern world.

All in all, Hansen's study may be criticized on similar grounds to Preiser-Kapeller's. Due to her immense geographical and thematic scope, it is almost inevitable that she treats most topics in only a cursory manner, even though the number of maps and the decent index are certainly helpful for the reader. Especially when delving into topics outside her main research areas, Hansen refrains from drawing on primary sources and instead chooses to rely almost entirely on secondary literature. While this is completely understandable, it cannot be denied that certain phenomena, especially in the eventful history of the Near East and South Asia, are simply too complex to be dealt with in a few pages and without reference to at least the main scholarly debates. In a number of cases, it is obvious that Hansen drew her information from a handful of studies or sometimes just one work, some of which have been superseded by more recent contributions. In addition, many earlier works on the global Middle Ages remain virtually unmentioned. Finally, the book lacks a comprehensive bibliography, and readers have to rely instead on the information provided in the (deliberately) sparse footnotes, along with a selection of titles for further reading.

Some reviewers have also rightly questioned whether the brief Viking expeditions to the Americas can be considered to have made as much of a contribution to medieval globalization as the highly complex and resilient political, religious, diplomatic, and economic networks of the Eurasian continent, which were by no means confined to the decades around the year 1000, but predated this artificial turning

point by several centuries. Taking this into account, it is questionable whether globalization really began with the second millennium CE.[11] However, apart from these concerns, which might be largely confined to academic circles, *The Year 1000 / Das Jahr 1000* must be praised for opening up an immense panorama of fascinating phenomena to interested readers, who will certainly profit from the author's clear and vivid style of writing.

Besides these and other monographs, collaborative projects have also studied the global Middle Ages. Building on the research network 'Defining the Global Middle Ages' (Universities of Oxford, Birmingham, and Newcastle, 2012–15), in 2018 British scholars Catherine Holmes and Naomi Standen published a supplement to the journal *Past & Present* entitled *The Global Middle Ages*, in which they gathered contributions by historians and archaeologists specializing in the history of Africa, the Americas, and Eurasia. In contrast to the monographs by Preiser-Kapeller and Hansen, this collection takes a sophisticated approach aimed at academic readers rather than the general public, as the editors' introduction makes clear. Likewise convinced that the origins of globalization preceded the age of European voyages of discovery, the volume's contributors focus on aspects of 'behaviour and interaction on a global scale in the millennium before 1500' (p. 1). However, they explicitly refrain from establishing artificial analogies and links between the medieval period and the globalization processes of other centuries. Instead, the global Middle Ages are presented as a 'a period of dynamic change and experiment when no single part of the world achieved hegemonic status' (p. 2), and its 'distinctive characteristics' (p. 3) are brought to the fore.

Focusing on a broad variety of examples from all over the world, the volume's ten articles address general phenomena which are more or less central to human interactions. The contribution by Mark Whittow presents possible explanations for the ratio of surviving written to non-written sources. Drawing on numerous examples from the Americas, Africa, and East Asia, he stresses that scholars must always bear in mind that their perception of the past is heavily influenced not only

[11] Similar criticism has been made in the reviews by Tilman Frasch, *International Quarterly for Asian Studies*, 51/3–4 (2020), 216–18; Jonathan Good, *Arthuriana*, 30/4 (2020), 70–2; and Thomas Ertl, *Historische Zeitschrift*, 313/2 (2021), 480–1.

by the quantity, but also by the types of available source material. Caroline Dodds Pennock and Amanda Power study cosmologies as manifestations of 'global' thinking, focusing mainly on Aztec culture, but taking comparable examples from other parts of the world into account as well. Cosmologies serve as a means for certain peoples or communities to make sense of their existence and its alleged purpose in time and space, and this is as true of the Middle Ages as it is of all periods of human history.

The third essay, by Jonathan Shepard, deals with networks as a basic category through which to perceive multilateral relations. Presenting silk roads overland and via sea as concrete examples of commercial networks, he concludes that these networks were not confined to certain groups, but in fact had an impact on large parts of the societies they connected. A crucial factor in analysing networks is the question of mobility, which is examined by Naomi Standen and Monica White. Focusing mostly on examples from West, Central, and East Asia, they present mobility as a structural phenomenon affecting not only merchants and pilgrims, but also the everyday life of major parts of society. The contribution by Ian Forrest and Anne Haour on the factor of trust addresses another important aspect of human relations, especially between people separated by long distances. By comparing examples from North and West Africa with ones drawn from the Near East and Europe, they present trust as a central aspect of both short- and long-distance relationships.

Simon Yarrow's article then opens up another thematic field by probing two prospects for the global Middle Ages: the loosening of the conceptual boundaries assigned to the Middle Ages by modern historiography, and the reframing of this period as a global phenomenon. In this context, Yarrow understands 'medieval globality' as 'the unfolding of collective imaginaries in tension with diffuse local and entangled modes of evaluative agency' (p. 214). The next contribution, by Conrad Leyser, Naomi Standen, and Stephanie Wynne-Jones, adopts a more practical approach by examining different settlement patterns and their contemporary perception in a comparative perspective spanning Africa, Europe, and East Asia. Next, Hilde De Weerdt, Catherine Holmes, and John Watts turn the volume's focus back to concrete human interactions. Focusing on three case studies from Song China, fifteenth-century

France, and Byzantium, they examine practices of political mediation and communication which 'connected the actions, interests and expectations of individuals and communities in the localities to the creation, maintenance and critique of high public power' (p. 288).

The last two contributions take up broader approaches again: Glen Dudbridge focuses on the contested paradigm of the world system, which scholars have perceived either as a single system, whether long gone or constantly evolving, or as several successive systems. Dudbridge applies this approach to the period from 600 to 900 CE, presenting the 'East Asian circuit' and the 'Islamic ecumene' as two examples whose comparison can yield new impulses. Instead of a formal conclusion, the final contribution by Alan Strathern provides a stimulating outlook on future research by linking the concept of the global Middle Ages with the adjacent and already well-established idea of a global early modernity. He emphasizes the main conceptual points of tension and the similarities between these paradigms, concluding that scholars of both periods have to be aware of each other's findings, not least because they are connected through the much older concept of 'pre-modernity' (p. 344).

The Global Middle Ages is a very important contribution to scholarly debate. The greatest advantage of the volume's methodological approach is that its contributors abstain from identifying a distinct world region or a specific period within the Middle Ages as a prime example of globalization. Rather, the phenomenological orientation of the individual chapters permits a technical but nevertheless broad and colourful view of an interconnected world in the medieval millennium and beyond. All of the contributions, many of them written jointly by various specialists, analyse their respective phenomena against an immense background of examples spanning different continents and periods, making them very valuable studies in their own right, and even more so in the context of the whole volume. Although a number of important regions like India, Japan, and the Pacific islands are rather under-represented, the extensive bibliography and detailed index bear witness to the volume's broad perspective.[12]

[12] Cf. also the reviews by Robert Ian Moore, *Journal of Medieval Worlds*, 2/1–2 (2020), 35–9; and by Ruth Mostern, *Studies in Late Antiquity*, 3/4 (2019), 640–3.

The last book to be reviewed is another edited volume, but one that takes a very different approach to *The Global Middle Ages.* In *Italien als Vorbild?*, which is based on an eponymous conference held in 2018, Jörg Oberste and Susanne Ehrich bring together ten contributions by international scholars, all focusing on economic and cultural interdependencies between European metropolises during the period between 1300 and 1600, which the editors consider to be 'the eve of the first globalization' (p. 10). The famous expeditions of Christopher Columbus, Vasco da Gama, and Ferdinand Magellan, labelled here the 'founding dates of a European-dominated global economy' (p. 10), had been based on the immense economic power, geographical knowledge, and nautical expertise of Italian cities and trading companies. Furthermore, Italy had been an influential 'cultural model' (p. 11) for medieval and early modern Europe. Providing a comparative context for this Italian role model, some of the volume's contributions focus on other political and economic capitals of Europe, which were connected to Italy through both competition and lively exchange on many levels.

After the editors' introduction, which underlines the key points of the volume's conceptual approach and highlights the main concerns of each chapter, the reader is presented with the first case study. Harriet Rudolph examines diplomatic practice in Venice in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Focusing not only on the relevant institutions, but also on knowledge management and 'guiding principles' (p. 25) as important factors in diplomatic relations, she concludes with a significant reassessment of the 'myth' of Venetian diplomacy (p. 21). Another view on La Serenissima is provided by Nicolai Kölmel, who deals with the perception of the city as a metropolis between around 1480 and 1560. Taking into account both written sources and paintings, he traces how this view changed over time. He also includes Amsterdam as a comparative example, for which Italian cities can be considered role models only to a certain extent. Rembert Eufe then offers a third perspective on Venetian history by examining the multilingual administration in Crete during the five centuries of Venetian rule. Having initially been imported from the Republic, administrative practices on the island always remained open to new impulses from the Italian mainland, but also adapted to specific local requirements.

Christoph Dartmann takes us to another important maritime republic. Taking Venice as a 'paradigmatic example' (p. 89), he focuses on late medieval Genoa as a 'Mediterranean port metropolis' (p. 91) as well as a 'northern Italian regional power' (p. 96). He concludes by addressing the main reasons for Genoa's decline in importance at the end of the Middle Ages. The following contribution by Albert Göschl takes a different approach by comparing literary works by the Florentines Filarete (*c.*1400–69) and Anton Francesco Doni (1513–74). These authors wrote about imagined 'ideal metropolises', to which they assigned both general and specific characteristics. Martin Raspe then presents a contribution that is only very loosely connected to the issue of globalization: he discusses the question of whether Farfa Abbey near Rome was the first medieval *Klosterhof* (a farm operated by a monastery) and thus a possible role model for later foundations.

In the next chapter, the reader's attention is once again turned towards Florence—or more specifically, the commune's merchant elite. Francesco Guidi-Bruscoli traces the diverse activities and social cohesion of this group in the great late medieval trade centres of Bruges, London, Seville, and Lisbon. Although the Florentines seem to have lacked a significant 'corporate spirit' (p. 142), their successful collaboration in financing large-scale projects can be demonstrated in various examples.

The following two essays provide the counter-examples to the Italian cities that I mentioned above. Ulf Christian Ewert focuses on the paradigm of path dependency, denoting the inability of economic systems to change their basic organizational or institutional elements. He studies this concept via the example of trading practices in the North and Baltic Sea area (the *Hanseraum*) and, in a second step, compares his findings with the quite different situation in the more dynamic Mediterranean region. The second comparative case study by Bart Lambert deals with Bruges, which was a thriving trade centre before losing its hegemony to Antwerp in the course of the sixteenth century. By tracing this development, Lambert discerns a process of 'gradual decline' in the West Flemish city rather than a 'steep fall' (p. 176).

Much like *The Global Middle Ages*, the editors of *Italien als Vorbild* refrain from closing their volume with a formal conclusion. Instead, the

last chapter by Dennis O. Flynn opens up a much wider geographical perspective. He traces the silver trade between Europe and China, which underwent radical changes in the fifteenth century due to the depletion of Chinese silver mines. European markets quickly adapted to the new situation, in part by tapping recently discovered resources in Central and South America, while Venice relied heavily on its trade relations with the Islamic world. Nevertheless, the author denies that the flow of goods along the 'Africa–Europe–Asia corridor' (p. 192) was the starting point for the globalization of economic systems. In his view, the beginning of such processes can only be discerned towards the end of the sixteenth century at the earliest, when the three main parts of the world (the Pacific, the Americas, and Eurasia and Africa) gradually became more and more connected (pp. 192–3).

After working through the contributions of *Italien als Vorbild?*, which are rounded off not by a bibliography, but at least by a decent index (pp. 198–204), the reader might be left in some perplexity. Although each article is valuable on its own, it is difficult to see how they are connected to each other, or to the paradigm of 'globalization'. While the case studies on Venice, Genoa, and Florence give many insights into the far-flung and innovative Italian trade networks across the Mediterranean, the selection of comparative examples outside Italy seems more arbitrary than representative. Case studies from the Iberian Peninsula, North Africa, or Eurasia would have contributed substantially to a broader picture. Similarly, some contributions, such as those on Farfa Abbey and the 'ideal metropolises' (which are nevertheless excellent studies in their own right), seem only loosely connected to the volume's central approach. Although many articles touch upon developments beyond the Mediterranean at least in passing, the final chapter by Denis O. Flynn is the only contribution with a truly 'globalized' scope, as promised by the volume's title. Nevertheless, the contributors have succeeded in presenting the Italian metropolises as thriving and innovative powers within the complex trade networks connecting Europe and the Mediterranean at the transition between the medieval and early modern periods.

Comparing all four publications examined in this article is not an easy task. First and foremost, they are all worth reading, not least because each of them opens up a broad panorama featuring a plethora

of developments and processes connecting large parts of the world. Whether these phenomena are studied via relevant secondary literature or, even more laudably, via primary sources, gathering them into a single publication can be considered a remarkable achievement. This holds especially true for the monographs by Johannes Preiser-Kapeller and Valerie Hansen, who processed their immense corpora of material on their own, while the volumes edited by Catherine Holmes and Naomi Standen and by Jörg Oberste and Susanne Ehrich bring together the collaborative efforts of experts specializing in different disciplines. What is more, the studies differ in respect to their target audiences. While the two monographs seem to be aimed at a broad audience of scholars and interested lay readers alike, and thus adopt a somewhat less complicated approach in terms of both writing style and the discussion of scholarly debates (see for example Hansen, p. 9), the two edited volumes gather contributions on specialist issues and confine themselves to academic discourse in their respective fields. These structural differences are also reflected in the media response to each publication.

Perhaps the biggest contrasts can be discerned in the approaches and perspectives brought to bear on the global Middle Ages. Preiser-Kapeller locates important impulses for globalization processes within the 'long late antiquity', focusing mainly on Africa and Eurasia and placing European actors merely at the periphery of events. In contrast, Hansen takes a geographically much wider but chronologically narrower point of view by concentrating more or less on the turn of the first millennium. Perhaps the broadest perspective, both geographically and chronologically, is adopted by the different articles in *The Global Middle Ages* edited by Holmes and Standen, whose theoretically grounded approaches make significant contributions to scholarly debate without labelling particular periods or world regions as especially important. In comparison to these three volumes, the conference proceedings published by Oberste and Ehrich lag behind to some extent. In a rather Eurocentric perspective, the contributions gathered in *Italien als Vorbild?* focus on late medieval Italy. Although at least some of the essays endeavour to broaden the geographical scope, one cannot escape the impression that 'globalization' is not the editors' main concern, but that they use it as a buzzword and consider

it to be a phenomenon more or less exclusively associated with the early modern age and later periods.

Nevertheless, it would be short-sighted to favour any one publication over the others. Each of the approaches taken in these books has its strengths and weaknesses, as well as a certain degree of justification without any claim to universal validity. However, approaches focusing more or less on a single world region (Oberste and Ehrich) or on artificial turning points (Hansen) have the potential to overestimate or marginalize certain developments and influential factors and thus distort the perspective. In contrast, theory-based approaches that are broad in geographical and chronological scope, such as those applied by Holmes and Standen in *The Global Middle Ages*, may prove more stimulating to scholarly debate and establish connections with different academic disciplines. Still, this debate should not remain confined exclusively to academic circles, but should be open to the general public as well. To this end, more accessible yet sophisticated publications like those by Preiser-Kapeller and Hansen play an important role too. In that sense, all of the publications reviewed here are valuable contributions to the ongoing debate on 'globalization' in the Middle Ages and beyond.

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TRACING THE HISTORY OF FEMINISMS: METHODS, MEANINGS, AND QUESTIONS

JANE FREELAND

SARAH COLVIN and KATHARINA KARCHER (eds.), *Women, Global Protest Movements, and Political Agency: Rethinking the Legacy of 1968*, Routledge Studies in Gender and Global Politics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), 206 pp. ISBN 978 0 815 38472 4 (hardback), £96.00; ISBN 978 0 367 47182 8 (paperback), £29.59

ZSÓFIA LÓRÁND, *The Feminist Challenge to the Socialist State in Yugoslavia*, Genders and Sexualities in History (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) xxii + 270 pp. ISBN 978 3 319 78222 5. £79.99 (hardback); ISBN 978 3 030 08647 3 (paperback), £54.99

TIFFANY N. FLORVIL, *Mobilizing Black Germany: Afro-German Women and the Making of a Transnational Movement*, Black Internationalism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2020), 308 pp. ISBN 978 0 252 04351 2 (hardback), $US 110.00; ISBN 978 0 252 08541 3 (paperback), $26.95

LUCY DELAP, *Feminisms: A Global History* (London: Pelican Books, 2020), 416 pp. ISBN 978 0 241 39814 2 (hardback), £20.00; ISBN 978 0 141 98598 5 (paperback), £10.99

The past twenty years have seen the growth of self-described 'histories of feminism'. An offshoot of women's and gender history, the history of feminism explores the diverse meanings and practices of activism against gender injustice. It looks at how women—and sometimes men—have advocated for equal rights, and how issues of equality have been understood and addressed over time. It examines the relationships between activists, the state, and society, and has revealed the ways in which feminism, and the women's movement more generally, has acted as a source of hope for change as well as division and alienation. In doing so, the history of feminism has drawn attention to the intersections of marginalization, the interconnectedness of social movements, and the ways in which theory has been put into practice.

The history of feminism has proven to be an incredibly dynamic field of study. It is strongly interdisciplinary and theoretically

engaged, and although often informed by methodologies drawn from social and cultural history, it is intensely political. Indeed, by examining feminism and feminist claims, historians are necessarily challenging what is considered 'political' and what political history is. Karen Offen has succinctly captured this:

> the history of feminism is a gendered narrative of political history that goes well beyond the adding and stirring in of an occasional queen, a comment on 'new woman' fashion, or a photograph of a demonstration for the right to vote. It necessarily expands the very meaning of 'political' and of what constitutes 'politics'.[1]

Taking feminism and gender inequality seriously, then, requires scholars to rethink the historical discipline. Whether it is by questioning historical periodizations, the significance of national boundaries, or even the meaning of 'political', the history of feminism necessarily expands and challenges historical categories.

But there are some fundamental issues facing historians of feminism. Most basically, what is feminism? At first glance, this may seem self-evident, but it soon proves illusory. The meaning of feminism has evolved over time; what was feminist in the eighteenth century may not register as such today, and vice versa. Moreover, what is 'feminist' in one geographical context may not be considered as such in a different country, region, or even locality. It is more accurate to speak of the history of feminisms, rather than to maintain the appearance of a unitary feminist practice over time and space.

We might also ask what makes someone a feminist. Is it enough to campaign for women's rights, or does there have to be a positive identification with the label? Much like the definition of feminism, the label 'feminist' assumes an imagined unity or sisterhood between women. Yet women's inequality is entangled with other forms of oppression and structures of power, including colonialism, capitalism,

[1] Karen Offen, 'The History of Feminism is Political History', *Perspectives on History*, 1 May 2011, at [https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/may-2011/the-history-of-feminism-is-political-history], accessed 11 Dec. 2021.

racism, homophobia, and ableism.[2] As postcolonial and Black feminist scholars have shown, much of feminist thought and practice has been built on supposedly universal emancipatory politics and the experiences of White, middle-class, Western women, and pressed into the service of colonial and racialized 'civilizing' missions. Indeed, feminism has long been deeply implicated in maintaining hegemonic power structures that have marginalized, divided, violated, and even killed. This has not only limited the power of global sisterhood but, as Lucy Delap has argued in *Feminisims*, has meant that while for some 'feminism has proved a transformative, explosive, life changing way of seeing the world. For others, it has elicited responses of visceral repudiation, laughter, ambivalence and irony' (pp. 8–9).

Part of the historian's task, then, is to unpack the manifold meanings of feminisms and women's emancipation across time and space, while also attending to the privileges, divisions, and marginalization on which feminism has been built and perpetuated. But precisely how to do this is a key challenge for the historian of feminism. Although feminisms emerged out of and in response to local and national contexts, thanks to the growth of communications technologies across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, even these local movements spoke to global and transnational developments. This task is all the more important given the ways in which older histories of feminism have centred European and North American developments at the expense of histories of feminisms from the Global South and from the geographical and social margins of European and North American society. Situating national and local histories within a global and transnational setting goes some way towards addressing these imbalances. But how exactly do we knit together local specificities in a global context, especially when the histories of women—in particular Women of Colour, working-class women, women with disabilities, lesbians, and women from colonized countries—are often not found within state or even activist archives?

This article reviews four recent contributions to the history of feminisms. The books featured examine the history of feminism from

[2] Kimberle Crenshaw, 'Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color', *Stanford Law Review*, 43/6 (1991), 1241–99.

the eighteenth century to the present, although there is a considerable emphasis on women's activism in the period from the late 1960s to the 1990s (often referred to as the 'second wave'). Each book in its own way responds to the conceptual and methodological questions at the heart of the history of feminism, and offers readers new approaches and questions in order to overcome these issues.

The volume *Women, Global Protest Movements, and Political Agency*, edited by Sarah Colvin and Katharina Karcher, centres on the watershed year of 1968. Published for the fiftieth anniversary of that revolutionary year, the book is one of a pair of volumes which re-examine the legacies and histories of 1968 through the lens of gender. The first volume—reviewed here—centres on the themes of gender and cultural memory, and the intersection of gender and violence. The second volume focuses exclusively on violence, in particular the relationship between violence and ideas of liberation and emancipation that proliferated among leftist and revolutionary protest movements in the late 1960s and 1970s. With diverse interdisciplinary approaches and a wide selection of case studies, the two volumes make a significant historical and historiographical intervention into the history of 1968.

While not centrally focused on feminism, the first volume's ten chapters broadly explore the relationships between 1968, women's activism, and the contestation of gender roles in different geographical and historical contexts. In doing so, they query the significance of the global protest movements that emerged in the late 1960s for women's rights discourses and practices. Although often described as a 'failure', 1968 has been interpreted by historians as a key turning point for liberal social and cultural change. In particular, the emergence of social movements—for example, feminism, environmentalism, gay rights—have all been linked to the transformations brought about by 1968 and are frequently presented as the productive legacy of an otherwise failed revolution.

But as this volume reveals, this is a narrative in need of revision. Across the book's various contributions, the male-dominated history of 1968 is thoroughly challenged, with several chapters highlighting the active roles women played throughout 1968 as they took part in even the most militant and violent of actions. It further questions the

very meaning of 1968 for women: not only were the transformations of gender roles often uneven or short-lived, but the volume also asks how important 1968 was for the 'emergence' of the global women's movements in the 1970s. In this way, by analysing the intersection of gender and late 1960s protest movements, the book decentres 1968 as a marker of (Western) liberal transformation, and instead explores the limits and meanings of the change it produced. As Colvin and Karcher state, 'rather than portraying the decades since 1968 as a global history of progress towards gender equality, the essays collected here consciously draw a complex, dynamic, and, at least in part, contradictory picture of women's involvement in transnational protest movements' (p. 11).

Feminism and women's movements are naturally key parts of this history of gender equality and social protest. Alongside the book's findings on gender and 1968, it also reveals several core issues facing historians of feminism. The chapters by Kristina Schulz, Andrea Hajek, Chris Reynolds, Christina Gerhardt, Zsófia Lóránd, and Clare Bielby address the history of feminism and women's activism most directly. The contributions by Schulz, Hajek, and Reynolds in particular raise important questions about the meaning of 1968 for the history (and historiography) of feminisms. This is especially clear in the chapter by Schulz, who examines the 'symbolic significance of "1968"' to the histories of women's movements in West Germany and France (p. 19). In West Germany, for example, Schulz juxtaposes two narratives: one that places the emergence of the new women's movement in 1971 as a result of the campaign to decriminalize abortion, and another that places the birth of the movement in 1968. A similar division is also to be found in the French case, where one narrative emphasizes the significance of 1968 and the other downplays its importance. In both the French and West German cases, Schulz connects these competing trajectories to key figures within feminism, namely Antoinette Fouque and Christine Delphy in France, and Alice Schwarzer and Helke Sander in West Germany.

As Schulz shows, these different histories are not mere curiosities. Instead, she argues that the debate over 1968 forms 'part of a symbolic struggle around the legitimation, aims, and means of a social movement, and thus about feminism itself' (p. 29). In other words, how

an actor views 1968 and its relationship to the women's movement shapes how they understand the very purpose and task of feminism. A similar argument is made by both Reynolds and Hajek, who ask whether 1968 was really so important after all. While Reynolds argues that 1968 provided a 'negative catalyst' for feminism in Northern Ireland, as women coalesced against the gendered hierarchies of the 1968 movement, Hajek poses a much more fundamental question about tracing the history of feminism. Indeed, for Hajek, centring 1968 as a key moment in the development of feminism means that women's activism is seen only as 'something that flowed out of the 1968 movement, rather than as a phenomenon in and of itself' (p. 33). Adopting this approach, Hajek examines the history of Italian feminism, and argues that the emergence of the women's movement in the late 1960s was largely the result of responses to earlier forms of organizing and the reluctance of these pre-existing women's associations to take issues of reproduction, sexuality, and gender oppression seriously.

Together, these chapters reveal how the history of feminism has been shaped by historicization efforts. Whether we understand 1968 as a key moment for women's rights or not, mapping a trajectory and a history for feminism is also an act of agenda-setting that frames understandings of what feminism is and how it should be practised. As Schulz's chapter suggests, this is something feminists have invested in to cement their vision of the struggle for women's rights.[3] Exploring these historicization processes, then, is not only integral to understanding the different meanings and practices of feminism but, as Hajek shows, is also a part of questioning the centres and peripheries of the histories we tell.

The issue of centre and periphery—in the geographical sense—is a core theme throughout *Women, Global Protest Movements, and Political Agency*, with several chapters arguing for a global approach to 1968 that shifts attention away from (Western) European and North American experiences. While Reynolds argues for the inclusion of Northern Ireland in the history of 1968 (a country whose involvement is often overshadowed by the 'Troubles' of the 1970s), Jennifer Philippa

[3] See also Lisa Tetrault, *The Myth of Seneca Falls: Memory and the Women's Suffrage Movement, 1848–1898* (Chapel Hill, 2014).

Eggert examines the situation in Lebanon, and Claudia Derichs explores Japan and South-East Asia. These chapters reveal a complex picture of feminism and women's activism across borders, one that speaks both to national contexts and global discussions of feminism and women's rights.

Zsófia Lóránd's chapter, and her monograph *The Feminist Challenge to the Socialist State in Yugoslavia*, pick up this issue as she traces the development of 'new Yugoslav feminism' from the late 1960s to 1990. Drawing on methods from intellectual history, alongside twenty oral history interviews together with archival and media sources, Lóránd presents a detailed history of the emergence and growth of feminism in Yugoslavia. In a field that is often overshadowed by the legacies and work of 'Western' feminism and Cold War binaries, Lóránd's study provides an important and welcome intervention. Her book reveals the unique expression of feminism in Yugoslavia, and in doing so helps to nuance the history of both life under state socialism and feminism itself.

In many ways, the story of new Yugoslav feminism will be familiar to readers. Disappointed at the failure of late 1960s activism to take women's voices seriously and frustrated at the inequalities they faced in daily life, women in Yugoslavia began talking. In cafés, pubs, and around kitchen tables, women in Belgrade, Ljubljana, and Zagreb read and discussed feminist texts. With time they formed groups at universities, invited speakers, developed publications, and organized major events. As Lóránd puts it, their work transitioned from grassroots 'academic work, the arts and literature' to activism with a mass audience (p. 2). What makes this story unique, however, is the socialist context, and the way it shaped the practice and politics of feminism in Yugoslavia, and the relationship between feminists, the state, and the broader dissident movement.

In Yugoslavia, as in many socialist states, men and women were officially equal. The socialist regime encouraged women to obtain an education and pursue a career alongside motherhood. In return, women were provided with services that enabled them to combine motherhood with paid employment, and had access to abortion. The centrality of equality to socialist state-making meant that feminism was not only deemed unnecessary, as men and women were already

equal, but was considered a Western, bourgeois ideology. Ironically, it was these overstated claims of equality that led women in Yugoslavia to feminism. As Lóránd writes, 'women were puzzled by the contradiction between the promise of the regime and their own experience of their "emancipation"' (p. 3).

It was this realization that drove a small number of 'intellectual women' in the late 1960s and early 1970s to turn to feminism. Based primarily in Zagreb and Belgrade (and later Ljubljana), it was at the universities that feminism first emerged within the student population. Universities, student centres, and student associations proved to be key sites for the early formation of feminism in Yugoslavia. They provided not only for the practical needs of the growing movement—physical spaces for students and professors to meet, and access to resources—but also the intellectual space for the development of a uniquely Yugoslav feminism. From within the university young feminists had access to foreign literature and publishing channels, and they could hold guest lectures and conferences, all of which enabled them to develop their own politics.

This is one of the most important interventions made in the book: Lóránd shows how the new Yugoslav feminists developed their own feminism. This was no simple transposition of a 'Western' feminist movement. Although many of the feminists she studies had connections with Western Europe and read key feminist texts by the likes of Betty Friedan and Germaine Greer, they combined this with Marxist thought, attention to the lives and activism of women in Latin America and Asia, and even with Indian philosophy. This intellectual engagement was then used by the women to query their own lives under socialism, even leading them to reconceptualize central feminist (and socialist) terms, such as 'consciousness, women's universal experience, patriarchy, family, work' (pp. 30–1).

What also made new Yugoslav feminism unique was its relationship to dissidence and the Yugoslav state. In this, Lóránd moves the scholarship on the Communist bloc away from a binary of the state against the people. New Yugoslav feminists both criticized the state's exaggerated claims of women's equality and attempted to speak to the regime and engage it in their critique. In making this argument, Lóránd shows that dissidence in Yugoslavia—especially when it came to

feminism—had multiple meanings and expressions. She also suggests that the closeness of feminists to the regime, alongside the centrality of women's equality to state socialism, is one of the reasons why liberal and national dissident groups marginalized feminists during the transition from socialism. Although the book ends in 1990, this points to the importance of feminist legacies to the post-socialist transition in Yugoslavia and the former Communist bloc more broadly.

The Feminist Challenge to the Socialist State in Yugoslavia most fundamentally reveals how the history of feminisms requires a 'reconsideration of our categories of post-WWII history' (p. 228). Dissidence, 'Western', 'Eastern', and even feminist are all complicated by paying attention to the trajectory of Yugoslav feminism. Despite studying a very different social and historical context, Tiffany N. Florvil's *Mobilizing Black Germany* similarly shows how centring Black women's activism challenges notions of race, the nation, and belonging in late twentieth-century Germany. Indeed, the two books show remarkable similarities: both highlight the importance of knowledge transfer, mobility, and higher education to the evolution of social movements, and both reveal the importance of language production, naming, and agency to understanding women's activism.

But whereas Lóránd focuses on feminism and the Yugoslav women's movement, Florvil examines Black German women's involvement in the formation and development of the modern Black German movement. As Florvil shows, women like May Ayim and Katharina Oguntoye were pivotal in shaping the contours of the movement. Working with other Black German women and men, and often in collaboration with People of Colour and other Black communities in Germany and Europe, they participated in a transnational feminist diasporic movement. In the process of tracing this movement, Florvil's book—perhaps more than any of the others reviewed here—shows the expansiveness of feminism. She moves the study beyond issues typically associated with women's rights, such as violence, abortion, and sexuality, and instead reveals how straight and lesbian Black German women worked together to forge a movement that spanned Germany, Europe, and the Atlantic. They worked with other racialized communities, multicultural feminist groups, and human rights organizations. And most importantly, they challenged both racial and

gender inequalities and contested their erasure from the nation, and in doing so, broadened notions of belonging and Germanness.

In making this argument, Florvil makes two key interventions. First, she shows the importance of race and Women of Colour for the post-war development of Germany. Although race has featured as a central element in the history of Germany before 1945, in the study of the post-war era it has remained on the periphery of the scholarship.[4] This is similarly the case in the study of feminism in German history, which has centred on the activism of the predominantly White 'new women's movement' of the early 1970s. Indeed, some of the activists Florvil studies were already active in the new women's movement, but found themselves alienated and their attempts to discuss race ignored by their White 'sisters'. Experiences like these, alongside everyday racism and sexism, prompted Black German women to approach racial and gender inequalities as inextricably related in their work in the Black German movement of the 1980s. By highlighting this introduction of Black feminism and intersectional feminist theory into Germany, Florvil reveals the importance of the 1980s as a pivotal moment for the rethinking of both race and feminism in Germany.

Second, Florvil intervenes in the work on Black internationalism and the Black diasporic movement. This scholarship has predominantly focused on the work of men, and has failed to consider Germany as a centre for Black internationalist thought and diasporic activism due to its short-lived colonial empire. In contrast, Florvil shows the pivotal role women played in the intellectual development of the Black German movement and the way in which their intellectual, creative, and activist work has contributed to the Black diasporic movement in Europe and globally by broadening discussions and notions of race, gender, citizenship, and belonging.

[4] Exceptions include: Lauren Stokes, '"An Invasion of Guest Worker Children": Welfare Reform and the Stigmatisation of Family Migration in West Germany', *Contemporary European History,* 28/3 (2019), 372–89; Jennifer A. Miller, *Turkish Guest Workers in Germany: Hidden Lives and Contested Borders, 1960s to 1980s* (Toronto, 2018); Rita Chin, Heide Fehrenbach, Geoff Eley, and Atina Grossmann, *After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe* (Ann Arbor, 2009); Maria Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins: The German–American Encounter in 1950s West Germany* (Chapel Hill, 2002).

With these contributions, Florvil's book is a model for an expansive history of feminism. Feminism was but one part of the political and intellectual work of the women Florvil studies. Their activism cut across and sought to address overlapping forms of marginalization, which Florvil expertly details. *Mobilizing Black Germany* shows that the work of Black German women cannot be ignored if historians want to trace changing understandings of gender and racial inequality in Germany and Europe.

A similarly expansive view of feminism is presented in Lucy Delap's *Feminisms: A Global History*. The most programmatic book of this selection, Delap lays out the conceptual, methodological, and political complexities of writing a global history of feminism from the eighteenth century to the present. Indeed, the book serves as a road map for navigating the many challenges in writing such a broad history.

One issue Delap identifies is the fluid and contested meaning of feminism across time and space. Feminism has had many meanings over time, and has been a source of debate and contestation. Although women and men have worked to address gender injustice (a term Delap explicitly uses to shift discussion away from rights and equality), many have refused the label 'feminist'. Much like Lóránd, Delap underscores the importance of respecting the agency of historical actors to identify (or not) as feminists. The act of naming and identifying is a political one, and the decision to work as a feminist says much about activist self-understandings, and about how feminism was perceived and practised historically. This attentiveness, however, creates difficulty for the historian wanting to bring together a diverse range of histories and activisms; as Delap argues, 'it would be a mistake to simply look at all these debates and movements in isolation; they often shared key ideas or drew inspiration from each other's struggles' (p. 10). Instead, then, Delap uses feminism as an 'entry point to understand better how campaigns over "women's rights", "new womanhood", "the awakening of women" or "women's liberation" might have shared concerns and tactics' (pp. 2–3). As Delap shows, adopting this approach to the history of feminism enables the historian to bring together a broad historical and geographical range of actors, texts, movements, objects, ideas,

and even dreams, while also acknowledging the specific contexts of different feminisms.

Periodization and the imposition of a Western 'hegemonic feminism' (to borrow from Chela Sandoval) is another challenge highlighted by Delap.[5] The history of feminism has typically been divided into a series of 'waves', most notably the 'first wave' of the late nineteenth century, when women fought for suffrage, and the 'second wave' of the late 1960s and 1970s, when feminism turned increasingly to issues of self-determination, violence against women, and reproductive rights. However, echoing Florvil, as many postcolonial feminists and Women of Colour have remarked, such a periodization obscures the activism and intellectual work of Women of Colour. It also presupposes a universal chronology of feminism based on White European and North American experiences, and in doing so ignores the existence and emergence of feminist movements outside this 'Western' timeline.

Delap side-steps this by approaching the history of feminism thematically. Across eight chapters devoted to dreams, ideas, spaces, objects, looks, feelings, actions, and songs, she explores how people have envisioned, made, felt, and practised feminism. Her writing artfully moves from different countries, individuals, and periods to paint a picture of the plurality of feminisms. She describes this approach as 'mosaic feminism' (p. 20). In one of the most important contributions made by the book, Delap calls for historians to see feminism as 'built up from inherited fragments but offering distinctive patterns and pictures. Like mosaics, the view from afar and the close reading of feminisms may give a very different picture' (p. 20). As the book shows, such an approach not only expands the history of feminism, but also reveals the cracks, divisions, and transformations of feminism over time.

As almost all the books reviewed here argue, feminism is not finished. Despite the fears of some scholars that we have moved into a 'post-feminist' world, there is still important work to be done. Whether #MeToo, #NiUnaMenos, global women's marches, Black Lives Matter, or the rise of right-wing populist parties and anti-gender movements, it is clear that the work of challenging gender injustice

[5] Chela Sandoval, *Methodology of the Oppressed* (Minneapolis, 2000).

must continue. But as these books all show, this is also work that must take place within our scholarship. The reliance on universalist narratives based on the experiences of a privileged few are simply not enough—neither in terms of detailing the complexity of the past, nor to address the challenges of today.

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BOOK REVIEWS

GRISCHA VERCAMER, *Hochmittelalterliche Herrschaftspraxis im Spiegel der Geschichtsschreibung: Vorstellungen von 'guter' und 'schlechter' Herrschaft in England, Polen und dem Reich im 12./13. Jahrhundert*, Deutsches Historisches Institut Warschau, 37 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2020), xii + 792 pp. ISBN 978 3 447 11354 0. €98.00

Grischa Vercamer's revised habilitation thesis offers a meticulously detailed and intellectually ambitious attempt at comparative history, exploring the representation of rulership by chroniclers in twelfth-century England, Poland, and the Holy Roman Empire. The choice of polities reflects Vercamer's own career: a German, working in Poland, who studied in Edinburgh (though Scotland's chronicles, as so often, lose out to the richer materials available further south). Poland's inclusion also reflects Vercamer's observation that too often an Iron Curtain persists in the minds of medievalists between Central and Eastern Europe. Vercamer has clearly profited from his immersion in multiple national scholarly traditions and the synthesis he offers, alongside the intriguing points of comparison, will certainly contribute to the kind of international scholarly exchange of which he is both advocate and beneficiary.

The introductory chapters take up a third of the text (excluding the appendix). The introduction sets out the topic and runs through theories of *Herrschaft* (rule), ritual, *Vorstellungsgeschichte* (history of ideals and concepts), narratology, topoi, and virtues. The second chapter lists the criteria by which Vercamer narrowed down his selection of sources, provides a useful introduction to each of the six chronicles ultimately chosen, and explains why many other (at times, seemingly more appropriate) works did not make the cut. For England, Vercamer selected William of Malmesbury's *Historia Novella* (*c.*1140) and Roger of Howden's *Chronica* (1191–1202); for the Empire, Otto of Freising and Rahewin's *Gesta Frederici* (1157–60) and

the *Historia Welforum* (*c*.1170); and for Poland, Gallus Anonymous and Wincenty Kadłubek.

The third chapter sets out the general ruling structures which prevailed in each polity. Here, Vercamer is juxtaposing three realms that have rarely been compared in any depth. In his words, he wished to compare polities with as many different 'settings' as possible (p. 10, author's original term). The discussion provided here of each realm's peculiar structural characteristics acts as an important foundation for his later analysis and is particularly helpful given that readers are unlikely to be equally versed in the history of each case study. Though allocated to the introductory section, this synthesis of English, German, and Polish scholarship is one of Vercamer's most valuable contributions and will provide food for thought for any historian interested in a comparative approach. For England, Vercamer could have glanced at the similar list of features compiled in John Maddicott's own impressive discussion of England and France.[1]

With chapter four we reach the weighty core of Vercamer's analysis. Representations of rulership in the chronicles are categorized according to nine fields of activity: prince as judge; as administrator; as politician or diplomat in advisory situations; as legislator; as representative of rule or staging of power; as fighter or army commander; as a pious ruler (notably the shortest section); and the *habitus* (habits and character) of the ruler. Vercamer briefly introduces the secondary literature on each area of rulership and then proceeds through each activity, chronicle by chronicle. We thus receive, for example, a discussion of the prince as legislator in William of Malmesbury's *Historia Novella*, and then an overall conclusion comparing the prince as legislator in all six chronicles.

The fifth chapter explores the narrative strategies pursued by each chronicler, before examining the overall portrayal of rulership found in each individual chronicle and its correspondence to the deeper political structures and characteristics of each realm. This time, we proceed author by author and a list of narrative devices is identified for each: William of Malmesbury, for example, deploys verbatim

[1] John R. Maddicott, *The Origins of the English Parliament 924–1327* (Oxford, 2010), esp. 376–452.

speech, comparison, enactment, sober description, and retrospection; Roger of Howden, concise description, insertion of documents, short interjections, visions, and explicit interventions; Gallus Anonymous, staging, metaphor, exaggeration, and literal speech; and so on. In three of the most important subsections of the entire monograph (5.2.3; 5.3.3; 5.4.3), the two chronicles chosen to represent each realm are compared to identify any 'national' peculiarities. A very concise chapter six discusses the results and the advantages of the approach deployed. The conclusion is not comprehensive, however, and readers should make use of the summaries provided throughout the analytical chapters.

Vercamer's conclusions flow from a comprehensive database, compiled for the project, through which the contents of each chronicle were analysed, subdivided, and categorized. The systematic approach, combining qualitative and quantitative analysis, is novel, particularly in the context of traditional scholarship on the topic, which has tended to focus on a single chronicler, ruler, or kingdom. The appendix (which takes up 349 of the book's 792 pages) is the fruit of Vercamer's laborious efforts, an impressive compendium of 672 chronicle extracts and a valuable resource in its own right. Each passage is accompanied by a helpful summary and discussion which takes into account a considerable volume of secondary literature. Through abbreviations, Vercamer also further catalogues the passages according to whether the chroniclers made an explicit or implicit intervention; whether they did so from a first-person or neutral perspective; and whether the rulers (or their actions) are described with praise, condemnation, or indifference. Qualitative and quantitative analysis are combined here (as throughout the main text), with percentages given to show the attention paid by the chronicler to each field of activity. The resulting pie charts give a first, though perhaps fleeting, impression of each chronicler's priorities.

Vercamer ultimately found notable similarities between the 'bird's eye view' of the structural features recognized by modern historians and the 'frog's eye view' provided by the chroniclers. The English authors (Roger of Howden especially) preferred to portray the king as administrator. The overseas possessions of English kings always created the potential for conflict, and the expansion of the administrative centre (London and Westminster) is detectable in the course of the war between Stephen and Matilda. That English kings could

ruin rebellious subjects by financial and legal means is mirrored in the lack of attention paid to the prince as warrior (only 11 per cent, in Vercamer's reckoning, of either William's or Roger's passages on rulership). The spread of writing in England, and competition between chroniclers, results in a 'matter-of-fact, sober narrative style', one of Vercamer's key categorizing terms. Compared to the Empire, the nobility receives little attention.[2] Not all readers will find these parallels between structural features and contemporary views to be as 'truly remarkable' (p. 297) as Vercamer. As he suggests, the importance of administrative rulership and of the 'sober' descriptive style will need to be verified by comparison with other authors.

For Poland, Vercamer finds a contrast between Gallus Anonymous and Wincenty Kadłubek in the importance attached to the prince as fighter (31 versus 13 per cent) and the ruler's *habitus* (21 versus 13 per cent). The difference, he argues, is rooted in each author's respective historical context. Bolesław III was subjugating Pomerania while Gallus was writing, and the disputes over succession chronicled by Kadłubek entailed much discussion of each contender's virtues and suitability. In terms of the typically Polish elements, Kadłubek presents Casimir II as an unfinished prince with a weakness for dice and feasts. Such vices had their upsides (affability; proximity to one's subjects), but Polish princes were portrayed as undergoing a process of correction. Gruesome massacres (Bolesław I's attack on Kiev; Bolesław II's indiscriminate slaughter of pregnant women and the elderly) are not condemned, but justified by both authors. The two chroniclers also wrote in a more elaborate, metaphorical, and theatrical style than their English or German contemporaries. There are once again strong parallels with the previously identified structural features, although urban, economic, and cultural change received less attention.

[2] For this point and other contrasts, see Nicholas Vincent, 'Sources and Methods: Some Anglo-German Comparisons', in Thorsten Huthwelker, Jörg Peltzer, and Maximilian Wemhöner (eds.), *Princely Rank in Late Medieval Europe: Trodden Paths and Promising Avenues* (Ostfildern, 2011), 119–38; Timothy Reuter, 'The Making of England and Germany, 850–1050: Points of Comparison and Difference', in id., *Medieval Polities and Modern Mentalities*, ed. Janet Nelson (Cambridge, 2006), 284–99; and Björn Weiler, *Kingship, Rebellion and Political Culture: England and Germany,* c.*1215*–c.*1250* (Basingstoke, 2007).

For the Empire, with the *Gesta Frederici* and the *Historia Welforum*, Vercamer finds insufficient similarities in his quantitative analysis to identify a peculiarly German construct of rulership. As he recognizes, the two sources are so different that one would not expect an overlap (raising the question as to whether the *Historia* was really the best choice). That both authors criticized their respective princes less than authors in England is striking. The imperial authors' recognition of the Empire's structural features varied. The special position of the emperor, his competition with the papacy, and elective kingship all feature, though here one is surprised to read that the 'strong position of the princes is naturally downplayed by the *Gesta Frederici*' (p. 339). The sheer size of the Empire; the strong position of noble dynasties, such as the Welfs; the problem of Italy; and the place of the *ministeriales* as a counterweight to the nobility can also be detected. The Empire's backwardness, compared to England and France, and the conservative tradition of the monastic schools, do not feature.

More nuanced parallels and distinctions also emerge. Rulers were often contrasted to highlight poor governance (Stephen and Robert of Gloucester by William of Malmesbury; Mieszko II and Casimir II as well as Bolesław II and Bolesław I by Gallus). Princes appeared as warriors in Poland, but more often as strategists and commanders in England and Germany. Political pragmatism was recorded as the motive behind nearly all apparently pious deeds. Other characteristics (was it typical in England for favourably regarded rulers only to be criticized upon their death?) require further comparison. In a 'conjured [*gezaubert*]' (p. 352) aside, Vercamer suggests that some of the expectations hinted at by his analysis may have survived to our own day. Vercamer connects the trenchant criticism of English chroniclers in the twelfth century with the famous English habit of not taking oneself too seriously. With the portrayal of a restrained and rational Barbarossa acting through clear structures of authority, Vercamer perceives an incipient German trust in authority. He also ties the fact that Polish dukes were permitted to err, provided they made amends, to a greater and more flexible leniency in modern Poland towards political transgressions. Given the methodological rigour maintained by the author up to this point, readers are likely to forgive such whimsical reflections, even if they do sound a discordant note.

As is typical of a habilitation thesis, the author's methodology is justified in detail. Sociological, literary, and cultural theories are discussed in depth (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Max Weber, Karl Marx, Michael Mann, Michel Foucault, and Hayden White all feature). The conclusions are unlikely to surprise: that *Macht* (power) and *Herrschaft* were inseparable in the Middle Ages; that images of rulership reflected an author's personal perspective as well as 'national' or regional circumstances; and that good rulership was defined in relation to the four classical cardinal virtues, their three Christian counterparts, and by a prince's willingness to submit to the clergy's moral authority. Vercamer in general has spared no effort to guide the reader through his approach, offering a clear structure with a great many introductions, conclusions, and summaries. He is upfront, both when laying out his own thought process while tackling such a daunting task and with regard to the limitations.

Inevitably, some avenues of research are left for others to pursue. Vercamer makes the case for the twelfth century as the decisive period in which to conduct his comparison. In particular, he suggests that this was a time in which ideas of order were reassessed amid the expansion of royal government, the development of Roman law, and a growing sense of individuality. Such a 'wide-ranging bundle of innovations' (p. 9), Vercamer argues, surely transformed how chroniclers judged their princes. The suggestion is not new. In one of the few specific discussions of the representation of twelfth-century kingship, Karl Leyser suggested (in a surprising absence from Vercamer's bibliography) that the Anglo-Norman realm and Norman Sicily were particularly rich sources of 'incisive business-like comment on kings' precisely because of the comparatively advanced growth of royal government.[3] The latter would indeed have made for an intriguing alternative case study. Yet with little discussion or analysis of portrayals of rulership before or after the twelfth century, this is not a subject that can be pursued in Vercamer's book. John of Salisbury's *Policraticus* too is described as 'extremely important' (p. 29), as is the influence of the Investiture Contest, but neither are referred to again in any detail in the main analysis.

[3] Karl Leyser, 'Some Reflections on Twelfth-Century Kings and Kingship', in id., *Medieval Germany and its Neighbours 900–1250* (London, 1982), 241–67, at 249.

Vercamer's choice of chronicles can also be queried. To qualify, the chronicler had to focus on 'contemporary history' (the likes of Geoffrey of Monmouth, Geffrei Gaimar, the *Kaiserchronik*, and even William of Malmesbury's *Gesta Regum* are hence excluded) and observe the ruler as an eyewitness or through oral testimony. Authors who recycled earlier material, or information from other authors, need not apply. The author should also be well-disposed towards the ruling dynasty, but without deploying hagiographical topoi. Though the reader will sympathize with Vercamer's predicament and his need to justify what must be, by necessity, an arbitrary selection, the reasoning deployed in chapter two to exclude other authors will raise a few eyebrows. Eadmer of Canterbury is described as 'not concerned with the royal house' (p. 65), despite the growing body of scholarship on his attitude towards kingship.[4] William of Newburgh lived too far north, was too remote from court, and apparently recorded events from too regional a perspective. Henry of Huntingdon loses out for having insufficiently close contacts to the royal court—yet as Vercamer notes elsewhere, our best evidence for William of Malmesbury's own experience is his attendance at the Council of Westminister in 1141. Comparing William, Otto of Freising, and Roger of Howden, the degree of royal familiarity clearly varied, as did the length of each work. As Vercamer reminds us, the *Historia Welforum*, the most surprising choice, takes up only seventeen pages in the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* folio edition, but in principle receives the same degree of analysis as Roger of Howden's lengthy *Chronica*.

In general, Vercamer's work provides an important reminder of the difficulty of balancing breadth and depth when making historical comparisons. Marc Bloch, the most famous advocate of this approach, is rightly invoked in the book's foreword, alongside the amusing anecdote that, having been advised by Bernd Schneidmüller to 'think big' (p. ix), Vercamer initially considered comparing six polities. That we are ultimately left with six chronicles instead inevitably diminishes some of the force of Vercamer's conclusions. Though Bloch is

[4] Mark Philpott, 'Eadmer, his Archbishops and the English State', in John R. Maddicott and David M. Palliser (eds.), *The Medieval State: Essays Presented to James Campbell* (London, 2000), 93–107; Sally Vaughn, *Anselm of Bec and Robert of Meulan: The Innocence of the Dove and the Wisdom of the Serpent* (Berkeley, 1987).

again referenced to justify the selection of at least three realms as the foundation for comparison, the choice of just two, with more material, might have provided a more secure beachhead from which future comparative forays could then have been attempted. Yet to judge this volume only by the conclusions resulting from the national comparison would be to mistake Vercamer's intention. This is very much a pilot study with a uniquely systematic approach, one that does not simply engage in 'eclectically picking and choosing the most beautiful source passages' (p. 55), but assesses each chronicler in the round. This attempt to 'weigh up' the expectations of individual authors does provide a new way to distinguish the typical from the specific in the political culture of multiple realms and periods. Whether or not future scholars follow the particularities of Vercamer's approach, they will still gain much from this diligent navigation of the challenges posed by comparative history.

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JAMIE PAGE, *Prostitution and Subjectivity in Late Medieval Germany*, Studies in German History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 176 pp. ISBN 978 0 198 86278 9. £65.00

Prostitution in the late Middle Ages has been a regular theme of historical scholarship, especially from the late 1970s onwards, with both broad overviews and a variety of local studies. Prostitution played an important role in the gender discourse of medieval society. On the one hand, the prostitute was a symbol of female sinfulness and depravity, but on the other, prostitutes provided a sexual outlet for unmarried men to prevent bigger evils—an idea borrowed loosely from St Augustine. Evidence of this ambivalent attitude towards prostitution can be seen in the institutionalization of public brothels in numerous towns in the German-language area and across Europe in the course of the fifteenth century and, in contrast, in the prosecution of so-called secret prostitutes. The date range of Jamie Page's study is from the late fourteenth century to the years shortly before 1500, although he limits his research to three microhistorical case studies in Zurich, Nördlingen, and Augsburg.

Page's research puts the focus on individual women, although sources in which prostitutes themselves openly discuss their life situation are few and far between. Personal testimony generally only comes to light in sources when these women came into contact with municipal justice. However, judicial sources are somewhat problematic. First, the statements made by prostitutes are not reproduced unfiltered, but are recorded in the words of the court clerk in an edited form. Second, sources from courts are very often biased, meaning they were written with a specific intent, for example to portray delinquents as obviously guilty. Therefore, court sources can only be considered ego-documents to a limited extent. Despite this problem, which Page discusses in detail in his introductory chapter with reference to existing historiography, the author has written an impressive study which offers a deep insight into the actions and everyday lives of late medieval prostitutes. Their living conditions were influenced by their individual situations as either unofficial or public prostitutes,

Trans. by Maxine Hart (GHIL)

and above all by circumstances inherent to their sex, like possible pregnancy. The linked themes of abortion and infanticide are also addressed in some depth. As the Nördlingen example shows, brothel-keepers must at times have wielded extreme violence in controlling the prostitutes employed in the public brothels licensed by various cities. Yet the extent to which Nördlingen may be typical of conditions in public brothels in the late Middle Ages is anyone's guess due to a lack of further contemporary sources from local authorities.

Ideally, Page would have also published his main sources in Middle High German, even if only in an appendix, as this would have offered German-speaking readers the opportunity to verify them in the original language. That said, Page often includes quotations in Middle High German within his text, after paraphrasing them in English. Yet despite this minor objection, the study offers a profound and very nuanced insight into the world of late medieval prostitution and convincingly shows the freedoms enjoyed by prostitutes, along with the constraints placed upon them, in the misogynistic world of the late Middle Ages.

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SASKIA LIMBACH, *Government Use of Print: Official Publications in the Holy Roman Empire, 1500–1600*, Studien zur europäischen Rechtsgeschichte, 326 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 2021), xviii + 347 pp. ISBN 978 3 465 04425 3. €79.00

In December 1511 Ulrich, duke of Württemberg, sent out invitations to a horse race to be held near Neckarweihingen on 11 May of the following year. The duke, notorious for keeping a ruinously expensive court, promised 'kurzwyl unnd geselschafft' (entertainment and companionship) and offered the victor prize money of 32 gulden and a silver cup. And he naturally turned to the new medium of his times in order to reach the greatest possible public for this event. He commissioned the printer Thomas Anshelm to produce an invitation directed plainly and simply to everyone: electors and princes, spiritual and secular lords of the Holy Roman Empire, counts, barons, knights, officials, citizens, and commoners were all invited (pp. 24–5). We do not know how many people actually turned up in the end, but the invitation itself has been preserved as one of the thousands of broadsheets from the sixteenth century that are today held by libraries, museums, and archives.

For Saskia Limbach, this invitation is a good example of early modern official printed material commissioned by a government—something that has long been neglected in the research. Her study, based on her Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of St Andrews in 2017, looks at official publications in the sixteenth century. It thus fits into a recent trend in research on the history of the book that attempts to take a more differentiated view of the connection between power and book printing in the early modern period. The older research was mainly interested in the emancipatory and subversive character of early modern book printing, and looked at pamphlets, illustrated leaflets, and printed material of an oppositional nature, regarding the printing press as primarily a vehicle for progress and enlightenment. For some years now, however, more interest has been taken in the productive interaction between new media technology and the expansion of power, while relations between book printers

Trans. by Angela Davies (GHIL)

and publishers and the established political and religious authorities are being examined beyond the topics of censorship and repression.[1]

In her investigation, Limbach concentrates on two cleverly chosen case studies. First, she looks at the Duchy of Württemberg, which went through a period of instability at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and was at times under the overlordship of the Habsburg emperor. From 1535, the dukes Ulrich and Christoph gradually developed it into a model Protestant territory. Limbach's second case study is of the Free Imperial City of Cologne, a Hansa city whose convenient location on the Rhine allowed it to become one of the biggest trade metropolises in the German-language area. Ruled since the Middle Ages by a Council newly elected every year, it was the only large Imperial city that remained Catholic. By juxtaposing Württemberg and Cologne, Limbach contrasts not only two fundamentally different models of early modern rule—rule by territorial princes, and rule by an Imperial city council—but also two domains of differing sizes and two confessional cultures. In the context of questions about the various governments' communication strategies and the conditions under which printers worked, this experimental structure is convincing.

Limbach approaches her material from two sides. First, she is interested in how governments used media; that is, she asks what documents were printed, what criteria played a part in these decisions, and what the governments' intentions were in having their ordinances, announcements, justifications, and invitations printed. Second, she adopts the perspective of the book market and the printers who worked with governments. Here the focus is on commercial aspects. Under what circumstances was it worthwhile for a printer to accept government contracts? What advantages and disadvantages did official print jobs have for entrepreneurial printers, as well as for those who gave out the jobs? What were the print runs, what formats were preferred, what profits could be made, and what risks were involved? The structure of the work reflects this dual approach. The first two chapters are devoted to the Duchy of Württemberg, taking first the government perspective

[1] For a recent overview of the research, see Helmer Helmers, Nina Lamal, and Jamie Cumby, 'Introduction: The Printing Press as an Agent of Power', in eid. (eds.), *Print and Power in Early Modern Europe (1500–1800)* (Leiden, 2021), 1–17.

and then that of the printers, while chapters three and four deal in the same way with Cologne.

In the case of the dukes of Württemberg, Limbach demonstrates the huge significance that the printing of large-format placards and smaller pamphlets had for rulers, especially at times of political crisis. In his defeat of the Poor Conrad rebellions and disputes with the Habsburgs, Duke Ulrich used broadsheets and pamphlets to justify himself and to mobilize outside powers to support him. But the dukes used the new medium of printed books especially when extending their territorial rule, developing their administrations, and communicating within their domains. The dukes had several hundred copies printed of individual decrees and ordinances, as well as of collections and publications of broader scope, such as Württemberg's ordinances (*Landesordnungen*), which were reissued five times before 1600 and expanded each time; a commentary relevant to the Duchy on the Imperial Police Ordinance; and the *Württembergische Große Kirchenordnung*, the Protestant ecclesiastical law of 1559. Copies were then distributed to officials in the ducal territories. Yet it was not always easy to find printers in Württemberg to take on the many jobs that needed to be done. Opening a print-works in Württemberg was a risky business because with the exception of the university town of Tübingen, the Duchy itself had no significant market for books, and the large printing centres such as Augsburg, Strasbourg, and Frankfurt with its book fair were not far away. Official print jobs were, as a rule, very small, and although they could be produced quickly and independently of the market, they were not lucrative enough on their own. In some cases, they had to take second place to more profitable jobs in larger and commercially successful print-works, and this sometimes resulted in long delays. It was only at the height of confessionalization that Tübingen was able to support a long-term print-works, which over several generations profitably printed official material for the dukes. They had so many jobs to commission because they printed not only decrees and police ordinances, but also church ordinances, declarations of Protestant faith, catechisms, and other reforming material (pp. 100, 106).

Things were very different in Cologne. The commercial metropolis on the Rhine was also a communications hub, and in the sixteenth century became the most important centre for Catholic printing in

the German-language area. Limbach lists more than a hundred printworks that existed there during the first 140 or so years of book printing (pp. 160–1), but only nine of them worked for Cologne's Council. Contrary to what has been assumed so far, the Council only began to distribute its ordinances and announcements in print very late, from the 1560s. Until this time, the traditional oral channels of communication—public gatherings, town criers, and above all the *Gaffeln* (Cologne's corporations and guilds), from whose members the Council was elected—had sufficed. A greater influx of religious refugees from the Netherlands and the threat of war in its conflict with the archbishop meant that from the middle of the century the Council increasingly had to use public notices and printed ordinances to maintain law and order. For most of Cologne's printers, however, these jobs were much less lucrative than the flourishing business of printing religious literature and confessional polemics. Unlike in the Protestant Imperial cities and territories, in Cologne it was not the secular authorities who were responsible for this branch of business, but the ecclesiastical authorities such as the cathedral chapter, the archbishop, and the various resident religious orders. Limbach emphasizes that Protestant Imperial cities such as Augsburg and Nuremberg produced a much greater range of official government publications (pp. 162–3). By this point at the latest, however, it becomes clear that the category of 'government publication', at least as defined somewhat cursorily in Limbach's introduction (p. 21), does not do full justice to the varied practice of early modern rule in the age of confessionalization. In Catholic areas, the religious bodies long continued to be authorities—some retaining their own jurisdictions—and in every case they had propagandist communication needs that did not differ substantially from those of Protestant rulers. For example, a printer who counted the Jesuit order that had moved to Cologne in 1544 among his clients could depend on business that was as profitable as that of Tübingen's printers, who published reformers' writings for the duke. To make a substantial profit from the Cologne Council's publications, by contrast, a printer either had to specialize—like Jaspar von Gennep, for example, who printed illustrated coinage regulations, having invested in the appropriate woodcuts in the middle of the century (pp. 185–6)—or rise to become a member of the city's political establishment and, like Maternus Cholinus, be elected to the Council

himself (p. 208). In both cases, however, their commercial profitability was a precondition for their successful and long-lasting co-operation with the Council, not its result.

Among the strengths of Limbach's work are its systematic structure, which ensures clarity and stringency; its close reading of the material, which also shows in the numerous illustrations; and the concise and clear presentation. Thanks to her careful archival research, the author can often reconstruct production processes in astonishing detail, based on price lists, account books, and other administrative papers. In many cases, she can provide precise information on prices, costs, and the size of print-runs. Limbach has chosen to keep information about the political context to an absolute minimum, allowing it to appear in her account only when it is necessary to explain conditions governing production and decision-making processes, but then every time. Paradoxically, this has the effect that on certain topics readers receive both too much and too little information. Thus—and especially when general statements are made—there are repetitions and redundancies, for example, when the uses governments made of printed books are discussed, or the function of the Court or Council printer, a role introduced around 1600, is explained (pp. 13, 69, 73, 216). On the other hand, the exceptionally conflict-ridden reign of Duke Ulrich—which saw revolt, exile, and the regaining of power by military means—is nowhere shown in overall context. Instead, it is discussed selectively in several places, and in each case individual and partial aspects are mentioned. The problems of this method become apparent when Limbach describes Duke Ulrich's 1543 regulation on carrying arms, which prohibited travellers from carrying firearms without exception, as a 'rather harsh restriction', and contrasts it with his son Christoph's more liberal regulation of 1551 (p. 49). But the threat resulting from the tense political situation, which prompted Duke Ulrich's strict weapons' ordinance, is only described many pages later in the context of a different issue (pp. 65–6).

Limbach's main interest, however, is not a cultural history of the political, but a history of the book. The official publications she investigates are mostly broadsheets, sometimes multi-page pamphlets, and much more rarely, as in the case of Württemberg's ordinances, thick books. They therefore overwhelmingly belong to a genre of literature which has survived only patchily and has hardly been studied. Thus

the reconstruction of a coherent and complete corpus of texts for investigation is a scholarly achievement that deserves recognition in its own right. In the course of her research, Limbach identified numerous texts that were listed neither in the *Catalog of Printed Works of the 16th Century Published in German-Speaking Countries* (VD16) of the Bavarian State Library, nor in the *Universal Short Title Catalogue* (USTC). In addition, she was able to clarify some dates and, partly as the result of painstaking work comparing woodcuts and initials, to identify for the first time which printers produced a number of known and unknown texts. She has documented the results of this basic research in an appendix numbering more than eighty pages, which lists almost 400 sixteenth-century official publications from Cologne and Württemberg, with references to all known copies and, where available, the relevant links. Limbach's work must therefore be seen as supplementing existing work on police ordinances.[2] It is thus very well placed in the publication series of the Max Planck Institute for Legal History and Legal Theory, and will be an indispensable reference work for future research on the book and media history of the sixteenth century.

[2] Achim Landwehr and Thomas Simon (eds.), *Repertorium der Policeyordnungen der Frühen Neuzeit*, vol. iv: *Baden und Württemberg* (Frankfurt am Main, 2001); Klaus Militzer (ed.), *Repertorium der Policeyordnungen der Frühen Neuzeit*, vol. vi: *Reichsstädte: Köln*, 2 pts. (Frankfurt am Main, 2005).

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NICHOLA M. V. HAYTON, HANNS HUBACH, and MARCO NEUMAIER (eds.), *Churfürstlicher Hochzeitlicher HeimführungsTriumph: Inszenierung und Wirkung der Hochzeit Kurfürst Friedrichs V. mit Elisabeth Stuart (1613)*, Mannheimer historische Schriften, 11 (Ubstadt-Weiher: verlag regionalkultur, 2020), 408 pp. ISBN 978 3 955 05142 6. €39.80

The wedding of the eldest daughter of King James VI/I, Elizabeth Stuart, and the Elector Palatine Frederick V in 1613 was one of the most important dynastic alliances in Protestant Europe forged on the eve of the Thirty Years War. It was an event of extraordinary political and cultural significance: on this alliance rested the hopes of Protestant European parties in their political struggle with Catholic forces, especially the Austrian Habsburgs. Even though these hopes turned out to be short-lived, the alliance proved pivotal for future dynastic ties between Britain and Protestant Germany: in 1714, Elizabeth Stuart's grandson George Louis, Elector of Hanover, became King George I of Great Britain and Ireland. The present collection of essays is based on an international academic conference that was held in Heidelberg on 5–7 September 2013 to commemorate the 450th anniversary of this Palatine wedding. The collection adds further perspectives to another volume of essays dedicated to the wedding, published in 2013 and based on a conference held at the University of Exeter in 2008.[1]

The volume's eighteen essays engage with a variety of topics, and have a dual focus on the dynastic, political side of the Palatine wedding and on questions of cultural history and cultural transfer. They represent diverse disciplines and methodologies, and are of varying scope. Some give broad overviews, such as Marco Neumaier's introductory essay, while others address more specialized questions and findings. The volume contains essays by both German and British scholars, beautifully mirroring the international character of the subject matter. Twelve texts are in German, six in English with added German summaries; the preface also appears in both languages. For the sake of making this book equally accessible to an English-language audience (and more generally for reasons of balance and

[1] Sara Smart and Mara R. Wade (eds.), *The Palatine Wedding of 1613: Protestant Alliance and Court Festival* (Wiesbaden, 2013).

equality), it would have been helpful to provide English summaries of the German texts as well—this was, perhaps, an editorial oversight. Given the wide variety of topics represented in the volume, it would have also been useful if the articles had been organized in different sections (for example, history, politics, and festival culture), similarly to the 2013 publication on the wedding.

Marco Neumaier's contribution, which functions as an introduction to the volume and provides an overview of its thematic scope, first discusses printed and manuscript sources that allow a reconstruction of the wedding festivities and an assessment of its larger political significance—texts such as wedding poems (epithalamia), sermons, masque libretti, travel and festival descriptions (for example, the prominent *Beschreibung der Reiß*), reproductions of ephemeral architecture such as triumphal arches allowing a reading of their political symbolism, broadsheet prints, as well as hitherto overlooked archival sources. In his discussion of the wedding's political significance, Neumaier focuses particularly on the important position of the Elector Palatine within the political fabric of the Holy Roman Empire, especially as holder of the imperial vicariate, and on the political and confessional changes in the Palatinate during the Reformation. As Neumaier explains, these changes culminated in the foundation of the Protestant Union on the eve of the Thirty Years War.

Other contributions explore specific aspects of this dynastic alliance in further detail, largely through various case studies. In his substantial, insightful essay, Peter Bilhöfer discusses the political background of the dynastic connection between England and the Palatinate, which, as he convincingly shows, should be viewed in the context of other political and military alliances forged between Western European Protestants in the early 1600s. Raingard Esser succinctly analyses the position of Frederick V and Elizabeth Stuart in European princely society. She examines the couple's visit to the Dutch Republic en route to Heidelberg to shed light on the House of Orange's political and dynastic aspirations and its manifold political and cultural connections with the Palatinate. In their unique contribution, Jakob Odenwald, Simon Grüning, and Felix Wenzel discuss and demonstrate how Google Earth can be utilized for an interactive engagement with the locations and events that Frederick V and Elizabeth Stuart

encountered during their travels from London to Heidelberg. (Unfortunately, I could not open the application, even though I used the link and followed the instructions given in the article. It is to be hoped that both link and application continue to be maintained to ensure readers can engage with this innovative idea).

In her engaging exploration of the lesser-known wedding between Elizabeth Stuart's companion Lady Anne Sutton Dudley and Frederick's envoy and Palatine Chamberlain Hans Meinhard von Schönberg, Nichola Hayton illustrates the obstacles that both this wedding and that of their prominent superiors faced because of differences in status and aristocratic ranking. It is perhaps one of the major insights of Hayton's and other contributions to this volume that these problems were exacerbated by the different systems of government in England and the Holy Roman Empire, which needed to be navigated with diplomatic finesse and intercultural competence. In his thought-provoking essay, Daniel Schönpflug then compares the Palatine wedding with weddings in the House of Brandenburg-Hohenzollern from the seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. He productively frames his comparison by taking a structural approach that considers aspects such as social distinction, state formation, foreign relations, cultural transfer, religion, law, and the history of emotions.

The remaining essays look at the cultural and artistic activities that took place in connection with the wedding on both sides of the English Channel. Three scholars engage with previously overlooked sources: a manuscript of occasional poetry commissioned by the University of Cambridge, paying homage to the newly-wed couple (Reinhard Düchting); the sermon given by Heidelberg court chaplain Abraham Scultetus at a thanksgiving service in Heidelberg (Christoph Strohm); and a previously unedited festival description dedicated to Philipp Ludwig, Count Palatine of Neuburg (Barbara Zeitelhack).

Six further essays explore court culture in England and the Palatinate. Andrew Thomas discusses the culture of the Palatine court in Heidelberg through the lens of Thomas Coryat's description of his visit to Heidelberg in 1608. Nicola Boyle traces the history of Lady Elizabeth's Men, a Jacobean theatre company under the patronage of Elizabeth Stuart, and investigates its participation in the wedding festivities. Graham Parry's and Barbara Ravelhofer's contributions

both address the court masques performed during the wedding ceremonies in London in February 1613. Parry focuses on the political themes that the masques communicated to the public, especially the vision of militant Protestantism that had been embraced by Prince Henry Frederick, who had died prematurely the year before; Parry identifies him as the main organizer of the masques. Another important theme staged in one of the masques was, as Parry shows, the colonization of Virginia. Ravelhofer, on the other hand, illustrates the practical aspects of masque production, such as machinery, surprising stage effects, costume design, and everyday challenges, such as the overwhelming noise that often made the spoken and sung masque texts unintelligible. In his captivating essay, Wolfgang Metzger explores the practical and symbolic dimensions of the triumphal fireworks staged in Heidelberg, placing this remarkable event in the context of the history of sixteenth and seventeenth-century pyrotechnic productions. Lastly, in her compelling essay comparing the Palatine wedding festivities with the dynastic alliance between France and Spain celebrated in Paris in 1612, Marie-Claude Canova-Green draws on her immense knowledge of early modern European court culture to analyse the political imagery of the spectacles and pageantry staged in Paris, London, and Heidelberg. She convincingly contrasts the message of peace and union that the Paris spectacles sought to communicate with that of military might and militant Protestantism projected in London and Heidelberg.

Two essays explore the Palatine wedding and its cultural dimensions through objects of art and architecture: Sigrid Gensichen and Silke Böttcher describe and analyse exciting recent findings of archaeological remains from the once-famous Hortus Palatinus (Garden of the Palatinate) in Heidelberg, especially art objects and technology found in a well room (*Brunnenstube*) in the grounds of the garden. Finally, Hanns Hubach builds on his impressive expertise in tapestries to reconstruct the once renowned (but now sadly lost) tapestry collection of the Heidelberg court.

Overall, the volume is beautifully produced, with ample illustrations. One of the book's many attractive traits is that it contains articles from a number of perspectives, in terms not only of methodologies, but also career stages among the authors, who range from graduate students

and senior scholars to emeritus faculty. Some notes on the contributors would have been useful in helping readers to place the essays in the authors' diverse academic backgrounds. Although admittedly time-consuming and costly to produce, an index of names and topics would also have been useful in helping readers orientate themselves in the wealth of material.

However, these are relatively minor criticisms, given the many merits of this book. The volume makes fascinating, rewarding reading for anyone interested in early modern European history, politics, and court culture. It is to be hoped that it will inspire further studies of the Palatine wedding and other early seventeenth-century celebrations of dynastic alliances, leading to productive new readings of the source material from the perspectives of postcolonial and gender studies.

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SIMON ADLER, *Political Economy in the Habsburg Monarchy 1750–1774: The Contribution of Ludwig Zinzendorf*, Palgrave Studies in the History of Finance (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), xi + 288 pp. ISBN 978 3 030 31006 6. £99.99 (hardcover)

Count Ludwig Friedrich Julius von Zinzendorf (1721–80) is known to historians of the Habsburg monarchy as a holder of prominent positions in the nation's fiscal and tax administration, and as a minister on Maria Theresa's Council of State. His role as a fiscal expert—especially as the president of the Hofrechenkammer (the monarchy's audit office, founded in 1762)—has been discussed in broad overview by Friedrich Walter, P. G. M. Dickson, Christine Lebeau, and most recently in several essays in an edited volume on the administrative history of the Habsburg monarchy during the early modern period.[1] However, his individual profile at the intersection between politics and economics has so far remained obscure. This should not come as a surprise, given that the studies listed above deal with the financial and tax policies of the Habsburg fiscal–military state primarily from the perspective of administrative history, to the exclusion of research into Zinzendorf's life and work.

This is what prompted Simon Adler to place Zinzendorf at the centre of his book (which is based on a Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Cambridge), and to examine the count's role as an observer of economic conditions in France and England, as a participant in economic discourse, and as a fiscal and economic policymaker. In the process, Adler goes far beyond pure intellectual history—despite

Trans. by Jozef van der Voort (GHIL)

[1] Thomas Fellner and Heinrich Kretschmayr (eds.), *Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung,* 14 vols. (Vienna, 1907–70), sect. ii, vol. i, pt. i: Friedrich Walter, *Die Geschichte der österreichischen Zentralverwaltung in der Zeit Maria Theresias (1740–1780)* (1938); P. G. M. Dickson, *Finance and Government under Maria Theresia, 1740–1780*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1987); Christine Lebeau, *Aristocrates et grands commis à la cour de Vienne (1748–1791): Le modèle français* (Paris, 1996); Michael Hochedlinger, Petr Maťa, and Thomas Winkelbauer (eds.), *Verwaltungsgeschichte der Habsburgermonarchie in der Frühen Neuzeit*, vol. i: *Hof und Dynastie, Kaiser und Reich, Zentralverwaltungen, Kriegswesen und landesfürstliches Finanzwesen* (Vienna, 2019).

claiming that his book is 'primarily concerned with ideas' (p. 7). He organizes his material along three thematic axes. First, he reconstructs Zinzendorf's economic and fiscal analyses and concepts as they developed over time; second, he situates him in the context of the economic ideas advanced by French and British authors; and third, he explores the count's role in the discourses of Vienna's political and administrative elites.

Adler bases his study on a dense array of sources from multiple archives, including the Zinzendorf collection in the Niederösterreichisches Landesarchiv, which has been systematically analysed here for the first time. Detailed paraphrases of Zinzendorf's own writings demand concentration on the part of the reader, but offer profound insights into the thinking of a state economist during the eighteenth century.

Adler's goal is not to write Zinzendorf's life story, but he nonetheless describes the count's biography in some detail. In the introduction to the book, we learn that Zinzendorf was born to a Lower Austrian family that had partly turned to Protestantism—especially Pietism—and settled outside the Habsburg dominions during the seventeenth century. His parents and grandparents had found a new sphere of activity in Saxony, but maintained links with their region of origin. In 1739, Zinzendorf converted to Catholicism in order to inherit the estate bequeathed by the Catholic branch of the family in Lower Austria, which was held in trust. In doing so, he laid the foundations for his later career as a civil servant under Maria Theresa. On the level of family politics, it is interesting to note that Zinzendorf's younger half-brother Karl (1739–1813) also embarked on a successful career in the Viennese court and government after converting to Catholicism. As governor of Trieste, president of the Hofrechenkammer, and above all as the author of a unique set of diaries, he was until now the better known of the two brothers.[2]

In 1746 Zinzendorf studied law in Leipzig, before entering the provincial government of Lower Austria the following year and becoming an assessor of the court of the Estates in 1748. Of crucial influence

[2] Partial edition: Grete Klingenstein, Eva Faber, and Antonio Trampus (eds.), *Europäische Aufklärung zwischen Wien und Triest: Die Tagebücher des Gouverneurs Karl Graf Zinzendorf 1776–1782*, 4 vols. (Vienna, 2009).

on his subsequent career were the links he established in 1749 with Count Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz, who was appointed ambassador to Paris in 1750. The ambitious Zinzendorf, who had a keen interest in economic matters, became a privileged member of Kaunitz's entourage—a circle of associates that was gradually expanded by the equally ambitious ambassador, who in 1753 became state chancellor and played a central role in guiding Habsburg policy for almost four decades. A clientelistic relationship developed between the two men that lasted for decades, to the benefit of both sides.

Chapter two describes how Zinzendorf's inclusion in the delegation to Paris gave him the opportunity to travel, especially through Brittany. There he gathered information about the French East India Company and the navy, which he recorded in memoranda. In another detailed memorandum he examined the links between the size of France's population, the state of its agriculture, and its trade activity in light of the country's monetary circulation, which was itself connected to state credit. Thanks to these inquiries, Zinzendorf made a name for himself among Viennese officials, and the study of interactions between different economic factors became his core interest. He also conducted research with direct practical applications, seeking to understand the origins of state power and prosperity in order to accurately rank the various European nations. To this end, he also travelled to England. Zinzendorf's studies thus form part of the historical background to the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756.

In chapters three and four, Adler shows that Zinzendorf's memoranda of the 1750s and 1760s should be situated in a disciplinary field inhabited by countless authors. Zinzendorf had detailed knowledge of economic debates in France through the writings of figures such as Jean-François Melon, who was in turn influenced by British writers. Jacques Vincent de Gournay, an intendant in the French Bureau of Commerce, conducted studies with a broad empirical basis that set out the economic conditions in France and the Habsburg domain, and emphasized the importance of the circulation of money through the economy. De Gournay applied the same methods as Zinzendorf and produced similar findings, and both authors made use of a Europe-wide network of informants and suppliers of data. Zinzendorf's translations of writings on fiscal and trade policy should also be considered in this context. Of

these texts, which Zinzendorf began working on while he was still a student, the most important was his translation of John Law's influential 1705 treatise *Money and Trade Considered*, which was published in 1758 under the title *Gedanken vom Gelde und von der Handlung*. Adler demonstrates in detail that Zinzendorf extended Law's thoughts on paper money and banks by adding intertextual references to other authors, inserting additional text, and so on. Here once again, the significance of the circulation of knowledge is revealed through textual analysis.

By engaging with French and British authors and by adopting best practices from other countries, Zinzendorf raised the bar for economic discussions between experts in Vienna, as we see in chapter five. It is therefore only natural that he looked to the Bank of England when his thoughts turned to the establishment of an effective state bank—one that would regulate the flow of money and above all act as a lender in order to support all sectors of the economy and increase prosperity. At times of war, it became important for the public finances to be administered on a basis of trust and transparency in order to keep the state budget adequately supplied with money.

In the sixth and most wide-ranging chapter, Adler assesses Zinzendorf's position in contemporary political and economic discourse and in the apparatus of government in Vienna. Zinzendorf was an empirical economist focused on solving practical problems, and he developed his ideas through conversation, correspondence, reading widely, and undertaking research trips. As a government official, however, he also had informal access to Maria Theresa and her husband Francis I, to whom he was a close adviser. The latter in particular was very interested in economic questions. Zinzendorf was convinced that tried-and-tested concepts drawn mainly from England and France should be applied to the Habsburg monarchy. He played an especially important role during war time, standing at the centre of a diverse array of projects and proposals for fiscal and economic reform that were drawn up by both officials and private citizens. He discussed economic problems in circles consisting mainly of noble functionaries occupying prominent posts in the apparatus of state, many of whom had clientelistic relations with the state chancellor Kaunitz.

When it came to the reform of fiscal institutions, Zinzendorf had a decisive influence on the chancellor. His goal was to establish public

bodies in Vienna that would have detailed knowledge of financial flows and would be able to exert regulatory control, and Zinzendorf came closer to achieving it as president of the Hofrechenkammer. The idea was for these bodies to monitor the central fiscal administration, supervise the accounts of the provincial Estates, and play a primary role in overseeing the national budget. However, at a time when the apparatus of state was undergoing constant reform, the Hofrechenkammer proved short-lived—partly because of its overextended remit, but also due to conflicts over its area of authority and disputes between individual officials. In 1773 it was placed under the control of the Hofkammer (the Habsburg treasury), and Zinzendorf was dismissed from his role as president and excluded from political life.

Adler demonstrates that Zinzendorf's political and economic thought was primarily focused on the state. It therefore stands to reason that his economic ideas circulated in the domain of government, or in other words, among the administrative elites. There was no critical public sphere to speak of in the Habsburg monarchy beyond the discourse between state officials. At the same time, Zinzendorf underscored the importance of economic factors in political decision-making. He not only sought to solve urgent financial problems, but also believed that a strong economy with a healthy credit and banking system was the basis of state power. Zinzendorf's economic analyses and ideas led him to deeper insights than had been achieved by Heinrich Gottlob von Justi or Joseph von Sonnenfels. Although Justi's and Sonnenfels's cameralist doctrines were taught to future civil servants at universities, the ideas circulating within the government itself stemmed from Zinzendorf.

Simon Adler's rigorously structured book (including an index) expands our knowledge of the eighteenth century considerably. Zinzendorf clearly emerges as an economic thinker operating between theory and practice, as a networker and active follower of European discourse, and as part of the administrative elite under Maria Theresa. Adler does not deal in generalizations or abstract concepts; his preferred method is to describe events with close reference to the sources, and to categorize and interpret strictly on the basis of empirical findings. As a result, his study produces substantial insights that are relevant to a number of different fields—not just economic history,

but also intellectual and administrative history, as well as the history of the fiscal–military state. Adler's book therefore deserves a wider readership than just historians of the Habsburg monarchy.

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ELISABETH-MARIE RICHTER, *England und der Index der verbotenen Bücher im 19. Jahrhundert*, Römische Inquisition und Indexkongregation, 21 (Leiden: Brill/Ferdinand Schöningh, 2021), x + 638 pp. ISBN 978 3 506 70474 0. €120.56 / $US 147.00

At the outset of his ascent from struggling writer and lapsed ordinand to second English pope, George Arthur Rose, the hero of Frederick Rolfe's 1904 novel of semi-autobiographical fantasy, *Hadrian the Seventh*, confesses a long litany of sins to a bishop. 'In regard to literature', he admits, 'I have read prohibited books and magazines—the *Nineteenth Century*, and books ancient and modern which are of a certain kind . . . my motive always has been to inform myself.'[1] Among its other discoveries, Elisabeth-Marie Richter's impressive new book on the relationship between England and the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum* during the nineteenth century makes clear that the conflict which Rolfe's half-fictional creation experienced between the allure of modern knowledge and the duty of obedience was far from unusual among English Catholics of Rolfe's generation.

Focusing in the first instance on the juridical processes by which English books came to be placed on the *Index*, and second on the views which English Catholics themselves took of the institution, *England und der Index* has a significance which extends beyond its central concern with the history of ecclesiastical censorship. For that history also opens new windows into the history of nineteenth-century English Catholicism, and the European impact of British intellectual and religious life.

Richter's book is the twenty-first volume to appear in Brill's invaluable series *Römische Inquisition und Indexkongregation*, under the general editorship of Hubert Wolf. In common with the rest of the series, *England und der Index* is one of the fruits of the 1998 opening of the archives of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, a vault still replete with treasure for the ecclesiastical, intellectual, or book historian. Known from its foundation in 1542 until 1965 under the more fearsome title of the Congregation of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition, or Holy Office, it shared responsibility for book censorship with the smaller Sacred Congregation of the Index. As Richter explains,

[1] Frederick Rolfe (Baron Corvo), *Hadrian the Seventh* (New York, 2001), 50.

this 'little sister' (p. 47) of the Inquisition kept the *Index* up to date, ruled upon questions of interpretation, and granted selective permissions to read its forbidden contents, prior to its full integration with the Holy Office in 1917. The *Index* continued to grow until it condemned its last book in 1961. Paul VI abolished it five years later. Codified into something like a formal procedure under the quasi-Enlightenment pope Benedict XIV, the *Index*'s stately workings could not keep pace with the huge expansion of the modern book trade, but the authorities lost none of their premodern vigour in prohibiting works injurious to the faith during the nineteenth century. Prominent among these were works of English provenance. Expertly navigating both the inquisitorial archives in Rome and the Westminster Diocesan Archives in London, Richter presents the English encounter with the *Index* from both the curial and the English points of view. Using sources in German, English, French, Italian, and Latin, she integrates the archival trail with close comparison of different editions of texts brought within the *Index*'s compass in order to analyse why, exactly, one edition of the same work earned censure rather than another. Following scholarship of this high order is one of the rewards which the book brings to the reader who possesses the opportunity to read its 551 pages of main text.

In a way that will be helpful for readers coming to the subject for the first time, the book begins with recapitulations of the history of post-Reformation English Catholicism and of the Roman apparatus of censorship. The obligatory discussion of the current state of research follows, before Richter's target comes into arresting focus with a fascinating table (pp. 74–81) of the English books which went before the Holy Office or the Congregation of the Index between 1815 and 1899. Of these a number were forbidden, whilst others were scrutinized but ultimately not included in the *Index*. To the Victorianist on the Clapham omnibus, the list of works which the Curia decided to censor could appear eclectic, even slapdash. Books were censured, but so were sermons and even individual journal articles, including a series of essays by St George Jackson Mivart on 'Happiness in Hell' in the *Nineteenth Century* (p. 81)—perhaps the inspiration for Rose's confession in *Hadrian the Seventh*. Hugh Trevor-Roper's mischievous description of the *Index*—'that incomparable roll of genius'—could only be applied at a stretch to such proscribed texts as George Combe's

System of Phrenology or William Stroud's *Treatise on the Physical Cause of the Death of Christ* (pp. 78, 81).[2] Although the *Index* condemned a number of what posterity would regard as nineteenth-century classics, such as John Stuart Mill's *Principles of Political Economy* (p. 79), many great Victorian works are passed over in silence: neither Leslie Stephen nor Charles Darwin earned a mention.

This table of prohibited works will be of great interest to scholars of nineteenth-century British intellectual culture. It also suggests certain difficulties with Richter's justifiable, but inescapably thorny decision to focus solely on 'English' books, in the sense of 'England's literary production' (p. 5). The quotation marks around 'English' are necessary, because the author decides to include Scottish works, marked with an asterisk, in the table alongside books originating in England. Richter argues that this is a fair inclusion in a book about England, because despite Scotland's separate ecclesiastical polity, Rome perceived it, together with England, as a heretical Protestant country. Ireland, by contrast, was a different case, being an overwhelmingly Catholic nation, and so Irish books are not mentioned. Richter's principles of selection are, at one level, quite reasonable. But British historians may have found it helpful had she taken the opportunity to include Irish books in the ledger, for there was substantial interpenetration between English and Irish Catholic intellectual culture in the period. On the Protestant side, close links existed between Anglo-Irish Protestants and England's Anglican elites, whilst Presbyterians in Ulster and Scotland moved freely across the North Channel. Indeed, as Richter goes on to note, two of the authors whom she discusses at greater length in the book—Laurence Sterne and Lady Sydney Morgan—themselves had Anglo-Irish backgrounds. A composite table, including all English, Scottish, Irish, and (perhaps implausibly) Welsh works that came before the censorial gaze, might have better reflected the porous nature of the boundaries between the literary, religious, and intellectual cultures of the United Kingdom's four nations.

This quibble is, however, a minor one, for it does not impede the reader's appreciation of the heart of Richter's book. Rather than focus

[2] Quoted in Richard Davenport-Hines, 'Introduction', in id. (ed.), *Letters from Oxford: Hugh Trevor-Roper to Bernard Berenson* (London, 2006), p. xxxv.

on all the fifty-four listed works, an embarrassment of riches which could have produced a relatively superficial treatment of her subject, she instead identifies four case studies. Leaving to future historians the philosophical, historical, theological, and political-economic works which attracted the attention of the censors, she instead attends to four case studies of the Congregation of the Index's response to 'literature in the narrower sense' (p. 84). The first is the eighteenth-century Anglican cleric Laurence Sterne's 1768 *A Sentimental Journey through France and Italy*, a novel relating the mainly amorous touring experiences of the author's alter ego, Reverend Mr Yorick, and placed on the *Index* in 1819. The second is the rationalistic Anglo-Irish author Lady Sydney Morgan's 1821 travelogue *Italy,* banned the next year. The third is Mary Martha Sherwood's evangelical Anglican work of children's fiction *The History of Little Henry and his Bearer*, published in 1814 and indexed in 1827. The fourth and final work singled out for attention is Percy Bysshe Shelley's posthumously published 1839 *Poetical Works*, the only one of the selection ultimately not prohibited in this way, in a decision of 1852.

Richter examines the English background and reception, Continental translation or dissemination, and censorial consideration of each of these works in a way that makes her book both a fascinating example of comparative reception history and a forensically argued study of the variegated complexities of papal censorship. Her findings are important, and often surprising. Throughout her account, Richter is concerned to reconstruct the intellectual personalities and mental world-views of the consultors appointed by the Congregation to report on suspicious books. They emerge as generalists, with little specific background in English affairs; hence their judgements were often rather light on the texts' contexts, or derivative of others' opinions. Intriguingly, censors' moral objections to problematic works often resembled those of conservative English Protestants, despite their doctrinal differences. Thus the curial consultor echoed earlier English readers in faulting Sterne for making light of religion and scripture. Where censors did not explicitly recommend proscription, this did not necessarily imply toleration, still less approval. Shelley's poems escaped the *Index* not because they were doctrinally harmless, but because the Congregation decided they were already prohibited according to the Tridentine 'second Index rule' (p. 427), according to

which works of heretics that treated religious questions stood under a general ban on perusal by the faithful.

Whilst the censors' awareness of English works was notably patchy, Richter winkles out the patterns which account for why certain works came to be of interest and others passed out of view. In most cases, little is known of the precise route through which individual works were denounced to the censors. But the Curia showed especial vigilance in defending the reputation of Italy and the Papal State against the calumnies of heretical authors. Hence it was no accident that Sterne, Morgan, and Shelley all deprecated the religious condition of Italy. An English work generally also had to appear in French or Italian translation before it attracted critical notice. This reflected both the censors' limited intelligence on the world beyond Rome and their more immediate concern to safeguard Catholic peoples rather than to police Protestant ones. The nature of the translation could also prove significant. Sterne's translator, Ugo Foscolo, made his prose more intolerably erotic than the English original, whilst one of the censor's main objections to Sherwood's *Little Henry* was that the Italian translation came from a Protestant Bible society. The fact that works were treated in translation helps to account for the often striking delay between a work's original publication and its consideration for the *Index*. It was not the sole explanation, however, for why English works came in for critical attention at moments of heightened anxiety. Shelley, unusually read in the English original, faced the censors shortly after the restoration of the English Roman Catholic hierarchy in 1850.

How far did Catholics heed the *Index*'s admonitions in practice? In the penultimate chapter before her conclusion, Richter poses this question in relation to the English Catholic hierarchy at the close of the nineteenth century. She argues that knowledge of the *Index* was notably slight among the English Catholic community at large. The most senior clergy—here especially Cardinal Herbert Vaughan, archbishop of Westminster from 1892 to 1903—regarded it as both impractical to enforce and counterproductive to evangelism. Unsuccessfully lobbying Rome to release the English church from the authority of the *Index*, Vaughan considered that English Catholics had to meet non-Catholics in free debate, unencumbered by the allegations of obscurantism which the *Index* invited. Richter convincingly argues that this difference of

opinion points to the limits of Romanization within English Catholicism after 1850. Where curial censors habitually thought in terms of the protection of Catholic nations from unbelief, English Catholics, more used to a free press and a religiously plural society, hoped for a less constipated response to modernity. Ultimately, this would be the approach that won out during the period of the Second Vatican Council.

Richter's imaginative, scrupulous, and authoritative work on the history of Catholic censorship is a model of its kind, presenting meticulous scholarship in engaging prose. A weighty contribution to a distinguished and vigorous series, it also opens up several new areas of inquiry for future research in nineteenth-century British and European intellectual and religious history. Richter herself urges the more thorough consideration of the reception which the *Index* obtained among English Catholics beyond the episcopate, among the parochial clergy, laity, and in Catholic educational institutions. It would be exciting to extend our understanding of the censorial process beyond the literary works upon which Richter concentrates, to integrate the works of history, theology, philosophy, and political economy which also came within its purview. Whether the ultimate omission of a dubious work from the *Index* did indeed always leave it under the general ban of the second rule, or whether a more accommodating response to certain non-Catholic English authors can be detected in some cases, may be a question worth pursuing. The book deserves to find a wide readership with Anglophone historians, among whom knowledge of German is regrettably no longer as widespread as it once was. Perhaps some way can be found of including English-language summaries in future volumes in the *Römische Inquisition und Indexkongregation* series, so that contemporary scholarship does not fall victim to modern forms of the intellectual parochialism which Richter historicizes so instructively.

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JANNE LAHTI (ed.), *German and United States Colonialism in a Connected World: Entangled Empires*, Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 319 pp. ISBN 978 3 030 53205 5. £89.99

'Europeans increasingly tended to see in America an idealized or distorted image of their own countries, onto which they could project their own aspirations and fears, their self-confidence and . . . guilty despair.'[1] This quotation from historian Hugh Honour captures the gist of this edited volume that brings together an impressive list of international scholars of colonialism and empire. At a moment when the legacies and memories of German colonialism are being discussed with great urgency and controversy, this is a timely publication. It takes a step back and explores the various ideas and concepts Germans had about their nation's imperial expansion. The basic assumptions of Janne Lahti's edited volume are that the United States have served as a main reference point for German imperialism, and that comparison should be a central category of analysis in the study of imperialism. According to Andrew Zimmerman, this is pertinent since

> the United States has been, arguably, the most successful white supremacist society in human history, a slaveholding settler colony that generated enormous power and prosperity and moral self-validation for a white ruling class. No wonder so many imperial and colonial thinkers have looked to the country as a model state and empire (p. 302).

Indeed, many Germans have looked to the United States for clues concerning discourses on and practices of settler colonialism.

The introduction by Janne Lahti is followed by twelve chapters, whose key themes are framed by two concluding comments by Andrew Zimmerman and Sebastian Conrad. To do justice to each of the highly insightful and carefully argued contributions would exceed the confines of this review, so highlights from individual chapters will need to suffice. In 'The Fantasy of Open Space on the Frontier', Robert L.

[1] Hugh Honour, *The New Golden Land: European Images of America from the Discoveries to the Present Time* (London, 1976), 3.

Nelson engages with agricultural economist Max Sering, who travelled to the American western frontier in the 1880s intending to apply the practices of colonial expansion he observed there to German plans for Eastern Europe. He recognized the importance of canal and railway infrastructure for colonial settlement, but also anticipated resistance from the local population to the arrival of German settlers. Closely observing US policies of removal and assimilation towards Native Americans, Sering favoured the assimilation of Slavic peoples. However, he was also concerned about the preservation of German language and identity, and about German nationalism in a non-German environment. Eventually, this advocate of 'inner colonization' came to embrace more direct, violent measures—namely, the 'Indian removal' of the Poles in order to create space for Germans east of Prussia.

Labour is a central category of analysis in a number of essays. In her chapter 'Ruling Classes and Serving Races', for instance, Dörte Lerp focuses on the impact of global migration flows on questions of labour and land. She analyses how Germans were granted privileged access to land that was inhabited by Poles and Africans respectively, and how colonial labour was organized along racial and ethnic lines, resulting in the creation of a white German 'ruling class' on the one hand, and a population of 'serving races' on the other (p. 131).[2] This was modelled on the US system of race-based slavery, as were practices of land appropriation that were similar to policies of removal and genocide towards Native Americans during the westward expansion. Lerp's discussion aptly demonstrates the transimperial circulation of ideas and practices relating to the (controlled) mobility of enslaved African Americans, Native Americans, Africans, and Poles, and that the empires found sometimes similar, sometimes different 'solutions' for the 'challenges' they faced.

Janne Lahti and Michelle Moyd offer an expert comparative analysis of Apaches and askaris as colonial soldiers in their chapter 'In Service of Empires'. Their contribution is an important intervention

[2] I have chosen to depart from the editorial policy of the *Bulletin* and keep the word 'white' uncapitalized in this review, since unlike 'Black', it does not refer to a shared historical experience and is not an emancipatory act of self-naming. However, I want to stress that 'Black', 'white', and other racial categories are socially constructed and that race is a biological fiction.

in a volume in which few chapters engage with the perspectives and motives of colonized subjects. By insightfully discussing the many similarities and differences between Apaches in the US west in the 1870s and African soldiers in German East Africa in the late 1880s and 1890s, they demonstrate that working as colonial soldiers offered these men 'unintended opportunities . . . to pursue their own goals and empowerment' (p. 235). Recruitment into colonial armies offered access to masculinity through a readiness for combat and violence, enabled them to provide for their (extended) families, and endowed them with privileges, even if these came at the price of losing their larger communities and being regarded as traitors to their people. Lahti and Moyd's discussion highlights the agency of these soldiers, who were 'practitioners of colonial rule' (p. 265). Their motives for joining the colonial forces were sometimes in direct opposition to what Euro-American and German colonial settlers intended, and the colonizers eventually realized that the recruitment of Apache soldiers fighting alongside white soldiers, and the deployment of askaris in their confrontation with white German settlers, had been a 'terrible mistake' (p. 268). The analysis highlights the understanding to be gained from comparative perspectives on imperial practices, and by including the voices and perspectives of the colonized, it demonstrates that they also exerted agency (albeit of a limited kind) and were complicit in colonial violence.

Andrew Zimmermann's afterword emphasizes that the majority of the chapters in the book engage with imperialist thinkers and their writings and practices. These sources convey a distorted image of the colonized, whose basic humanity is often questioned. Yet, in line with Edward Said's foundational, but controversial, approach of Orientalism, all the contributors engage with their protagonists critically. In a similar vein, Sebastian Conrad notes that interactions and entanglements between empires were largely one-sided affairs, since many German imperial protagonists looked across the Atlantic for inspiration, but this gaze was rarely reciprocated. The main point of interest for Germans was the westward expansion, along with its railway infrastructure and its accompanying ideology of manifest destiny. This served as a pretext for Germany's own expansionist fantasies towards Eastern Europe and in African colonial settlements—both

intended to bring German emigration to the United States to a halt. One crucial point that connects all the contributions in this volume, Conrad emphasizes, is that empire is first and foremost a political strategy. Empires thrived thanks to the mobility of cheap labour and a deeply racialized colonial workforce, but also because of the movement of ideas, concepts, and practices across the Atlantic.

This is a fine volume that promises to create productive discussions among historians and in the classroom. It clearly demonstrates the global, transnational nature of imperialism and empire by offering comparative analyses of labour recruitment practices, colonial settlements, removal and assimilation policies towards indigenous peoples, and the agents of colonial policies.

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JUDITH HESS, *Europäisierung des Gedenkens? Der Erste Weltkrieg in deutschen und britischen Ausstellungen*, Public History—Angewandte Geschichte, 8 (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2021), 358 pp. ISBN 978 3 837 65619 0. €60.00

Looking back at the First World War centenary, Daniel Todman labelled the vast range of public activities staged in 2014 a 'swirling cultural blizzard'. These events, he wrote, allowed 'the already fascinated to confirm their existing beliefs', provided others with 'a superficial moment' of engagement, and passed many more people 'completely by'.[1] At the start of the centenary, however, there had been a brief period of hope, when it seemed that new approaches to the conflict that escaped national boundaries might take hold. Judith Heß's book concentrates on the opening salvos in this period, concluding her observations long before the optimism of August 2014 was lost in the 'blizzard' of centenary fatigue. Her focus is on the numerous First World War exhibitions that sprang up in both Britain and Germany, all seeking to offer the public a framework through which to understand the complexities of the conflict's many histories. Across eleven detailed chapters, Heß explores whether these exhibitions managed to achieve a 'Europeanization of remembrance', thereby cementing new approaches to the war in the public imagination.

Where Heß's book differs from other recent studies of the centenary is in its comparative approach. This focus allows Heß to move beyond the centenary moment itself and to delve more deeply into the British–German relationship through the prism of the two countries' memory cultures. Scholarly writing on this subject has long emphasized a stark difference in the ways that the British and German publics have looked back on the First World War. George Mosse's seminal work on the 'cult of the fallen soldier' identified revanchist memories in inter-war Germany that were never replicated to the same degree in Britain.[2] After 1945 this difference persisted, with the

[1] Daniel Todman, '"Something about Who We Are as a People": Government, Media, Heritage and the Construction of the Centenary', *Twentieth Century British History*, 27/4, (2016), 518–23, at 523.

[2] George L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (New York, 1990).

more recent experience of Hitler's genocidal war overshadowing the earlier conflict in divided Germany.[3] For the British, meanwhile, as David Reynolds has noted, the First World War still retained a hold over the public imagination as a symbol of apparent futility.[4]

Following the pattern of these studies and others, Heß's starting point is the same perceived gulf between British and German memory cultures. 'In German historical consciousness', she asserts, 'it is above all National Socialism and the Second World War that are present.' In Britain, by contrast, memory of the First World War is 'kept alive' by the annual Remembrance Day commemorations (p. 15). However, given the significant role that memories of the Second World War also play in British politics and society—something that has been a theme in the work of Lucy Noakes and Mark Connelly—perhaps this rigid dichotomy between a British focus on the First World War and a German fixation on the later conflict is slightly wide of the mark.[5] Instead, it appears far more apposite to start not from a point of division, but rather by looking at how the Second World War shaped and has continued to reshape memories of the 1914–18 conflict in both countries.

There have of course been a variety of different political and cultural impulses feeding into the way both British and German societies have understood the First World War. Films and novels through to memoirs and mementos have all played a role. For Heß, though, it is solely the exhibitions that are important to her discussion, although she is very careful to situate these more broadly, considering them within the wider cultural landscape in which they were produced. Each chapter of the book then sees Heß ask different questions of the centenary exhibitions to determine which aspects of the war each exhibition chose to prioritize. The thematic chapters run chronologically, starting with familiar questions about war guilt, moving through to violence, death, and suffering on the home front, before

[3] Annika Mombauer, 'The German Centenary of the First World War', *War & Society*, 36/4 (2017), 276–88, at 279.

[4] David Reynolds, *The Long Shadow: The Great War and the Twentieth Century* (London, 2013).

[5] Lucy Noakes, *Dying for the Nation: Death, Grief and Bereavement in Second World War Britain* (Manchester, 2020); Mark Connelly, *We Can Take It! Britain and the Memory of the Second World War* (Harlow, 2004).

finally turning to consider how politicians chose to discuss the centenary exhibitions.

With such broad themes and overarching research questions, it was clearly always going to be a tricky task to select case studies that fully aligned with them. Heß's approach, therefore, is to focus on regional and national exhibitions that had the potential for good visitor numbers (p. 29). From a German perspective, special exhibitions held in the Deutsches Historisches Museum in Berlin, the Militärhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr in Dresden, Stuttgart's Haus der Geschichte Baden-Württemberg, and the Historisches Museum der Pfalz in Speyer all feature. The British comparison comes from the new First World War Galleries in the Imperial War Museum in London, the Firing Line: Cardiff Castle Museum of the Welsh Soldier, and the Imperial War Museum North in Manchester. As the case studies all cover exhibitions housed in significant regional or national museums, it is clear that each would touch on Heß's main themes concerning the broad course of the war. Yet at the same time, the reliance on such prominent exhibitions is something of a missed opportunity. While the Deutsches Historisches Museum's centenary exhibition repeated some of the themes covered ten years earlier in its 'Der Weltkrieg 1914–1918: Ereignis und Erinnerung' anniversary presentation, smaller local exhibitions offered more exciting approaches.[6] The Staatliche Bibliothek in Regensburg, which approached the war through the history of French prisoners of war, and Stockport Museum's exploration of the experience of minority voices offer good examples of local innovations.[7]

There may well have been plenty of local exhibitions offering a slightly different perspective on the war experience, but the book's seven case studies provide a good snapshot of broader museal trends that came to the fore during the centenary. With the case studies

[6] René Schlott (ed.), *Der Weltkrieg 1914–1918 – Ereignis und Erinnerung – Eine Ausstellung im Deutschen Historischen Museum Berlin* (Berlin, 2004).

[7] 'Mitten im Krieg: Das Regensburger Kriegsgefangenenlager während des Ersten Weltkriegs', Staatliche Bibliothek Regensburg, 2016, at [https://www.staatliche-bibliothek-regensburg.de/article/mitten-im-krieg-das-regensburger-kriegsgefangenenlager-waehrend-des-ersten-weltkriegs/] accessed 17 Jan. 2022; Stockport Museum, 'Keep the Home Fires Burning: Stories from World War I', 2014.

settled and the key historical themes selected, the purpose of the eight main chapters is to determine which image of the war each exhibition displayed, focusing in particular on differences between the British and German presentations. Each chapter works towards this goal in a systematic, albeit rather rigid, fashion. In the first section of each chapter, Heß provides a synthesis of the existing historiographical debates relevant to the particular topic. After this outline, the discussion then turns to see if each exhibition has followed the historiographical consensus or whether 'differences between research and the exhibitions' can be determined (p. 139).

This hunt for some form of historical truth begins in chapters three and four, which follow on from two lengthy introductory sections. Their focus is on the outbreak of the conflict and the well-trodden war guilt debate. Perhaps due to the complexity of this history, which does not lend itself particularly well to the museum setting, Heß finds that the exhibitions mainly skirt around the subject of guilt. Where the issue is touched upon, however, she notes that the German exhibitions were more likely to 'sketch out a picture of shared responsibility amongst the belligerent powers' (p. 138), while in comparison the British tended to depict the war's outbreak as a clash between a 'German aggressor' and a passive British state (p. 165). Chapters five and six focus on the memory of the war, exploring how the conflict has been understood in politics and society. Again, Heß identifies a dividing line between the two countries' approaches. The German exhibitions viewed European integration as a 'successful outcome of the learning process' that the two world wars started (p. 175). Unsurprisingly, in Brexit Britain, the exhibitions avoided framing the war in European terms, but still managed to imbue it with meaning. Leaving behind older narratives of futility and a lost generation, they viewed the war as a justified defence of civilized values for which contemporaries were willing to fight (p. 201).

The next set of chapters, seven and eight, deal with the history of wartime suffering at home and on the (Western) Front, covering everything from trenches and shelling through to forced labour and propaganda. In an engaging section on gas warfare, Heß explores how the exhibitions all chose to deploy original artefacts and images of gas masks in action as a means of visualizing the horrors of frontline warfare. What makes this discussion so successful is that it breaks away

from a fairly strict comparison of the historiography vis-à-vis the exhibition displays. Instead, Heß demonstrates a more transnational approach, as both the British and German curators used a similar set of objects to create immersive displays (pp. 212–16). Finally, the book's concluding chapters, nine and ten, explore politicians' contributions to the centenary period. Unlike in the earlier chapters, the exhibitions are more at the margins of the discussion, making an appearance only when politicians turned up to declare them open. This was a role that both David Cameron and Angela Merkel performed in 2014, opening the main centenary exhibitions in London and Berlin (pp. 276, 283).

Heß concludes her narrative lamenting that the centenary exhibitions failed to 'present a Europeanization of the history of the First World War'. The reason for this shortcoming, she contends, is that 'national narratives and national historical perspectives were not integrated into a transnational European history of the First World War' (p. 309). None of this should come as a great surprise, as these exhibitions had to speak to national audiences, funders, and political beneficiaries. Yet despite Heß's pessimism, British and German representations of the conflict, whether in museums, literature, or on screen, do offer more than a parallel history of wartime suffering. To uncover these other aspects of a complex memory culture would require an exploration of a broader range of exhibitions, beyond the more familiar national or large regional interpretations. It would also mean picking up shared cultural responses, such as the history of the gas mask, or exploring points of contact and exchange where British and German experiences overlapped. Histories of humanitarianism, diplomacy, prisoners of war, enemy aliens, and care parcels—which did make an appearance in some of the exhibitions—all offer important starting points for highlighting interactions rather than just divisions. A shared history of British–German memory of the war may still be awaiting its author, but for now Heß's study gives readers plenty to ponder.

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CONFERENCE REPORTS

Fifteenth Workshop on Early Modern German History. Organized by the German Historical Institute London in co-operation with the German Historical Institute Washington DC and the German History Society, held online on 7 May 2021. Conveners: Bridget Heal (University of St Andrews), Katherine Hill (Birkbeck, University of London), David Lederer (NUI Maynooth), Alison Rowlands (University of Essex), and Hannes Ziegler (GHIL).

Spring 2021 saw the welcome return of the GHIL workshop on early modern German history. Originally planned for May 2020, it was one of many events postponed due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Thankfully, the organizers were able to bring together presenters and attendees for a one-day online event this year. While it was a shame not to meet in person, the online format retained the core principles of the workshop, providing a welcoming and engaging platform for open discussion of new research and of developing projects. It also enabled participants to join from across the UK, Germany, and the USA. The nine papers presented covered wide-ranging themes, including public communication, identity and image, good governance and crisis management, and Renaissance learning and art. Scholars at all stages in their academic careers attended and presented at the workshop. It was especially encouraging to see a strong postgraduate and early-career presence—a testament to the supportive environment created by the workshop and a demonstration of the ongoing appeal of early modern German history as a subject of research.

The first session of the day, chaired by Bridget Heal, featured three papers which addressed different forms of communication and persuasion. Stefan Beckert (TU Dresden) presented a part of his current doctoral research, which seeks to develop a greater understanding of the mid sixteenth-century public sphere. Beckert defined any communication without a specific addressee or recipient as part of the

public sphere, and his paper explored the use of language of dissent, slander, and provocation (invectives) in public communication during the pamphlet controversy relating to Duke Henry II of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel between 1538 and 1542. Beckert stressed the importance of social capital for effective governance during this period and argued that when employed effectively, invectives in Protestant pamphlets served a dual purpose. On the one hand, they were offensive, attacking the duke's social capital and damaging his honour; on the other, they were protective, justifying and legitimizing the actions of the Protestant princes. Public communication required a delicate balance in the use of invectives; ultimately, whether something amounted to slander or honourable defence was decided in the public sphere.

Protestant propaganda, albeit in a different form, was also the subject of the paper by Thomas Wood (University of Birmingham). His doctoral research examines representations of serpents and dragons in early modern German culture, and in his paper he considered the use of the papal dragon in Protestant imagery to denigrate the papacy. Wood highlighted long-standing folkloric and popular perceptions of the dragon as a greedy and evil creature. These connotations made it an appealing image for Protestant propagandists because it could be readily understood by a wide audience without the need to develop new visual literacy. The dichotomy of the dragon and dragon slayer also contributed to a national myth-making process for Protestants. Wood traced the association of the dragon with the Antichrist and with the papacy in a variety of images in the early decades of the Reformation, and noted a growing confidence in the Protestant message by the 1540s. These ideas culminated in Peter Gottland's woodcut of St George defeating the dragon (1552), a bold illustration of Protestant faith triumphing over Catholicism. Wood also observed that such imagery was gradually exported to communities outside German lands, such as the Netherlands, emphasizing the significance of this motif to a developing Protestant identity.

The final paper in this session likewise focused on the communication of Protestant ideas. Benedikt Brunner (Leibniz Institute of European History, Mainz) presented work from his second book project, a comparative work exploring attitudes to death in several different Protestant cities in Europe and New England between 1580

and 1750. Death and ways of coping with bereavement form a key part of Christian and confessional identity, and some suggest that the Reformation changed the meaning of death. Brunner's project considers the accuracy of this characterization by analysing funeral sermons from Nuremberg, Basel, London, and Boston. He noted that funeral sermons are often only considered in a Lutheran context; yet although they originated among Lutherans, other strands of Protestantism also adopted them. Funeral sermons were primarily intended to support the grieving community and to provide instruction on living a good life in order to ensure a peaceful death. Brunner shed particular light on the funeral sermons' discussions of the body and soul. The body was presented in a negative light in the sermons, with the preachers in the different cities instead emphasizing the destiny of the soul and the need to train it for death. Overall, Brunner demonstrated that funeral sermons conveyed central theological beliefs and norms of living and dying to the community, and therefore offer an insight into the development of Protestant identities within the cities he is examining.

In the second session, chaired by Alison Rowlands, Rita Voltmer (Trier University) introduced her current research project, which examines resilience and criminal justice in witchcraft and fornication trials in the western territories of the Old Reich (fifteenth to seventeenth centuries). The project is part of a wider research group based at Trier University combining approaches from history and social science to explore how the concept of resilience can be used to analyse social, religious, and political upheaval and the steps to regain stability. The group considers resilience to be a neutral concept that denotes the ability of social groups and structures to continue and survive in the face of disruptive events and change. Voltmer provided an overview of the key principles and questions guiding the research. Rather than focusing on the resilience of those tried for witchcraft, Voltmer's research examines criminal justice as a resilience strategy (a method for individuals and groups to cope with disruptive events) and explores witchcraft and fornication trials as resilience resources within this framework. It questions how, when, and in what contexts criminal justice was used as a resilience strategy. It also considers how this strategy was used at different operational levels—among

authorities, experts, and the general populace—and how these groups interacted. Voltmer noted that the western territories of the Old Reich provide a perfect testing ground for this research as they were politically, judicially, and linguistically fragmented, and there were several severe witch hunts there. They are therefore a good setting for examining the continuities and discontinuities in the use of witchcraft and fornication trials as resilience resources. The project is still in its early stages, with two further workshops planned in the next year. Voltmer argued that the application of the resilience concept developed by this research group has the potential to provide a new paradigm for considering the functionality and non-functionality of belief in witchcraft and of the trials.

The third panel, chaired by Katherine Hill, featured three speakers whose papers all addressed notions of identity and image. Fabrice Flückiger (LMU Munich) presented a paper from his current book project exploring practices and representations of good government in cities. Flückiger's paper considered the role of dance in reflecting ideas of good governance and harmony in Nuremberg. He discussed the *Tanzstatut* (originally drawn up in July 1521), which specified who could attend dances at the city hall. The forty-two patrician families listed in the *Tanzstatut* were the families from which members of the council were drawn. Flückiger suggested that the dances codified in the *Tanzstatut* were part of the symbolic identification of these patrician families as the leading citizens of the community. Participation in the dance was a way for the patrician to assume his council duties publicly. Flückiger also drew attention to the *Rathaussaal*, the room in the city hall where dances took place. The frescos in this room used motifs borrowed from ancient Rome to reflect Nuremberg's prominence in the Holy Roman Empire and to emphasize republican values. Ultimately, Flückiger claimed that the dances were a representation of order in a well-governed city. With patrician rule under threat from monarchical government and the rise of absolutism, the dances reflected the will and ability of the richest citizens of Nuremberg to do their duty and protect the city. According to Flückiger, they were essential to ensuring the longevity of city structures.

Frederick Crofts (University of Cambridge) presented an abridged version of an article he has recently published in the *Historical Journal*.

It is part of his current doctoral research, which explores epistemic images, confessionalization, and intellectual and visual culture in Germany through the works of Calvinist church councillor and lawyer Marcus zum Lamm (1544–1606). During his lifetime zum Lamm compiled a vast collection of manuscript and printed images in his *Thesaurus Picturarum*. In his paper, Crofts focused on two volumes of this collection: volume fifteen (*Turcica*), which contains images of eastern and African people, and volume twenty-three, which contains images of contemporary German costume from sixteen different cities located in the Rhine–Danube heartland. Crofts argued that the juxtaposition of these two volumes created an image of Germanness, with the images of eastern and African alterity standing in contrast to those of German costume. According to Crofts, zum Lamm was inspired by early German humanist ideas of Germans as indigenous people from between the Rhine and the Danube. Zum Lamm's costume images were also part of a wider attempt by the Palatinate Electors in Heidelberg to place themselves at the centre of German history and to create a Protestant union under Calvinist leadership. Crofts used the examples of images of Jews from Worms and of East Frisians to demonstrate that zum Lamm's iconographic and historical references designated some groups as inside and others as outside his conception of Germany and Germanness.

Holly Fletcher (University of Cambridge), who recently completed her Ph.D. examining body weight, shape, and size in early modern Germany, presented the final paper of this session with a discussion of the relationship between clothing and the materiality of the body. Her paper challenged the notion that concern about body weight and shape is a modern phenomenon, and showed that assumptions that fatness was simply viewed as a positive sign of prosperity and wealth in early modern Germany are misconceived. Fletcher used images, personal reflections, and letters from individuals in Germany to consider how body shape altered one's experience of the world. She explored several different examples that demonstrated how people's fashion choices were influenced by their physical form and by cultural ideals of body shape. She also discussed the *Gansbauch*—padding which created the impression of a rounded stomach in male clothing. Although this item of clothing may seem to indicate that men wanted

to appear fat, the garment could in fact accentuate a slim waist, and by wearing it, men could demonstrate that they were slender enough to fit into the garment. Overall, Fletcher underlined the critical role of clothing and dress in approaching the materiality of bodily size and shape.

In the fourth panel, chaired by David Lederer, Alexander Schunka (FU Berlin) presented his research on water scarcity and resource management in early modern Germany, focusing on cities in the Duchy of Saxe-Gotha and the Electorate of Brandenburg in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Schunka's paper was wide-ranging and covered several themes, including the management of water in urban communities, the regulation of rivers and canals, practices of co-operation, potential for conflict, and the position of water in early modern mindsets. Using a variety of sources from religious, legal, and political contexts, Schunka emphasized the cultural value of water and explained the need for careful co-operation between multiple social groups to maintain water supplies. Public fountains, for example, were places where different social groups intersected, and were maintained and managed by the community as a whole. Water usage also held the potential for significant conflict. Schunka particularly highlighted the role of millers (as principal users of water) and local elites, and noted the management of water supplies such as the Finow Canal in Berlin during the eighteenth century, which was carefully monitored every day to ensure shipping did not interfere with milling. Schunka emphasized that studying water regimes in landlocked territories offers an insight into co-operative forms of resource management, demonstrating that such techniques did not originate in the modern period. While the study of water in landlocked communities may not be as dramatic as in coastal regions, Schunka proposed that this 'normal' case can shed light on how societies coped with and managed disaster.

The final session, chaired by Hannes Ziegler, featured a paper by William Theiss (Princeton University), a Ph.D. candidate whose research focuses on Renaissance learning and art in Cologne during the second half of the sixteenth century. Theiss proposed a new geography of neo-Stoicism. While neo-Stoicism has often been considered unimportant in German history, Theiss claimed that Cologne was a

laboratory of ideas for the movement, and particularly for its founder Justus Lipsius, who studied at the Jesuit school in Cologne from age 11 to 16. The other key figure in Theiss's paper, Gerhard von Kempen, taught Greek at the Jesuit school while Lipsius was a student there. Following a mission to the northern Netherlands during the 1560s, Kempen became increasingly unwell and was confined to an independent Jesuit-run asylum in Cologne; his madness culminated in a murderous attack on three Jesuits in 1574. Theiss used this case to consider how responses to madness were connected to the development of neo-Stoic ideas. Examining the records of Kempen's interrogation, Theiss found links between his visions of history and those expressed in Lipsius's later writings, with both drawing parallels between the events in the work of Tacitus and the present day. While Theiss acknowledged that there is insufficient biographical evidence to state that Lipsius's writings were directly influenced by this case, he argued that the two men provide insights into the development of neo-Stoic ideas as people navigated living in an ambiguous, violent world.

As in previous years, the workshop offered the opportunity for a relatively informal exchange of ideas about ongoing research. This exchange was not hindered by the online format, and each panel was followed by a lively question and answer session in which attendees gave feedback and explored connections that emerged between different papers. The broad thematic scope of the workshop remains one of its greatest strengths, exposing attendees to areas outside their specific research specialisms. As a postgraduate researcher, attending this workshop was a valuable opportunity to learn more about the range of ongoing work in early modern German history and to make new connections with scholars at all stages of their academic careers. The workshop was a clear demonstration of the vitality of the field, and a welcome sign that many fruitful avenues remain for future research.

Natalie Grace (University of Nottingham)

Migration and Migration Policies in Europe since 1945. Conference organized by the German Historical Institute London in co-operation with the London School of Economics and Political Science, held online, 30 June–3 July 2021. Conveners: Ulrich Herbert and Jakob Schönhagen (Forschungsgruppe Zeitgeschichte, University of Freiburg), and Christina von Hodenberg (GHIL).

What has migration meant to Europe since 1945? The starting point for this international conference, held digitally and organized by the GHIL, was the hypothesis that previous works on migration history have either stuck to the level of the nation, or focused exclusively on international organizations and processes. It is rare to find comparative and synthesizing studies that bring these levels together. By looking at migration processes in eleven European countries along with the migration policies of the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), the conference aimed to identify overarching national similarities and differences as well as breaks in continuity, and to question common historiographical narratives and periodizations, thereby laying the foundations for further transnational and comparative work.

In his keynote lecture, Peter Gatrell (University of Manchester) enumerated the themes that a European history of migration after 1945 cannot ignore, and put forward his own proposal for periodization. For Gatrell, the history of migration even after the Second World War can only be understood as a history of not just conventional, but also structural violence. Migration, he said, was in many cases not only an 'escape from violence', in the words of Aristide R. Zolberg, but also an escape into violence.[1] Gatrell argued that migration history must take more account of three factors: first, the influence of the European empires;

Trans. by Angela Davies (GHIL)

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[1] See Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo, *Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World* (New York, 1989), 29–36.

second, the various demographic policies of the European national states; and third, European diasporas (for example, of the Bulgarian people). He went on to propose a periodization for European migration policy. After the continuing violence after the war (1945–49), the high point of planned migration (1950–73), and the Schengen era following the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, Gatrell suggested that the European states found themselves in a crisis about the right of asylum and were in a panic mode that has still not passed. He concluded with a plea for the public debate to be pluralized, and pointed out that historians can make a contribution to this.

The first panel, which dealt with Western European nations, began with Matthias Waechter (CIFE, European Institute, Nice) discussing inconsistencies in French migration history. Since the nineteenth century, he said, the French government had pushed the image of a welcoming land (*terre d'accueil*), but in fact utilitarian considerations, demographic patterns, and industrialization dictated French immigration policy. If the baby boom in France after 1945 meant that the demographic factor was no longer so important, the *Trente Glorieuses*—the thirty years of strong economic growth from 1945 to 1975—were characterized by a consensus about the need for labour immigration, one which tolerated illegal immigration. But the high unemployment rates of the 1970s put an end to this too. Instead, the notion of a tolerance threshold (*seuil de tolérance*) gained ground, suggesting a maximum acceptable level of immigration. Balancing these views, Waechter proposed that Gérard Noiriel's description of the country as a 'melting pot' was still meaningfully provocative, as both the idea of France as a failed country of immigration and the French republican model continued to shape the public discourse in France.[2]

In her paper, Becky Taylor (University of East Anglia) analysed UK immigration legislation, pointing to the long shadow of the British Empire on the country's migration history. This can be illustrated by reference to the British Nationality Act 1948, which established a single status of Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies for residents of both the UK *and* its colonies, giving residents of the colonies

[2] See Gérard Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity* (Minneapolis, 1996), 265–79.

a new nationality which did not depend on being born in Britain. The provisions of the act were increasingly limited by further legislation in 1962, 1968, and 1971, which made immigration into the UK from the African and Asian Commonwealth more difficult. The British debate on European immigration did not begin until the introduction of EU citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. At the same time, the British government tried actively to reduce the number of successful asylum applications by passing numerous asylum laws in the 1990s.

Summing up, Leo Lucassen (International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam) identified three fundamental aspects of change in the post-1945 European migration regime beyond the ongoing phenomenon of labour migration—namely, decolonization, the positive revaluation of refugee status after 1990, and the entitlement to welfare rights for migrants. These developments have stalled, as decolonization can be considered over, the welfare state is at present largely closed to immigrants, and asylum law has come under strong political pressure.

Jenny Pleinen (University of Augsburg/GHIL) then presented a case study in which she analysed the scope for action which local authorities had in Belgium's migration regime. After 1945 the Aliens Police, based in the Ministry of Justice and numbering only fifty officers, decided whether new arrivals had the right to remain. As in France, the status of people who entered without a visa but could demonstrate that they had employment was retrospectively legalized in Belgium. Pleinen showed that despite Belgium's centralized immigration policy, local authorities could offer bureaucratic resistance to the Ministry of Justice by taking a long time to implement orders, not meeting formal requirements, or simply not consulting the Aliens Police. In the 1960s this scope for action, which de facto existed already, was formalized, and the administration was also decentralized.

The second panel, on Eastern and South-Eastern European states, was opened by Emilia Salvanou (Hellenic Open University, Athens) looking at the consequences of the Greek Civil War (1946–9), during which up to 10 per cent of the population took flight. The removal of children by both sides in the Civil War, who transported them to Eastern European countries or to Australia and the USA, is still the central historiographical and political point of contention. While migrant

workers in the 1950s tended to move internally to cities in Greece or externally to the USA, by the 1960s they wanted to go to Europe—and to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in particular. The end of the Cold War was a turning point, after which immigration into Greece, especially from Albania, increased strongly. Although at present 7 per cent of the Greek population does not hold a Greek passport, the Greek nation still sees itself as ethnically highly homogenous and the *jus sanguinis*—the principle of nationality law by which citizenship is determined or acquired by the nationality or ethnicity of one or both parents—is anchored in Greek citizenship law.

Dariusz Stola (Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw) emphasized Poland's special position as the only state represented at the conference which was a former member of the Eastern bloc. Because Poland had very small migration figures during the Cold War—in 1954, a total of only fifty exit permits were issued—smaller-scale movements of traders and seasonal workers are also taken into account. In the early years of the Polish People's Republic, only Germans and Jews had special permission to emigrate. They were permitted to leave the country in two phases—around 1950 and between 1955 and 1959—for the GDR, the FRG, and Israel. Finally, the end of the Cold War and Poland's entry into the EU were decisive turning points. Thereafter emigration increased sharply, especially to the UK, as emigrants could fall back on existing networks of Poles who had emigrated before 1945, of Solidarity refugees, and of *Aussiedler* (Germans who had been living in Eastern Europe).

Marie-Janine Calic (LMU Munich) gave an overview of migration movements to and from Yugoslavia. In the immediate post-war period, population groups were repatriated by the state, and the Hungarian, German, Jewish, and Muslim populations emigrated or were expelled. More than 100,000 people left the country as labour migrants between 1945 and 1963, mostly headed for the FRG, although this was illegal. The Yugoslav government opposed this, and the status of Yugoslav migrants in the FRG remained precarious until a recruitment agreement was signed in 1968. By passing an Amnesty Act in 1962, the Yugoslav government enabled former Nazi collaborators who had fled the country to come back, and about half of them—around 50,000 people—returned to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav wars

(1991–2001), finally, resulted in the biggest refugee crisis in Europe since the Second World War, in the course of which 25 per cent of the population left the former Yugoslavia.

Johan Svanberg (Stockholm University) opened the third panel, which brought together further national case studies drawn from Northern, Central, and Southern Europe. Svanberg described Sweden's post-war path from taking in Second World War refugees to actively recruiting labour. With this aim, the Swedish government as early as 1947 concluded bilateral agreements with Italy, Hungary, and Austria, until the Swedish unions pushed through a more restrictive immigration policy in 1967. In the 1950s most migrants to Sweden still came from Scandinavia, encouraged by the establishment of a Common Nordic Labour Market in 1954. Svanberg questioned the master narrative of a switch from labour migration to refugees and family reunions after 1975, as this interpretation was based solely on the deteriorating labour market in Sweden. In fact, migrant workers often worked alongside refugees, with no distinction being made between them.

In the following paper, Ulrich Herbert (University of Freiburg) looked at what happened to displaced persons, guest workers, refugees, and *Aussiedler* in the post-war history of the FRG. The integration of more than twelve million German refugees (displaced persons) from Eastern Europe after the Second World War—a quarter of the FRG's population—can be seen as a success, despite initial resentments. From 1955, the FRG began to recruit Southern European migrant workers, and this trend strengthened when the Berlin Wall was built in 1961. These were known as guest workers, and their employment was at first seen as a temporary measure. As was the case in other Western European countries, asylum law played only a marginal role in the FRG in the first two decades of its existence. This changed in response to a judgement of West Germany's Federal Administrative Court in October 1975 which guaranteed an unlimited right of asylum. Contrary to representations in the media, which concentrated mainly on Black refugees in the 1990s, two-thirds of the 2.8 million asylum seekers between 1986 and 2006 came from Eastern Europe. Over the same period, roughly the same number of *Aussiedler* arrived in Germany. Like the displaced persons in the immediate post-war period, they were given preferential treatment.

Oliver Rathkolb (University of Vienna) emphasized the special features of Austria's migration policy by comparison with Germany's. He pointed out that the status of displaced persons in post-war Austria was very different from that in Germany. By 1946, several hundred thousand *Volksdeutsche* – ethnic Germans who had lived in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe until 1945 – had been expelled from Austria, but thereafter about 350,000 were integrated. In Austria, recruitment agreements for migrant workers from Spain (1961), Turkey (1964), and Yugoslavia (1966) were negotiated by the unions and employers. The strong focus on cheap labour and the neglect of educational programmes explain why to the present day education is not highly valued by these groups. But the integration of Bosnian refugees after the Yugoslav wars must count as a success story. The higher educational level of the refugees on average compared to that of other migrant groups, as well as a sympathetic response born of imperial nostalgia in Austria, contributed to this.

Olga Sparschuh (TU Munich) explained that the usual account of Italy's migration history, which sees it change from a country of emigration to one of immigration in the 1970s, presents a more differentiated picture if internal migration is also taken into account. Between 1955 and 1971 about nine million Italians migrated within the country, which is more than left the country for Europe over the same period. Not only Munich, but also Turin was a destination for migrant workers from southern Italy. The year 1973, when for the first time more people immigrated than emigrated, marked the beginning of Italy's slow shift from a country of emigration to one of immigration. Until the 1990s, immigration was not legally regulated because of the low numbers. Several programmes were subsequently introduced to retrospectively legalize the status of immigrants.

In the first paper of the fourth panel, which looked at European and global aspects of migration history, Jürgen Bast (Justus Liebig University Giessen) explained that EU migration law now exerts a decisive influence on policy in the European national states. The path to this outcome can be explained by the close connection between EU constitutional and migration law. To start with, the Treaties of Rome established a split migration regime from 1958. This guaranteed freedom of movement within the European Economic Community (EEC),

but did not apply to immigrants from third countries and the French overseas territories. The Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force in 1999, and the European Council meeting held in Tampere in the same year represented a turning point. The numerous guidelines subsequently adopted—on family reunification, for example—resulted in a common EU liberal asylum and migration policy for immigrants from third countries.

Michael Mayer (Academy for Political Education, Tutzing) then discussed a specific aspect of European migration history—namely, asylum in Europe. He started by looking at how international refugee law and the concept of asylum were shaped by the Western European states and the USA in the immediate post-war period. At this time, the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention limited the concept of refugees to Europe and ignored refugee crises elsewhere. Mayer then emphasized what was different about the FRG in a European context—namely, that it anchored the right to asylum for those suffering political persecution in its constitution. The original aim of this clause was to help Germans who were being politically persecuted in the Soviet Occupation Zone, but it was made redundant as East Germans were automatically granted citizenship of the FRG.

Taking the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) as an example, Jakob Schönhagen (University of Freiburg) demonstrated that the UN did not identify refugee movements as a persistent political problem until the 1960s. Initially, the budget of the International Refugee Organization (IRO), which had existed since 1946, was savagely cut with the founding of the UNHCR in 1950 and the passing of the Geneva Convention on Refugees in 1951, and refugee policy was renationalized. Refugees were defined solely as European displaced persons—a problem unique to the past—and what Schönhagen called 'a politics without future' was the result. It was not until the start of decolonization—with refugee movements during the Algerian War (1954–62), for example—that the UN gradually developed a more universal understanding of refugees, as codified in the New York Protocol of 1967. Schönhagen pointed out, however, that this more universal view was fragmented. While the UNHCR first co-ordinated comprehensive aid efforts in 1971 during the Indo-Pakistani war, it did not offer assistance during the war in Biafra or the Vietnam War.

The paper by Agnes Bresselau von Bressensdorf (Berlin Center for Cold War Studies) followed on chronologically from Schönhagen's presentation. She discussed the global refugee regime from 1970 in terms of the root causes debate in the UN and European practices in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The root causes debate—in which a German initiative of around 1980 suggested that preventing refugee movements in the first place should be prioritized over later humanitarian measures—was subsequently connected with the issue of structural inequality between the Global North and the Global South, something that had already been discussed for some time. Specifically, the member states of the European Community followed a strategy of regionalization for refugees from Pakistan and Afghanistan. By providing aid to refugees on the borders and involving the Turkish government, they attempted to keep refugee movements as far from European borders as possible.

Summing up, Ulrich Herbert suggested that a periodization pattern could be discerned for all the countries discussed. First there was the phase between 1944–5 and the mid 1950s, during which migration processes were shaped by the aftermath of war and decolonization. Second, in the West, the years between the mid 1950s and the early 1970s were marked by labour migration within Europe, while this did not apply in the political East with the exception of Yugoslavia. The third phase identified by Herbert, from the early 1970s to the years around 1990, was characterized in the West by a switch from labour migration to refugee and asylum migration. A great migration to the West began in the disintegrating Soviet empire, mostly by migrants seeking asylum, and in the special case of Germany as a destination, also the migration of ethnic German *Aussiedler*. After the fall of the Soviet empire, Western Europe began to close its borders to further immigration—with variable success—while eastern Central Europe saw refugees from the Global South seeking asylum for the first time.

Herbert also pointed out that the perspective of the refugees has found little consideration in the research, which is dominated by images of victims or pioneers. It has also become apparent that while mass migration has almost always resulted in significant challenges in the host countries, these were caused not so much by the immigrants themselves as by the reactions of the societies receiving them. While

Herbert personally favoured an analytical rather than an activist role for historians, he stressed the need for them to take a position in the current situation.

RALF KRETZSCHMAR (University of Freiburg)

Chronopolitics: Time of Politics, Politics of Time, Politicized Time. Conference organized by the German Historical Institute London, the Leibniz Centre for Contemporary History Potsdam (ZZF), the Leibniz Research Alliance 'Value of the Past', and the Arbeitskreis Geschichte + Theorie, and held in Potsdam, 16–18 September 2021. Conveners: Tobias Becker (ZZF), Christina Brauner (University of Tübingen), and Fernando Esposito (University of Konstanz).

This conference brought together scholars working on the interrelationship between time and politics, temporality, and historiography in order to systematize debates on chronopolitics and to connect theoretical work on temporalities with traditional historical research.

In his opening keynote lecture, Dipesh Chakrabarty (University of Chicago) outlined two conflicting chronopolitics arising out of the collision between geological and human–historical time. The notion of a 'post-pandemic future' illustrates the singularity that we attribute to the pandemic, whereas climate change is narrated as a process. Given the difficulty of placing the Anthropocene in terms of human periodization, Chakrabarty argued that human concerns (for example, the pandemic) should be converted into the Anthropocene time, and not simply vice versa.

While the keynote lecture looked at the synchronization of two temporalities, the first panellists focused on microstudies of three events as (de)synchronizers. Burak Onaran (Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University) examined the junta's intervention within the existing time order after the *coup d'état* in Turkey on 27 May 1960. The immediate historicization of the coup fulfilled the promised future of the Kemalists' past, thus legitimizing the junta's actions and creating a continuity of historic meaning. Helge Jordheim (University of Oslo) then problematized the 'timelines' that were used to a great extent after the terror attacks of 22 July 2011 in Norway. Timelines often seem to reconstruct time and appear rational but, according to Jordheim, they represent highly conflicting instruments of evaluation.

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In the last presentation of the panel, Alexander C. T. Geppert (New York University) introduced 'futurity' and 'velocity' as the temporal regimes of the space age. The connection between these temporalities and a complex media infrastructure ensured that the moon landing on 20 July 1969 was perceived as a synchronizer of time and space, which transformed the world into a planet.

Despite the uniqueness of the events they addressed, all the panellists demonstrated that individual events encapsulate larger processes—be they the transition of power, dealing with terror, or new perceptions of temporal and spatial borders on earth. The focus was on synchronicity, and the discussion showed that it had a twofold effect: when politics aims to synchronize temporalities and events, political groups also have an interest in the politics of desynchronization. Thus to determine agency in specific studies, it is necessary to elucidate what Reinhart Koselleck called the defining layer in the temporal sediments of the event. In terms of agency, the case studies brought up the role of the media as a crucial synchronizer that also diversified and produced multiple temporalities.

Mirjam Hähnle (University of Basel) opened the second panel by arguing that in the eighteenth century, travelogues about the Middle East expressed relations between regions in temporal dimensions, describing relics or places. Rejecting the simple assumption of a break between premodern and modern temporalities, she proposed discontinuities and temporal overlaps between modernity and premodernity. Mirjam Brusius (GHIL) examined how archaeology contributed to the constitution of historical time and its relevance for the creation of European narratives of progress and civilizatory hierarchies. She demonstrated that history and archaeology rely on linearity constructed by material and archival practices that emerged in the nineteenth century in the Western world. In the panel's last paper, Andrea Nicolas (Berlin) discussed how the political time regimes of governmental rule are interconnected with dominant forms of historicity, exemplified by the *gadaa* system of Oromo society in Ethiopia. She argued that the political contexts in which historicities emerge shape their historical narration. Thus the question of who shapes the discourse is crucial for the historiographical framing of *gadaa* as a counter-concept to Western democracy.

The panel emphasized the relevance of materiality for the construction of temporalities. Objects serve as tools to access certain periods and are used to establish temporalities, but themselves incorporate multiple temporal structures. Yet materiality can go further than the examples presented and also include temporal traces in practices and bodies. These findings demand new approaches to the history of science, archaeology, and cultural sciences, and especially to museums and heritage studies. Western colonial practices cannot be swept away, and collected objects pose a challenge to European exhibitions. This demonstrates the need for new approaches to collecting objects in the first place. Furthermore, the example of Oromo society problematizes how modern Western concepts such as 'democracy' change our perceptions and interrogation of empirical data, and how changes in conceptualization may politicize a subject, which is then appropriated. Similar conceptualizations affect attributions like 'modern' and 'premodern', or 'colonial' and 'post-colonial', which have their own temporalities and often alter our research methods.

The first part of the third panel dealt with the ideological temporalities of (post)socialism in Eastern Europe. Marcus Colla (University of Cambridge) asked what temporal orders existed under socialism, and how a temporal lens may help us to better grasp the conditions and crisis of late socialism. He argued that both simultaneous and alternative temporalities were strongly interconnected with the regime, and thus every critique connected to the notions of time was perceived as a critique of the regime. Adéla Gjuričová (Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague) complemented the discussion on socialist temporalities by focusing on the transition from socialism to democracy in Czechoslovakia. She examined conflicting temporalities in four subfields of the transition period: the legislative procedure; reform negotiations in parliament; the demand for privatization; and the election of 1992, with the subsequent transformation of what had been a federation into two republics.

Gjuričová used chronopolitics as a tool to distinguish various social groups by their specific experiences of time in order to overcome the binary notion of supporters of Communist policies and the opposition, while Colla productively identified temporalities in various policies and discourses. By differentiating between political

concepts of time and experiences of time, the panel demonstrated the importance of being aware of analytical methods and applied concepts. The concept of 'revolution' itself reveals temporal layers in the events of 1989, both as an analytical concept and in the language of sources: 'revolution' may re-temporalize 1989 by aligning it with other revolutions, or change its semantics in Eastern European languages by adding an active or passive component. Another issue that raised concerns was the division into Eastern and Western temporalities. It must be asked whether the changes were mutual, or what the specific features in each case were.

In the evening lecture, Margarita Rayzberg (Cornell University) and Blake Smith (University of Chicago) focused on academic chronopolitics and examined our disciplinary and systemic experiences of time, discourses on time, and perceptions of time as a resource. In their well-known book *The Slow Professor*,[1] Maggie Berg and Barbara K. Seeber articulated a critique of speed and constant pressure for productivity in academia, but the panellists rejected the existence of this choice, especially for junior scholars who are dependent on high performance in a competitive environment. Academics are constantly producing and making sense of time when narrating their biographies. Another aspect concerned how academics communicate in society—how they strive to be timely and relevant when speaking on certain topics in public, despite having had a rather atemporal training while working on a Ph.D. thesis.

In the second part of the panel on socialist and neoliberal temporalities, Benjamin Möckel (University of Cologne) examined the discourse on the political metaphor of future generations. He argued that the concept's success lies in its adaptation to various political agendas. Furthermore, the metaphor integrates distant futures into the political discourse to allow us to talk about the future. While Möckel problematized moral responsibilities as expressed in economic values, Elizabeth Cohen (Syracuse University) introduced the attribution of value to time in liberal democracies. Cohen focused on 'scientifically measured durational time' to describe how non-measurable aspects

[1] Maggie Berg and Barbara K. Seeber, *The Slow Professor: Challenging the Culture of Speed in the Academy* (Toronto, 2016).

of political processes are evaluated in terms of time. Starting with the calendar, which is essential for establishing and maintaining political boundaries, Cohen stressed the function of time in forming justice and in deliberation.

By leaving historical or experienced time out of her analysis, Cohen remarkably demonstrated how to make time and procedural temporalities visible. This approach may be applied not only to governing systems, but also to institutions that are determined by procedures, such as courts and parliaments. Furthermore, the examination of temporalities in procedures allows for long-term perspectives and comparisons, providing an opportunity to move beyond microstudies. As Cohen's analysis concentrated on procedures, she was able to precisely articulate their interconnected power relations. Thus Cohen's approach fulfils the demand to identify who the actors are in historical research on chronopolitics. Möckel's talk exemplified how its vagueness allowed the metaphor of future generations to work: it does not specify when the future generations start—or whether the actors are even speaking for themselves, as in case of the climate crisis. But the demand to consider the rights of future generations prioritizes political agendas connected with them as a strategy of legitimation. Does the success of the metaphor of future generations in agenda-setting mean that time is becoming irrelevant to certain political arguments?

The fourth panel focused on historicities. Fernando Esposito (University of Konstanz) problematized the doing of historiography not as observation, but as a chronopolitical act. Exemplifying the argument about the historicization of historicism put forward by Reinhart Koselleck, Esposito stressed that not every change of relation to the past happened with the intention of intervening in historiographical temporalities (as Claude Lanzmann's film *Shoah* or W. G. Sebald's novel *Austerlitz* demonstrate). Instead, changed relations to the past often relied merely on structural transformations. Stressing the Eurocentricity of Koselleck's concept of the contemporaneity of the non-contemporaneous, Esposito used it to conceptualize the plurality of times and contemporaneities as the new fundamental experience of time.

Using the term coined by Ethan Kleinberg (Wesleyan University), Esposito contributed to the 'history of the present'. Rejecting that way of narrating history, Kleinberg presented his own understanding of

the history of the present—one that disputes that the present is a stable point that itself presupposes a stable past. Kleinberg approached the present as a performative interpretation that transforms and limits the past. Thus he diagnosed the discipline's inability to relate to the future. As a result, historians 'roam an ever-extending present while looking back'. Kleinberg emphasized that Koselleck's assumption of anthropological constants throughout history is similarly determined by our temporalities, and in this respect restricts our imagination of possible present pasts. Kleinberg argued for a plurality of approaches to encounter the 'ghosts' of the past that are 'surging' in our present—enabling historians to ride 'the surge', as the past only exists as history.

Zoltán Boldizsár Simon (Bielefeld University) introduced a new approach of this sort, in which technological and ecological temporalities disconnect history from its past and break the developmental continuity between past, present, and future. Linking the political domain with historical temporalities, he described a desynchronization of political and technological time in terms not of the pace of change, but of the different kinds of change informing them. Drawing on Helge Jordheim's argument of a modernity that synchronized multiple temporalities with a single linear and homogenous narrative progress, Simon outlined a desynchronization of 'processual–developmental' and 'evental–unprecedented' changes, arguing that this produces temporal conflicts concerning our expectations of the future or the relevance of the past.

This conference laid out a potential programme for exploring the relations of time and politics in/of history. First, the connection consists of time as a resource in politics, giving rise to a struggle for dominance over time, or power relations characterized as temporal conflicts. Time as a resource can operate in different modes, such as a political use of historical time, the politics of memory, and claims of a crisis, but may also cover topics such as time in spaces like parliaments or courts. Second, politics and power presuppose actors who need to be identified in order for power and time relations to be visualized. Studying actors in dominant power relations, a history of chronopolitics must ask how the experiences of excluded actors should be considered. Third, academics must reflect on disciplinary chronopolitics and research as a chronopolitical act. Historians are

crucial chronopolitical actors who police what counts as history and, by doing so, politicize time and history. Finally, the theory of history must not only frame empirical research, but also integrate the temporal category into research on historical and social change.

Olga Sabelfeld (Bielefeld University / SFB 1288 Practices of Comparing)

Twelfth Medieval History Seminar. Workshop organized by the German Historical Institute London and supported by the German Historical Institute Washington DC, held online on 30 September–2 October 2021. Conveners: Stephan Bruhn (GHIL), Paul Freedman (Yale University), Fiona Griffiths (Stanford University), Bernhard Jussen (Goethe University Frankfurt am Main), Simon MacLean (University of St Andrews), Marcus Meer (GHIL), Len Scales (Durham University), Dorothea Weltecke (Humboldt University of Berlin).

Now in its twelfth iteration, the biennial Medieval History Seminar (MHS) has become an established platform for postgraduate students to present and discuss ongoing research projects on the Middle Ages with distinguished medievalists as well as their peers. It has also become a cherished tradition of the German Historical Institutes in London and Washington; however, the Covid-19 pandemic has forced many traditional events to be postponed or adapted, and the Medieval History Seminar was no exception.

While in previous years postgraduates from universities in the UK, Ireland, Germany, and North America met at the GHIL in person, international travel remains riddled with hurdles, and so in 2021 an online format for the MHS proved inevitable. Of course, the social aspects of in-person events, which are generally as enjoyable as they are constructive, can only be imperfectly imitated by virtual coffee and tea breaks; but thanks to the attendees' exemplary discipline, the academic parts of the seminar proved to be as productive as ever.

Ph.D. students and early-career scholars were invited to circulate short essays in anticipation of the seminar, and also asked to prepare and present more detailed commentaries on two of their peers' papers at the workshop. These commentaries kicked off the discussion of each essay among the attendees and were augmented by questions from the conveners, who chaired the sessions of the seminar. This year's conveners were Fiona Griffiths, Dorothea Weltecke, Len Scales, Paul Freedman, Simon MacLean, and Bernhard Jussen, whose familiarity with both German- and English-speaking academia was essential to another key feature of the MHS: its bilingual conception encourages participants to hone their skills in each other's languages, navigating

the advantages and disadvantages of German idiosyncrasies and English conciseness.

The attendees' impressive linguistic skills in languages from Castilian to Hebrew certainly added to the already disciplinarily diverse line-up of the seminar, with contributions from legal, social and economic, urban, religious, and cultural history, as well as considerable expertise in adjacent disciplines, including Latin philology. This allowed participants to pay close attention to the minutiae of translating tricky terms, as the first session impressively demonstrated. Vedran Sulovsky (University of Cambridge) considered the consecration date of the Marienkirche in Aachen. Looking closely at extant sources, including those concerned with local liturgy, he suggested that the church was in fact dedicated on 17 July 802 and endowed with relics of Sts Speratus, Cyprian, and Pantaleon, which, he argued, had been sent by the Abbasid rulers in Carthage. The year 802 also featured in the essay by Grigorii Borisov (University of Tübingen), although his interest in the reception of Carolingian legal writing went far beyond the early medieval period. Moving backwards from the antiquarian interests of humanist Johannes Herold in the sixteenth century, Borisov analysed the historical interpretation of early medieval *leges* in the case of the *Lex Thuringorum* during the reign of Abbot Bovo III (942–8) of Corvey Abbey and the composition of the *Lex Frisionum* in Charlemagne's time.

The second session saw a chronological leap away from the early Middle Ages, while thematically it turned towards questions of daily life, albeit in two different institutional contexts. Lena Liznerski (University of Mannheim) reminded participants of the challenging but promising research technique of acquiring quantitative data from qualitative sources. Tax decrees and guild ordinances, for example, can be made to answer questions of economic history, as Liznerski's analysis of the regulation concerning bread prices in late medieval Speyer demonstrated. Reconstruction from fragmentary information as the historian's task also formed the subject of the essay by Emma Gabe (University of Toronto), who attempted to understand the daily routine of lay sisters in the fifteenth-century Observant Dominican Katharinenkloster of Nuremberg. Eventually, Gabe argued, differences in the lay sisters' routine underlined differentiation from the

choir nuns: both shared spaces, but the secondary status of the lay sisters within the convent was perpetually reinforced.

The theme of differentiation continued in the third session, where the essay by Maria Seidel (Heidelberg Center for Jewish Studies) on the will—written in Hebrew—of Judah ben Asher (1270–1349) carefully excavated this emigrant's desire to reconcile preserving inherited customs with embracing his family's adopted home on the Iberian Peninsula. That the close investigation of physical manuscripts and their transmission history offers manifold insights for social and cultural history was also shown by the second essay of this session: Christian Schweizer (Trinity College Dublin) once again put the spotlight on the early medieval period, analysing Dicuil's *Liber de astronomia* (*c.*814–18) as a source for Carolingian court life during the reign of Louis the Pious, as well as for the intellectual (and specifically computistic) interests of the Carolingian *correctio* (rather than renaissance).

Uses and reuses of written texts also inspired the first essay of the fourth session, submitted by Hanna Nüllen (Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg), who works on the registers or custumals (*Stadtbücher*) of German towns. Their compilation, Nüllen showed, committed oral information to the written word and thus not only testifies to the intensification of writing in urban administration in the later Middle Ages, but also speaks to the formation of urban society as a legal community (*Rechtsgemeinschaft*). Both aspects were, ultimately, a matter for elites, and urban elites again took centre stage in the second essay of the session. Matthew Coulter (University of Cambridge) introduced his audience to the strategies of political communication employed by Saxon towns in their relationships with the Hungarian royal court, where personal connections to the king and royal officials proved a crucial condition for the towns' ability to pursue their aims and protect their interests.

If the essays had so far oscillated between the early and late medieval periods, in the fifth session the High Middle Ages received their due attention. Monja Schünemann (Humboldt University of Berlin) argued that references to weather in accounts of the 'Catastrophe of Rome' in 1167, which saw Frederick Barbarossa's Italian ambitions scuppered by a devastating disease, ought to be reconsidered as a

phenomenon of perceptional history (*Vorstellungsgeschichte*)—one that established idealized attributes of medieval rulers and aided in the creation of social cohesion at the same time. Matthew Clayton (Durham University) turned to a different topos of medieval literature by investigating representations of Julius Caesar in works such as William of Poitiers's *Gesta Guillelmi* and the Middle High German *Annolied*, where the Roman emperor emerges as a common denominator of culturally shared ideas about justice.

The sixth and final session provided further close readings of source texts in the field of religion, with the essay by Thomas Kaal (Goethe University Frankfurt am Main) questioning previous interpretations of the late medieval Castilian expression *nada que nascer e morir* as an indication of religious scepticism. Instead, Kaal showed the originally much broader semantic basis of the expression and traced it as it gradually narrowed in meaning and entered discourses about religious deviance. Returning to German-speaking areas one last time, the contribution by Laura Moncion (University of Toronto) sought to understand the role of obedience for female recluses in towns. Monastic rules, saintly vitae, and other sources, Moncion showed, articulated obedience as a concept that communicated not the subjugation of religious men and women, but their spiritual authority.

Given the disciplinary, thematic, chronological, and geographical breadth of the contributions discussed over the three days of the seminar, a concluding summary can only identify broader shared aspects. One that stands out is the productivity of detailed deconstructions of texts and in-depth analysis of their proliferation. As the attendees' essays and comments have shown, these remain two of the key tools of any medievalist, and they are sharpened—and by no means replaced—by the methodological attention (rightly) paid to visual and material culture.

Finally, there was undoubtedly something stimulating about the seminar's wide-ranging mix of contributions. This point was also emphasized at the end of the three days by Bernhard Jussen, who joined the Medieval History Seminar for the last time as his term as convener came to an end, as did Paul Freeman's. We are most grateful for their expertise and enthusiasm over eight years of the MHS

and hope to see them in London again soon. And the same applies to all participants who were not able to meet us in person in 2021, but whose readiness to join us in this online format we immensely appreciated.

MARCUS MEER (GHIL)

Contemporary Historians and the Reuse of Social Science-Generated Datasets: An International Dialogue on the Challenges Presented by Social Science Data. Workshop organized by the German Research Foundation (DFG) project 'Social Science Data as Sources for Contemporary History' ('Sozialdaten als Quellen der Zeitgeschichte') and held at the German Historical Institute London on 28–30 October 2021. Conveners: Lutz Raphael (Trier University), Sabine Reh (Research Library for the History of Education, BBF-DIPF Berlin), Pascal Siegers (GESIS—Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences), Kerstin Brückweh (Berliner Hochschule für Technik), and Christina von Hodenberg (GHIL).

The third workshop of the DFG-funded project 'Social Science Data as Sources for Contemporary History' aimed to establish an international dialogue between historians, sociologists, and representatives of the infrastructure that collects and provides access to social science-generated datasets. In her introductory remarks, Christina von Hodenberg (GHIL) emphasized the value of international exchange for a reflection of the different approaches employed by contemporary historians who analyse and incorporate social science data into their research. In addition to addressing such methodological questions, the workshop provided an opportunity to gain a deeper understanding of how research data infrastructures process, archive, and make social science data accessible in countries across Europe.

The first panel focused on the reuse of qualitative and life history interviews. In her presentation, the sociologist Jane Gray (Maynooth University) introduced her research on 'family rhythms', reusing and combining archived qualitative social science data from the Life Histories and Social Change Collection, and drawing on semi-structured interviews conducted during the national longitudinal study of children Growing Up in Ireland (GUI). Both datasets have been deposited in the Irish Qualitative Data Archive and are now maintained and disseminated by the Digital Repository of Ireland. According to Gray, working across datasets using descriptive approaches and mixing them with other historical sources such as quantitative data allows an analysis of changing relationships between children and their grandparents across extended periods of time. Gray discussed the

implications of a 'descriptive turn' in the social sciences, which draws on diverse sources (such as qualitative records and social media data) to present complex social phenomena and social change, thus overcoming the limitations of traditional surveys.

Clemens Villinger (GESIS) explained how he reused interviews conducted by social scientists in East Germany during the 1990s to write a history of consumption from an everyday perspective. He identified three major obstacles to his research: first, the interviews were hard to locate because they remained in the personal archives of the interviewers; second, access depended on personal sympathies; and third, different ethical views exist about whether they can be reused at all. He called for a code of ethics to make it easier for historians to reuse social science data responsibly, and to reduce the associated costs. Taking his own research on the attribution of consumer responsibility after 1989–90 as an example, Villinger argued that the benefits of reusing interviews outweigh the challenges, while support was missing to reduce the burden of analysing existing social science research data.

The third paper was presented by Mary Stewart and Charlie Morgan (both British Library Sound Archive). Unlike in Germany, the reuse of interviews has played a key role in the British oral history movement since its beginnings in the 1970s. This is why the Sound Archive aims to make as much qualitative data as possible available not only to scientists and academics, but also to the media, artists, and families. Before the public reuse of older collections is permitted, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) requires the archive to identify personal data about living people and to evaluate whether its public release is likely to cause 'substantial damage and distress'. The nature of the interviews requires an elaborate lexicon search engine to identify sensitive passages. This can itself be reused to make the collection searchable and therefore more accessible. Unlike in Germany, the British Library Sound Archive datasets are not anonymized, which means that information is not lost when they are used for research.

In her comment, Kerstin Brückweh (BHT) suggested establishing a help desk for historians dealing with ethical questions. She also raised the question of whose history we are writing if interviews

with 'ordinary people' are less easily accessible than interviews with 'movers and shakers' such as politicians.

The second panel focused on survey data as a source for social history and started with a presentation by Mor Geller (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) about the KINO-DDR social science research project carried out by the East German Central Institute for Youth Research. The project was designed to elicit viewers' opinions of socialist films. From a history of knowledge perspective, Geller demonstrated the complex relations between the social scientists, the survey, and the participants, which she characterized as 'a double-ended line of communication'. She argued that opinion polls can be used as a historical source to open up ways of studying the relationship between the socialist state and its population.

Marcus Böick (Ruhr-University Bochum) spoke about his analysis of interviews with managers working for the Treuhandanstalt (Trust Agency, set up in 1990 to privatize East German enterprises), which were conducted by an ethnologist in 1992. After tracking them down in the personal possession of a former employee, Böick managed to retrieve the interview transcripts from a number of floppy discs. He used them to write a social microhistory of the Treuhandanstalt from the perspective and experience of the mostly West German managers. By identifying narrative patterns, Böick was able to create types such as the 'industry manager' and topoi such as the self-definition as pioneers working on the economic frontier of the 'wild east'. Böick highlighted open questions concerning the use of datasets rediscovered by historians when there are no guidelines for their appropriate use.

Moritz J. Feichtinger (University of Bern) then introduced his work on quantification practices used to monitor, model, and manipulate societies. He drew upon the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) used during the Vietnam War as an example. To understand and analyse computing techniques dating from the 1960s and 1970s, Feichtinger engages with a process he calls data 're-enactment', which consists of five steps: the conversion of data into a readable format; the creation of a data life cycle model; the annotation of converted datasets; the simulation (or mimicking) of historic update, maintenance, aggregation, and query routines; and finally, publication as a web-based

simulation. According to Feichtinger, this approach allows a deeper understanding of how the use of data shaped (military) representations of the world that not only influenced decision-making and policy-making processes, but also had a tangible impact on the Vietnamese people.

The comment was given by Christina von Hodenberg. She asked what theoretical, ethical, and practical aspects need to be considered when reusing social science data produced in dictatorships, wars, or colonial contexts. During the discussion both Böick and Pascal Siegers emphasized that errors, biases, and self-censorship are typical of data production in all political contexts. The second part of the discussion revolved around the fundamental question of whether it makes sense to reuse social science data if they do not allow established historical narratives to be challenged.

The second day started with a presentation by Irena Saleniece (Daugavpils University) on oral history interviews with Latvian teachers that are archived in the Centre of Oral History established in 2003. Saleniece is conducting new interviews and reusing existing qualitative datasets to write an experiential history of the Sovietization of the Latvian school system between the 1940s and 1960s. For her, oral history interviews with different generations of (often bi- or trilingual) Latvians serve to counteract the record from the state archives, which during the Soviet period falsified facts and silenced inconvenient voices. She focuses on emotional, episodic, and bottom-up perspectives to break through the standardized 'Bolshevik speak'.

The director of the Mass Observation Archive, Fiona Courage (University of Sussex), gave an introduction to the history and holdings of the archive, as well as her own research on the value of higher education. The initial mass observation project ran from 1937 to the 1950s and was revived in 1981. To this day, the charity-based archive records everyday life in Britain using volunteer panel writers who fill in questionnaires three times a year and also keep diaries. Like the interviews in the British Library Sound Archive, the data are not anonymized. As Courage put it, the broad consent of study participants allows personal data to be used to reconstruct long-term life stories.

In his comment, Pascal Siegers stressed the value of historical research on socialization in schools and other institutions, arguing that historians could enrich the debate in the social sciences. He questioned the reliability of oral history sources, pointing to their subjectivity. In response, Lutz Raphael remarked that oral history interviews could help to reconstruct processes of subjectivization.

The final panel started with a presentation by Alexander Nützenadel (HU Berlin) about the impact of the 'behavioural turn' on economic history. He used examples from the DFG-funded programme 'Experience and Expectation' to explain how reused social science-generated datasets from large-scale surveys can be combined with techniques like 'distant reading' of traditional sources such as newspapers to investigate how interactions between individual preferences, beliefs, and economic expectations led to economic decisions. This historicization of expectations not only raises methodological questions, but also leads to practical problems related to the long-term storage and accessibility of the research data produced. To manage and store the data, the programme has partnered with the Berlin State Library to design an infrastructure based on MyCoRe, which is free, open-source software for the development of data repositories.

The central question of the joint presentation by Benoît Majerus and Lars Wieneke (both Luxembourg Centre for Contemporary and Digital History, C²DH) was how clandestine global and local networks of tax evasion can be identified by methods of data extraction from the public register of companies in Luxembourg. The main goal of their project is to identify and analyse networks of individual actors who registered companies. Although the registry is available in standardized PDF documents, named-entity extraction and a data-based understanding of these networks pose complex methodological and technical questions. The data will permit an understanding of how networks for tax evasion developed in Luxembourg from the beginning of the twentieth century.

Lastly, Michael Whittall (Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg) outlined a sociological project that revisits interviews with East German works councils conducted in the early 1990s. These historical interviews will be compared with recent sources on works councils in selected companies that are still in existence. Whittall and

his colleagues aim to reconstruct changing perceptions of works councils in relation to factors such as qualifications or length of service. Like all projects represented in the workshop that reuse qualitative data produced by research on the transformation of the 1990s, this project faces data challenges such as accessibility, ethical and ownership questions, difficulties in researching historical production contexts, and issues of long-term storage.

According to Lutz Raphael, who commented on the last panel, all presentations illustrated that the old division of labour between sociology and history is becoming obsolete, not only because of new sources, but also because of changing research methods. The search for weighted factors of causality is increasingly giving way to the search for patterns, meaning, process, and agency. Even though the presentations touched on different subjects and sources, Raphael proposed the category of historical experience as a unifying point that could connect different branches of research. At the same time, he pointed critically to the emergence of a methodological gap produced by computing processes that are no longer fully understood by (most) historians. In response, Andreas Fickers (Luxembourg Centre for Contemporary and Digital History, C^{2}DH) described digital hermeneutics as a common space where data, tools, and infrastructure are shared. In his view, historians are now experiencing nothing less than a turning point in the history of science that is fundamentally changing epistemic traditions.

In his concluding comment, Fickers suggested four different modes of reusing social science-generated data: re(dis)covery, reinterpretation, recontextualization, and re-enactment. The first aspect involves historians applying techniques such as retrodigitization, the annotation of metadata, and restoring data that used to be the typical domain of archives or libraries. Reinterpreting data means using new digital tools that not only empower historians, but also limit historical knowledge production. Reflecting on the opportunities and limits of digital methods, Fickers pointed to 'tool criticism' as a new historical instrument that can help to narrow the methodological gap. He argued that recontextualizing data also poses ethical questions that can include disfiguring meaning, while indexation processes can also have excluding effects. To deal with issues arising from reframing sources in a digital

environment, he suggested engaging in practices of 'ethical editing' and interface criticism to understand how datasets are (re)presented on digital platforms. His last point on re-enacting referred to the materiality of datasets and the knowledge that is embedded in both the physical datasets and the machines processing them.

The final discussion showed that there was no common understanding of how the terms 'use' and 'reuse' should be differentiated. But there was agreement that social science datasets are valuable sources that must be secured, archived, and made accessible. Von Hodenberg pointed out that there is a lack of international data infrastructure, even though scientific knowledge production is increasingly dominated by international co-operation. Siegers explained this in terms of the specialization of nation-based scientific communities who demand infrastructure which fits their needs. Fickers, on the other hand, pointed to international standards, such as the Europeana metadata scheme, that not only enable interoperability, but also make archived datasets findable. In the end, the workshop showed that the reuse of datasets by contemporary historians is a dynamic field characterized by decentralized infrastructure and a broad variety of sources, tools, and approaches. It became clear that the collection, organization, and interpretation of social science-generated datasets will continue to be a task for years to come.

Clemens Villinger (GESIS — Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences)

The History of Medialization and Empowerment: The Intersection of Women's Rights Activism and the Media. Third meeting of the International Standing Working Group on Medialization and Empowerment, held online, 20–21 January 2022. Conveners: Christina von Hodenberg and Jane Freeland (German Historical Institute London), alongside partners at the Max Weber Forum for South Asian Studies in Delhi, the German Historical Institute Washington DC, the German Historical Institute Rome, and the Orient Institute Beirut.

This conference explored the role of the media in shaping and constituting discussions of gender roles and women's rights globally, and marked the end of a three-year project looking at the interconnections, contingencies, and dependencies of women's rights and the media throughout the long twentieth century. It was organized as part of the international research project 'Knowledge Unbound: Internationalization, Networking, Innovation in and by the Max Weber Stiftung', which is funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research.

Drawing on their work in the history of feminism and media history, Jane Freeland and Christina von Hodenberg welcomed the participants with some methodological remarks. Although it plays a crucial role as a wellspring of and a source of evidence for feminist activism, Freeland argued that historians seldom look at the media as an actor in its own right, one that has shaped feminist politics and ideas of private and public life. To address this shortcoming, von Hodenberg suggested scholars draw from the concept of medialization, a term describing how the growth of mass media (from popular press, radio, and TV to the internet) throughout the long twentieth century has increasingly resulted in the media setting the conditions for public debate and understanding. A key aim of the conference was to investigate how paying attention to the medialization of feminism might change histories of feminism and women's emancipation.

The first panel explored the role of the media in discussing and shaping the way we think about the connections between gender, war, and violence. Twinkle Siwach (Jawaharlal Nehru University) examined violent crimes against women in contemporary India. By looking at the First Information Reports logged with the police and

how they are picked up by the media, the courts, and civil society organizations, Siwach identified different networks of communication. Christin Hansen (Paderborn University) then explored media representations of women in combat during the Spanish Civil War. While women's magazines like *Mujeres Libres* used the war as a space for negotiating gender roles and feminism, Hansen argued that these representations did not challenge gender roles, but rather perpetuated them. In commenting on the two papers, Freeland invited the participants to look more closely at the link between gender and violence and to think of it not just in terms of gender-based violence, but as a mutually reinforcing dynamic that continues from times of armed conflict to periods of peace.

The second panel focused on transnational aspects of feminism and the media, with four speakers examining the role of the media in spreading feminism and ideas of women's emancipation across borders. Marie Cabadi (University of Angers) compared the production of women's newsletters in Belgium, France, and the UK that were circulated by women's centres both nationally and internationally. Cabadi argued that women's newsletters could also be seen as an extension of local feminist spaces, bringing together women from all over the world. Alexandra (Sasha) Talaver (Central European University) and Lea Börgerding (FU Berlin) presented a joint project that compared two socialist women's magazines during the International Women's Year in 1975: *Rabotnitsa* from the Soviet Union and *Für Dich* from the GDR. Talaver and Börgerding argued that both magazines were similarly invested in shaping a vision of the global women's movement by highlighting women's solidarity based on anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism, while delegitimizing and downplaying liberal feminism. Frederik Schulze (University of Cologne) subsequently explored the crucial role of medialization and transnational connections in the history of women during the interwar period in Latin America. Schulze emphasized the need to look beyond feminist media and include political, educational, and scientific publications, as well as mainstream and entertainment media, photographs, movies, and radio in our corpus of sources. In her commentary, Zsófia Lóránd (University of Cambridge) highlighted the role that historiographical work has played in broadening the view

of the 1970s by including the Eastern bloc and internationalist organizations, such as the Women's International Democratic Federation.

The first day of the conference ended with the third and final launch event of the online exhibition 'Forms, Voices, Networks: Feminism and the Media'.[1] The aim of the exhibition, as the curator Maya Caspari (GHIL) highlighted, is to explore the relationship between feminism and the public media in twentieth-century India, Germany, and Britain. The exhibition follows the approach of gender historian Lucy Delap, who in her recent book suggests looking at the history of feminism through the metaphor of a mosaic, because

> like mosaics, feminist coalitions were built up from the bits and pieces available—other movements, committed individuals, actions and ideas. Some mosaics have been long-lived; others have crumbled, and their tiles have been reused, or have disappeared from view.[2]

Rather than attempting to tell a single chronological story, the exhibition adopts this 'mosaic' structure to present a series of snapshots of moments when feminists have mobilized the media in creative ways across often diverse contexts.

The launch event focused on feminism and the radio in Britain and Germany. Kate Lacey (University of Sussex) stressed the importance of the radio, a medium that has often been overlooked by both media and feminist historians. Lacey argued that since its invention, the radio has helped women to find a voice in the public sphere. At the same time, she encouraged us to think of radio not only as a space where women can make their voices heard, but also as a forum for active listening. Lacey further stated that radio's ability to cross not only physical borders and boundaries, but also those of class, age, and disability, allows it to diversify the spaces of feminist media production. Alongside Lacey, the co-founder of FemFM, Caroline Mitchell (University of Sunderland), described radio in the early 1990s as a very male affair. Although already working at radio stations, women were

[1] See [https://feminismandthemedia.co.uk/], accessed 11 Feb. 2022.

[2] Lucy Delap, *Feminisms: A Global History* (London, 2020) 20-1. See also the discussion of this book in the review article 'Tracing the History of Feminisms: Methods, Meanings, and Questions' by Jane Freeland earlier in this issue.

largely invisible at that time. The challenge, Mitchell explained, was to tackle the stereotype that women could not present on air. Combatting this, the collective FemFM did everything themselves—from designing the programme and presenting to marketing and writing jingles. For FemFM, it was important that the voices of women were heard on air.

The second day of the conference began with a panel exploring how the media challenges current periodizations of the history of feminism. Atsuko Sano (University of Tokyo) examined how the use of information and communication technology changes the discourse on reproductive health rights in contemporary Germany and Japan. Sano argued that the introduction of new media has allowed women in both countries to network and share information about abortion and contraception, greatly expanding women's knowledge. Isabel Heinemann (University of Münster) similarly explored the negotiation of women's reproductive rights in 1950s and 1960s Germany. Focusing on women's statements on abortion published in *Stern*, Heinemann challenged the common assumption that the West German women's movement began with the abortion protests of 1971. By choosing mainstream media instead of New Left and feminist journals, Heinemann identified alternative moments of women's politicization. Michalina Augusiak (University of Warsaw) examined the memory politics of the Polish League of Women between 1945 and 1989. After initially renouncing pre-war women's activism as class-exclusionary, Augusiak argued, the state-sponsored organization developed a more favourable account of the history of the Polish women's movement. In her commentary, Hannah Yoken (University of Jyväskylä) pointed out the utility of the wave metaphor when introducing people to the history of women's organizing, while encouraging the participants to think about when it is necessary to problematize and deconstruct periodizations, and for which audiences.

The next panel examined women's political representation in the media. Sharon Omotoso (University of Ibadan) looked at the medialization of corruption and its effects on women's political participation in present-day Nigeria. Although female politicians are usually ignored and downplayed, Omotoso argued that they are typically over-reported when accused of corruption. Therefore, she concluded,

corruption is medialized against women in public office, leading to women being maligned and often bullied out of politics prematurely. Jane Freeland analysed the last years of the East German women's magazine *Für Dich* during German reunification as it moved from an official socialist publication to a commercial venture. *Für Dich* not only provided a space for women's politics and issues in the months leading up to reunification, but also played an important role in portraying the lives of East German women during the transition. Economic circumstances were also crucial in the paper by Dóra Czeferner (Institute of History, Hungarian Academy of Sciences), who analysed the Hungarian feminist press in the early twentieth century. Focusing on *A Nő és a Társadalom* ('Women and Society'), Czeferner traced the development and struggles of early feminist media. The comment by Emily Steinhauer (GHIL) centred on the complex relationship between feminism, politics, and the media. Steinhauer invited the participants to think about medialization in this context as a constant reciprocal process.

The last panel explored the role of the media in drawing attention to women's sexual and reproductive rights. First, Annalisa Martin (Birkbeck, University of London) examined sex worker activism and engagement with the local press in the 1960s and 1970s. By focusing on letters sent to local newspapers, Martin showed that women who sold sex were politically engaged in trying collectively to raise awareness and agitate for change long before the foundation of an organized movement in the 1980s. However, the message of these informal interest groups was mediated and largely framed by journalists. The paper by Inbal Ofer (Open University of Israel) explored the connection between women activists, feminist agendas, and print media in Spain by focusing on the decriminalization of abortion in three mainstream newspapers. Although feminist activists first introduced sexuality and reproductive rights into public debate, Spanish mainstream media viewed medical professionals as more legitimate mediators of these topics. In her presentation, Ofer therefore gave more room to feminist discourse and media practice. The final paper by Jennifer Rodgers (Caltech) dealt with the importance of print media in opening public discursive spaces about childbirth in divided Germany. Rodgers explored how women in both countries mobilized print

media to educate and empower women on their right to bodily autonomy. However, Rodgers focused on underlying questions of race and ethnicity by contrasting the romantic fetishization of Native American birthing practices with the racialization of what were perceived as African birthing practices.

The conference ended with some concluding remarks by Penny Morris (University of Glasgow), who emphasized the interconnectedness of media not only in terms of the relationship between different media forms, but also in terms of the transnational practices of magazines and feminisms. Jane Freeland agreed with Morris that focusing on the media challenges both historical narratives of feminism and the very definition of feminism. The media not only shapes discussions about women's rights, she argued, but also makes them visible, promoting the idea of feminism as a complex mosaic. Christina von Hodenberg took up a question raised on the second day of the conference about the importance of media economics and the market, a topic that deserves further study in the future.

Overall, the conference proved that it is worth taking a closer look at the media, especially for the history of feminism. It further showed that feminist counter-culture and mainstream media cannot be considered separately, but that it is precisely their relationship to each other and the processes of negotiation that challenge common narratives and produce new perspectives. During the two days of the conference, fundamental methodological questions were raised that call for further studies. What are the challenges of working with feminist media? How can we explore the emergence of feminist ideas and the transnational networking of feminist movements while considering their differences, conflicts, and negotiation processes? How do we reflect on the complex and often changing role of media for feminists?

Kassandra Hammel (University of Freiburg)

NOTICEBOARD

Scholarships Awarded by the German Historical Institute London

Each year the GHIL awards a number of research scholarships to German postgraduate and postdoctoral researchers to enable them to carry out research in Britain. The scholarships are generally awarded for a period of up to six months depending on the requirements of the research project. Scholarships are advertised on [www.hsozkult.de] and the GHIL's website. Applications should include a CV, educational background, list of publications (where appropriate), and an outline of the project, along with a supervisor's reference confirming the relevance of the proposed archival research. Please address applications to Dr Stephan Bruhn, German Historical Institute London, 17 Bloomsbury Square, London WC1A 2NJ, or send them by email to stipendium@ghil.ac.uk. **Please note that due to the United Kingdom leaving the EU, new regulations for research stays apply. Please check the scholarship guidelines for further information.** If you have any questions, please contact Dr Stephan Bruhn. German scholars present their projects and the initial results of their research at the GHIL Colloquium.

In the first round of allocations for 2021 the following scholarships were awarded for research on British history, German history, and British–German relations:

Martin Deuerlein (University of Tübingen): Indigenität: Ein zentrales Konzept der Moderne
Almuth Ebke (University of Mannheim): Das Andere der Moderne? Die historisch-kritische Bibelforschung und die 'Einhegung' von Religion, ca. 1860–1920
Andreas Eder (University of Freiburg): False Statements, Illegal Practices und Unwahrheiten: Die Kommunikation der politischen Lüge in Großbritannien und Deutschland 1883–1912

Louisa-Dorothea Gehrke (Leipzig University): Johann Philipp Breyne in den botanischen Gärten Europas: Eine Spurensuche anhand seiner Korrespondenz
Franziska Hermes (FU Berlin): Shipwreck and the British East India Company in the Eighteenth Century
David Irion (LMU Munich): Die Rahmenprogramme der Europäischen Union: Bedeutungsgewinn durch De-Ökonomisierung? (ca. 1980–2002)
Josefine Langer (HU Berlin): Überleben und Schreiben: Eine Verflechtungsgeschichte früher jüdischer Geschichtsschreibung der Shoah, 1945–1961
Marie-Christine Schoel (University of Münster): Installation und Geschlecht: Geschlechtertheoretische Analyse installativer Praxis und deren Verortung in der feministischen Kunst- und Ausstellungsgeschichte anhand von ausgewählten Praxisbeispielen

Prize of the German Historical Institute London

The Prize of the German Historical Institute London is awarded annually for an outstanding Ph.D. thesis on:

- German history (submitted to a British or Irish university),
- British history or British colonial history (submitted to a German university), or
- British–German relations or British–German comparative history (submitted to a British, Irish, or German university).

The Prize is 1,000 euros.

To apply, send one copy of the thesis with

- a one-page abstract,
- examiners' reports on the thesis,
- a brief CV,
- a declaration that the work will not be published before the judges have reached a final decision, and
- a supervisor's reference

to reach the GHIL by 31 July 2022. Applications and theses should be sent by email as a PDF attachment to: prize@ghil.ac.uk.

If the prize-winning thesis is on British history, British colonial history, British–German relations, or British–German comparative

history, it may also be considered for publication in one of the Institute's book series.

The Prize will be presented on the occasion of the GHIL's Annual Lecture on 4 November 2022. For further information, please visit [https://www.ghil.ac.uk/opportunities/prizes].

Forthcoming Workshops and Conferences

Medieval Germany Workshop. International workshop to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 6 May 2022. Conveners: Len Scales (Durham University) and Marcus Meer (GHIL).

This one-day workshop on the history of medieval Germany (broadly defined) will provide an opportunity for researchers in the field from the UK, Continental Europe, and the USA to meet in a relaxed and friendly setting and to learn more about each other's work. Short papers of 10–15 minutes will allow researchers at all career stages with an interest in any aspect of the history of medieval Germany to share their ideas and receive feedback. The participants are therefore encouraged to concentrate on presenting work in progress, highlighting research questions and approaches, and pointing to as yet unresolved challenges of their projects. Eva Schlotheuber (Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf) and Wolfram Drews (University of Münster) will join the workshop as mentors and presenters.

From Cambridge to Bielefeld – and Back? British and Continental Approaches to Intellectual History. Annual conference of the German Association for British Studies, to be held at the Centre for British Studies at the Humboldt University of Berlin, 2–4 June 2022. Conveners: Sina Steglich and Emily Steinhauer (GHIL).

Intellectual history has several points of origin, and the notion of this methodological approach varies depending on its academic context and disciplinary traditions. In the anglophone world, intellectual history is primarily the history of political thought and as such focuses

on specific *political* ideas, having been most prominently reshaped by the protagonists of the famous Cambridge School from the mid twentieth century. In the German context, intellectual history is anchored in both the political sciences and history, and as a result is discussed in two different disciplinary fields. Therefore, the spectrum of intellectual history ranges from political theory to the widened perspective of the history of concepts, which has gained widespread attention and is intrinsically bound to one of its founding fathers, Reinhart Koselleck. In France, by contrast, intellectual history is known as the history of mentalities, and historical 'ideas' are thus explicitly seen as embedded in and shaped by social and cultural conditions. This rather simplistic summary suggests that to speak of intellectual history and to follow this methodological approach is always to move on uncertain ground. The basic—but not banal—questions of 'why', 'how', and 'where' are the starting points of the workshop. It will discuss these 'national' and disciplinary traditions of intellectual history, along with their advantages and challenges, by bringing together scholars from both the British context and the Continental academic world. The confirmed keynote speaker is Professor Richard Bourke (University of Cambridge).

Education and Urban Transformations: Marginalities and Intersections. International conference to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 9–11 June 2022. Organized by the GHIL in co-operation with project partners in India and the Max Weber Forum for South Asian Studies, New Delhi. Conveners: Indra Sengupta (GHIL), Nandini Manjrekar (TISS Mumbai), Geetha B. Nambissan (formerly Jawaharlal Nehru University), Shivali Tukdeo (NIAS Bengaluru), and Sebastian Schwecke (Max Weber Forum, New Delhi).

The conference marks the completion of the current phase of a research collaboration between the India Research Programme of the GHIL, the Max Weber Forum for South Asian Studies, New Delhi (previously known as the MWS India Branch Office), and project partners from three Indian universities and research institutes on the theme of 'Education and the Urban in India'.

In its relatively short lifespan as a domain of academic inquiry, the discipline of urban studies has developed a research trajectory that is built on diverse theoretical grounds and multidisciplinary perspectives. Scholars of educational studies have also begun to engage with changing urban landscapes, an important outcome of which is a research field at the intersection of education and urban studies. This new research frames the urban education dynamic in terms of broad, pluralistic considerations that go beyond exclusively city-centric analysis. It places historical, social, and political factors as essential anchors around which the changes in urban and educational terrains can be understood. A wide range of actors, institutions, and practices occupy important positions in understanding urban issues such as mobility, housing, access, and quality of schools, which have become crucial to appreciating the conditions of living and learning among marginal groups in the urban context. At the conference, we will discuss these issues, which we explored in the project, with international scholars working on these themes in other parts of the world. In particular, the conference will engage with the following themes: nation, citizenship, and urban education; urban restructuring and new marginalities; and resistance, knowledge, and pedagogies.

William Pink (Marquette University) will deliver the keynote lecture. A round table on 'Covid-19, Urban Lives, and Education' is planned.

Violence against Women: Historical and Comparative Perspectives. Workshop to be held at the German Historical Institute, 14–16 July 2022. Organized by the GHIL, the Essen College for Gender Research at the University of Duisburg-Essen, and the Violence and Society Centre at City, University of London, and funded by the Anneliese Maier Research Award from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. Conveners: Christina von Hodenberg and Jane Freeland (GHIL), Sylvia Walby (City, University of London), and Karen Shire (University of Duisburg-Essen).

Bringing together sociologists and historians, this three-day conference explores the relations between gender regimes and gendered violence in Britain and Germany in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries in

a global context. The conference aims to explore the following questions: what does violence against women tell us about the historical development of different societies? What can we learn from history about the circumstances under which such violence changes, and about successful strategies of feminist resistance, coalition-building, and making violence visible? What are the implications of diverse varieties of gender regimes for historical variations or changes in gendered violence? What are the implications of different concepts of violence and of gender for historical and comparative work? What are the diverse forms of feminist responses to and engagement with violence and their implications for reducing it? In asking these questions, the conference seeks to bridge disciplinary divides and develop a greater understanding of violence against women.

Environment and the British Empire. Summer school to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 19–22 July 2022, organized by the India Research Programme of the GHIL. Convener: Indra Sengupta (GHIL).

The summer school is the first to be organized by the India Research Programme of the GHIL. The relationship between imperialism and colonialism and devastating, enduring changes in the global environment is now accepted. This summer school will focus on the British Empire, with particular emphasis on colonial India, in order to examine this relationship. How did the colonial exploitation of natural resources and control of populations through political power and racial ideologies transform the environment? Our experts, the eminent historians Professors David Arnold (University of Warwick) and Neeladri Bhattacharya (Ashoka University), will discuss key questions in the history of environment and empire with students in a lively and engaging atmosphere. While India and South Asia will be the focus of the summer school, examples will also be drawn from other parts of the British Empire, such as Africa and South-East Asia. In addition to the classes, excursions in London will be organized as a part of the programme.

The course is aimed at advanced BA or MA students of history, English, or other related subjects at all German universities. An interest in

the history of the British Empire and its colonies and/or environmental history is desirable. The course is open to students from all German universities. It will be taught in English.

The Politics of Iconoclasm in the Middle Ages. International conference to be held at the German Historical Institute London and the Warburg Institute, in co-operation with the Leibniz Institute for the History and Culture of Eastern Europe (GWZO), in Leipzig, 1–2 September 2022. Conveners: Sarah Griffin (Warburg Institute), Marcus Meer (GHIL), and Len Scales (Durham University).

This conference will bring together scholars of social, cultural, political, and art history whose work touches on the phenomenon of 'iconoclasm', broadly understood as any opposition towards and action against visual matters meant to challenge or indeed support powerful individuals, political structures, social hierarchies, and territorial spaces. Practices of censoring, defacing, erasing, and replacing the visual—whether because it was felt to evoke persons, structures, and claims now deemed objectionable or, by contrast, out of fear that it would undermine a cherished status quo—are understood as versatile communicative weapons deliberately deployed in the sociopolitical conflicts that affected and divided societies in Western and Central Europe in the Middle Ages, *c.*900–1500.

The conference will thus shed light on a previously neglected period that has yet to see its sources analysed and recognized among 'the extraordinarily abundant evidence for the ways in which people of all classes and cultures have responded to images', as David Freedberg argues. It is likely to become clear that in the Middle Ages, too, 'there has always been a direct connection between the status of images and politics', as Bruno Latour highlights; opposition and violence towards visual matters were confined neither to art nor to religion. The conference will therefore add an innovative chapter to the study of art and visual history by showing not just the diversity of behaviour directed against the visual, but also by demonstrating that practices of criticizing, censoring, defacing, erasing, and replacing visual matters were seen not only as representing, but also as

shaping social order in the Middle Ages, too. In this sense, of course, the conference is also a contribution to the medieval history of the political, social, and cultural, where the role of opposition and violence towards visual matters beyond the field of religion has yet to be explored in detail. To study this volatile aspect of medieval society is important not least because current discourses make use of the past to oppose as well as promote the defacement, destruction, or removal of statues, for example.

Things on the Move: Materiality of Objects in Global and Imperial Trajectories, 1700–1900. International conference to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 8–10 September 2022. Organized by the GHIL in co-operation with the Prize Papers Project. Conveners: Indra Sengupta (GHIL), Felix Brahm (University of Hamburg), Christina Beckers, Dagmar Freist, and Lucas Haasis (Prize Papers Project, University of Oldenburg).

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were defined by increased globalization, the growth of empires outside Europe, the emergence of global markets, and the establishment of colonial rule in many parts of the world. As recent scholarship has shown, an amplified movement of people—both voluntary and involuntary—and of objects in space and time was at the very core of these processes. This conference will focus on the movement of material objects and analyse the significance of their mobility in this period of great transformation between the early modern and modern periods.

The conference aims to bring together perspectives from global history and the history of European imperialism and colonialism. By focusing on the global, imperial, and colonial materiality of objects on the move within a common analytical framework, the conference will bring these partly distinct research fields into closer conversation with each other. It will bring together international scholars to discuss the potential of a material history with global scope for investigating connections and exclusions, and for exploring the plurality of cultures, cross-cultural encounters, life processes, and exchange processes in contact zones in different parts of the world. Such a conversation,

developing out of an analysis of material culture, has the potential to challenge grand narratives of globalization or European expansion and perhaps even to break down rigid epochal barriers and allow for a new periodization of world history.

Thyssen Lecture Series

Science, Knowledge, and the Legacy of Empire. The Thyssen Lecture Series to be held at the German Historical Institute London, 2022–25. Organized by the GHIL and the Fritz Thyssen Foundation.

The GHIL is proud to announce a new collaborative lecture series with the Fritz Thyssen Foundation on *Science, Knowledge, and the Legacy of Empire*. The series consists of two lectures a year, in May and October, which will be delivered by distinguished international scholars. Initially given at Bloomsbury Square, each lecture will be repeated at a British university outside Greater London. The series is planned to run for four years, starting in October 2022, and the first speaker is Sumathi Ramaswamy, James B. Duke Distinguished Professor of History, Duke University.

The imperial and colonial contexts in which modern science and scholarship came of age haunt us to this day. Be it the origin of museum collections, the Eurocentrism of history textbooks and academic curricula, or the lack of minority ethnic university staff—the shadows of an imperial past loom large. This lecture series will engage with the field of 'science and empire' and the analytical category of 'colonial knowledge'. Postcolonial studies has long identified 'colonial knowledge' as a hegemonic tool of empire-building. Drawing on this conceptual frame, but also questioning it, we at the GHIL see the production and circulation of knowledge in colonial settings as an unsettled and fractious process that challenged and destabilized colonial state power as often as it supported it. We are interested in examining the relationship between localized sites of knowledge production and wider, inter-imperial, and potentially global networks of circulation. We ask how such forms of circulation affected the nature of knowledge thus produced, and the power relationships that have

long informed our understanding of colonial knowledge and structures of domination and subordination. Most importantly, we are keen to explore the afterlife of colonial knowledge and imperial science in recent, twenty-first century history in Britain, Germany, and beyond. How do imperial legacies shape present-day academia and knowledge production? How are the colonial past, and obligations arising from it, debated today? How do these figure in memory cultures, and what role do they play in political relations within Europe, and in Europe's relations with the non-European world?

First Lecture: Sumathi Ramaswamy, James B. Duke Distinguished Professor of History at Duke University, 'Worlding India', 25 October 2022 at the GHIL and 27 October 2022 at the University of Cardiff.

'Imperialism . . . is an act of geographical violence through which virtually every space in the world is explored, charted, and finally brought under control. For the native, the history of his or her colonial servitude is inaugurated by the loss to an outsider of the local place'. Taking its inspiration from this provocation by the late Edward Said (1990), my paper focuses on a range of modern disciplinary formations which I gloss here as earth sciences, among which I include geology, palaeontology, natural history, and most especially, geography and cartography. I consider how these sciences 'worlded' one specific location on the earth's surface, 'India', as a knowable, calculable, intelligible, and masterable place over the course of two centuries of British colonial rule (Spivak, 1985). I then go on to discuss three 'scenes of world-imagining' that surfaced among inhabitants of the subcontinent in response to this worlding of their (home)land (Wenzel, 2014). I explore how these responses cope with the demands and (dis)enchantments of empire's worlding projects through operations that I characterize as 'geo-reverencing', 'geographies of loss', and 'topographies of plenitude'. As I do so, I draw inspiration from political philosopher Jane Bennett's *The Enchantment of Modern Life* (2001), in which she rightly asks us 'to come to terms as closely as possible with enchanting events and affects residing within or alongside scientific calculation, instrumental reason, secularism, or disciplinary power.' My goal is to show that these contending world imaginings

are not simply 'enchanted' reclamations of a (home)land violently worlded by the disciplinary practices of the dominant colonial project; rather, they demonstrate a 'conflicted intimacy' between science, art, and imagination—between all manner of strategic archaisms and atavisms on the one hand, and the scientific and novel on the other (Terdiman, 1985). This state of conflicted intimacy is what I gloss as 'off-modern', a concept I adapt from Svetlana Boym (2001) to argue that for world-making projects in colonial and postcolonial India, the empire's gift of science is indispensable but inadequate (Chakrabarty, 2000).

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https://www2.ghil.ac.uk/catalogue2/recent_acquisitions.php

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https://www.ghil.ac.uk/publications